Alice and Wittgenstein: Materialism, Functionalism, and Comp

[Craig Weinberg]

Here I present another metaphor to encapsulate by view of the relation between consciousness, information, and physicality by demonstrating the inadequacy of functionalist, computationalist, and materialist models and how they paint over the hard problem of consciousness with a choice of two flavors of the easy problem.

I came up with this thought exercise in response to this lecture: http://backdoorbroadcasting.net/2012/05/zoe-drayson-the-autonomy-of-the-mental-and-the-personalsubpersonal-distinction/

Consider "Alice in Wonderland"

Let's say that Alice is trying to decide whether she can describe herself in terms of being composed of the syntax of the letters, words, and sentences of the story from which she emerges, or whether she is composed of the bleached and pressed wood pulp and ink that are considered page parts of the whole book.

The former I would say corresponds to the functionalist view of Alice as "roles and realizers", while the materialist view of Alice corresponds to the mereological "parts and wholes". To extend the metaphor to computationalism I would make the distinction between functionalism and computationalism as the difference between the string of English words being equivalent to the story of Alice (functionalism) and the same thing but with the capacity for the string of words to translate themselves into any language.

• Materialism = pages in a book,
• Functionalism = English words in sentences (literature),
• Computationalism / Digital Functionalism = Amazon Kindle that translates literature into any language (customized literature).

Although this distinction between comp and functionalism does, I think, make comp superior to either functionalism or materialism, it is still ultimately the wrong approach as it takes the story and characters for granted as an unexplained precipitate of linguistic roles and grammatical realizers. This is Searle, etc. The symbol grounding problem. In this respect, comp and functionalism are equivalent - both wrong in the same way and in the way that is orthogonal/perpendicular to the way that materialism is the wrong approach.

What must be understood about consciousness, and about Alice, is that nothing means anything without the possibility of perception and participation to begin with in the universe. There is, to my way of thinking, zero possibility of perception or participation experiences emerging from either as that relies on a free lunch where either the paper and ink, the words and sentences, or the bits and bytes can spontaneously illustrate Alice and her world, as well as spontaneously invent the concept of illustration itself - of color and shape, of the lilt of her voice, the relation of those things to each other and how they are presented not as separate aspects being related but as a whole character.

If we want to understand Alice as she is, not as she thinks of herself in terms of the pages, words, or bytes of her story, then I think we need to begin with the reality of Alice as 'the given'. We don’t have to believe that she is anything more than a character or that her life is anything other than a story, but if the character and story were really the ground of being for Alice, then the book of pages (brain hardware) and the language typed through those pages (cognitive software) both make sense as ways of stabilizing, controlling, and reproducing aspects of the story. The book is what makes Alice in Wonderland a publicly accessible artifact and the words are what mediate from the public spatial sense to the private temporal sense.

To extend this a bit more, we could say that the private motive to open the book, read the words, and imagine the characters and scenes in the story are what bind the symbols to the private sense experience. Body needs the book, mind needs the words, but story needs the willing self. The story is not bytes or words or turning pages, it is intentionalized interior sensorimotive experience and nothing else. The map is not the territory.

What this means is that all of the levels discussed in the lecture are not personal or sub-personal at all, but rather they are different aspects of the impersonal: impersonal (surface-topological) and impersonal (syntactic-operational). I propose a whole other indispensable half of this picture of consciousness and experience of which to paraphrase Wittgenstein, we cannot speak, thereof we must remain silent. We can however, listen.

We cannot speak about the personal, but we can know what it is to be a person. We can realize ourselves directly, as an autonomous presence without converting ourselves into an external appearance or function. We can let human experience be human experience on it's native level, in it's native language, and nothing less. We are not merely aggregates of bytes and cells nor fragments of inevitable evolutionary algorithms of speciation, we are also irreducibly people with irreducibly human bodies. We propagate a conscious experience directly into our environment of our own (quasi-free) will, out of our own anthropological sense and motive. Of course the sub-personal and super-personal levels inform and influence our every choice and desire, but that doesn't negate the fact that there is a something personal to which these choices and desires actually refer.

