Amoeba's Secret openly available under CC-BY license

[Russell Standish]

Hi guys,

I finally got around to doing something I meant to do years ago - I
have released the English translation of "Amoeba's Secret" as a freely
downloadable PDF under the Creative Commons CC-BY license at
https://www.hpcoders.com.au/docs/amoebassecret.pdf .

Bruno Marchal was a long time contributer to this list, and this
semi-autobiography is also one of the clearest explanations of his
ideas.

Enjoy,

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Principal, High Performance Coders hpc...@hpcoders.com.au
http://www.hpcoders.com.au
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[Brent Meeker]

That's great!  Many thanks to you, Russell.

Brent

[LizR]

Hi Russell,

Do you have any news of Bruno? I see his last contribution here was a
couple of years ago.

Best wishes,
Liz

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[Russell Standish]

I did get a response from him when I suggested making Amoeba's Secret
open access.

According to Kim Jones, who visited him 2022, he is well and taking a
break from the Everything List.

Cheers

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[Liz R]

Thanks Russell. Hope you are all well on the Everything list.

[Terren Suydam]

Yes, thank you Russell, this is a real gift!

To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/03a823b1-a29c-4578-92c7-080c80dad9b3n%40googlegroups.com.

[Alan Grayson]

I've been reading Marchal's de facto autobiography. It's hugely impressive, leading me to be more open to his main conclusion, IIUC, that arithmetic is at the core of reality, yes, physical reality. AG

[John Clark]

On Sat, Sep 7, 2024 at 11:16 PM Alan Grayson <agrays...@gmail.com> wrote:

> I've been reading Marchal's de facto autobiography. It's hugely impressive, leading me to be more open to his main conclusion, IIUC, that arithmetic is at the core of reality, yes, physical reality. AG

If a mathematical sphere is the fundamental reality and a physical billiard ball is just an approximation of one, then why is a billiard ball astronomically more complex than the sphere? Wouldn't you expect an approximation (or a simulation) to be simpler than the real thing? I think it would be more accurate to say that a meteorologist's mathematical model is an approximation of a physical hurricane, and a physical hurricane is NOT an approximation of a meteorologist's mathematical model. 

Mathematics is the language of physics but mathematics is not physics. That's why Physics is more fundamental than mathematics, and that's why you can't get milk out of the English language word "COW".

John K Clark    See what's on my new list at  Extropolis

swo

[Russell Standish]

That's not Marchal's idea at all. Most of the complexity of a billiard
ball is accidental anyway.

The idea is that if consciousness is a computational thing (ie
mathematical), then phenomena (ie physics) is entirely due to random
splitting of the trace of the universal dovetailer (which is also a
mathematical thing).

So either physics is arithemetic, with true randomness built in, or
consciousness is not computational.

I would go further that this conclusion follows if computationalism
was weakened to functionalism, but the logic is not quite so clear cut
in that case.

[Alan Grayson]

What is the universal dovetailer? TY, AG

[John Clark]

On Sun, Sep 8, 2024 at 7:10 PM Russell Standish <li...@hpcoders.com.au> wrote:

>  Most of the complexity of a billiard ball is accidental anyway.

Even if you ignore the internal chemistry of a billiard ball a mathematical sphere is only an approximation of a billiard ball. It would take very little information to perfectly describe the shape of a sphere, but it would take vastly more information to perfectly describe the shape of a physical billiard ball. And as I said before, simulated physical objects are simpler than real physical objects. Mathematics is the language of reality but I've never heard of a description of an object being more complex than the object itself. 

> The idea is that if consciousness is a computational thing 

 

I Think it's a brute fact that consciousness is the way data feels when it is being processed intelligently, and the argument I gave in the above does not apply to consciousness because it is not a physical object, it is not even a noun, it is an adjective. Intelligence is the way atoms behave when they are arranged in ways that can produce the same results that a Turing Machine can. And consciousness is the way data feels when it is being processed intelligently.

> (ie) mathematical),

No. Mathematics can describe computation, but it is not computation. That’s why the semiconductor industry exists, software alone is not sufficient, in fact, software alone can’t do anything.  If you actually want to DO something, if you want something to change over an interval of time, then matter is required. That's why the information in a book can't do anything if it's just sitting on a shelf, that information can only cause something to change if a person or, as we've seen very recently, an AI, reads it.  And both the person and the AI are made of atoms. And atoms are physical.  

Computation involves the manipulation of information, and the minimum amount of energy needed to perform a calculation is greater than zero.  Also, the amount of information that you can stuff into a volume of space is finite, if there is too much information then the volume turns into a Black Hole where the information, if it still even exists, is inaccessible. So information is physical and computation is a physical process. 

> then phenomena (ie physics) is entirely due to random splitting

Schrodinger's wave function is NOT random, it is 100% deterministic. And if you wanted to sum up Hugh Everett's Many Worlds theory in the fewest words possible it would simply be "everything follows Schrodinger's wave function, even the entire universe". So to a mind vast enough to comprehend the entire Universal Wave Function nothing would be random. 

 

> So either physics is arithemetic, with true randomness built in, or

Or arithmetic is a subset of physics.  

 

> consciousness is not computational.

I keep asking this question but I never receive an answer: "if consciousness is not computational then how did Darwin's theory of natural selection manage to produce at least one conscious being, me, ....., and possibly you too?"  

 John K Clark    See what's on my new list at  Extropolis

pu2

[Brent Meeker]

On 9/9/2024 5:25 AM, John Clark wrote:

No. Mathematics can describe computation, but it is not computation. That’s why the semiconductor industry exists, software alone is not sufficient, in fact, software alone can’t do anything.  If you actually want to DO something, if you want something to change over an interval of time, then matter is required. That's why the information in a book can't do anything if it's just sitting on a shelf, that information can only cause something to change if a person or, as we've seen very recently, an AI, reads it.  And both the person and the AI are made of atoms. And atoms are physical.  

Computation involves the manipulation of information, and the minimum amount of energy needed to perform a calculation is greater than zero.  Also, the amount of information that you can stuff into a volume of space is finite, if there is too much information then the volume turns into a Black Hole where the information, if it still even exists, is inaccessible. So information is physical and computation is a physical process. 

I generally agree with John, but I would point out that computation is a physical process that realizes a mathematical process.  Sure it's more complicated because it depends on the physics, but that is incidental to the computation.  So it's kind of the reverse of using mathematics to describe something.  In a computational process it's the mathematics that's essential.

That, in itself doesn't answer the question of whether consciousness is computation, but nerves are physiological structures whose essential function is transmitting information.  So I would say consciousness originates with the evolution of nerves and eventually the central nervous system.  I see consciousness has having several levels from simple detecting and reacting to immediate surroundings, to internal models of self versus others, to planning and projection, to language and abstraction.  So conscious is implicitly information processing, but not all of it is what humans think of as being conscious, having an inner narrative.

