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    arthur garbayo <arthur...@gmail.com> Feb 11 08:03PM -0200  

    [image: Morgan Stanley]
     
    Brazil
    *How Much Lower Can Rates Go? *
    February 01, 2012
     
    By Gray Newman <http://www.morganstanley.com/views/gef/team/index.html#anchorgraynewman>|
    New York & Arthur Carvalho | Sao Paulo
     
    *Gray Newman:* *Arthur, with Carnaval less than a month away, a lot of
    investors I speak with believe that Brazilians have a new reason to
    celebrate. Just this past week Brazil's central bank stated that there was
    an "elevated probability" that the target Selic interest rate was on its
    way to single-digits.* For over a decade now we've been waiting to see
    single-digit interest rates in Brazil and they've never materialised except
    in 2009 (and early 2010) when we were in the midst of a global recession.
     
    I don't mean to put you on the spot, but you don't seem to be joining in
    the celebration. You have the Selic reaching 10% this year. Why the
    caution? Did I misread the minutes?
     
    *Arthur Carvalho:* *Thanks Gray. Today, we're adjusting our forecast for
    the Selic interest rate to reach 9.75%,* down from our previous forecast of
    10%. But you are right; even with our new forecast, we are maintaining a
    more cautious stance.
     
    *I think there are a couple of issues here. First, I agree that the
    minutes from last week are fairly clear: Brazil's central bank would like
    to bring interest rates to single-digits.* But my job is to forecast what
    I believe that the central bank will end up doing, not what it wants to
    do. You can argue that some members of the central bank's board would like
    to do much more in cutting rates, but I think there is a limit as to how
    far they will go. And I suspect we are already nearly there.
     
    *Second, remember that we've seen time and time again that the central bank
    has often followed up a statement that was viewed by the market as too
    hawkish with a statement that was a bit more dovish.* If you remember in
    the last week of December, many read the quarterly Inflation Report as very
    hawkish. The language from last week's minutes may in part be in response
    to this.
     
    *Gray Newman:* Arthur, I understand your second point about the central
    bank wanting to fine-tune its message and the need it has to balance out
    perceptions when the market starts to move too far in one direction or
    another. But the language in the minutes was pretty clear. The central
    bank seems to be on its way to a 9% handle - a view I've been highlighting
    for a long time - or even lower.
     
    *Arthur Carvalho:* *I'll give you that. While I was looking for a dovish
    set of minutes to offset the more hawkish tone of the Inflation Report, I
    was surprised as well as just how dovish the minutes sounded. *But that
    brings me back to my first point: my job is to determine what the central
    bank will do, not what it would like to do. And on that front, it's worth
    re-looking at Brazil's inflation dynamic
     
    *Year-on-year inflation should slow in the coming months due to base
    effects and to some extent during the whole year due to the new weights,* given
    the components of the IPCA measure of inflation. You will recall that food
    inflation was heavily influenced last year by supply shocks that are being
    replaced by much more benign readings this year. This should take
    inflation from the current 6.5% to 5.3% or even slightly lower depending on
    the harvest, although the weather of late has not been cooperating - we've
    been suffering from a new bout of drought. But listen, I'm not a
    meteorologist and could be surprised.
     
    *But after this base effect plays out, I expect that inflation will stall
    around 5.3% to 5.5%,* and this should end the downward trend that has been
    giving the false impression that Brazil's inflation problem is over.
     
    *Meanwhile on the growth front - which seems to be the other implicit goal
    from the central bank - things look significantly better.* The epicenter of
    softer growth was in 3Q and was largely concentrated in the industrial
    sector that was undergoing an inventory correction that led to flat GDP
    reading in that quarter. Although demand softened compared with the pace
    seen in early 2011 (due to tightening measures), it was still stronger than
    supply. I'd argue that the resilience on the demand side can be attributed
    to the labor market strength we've been highlighting (see "Brazil: The
    Cyclical and Structural Inflation Dilemma", *This Week in Latin America*,
    January 23, 2012). Unemployment is now at record-low levels - it reached
    4.7% in December - and real wages that looked softer in 3Qr were up 2.6% in
    real terms in December, hardly a worrisome scenario for domestic demand.
     
    *I have no doubt that the central bank would like to take the Selic to
    single-digits, what central bank would not? But the central bank's goal is
    to ‘control' inflation,* not simply reduce the interest rate and then face
    a greater inflation problem later.
     
    *I am expecting another 50bp cut to 10% at the March meeting, followed by a
    last 25bp cut in April,* given that now it will be politically costly to
    take back the single-digit rates promise. But the notion that in late May
    the central bank can continue to cut when faced with stronger growth data
    and stable inflation well above the 4.5% target seems unlikely even for our
    currently dovish central bank.
     