The psyche, to continue with the Alice in Wonderland metaphor, has a protagonist - an Alice. It has other characters too, and themes, and a plot, etc…or does it? Does it literally ‘have a plot’, or are stories more of an experience with multiple frequency layers of events, memories, and expectations? These are the kinds of considerations we would have to make if we want to look at what consciousness actually is scientifically. Maybe it is better not to try to do that, or maybe it shouldn't be the concern of science. I am okay with that. But we should not be confused about what we are doing when we work with the vehicles and shadows of consciousness - the names and numbers, substances and functions. If we lose the realism of the self, then we will make books that publish their own empty stories, written by focus-group algorithms about the wonders of algorithms and emptiness and self-publishing books.

Craig

[Roger Clough]

Hi Craig Weinberg

 

I seem to be a voice crying in the wilderness. So be it, but...

 

When you say "Here I present ", how or where does the "I" fit into your philosophy ?

 

You cannot have thinking or consciousness or intelligence or perception withut it.

 

 

 

Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net

9/8/2012

Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him

so that everything could function."

----- Receiving the following content -----

From: Craig Weinberg

Receiver: everything-list

Time: 2012-09-08, 09:10:48

Subject: Alice and Wittgenstein: Materialism, Functionalism, and Comp

Here I present another metaphor to encapsulate by view of the relation between consciousness, information, and physicality by demonstrating the inadequacy of functionalist, computationalist, and materialist models and how they paint over the hard problem of consciousness with a choice of two flavors of the easy problem.

I came up with this thought exercise in response to this lecture: http://backdoorbroadcasting.net/2012/05/zoe-drayson-the-autonomy-of-the-mental-and-the-personalsubpersonal-distinction/

Consider "Alice in Wonderland"

Let's say that Alice is trying to decide whether she can describe herself in terms of being composed of the syntax of the letters, words, and sentences of the story from which she emerges, or whether she is composed of the bleached and pressed wood pulp and ink that are considered page parts of the whole book.

The former I would say corresponds to the functionalist view of Alice as "roles and realizers", while the materialist view of Alice corresponds to the mereological "parts and wholes". To extend the metaphor to computationalism I would make the distinction between functionalism and computationalism as the difference between the string of English words being equivalent to the story of Alice (functionalism) and the same thing but with the capacity for the string of words to translate themselves into any language.

• Materialism = pages in a book,
• Functionalism = English words in sentences (literature),
• Computationalism / Digital Functionalism = Amazon Kindle that translates literature into any language (customized literature).

Although this distinction between comp and functionalism does, I think, make comp superior to either functionalism or materialism, it is still ultimately the wrong approach as it takes the story and characters for granted as an unexplained precipitate of linguistic roles and grammatical realizers. This is Searle, etc. The symbol grounding problem. In this respect, comp and functionalism are equivalent - both wrong in the same way and in the way that is orthogonal/perpendicular to the way that materialism is the wrong approach.

What must be understood about consciousness, and about Alice, is that nothing means anything without the possibility of perception and participation to begin with in the universe. There is, to my way of thinking, zero possibility of perception or participation experiences emerging from either as that relies on a free lunch where either the paper and ink, the words and sentences, or the bits and bytes can spontaneously illustrate Alice and her world, as well as spontaneously invent the concept of illustration itself - of color and shape, of the lilt of her voice, the relation of those things to each other and how they are presented not as separate aspects being related but as a whole character.

If we want to understand Alice as she is, not as she thinks of herself in terms of the pages, words, or bytes of her story, then I think we need to begin with the reality of Alice as 'the given'. We don锟絫 have to believe that she is anything more than a character or that her life is anything other than a story, but if the character and story were really the ground of being for Alice, then the book of pages (brain hardware) and the language typed through those pages (cognitive software) both make sense as ways of stabilizing, controlling, and reproducing aspects of the story. The book is what makes Alice in Wonderland a publicly accessible artifact and the words are what mediate from the public spatial sense to the private temporal sense.

To extend this a bit more, we could say that the private motive to open the book, read the words, and imagine the characters and scenes in the story are what bind the symbols to the private sense experience. Body needs the book, mind needs the words, but story needs the willing self. The story is not bytes or words or turning pages, it is intentionalized interior sensorimotive experience and nothing else. The map is not the territory.

