AntiWar
June 10, 2006
More Condi diplomacy?
Dr. James Gordon Prather
Nuclear weapons
physicist
Nuclear bomb tester at Lawrence Livermore
Technical director of
nuclear bomb testings at Sandia
Chief scientist of the U.S. Army
U.S. Navy
veteran
The French, Brits and Germans (allegedly acting
on behalf of the European Union) have just made a confidential
"take-it-or-you'll-be-sorry" offer to Iran to "come back to the negotiating
table".
To what table and to negotiate what?
Well, with the Tehran Agreed Statement of 2003 [1], Iran had hoped to
get the EU to ignore or surmount the barriers erected by the United States in
the late 1970s to European economic and technological cooperation with
Iran.
For its part, the E3/EU ostensibly wanted to get "objective guarantees"
about the peacefulness of Iran's nuclear program. But, realistically, it's more
likely the EU wanted to keep Iranian oil and natural gas flowing to Europe,
rather than to China.
Of course, Iran's nuclear program was already subject to an
International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards Agreement [2], entered unto as a
condition of Iran's being a non-nuke signatory to the Treaty on
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, NPT [3].
Nevertheless, to "promote confidence"– Iran offered to sign an
"Additional Protocol" [4] to their "Safeguards Agreement" [5] and to
immediately begin cooperation with the IAEA "in advance of its
ratification".
Furthermore, while the Tehran Agreed Statement reaffirmed Iran's "right
under the nuclear non-proliferation regime to develop nuclear energy for
peaceful purposes", Iran VOLUNTARILY suspended for the duration of the
negotiations "all uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities as defined by
the IAEA".
A magnanimous offer by the
Iranians.
And what did Iran get in return?
Not much. The E3/EU governments did formally "recognize the right of
Iran to enjoy peaceful use of nuclear energy in accordance with the NPT".
Now, that's big of them, since the NPT makes that Iran's "inalienable
right".
Anyway, a year later, the E3/EU and Iran notified all IAEA members that
they had agreed – the Paris Accord [6] – to negotiate a formal agreement that
would "provide objective guarantees (to E3/EU) that Iran's nuclear program is
exclusively for peaceful purposes. It will equally provide firm guarantees (to
Iran) on nuclear, technological and economic cooperation and firm commitments
(to Iran) on security issues".
Three months after that, Iran submitted – as required by the Paris
Accord – an initial package of "objective guarantees" that included a voluntary
"confinement" of Iran's nuclear program [7].
In particular, the Iranians offered to forego indefinitely the chemical
processing of spent fuel to recover unspent uranium and plutonium.
The Iranians also offered to limit their uranium-enrichment activities
to those necessary for meeting contingency requirements of Iran's power
reactors.
The Iranians even offered to go BEYOND the requirements of the
"Additional Protocol" to allow "on-site presence of IAEA inspectors at the
conversion and enrichment facilities".
Did the E3/EU accept this magnanimous offer?
No, they didn't even acknowledge it.
Did the E3/EU submit – as required by the "Paris Accord" – an initial
package of "guarantees on nuclear, technological and economic cooperation" as
well as "firm commitments" that a "coalition of the willing" wouldn't be allowed
to do unto them what had been done to Iraq?
No.
Why?
Well, evidently, Condi Rice wouldn't let them.
After the Iranians broke off the negotiations last August (because the
E3/EU obviously weren't negotiating in good faith) and announced they were
resuming – subject to IAEA Safeguards – the nuclear activities they had
voluntarily suspended, the E3/EU sent a letter to the IAEA Board of Governors,
wherein they stated their objection to Iran ever resuming those
activities.
In particular:
"We do not believe that Iran has any
operational need to engage in fissile material production activities of its own,
nor any other reason to resume [UF-6 production] activity at Esfahan, if the
intentions of its nuclear program are exclusively peaceful".
By some strange coincidence, that's Condi's belief, too:
"I think it's fair to say that we would be
very concerned if the Iranians were left with stockpiles of UF-6 that could be
used in nuclear weapons. But I don't want to get any further into details about
what may be being contemplated by other parties to the negotiations – by the
parties to the negotiations".
"Other" parties?
Well, reportedly, the confidential "take-it-or-you'll-be-sorry" offer
the E3/EU has just made to the Iranians was endorsed by Condi.
And, reportedly, the offer merely requests Iran suspend the actual
enrichment of uranium for the duration of the renewed talks, not indefinitely.
Furthermore, reportedly, it allows Iran to continue UF-6 uranium-conversion
activities. [8]
If these reports are accurate, no wonder Iran is considering the offer
"favorably". Now, if they can just get "firm commitments" that they won't get
pre-emptively bombed in their burqas even if they accept the
"take-it-or-you'll-be-sorry" offer.
Notes:
---------
[1] Tehran Agreed Statement (October 21, 2003)
[3] Text of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
(NPT)
[5] Iran’s Safeguards Agreement