    And remember Gray, just a few weeks ago, I was being criticized for being
    too dovish. If you look at the DI curve in January right before the
    central bank announced the last 50bp cut, it was pricing in the final cut
    to 10.25% while I was forecasting that the authorities were on their way
    lower still to 10%.
     
    *Gray Newman:* *Fair enough Arthur. We've seen the market swing from one
    end to the other on the rates call in Brazil.* I remember this time last
    year when you were arguing that the market was misdiagnosing Brazil's
    inflation problem. Rather than focus on the underlying uptrend in service
    prices, many had fallen into an easy extrapolation from a handful of beef
    and produce shocks to headline inflation. That easy extrapolation then
    collapsed.
     
    And despite my first question about why you had only modestly adjusted your
    10% forecast for the Selic rate to 9.75%, I actually agree that the real
    issue here is not whether the central bank goes to 9.75% or to the 9% range.
     
    *The way I see it, Brazil has been facing two challenges. The first is a
    structural challenge of how to live with a strong currency* which is
    damaging Brazil's industrial base while boosting consumption (the Growth
    Mismatch). There is nothing wrong with counter-cyclical policy, but the
    Growth Mismatch is a structural issue that is unlikely to be resolved by
    adopting counter-cyclical policy.
     
    *And the second challenge is a cyclical one seen most intensely during
    3Q11, *which was primarily concentrated in weakening output as demand from
    abroad suffered. Again there is nothing wrong with engaging in
    counter-cyclical policy, but in Brazil's case it appears that the shortfall
    was more a matter of output suffering due to external factors than because
    domestic demand had collapsed.
     
    *Arthur Carvalho:** Indeed, here's what I've been telling investors since
    late last year: Be prepared for the Growth Mismatch to reemerge in 2012.*
    That was a harder sell in November than it is today. At the time, I had to
    argue that Brazil would see a rebound in stronger domestic demand in 2012
    based on the policy response.
     
    *Although many have doubts about how effective monetary policy is in
    Brazil, I am actually a believer.* The tightening cycle did slow down
    credit in 2011. More importantly, macro-prudential measures shifted credit
    growth towards overdraft and credit cards, rather than auto and personal
    loans. And now the central bank is reversing itself on most of this; right
    now we are on the exact opposite side of the early 2011 story. Monetary
    policy is as loose as it has been in the past 15 years. It takes time, but
    this stimulus should be kicking in later in 1Q. I am hearing everywhere
    from auto sales picking up to banks saying that they are already passing
    through the softer credit standards. It worked to slow down consumer
    demand, and it should now work to boost demand as well.
     
    *Also, do not forget the impact that the minimum wage will have in
    consumption: not only is the labor market in a multi-decade tight level,
    but in February the minimum wage paid will also be 14.1% higher than the
    month before.* We hear estimates that 44 million Brazilians earn a minimum
    wage. And remember that more than half of those - around 25 million - are
    pensioners with little or no marginal propensity to save. Yes, we should
    hear a fiscal announcement over the next few weeks with significant budget
    cuts, but even if the authorities announce an R$60 billion cut, expenditure
    will grow above 10% this year. And last but not least, the development
    bank, BNDES, has just received a new round of fresh capital to continue to
    expand its balance sheet, and we can already see evidence of a pick-up on
    BNDES loan expansion in December's credit data. All this will be much more
    evident in 2Q, exactly when the single-digit Selic is set to appear.
     
    *Gray Newman:* As you know Arthur, whenever you use the phrase the Growth
    Mismatch, you've got me on board. But let me play devil's advocate here
    for a minute. While our US economics team is still working through the
    tension between FOMC members' projections for the fed funds rate and the
    official FOMC statement, it remains of the view that the Fed is paving the
    way for QE3. It's easy to imagine a world in which the Fed and the ECB
    remain very accommodative for a long time, which, in turn, could put
    pressure on commodity prices higher and the Brazilian *real* to strengthen
    further.
     
    *Can't you argue that Brazil's central bank is simply trying to stave off
    excessive inflows to Brazil with its more dovish tone?* After all, the
    Brazilian central bank hardly appears to be alone. The Chilean central
    bank surprised Luis Arcentales earlier in January with a rate cut. Luis
    has long argued the Chileans would ease rates, just not in January, given
    stronger-than-expected inflation prints. And if you read the January 20
    communiqué from Mexico's central bank, it was about as dovish as you could
    imagine without cutting interest rates. After having warned of FX
    pass-through in December, Banco de Mexico now downplayed it as a risk. In
    fact, Banco de Mexico went so far as to remove the specific reference to
    the exchange rate as a factor that needed to be "closely monitored" and
    repeated its line that the next move could be an easing, given more
    accommodative stances of central banks in the developed world.
     
