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We now know that U.S. & EU weren't negotiating in good faith

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Arash

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Jul 9, 2006, 2:45:39 AM7/9/06

AntiWar
July 8, 2006

Condi's never-ending strong-arming

Dr. James Gordon Prather
Nuclear weapons physicist
Former Nuclear bomb tester at Lawrence Livermore
Former Technical director of nuclear bomb testings at Sandia
Former Chief scientist of the U.S. Army
U.S. Navy veteran

One of the first things Condi Rice did NOT do as secretary of state was to address the 2005 Review Conference [1] of the Treaty on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons [2].

She also didn't allow the conclusions and commitments made at the 2000 NPT RevCon [3] to even be discussed, much less reaffirmed.

Instead, Condi sent Stephen Rademaker to inform the 2005 NPT conferees thusly:

Britain, France and Germany, with our support, are seeking to reach a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear problem, a solution that given the history of clandestine nuclear weapons work in that country, must include permanent cessation of Iran's enrichment and reprocessing efforts, as well as dismantlement of equipment and facilities related to such activity.

Now, Mohamed ElBaradei, director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and responsible for verifying to NPT signatories that no source or special nuclear materials are used in furtherance of a military purpose, had just reported, after more than two years of unprecedented highly intrusive inspections, "I have seen no nuclear weapons program in Iran".

Hence, Condi was essentially charging that the IAEA is incompetent to accomplish its NPT mission.

Condi, therefore, had given up on the NPT and was supporting efforts outside the NPT to reach a "diplomatic" solution to the "Iranian nuclear problem".

If possible.

What efforts were those?

Well, on November 15, 2004, Brit, French and German ambassadors (with the support of Javier Solana, high representative of the European Union) signed an agreement with the Iranian ambassador, now known as the Paris Accord [4].

The Paris Accord negotiations – nominally – were to (a) provide "objective guarantees" to the Brits-French-Germans that Iran's nuclear program is "exclusively for peaceful purposes" and (b) provide equally "firm guarantees" to the Iranians of EU technological and economic cooperation as well as "firm commitments" on "security issues".

These negotiations involved only the Brits-French-Germans and Iranians.

The Iranians offered to VOLUNTARILY suspend for the duration of the negotiations "all enrichment related and reprocessing activities". Since those activities were already subject to an IAEA full-scope Safeguards Agreement [5], the IAEA was invited to "verify" the suspension.

The negotiations did not otherwise involve the IAEA Board or concern them.

However, the primary mission of the IAEA is to facilitate the widest possible transfer and subsequent peaceful use of nuclear technology.

If, therefore, the Brits-French-Germans were – with U.S. support – seeking "permanent cessation of Iran's enrichment and reprocessing efforts, as well as dismantlement of equipment and facilities related to such activity", they were not negotiating in "good faith" under the terms of the Paris Accord or the NPT or the IAEA Statute [6].

We now know – Stephen Rademaker knew at the time – that as a result of Condi's arm-twisting, the Brits-French-Germans weren't negotiating in good faith.

On March 23, 2005, Iran had offered a "confidential" package of "objective guarantees" that included a voluntary "confinement" of Iran's nuclear programs, to include:

a) forgoing the reprocessing of spent reactor fuel;

b) forgoing the production of plutonium;

c) producing only the low-enriched uranium required for Iran's power reactors; and

d) the immediate conversion of all enriched uranium to fuel rods.

By any measure, the Iranian "confinement" offer was substantial. Nevertheless, Condi did not allow the Brits-French-Germans to even acknowledge the Iranian offer, much less accept it.

Hence, in August [7] the Iranians notified the IAEA they had broken off the Paris Accord negotiations and intended to resume some of the Safeguarded enrichment activities they had voluntarily suspended.

Condi then strong-armed the Brits-French-Germans into improperly involving the IAEA Board in the mess they made. The IAEA Board then improperly and illegally "required" Iran to resume negotiations with the Brits-French-Germans.

The Iranians refused.

Condi then strong-armed the IAEA Board into improperly and illegally seeking to involve the UN Security Council (UNSC) in the Iran-Board confrontation. Contrary to what you have been told, the Security Council essentially "remanded" the "Iranian dossier" to the IAEA Board.

That is, the Security Council refused to accept jurisdiction (which is what the IAEA Board should have done).

Now, Condi has strong-armed the Russians, Chinese and the Brits-French-Germans into sending EU High Representative Solana to make a "confidential" offer to Iran to return to the negotiating table.

