MichaelE wrote:
> HeartDoc Andrew, in the Holy Spirit, boldly wrote:
> > MichaelE wrote:
> >
> >
> >
http://www.reddit.com/r/LockdownSkepticism/comments/qmimr7/political_theology_and_covid19_agambens_critique/
> > >
> > >
> > >Political Theology and COVID-19: Agamben’s Critique of Science as a New
> > >“Pandemic Religion”
> > >Guillermo Andrés Duque Silva and Cristina Del Prado Higuera
> > > From the journal Open Theology
> > >
https://doi.org/10.1515/opth-2020-0177
> > >Abstract
> > >The philosopher Giorgio Agamben has reacted to the coronavirus
>crisis in
> > >a way that markedly contrasts with most other positions in contemporary
> > >political philosophy. His position has been described as irrational,
> > >politically incorrect, and unfair toward the victims of COVID-19. In
> > >this article, we delve into the foundations of this peculiar,
> > >pessimistic, and controversial reaction. From Agamben’s conceptual
> > >framework, we will explain how state responses to the COVID-19 crisis
> > >have turned science into a new religion from the dogmas of which
>various
> > >strategies have been developed in order for states to exercise
> > >biopolitical power under theological guises.
> > >
> > >Keywords: state of exception; political theology; COVID-19; sovereignty
> > >1 Introduction
> > >At the beginning of 2020, an important philosophical debate took place
> > >on the COVID-19 crisis. Various contemporary thinkers such as Slavoj
> > >Žižek, Roberto Esposito, and Jean-Luc Nancy put forward their positions
> > >regarding the critical situations then developing. In February 2020,
>the
> > >Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben intervened with a press release
>that
> > >aroused the most relentless criticism from the philosophical community.
> > >The title of the publication: The invention of an epidemic revealed the
> > >critical position that Agamben advanced against the measures that have
> > >been imposed by states within their responses to the health emergency.
> > >In that publication, the renowned philosopher called the state
>responses
> > >to the pandemic crisis “frantic, irrational and completely
>unjustified.”
> > >Agamben questioned why the media and the authorities were making an
> > >effort “to spread a climate of panic, causing a true state of
>exception,
> > >with serious limitations on movements and a suspension of the normal
> > >functioning of living and working conditions in entire regions.” From
> > >Agamben’s perspective, those measurements were totally out of
>proportion
> > >to what, according to him, was simply a typical common flu.
>
> > A coronavirus is simply different from a flu virus whether the latter
> > is either typical or common.
>
> > >A wave of criticism was quickly levied against Agamben and we shall
> > >examine in this article the most important elements thereof. We will
>not
> > >discuss the virus’s destructive capacity since Agamben’s classification
> > >of COVID-19 as “simply flu” falls by itself. What interests us is the
> > >link Agamben makes between the emergence of COVID-19 and what he
> > >conceptualizes as a resultant permanent state of exception.
> > >
> > >Agamben has devoted himself for more than twenty years to the scholarly
> > >study of the state of exception in Western culture. While his study of
> > >the subject began solely on a theoretical and abstract plane, it
> > >suddenly took life before his eyes in the form of the worldwide
>response
> > >to COVID-19. For this reason, quite beyond Agamben’s controversial
> > >position on the lethality of the virus, we are interested in the
> > >argument that the philosopher puts forward about a growing tendency of
> > >states to use the state of exception as a standard paradigm of
> > >government, a propensity of theirs for which the cover given by
>COVID-19
> > >is ideally suited, as he explains in his most recent work.[1]
> > >
> > >This article will fulfill three purposes, arranged into three sections.
> > >First, we will examine Giorgio Agamben’s theoretical proposal of the
> > >state of exception as a dialogue, on the one hand, with the criticisms
> > >received from other philosophers, and, on the other hand, with the
> > >possible applications that this theory would have in concrete
>situations
> > >generated by the COVID-19 crisis. Second, we will analyze the
>conceptual
> > >framework of political theology and economic theology in Giorgio
> > >Agamben’s work, especially that developed in The Kingdom and the Glory:
> > >For a Theological Genealogy of Economy and Government. Finally, we will
> > >put this theory in the context of the health crisis and the question of
> > >the origin and legitimacy of laws and measures that affect social life
> > >in the state of emergency generated by the coronavirus. In Section
>4, we
> > >will draw attention to the scope of the current state of exception
>that,
> > >in the Agambenian theoretical framework, will not be overcome with the
> > >end of the pandemic, in the same way, that it did not begin with it.