    *Arthur Carvalho:** I have no doubt that the authorities are concerned
    about rising commodity prices and inflows to Brazil.* The exchange rate
    seems to be crucial to the new industrial policy that aims to save
    embattled domestic-oriented industries. Clearly, every time the Fed and
    ECB signal further quantitative easing, these generate concerns, but not
    all concerns lead to the conclusion that rates should be cut further.
    Remember in 2010 a big part of the inflows from foreign capital was
    actually being channelled to consumer credit, given that banks were raising
    capital abroad and expanding their balance sheets domestically. And higher
    commodities prices can also be inflationary. So, to imagine that the
    central bank will simply react by cutting interest rates aggressively could
    complicate things further for Brazil. Indeed, I don't think lower rates
    will be the primary tool to avoid currency appreciation.
     
    *Gray Newman:* Just to be clear here Arthur, the central bank is going to
    have a difficult time now backtracking on the suggestion that Brazil is
    heading to a single-digit Selic target. Once you are that explicit, it is
    hard to stop short.
     
    *Is part of the intent of the minutes to slow down the gains of the
    Brazilian real?* Can you imagine a much stronger *real *prompting interest
    rate cuts to the 8% range or lower? What could come next?
     
    *Arthur Carvalho:** I think that a much more dovish central bank could lead
    to a weaker currency, but in order to actually end the carry trade, the
    authorities would have to reduce rates much more aggressively than my
    target of 9.75%* or your talk of rates closer to 9%. Are we on our way to
    8% or lower? I don't think so. This would in turn create too much
    stimulus for domestic demand and would result in an even further
    acceleration in services prices and eventually in headline inflation. The
    administration has been quite clear when it comes to dealing with inflows
    and currency appreciation. I would not be surprised if it hikes even
    further the IOF in derivatives, which it perceives as the most important
    channel for *real* strengthening.
     
    *Gray Newman:* OK, I think I understand you. You have interest rates
    moving lower for three reasons: first, that is what the central bank has
    signaled; second, the base effect is allowing for a temporary downward
    trend in the year-over-year numbers; and third, the softness in the economy
    - largely due to an external shock - has been enough to keep expectations
    largely in check. But that puts you in a fairly uncomfortable position.
    You don't have inflation returning to the 4.5% target anytime soon,
    certainly not in 2012. Doesn't that raise the risks that inflation could
    move higher along with expectations and that the authorities could be
    forced to hike interest rates in 2013?
     
    *Arthur Carvalho:** Although we are forecasting a much more benign headline
    inflation path that will be below 5.5% for a good part of the year, core
    inflation will likely continue to be above 6.0%* and raises questions about
    the appropriateness of the policy stance. But I don't expect the central
    bank to reverse course and hike in 2012. Headline inflation should be
    lower due to a series of one-off effects such as energy prices revision and
    no bus fare hikes due to municipal elections. On top of that, I am
    assuming that food prices will behave well. Of course, if there is any
    supply shock on the food chain, we could have a headline number
    accelerating very sharply, and it could get above 6% in a couple months.
    Let's hope that the possible QE that our European and US teams are
    expecting doesn't have the same impact as it did on commodity prices in
    2010.
     
    *Finally, I believe that growth was behind most of the aggressive easing
    cycle in 2011: many of those fears should be tamed as we see stronger data
    on the activity front.* I believe that by April there will be enough data
    to prompt a smaller 25bp cut to 9.75%, although not enough to signal the
    end of the cycle. But by late May, I believe that it will be increasingly
    hard to justify continuing to stimulate an economy with a significantly
    better growth outlook knowing that monetary policy lags from six to nine
    months.
     
    *But I do think that a hike in interest rates will be necessary in 2013:
    we're looking for rates to move back up to 11%. * You'll notice that the
    hiking cycle in 2013 is smaller in part because I suspect that the
    authorities will opt for a mixed approach using both macro-prudential
    measures as well as the Selic. Again, all of this is assuming that the
    world continues to muddle through. If this is the case, I expect that the
    Brazilian economy will continue to accelerate through 2012, and this should
    continue to pressure services prices. As you mentioned, this will most
    likely de-anchor inflation expectations and pose a risk to headline
    inflation in 2013.
     