What this means is that all of the levels discussed in the lecture are not personal or sub-personal at all, but rather they are different aspects of the impersonal: impersonal (surface-topological) and impersonal (syntactic-operational). I propose a whole other indispensable half of this picture of consciousness and experience of which to paraphrase Wittgenstein, we cannot speak, thereof we must remain silent. We can however, listen.

We cannot speak about the personal, but we can know what it is to be a person. We can realize ourselves directly, as an autonomous presence without converting ourselves into an external appearance or function. We can let human experience be human experience on it's native level, in it's native language, and nothing less. We are not merely aggregates of bytes and cells nor fragments of inevitable evolutionary algorithms of speciation, we are also irreducibly people with irreducibly human bodies. We propagate a conscious experience directly into our environment of our own (quasi-free) will, out of our own anthropological sense and motive. Of course the sub-personal and super-personal levels inform and influence our every choice and desire, but that doesn't negate the fact that there is a something personal to which these choices and desires actually refer.

The psyche, to continue with the Alice in Wonderland metaphor, has a protagonist - an Alice. It has other characters too, and themes, and a plot, etc锟給r does it? Does it literally 锟絟ave a plot�, or are stories more of an experience with multiple frequency layers of events, memories, and expectations? These are the kinds of considerations we would have to make if we want to look at what consciousness actually is scientifically. Maybe it is better not to try to do that, or maybe it shouldn't be the concern of science. I am okay with that. But we should not be confused about what we are doing when we work with the vehicles and shadows of consciousness - the names and numbers, substances and functions. If we lose the realism of the self, then we will make books that publish their own empty stories, written by focus-group algorithms about the wonders of algorithms and emptiness and self-publishing books.

Craig

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[Craig Weinberg]

Hi Roger,

In my view, the "I" is how any particular subjective experience refers to itself. I agree, you can't have consciousness without the "I" orientation, although the ability to conceive of oneself may not be necessary for consciousness. Consciousness requires only an experience of being, not necessarily an understanding of the experience of being or self or "I". You could say that the term 'consciousness' refers specifically to self-awareness though, and I think it's ok to define the word that way. I'm more interested in the hard problem - so not human consciousness in particular but the faintest hint of awareness or sense as opposed to completely non-experiential unconsciousness.

Craig

On Saturday, September 8, 2012 10:56:51 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote:

Hi Craig Weinberg

 

I seem to be a voice crying in the wilderness. So be it, but...

 

When you say "Here I present ", how or where does the "I" fit into your philosophy ?

 

You cannot have thinking or consciousness or intelligence or perception withut it.

 

 

 

Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net

9/8/2012

Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him

so that everything could function."

----- Receiving the following content -----

From: Craig Weinberg

Receiver: everything-list

Time: 2012-09-08, 09:10:48

Subject: Alice and Wittgenstein: Materialism, Functionalism, and Comp

Here I present another metaphor to encapsulate by view of the relation between consciousness, information, and physicality by demonstrating the inadequacy of functionalist, computationalist, and materialist models and how they paint over the hard problem of consciousness with a choice of two flavors of the easy problem.

I came up with this thought exercise in response to this lecture: http://backdoorbroadcasting.net/2012/05/zoe-drayson-the-autonomy-of-the-mental-and-the-personalsubpersonal-distinction/

Consider "Alice in Wonderland"

Let's say that Alice is trying to decide whether she can describe herself in terms of being composed of the syntax of the letters, words, and sentences of the story from which she emerges, or whether she is composed of the bleached and pressed wood pulp and ink that are considered page parts of the whole book.

The former I would say corresponds to the functionalist view of Alice as "roles and realizers", while the materialist view of Alice corresponds to the mereological "parts and wholes". To extend the metaphor to computationalism I would make the distinction between functionalism and computationalism as the difference between the string of English words being equivalent to the story of Alice (functionalism) and the same thing but with the capacity for the string of words to translate themselves into any language.

• Materialism = pages in a book,
• Functionalism = English words in sentences (literature),
• Computationalism / Digital Functionalism = Amazon Kindle that translates literature into any language (customized literature).