Brent

[John Clark]

On Mon, Sep 9, 2024 at 2:14 PM Brent Meeker <meeke...@gmail.com> wrote:

> I generally agree with John, but I would point out that computation is a physical process that realizes a mathematical process. 

I think it would be more accurate to say it realizes an informational process because mathematics is just a small subset of logic. In Boolean arithmetic  1+1 =1. And the very word "process" implies a procedure that causes a change with the passage of time, but without physics nothing can change. No matter how good a mathematics book is it will never change, and if it's just sitting on the shelf and nothing physical, human or AI, ever reads it then it will not cause anything else to change either.    

 

> Sure it's more complicated because it depends on the physics, but that is incidental to the computation.

The particular physics used in a computation is incidental BUT the use of SOME variety of physics (mechanical gears rods and pulleys, biological nerves, vacuum tubes, transistors, integrated circuits, quantum computers etc) is NOT incidental because information is physical, so if you want to process it mathematics is not enough, you need physics. If that were not true Nvidia then would go broke as would the entire semiconductor industry.

 John K Clark    See what's on my new list at  Extropolis

nsi

[Brent Meeker]

It's even more abstract than that.  Given any sequence of states you can label them so as to represent a computation.  So I think the physics is really incidental to the computation.

Brent

[John Clark]

On Tue, Sep 10, 2024 at 4:44 PM Brent Meeker <meeke...@gmail.com> wrote:

> Given any sequence of states you can label them so as to represent a computation.  So I think the physics is really incidental to the computation.

You need to make the labels, and making something involves a change, and a change cannot happen without the involvement of matter and the laws of physics.  

  John K Clark    See what's on my new list at  Extropolis

uwx

[Liz R]

The question is whether or not maths exists independently of the material universe. Some people think it does (that it's true in all worlds, regardless of their laws of physics) while others think that it's a human invention approximating to physical phenomena. Personally I'm inclined to think that maths is true regardless of which universe you're in, or indeed true whether or not any universes exist. This is Max Tegmark's view, for example, as described in his book "Our Mathematical Universe". His idea (which is in the same ballpark as Bruno's, but approaching it from, as it were, the opposite direction) is that maths is necessarily true, and therefore makes a foundation on which to build an ontology that gets "somethig from nothing".

I'm not sure how one can test this, however.

[Brent Meeker]

What do you conceive of as "true".  I think of all mathematics as having the form: Given these axioms and these rules of inference then these theorems follow.  Bruno only posits a small part of mathematics as true.  I'm not sure how he relates "true" and "exists".

Brent

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[Liz R]

Well, exactly. It's Peano or whatever, so a small subset. Bruno and Tegmark have this idea - I find Tegmark easier to follow personally - that because physics is possibly isomorphic to some set of equations that describe reality, Occam suggests that we don't actually need reality to exist, only the equations.

YMMV...!

[Russell Standish]

On Wed, Sep 11, 2024 at 09:40:32PM -0700, Liz R wrote:
> Well, exactly. It's Peano or whatever, so a small subset. Bruno and Tegmark
> have this idea - I find Tegmark easier to follow personally - that because
> physics is possibly isomorphic to some set of equations that describe reality,
> Occam suggests that we don't actually need reality to exist, only the
> equations.
>

It is more that whatever foundational basis of reality is, so long as
it is Turing complete, a computationlist mind cannot distinguish it
from any other Turing complete substrate. It is almost assuredly not
the reality we see. In another sense, our reality supervenes on all
possible universal Turing machines. The question of what is the
foundational reality has no answer - epistemologically equivalent to
asking how many angels can dance on the head of a pin.

[Liz R]

Thanks, Russell. Bruno tried to explain this to me a while ago but I probably didn't take it all in. Am I right in thinking this has something to do with "no oracles" - that is, reality contains no sources of infinite unpredictable data? A naked signularity would presumably count as an oracle, while it appears any area of space-time contains finite data (the Deckenstein bound?) - does that make it Turing complete, in principle? Or am I talking nonsense?

[Giulio Prisco]

Interesting! How about an .epub version?
I see there's a .pdf of the original in French: search "Le secret de
l'amibe" - is this the version of the document that the translation is
based on?

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[Russell Standish]

On Thu, Sep 12, 2024 at 08:51:16AM +0200, Giulio Prisco wrote:
> Interesting! How about an .epub version?

.epub version is available for a small fee from Amazon Kindle Direct.

> I see there's a .pdf of the original in French: search "Le secret de
> l'amibe" - is this the version of the document that the translation is
> based on?

Indeed it is!

[Russell Standish]

On Wed, Sep 11, 2024 at 11:48:02PM -0700, Liz R wrote:
> Thanks, Russell. Bruno tried to explain this to me a while ago but I probably
> didn't take it all in. Am I right in thinking this has something to do with "no
> oracles" - that is, reality contains no sources of infinite unpredictable data?
> A naked signularity would presumably count as an oracle, while it appears any
> area of space-time contains finite data (the Deckenstein bound?) - does that
> make it Turing complete, in principle? Or am I talking nonsense?

It sounds vaguely plausible, but could well be the latter :). At least
its not egregious nonsense like immigrants eating you pets :P.

Cheers

[Liz R]

In order to test Bruno's hypothesis, it would be necessary to know if reality is Turing complete ("computable" for short). Hence my mention of oracles and singularities, which presumably aren't computable. I would imagine that reality is in principle computable, given its quantum nature and discoveries like black hole entropy and information content - though probably at a level below what we can currently access.

Interesting that this limits our ability to know the foundational basis of reality - or do you think we might be able to get around that one day?

[Liz R]

On the subject of whether consciousness is computation (or is it "supervenes on computation" or something? Anyway...) - if it turns out that physics is computable, that undercuts that question, in that assuming consciousness is the product of physics, it must also be. the product of computation (possibly at a level far below that of frain cells)

[Brent Meeker]

But physics isn't computable, it includes quantum mechanics which introduces randomness. 

Brent

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[Liz R]

Yes I wondered about that, but it's possible that physics isn't intrinsically random. It could be based on something computable, and only appear random from our perspective - presumbly some versions of many-worlds would fit the bill. Also, although various attempts to show hidden variables have fallen down, it's always possible something of that sort might be involved that we haven't thought of yet. It's also possible that time symmetry could act in that sort of way, making apparent randomness from a failure to take all the boundary conditions into account (entanglement becomes far less spooky if you allow for quantum objects not distinguishing between directions in time, for example).