    *Gray Newman:** I cannot help but worry a bit here about two things in
    2012, long before we get to 2013. First, we could be setting ourselves up
    for Growth Mismatch in overdrive.* Imagine a return to strong inflows
    pressuring the currency

     

    arthur garbayo <arthur...@gmail.com> Feb 11 07:57PM -0200  

    [image: Morgan Stanley]
     
    [image: Global Economic Forum]
     
    India
    *How Global Funding Environment Influences India's Growth Trend?*
    February 08, 2012
     
    By Chetan Ahya <http://www.morganstanley.com/views/gef/team/index.html#anchorchetanahya>|
    Hong Kong & Upasana Chachra | Mumbai
     
    Over the last few months, we have been highlighting that India's growth
    outlook will be influenced by two key macro factors: (a) the global funding
    environment and its impact on capital inflows into India; and (b) domestic
    challenges in the form of (i) weak domestic macro stability, which reduces
    the room for aggressive counter-cyclical monetary or fiscal policy, and
    (ii) a weak macro environment, which is not conducive for quick revival in
    the investment cycle. In this note, we are reiterating our framework on how
    and why the global funding environment influences India's growth trend.
     
     
    *Capital Inflows - A Critical Macro Link:*
     
    *#1 Funding the Current Account Deficit*
     
    Since the credit crisis, India's current account deficit has widened and
    moved to a range of 2.5-3% of GDP from 1-1.5% of GDP earlier. We believe
    that the government's desire to stimulate domestic demand (with
    expansionary fiscal policy) at a time when external demand has been
    relatively slow has been the most important factor behind the wider current
    account deficit. Indeed, India is the only country in the region running a
    current account deficit. During the 12 months ending December 2011, we
    estimate that India will run a current account deficit of US$53 billion,
    -2.8% of GDP.
     
    Moreover, India's dependence on less stable non-FDI inflows to fund its
    current account is high. For the three years ending F2012 (year ending
    March 2012), we estimate that about 76% of the total capital inflows of
    US$184 billion have been from non-FDI inflows, including commercial loans,
    trade credit and portfolio equity inflows. Indeed, the dependence on
    debt-creating inflows has been much higher in recent years, given that the
    share of debt-creating inflows averaged only 44% in the 10-year period of
    F2001-10.
     
    While India manages to fund its current account deficit with ease when
    global financial markets are relatively benign, in times of uncertainty,
    the high reliance on capital inflows to fund its current account deficit
    will bring the challenges of managing balance of payments and exchange rate
    volatility.
     
    *#2 Large Net FX Outflows or Inflows Affect Domestic Liquidity Conditions*
     
    As the current account is in deficit, a slowdown in capital inflows will
    result in net foreign exchange (FX) outflows. The net FX outflows will
    cause a deceleration in reserve money growth. Moreover, any intervention in
    the FX market (selling dollars) to prevent excessive currency depreciation
    will result in tightening in domestic liquidity conditions. Indeed, as
    capital inflows slowed during August-December, reserve money growth has
    suffered. While there has been a rise in the money multiplier (which has
    helped to offset part of the deceleration in money supply), the growth in
    money supply (M3) decelerated from 17.3% in August to 15.8% currently.
     
    This deceleration in money supply growth has kept interbank liquidity
    conditions tight. Over the last few months, interbank liquidity has been
    persistently higher than the central bank's comfort limit of US$12 billion
    (about 1% of net time and demand liabilities). Although the RBI could have
    injected liquidity through open market operations and a reduction in the
    cash reserve ratio, the trailing inflation problem has meant that the RBI
    has had to err on the side of being conservative and was not able to
    pre-emptively inject liquidity in an aggressive manner.
     
    *#3 Commercial Sector Funding Is Highly Dependent on Capital Inflows*
     
    Foreign capital has been a key contributor to overall commercial sector
    funding in India. The direct contribution of various sources of capital
    inflows including portfolio equity inflows, foreign debt and FDI has been
    about 26% in F2012 (up to December) as per the RBI. Hence, the trend in
    capital inflows weighs heavily on the trend of investment growth in the
    country. Moreover, portfolio equity inflows and global capital market
    movement also influence the risk capital allocation behaviour in the
    domestic market. A high share of foreign ownership has meant that domestic
    stock market movements have been highly linked to the trend in global risk
    appetite and portfolio equity flows. This, in turn, influences the
    corporate sentiment for risk capital allocation behaviour and investment
    sentiment.
     