Although this distinction between comp and functionalism does, I think, make comp superior to either functionalism or materialism, it is still ultimately the wrong approach as it takes the story and characters for granted as an unexplained precipitate of linguistic roles and grammatical realizers. This is Searle, etc. The symbol grounding problem. In this respect, comp and functionalism are equivalent - both wrong in the same way and in the way that is orthogonal/perpendicular to the way that materialism is the wrong approach.

What must be understood about consciousness, and about Alice, is that nothing means anything without the possibility of perception and participation to begin with in the universe. There is, to my way of thinking, zero possibility of perception or participation experiences emerging from either as that relies on a free lunch where either the paper and ink, the words and sentences, or the bits and bytes can spontaneously illustrate Alice and her world, as well as spontaneously invent the concept of illustration itself - of color and shape, of the lilt of her voice, the relation of those things to each other and how they are presented not as separate aspects being related but as a whole character.

If we want to understand Alice as she is, not as she thinks of herself in terms of the pages, words, or bytes of her story, then I think we need to begin with the reality of Alice as 'the given'. We don锟� have to believe that she is anything more than a character or that her life is anything other than a story, but if the character and story were really the ground of being for Alice, then the book of pages (brain hardware) and the language typed through those pages (cognitive software) both make sense as ways of stabilizing, controlling, and reproducing aspects of the story. The book is what makes Alice in Wonderland a publicly accessible artifact and the words are what mediate from the public spatial sense to the private temporal sense.

To extend this a bit more, we could say that the private motive to open the book, read the words, and imagine the characters and scenes in the story are what bind the symbols to the private sense experience. Body needs the book, mind needs the words, but story needs the willing self. The story is not bytes or words or turning pages, it is intentionalized interior sensorimotive experience and nothing else. The map is not the territory.

What this means is that all of the levels discussed in the lecture are not personal or sub-personal at all, but rather they are different aspects of the impersonal: impersonal (surface-topological) and impersonal (syntactic-operational). I propose a whole other indispensable half of this picture of consciousness and experience of which to paraphrase Wittgenstein, we cannot speak, thereof we must remain silent. We can however, listen.

We cannot speak about the personal, but we can know what it is to be a person. We can realize ourselves directly, as an autonomous presence without converting ourselves into an external appearance or function. We can let human experience be human experience on it's native level, in it's native language, and nothing less. We are not merely aggregates of bytes and cells nor fragments of inevitable evolutionary algorithms of speciation, we are also irreducibly people with irreducibly human bodies. We propagate a conscious experience directly into our environment of our own (quasi-free) will, out of our own anthropological sense and motive. Of course the sub-personal and super-personal levels inform and influence our every choice and desire, but that doesn't negate the fact that there is a something personal to which these choices and desires actually refer.

The psyche, to continue with the Alice in Wonderland metaphor, has a protagonist - an Alice. It has other characters too, and themes, and a plot, etc锟�r does it? Does it literally 锟�ave a plot�, or are stories more of an experience with multiple frequency layers of events, memories, and expectations? These are the kinds of considerations we would have to make if we want to look at what consciousness actually is scientifically. Maybe it is better not to try to do that, or maybe it shouldn't be the concern of science. I am okay with that. But we should not be confused about what we are doing when we work with the vehicles and shadows of consciousness - the names and numbers, substances and functions. If we lose the realism of the self, then we will make books that publish their own empty stories, written by focus-group algorithms about the wonders of algorithms and emptiness and self-publishing books.

[Roger Clough]

Hi Craig Weinberg

 

 

I think that the perceiver must be a lot like the creator in

terms of its not being an endless regress of homunculi.

There has to be either a stopping point or an entrance to

the nonphysical from the physical, the unextended

from the extended.

 

Platonia's  All is such an entity.

Another might be the limit in terms of size of what a substance is.

For you can't seem to get any smaller than Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle,

which would be a stopping point.

 

Leibniz speaks in terms of reflectors.

 

Elsewhere, perhaps in Leibniz, the perceiver is characterized as

being a unity, a whole, a point of focus.  It must

also be very wideband, to take in much at one glance.

And allow info coming in from many directrions and angles at once.

 

Maxwell's Demon also seems to be at least part of a candidate.

And I have guessed that intelligence itself must be the perceiver.

 

C'mon materialists, knock yourselves out !