[Bruce Kellett]

On Fri, Sep 13, 2024 at 9:28 AM Liz R <liz...@gmail.com> wrote:

Yes I wondered about that, but it's possible that physics isn't intrinsically random.

No, that isn't possible. Randomness is intrinsic, and not derivable from anything else.

It could be based on something computable, and only appear random from our perspective - presumbly some versions of many-worlds would fit the bill.

No, many-worlds is a decided failure as far as randomness is concerned. You cannot get intrinsic randomness as exhibited by quantum phenomena from a deterministic theory such as many-worlds.

Also, although various attempts to show hidden variables have fallen down, it's always possible something of that sort might be involved that we haven't thought of yet.

That is just a cheap let-out: "It could be something we haven't thought of yet. There are very good reason to think that intrinsic randomness cannot arise from a deterministic theory.  You can get randomness from ignorance, as in classic statistical mechanics, but that is not intrinsic -- things are still deterministic if you have complete knowledge. Which is not the case in QM.

Bruce

[Russell Standish]

One of the consequences of the universal dovetailer argument is that
if conciousness is computational, then physics is not. Intrinsic
randomness arises from the first person view of the operation of the
dovetailer.

Perhaps what you're thinking of is oracles solving computationally
impossible problems, such as delivering the successive digits of the
Chaitin probablility Ω.

A corrolary of this is that a computational physics à la Konrad Zuse's
Rechnender Raum would rule out computationalism, and consequently
physical supervenience.

Cheers

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[Liz R]

On Friday 13 September 2024 at 12:20:01 UTC+12 Russell Standish wrote:

One of the consequences of the universal dovetailer argument is that
if conciousness is computational, then physics is not.

That's interesting. I don't see how that could happen, would you mind elaborating? (I've read "The Amoeba's Secret" thanks to you but I can't remember this part).

 

Intrinsic
randomness arises from the first person view of the operation of the
dovetailer.

I can see that, at least, I think it's similar to the idea of apparent randomness in many-worlds?

 

Perhaps what you're thinking of is oracles solving computationally
impossible problems, such as delivering the successive digits of the
Chaitin probablility Ω.

A corrolary of this is that a computational physics à la Konrad Zuse's
Rechnender Raum would rule out computationalism, and consequently
physical supervenience.

I can see how that follows from the first paragraph, but as mentioned I can't think how computational consciousness leads to non-computational physics (or exactly what that means).

[Liz R]

On Friday 13 September 2024 at 11:47:31 UTC+12 Bruce Kellett wrote:

On Fri, Sep 13, 2024 at 9:28 AM Liz R wrote:

Yes I wondered about that, but it's possible that physics isn't intrinsically random.

No, that isn't possible. Randomness is intrinsic, and not derivable from anything else.

This is the sort of thing that made me think of "oracles". What sort of physical (or mathematical) process could, at least in principle, be intrinsically random? (Rather than apparently random due to ignorance of an underlying lower-level deterministic mechanism.) An oracle that delivers the next digit in Chaitin's constant, as mentioned by Russell, might be the sort of thing - which could mean a suitable source of randomness in physics is the "universal dovetailer" or something similar.

It could be based on something computable, and only appear random from our perspective - presumbly some versions of many-worlds would fit the bill.

No, many-worlds is a decided failure as far as randomness is concerned. You cannot get intrinsic randomness as exhibited by quantum phenomena from a deterministic theory such as many-worlds.

I thought you could get the appearance of randomness from a first-person perspective in MW? Has that been shown to not work?

Also, although various attempts to show hidden variables have fallen down, it's always possible something of that sort might be involved that we haven't thought of yet.

That is just a cheap let-out: "It could be something we haven't thought of yet. There are very good reason to think that intrinsic randomness cannot arise from a deterministic theory.  You can get randomness from ignorance, as in classic statistical mechanics, but that is not intrinsic -- things are still deterministic if you have complete knowledge. Which is not the case in QM.

Well, yes - by definition, intrinsic randomness can't arise from a deterministic theory. However, I will wait for your ideas on the types of physical or mathematical processes that could lead to intrinsic randomness before commenting on this further, as I can't get past that first hurdle yet!

[Russell Standish]

On Thu, Sep 12, 2024 at 07:48:36PM -0700, Liz R wrote:
> On Friday 13 September 2024 at 12:20:01 UTC+12 Russell Standish wrote:
>
> One of the consequences of the universal dovetailer argument is that
> if conciousness is computational, then physics is not.
>
>
> That's interesting. I don't see how that could happen, would you mind
> elaborating? (I've read "The Amoeba's Secret" thanks to you but I can't
> remember this part).

Physics, as in what is observed - phenomenology. The universal
dovetailer will run all computations, so at each step where there is a
difference of computation, all branches are taken. To a conscious
entitity, the result will appear as an intrinsic random process -
there is no meaningful statement to say which ameoba is the original
one, they all are.

The only get out I can think of is if the "foundational reality"
(ontological layer) is sufficiently poor that it is incapable of
running a universal dovetailer. But in that case, it would show up in
observed physics, ie it would be impossible to imlement a universal
dovetailer in our reality - or any sort of universal Turing machine or
computer.

I don't think this consequence is written in Amoeba's Secret, as it
came out during discussions on this list which postdated Le secret de
l'amibe. It might be in my book, but I don't recall now :).

>
>  
>
> Intrinsic
> randomness arises from the first person view of the operation of the
> dovetailer.
>
>
> I can see that, at least, I think it's similar to the idea of apparent
> randomness in many-worlds?
>  

Yes.

>
> Perhaps what you're thinking of is oracles solving computationally
> impossible problems, such as delivering the successive digits of the
> Chaitin probablility Ω.
>
> A corrolary of this is that a computational physics à la Konrad Zuse's
> Rechnender Raum would rule out computationalism, and consequently
> physical supervenience.
>
>
> I can see how that follows from the first paragraph, but as mentioned I can't
> think how computational consciousness leads to non-computational physics (or
> exactly what that means).
>
>

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[Brent Meeker]

On 9/12/2024 8:23 PM, Russell Standish wrote:

On Thu, Sep 12, 2024 at 07:48:36PM -0700, Liz R wrote:

On Friday 13 September 2024 at 12:20:01 UTC+12 Russell Standish wrote:

    One of the consequences of the universal dovetailer argument is that
    if conciousness is computational, then physics is not.


That's interesting. I don't see how that could happen, would you mind
elaborating? (I've read "The Amoeba's Secret" thanks to you but I can't
remember this part).

Physics, as in what is observed - phenomenology. The universal
dovetailer will run all computations, so at each step where there is a
difference of computation, 

A difference between what and what?  In one thread and another...that must happen at almost every step.  Each thread is deterministic so why would it branch?