> > >
> > >2 Pandemic and homo sacer: Our neighbor has been abolished
> > >The Italian philosopher has attempted to carry further the
>philosophical
> > >project dealing with biopolitics and their underlying genealogical
> > >considerations that was initiated by Michel Foucault. Agamben describes
> > >the contemporary age as a time that manages to materialize the
>diagnosis
> > >that Foucault hinted at in reference to the concept of “biopolitics” in
> > >his last works. The notion of biopolitics has been used to describe the
> > >administration of power in human life as a government paradigm in
> > >Western culture. According to Foucault’s conception of human powers:
> > >these act in two ways:[2] those that boost life or those that end
>it.[3]
> > > From the first perspective, that of the impulse of life, human beings
> > >are, for those in power, simply raw material to be preserved; however,
> > >in the second case, those in power are compelled to exercise mechanisms
> > >that end the life of a part of the population that they administer. The
> > >two visions are complementary because, ultimately, the deaths of some
> > >subjects may serve to protect the lives of others. Giorgio Agamben
> > >revives the concept of biopolitics in order to describe contemporary
> > >society and goes one step further: he focuses his attention on a
> > >pessimistic perspective of biopolitics. Agamben dedicates himself to
> > >understanding the criteria for the administration of death that are
> > >exercised in the history of the West so as to identify biopolitical
> > >patterns in the governments of Western societies, as well as the
>reduced
> > >possibilities of resistance that may emerge in a world that has been
> > >turning into a “gigantic concentration camp.”[4]
> > >
> > > From Agamben’s perspective, the most reprehensible cruelties that have
> > >taken place in the exercise of power in the West, instead of being
> > >exceptional anomalies, constitute instances inherent in the process of
> > >the social construction of modernity.[5] In this way, Giorgio Agamben
> > >interprets Ernst Nolte’s position on Auschwitz: history seems to resist
> > >being left in the past. Indeed, Auschwitz constitutes the obscene
> > >paradigm of the modern that Agamben turns into the founding myth of a
> > >biopolitical era. This paradigm refuses to “remain in the past” and
> > >gives meaning to contemporary forms of government. The Italian follows
> > >the weak but the constant beat of the Musselman [6] of Auschwitz. The
> > >philosopher carries out, in a research program over a decade and
> > >producing six books, a prodigious archaeological excavation of power so
> > >as to identify among its meanings what is the essential core of the
> > >modern, an explanation of the question of “how did we get to
>Auschwitz?”
> > >and through that genealogy journey finds the origins of the concept of
> > >“Nuda Vita.”[7]
> > >
> > >Contemporary life, in the concept of biopolitics proposed by Agamben,
> > >has become a bare life. Life thus conceived is reduced to what is
> > >produced and managed by law. The individuals in a concentration camp
>are
> > >stripped of all rights and political–legal status; their life is
> > >treated, by the agents of power, as matter without human form, naked
> > >life: they are data, figures, biological units that are always
> > >disposable, as opposed to the greater value of the future and the
> > >preservation, paradoxically, of other lives.[8] Under the rule
>exercised
> > >by the agents of power, Nuda Vita, according to Agamben, gives rise to
> > >the pauperization of human life in general. Among the concentration
>camp
> > >subjects, Agamben focuses on two figures; the Musselman, on the one
> > >hand, represents the most powerless figure in the concentration camp.
> > >Resigned to dying, he is engulfed in humiliation, fear, and horror. On
> > >the other hand, there is the homo sacer, who lives trapped in the
>middle
> > >of an incongruity; on the one hand, he bears the burden of a crime, but
> > >he is legally unsacrifiable. That is, it is forbidden to subject him to
> > >death at the same time that he has to live knowing that others are
> > >allowed impunity if they kill him.[9] Agamben advances and relates the
> > >nuda vita and the homo sacer as metaphors of modern life and the
> > >concentration camp as its paradigm. In this regard, Múnera and
>Benavides
> > >indicate that:
> > >
> > >Bared life [as life for death] is not the simple natural life, but a
> > >politically unprotected life, permanently exposed to death or the
> > >humiliations caused, with total impunity, by the sovereign power or by
> > >those who compose it as citizens.[10]
> > >
> > >It is inevitable to compare Agamben’s bare life concept with his
> > >statements about the disease and the states of emergency that COVID-19
> > >has generated.
> > >
> > >In particular, the intergenerational differences that are promoted in
> > >defense of general well-being are striking. All, but particularly the
> > >older generations, have experienced, in a certain way, being locked
>in a
> > >politically unprotected life, permanently exposed to death. The older
> > >adult has become a Musselman of the twenty-first century, resigned to
> > >death but while being unsacrifiable. His death is an expected result
> > >that, however, is not directly ordered. The death is, in this case,
> > >expected as a natural result of the isolation offered, in European
> > >nursing homes, for instance. His death is considered a natural and
> > >inevitable result. The fact that consideration of the option of
>saving a
> > >patient with a ventilator leans naturally to a question as to who
>“has a
> > >whole life ahead of him,” at no time admits the other option of
> > >considering that choice as a criminal act in respect of other patients
> > >not so saved, puts us face to face with biopower. If the meaning of
>that
> > >choice seems justifiably natural, it is because in that
>normalization of
> > >horror lies the essence of the administration of power in the
> > >contemporary age, a power that conserves one life and ends another.
>This
> > >is the meaning of the criticism that Agamben makes of the health
> > >emergency’s political background, which not only affects the elderly as
> > >Musselman of the XXI century but, in general, is directed at all
> > >individuals of Western civilization destined to become a contemporary
> > >homo sacer. For Agamben, the message that sustains the biopolitics of
> > >COVID-19 is based on the promotion of horror: the governmental machine
> > >tells us that “our neighbour has been abolished.”[11]
> > >
> > >To analyze how life in the West has been transformed into a simple
>naked
> > >life due to the pandemic, we have systematically studied all of Giorgio
> > >Agamben’s discourse on the health emergency and the changes that are
> > >taking place in some Western democracies. After studying the sixteen
> > >chapters of the book A che punto siamo? L´epidemia come politica we
>have
> > >come upon an interesting finding: not only can it be verified that we
> > >live in a permanent state of exception, as Agamben presented in his
> > >research, but the pandemic has created a particular religious need to
> > >which the church cannot respond, but to which science can. That is, in
> > >the pandemic crisis science has become the new religion and takes from
> > >religion its forms and strategies of governing life, all the while
>using
> > >scientific arguments.