 

 

Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net

9/10/2012

Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him

so that everything could function."

----- Receiving the following content -----

From: Craig Weinberg

Receiver: everything-list

Time: 2012-09-09, 13:27:09

Subject: Re: Alice and Wittgenstein: Materialism, Functionalism, and Comp

If we want to understand Alice as she is, not as she thinks of herself in terms of the pages, words, or bytes of her story, then I think we need to begin with the reality of Alice as 'the given'. We don� have to believe that she is anything more than a character or that her life is anything other than a story, but if the character and story were really the ground of being for Alice, then the book of pages (brain hardware) and the language typed through those pages (cognitive software) both make sense as ways of stabilizing, controlling, and reproducing aspects of the story. The book is what makes Alice in Wonderland a publicly accessible artifact and the words are what mediate from the public spatial sense to the private temporal sense.

To extend this a bit more, we could say that the private motive to open the book, read the words, and imagine the characters and scenes in the story are what bind the symbols to the private sense experience. Body needs the book, mind needs the words, but story needs the willing self. The story is not bytes or words or turning pages, it is intentionalized interior sensorimotive experience and nothing else. The map is not the territory.

What this means is that all of the levels discussed in the lecture are not personal or sub-personal at all, but rather they are different aspects of the impersonal: impersonal (surface-topological) and impersonal (syntactic-operational). I propose a whole other indispensable half of this picture of consciousness and experience of which to paraphrase Wittgenstein, we cannot speak, thereof we must remain silent. We can however, listen.

We cannot speak about the personal, but we can know what it is to be a person. We can realize ourselves directly, as an autonomous presence without converting ourselves into an external appearance or function. We can let human experience be human experience on it's native level, in it's native language, and nothing less. We are not merely aggregates of bytes and cells nor fragments of inevitable evolutionary algorithms of speciation, we are also irreducibly people with irreducibly human bodies. We propagate a conscious experience directly into our environment of our own (quasi-free) will, out of our own anthropological sense and motive. Of course the sub-personal and super-personal levels inform and influence our every choice and desire, but that doesn't negate the fact that there is a something personal to which these choices and desires actually refer.

The psyche, to continue with the Alice in Wonderland metaphor, has a protagonist - an Alice. It has other characters too, and themes, and a plot, etc� r does it? Does it literally � ave a plot , or are stories more of an experience with multiple frequency layers of events, memories, and expectations? These are the kinds of considerations we would have to make if we want to look at what consciousness actually is scientifically. Maybe it is better not to try to do that, or maybe it shouldn't be the concern of science. I am okay with that. But we should not be confused about what we are doing when we work with the vehicles and shadows of consciousness - the names and numbers, substances and functions. If we lose the realism of the self, then we will make books that publish their own empty stories, written by focus-group algorithms about the wonders of algorithms and emptiness and self-publishing books.

Craig

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[Craig Weinberg]

On Monday, September 10, 2012 7:00:22 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote:

Hi Craig Weinberg

 

 

I think that the perceiver must be a lot like the creator in

terms of its not being an endless regress of homunculi.

There has to be either a stopping point or an entrance to

the nonphysical from the physical, the unextended

from the extended.

Sure, perception is by definition an anchoring of orientation. It recapitulates singularity. I don't know that I would call it a creator, more of an everythingness - a totality. The idea of homunculi is exactly why I don't think a creator is possible. To me, if the universe requires a creator, than certainly the creator would require a creator too. Why wouldn't it?

There can't be a stopping point unless that point is the notion of stopping itself...which I think is the case. I call it the Sole Entropy Well conjecture. The first signal can only be the perpetual readiness for release from itself. All creation arises as nested juxtapositions of the presence and absence of that readiness.The Sole Entropy Well is a perpetually plummeting level of entropy relative to the fractally spawning subroutines within it, subroutines which are also experiences of readiness for release from themselves who preceive the outermost routine as that which is eternally 'stopped' (since it is, relative to their spawning and subdividing of the moment of singularity into eternities).

Craig
 

 

Platonia's  All is such an entity.

Eh, Platonia is just a plug for incomplete understanding. If we can't make sense of the universe in terms of what we can access directly, then what's the point? Any explanation is as good as any other.
 