    *Great Monetary Easing Part 2 (GME2) to Reduce Funding Risks?*
     
    As our Co-Head of Global Economics, Joachim Fels, highlights, we are
    entering a second round of monetary easing which "will be aimed at
    minimising recession risks, preventing deflation and helping governments to
    stabilise debts and deficits" (for more details, see *Sunday Start, What
    Next in the Global Economy*, January 22, 2012). Indeed, we have already
    begun to see signs of this monetary easing around the world. On November
    30, 2011, to ease the dollar funding problems of European banks, the
    Federal Reserve, along with the ECB, Bank of Japan, Bank of England, Swiss
    National Bank and Bank of Canada "agreed to lower the pricing on the
    existing temporary U.S. dollar liquidity swap arrangements by 50 basis
    points so that the new rate will be the U.S. dollar overnight index swap
    (OIS) rate plus 50 basis points". Moreover, our colleagues in Europe
    believe that the first Long-Term Refinancing Operations (LTRO) conducted by
    the ECB has significantly reduced the risk of a systemic banking crisis
    (for more details, see *Don't Underestimate the Impact of the LTROs*,
    January 18, 2012).
     
    Looking ahead, our global economics team expects meaningful easing measures
    from both the ECB and the Fed in the near term. In Europe, our colleagues
    expect that the second round of LTRO (due in February) could add an
    incremental €200-450 billion of additional funding into the banking system
    (for more details, see *LTROs Underestimated, but Great Deleveraging Ongoing
    *, February 2, 2012). This would then be followed up by a further 50bp
    policy rate cuts by the ECB in 1Q12 and eventually culminate in
    "broad-based asset purchases across countries and maturities only if it had
    exhausted its standard policy tools and still saw downside risks to price
    stability". In the US, our economics team expects the Fed to announce a
    third round of quantitative easing (QE3) of roughly US$500-750 billion in
    April-May 2012.
     
    The measures taken by the central banks in the developed world so far are
    beginning to reduce the global funding risks. This stabilisation in funding
    risks has been manifested in a narrowing of the Libor-OIS spreads to 42bp
    from the peak of 50bp on January 6, 2012. Spreads of Italian and Spanish
    two-year government bonds over German two-year government bonds have also
    declined to 284bp and 238bp, respectively, from 602bp and 448bp as of
    December 1, 2011.
     
    This improvement in the global funding environment has, in turn, resulted
    in a revival of capital inflows into EM and India. If the revival in
    capital inflows is sustained, it will start reducing the pressure on
    commercial sector funding and help to ease the tightness in interbank
    liquidity to some extent.
     
    *Bottom line:* As we mentioned in our regional economics note (see *Asia
    Pacific Economics: Downside Risks to AXJ Growth Reducing but Not Totally
    Out of the Way*, January 24, 2012), the systemic risks in the funding
    environment have been reduced and have given us some comfort that the
    probability of downside risks to the region's growth have been reduced. The
    reduction of the funding stresses is particularly important for India,
    given the importance of capital flows. While the funding environment (and
    therefore capital inflow) improves and becomes less of a drag, we believe
    that the challenging domestic environment will mean that it will still be
    difficult to achieve a V-shaped recovery in growth. We will address the
    issue regarding domestic challenges in a follow-up note.
     
    --
     
    *Para ter mais informação acesse estes portais:
    www.desenvolvimentistas.com.br e http://www.joserobertoafonso.ecn.br/*

     

    arthur garbayo <arthur...@gmail.com> Feb 11 02:38PM -0200  

    *Agradeço ao professor Márcio Garcia, da PUC-Rio, o repasse*
     
     
     
    ** **
     
    **

     

    desenvolv...@googlegroups.com Feb 11 08:53AM  

    =============================================================================
    Resumo do tópico de hoje
    =============================================================================
     
    Grupo: desenvolv...@googlegroups.com
    URL: http://groups.google.com/group/desenvolvimentistas/topics
     
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    =============================================================================
    Tópico: papel dos bancos
    URL: http://groups.google.com/group/desenvolvimentistas/t/a7c305a8ea984b1e
    =============================================================================
     
    ---------- 1 de 1 ----------
    De: ceci....@terra.com.br
    Data: Feb 11 08:40AM
    URL: http://groups.google.com/group/desenvolvimentistas/msg/3c178171e85bae35
     
    Foi o colapso da taxa de câmbio que causou o aumento espetacular da
    inflação...... vejam abaixo, Ceci
    COMO OS BANCOS ROMPERAM O CONTRATO SOCIAL AO PROMOVEREM OS SEUS
    INTERESSES PARTICULARES
     
    POR MICHAEL HUDSON
    _Não era previsível que os bancos fossem assim. Qual será o seu
    futuro – e qual deverá ser o papel financeiro dos governos? _
     