> > >
> > >The author presented his arguments in the face of the COVID-19 crisis,
> > >as quarantines and restrictions on movement were being put into
>place in
> > >Europe, being presented as the most plausible means of handling the
> > >peaks of contagion during 2020. In our study, we have identified that
> > >the progression of Agamben’s argument follows three basic stages, the
> > >first of which is present in his February 2020 publications. Here we
>can
> > >identify the notion of a fear of contagion as a key element.
> > >
> > >The central idea raised by Agamben indicates that the management of the
> > >COVID-19 crisis has generated “a perverse vicious circle: the
>limitation
> > >of freedom imposed by governments is accepted in the name of a desire
> > >for security that has been induced by governments themselves, the same
> > >governments that are now intervening in order to satisfy that
> > >desire.”[12] In this sense, this fear of contagion forms the
>fundamental
> > >basis of a new form of the traditional transaction between protection
> > >and obedience that has characterized the relationships between modern
> > >states and their citizens.
> > >
> > >In his March 11 publication, at one of the most critical moments of the
> > >pandemic, Agamben explains that the fear of contagion has made citizens
> > >accept unprecedented restrictions on their freedoms, fuelled by the
> > >uncertainty generated by not being able to identify materially the
> > >source of risk and harm. The second group of arguments follows from the
> > >previous ones and supposes the transition from collective fear to
> > >individual isolation, with the deterioration in human relationships
>that
> > >this produces. These two elements, collective fear and individual
> > >isolation, support the third argument, which leads to the
>culmination of
> > >Agamben´s criticism of governments. More specifically, in Riflessioni
> > >sulla pestee the author claims that the pandemic has reactivated a need
> > >for religion that the church cannot satisfy. This demand for
>religiosity
> > >is met today by what we refer to as science.
> > >
> > >In summary, beyond confirming that we live in a permanent state of
> > >exception, the interesting finding that we would like to highlight is
> > >the emergence of a need for religion that the Church can no longer
> > >satisfy but that science can, even if only through theological
> > >strategies of government.
> > >
> > >Agamben describes the theological form of science as a new religion
>made
> > >evident through a discourse disseminated via the media that combines
> > >religiosity with science. The author affirms that the obsessive appeal,
> > >“especially in the American press, to the word ‘apocalypse’ and to the
> > >end of the world is an indication of this.”[13] However, blind faith in
> > >science is not only evident in the media’s discourse, but is also
> > >transferred to politics and decision making, that is, to the terrain of
> > >sovereignty. The decisions that promote life or end it in the
>context of
> > >the pandemic have been supported by scientific reasons that are
> > >sometimes contradictory. This reveals to us a science of differing
> > >opinions and prescriptions that range “from the heretical minority
> > >position (also represented by prestigious scientists) of those who deny
> > >the seriousness of the phenomenon to those within the mainstream
> > >orthodox discourse who affirm it and yet radically diverge among
> > >themselves in their opinions on how to deal with the pandemic.”[14]
> > >
> > >Contrary to what the essence of science would indicate, some experts
>(or
> > >some self-defined as such) act like governmental commissioners to
>define
> > >how life is to be promoted or ended. This situation is similar to that
> > >of a religious conflict, where the role of experts is not always to
> > >reach the best solution but rather “to ensure the favor of the monarch,
> > >who at the time of the past religious disputes that divided
> > >Christianity, took sides according to his interests with one current or
> > >another and imposed his solutions.”[15] In other words, this new
> > >“science” of religion comes interweaved with a new biopolitical
> > >government relying on theological strategies. In this article, we will
> > >analyze arguments that explain this change based on Agamben’s work,
> > >mainly his genealogy of sovereignty in his work Il regno e la gloria.
> > >
> > >It is indispensable to compare Agamben’s bare life concept with his
> > >statements about the disease and the states of emergency that COVID-19
> > >has generated. In particular, the intergenerational differences that
>are
> > >promoted in defense of general societal well-being are striking. All,
> > >but particularly the older generations, have experienced, in a certain
> > >way, being locked into a politically unprotected life, permanently
> > >exposed to death. The older adult has become a Musselman of the
> > >twenty-first century, resigned to death, while being unsacrifiable. His
> > >death is an expected result that, however, is not directly ordered. The
> > >death is, in this case, expected as a natural result of the isolation
> > >they offer, in Europe, for instance, in nursing homes. His death is
> > >considered a natural and inevitable result. The fact that the choice
> > >between saving a young patient with a ventilator leans naturally to who
> > >“has a whole life ahead of him,” at no time admits the option of
> > >considering it as a criminal act, puts us face to face with
>biopower. If
> > >the meaning of that choice tends to naturalize, it is because in that
> > >normalization of horror lies the essence of the administration of power
> > >in the contemporary age, a power that drives one life and ends another.
> > >This is the meaning of the criticism that Agamben makes of the health
> > >emergency’s political background, which not only affects the elderly as
> > >Musselman of the XXI century but, in general, is directed at all
> > >individuals of Western civilization destined to become a contemporary
> > >homo sacer. For Agamben, the message that sustains the biopolitics of
> > >COVID-19 is based on the promotion of horror: the governmental machine
> > >tells us that “our neighbor has been abolished.”[16]
> > >
> > >The sovereignty exercised by the governmental powers in this
> > >interpretation by Agamben does not require greater legitimacy than the
> > >very fact of being able to dispose of the lives of subjects. That is,
> > >the decisions of government agents are considered legitimate “by the
> > >simple fact of their sovereignty.”[17] This is what grounds as legal
>and
> > >legitimate the sovereign decision of the attribution of the ventilator
> > >referred to above, where reasons may be given or not since the symptom
> > >and the expression of sovereignty do not need reasons in order to be
> > >exercised.