Another might be the limit in terms of size of what a substance is.

For you can't seem to get any smaller than Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle,

which would be a stopping point.

 

Leibniz speaks in terms of reflectors.

 

Elsewhere, perhaps in Leibniz, the perceiver is characterized as

being a unity, a whole, a point of focus. 

I agree. I came to the same conclusion before I had heard of monads.
 

It must

also be very wideband, to take in much at one glance.

And allow info coming in from many directrions and angles at once.

You are assuming the universe as a nothingness within which signals are generated. To realize the monad, I think you have to turn it over and see signals emerging as reconnections of temporarily partitions of everythingess.
 

 

Maxwell's Demon also seems to be at least part of a candidate.

And I have guessed that intelligence itself must be the perceiver.

Intelligence may be an overrated human subroutine. Sensation and perception are a lot more popular, and for good reason I think.


Craig
 

If we want to understand Alice as she is, not as she thinks of herself in terms of the pages, words, or bytes of her story, then I think we need to begin with the reality of Alice as 'the given'. We don锟�have to believe that she is anything more than a character or that her life is anything other than a story, but if the character and story were really the ground of being for Alice, then the book of pages (brain hardware) and the language typed through those pages (cognitive software) both make sense as ways of stabilizing, controlling, and reproducing aspects of the story. The book is what makes Alice in Wonderland a publicly accessible artifact and the words are what mediate from the public spatial sense to the private temporal sense.

To extend this a bit more, we could say that the private motive to open the book, read the words, and imagine the characters and scenes in the story are what bind the symbols to the private sense experience. Body needs the book, mind needs the words, but story needs the willing self. The story is not bytes or words or turning pages, it is intentionalized interior sensorimotive experience and nothing else. The map is not the territory.

What this means is that all of the levels discussed in the lecture are not personal or sub-personal at all, but rather they are different aspects of the impersonal: impersonal (surface-topological) and impersonal (syntactic-operational). I propose a whole other indispensable half of this picture of consciousness and experience of which to paraphrase Wittgenstein, we cannot speak, thereof we must remain silent. We can however, listen.

We cannot speak about the personal, but we can know what it is to be a person. We can realize ourselves directly, as an autonomous presence without converting ourselves into an external appearance or function. We can let human experience be human experience on it's native level, in it's native language, and nothing less. We are not merely aggregates of bytes and cells nor fragments of inevitable evolutionary algorithms of speciation, we are also irreducibly people with irreducibly human bodies. We propagate a conscious experience directly into our environment of our own (quasi-free) will, out of our own anthropological sense and motive. Of course the sub-personal and super-personal levels inform and influence our every choice and desire, but that doesn't negate the fact that there is a something personal to which these choices and desires actually refer.

The psyche, to continue with the Alice in Wonderland metaphor, has a protagonist - an Alice. It has other characters too, and themes, and a plot, etc锟�r does it? Does it literally 锟�ave a plot , or are stories more of an experience with multiple frequency layers of events, memories, and expectations? These are the kinds of considerations we would have to make if we want to look at what consciousness actually is scientifically. Maybe it is better not to try to do that, or maybe it shouldn't be the concern of science. I am okay with that. But we should not be confused about what we are doing when we work with the vehicles and shadows of consciousness - the names and numbers, substances and functions. If we lose the realism of the self, then we will make books that publish their own empty stories, written by focus-group algorithms about the wonders of algorithms and emptiness and self-publishing books.

Craig

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[Roger Clough]

Hi Craig Weinberg

The Creator is not created. So no problem.

And the supreme monad is able to do all of the
functions of a homunculus.


Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net
9/11/2012

Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him
so that everything could function."
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Craig Weinberg
Receiver: everything-list

Time: 2012-09-11, 01:04:34
Subject: Re: What must the perceiver be like?

If we want to understand Alice as she is, not as she thinks of herself in terms of the pages, words, or bytes of her story, then I think we need to begin with the reality of Alice as 'the given'. We don? have to believe that she is anything more than a character or that her life is anything other than a story, but if the character and story were really the ground of being for Alice, then the book of pages (brain hardware) and the language typed through those pages (cognitive software) both make sense as ways of stabilizing, controlling, and reproducing aspects of the story. The book is what makes Alice in Wonderland a publicly accessible artifact and the words are what mediate from the public spatial sense to the private temporal sense.