Brent

[Bruce Kellett]

On Fri, Sep 13, 2024 at 1:07 PM Liz R <liz...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Friday 13 September 2024 at 11:47:31 UTC+12 Bruce Kellett wrote:

On Fri, Sep 13, 2024 at 9:28 AM Liz R wrote:

Yes I wondered about that, but it's possible that physics isn't intrinsically random.

No, that isn't possible. Randomness is intrinsic, and not derivable from anything else.

This is the sort of thing that made me think of "oracles". What sort of physical (or mathematical) process could, at least in principle, be intrinsically random?

You might want to call intrinsic randomness an "oracle", but I don't really know what that means. Intrinsic randomness in physics would have to be a primitive, independent of other deterministic laws. The sort of thing that I have in mind is spontaneous collapse of the wave function, or the random 'flashes' of GRW theory.

(Rather than apparently random due to ignorance of an underlying lower-level deterministic mechanism.) An oracle that delivers the next digit in Chaitin's constant, as mentioned by Russell, might be the sort of thing - which could mean a suitable source of randomness in physics is the "universal dovetailer" or something similar.

 

 I don't see how the universal dovetaier could be a source of intrinsic randomness. It is strictly deterministic, and if you have branches as in many-worlds, choosing between the branches can be implemented only by some other intrinsically random process -- it can't be internally generated.

 

It could be based on something computable, and only appear random from our perspective - presumbly some versions of many-worlds would fit the bill.

No, many-worlds is a decided failure as far as randomness is concerned. You cannot get intrinsic randomness as exhibited by quantum phenomena from a deterministic theory such as many-worlds.

I thought you could get the appearance of randomness from a first-person perspective in MW? Has that been shown to not work?

I don't think that works. The idea often put forward is something along the lines of self-locating uncertainty -- out of all the branches, which one am I on? But that is only apparent randomness, and to get such an idea to work, you need to be able to make a random choice between branches. Such randomness will be intrinsic in that It doesn't come from anywhere else (it is not already part of the theory). So in order to generate such apparent randomness you actually need an independent source of intrinsic randomness (to be able to make your self-locating choice.)

Also, although various attempts to show hidden variables have fallen down, it's always possible something of that sort might be involved that we haven't thought of yet.

That is just a cheap let-out: "It could be something we haven't thought of yet. There are very good reason to think that intrinsic randomness cannot arise from a deterministic theory.  You can get randomness from ignorance, as in classic statistical mechanics, but that is not intrinsic -- things are still deterministic if you have complete knowledge. Which is not the case in QM.

Well, yes - by definition, intrinsic randomness can't arise from a deterministic theory. However, I will wait for your ideas on the types of physical or mathematical processes that could lead to intrinsic randomness before commenting on this further, as I can't get past that first hurdle yet!

Yes, by definition, intrinsic randomness cannot arise from a deterministic theory, so there are no physical processes of the common type known to date that can lead to it. One needs a separate source of intrinsic randomness. That is one of the strengths of GRW collapse theory: it is perhaps the only theory around at the moment that has an explanation of intrinsic randomness, since randomness is a primitive in that theory.  Other hidden variable theories, such as Bohmian Mechanics, can explain quantum randomness, but only as a consequence of ignorance about the influence of every other particle in the universe. That is still deterministic (though non-local), not intrinsic.

Bruce

[Alan Grayson]

Isn't Bohmian Mechanics a deterministic theory which reproduces the probability results of QM? AG 

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Fri, 13 Sept 2024 at 15:08, Bruce Kellett <bhkel...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Fri, Sep 13, 2024 at 1:07 PM Liz R <liz...@gmail.com> wrote:

I don't think that works. The idea often put forward is something along the lines of self-locating uncertainty -- out of all the branches, which one am I on? But that is only apparent randomness, and to get such an idea to work, you need to be able to make a random choice between branches. Such randomness will be intrinsic in that It doesn't come from anywhere else (it is not already part of the theory). So in order to generate such apparent randomness you actually need an independent source of intrinsic randomness (to be able to make your self-locating choice.)

The intrinsic randomness arises from the fact that it is impossible to predict which branch you will end up in, even for an omniscient being.

--

Stathis Papaioannou

[Bruce Kellett]

That is just a restatement of the traditional measurement problem. Self-locating uncertainty is not intrinsic randomness. What is it that selects which branch you are actually on? You need some means of random selection which is not included in the underlying theory. You have to add, by hand, some additional principle of randomness, such as the Born Rule.

Bruce

[Quentin Anciaux]

Could be the lenght of the program going through that state using a frequency sampling, shortest program going through that state have higher measure... the dovetailer run "more often" short programs than longer one

Bruce

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[Stathis Papaioannou]

Nothing selects which branch you will be on, since with certainty a version of you will end up in each branch. If the omniscient being predicts that you will end up in branch A, the prediction is wrong for the version of you in branch B, and if the omniscient being predicts that you will end up in branch B the prediction is wrong for the version of you in branch A. It is logically impossible to make an accurate prediction.

--

Stathis Papaioannou

[Bruce Kellett]

On Fri, Sep 13, 2024 at 5:18 PM Quentin Anciaux <allc...@gmail.com> wrote:

Le ven. 13 sept. 2024, 09:04, Bruce Kellett <bhkel...@gmail.com> a écrit :

On Fri, Sep 13, 2024 at 4:51 PM Stathis Papaioannou <stat...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Fri, 13 Sept 2024 at 15:08, Bruce Kellett <bhkel...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Fri, Sep 13, 2024 at 1:07 PM Liz R <liz...@gmail.com> wrote:

I don't think that works. The idea often put forward is something along the lines of self-locating uncertainty -- out of all the branches, which one am I on? But that is only apparent randomness, and to get such an idea to work, you need to be able to make a random choice between branches. Such randomness will be intrinsic in that It doesn't come from anywhere else (it is not already part of the theory). So in order to generate such apparent randomness you actually need an independent source of intrinsic randomness (to be able to make your self-locating choice.)

The intrinsic randomness arises from the fact that it is impossible to predict which branch you will end up in, even for an omniscient being.

That is just a restatement of the traditional measurement problem. Self-locating uncertainty is not intrinsic randomness. What is it that selects which branch you are actually on? You need some means of random selection which is not included in the underlying theory. You have to add, by hand, some additional principle of randomness, such as the Born Rule.

Could be the lenght of the program going through that state using a frequency sampling, shortest program going through that state have higher measure... the dovetailer run "more often" short programs than longer one

No. You still need the Born Rule: the Born rule has two aspects: It has an intrinsic notion of probability, and it relates probability to amplitudes of the wave function.