> > >
> > >For Agamben, where this sovereignty is developed is closely related to
> > >the duality between normality and exception that Carl Schmitt raised;
> > >however, it breaks the dichotomous scheme that characterized
> > >Plettenberg’s jurist. Agamben indicates that the sovereign is not the
> > >one who decides in and on the state of exception but rather is the one
> > >capable of maintaining exceptional actions as an area subject to his
> > >control and presenting them as standard actions. Thus, to the old
>logic:
> > >normality – exception – new normality that we would long for with
> > >Schmitt’s scheme, Agamben proposes a notion of permanent
>exceptionality.
> > >If Carl Schmitt went so far as to affirm that “the sovereign is at the
> > >same time, outside and inside the legal order”[18] for his ability to
> > >suspend normality with the declaration of a state of exception and
> > >reinstitute a new legal order, Giorgio Agamben goes one step
>further: He
> > >affirms that his sovereign acts under a self-justifying imperative,
> > >which indicates: “the law is outside itself, and I, the sovereign, who
> > >am outside the law, declare that there is no outside the law.”[19]
> > >
> > >While in the Schmittian approach, exceptionality and sovereignty are
> > >attributes of the political struggle,[20] in Agamben, the place of
>power
> > >and its exercise are transcendent to political groups and actors.
> > >Authority and administration are expressed from a permanent
> > >exceptionality. For that reason, the sovereignty in Agamben is a place,
> > >not a specific actor. The government is a verb rather than a noun. So,
> > >while the sovereign for Schmitt may be a political party, a monarch, a
> > >populist leader, or even, in its last stage, a guerrilla group that
> > >decides in and on the state of exception, for Agamben, that role is the
> > >experience of governing, not a specific social actor.[21] That is,
>it is
> > >not the result of a specific decision-maker but of the social and legal
> > >order that has been built in the West.[22] This form of exceptionality
> > >is expressed permanently, without breaks or claims of new normalities.
> > >For Agamben, sovereignty and the right that emanates from it do not
> > >arise from the pauses of exceptionality that Schmitt proposes because,
> > >in the contemporary West, there is nothing more normal than living in a
> > >permanent state of exception. In other words, the state of exception in
> > >Giorgio Agamben’s thought is not characterized by its abnormality and
> > >contingency, and it is not explained in terms of “normality to come,”
> > >but instead by its permanence, which is why it is, in most cases, an
> > >imperceptible exceptionality.[23]
> > >
> > >Although the approach to a permanent state of exception places the
> > >COVID-19 crisis in a broad panorama, the criticisms received by another
> > >biopolitics researcher, Roberto Esposito, reflect that it is still too
> > >early to see beyond the “death toll,” as Agamben urges. It is not yet
> > >time to analyze the qualitative effect that the decision to quarantine
> > >humanity and its freedoms will leave in the long term. Specifically,
> > >Esposito indicates to Agamben that the comparison between spending a
>few
> > >days in isolation in a comfortable Italian middle-class house and the
> > >horror of a concentration camp is implausible and irresponsible.[24]
> > >Esposito is right. However, we should add to his reply that the way
> > >COVID-19 restrictions are assumed is not the same in regions of the
> > >world where, for example, washing hands with soap and water has been a
> > >luxury for centuries. So, Esposito seems to lose sight of the fact that
> > >the exceptional is not dictated by the circumstances in which isolation
> > >is assumed but comes from how we internalize in customs what should not
> > >under any circumstances be accepted.[25] For example, we have
> > >incorporated as something “normal” that enormous regions of the world
> > >live under the quarantine imposed by hunger and misery. Agamben reminds
> > >us that the genuine plague is none other than the meekness with
>which we
> > >accept to live with exceptional and reprehensible situations.[26]
> > >Finally, this “normalization of the exceptional” is a consequence of
> > >sovereignty in the biopolitical era and the permanent state of
> > >exception, and the emergence of COVID-19 is settling into it, like its
> > >most advanced chapter.
> > >
> > >3 COVID-19 and democracy: A people that can reign but not govern
> > >Many of the criticisms that Agamben received sought to label him as
>part
> > >of the “conspiracy theorist paranoiacs” who assign to the states and
>the
> > >capitalist elites the responsibility of having spread fear amongst
> > >citizens when, in fact, capitalism and its government elites have been
> > >highly affected by the crisis capitalism and its government elites have
> > >been the main affected by the crisis. Žižek’s criticism of Agamben, for
> > >example, questioned the benefit that the state of emergency could bring
> > >to governments and capitalist elites because, in the end, the emergency
> > >has accentuated, on the one hand, general distrust in the governments
> > >and, on the other hand, an unprecedented economic crisis. Žižek asks
> > >Agamben: what elite would be interested in promoting such a movement
> > >against their interests? The answer in favor of Agamben to this
>question
> > >can be found in the criticism that Paolo Flores d’Arcais made of
>Agamben
> > >in MicroMega. For Flores d’Arcais, COVID-19 has not strengthened the
> > >state or capital’s power. This position coincides with that of Žižek.
> > >However, the pandemic has been characterized by the appearance of a new
> > >“conspiracy of white coats”: doctors and scientists who appear today as
> > >depositaries of the “last word” in government on the lives of its
> > >citizens. According to Flores d’Arcais, this is/represents a power more
> > >significant than the interests of governments and capital.[27]
> > >
> > >If we focus on the way decisions are made in the COVID-19 state of
> > >exception, and in the Agambenian theoretical framework, we will see
>that
> > >governments rely on the medical-scientific argument to justify their
> > >decisions with two benefits to them, such administrators; on the one
> > >hand, they avoid the need to submit their proposals to the demanding
> > >deliberation of democratic systems and, on the other hand – with that
> > >shortcut and delegation to the scientists – the governments exempt from
> > >their original responsibilities; as simple “operators” of a scientific
> > >decision that, after all, is alien to them. So, that last decision of
> > >the “white coats” to which Flores d’Arcais refers is not taken in some
> > >way above the governments themselves but is instead used by the latter
> > >as an argument of authority that operates theologically. If we consider
> > >the theological background in which the scientific decisions that
> > >subsequently sustain government actions arise, we see a correlation
> > >between earthly government authorities and “scientific sovereignty.”