To extend this a bit more, we could say that the private motive to open the book, read the words, and imagine the characters and scenes in the story are what bind the symbols to the private sense experience. Body needs the book, mind needs the words, but story needs the willing self. The story is not bytes or words or turning pages, it is intentionalized interior sensorimotive experience and nothing else. The map is not the territory.
What this means is that all of the levels discussed in the lecture are not personal or sub-personal at all, but rather they are different aspects of the impersonal: impersonal (surface-topological) and impersonal (syntactic-operational). I propose a whole other indispensable half of this picture of consciousness and experience of which to paraphrase Wittgenstein, we cannot speak, thereof we must remain silent. We can however, listen.
We cannot speak about the personal, but we can know what it is to be a person. We can realize ourselves directly, as an autonomous presence without converting ourselves into an external appearance or function. We can let human experience be human experience on it's native level, in it's native language, and nothing less. We are not merely aggregates of bytes and cells nor fragments of inevitable evolutionary algorithms of speciation, we are also irreducibly people with irreducibly human bodies. We propagate a conscious experience directly into our environment of our own (quasi-free) will, out of our own anthropological sense and motive. Of course the sub-personal and super-personal levels inform and influence our every choice and desire, but that doesn't negate the fact that there is a something personal to which these choices and desires actually refer.

The psyche, to continue with the Alice in Wonderland metaphor, has a protagonist - an Alice. It has other characters too, and themes, and a plot, etc? r does it? Does it literally ? ave a plot , or are stories more of an experience with multiple frequency layers of events, memories, and expectations? These are the kinds of considerations we would have to make if we want to look at what consciousness actually is scientifically. Maybe it is better not to try to do that, or maybe it shouldn't be the concern of science. I am okay with that. But we should not be confused about what we are doing when we work with the vehicles and shadows of consciousness - the names and numbers, substances and functions. If we lose the realism of the self, then we will make books that publish their own empty stories, written by focus-group algorithms about the wonders of algorithms and emptiness and self-publishing books.

Craig

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[Craig Weinberg]

Hi Roger,

On Tuesday, September 11, 2012 8:36:47 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote:

Hi Craig Weinberg  

The Creator is not created. So no problem.

Why not just say The Universe is not created. So no problem?

What does the idea of an uncreated Creator add that has any explanatory power? Would the idea of a Creator seem obvious if the Bible didn't exist?

What if you found out that the Bible was actually written by people's demons who mixed truth with lies over centuries to cause confusion, oppression, and cruelty. If I were Satan, why wouldn't I tell people that I am God and make them write a book which causes fear, superstition, and misery (even if the cost is that it has some very good side effects as well)? Not to suggest that you doubt your faith, but logically, the idea of a Bible seems contrary to the purposes of a Creator who endows his creations with direct capacities to make sense of his creation (including themselves). Does he want us to know he exists or doesn't he? If so, why write a bunch of crazy ambiguous scriptures that vary from place to place? If not, why allow such blasphemous confusions to thrive?

Craig

[Roger Clough]

Hi Craig Weinberg

 

But the universe IS created.

 

I  believe that Satan wrote the Koran, but not the Bible,

for the Bible asks us to love and forgive each other. 

Writing that would burn the Devil's fingers.

So the koran seems to omit the part about loving

and forgiving each other.

 

 

Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net

9/11/2012

Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him

so that everything could function."

----- Receiving the following content -----

From: Craig Weinberg

Receiver: everything-list

Time: 2012-09-11, 08:52:16

Subject: Re: Re: What must the perceiver be like?

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[Craig Weinberg]

On Tuesday, September 11, 2012 9:10:46 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote:

Hi Craig Weinberg

 

But the universe IS created.

I can say that God IS created too. Here goes: God IS created.

Whatever created the universe would have to also be the universe, or an arbitrary conceptual partition thereof.
 

 

I  believe that Satan wrote the Koran, but not the Bible,

Hahahaha. Well that works out nicely for you then. No cognitive bias there.

 

for the Bible asks us to love and forgive each other. 

