@@ Nuclear weapons physicist: Its all Jew lies @@
Arash
June 28, 2004
Casus Belli: High-Pitched Whine
By Dr.James Gordon Prather
Nuclear weapons physicist
gpra...@worldnetdaily.com
Well, there they go again. The neo-crazy media sycophants are quoting
unnamed "Western diplomats" to the effect that Syria is secretly developing
nukes.
Evidence?
Well, it seems someone's "experimental" sensors may have picked up what may
be the acoustic or electronic signature of a high-speed gas-centrifuge.
That's it?
We're going to war with Syria because of a high-pitched whine?
Well, no. It seems that metallurgist A.Q. Khan - who developed Pakistan's
high-speed gas-centrifuges - gave several lectures on "nuclear materials" in
late 1997 and early 1998 in Damascus.
And, there's more.
According to the unnamed "Western diplomats," beginning in 2001, Khan and
several Pakistani colleagues had other "clandestine" meetings in Iran with
Syrian "nuclear officials."
How much more evidence do you need?
What is a "nuclear material?" Well, uranium hexafluoride (UF6) - which is a
solid at room temperature - is a nuclear material.
http://web.ead.anl.gov/uranium/guide/uf6/index.cfm
If you hook a thousand or so high-speed gas-centrifuges together in cascade
and input ordinary gaseous uranium hexafluoride, you get enriched uranium
hexafluoride as output. http://www.exportcontrols.org/centrifuges.html
Nowadays, virtually all enriched uranium is used as fuel for nuclear power
plants. Nowadays, most enriched uranium is produced by gas-centrifuge
cascades sited in Western Europe, China, Russia or Pakistan.
The United States still depends upon the WWII gaseous-diffusion process, but
Iran's modern gas-centrifuge cascade under construction could be operational
in a year or so. http://www.chemcases.com/2003version/nuclear/nc-07.htm
The gas-centrifuges in the Iranian facility - which has already been visited
by International Atomic Energy Agency officials and will be subject to an
IAEA Safeguards Agreement, when completed - appear to be very similar to
those in a Pakistani cascade that is also subject to an IAEA Safeguards
Agreement.
The U-238 isotope - which is not fissile, but accounts for about 99.3% of
natural uranium - is "cast out" by the centrifuges, thereby "enriching" the
concentration of the fissile U-235 isotope in the remaining gas.
Typically, when low enriched uranium - reactor grade - is produced, the
output volume is about an order of magnitude less than the input volume.
Typically, if highly enriched uranium (HEU) is desired - to make a nuke, for
example - the LEU output is then used as input to a separate smaller
cascade, employing hundreds - not thousands - of high-speed centrifuges.
http://www.nuclearfiles.org/reatomicbasics/materials.htm
The neo-crazies want you believe that Iran's having thousands of
gas-centrifuges in a cascade is tantamount to having the capability to
produce nukes.
However, Syria and Iran are NPT signatories. Therefore, any
uranium-enrichment facility - as well as any LEU produced - would be subject
to IAEA Safeguards. As NPT-signatories, neither Syria nor Iran would be
permitted to have a HEU producing facility. In any event, the LEU they would
need for input to a secret HEU-producing facility would be under IAEA lock
and seal.
The neo-crazies would have you believe that the IAEA inspectors are so dumb,
so incompetent, that they would never notice the Syrians and/or Iranians
stealing the literally tons of LEU needed for input to their secret
HEU-producing cascade.
The evidence is to the contrary. In the 1980s, South Africa had not yet
become an NPT signatory. Hence their uranium-enrichment facility - which
made fuel for their nuclear power plants - was not subject to IAEA
Safeguards. Nor was the enriched uranium it produced.
Hence, there would have been no reason for them to hide what they were
doing. No reason for them to not openly make HEU in their uranium-enrichment
facility.
Nevertheless, the South Africans had a separate - nearby, on site, but
secret - facility for producing HEU for nukes, using LEU they secretly
diverted.
When South Africa decided to sign the NPT, they first had to get rid of the
half-dozen gun-type nukes they had produced. They "blended down" the
weapons-grade HEU into LEU. They also completely dismantled and
decontaminated the secret HEU facility before allowing in the IAEA
inspectors. Nevertheless, the IAEA inspectors soon figured out what the
South Africans had been doing, secretly, and confronted them.
So why are the Iranians and the Syrians so concerned about charges by the
neo-crazies that they have secret nuke programs the IAEA can't find?
Well, according to the Israeli independent newspaper, Ha'aretz, a month
before the US invaded Iraq, Under-Secretary of State Bolton met with Israeli
officials. Everyone knew the Iraqis didn't have nukes, but the Israelis
suspected the Iranians might.
Bolton told them he had "no doubt" that "America will attack Iraq" and that
"it will be necessary to deal with threats from Syria, Iran and North Korea,
afterwards."
Moral? The IAEA can't save you. Hence that high-pitched whine in Syria?
* Physicist James Gordon Prather has served as a policy implementing
official for national security-related technical matters in the Federal
Energy Agency, the Energy Research and Development Administration, the
Department of Energy, the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the
Department of the Army. Dr. Prather also served as legislative assistant for
national security affairs to U.S. Sen. Henry Bellmon, R-Okla. -- ranking
member of the Senate Budget Committee and member of the Senate Energy
Committee and Appropriations Committee. Dr. Prather had earlier worked as a
nuclear weapons physicist at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in
California and Sandia National Laboratory in New Mexico.
http://www.antiwar.com/orig/prather.php?articleid=2890