> > >This self-power justifies coercive decisions under the irrefutable halo
> > >that medicine offers. In the long term, contrary to what Žižek says,
> > >those measures that in principle seem to affect capital and the states
> > >will strengthen them notably, since the exceptional will become
>routine,
> > >in an accelerated way and with a high democratic cost that will be
> > >difficult to recover. In the end, with the irrefutable and self-imposed
> > >argument of “medical reason,” the governments that have sustained the
> > >temporary suspension of the legal order will have been able to justify
> > >unprecedented control over the individual and society to protect them
> > >from an unprecedented danger. In summary, by dint of the
> > >medical–political duality, in the crisis of COVID-19, a contemporary
> > >version of the theological–political duality that Agamben studied is
> > >forged to explain that who governs, in the occidental democracies is
> > >that power capable of converting the state of exception into order, and
> > >the world – into a gigantic “concentration camp.” Seen like this, the
> > >relationship between theology and politics that can be established in
> > >the decisions taken to contain COVID-19, coming from Agamben, does not
> > >correspond in any way with a conspiratorial agenda.
> > >
> > >In Agamben’s viewpoint, the world configured as a concentration camp
> > >predates COVID-19; in fact, it is as old as Western societies’ very
> > >formation. How does Agamben explain why we got to this point? Agamben
> > >considers that the West’s history is the history of creating a bipolar
> > >biopolitical “governmental machine” that operates theologically on
>human
> > >lives, despite having eliminated the need to sustain its actions in
>some
> > >essence or primary political substance: the machinery of government
>that
> > >does not need to refer to a divine foundation and, nevertheless, is
> > >always presented as a sacred institution.[28]
> > >
> > >The biopolitical government is clothed with celestial majesty without
> > >properly a divine substance from which its authority emanates. In Il
> > >regno e la gloria, Agamben performs a genealogical exercise of modern
> > >government. He explains the emergence of this governmental machine,
> > >moving back to the Judeo-Christian theological origins. This
> > >genealogical development is highly relevant for understanding Agamben’s
> > >criticism of the global state of exception that has unleashed through
> > >COVID-19. Agamben’s research allows us to understand that modern
>Western
> > >culture has built a type of government that can dispense with the need
> > >to refer its decisions to a fundamental, essential, and superior power
> > >and, even so, operate under theological principles. The modern
> > >understood in this way does not presuppose, much less arise from, the
> > >rupture between substance and form, nor the separation between
> > >auctoritas and potestas. Rather, the modern invokes the discovery of an
> > >absent, immobile divine power, whose sacredness depends not on itself,
> > >but on the glorification of those who, without being God, have assumed
> > >the management of its praxis on earth.
> > >
> > >In modern government the providential and scientific levels?–?that of
> > >power and that of authority–make up two poles that cooperate: they
> > >maintain the place of the sacred as an empty throne, that is, without a
> > >specific substance and, at the same time, they preserve the sacredness
> > >in the management rites that, “in the name of the sacred,” are carried
> > >out by angels, ministers, shepherds, saints for each prayer and, in
> > >general, all the bureaucratic machinery responsible for religious
> > >praxis. To reach this conclusion, Agamben faces the task of creating a
> > >genealogy of government, similar to that carried out by Foucault while
> > >going beyond Foucault’s work. Concurrently, the French philosopher
>finds
> > >in the pastoral work of the first two centuries of Christianity the
> > >authentically modern moment that found the birth of political power in
> > >the theological contamination of the human government’s world. Let us
> > >remember that for Foucault, this moment is characterized by
>transforming
> > >power into a properly human management attribute, that is, detached
>from
> > >transcendental sovereignty. Modern political power, that is, the
> > >capacity to provide security, administration, and management to the
> > >state, would be born, in Foucault’s perspective, from that pastoral
> > >power, in essence, private, and oriented to the economic technique that
> > >the priests and first Christian leaders carried out on their flock and
> > >over each one his “sheeps.”[29] For his part, in various theological
> > >treatises, Agamben analyzes how the political is also present in the
> > >origins of Jewish and Christian religious dogmatic discourses. Agamben
> > >explains, for example, that the term oikonomia, which characterizes the
> > >first private management of the “pater familias,” not only has the
> > >political implications that we know today in the states but also had
>and
> > >has profound theological implications to which Foucault did not pay
> > >enough attention. Thus, the domestic administration to which modern
> > >oikonomia refers is part of both the theological and the political.[30]
> > >For example, the Holy Trinity expresses a form of political management
> > >of the world; the economy is applied as an internal articulation that
> > >favors its praxis. Due to the internal connection that the three
> > >elements that compose it are unity and, at the same time, plurality of
> > >actions; here, the economy not only acts as a metaphor, of the modern
> > >separation of the legislative, executive, and judicial powers – as
> > >Foucault indicated – but they constitute – according to Agamben – its
> > >historical origin since it took place first in theology and later in
> > >politics.[31] In summary, through an analysis of theological treatises,
> > >which are in themselves an invaluable finding,[32] Agamben
>overcomes, on
> > >the one hand, the causal link between theology and politics and, on the
> > >other hand, questions the overvalued secularization of present
> > >theological concepts, for example, those of Carl Schmitt. For Agamben,
> > >theology is at the base of politics in the same way that politics
>was at
> > >the base of theology from its origins. The problematic issue has been
> > >that the bureaucratic apparatus of “domestic administrators,” those who
> > >today issue movement restriction orders, for example, has evolved to
>the
> > >current forms of absolute control over a social life, without the
> > >substance or foundation of those measures coming from absolute power.