As the Brits-French-Germans-Russians-Chinese and Iranians must know, Condi has no intention of allowing good-faith negotiations this time, either. If she had, the "confidential" offer to negotiate would essentially restate the terms of the Paris Accord.

And the starting point for the negotiations would be careful consideration by Condi and the Brits-French-Germans-Russians-Chinese of the March 23, 2005, offer by the Iranians.

Notes:

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[1] 2005 Review Conference (7th RevCon) - Final Draft

http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/RevCon05/draftfinaldoc.pdf [PDF-150]

http://www.un.org/events/npt2005/documents.html

[2] Text of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear weapons (NPT)
http://www.un.org/events/npt2005/npttreaty.html

[3] NPT disarmament provisions: "13 practical steps" toward TOTAL GLOBAL nuclear disarmament
The 13 Practical Steps for the implementation of "Article VI" adopted by the 2000 NPT Review Conference (6th RevCon) to nuclear disarmament. In light of the rules of treaty interpretation set forth in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the Practical Steps lay down criteria, principles, and measures for compliance with Article VI. They constitute subsequent agreement and practice authoritatively applying and interpreting Article VI. Accordingly, to implement the Practical Steps is to move towards complete fulfillment of the legal obligations set forth in Article VI. To fail to do so in essential respects is to demonstrate a lack of good faith and to breach the Article VI obligations.

http://disarmament.un.org/wmd/npt/2000FD.pdf [PDF-200KB]
http://disarmament.un.org/wmd/npt/nptrevdocuments.html
http://www.lcnp.org/disarmament/npt/13stepspaper.htm

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/13_steps

Bush has often said he wants to "STRENGTHEN" the NPT. Obviously, that is a big LIE. In fact, there had been entirely too much "strengthening" of the NPT at the Sixth Review Conference (Sixth RevCon), held six years ago (2000), to suit Bush. The final report of the Sixth RevCon (http://www.basicint.org/nuclear/NPT/2000revcon/finaltext.htm) began by reaffirming the recommendations contained in the final report of the Fifth Revcon (http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/1995dec.html). But it took delegates to the Seventh RevCon (http://www.un.org/events/npt2005) two weeks to even agree on an agenda because Bush "REFUSED" to allow the final report of the "Sixth RevCon" to even be discussed (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/13_steps), much less be reaffirmed. Among other things, the Sixth RevCon Report affirmed: "An unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon states to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament to which all states parties are committed under Article VI". Disarm? "The importance and urgency of signatures and ratifications, without delay and without conditions and in accordance with constitutional processes, to achieve the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty" (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CTBT). Ratify the CTBT? "The Sixth Conference reaffirms that IAEA is the competent authority responsible for verifying and assuring … compliance with its safeguards agreements … with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.… It is the conviction of the Conference that nothing should be done to undermine the authority of IAEA in this regard". Don't challenge the authority of the IAEA? "The Sixth Conference notes the reaffirmation by the nuclear-weapon states of their commitment to the United Nations Security Council resolution 984 in 1995 (http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1995/scres95.htm) on security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon states parties to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons". Give assurances to IRAN that we won't attack them with nuclear weapons? You've got to be kidding. Bush would never agree to do any of those things, now required of us by the NPT.

[4] Paris Accord (November 26, 2004)

Communication received from the Permanent Representatives of France, Germany, United Kingdom and Iran concerning the agreement signed in Paris on 15 November 2004.

http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2004/infcirc637.pdf [PDF-80KB]

[5] IAEA's "Safeguards Agreement"
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Factsheets/

[6] IAEA Statute

http://www.iaea.org/About/statute_text.html

[7] Communication dated August 1, 2005 received from the Permanent Mission of Iran to the Agency

http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2005/infcirc648.pdf [PDF-100KB]

* Physicist James Gordon Prather has served as a policy implementing official for national security-related technical matters in the Federal Energy Agency, the Energy Research and Development Administration, the Department of Energy, the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Department of the Army. Dr. Prather also served as legislative assistant for national security affairs to U.S. Senator Henry Bellmon, R-Okla. --ranking member of the Senate Budget Committee and member of the Senate Energy Committee and Appropriations Committee. Dr. Prather had earlier worked as a nuclear weapons physicist at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (http://www.llnl.gov) in California and Sandia National Laboratory (http://www.sandia.gov) in New Mexico. http://www.antiwar.com/prather