    A relação, inerentemente simbiótica, entre bancos e governos foi
    recentemente subvertida. Na época medieval, os banqueiros ricos
    emprestavam aos reis e aos príncípes, que eram os seus maiores
    clientes. Mas agora são os bancos que estão necessitados e
    dependentes dos governos para se aprovisionarem, como durante os
    resgates pós-2008, que os salvaram de uma falência causada pelos
    seus maus empréstimos ao sector privado e pelos jogos especulativos.
    Ainda assim, os bancos continuam a intimidar os governos – não por
    terem dinheiro em caixa, mas sob a ameaça de uma falência que
    arrastaria consigo toda a economia, caso não lhe seja dado um
    controlo completo da política fiscal, dos gastos e do planeamento
    económico público. Este processo está mais avançado nos Estados
    Unidos. Joseph Stiglitz caracterisa a enorme transferência (levada a
    cabo pela administração Obama) de dinheiro e dívida pública para
    os bancos como uma "privatização dos ganhos e uma socialização das
    perdas. É uma parceria na qual um dos parceiros rouba o outro". [1]
    [1] O Prof. Bill Black defende que os bancos se estão a tornar
    realidades de tipo criminal e a inovar no campo das fraudes ao
    controlo. [2] [2] A alta finança corrompeu as agências de
    regulação, falsificou a contabilidade através de truques de "mark
    to model" (contabilidade com base em modelos financeiros, e não no
    preço de mercado) e financiou as campanhas dos seus apoiantes para
    desactivar a fiscalização pública. O resultado foi deixar os bancos
    controlar a forma como a economia distribui o seu créditos e os seus
    recursos.
    Se algo há de positivo na actual crise da dívida, é que ela torna
    impossível a manutenção da presente situação e das suas
    tendências. Portanto, ela não é apenas uma oportunidade para
    reestruturar o sector bancário; tal reestruturação não é uma
    escolha, mas uma necessidade. A questão premente é a de saber quem
    controlará a economia: os governos ou o sector financeiros e os
    monopólios aos quais se aliaram?
    Felizmente não será necessário reinventar a roda. Há mais de um
    século que o perfil de um sistema bancário industrial produtivo é
    bem conhecido. Mas os recentes lobbis bancários obtiveram um enorme
    sucesso em desviar as atenções das análises clássicas acerca de
    como construir um sistema fiscal e financeiro capaz de promover o
    crescimento económico – através de controlo público aos
    privilégios dos bancos.
    COMO OS BANCOS ROMPERAM O CONTRATO SOCIAL AO PROMOVEREM OS SEUS
    INTERESSES PARTICULARES
    Outrora, as actividades dos bancos eram conhecidas de todos. Os
    bancos recebiam depósitos e emprestavam-nos, pagando menos ao
    depositantes do que cobravam em juros por empréstimos de risco ou com
    pouca liquidez. O risco era suportado pelos banqueiros, e não pelos
    depositantes, nem pelo governo. Hoje em dia, trata-se cada vez mais de
    emprestar quantias irresponsáveis a especuladores que as usam para
    actividades comercias de curto prazo. As crises financeiras
    aprofundaram-se e começaram a afectar camadas mais amplas da
    população à medida que a pirâmide da dívida disparou e que a
    qualidade do crédito se afundou até à categoria tóxica do
    "empréstimo trapaceiro".
    O primeiro passo no sentido da actual dependência mútua entre a
    alta finança e os governos foi dado quando os bancos centrais
    começaram a funcionar como último recurso de crédito, de forma a
    mitigar as crises de liquidez que resultavam dos privilégios detidos
    pelos bancos em termos de criação de crédito. A seu tempo, os
    governos começaram também a assegurar os depósitos, por
    reconhecerem, no contexto de um crescente ímpeto da Revolução
    Industrial, a importância de mobilizar e transformar as poupanças em
    investimento de capital. Em troca deste apoio, os governos regularam
    os bancos como um serviço público.
    Com o passar do tempo, os bancos procuraram sempre anular esta
    vigilância reguladora, ao ponto de descriminalizar a fraude.
    Patrocinando um ataque ideológico aos governos, acusaram as
    burocracias públicas de "distorcer" os mercados livres (entenda-se,
    mercados livres de comportamentos predatórios). Neste momento, o
    sector financeiro procura controlar o planeamento económico.
    O problema é que o tempo financeiro está estruturado a curto prazo
    e é frequentemente auto-destrutivo. Na medida em que o produto do
    sistema bancário é dívida, o plano empresarial por ele orientado
    tende a ser predatório, com grandes custos para as economias. É por
    isso que são necessários pesos e contrapesos, bem como vigilância