> > >
> > >Although Agamben refers to ancient theological texts, he argues that
> > >these texts have implications for understanding the current political
> > >decline, the tendency to authoritarianism, and the crisis of liberal
> > >democracies. He considers that the contemporary era is characterized by
> > >the total triumph of life’s economic government in all its dimensions.
> > >With his genealogy, Agamben shows that life’s objectification as an
> > >administrable good has not always been the prevailing paradigm. On the
> > >contrary, Agamben explains that the birth of the modern perspective on
> > >power is located precisely in the separation between two paradigms and
> > >the subsequent autonomy of one over the other: political theology and
> > >economic theology. In the first, God’s will is the origin of sovereign
> > >power; that is, where the divine plan of salvation resides in the
> > >Judeo-Christian culture. In the second, both God’s and human life are
> > >manageable matter: objects of an economy of life administered by
>experts
> > >and authorities authorized to resolve human vicissitudes.[33] In God’s
> > >figure, political theology found the symbol of sovereign power, and
> > >economic theology substitutes the said transcendence with the idea
>of an
> > >oikonomia conceived as an immanent order.[34] The contemporary
>political
> > >crisis, the one that has led to the creation of this gigantic
> > >concentration camp, exacerbated by COVID-19, would be based on the fact
> > >that political theology has lost almost all ground to economic
>theology,
> > >a field of power that acquires independence and that does not need
>to be
> > >justified in the will of God, that is in, authentic and transcendent
> > >power, to rule. In this fracture between God and his praxis, Agamben
> > >identifies the emergence of the “western governmental machine,” a
> > >bipolar machine that separates God’s omnipotence from the world’s
> > >rational government, that is, absolute power, from its worldly
>exercise.
> > >
> > >To better explain the above, Agamben analyzes the motto of
> > >constitutional monarchies with which kingdom and government differ,
>thus
> > >graphically describing his finding of the fracture of God: in the same
> > >way that “the king reigns, but does not rule,” God reigns, but does not
> > >rule in modern societies of the Judeo-Christian tradition. Economic
> > >theology gains greater independence as the field of government is
> > >abrogated, sustaining its exclusivity overall “that which God cannot
> > >do,” that field between the challenges of day-to-day human life and the
> > >mystery of divine truth, “becomes in the paradigm of the distinction
> > >between power and its exercise, between kingdom and government.”[35]
> > >
> > >This division presents us with a powerless God before his creation
>since
> > >“he can only act through the natural order that he has
>established.”[36]
> > >He can do everything, but he cannot do anything that is not an
>automatic
> > >response to his wisdom and to the logic of the order that he has
> > >established. A God powerless in the face of the daily demands of his
> > >creature since his logic does not belong to the world of the contingent
> > >but of the transcendent. For its part, in the human world, changing and
> > >unpredictable, everything is manageable from the understanding between
> > >humans; that is why this is a world that fits the possibility of
> > >government. Through a journey between primitive and medieval Christian
> > >texts, Agamben argues that modern government is present to administer
> > >the intermediate space between the particular and unpredictable events
> > >of men and the general providence or absolute power of God. The
> > >decisions of the men who govern that terrain will tend to apply general
> > >providence to the situations they live, making a calculation,
>ultimately
> > >an interpretation, of their decisions regarding the unknown plan of
> > >salvation. In Agamben’s words, the first rulers of modern oikonomy
> > >“would assume an idea of an order founded on the contingent play of
> > >immanent effects.”[37]
> > >
> > >This distinction between the divine, inaccessible, and incomprehensible
> > >realm and human government may find an application in the case of the
> > >coronavirus crisis. The truth about the origin and ultimate solution to
> > >the pandemic seems to escape our frame of thought. Beyond the hope of a
> > >vaccine, comprehensive knowledge about the COVID-19 phenomenon seems to
> > >be sheltered in a place that is alien to us, before which we have left
> > >only the interpretations and improvisations of human management. For
> > >this reason, Jean-Luc Nancy’s criticism of Agamben, in which he replies
> > >to the Italian philosopher that the experience we are living is a
>“viral
> > >exception and not a political–legal exception.”[38] Nancy’s
> > >differentiation reflects the duality between earthly management and the
> > >mysterious core of power that Agamben describes in Il regno e la
>gloria.
> > >In the distinction made by Nancy in his question to Agamben, a current
> > >application of the difference between kingdom and government is
> > >installing itself, a reflection of our natural inability to access the
> > >origin of the problem, in such a way that we seek for the unknown,
> > >stratagems and euphemisms such as that of the “viral exception,” behind
> > >which we hide our impotence in the face of a problem that surpasses us
> > >in understanding and control. It is certainly not truly clear what
>Nancy
> > >means by a “viral exception” and how it differs from a political–legal
> > >exception. What is clear is that, since we are not, as humanity,
>capable
> > >of accessing a transcendent power to handle the problem of COVID-19
>with
> > >that power’s full knowledge, we use restrictions on liberties like the
> > >exact measures of the imperfect world of government that we have built.
