Israel is the problem.
As Condi was threatening to exert "greater pressure on the
Iranians through sanctions and other measures through the Security Council and,
if necessary, with like-minded states outside of the Security Council", the
Nuclear Suppliers Group or NSG was meeting in plenary session in
Brazil.
Established in 1975, as a direct result of the test of a
nuclear weapon by India, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (http://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/guide.htm) is comprised of
44 nuclear-supplier states that have voluntarily agreed to coordinate their
export controls governing transfers of nuclear materials, material production
and processing equipment and related technology to non-nuclear-weapon
states.
NSG members are expected – but not required – to forgo
nuclear exports to countries that do not subject their imports to the
International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards regime (http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Factsheets/).
Since 1992, to be eligible for importing nuclear reactors,
reactor fuel and certain proscribed equipment from an NSG member, the importer –
NPT signatory or not – must have in place a comprehensive IAEA Safeguards
Agreement covering all nuclear activities and facilities.
Hence, the NSG effectively controls nuke
proliferation-potential exports and the IAEA effectively subsequently monitors
nuke proliferation-potential imports.
Now, India is not a NPT signatory, but has some materials,
equipment and facilities subject to IAEA Safeguards.
In the past, we put great pressure on all NSG members to
rigorously apply the NSG guidelines to India. In particular, we attempted to
prevent the construction by Russia of the first two nuclear power plants at
Koodankulam. We even attempted to prevent refueling of the US-built Tarapur
atomic power station (http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/india/tarapur.htm).
Russia was only able to supply low-enriched uranium to Tarapur in 2001 on the
basis of "safety" considerations.
But then, last year, Bush-Cheney-Rice decided to make
India "our new strategic partner".
Since India refuses to subject all its "nuclear"
activities to IAEA Safeguards, our deal with India will require permanent
"waivers" of NSG guidelines.
As of this writing, it is not clear whether China will
agree, since the objective of the new US-Indian "strategic partnership" is to
"contain" China.
Either way, Bush-Cheney may have destroyed the
IAEA-NPT-NSG nuke proliferation-prevention regime, which has always been a top
priority.
The regime has been in the way of the establishment – via
pre-emptive attacks against "nuke" proliferators – of an American
Hegemony.
When Bush-Cheney came to power, they confronted IAEA
certification that no "source or special nuclear materials" – much less hundreds
of pounds of almost pure uranium-235 or plutonium-239 – were being used by Iraq,
Iran and North Korea in furtherance of a military purpose.
Bush-Cheney ignored the IAEA – and defied the Security
Council – by launching a pre-emptive attack against Iraq, allegedly to put an
end to Iraq's nuke "ambitions".
Bush-Cheney appear to be on the verge of defying the IAEA
and the Security Council once again, launching a pre-emptive attack against
Iran, allegedly to put an end to Iran's nuke "ambitions".
Bush-Cheney and the Israelis claim – but surely don't
really believe – that if the Iranians are allowed to get their
uranium-enrichment centrifuges (basically second-hand Pakistani junk) operating
in IAEA Safeguarded cascades, they will be only months away from having a nuke
arsenal.
If Iran circumventing the IAEA Safeguards regime were
their "real" concern, the solution to the Iranian uranium-enrichment crisis is
at hand.
We have prevented the Iranians from realizing the
multi-billion dollar investment they made in the 1970s in EuroDif, the
French-based uranium-enrichment consortium.
But, now the Brits want to sell their one-third interest
in Urenco – the Dutch, UK and German world-leader in centrifuge technology and
uranium enrichment.
Why don't the Chinese buy out the Brits, then guarantee
Iran nuclear fuel for Chinese-built nuclear power plants as part of a
Chinese-Iranian agreement for co-production of Iranian oil and natural gas?
There, Condi. See how simple that
was.