@@ NO Nuclear double standards @@
Arash
May 4, 2005
Nuclear double standards
Article IV of NPT:
Parties [i.e. IRAN] have the "inalienable right" to develop ... nuclear energy & to
acquire nuclear technology.
http://image.guardian.co.uk/sys-images/Politics/Pix/columnists/2001/03/15/Simon_Tisdall.gif
By Simon Tisdall
Many damaging accusations have been leveled at John Bolton
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_R._Bolton), President George Bush's controversial
nominee as U.S. ambassador to the UN.
But perhaps the most serious is that Mr. Bolton (http://www.stopbolton.org), as
undersecretary of state for arms control and international security since 2000, bungled
efforts to dissuade North Korea from developing nuclear weapons.
Mr. Bolton helped to scrap the Clinton administration's 1994 "agreed framework" that froze
North Korea's weapons-related plutonium reprocessing programme. The framework was
imperfect - but nothing remotely adequate replaced it.
In 2002, President Bush denounced North Korea as part of the "axis of evil". In 2003,
Pyongyang withdrew from the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and traded insults with Mr.
Bolton. In February, it declared itself a nuclear weapons state.
And at the weekend, on the eve of the treaty review conference in New York, North Korea
said stalled regional talks were effectively dead.
The Pentagon's Defence Intelligence Agency conceded last week that North Korea probably
now has nuclear-armed missiles capable of hitting U.S. soil.
This signal policy failure risks being repeated in Iran, with which Mr. Bolton has also
refused to deal directly. Western countries suspect Iran is secretly developing nuclear
weapons. It says it is interested only in generating nuclear-powered electricity.
Unlike Pyongyang, Tehran still belongs to the treaty and has signed the "additional
protocol" allowing intrusive UN inspections
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_Non-Proliferation_Treaty).
But as the conference met this week, EU-led efforts to persuade Iran to suspend uranium
enrichment were on the verge of breakdown.
Such problems go to the heart of the conundrum facing the 188-country conference. The
treaty's article IV says state parties have the "inalienable right to develop ... nuclear
energy for peaceful purposes" and to acquire technology to this end
(http://disarmament2.un.org/wmd/npt/npttext.html).
But post-9/11, the U.S. and its allies, newly alarmed about proliferation, want to curb
the availability of such technology, starting with the nuclear fuel cycle.
Mr. Bush proposed last year to "cap" the number of states possessing fuel enrichment
capabilities. The International Atomic Energy Agency has suggested a five-year moratorium
on new facilities in return for guaranteed fuel supplies for certified users.
But as the independent British-American Security Information Council points out: "There is
no international consensus on how to deal with the problem."
"The big loophole in the treaty is legal acquisition [of dual-use technology]," a British
official said. "We want to try and address it as much as possible, but it's fiendishly
difficult."
Such pessimism appears well-founded. Non-weapons states accuse nuclear powers of double
standards. They say the curbs are biased and the "13 steps"
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/13_steps) agreed at the last review in 2000 have not been
honored.
The steps included the promise of a "diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security
policies and the engagement as soon as possible of all nuclear-weapons states in the
process, leading to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons", as stipulated by the
treaty.
The Bush administration's weapons modernization and development plans, and its overall
disdain for arms treaties, are said to undermine the treaty. So, too, is Britain's refusal
to relinquish theoretical "first use" of nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear armed
state.
The west's de facto acceptance of states that have developed nuclear weapons - notably
Israel, Pakistan and India - has also weakened potential collective action.
North Korea's accelerating nuclear activities are linked by some analysts to Iraq.
Pyongyang surmised that if Saddam Hussein really had possessed the bomb, the U.S. would
not have dared to attack him. Iran may have reached a similar conclusion.
"By holding open their own options, the weapons states contribute to a permissive climate
that underscores the limits of non-proliferation," said Rebecca Johnson, editor of
Disarmament Diplomacy. "Nuclear weapons are viewed as the "currency" necessary for being
taken seriously by the United States."
She said those states wishing to retain their enrichment and reprocessing capacity while
denying facilities to others must ask themselves how serious they are about the need to
prevent proliferation.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/worldbriefing/story/0,15205,1475981,00.html
http://www.guardian.co.uk/Columnists/Archive/0,5673,-822,00.html
Kavik Kang
news:Z1eee.1015$pi1....@newscontent-01.sprint.ca...
> Gaurdian UK
> May 4, 2005
>
>
> Nuclear double standards
A stupid phrase. Of course there are double standards when it comes to
nuclear weapons. Minor nations of insignificant military power have no
business having nuclear weapons. Only a fool would believe otherwise.