> > >Only that explains the response to the crisis through quarantines and
> > >impositions of authority that have not changed focus since the pest
> > >control we did centuries ago, for example, to the Spanish flu. To this
> > >same economic management of life belong, in fact, categories such as
> > >Nancy’s, related to a supposed “viral exception,” since with them an
> > >attempt is made to provide a mysterious legitimacy to the old and
> > >precious political–legal shackles of the West. In summary, if the state
> > >of exception in which we live has been based on the management of
> > >calculations and interpretations of a transcendent power that is
> > >inaccessible to us, then the contingent games of immanent effects that
> > >we create around emergencies such as COVID-19, and not only in it,[39]
> > >deserve questioning.
> > >
> > >4 Promises of glorification
> > >The Agambenian genealogy takes an unexpected and provocative turn when,
> > >in the second part of The Kingdom and the Glory, the Italian
>philosopher
> > >asks himself about the bureaucratic circle closest to the power of God;
> > >the Angels. He wonders: what happens to them and their functional
> > >specialization when doomsday arrives? The question is posed to the
> > >theological tradition. However, the answer is found in the Heideggerian
> > >ontology: according to Agamben, the angels who, in principle, would not
> > >fulfill more functions than to satisfy the demands of humanity, would
> > >remain limited to performing their most essential function. That is:
> > >glorify God, keeping him isolated for his glory. What a paradox that
> > >Agamben discovers; not even a hypothetical day of judgment would break
> > >the logic of the government machine’s bipolarity by revealing the
> > >absolute power of God. This paradox has implications in the current
> > >coronavirus crisis and in the proposals for an alternate world to be
> > >built.[40] With a hypothetical end of the world, the place of absolute
> > >power would continue to be isolated by its splendor and by the acclaim
> > >that the angels would do around and about it. From an imperfect
> > >humankind point of view, this separation from the core-power would
> > >reveal that pure power ever is, in essence, an empty place, a nothing
> > >that to “be power” needs the glorification of the angels at the end of
> > >the world, such as his earthly stewards did during normal times. Glory
> > >is, consequently for Agamben, the essence of the concept of the
> > >political that affects the supreme power of God in a different way than
> > >what it can do over men since it contains a correlation: on the one
> > >hand, God depends on the glory and glory of God and, on the other hand,
> > >glory becomes glory only through glorification. That is to say, the
>only
> > >sure thing, consequently, is that the human power resides in those who
> > >can glorify the sacred and mysterious nucleus. In other words, Agamben
> > >identifies that the power of the western governmental machine, the one
> > >that has acquired current absolute dominance over social and individual
> > >life, is sustained by the constant ovation and acclaim of men
>themselves
> > >in order for it to exist.[41] In summary, the purest elemental power is
> > >an empty nucleus surrounded by the veil of Glory. That veil, on the one
> > >hand, glorifies it; that is, it elevates Glory to the place of absolute
> > >power and, on the other hand, hides such pure power from humanity under
> > >a halo of mystery. Agamben transfers this theological metaphor to the
> > >level of the individual. The humankind without politics is like that
> > >God, in essence, innocuous and isolated, described by Agamben as a
>being
> > >at rest, immobile and oblivious to the tasks of government, his life
> > >acquires a meaning when he is surrounded by Glory, at the same time
>that
> > >it becomes his condemnation: he leads him to pursue, through politics,
> > >utopias that, as such, are inaccessible; like promises about a kingdom
> > >that, written with strokes of glorification, mark our political
> > >identities with their indelible stamp.
> > >
> > >For Agamben, the inaction of Glory brings together what we call
> > >politics: it surrounds the simplicity of the human species, its natural
> > >condition of lack of identity is overcome thanks to it. Politics
> > >understood as Glory provides us with a purpose that, although it is
> > >devoid of divine purity, justifies the absolute control over life as,
> > >after all, our purpose. It could be said that theology and politics
>live
> > >in the prelude to an “empty throne.” To build that anteroom full of
> > >government mechanisms while simultaneously glorifying the inaccessible
> > >sacred is the purpose of modern politics.
> > >
> > >In conclusion, Glory as inaction unites the sacred and the profane
>gives
> > >rise to the political as a meaning imposed on biological life. At
> > >present, in Western culture the hegemonic power of Glory is expressed,
> > >for example, in what we know under the name of “public opinion,” which
> > >is constructed by the media, the social networks, and, in general, by
> > >the mass media. The force of this public opinion hides an empty center
> > >of truth that, despite its emptiness, rules over dissenting positions:
> > >it does not possess pure truths and, nevertheless, its inertia affects
> > >all political positions, even the best-supported ones, in such a way
> > >that consistently tend to conform to it as a paradigm of “politically
> > >correct.” The politicians’ or governmental agencies’ extreme
>sensitivity
> > >to public opinion leads them to approach these views as more pressing
> > >and deserving of justice.