Bruce

[Bruce Kellett]

It is unfortunate, therefore, that all real experiments result in just one answer, which is the nub of the measurement problem. Which answer is unpredictable, but that does not mean that there can be some omniscient being that can predict your result. It is a matter of an intrinsic probability -- viz. the Born Rule.

Bruce

[Stathis Papaioannou]

The branching makes the outcome fundamentally unpredictable, which is what randomness is. It results from the branching and nothing else. It is not specific to QM or MWI: it results from any process where the observer branches.

 

--

Stathis Papaioannou

[Quentin Anciaux]

The thing is to recover the born rules, some frequency must be in play, some things are more likely than other, if you had to make a bet, it's important and you wouldn't bet every outcome is equally likely. 

 

--

Stathis Papaioannou

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[Bruce Kellett]

That is not randomness. Unpredictability might be a consequence of randomness, but they are not the same thing.

It results from the branching and nothing else. It is not specific to QM or MWI: it results from any process where the observer branches.

The problem with this approach is that it takes no account of probability. I can arrange things so that the probability of a particular result is, say, 0.7, and this can be verified with repeated experiments. If it is just a matter of the branching, then the probability is unity on every trial. So unpredictability and/or branching, in themselves, cannot account for probability.

Bruce

[Bruce Kellett]

On Fri, Sep 13, 2024 at 6:15 PM Quentin Anciaux <allc...@gmail.com> wrote:

Le ven. 13 sept. 2024, 10:12, Stathis Papaioannou <stat...@gmail.com> a écrit :

On Fri, 13 Sept 2024 at 17:30, Bruce Kellett <bhkel...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Fri, Sep 13, 2024 at 5:23 PM Stathis Papaioannou <stat...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Fri, 13 Sept 2024 at 15:08, Bruce Kellett <bhkel...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Fri, Sep 13, 2024 at 1:07 PM Liz R <liz...@gmail.com> wrote:

I don't think that works. The idea often put forward is something along the lines of self-locating uncertainty -- out of all the branches, which one am I on? But that is only apparent randomness, and to get such an idea to work, you need to be able to make a random choice between branches. Such randomness will be intrinsic in that It doesn't come from anywhere else (it is not already part of the theory). So in order to generate such apparent randomness you actually need an independent source of intrinsic randomness (to be able to make your self-locating choice.)

The intrinsic randomness arises from the fact that it is impossible to predict which branch you will end up in, even for an omniscient being.

That is just a restatement of the traditional measurement problem. Self-locating uncertainty is not intrinsic randomness. What is it that selects which branch you are actually on? You need some means of random selection which is not included in the underlying theory. You have to add, by hand, some additional principle of randomness, such as the Born Rule.

Nothing selects which branch you will be on, since with certainty a version of you will end up in each branch. If the omniscient being predicts that you will end up in branch A, the prediction is wrong for the version of you in branch B, and if the omniscient being predicts that you will end up in branch B the prediction is wrong for the version of you in branch A. It is logically impossible to make an accurate prediction.

It is unfortunate, therefore, that all real experiments result in just one answer, which is the nub of the measurement problem. Which answer is unpredictable, but that does not mean that there can be some omniscient being that can predict your result. It is a matter of an intrinsic probability -- viz. the Born Rule.

The branching makes the outcome fundamentally unpredictable, which is what randomness is. It results from the branching and nothing else. It is not specific to QM or MWI: it results from any process where the observer branches.

The thing is to recover the born rules, some frequency must be in play, some things are more likely than other, if you had to make a bet, it's important and you wouldn't bet every outcome is equally likely.

That is a very important point. You need to be able to take account of probability, and in QM the Born Rule does this. Unfortunately, many-worlds or branching models have great problems giving any sensible account of probability. Attempts, such as those of Carroll and Zurek, make use of the assumption that equal amplitudes have equal probabilities. When you think about it, this is essentially the Born Rule, since it introduces both the concept of probability, and relates it to amplitudes. Thus all such attempts in the context of many-worlds or other branching models, are inherently circular.

Bruce

[Stathis Papaioannou]

Stathis Papaioannou

On Fri, Sep 13, 2024 at 18:15 Quentin Anciaux <allc...@gmail.com> wrote:

Le ven. 13 sept. 2024, 10:12, Stathis Papaioannou <stat...@gmail.com> a écrit :

On Fri, 13 Sept 2024 at 17:30, Bruce Kellett <bhkel...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Fri, Sep 13, 2024 at 5:23 PM Stathis Papaioannou <stat...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Fri, 13 Sept 2024 at 15:08, Bruce Kellett <bhkel...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Fri, Sep 13, 2024 at 1:07 PM Liz R <liz...@gmail.com> wrote:

I don't think that works. The idea often put forward is something along the lines of self-locating uncertainty -- out of all the branches, which one am I on? But that is only apparent randomness, and to get such an idea to work, you need to be able to make a random choice between branches. Such randomness will be intrinsic in that It doesn't come from anywhere else (it is not already part of the theory). So in order to generate such apparent randomness you actually need an independent source of intrinsic randomness (to be able to make your self-locating choice.)

The intrinsic randomness arises from the fact that it is impossible to predict which branch you will end up in, even for an omniscient being.

That is just a restatement of the traditional measurement problem. Self-locating uncertainty is not intrinsic randomness. What is it that selects which branch you are actually on? You need some means of random selection which is not included in the underlying theory. You have to add, by hand, some additional principle of randomness, such as the Born Rule.

Nothing selects which branch you will be on, since with certainty a version of you will end up in each branch. If the omniscient being predicts that you will end up in branch A, the prediction is wrong for the version of you in branch B, and if the omniscient being predicts that you will end up in branch B the prediction is wrong for the version of you in branch A. It is logically impossible to make an accurate prediction.

It is unfortunate, therefore, that all real experiments result in just one answer, which is the nub of the measurement problem. Which answer is unpredictable, but that does not mean that there can be some omniscient being that can predict your result. It is a matter of an intrinsic probability -- viz. the Born Rule.

The branching makes the outcome fundamentally unpredictable, which is what randomness is. It results from the branching and nothing else. It is not specific to QM or MWI: it results from any process where the observer branches.

The thing is to recover the born rules, some frequency must be in play, some things are more likely than other, if you had to make a bet, it's important and you wouldn't bet every outcome is equally likely. 

Isn’t that separate from the question of whether the randomness an observer sees in MWI is truly random?