    regulatória, para garantir a justeza dos negócios. O desmantelamento
    das tentativas públicas de orientar a banca no sentido da promoção
    do crescimento económico (e não apenas no sentido de enriquecer os
    banqueiros) permitiu aos bancos transformarem-se em algo que ninguém
    previa. Os seus maiores clientes são outras instituições
    financeiras, seguradoras e imobiliárias – e não empresas
    industriais. A alavancagem da dívida por parte do sector imobiliário
    e dos monopólios, de especuladores de arbitragem cambial, _hedge
    funds _e _corporate raiders _inflaciona os preços dos activos de
    crédito. O resultado desta criação de "riqueza contabilística" é
    a sobrecarga da economia real (produção e consumo) com dívida e
    impostos relacionados, aumentando o custo de vida e os custos
    empresariais numa proporção superior à diminuição dos custos de
    produção conseguidos pelo aumento da produtividade.
    Desde 2008, os resgates públicos têm eliminado os maus empréstimos
    da contabilidade do bancos, com elevadíssimos custos para os
    contribuintes – cerca de 13 mil milhões de dólares nos Estados
    Unidos, e ainda mais, proporcionalmente, na Irlanda e nas economias
    que estão agora sujeitas à austeridade para pagar a desregulação
    do "mercado livre". Os banqueiros têm a economia refém, ameaçando
    com um crash monetário caso deixem de ter injecções de liquidez,
    empréstimos dos bancos centrais quase a custo zero, hipotecas ou
    outras garantias necessárias aos seus jogos de casino. A política
    que daí resulta torna os governos demasiado fracos para ripostar.
    O processo que começou com o apoio por parte dos bancos centrais
    tornou-se assim numa estrutura de amplas garantias governamentais
    contra a insolvência dos bancos. Os maiores bancos concederam tantos
    empréstimos irresponsáveis que estão neste momento completamente
    dependentes dos estados. No entanto, tornaram-se suficientemente
    poderosos para fazerem o poder legislativo agir apenas em seu
    benefício. Os media e mesmo alguns teóricos economistas foram
    mobilizados para se apresentarem como especialistas, numa tentativa de
    convencer a opinião pública de que a política financeira deve ser
    deixada nas mãos de burocratas – escolhidos pelos bancos, como se
    nenhuma política alternativa restasse aos governos senão subsidiar
    almoços grátis financeiros e coroar os banqueiros como monarcas da
    sociedade.
    A Economia da Bolha e a sua consequente austeridade não teriam
    existido sem o sucesso obtido pelo sector financeiro no
    enfraquecimento da regulação pública e no aprisionamento dos
    tesouros nacionais, sucesso que se estende ao ponto de tornar
    inoperante a aplicação da lei. Os governos devem render-se a esta
    tomada do poder? Se não o fizerem, quem deverá suportar o peso das
    perdas acumuladas por um sistema financeiro que se tornou
    disfuncional? Se os contribuintes tiverem de pagar, a economia
    tornar-se-á dispendiosa e perderá competitividade – e a oligarquia
    financeira reinará.
    O ACTUAL DILEMA DA DíVIDA
    Dantes, o fim do jogo consistia em cancelar parcialmente _(write
    down) _as dívidas incobráveis. Isto significava perdas para os
    bancos e para os investidores. Mas hoje em dia, o montante da dívida
    geral está estabilizado – através da transferência das dívidas
    incobráveis da contabilidade dos bancos para uma dívida pública,
    que os contribuintes têm de pagar para salvar os bancos e os seus
    credores das perdas. Os governos dão aos bancos obrigações acabadas
    de cunhar ou crédito nos bancos centrais em troca de hipotecas
    tóxicas e apostas falhadas – tudo isto sem qualquer
    reestruturação do sistema financeiro no sentido de criar uma
    economia mais estável e menos conduzida pela dívida. A premissa é
    que estes resgates permitirão aos bancos voltar a emprestar o
    suficiente para permitir à economia voltar a crescer e pagar as suas
    dívidas.
    Adivinhando o futuro, os banqueiros estão a ficar com o máximo de
    dinheiro dos planos de resgate e a usá-lo para comprar rapidamente a
    maior quantidade de propriedades tangíveis e direitos de propriedade
    que podem, enquanto os seus lobistas mantêm abertas as torneiras dos
    subsídios públicos.
    A ideia é de que as economias estranguladas pela dívida podem
    retomar o seu crescimento normal pedindo emprestado o suficiente para
    saírem da dívida. Mas um quarto do património imobiliário
    norte-americano é já capital líquido negativo – ou seja, vale
    menos que as hipotecas que lhe estão associadas – e o mercado das
    propriedades continua a encolher, e por isso os bancos não emprestam
