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Classified Iranian national security information, under the IAEA Statute; are absolutely NONE of IAEA's business

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Arash

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Jun 20, 2006, 4:57:36 AM6/20/06

AntiWar
June 17, 2006

Iran's nuclear-energy rights

Dr. James Gordon Prather
Nuclear weapons physicist
Former Nuclear bomb tester at Lawrence Livermore
Former Technical director of nuclear bomb testings at Sandia
Former Chief scientist of the U.S. Army
U.S. Navy veteran

According to the United Nations statute establishing the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA):

The Agency shall seek to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world. It shall ensure, so far as it is able, that assistance provided by it or at its request or under its supervision or control is not used in such a way as to further any military purpose.

The Agency is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its members, and all members – in order to ensure to all of them the rights and benefits resulting from membership – shall fulfill in good faith the obligation assumed by them in accordance with this Statute. [1]

Hence, the IAEA Secretariat, the IAEA Board of Governors and all members are to – "in good faith" – assist in the development and practical application of atomic energy for peaceful purposes in all member states.

In order to ensure that "special fissionable or other materials, equipment, services, equipment, facilities and information" are not used "in such a way as to further any military purpose", the IAEA Secretariat administers a Safeguards system.

Iran entered into a "Safeguards Agreement" with the IAEA in 1974. [2]

Under that agreement (contrary to what the neo-crazy sycophantic media has told you) Iran is NOT required to inform the IAEA about the existence of facilities – such as the uncompleted nuclear power plant at Bushehr, for example– until 180 days before "special fissionable or other materials" are actually introduced into the facility.

Iran notified the IAEA about Bushehr, the Uranium Conversion Facility at Esfahan (Isfahan) and the Uranium Enrichment Facility at Natanz – and subjected them to IAEA Safeguards – years before being required to do so.

Hence, for years, the principal responsibility of the IAEA's director general, Mohamed ElBaradei, in Iran has been to assist the Iranians get those "safeguarded" facilities at Bushehr, Esfahan (Isfahan) and Natanz up and operating, safely and peacefully.

As well as to counter the "bad faith" efforts of the Cheney Cabal to prevent the Iranians from getting those facilities up and operating.

So, ElBaradei's report to the IAEA Board's quarterly meeting last week [3] was mostly an update of what he has done to assist the Iranians at Bushehr, Esfahan (Isfahan) and Natanz. Right?

Wrong!

ElBaradei's report is mostly an update of what he has not done.

You see, at their last quarterly meeting, the Board directed ElBaradei to report to the UN Security Council (UNSC) their determination that to satisfy some Board members as to the exclusively peaceful intent of Iran's nuclear program, the Board "deemed it necessary" for Iran to, inter alia:

implement transparency measures, as requested by the Director General, including in GOV/2005/67 [4], which extend BEYOND the formal requirements of the "Safeguards Agreement "and "Additional Protocol", and include such access to individuals, documentation relating to procurement, dual use equipment, certain military-owned workshops and research and development as the Agency may require in support of its ongoing investigations. [5]

BEYOND the requirements of a potential "Additional Protocol".

FAR BEYOND the requirements of Iran's existing "Safeguards Agreement".

Iran promptly informed ElBaradei that – in the future – it would comply only with their Safeguards Agreement.

After 3 years of VOLUNTARY cooperation that went beyond even an "Additional Protocol" [6] not yet in force [Iranian parliament has not ratified the "Additional Protocol", so Iran has no legal obligation to obey it], Iran declared:

It should also be recalled that Iran has fully cooperated in provision of voluminous information; granting many accesses to different locations [even military sites]; arranging interviews with individuals; submission of non-Safeguards related information; [granting] permission for taking large number of environmental samples from nuclear and non-nuclear sites and even from military sites; [arranging] over thousands of hours of meetings with experts in understanding the detail of every subject [which amounted to more than 1700 man-days of inspection]; therefore, the Agency has full understanding on every part of the program and has achieved progress on the matters. [7]

So, does ElBaradei acknowledge in his latest report that previous cooperation by Iranians had – in fact – gone FAR, FAR BEYOND what was required under their existing "Safeguards Agreement"?

No.

He just complains about how hard it is, now, "to follow up" on "information" obtained from a MYSTERIOUS "walk-in" laptop [8], provided him by the Cheney Cabal.

First, there is "Operation Green Salt" [9], an inexplicable – therefore, highly suspect – military uranium-conversion program.

Then, there is the "design of a missile re-entry vehicle" [10], which – "if authentic" – is highly classified Iranian national security information and, under the "IAEA Statute", absolutely NONE of ElBaradei's business.