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Fri, 13 Sept 2024 at 18:25, Bruce Kellett <bhkel...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Fri, Sep 13, 2024 at 6:12 PM Stathis Papaioannou <stat...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Fri, 13 Sept 2024 at 17:30, Bruce Kellett <bhkel...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Fri, Sep 13, 2024 at 5:23 PM Stathis Papaioannou <stat...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Fri, 13 Sept 2024 at 15:08, Bruce Kellett <bhkel...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Fri, Sep 13, 2024 at 1:07 PM Liz R <liz...@gmail.com> wrote:

I don't think that works. The idea often put forward is something along the lines of self-locating uncertainty -- out of all the branches, which one am I on? But that is only apparent randomness, and to get such an idea to work, you need to be able to make a random choice between branches. Such randomness will be intrinsic in that It doesn't come from anywhere else (it is not already part of the theory). So in order to generate such apparent randomness you actually need an independent source of intrinsic randomness (to be able to make your self-locating choice.)

The intrinsic randomness arises from the fact that it is impossible to predict which branch you will end up in, even for an omniscient being.

That is just a restatement of the traditional measurement problem. Self-locating uncertainty is not intrinsic randomness. What is it that selects which branch you are actually on? You need some means of random selection which is not included in the underlying theory. You have to add, by hand, some additional principle of randomness, such as the Born Rule.

Nothing selects which branch you will be on, since with certainty a version of you will end up in each branch. If the omniscient being predicts that you will end up in branch A, the prediction is wrong for the version of you in branch B, and if the omniscient being predicts that you will end up in branch B the prediction is wrong for the version of you in branch A. It is logically impossible to make an accurate prediction.

It is unfortunate, therefore, that all real experiments result in just one answer, which is the nub of the measurement problem. Which answer is unpredictable, but that does not mean that there can be some omniscient being that can predict your result. It is a matter of an intrinsic probability -- viz. the Born Rule.

The branching makes the outcome fundamentally unpredictable, which is what randomness is.

That is not randomness. Unpredictability might be a consequence of randomness, but they are not the same thing.

Maybe they are. It is subject to debate.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/chance-randomness/

 

It results from the branching and nothing else. It is not specific to QM or MWI: it results from any process where the observer branches.

The problem with this approach is that it takes no account of probability. I can arrange things so that the probability of a particular result is, say, 0.7, and this can be verified with repeated experiments. If it is just a matter of the branching, then the probability is unity on every trial. So unpredictability and/or branching, in themselves, cannot account for probability.

Bruce

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Stathis Papaioannou

[scerir]

Randomness? What randomness?

Klaas Landsman

This is a review of the issue of randomness in quantum mechanics, with special emphasis on its ambiguity; for example, randomness has different antipodal relationships to determinism, computability, and compressibility. Following a (Wittgensteinian) philosophical discussion of randomness in general, I argue that deterministic interpretations of quantum mechanics (like Bohmian mechanics or 't Hooft's Cellular Automaton interpretation) are strictly speaking incompatible with the Born rule. I also stress the role of outliers, i.e. measurement outcomes that are not 1-random. Although these occur with low (or even zero) probability, their very existence implies that the no-signaling principle used in proofs of randomness of outcomes of quantum-mechanical measurements (and of the safety of quantum cryptography) should be reinterpreted statistically, like the second law of thermodynamics. In appendices I discuss the Born rule and its status in both single and repeated experiments, and review the notion of 1-randomness introduced by Kolmogorov, Chaitin, Martin-Lo"f, Schnorr, and others.

Comments:	32 pages, extended version of talk on July 11th, 2019 at the conference "From weak force to black hole thermodynamics and beyond" in Utrecht in honour of Gerard 't Hooft. v2 is significant revision with new Appendix C and various clarifications
Subjects:	History and Philosophy of Physics (physics.hist-ph); Mathematical Physics (math-ph); Quantum Physics (quant-ph)
Cite as:	arXiv:1908.07068 [physics.hist-ph]
	(or arXiv:1908.07068v2 [physics.hist-ph] for this version)

[Bruce Kellett]

No. Randomness includes the notion of a probability distribution.

Bruce

[Bruce Kellett]

On Fri, Sep 13, 2024 at 6:51 PM Stathis Papaioannou <stat...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Fri, 13 Sept 2024 at 18:25, Bruce Kellett <bhkel...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Fri, Sep 13, 2024 at 6:12 PM Stathis Papaioannou <stat...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Fri, 13 Sept 2024 at 17:30, Bruce Kellett <bhkel...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Fri, Sep 13, 2024 at 5:23 PM Stathis Papaioannou <stat...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Fri, 13 Sept 2024 at 15:08, Bruce Kellett <bhkel...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Fri, Sep 13, 2024 at 1:07 PM Liz R <liz...@gmail.com> wrote:

I don't think that works. The idea often put forward is something along the lines of self-locating uncertainty -- out of all the branches, which one am I on? But that is only apparent randomness, and to get such an idea to work, you need to be able to make a random choice between branches. Such randomness will be intrinsic in that It doesn't come from anywhere else (it is not already part of the theory). So in order to generate such apparent randomness you actually need an independent source of intrinsic randomness (to be able to make your self-locating choice.)

The intrinsic randomness arises from the fact that it is impossible to predict which branch you will end up in, even for an omniscient being.

That is just a restatement of the traditional measurement problem. Self-locating uncertainty is not intrinsic randomness. What is it that selects which branch you are actually on? You need some means of random selection which is not included in the underlying theory. You have to add, by hand, some additional principle of randomness, such as the Born Rule.

Nothing selects which branch you will be on, since with certainty a version of you will end up in each branch. If the omniscient being predicts that you will end up in branch A, the prediction is wrong for the version of you in branch B, and if the omniscient being predicts that you will end up in branch B the prediction is wrong for the version of you in branch A. It is logically impossible to make an accurate prediction.

It is unfortunate, therefore, that all real experiments result in just one answer, which is the nub of the measurement problem. Which answer is unpredictable, but that does not mean that there can be some omniscient being that can predict your result. It is a matter of an intrinsic probability -- viz. the Born Rule.

The branching makes the outcome fundamentally unpredictable, which is what randomness is.

That is not randomness. Unpredictability might be a consequence of randomness, but they are not the same thing.

Maybe they are. It is subject to debate.

Just because something is debated does not mean that the issue is not clear.

Bruce

[Stathis Papaioannou]

Stathis Papaioannou

If the probability of an event is 0 or 1 it is determined, otherwise  it is random. 

[Quentin Anciaux]

There must be some kind of measure, if none, and everything happens with the same weight how can that account for what we see... i don't expect to transform in a tea pot the next second... so some kind of measure is at play.