> > >
> > >Agamben questions the “pseudoscientific” claims of the approaches that
> > >try to name, explain, and deify Glory. On the one hand, he questions
> > >Habermas, who proposes certain idolatry in the search for consensus as
> > >an “achieved utopia” of institutional channeling of sovereignty.[42]
> > >According to Habermas, the public sphere and deliberation refer to the
> > >pole of government. However, for Agamben, this is only one of the
>modern
> > >forms that the old glorifying acclaim of modern oikonomy acquires. On
> > >the other hand, he questions the power of the decision legitimized by a
> > >“cheering people” that Schmitt exalts as sovereign in Constitutional
> > >Theory; the acclamation of the demos around the ruler is just the other
> > >pole of glorification, according to Agamben. [43] Both Habermas and
> > >Schmitt try to impose a statute of logic and divinity on what, for
> > >Agamben, is an inaccessible substance. Deliberation and decision are
> > >nothing more than liturgical spectacles, two euphemistic artifacts
> > >created by man to explain what has no explanation; to place in the
>place
> > >of the “empty throne” that we described before, a role of authority
>that
> > >does not belong to them and to present them as the “discovered” origins
> > >of the power of governments. The truth, according to Agamben, is that
> > >the origin of a general acceptance of laws that, for example, define
>the
> > >life or death of thousands of people is unknown; what makes such a law
> > >an obligation accepted by the citizenry does not arise from debate or
> > >prior deliberation or from the simple fact of deciding. Deliberation
>and
> > >decision are parts of an economy of power that do not constitute
> > >transcendent sovereign power since there is nothing so rational and
> > >indisputable within a decision or deliberation that can explain the
> > >general acceptance of orders that define who lives and who does not.
> > >
> > >Slavoj Žižek’s proposal regarding a humanistic emergence from which
> > >“true communism” would result does not stop attracting attention; in
> > >some way, it would adjust to one of the possible answers Agamben
> > >analyzes about the hypothetical apocalyptic situation. We should ask
> > >Žižek more than Agamben if the proposal of a “post-covid communism”[44]
> > >is not another accommodation of modern oikonomia to maintain the
> > >original divide between kingdom and government? Wouldn’t this new
> > >communism be another form of glorification?
> > >
> > >It is possible to find ourselves in front of another “mirage of
> > >divinity,” another earthly “performance” such as that of Habermarsian
> > >deliberation and Schmittian decisionism. It must be said that Agamben
> > >does not offer an alternative to lockdowns and quarantines, beyond
> > >criticizing the coercive response and warning of the totalitarian risk
> > >that the crisis and the state of emergency is generating. It is not
> > >clear that there really is an alternative proposed by Agamben to handle
> > >the pandemic without it being also a biopolitical response. The
> > >so-called herd immunity strategy, for example, or the actions that seek
> > >to save the economy are also responses coming from the government
> > >regarding people’s lives. Agamben’s argument does not suppose a miracle
> > >solution with regard to the public management of COVID-19, it is simply
> > >a warning that governments are taking advantage of the state of
> > >exception to replace constitutional rights and to self-abrogate an
> > >authority that goes beyond what is allowed by law.
> > >
> > >5 Conclusion
> > >When Agamben indicates that States’ response to COVID-19 is
> > >disproportionate, he does so from an understanding and from
>genealogical
> > >knowledge of the processes of government; it is not resulting from a
> > >conspiracy theorist-paranoid or irrational approach. From that
> > >perspective, governments’ authoritarian attributions are only the most
> > >recent radicalization of the forms of absolute domination over social
> > >life that has characterized Western culture since its origins.
> > >
> > >For Agamben, modern biopolitics is expressed in the crisis of how
> > >COVID-19 reinforces a status of obligational? Control over human life
> > >grounded on in-determinacy and un-founded power. This indeterminacy of
> > >the “place” and foundation of power is more aggressive concerning the
> > >control that can be exercised, for example, in concrete forms of
> > >government such as “totalitarianism” or “dictatorship.” The state of
> > >exception that we experience is presented as a “threshold of
> > >indeterminacy between democracy and absolutism,”[45] as Agamben has
> > >proposed for decades. The West, according to Agamben, has built a state
> > >of exception that “is not a dictatorship, but a vacuum space of law.
> > >That is a zone of anomie in which all legal determinations are
> > >deactivating.”[46] As a result of perverse and “intimate solidarity
> > >between democracy and totalitarianism.”[47] So, the state of exception
> > >generated by COVID-19 is just the continuity of that order.
> > >
> > >Agamben has been wrong on one point: COVID-19 is not a regular flu: it
> > >has been the “most important of all the flus” that he has been able to
> > >witness since he began his research program in 1996. For better or
> > >worse, COVID-19 has allowed the materializing for his critics to see
>“in
> > >vivo” the meaning of his extensive and abstract work on the permanent
> > >state of exception. Perhaps the harsh reality that forces us to
> > >experience biopolitical decisions first-hand today allows us to
> > >understand why the world, according to Agamben, has become a “place
> > >where the state of exception perfectly coincides with the rule and
>where
> > >the extreme situation becomes the very paradigm of everyday life.” In
> > >other words, it allows us to see how and why the world is transforming
> > >into a gigantic concentration camp.
> > The only *healthy* way to stop the pandemic, thereby saving lives, in
> > U.S. & elsewhere is by rapidly (
http://bit.ly/RapidTestCOVID-19 )
> > finding out at any given moment, including even while on-line, who
> > among us are unwittingly contagious (i.e pre-symptomatic or
> > asymptomatic) in order to
http://bit.ly/convince_it_forward (John
> > 15:12) for them to call their doctor and self-quarantine per their
> > doctor in hopes of stopping this pandemic. Thus, we're hoping for the
> > best while preparing for the worse-case scenario of the Alpha lineage
> > mutations and others like the Gamma, Beta, Epsilon, Iota, Lambda, Mu &
> > Delta lineage mutations combining to form hybrids that render current
> > COVID vaccines/pills no longer effective.
> >
> > Indeed, I am wonderfully hungry (
http://bit.ly/RapidTestCOVID-19 )
> > and hope you, Michael, also have a healthy appetite too.
> >
> > So how are you ?
>
> I am wonderfully hungry!
Source:
https://groups.google.com/g/sci.med.cardiology/c/wFXNYyTrDFg/m/8CvOjVHGAwAJ