Notes:

--------

[1] IAEA Statute

http://www.iaea.org/About/statute_text.html

[2] Iran’s Safeguards Agreement

The text of the agreement between Iran and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (December 13, 1974)
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc214.pdf [PDF-80KB]

[3] Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in Iran (June 8, 2006)

http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaIran/gov2006-38.pdf [PDF-50KB]

[4] Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in Iran (September 2, 2005)

http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2005/gov2005-67.pdf [PDF-100KB]

[5] Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in Iran (April 28, 2006)

http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaIran/gov2006-27.pdf [PDF-90KB]

[6] IAEA's "Additional Protocol" to the "Safeguards Agreement"
http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/sg_protocol.html

[7] Communication dated March 7, 2006 received from the Permanent Mission of Iran to the Agency

http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2006/infcirc672.pdf [PDF-130KB]

[8] "The Laptop: Decoding Iran's Ambitions", New York Times (November 12, 2005)

http://groups.google.com/group/soc.culture.iranian/msg/f552c361c6d02dfc

The "Smoking Laptop" from Iran

http://groups.google.com/group/soc.culture.iranian/msg/911beee32e40791b

http://tinyurl.com/ru36v

[9] Operation Green Salt

http://groups.google.com/group/soc.culture.iranian/msg/6181069b5f96d9fc

http://tinyurl.com/nzxwo

[10] UN agency says Iran nuclear work may link to weapons, New York Times (February 1, 2006)

http://groups.google.com/group/soc.culture.iranian/msg/391c97d0b911131f

* Physicist James Gordon Prather has served as a policy implementing official for national security-related technical matters in the Federal Energy Agency, the Energy Research and Development Administration, the Department of Energy, the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Department of the Army. Dr. Prather also served as legislative assistant for national security affairs to U.S. Senator Henry Bellmon, R-Okla. --ranking member of the Senate Budget Committee and member of the Senate Energy Committee and Appropriations Committee. Dr. Prather had earlier worked as a nuclear weapons physicist at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (http://www.llnl.gov) in California and Sandia National Laboratory (http://www.sandia.gov) in New Mexico. http://www.antiwar.com/prather

Interviews with nuclear weapons physicist Dr. James Gordon Prather:
September 17, 2005
http://www.weekendinterviewshow.com/audio/prather6.mp3
July 23, 2005
http://www.weekendinterviewshow.com/audio/prather5.mp3
May 7, 2005
http://www.weekendinterviewshow.com/audio/prather4.mp3
April 9, 2005
http://www.weekendinterviewshow.com/audio/prather3.mp3
February 5, 2005
http://www.weekendinterviewshow.com/audio/prather2.mp3
December 4, 2004
http://www.weekendinterviewshow.com/audio/prather.mp3

West has kept billions of Iran's EURODIF investments for 30 years In 1975, Iran took a very costly 10% financial participation in EURODIF uranium enrichment plant being built in France. Iran paid $1 billion towards the purchase of a 10% share of ownership in EURODIF and agreed to buy a quota from the new plant. But after the Iranian revolution in 1979, neither was Iran given any enriched uranium nor did it get back its investment from EURODIF. The U.S. was also paid to deliver new fuel and upgrade its power in accordance with a contract signed before the revolution. U.S. gave neither the fuel nor the billions of dollars it had received for it. Germany was paid for in full, billions of dollars for the two nuclear facilities in Busher, but after three decades, Germany has refused to export any equipments or refund the money.
http://groups.google.com/group/soc.culture.iranian/msg/0540800f7314f7b0

Nuclear program of Iran
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_program_of_Iran

IAEA and Iran
http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaIran/index.shtml

Setting the Record Straight about Iran's Nuclear Program
http://groups.google.com/group/soc.culture.iranian/msg/a19f89b941a33707

U.S. endorsed Iranian plans to build massive nuclear energy industry
http://groups.google.com/group/soc.culture.iranian/msg/9b0a04b1107d7171

Washington: The Biggest NPT Violator
http://groups.google.com/group/soc.culture.iranian/msg/e2233bcb812ca246

IAEA Chief Invalidates the NPT
http://groups.google.com/group/soc.culture.iranian/msg/3e2365eddc3bd0ff

Time to shut-down the UN
http://groups.google.com/group/soc.culture.iranian/msg/50134d0a62fb448f

Even threatening to use nuclear weapons is a violation of international law
http://groups.google.com/group/soc.culture.iranian/msg/5bd9a41bf89f3f1d

Nuke-Free Zone
http://groups.google.com/group/soc.culture.iranian/msg/81b70f5168c02764

More Condi diplomacy?

http://groups.google.com/group/soc.culture.iranian/msg/8f9036be580f2151

Hijacked by the Neocrazies
http://groups.google.com/group/soc.culture.iranian/msg/030051c0a5a88c65

Iranian crisis resolved

http://groups.google.com/group/soc.culture.iranian/msg/d23242f3f62d3746

Kudos to Congress From Israel

http://groups.google.com/group/soc.culture.iranian/msg/2edc97abd03b99e4

The best U.S. Congress money can buy
http://groups.google.com/group/soc.culture.iranian/msg/585faaf4d2e9eb74

Another 'Coalition of the Willing'?

http://groups.google.com/group/soc.culture.iranian/msg/f696f2a3a401850f

Judy-Baby vs TIME
http://groups.google.com/group/soc.culture.iranian/msg/2080d3c61b904992

Iran was not ordered to Stop Enrichment
http://groups.google.com/group/soc.culture.iranian/msg/f4731d785c554085

Western-Style Democracy – No!
http://groups.google.com/group/soc.culture.iranian/msg/466cae8cbc38307d

Media liars exposed
http://groups.google.com/group/soc.culture.iranian/msg/7f34f4e6346a9bb5

Dolts – or liars?
http://groups.google.com/group/soc.culture.iranian/msg/7eb4595173cae97d

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