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[John Clark]

On Thu, Sep 12, 2024 at 12:40 AM Liz R <liz...@gmail.com> wrote:

>  physics is possibly isomorphic to some set of equations that describe reality, 

I agree, and that's why physics is the language of mathematics, it's very good at describing things. An equation can describe how system X, that is made of mass/energy, can in an interval of time change into something different, system Y.  But a language by itself can't do anything because neither mathematics nor the English language can change with time unless there is a brain made of atoms to think about them. Neither intelligence nor consciousness can exist without something changing with time. The symbols that make up mathematical equations can't change with time, but carbon atoms can, so you can erase a symbol in an equation that you penciled in and lay down a different pattern of carbon atoms that represents a different symbol.

> Occam suggests that we don't actually need reality to exist, only the equations.

Modern philosophers define "reality" as a substance that actually exists in an external world, and they define "existence" as the state of having "reality". And round and round we go.That's why I say in the modern age it's mathematicians and physicists who are in the vanguard of the investigation into the fundamental nature of reality, while those who write "philosopher" on their tax forms when it asks about occupation are really in the synonym business not the philosophy business.  

And I would also maintain that the semiconductor industry is an existence proof that equations alone are not sufficient because they can't DO anything. If you want to actually DO something, that is to say if you want to make a change over a period of time, then you're going to need mass/energy.

John K Clark    See what's on my new list at  Extropolis

epm

[Stathis Papaioannou]

How would you describe the difference between a deterministic and indeterministic model?

--

Stathis Papaioannou

[Alan Grayson]

On my first reading, I didn't notice that BK dealt with the issue of Bohmian Mechanics; that it deals with probability by assuming it's a consequence of ignorance about the influence of every other particle in the universe. My take on the issue of irreducible randomness is that it implies that the universe is unintelligible. I think the human mind can only understand causality in the context of determinism, where rules exist, called Laws of Nature,  which produce specific outcomes of experiments. But QM offers no rules AFAICT, when it comes to measurement. Moreover, determinism is dead, given the Uncertainty Principle. So we're worse off than being between a rock and a hard place. What we need and want is a deterministic theory for measurement, but we're denied that by virtue of the Uncertainty Principle. AG  

[Brent Meeker]

That seems to assume there is only one real you who ends up on only one thread.

Brent

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[Brent Meeker]

On 9/13/2024 12:18 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

Le ven. 13 sept. 2024, 09:04, Bruce Kellett <bhkel...@gmail.com> a écrit :

On Fri, Sep 13, 2024 at 4:51 PM Stathis Papaioannou <stat...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Fri, 13 Sept 2024 at 15:08, Bruce Kellett <bhkel...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Fri, Sep 13, 2024 at 1:07 PM Liz R <liz...@gmail.com> wrote:

I don't think that works. The idea often put forward is something along the lines of self-locating uncertainty -- out of all the branches, which one am I on? But that is only apparent randomness, and to get such an idea to work, you need to be able to make a random choice between branches. Such randomness will be intrinsic in that It doesn't come from anywhere else (it is not already part of the theory). So in order to generate such apparent randomness you actually need an independent source of intrinsic randomness (to be able to make your self-locating choice.)

The intrinsic randomness arises from the fact that it is impossible to predict which branch you will end up in, even for an omniscient being.

That is just a restatement of the traditional measurement problem. Self-locating uncertainty is not intrinsic randomness. What is it that selects which branch you are actually on? You need some means of random selection which is not included in the underlying theory. You have to add, by hand, some additional principle of randomness, such as the Born Rule.

Could be the lenght of the program going through that state using a frequency sampling, shortest program going through that state have higher measure... the dovetailer run "more often" short programs than longer one

That would provide relative measures, but then under the assumption of probabilistic selection.  I doubt you could make them match the Born rule.

Brent

[Brent Meeker]

Remember MWI is just a theory.  There are no known processes in which any observer (or even a non-observer) branches; which is one reason to doubt MWI.

Brent

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Sat, Sep 14, 2024 at 06:42 Brent Meeker <meeke...@gmail.com> wrote:

That seems to assume there is only one real you who ends up on only one thread.

I can’t help the fact that I feel I am the unique continuation of the original who got there randomly. There seems to be a nuance in the word “randomly” the way some people are using it here that I am missing: that it’s isn’t really random if there is a particular type of probability distribution?

[John Clark]

On Fri, Sep 13, 2024 at 1:08 AM Bruce Kellett <bhkel...@gmail.com> wrote:

>> I thought you could get the appearance of randomness from a first-person perspective in MW? Has that been shown to not work?

> I don't think that works. The idea often put forward is something along the lines of self-locating uncertainty -- out of all the branches, which one am I on? But that is only apparent randomness,

True. Schrodinger's wave function is completely deterministic so if you knew the wave function for the entire universe then nothing would be random, but of course we don't know the universal wave function and never will. 

 

> and to get such an idea to work, you need to be able to make a random choice between branches.

Choice has nothing to do with it. The one and only assumption Many Worlds makes is that everything always follows Schrodinger's equation.  And that means that everything consistent with that equation will happen. And you turning right is consistent with Schrodinger so that will happen, and you turning left is consistent with Schrodinger so that will happen, but an electron turning into a proton is not consistent with Schrodinger so that will never happen. If Many Worlds is correct then randomness is just apparent, not objectively intrinsic.

 

> GRW collapse theory: it is perhaps the only theory around at the moment that has an explanation of intrinsic randomness,

I think Many Worlds is probably correct but of course I can't be certain, and I have to give credit to GRW and other intrinsic collapse theories because they make experimentaly testable predictions. I doubt it will happen but if their predictions turn out to be true then there is no wiggle room, they will have proved that Many Worlds is dead wrong. However they do not give an explanation for randomness, GRW and related theories just stick in additional stuff, including two new constants of nature, into Schrödinger's Wave Equation that generates randomness. And the constants were not picked for any theoretical reason, instead it was completely ad hoc;  if those two  constants were any larger we would have already detected them, and if they were any smaller they would be too small to get the job done. 

Getting back to "choice", there are only two possibilities, you did what you did for a reason or you did what you did for no reason. If Many Worlds is correct then there is always a reason why you did what you did, although you may not know what it is. If GRW is correct then some effects have no cause. Time will tell which is right.  

John K Clark    See what's on my new list at  Extropolis

twt

[Brent Meeker]

On 9/13/2024 4:25 AM, John Clark wrote:

On Thu, Sep 12, 2024 at 12:40 AM Liz R <liz...@gmail.com> wrote:

>  physics is possibly isomorphic to some set of equations that describe reality, 

I agree, and that's why physics is the language of mathematics, it's very good at describing things. An equation can describe how system X, that is made of mass/energy, can in an interval of time change into something different, system Y.  But a language by itself can't do anything because neither mathematics nor the English language can change with time unless there is a brain made of atoms to think about them.