    a menos que tenham garantias da Administração Federal que lhes
    garantam a cobertura de qualquer perda que possam sofrer. De qualquer
    forma, é já matematicamente impossível suportar o montante geral da
    dívida actual sem impor medidas de austeridade, conduzindo à
    deflação e à depressão.
    Não era assim que se esperava que os bancos evoluíssem. Se os
    governos têm de garantir os empréstimos bancários, então também
    podem emprestar directamente – e receber os juros. Efectivamente,
    desde 2008 que o crash da economia sobre-endividada levou os governos
    a tornarem-se os maiores accionistas dos maiores e mais ameaçados
    bancos – Citybank nos Estados Unidos, o Banco da Irlanda e o Royal
    Bank of Scotland na Grã-Bretanha. E ainda assim, em vez de aproveitar
    a oportunidade para gerir estes bancos como serviços públicos e
    diminuir as taxas sobre o serviços dos cartões de crédito – e,
    sobretudo, parar de emprestar a especuladores – os governos deixam
    estes bancos ser parte de um "capitalismo de casino" que se tornou o
    seu plano empresarial.
    Não há nenhuma razão natural para que as coisas sejam assim. As
    relações entre os bancos e os governos costumavam funcionar ao
    contrário. Em 1303, o rei Filipe IV de França ("O Justo") deu o tom,
    ao confiscar os bens dos Templários, prendendo-os e matando muitos
    deles – não por crimes financeiros, mas acusando-os de adorar o
    diabo e de práticas sexuais satânicas. Em 1344, o banco Peruzzi
    faliu, seguido pelo Bardi, por fazer empréstimos sem garantias a
    Eduardo III de Inglaterra e a outros monarcas que morreram ou não
    pagaram. Muitos bancos desde aí tiveram que suportar perdas
    originadas por empréstimos imobiliários ou especulativos que nunca
    foram pagos.
    De forma oposta, os actuais governos dos EUA, da Grã-Bretanha e da
    Letónia transferem as perdas dos bancos para os seus orçamentos
    nacionais, impondo uma pesada carga aos seus contribuintes –
    enquanto deixam os banqueiros ficar com a riqueza. Esta troca de
    "dinheiro por lixo" transformou a crise das hipotecas e o colapso
    geral da dívida num problema fiscal. Ao transferir as novas dívidas
    públicas de resgate para a economia não-financeira, arriscamo-nos a
    aumentar o custo de vida e os custos empresariais. Este é o resultado
    da incapacidade da economia distinguir dívidas e empréstimos
    produtivos e improdutivos. Isto ajuda também a explicar porque é que
    as nações sofrem hoje em dia com a austeridade e a servidão da
    dívida, em vez de desfrutarem do aprazível crescimento económico
    que os optimistas tecnológicos lhes prometiam há um século atrás.
    Voltamos assim ao problema inicial: qual deve ser o papel dos bancos?
    Esta questão foi exaustivamente discutida nos anos que antecederam a
    1ª Guerra Mundial. Hoje em dia, reveste-se de uma ainda maior
    urgência.
    COMO OS ECONOMISTAS CLáSSICOS PROCURARAM MODERNIZAR OS BANCOS PARA
    OS TORNAR AGENTES DO CAPITALISMO INDUSTRIAL
    A Grã-Bretanha foi o berço da Revolução Industrial, mas raros
    foram os empréstimos financeiros a longo prazo a serem investidos em
    fábricas ou outros meios de produção. Os bancos comerciais ingleses
    e holandeses tendiam a emprestar a curto-prazo e com base em
    contrapartidas, tais como mercadorias ou contratos de vendas de
    mercadorias ("recebíveis"). Estes financiamentos comerciais obtiveram
    um sucesso suficiente para permitir aos banqueiros manter as antigas
    práticas de financiamento a curto prazo durante a época da
    Revolução Industrial. Isto significa que James Watt e os outros
    inventores não tiveram outra alternativa senão angariar fundos de
    investimento junto da sua família e amigos, na impossibilidade de os
    pedir emprestados aos bancos.
    Foram os franceses e os alemães que levaram a banca para a fase
    industrial, de modo a permitir às suas nações igualarem o
    desenvolvimento das potências industriais. Em França, os
    saint-simonianos sublinhavam a necessidade de criar um sistema de
    crédito industrial destinado a financiar meios de produção. Com
    efeito, eles propuseram uma reestruturação da banca segundo
    princípios próximos dos do mutualismo. Esta reestruturação teve
    início com o Crédit Mobilier, fundado em 1852 pelos irmãos
    Péreire. O seu objectivo era fazer a banca passar do financiamento de
    dívida contra juros a empréstimos equitativos pelos quais receberia
    dividendos, dividendos esses que poderiam crescer ou diminuir de
    acordo com o sucesso do negócio do devedor.

     

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