Language is representation.  Its "energy" can't do work either.  Its "distance" isn't far away whatever you think about it.  And mathematics doesn't change just because you think about it.

Neither intelligence nor consciousness can exist without something changing with time.

I think you're just making a philosophical position out of a tautology change=>time.  You might as well add motion=>distance and heating=>temperature.

The symbols that make up mathematical equations can't change with time,

They can't change with distance either, or the ink used, or motion,...  But their meaning changes in different applications.
 

but carbon atoms can, so you can erase a symbol in an equation that you penciled in and lay down a different pattern of carbon atoms that represents a different symbol.

> Occam suggests that we don't actually need reality to exist, only the equations.

Modern philosophers define "reality" as a substance that actually exists in an external world, and they define "existence" as the state of having "reality". And round and round we go.That's why I say in the modern age it's mathematicians and physicists who are in the vanguard of the investigation into the fundamental nature of reality, while those who write "philosopher" on their tax forms when it asks about occupation are really in the synonym business not the philosophy business.  

And I would also maintain that the semiconductor industry is an existence proof that equations alone are not sufficient because they can't DO anything.

The existence of something that's not equations alone and does something, is not a proof that nothing is done by equations alone.  It's a proof that at least one thing requires more than equations to be done. 

If you want to actually DO something, that is to say if you want to make a change over a period of time, then you're going to need mass/energy.

Actually those are conserved.  What you need is low entropy energy.

Brent

[Brent Meeker]

On 9/13/2024 2:00 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On Sat, Sep 14, 2024 at 06:42 Brent Meeker <meeke...@gmail.com> wrote:

That seems to assume there is only one real you who ends up on only one thread.

I can’t help the fact that I feel I am the unique continuation of the original who got there randomly.

Then you can't help feeling that MWI is wrong.

There seems to be a nuance in the word “randomly” the way some people are using it here that I am missing: that it’s isn’t really random if there is a particular type of probability distribution?

If a variable is random there must be a probability distribution.  But not necessarily one we know.

Brent

[Bruce Kellett]

On Fri, Sep 13, 2024 at 6:12 PM Stathis Papaioannou <stat...@gmail.com> wrote:

The branching makes the outcome fundamentally unpredictable, which is what randomness is. It results from the branching and nothing else. It is not specific to QM or MWI: it results from any process where the observer branches.

One of the troubles with this is that it takes no account of probability -- the fact that some outcomes might be more or less likely than others. The outcome on any one trial may be unpredictable for the branching individual, but unpredictability is not random selection from a distribution. If you do not take probabilities into account you cannot understand the correlations that exist between outcomes on repeated trials.

Bruce

[John Clark]

On Fri, Sep 13, 2024 at 5:51 PM Brent Meeker <meeke...@gmail.com> wrote:

 >> physics is the language of mathematics, it's very good at describing things. An equation can describe how system X, that is made of mass/energy, can in an interval of time change into something different, system Y.  But a language by itself can't do anything because neither mathematics nor the English language can change with time unless there is a brain made of atoms to think about them.

> Language is representation. 

 Yes, as I said mathematics is "very good at describing things".

 

> Its "energy" can't do work either.  Its "distance" isn't far away whatever you think about it. 

Work is force over a "distance", but for the very concept of "distance" to be meaningful it must have four properties: 

1) The distance between X and Y must be greater than or equal to zero for all X and Y.

2) The distance between X and Y equals zero if and only if X=Y.

3) The distance between X and Y must be the same as the  distance between Y and X.

4) The distance between X and Z must be less than or equal to the distance between X and Y plus the distance between Y and Z, for all X, Y, and Z.

The real numbers and the complex numbers all have the above four properties so they could be used to measure "distance" BUT it turns out there is another fundamentally different type of number that also has those four properties called P-adic numbers.  For any prime number p, is a p-adic number system and in those systems the size of a number does not depend on how far it is from zero but by how the visible that number is by powers of P. It can lead to some unintuitive results, in the 5-adic system, 25 is smaller than 5.

But if both the Real Numbers and the P-adic numbers are equally consistent why don't we start teaching first graders about P-adic numbers? Because the real numbers are extremely useful in physics, a.k.a. the physical world, but the  P-adic numbers are almost useless in physics, although they are helpful  in pure mathematics, Andrew Wiles used them to prove Fermat's Last Theorem,

> mathematics doesn't change just because you think about it.

Yes but that's the problem, the very fact that mathematics doesn't change in time is the reason it can't produce intelligence or consciousness. Physics is needed for that.

>> Neither intelligence nor consciousness can exist without something changing with time.

>I think you're just making a philosophical position out of a tautology change=>time. 

The great thing about tautologies is that all of them are 100% true.  

You might as well add motion=>distance and heating=>temperature.

I can imagine that an intelligent conscious being might not be changing its position in space, and it might not be changing its temperature, but I can't imagine an intelligent conscious being not changing its thoughts in time. The trouble with pure mathematics is that it's timeless. 

>> The symbols that make up mathematical equations can't change with time,

> They can't change with distance either, or the ink used, or motion,...  But their meaning changes in different applications.

"Meaning" does not "mean" anything unless there is an intelligent conscious being around because they are the only ones that are in the meaning conferring business.   

> Modern philosophers define "reality" as a substance that actually exists in an external world, and they define "existence" as the state of having "reality". And round and round we go.That's why I say in the modern age it's mathematicians and physicists who are in the vanguard of the investigation into the fundamental nature of reality, while those who write "philosopher" on their tax forms when it asks about occupation are really in the synonym business not the philosophy business.  And I would also maintain that the semiconductor industry is an existence proof that equations alone are not sufficient because they can't DO anything. And I would also maintain that the semiconductor industry is an existence proof that equations alone are not sufficient because they can't DO anything.

> The existence of something that's not equations alone and does something, is not a proof that nothing is done by equations alone. It's a proof that at least one thing requires more than equations to be done. 

It's proof that if you want something that can  DO things, anything, then it's going to need to have Physics up its sleeve because pure mathematics is not sufficient. 

>> If you want to actually DO something, that is to say if you want to make a change over a period of time, then you're going to need mass/energy.

> Actually those are conserved.  What you need is low entropy energy.

 

Conservation is irrelevant. What you need if you want to produce intelligence or consciousness is an arrangement of atoms that can process information; those configurations tend to be low entropy but that's not important. Information can have low entropy too but information can't process itself without the help of atoms regardless of if it's low entropy or high. 

  John K Clark    See what's on my new list at  Extropolis

6d4

[Brent Meeker]

On 9/14/2024 10:02 AM, John Clark wrote:

Work is force over a "distance", but for the very concept of "distance" to be meaningful it must have four properties: 

No. "Distance" is a word.  Work is force acting over distance.

Brent