Writing that would burn the Devil's fingers.

Haha, why, because malicious predators aren't allowed to suggest that their prey be meek and mild? You don't think this message would come in handy in Bronze Age societies for establishing political order under a priesthood class on behalf of military leaders? Is the Devil a wolf that is forbidden to wear sheep's clothing? You think that the Devil could tempt and lie to people by announcing that he is the Devil? If I were the Devil, I would be most interested in recruiting priests, police, judges, teachers, politicians, businessmen, etc. What would be the point of tempting degenerate sinners who I already own?
 

So the koran seems to omit the part about loving

and forgiving each other.

Does it? I haven't read the Koran. A brief Googling reveals:


“…. But if you pardon and exonerate and forgive, Allah is Ever-Forgiving, Most Merciful.” [Qur’an, 64: 14]

“Hold to forgiveness, command what is right, and turn away from the ignorant.” [Qur’an, 7:199]

“… They should rather pardon and overlook. Would you not love Allah to forgive you? Allah is Ever-Forgiving, Most Merciful.” [Qur’an, 24:22]

Have you traveled much Roger? I think it makes it easier to see how biased our minds are by default just from being in the same place around the same kinds of people.

Craig
 

[Roger Clough]

Hi Craig Weinberg

 

You're certainly welcome to your beliefs.

 

OK, I was wrong about forgiving your neighbor,

but I don't think that the Koran asks you to love your neighbor.

 

Yes, I've travelled a lot.

 

 

Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net

9/11/2012

Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him

so that everything could function."

----- Receiving the following content -----

From: Craig Weinberg

Receiver: everything-list

Time: 2012-09-11, 09:48:04

Subject: Re: Re: Re: What must the perceiver be like?

On Tuesday, September 11, 2012 9:10:46 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote:

Hi Craig Weinberg

 

But the universe IS created.

I can say that God IS created too. Here goes: God IS created.

Whatever created the universe would have to also be the universe, or an arbitrary conceptual partition thereof.
 

 

I  believe that Satan wrote the Koran, but not the Bible,

Hahahaha. Well that works out nicely for you then. No cognitive bias there.

 

for the Bible asks us to love and forgive each other. 

Writing that would burn the Devil's fingers.

Haha, why, because malicious predators aren't allowed to suggest that their prey be meek and mild? You don't think this message would come in handy in Bronze Age societies for establishing political order under a priesthood class on behalf of military leaders? Is the Devil a wolf that is forbidden to wear sheep's clothing? You think that the Devil could tempt and lie to people by announcing that he is the Devil? If I were the Devil, I would be most interested in recruiting priests, police, judges, teachers, politicians, businessmen, etc. What would be the point of tempting degenerate sinners who I already own?
 

So the koran seems to omit the part about loving

and forgiving each other.

Does it? I haven't read the Koran. A brief Googling reveals:

锟斤拷. But if you pardon and exonerate and forgive, Allah is Ever-Forgiving, Most Merciful.� [Qur锟絘n, 64: 14]

锟紿old to forgiveness, command what is right, and turn away from the ignorant.� [Qur锟絘n, 7:199]

锟斤拷 They should rather pardon and overlook. Would you not love Allah to forgive you? Allah is Ever-Forgiving, Most Merciful.� [Qur锟絘n, 24:22]

To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/81MGgWxT2k0J.

[Craig Weinberg]

On Tuesday, September 11, 2012 10:06:18 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote:

Hi Craig Weinberg

 

You're certainly welcome to your beliefs.

 

OK, I was wrong about forgiving your neighbor,

but I don't think that the Koran asks you to love your neighbor.

"Worship Allah and join none with him (in worship); and do good to parents, kinsfolk, orphans, the poor, the neighbor who is near of kin, the neighbor who is stranger, the companion by your side, ... "[ Quran, chapter 4, verse 36]

Loving your neighbor is not about sending Valentines to strangers, it's just about not being prejudiced. It's the timeless wisdom of the Golden Rule - 'don't forget that other people are just like you and you are just like them.'. It's basically a summary of Liberal Socialism.

Craig
 

 

Yes, I've travelled a lot.

 

 

Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net

9/11/2012

Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him

so that everything could function."

----- Receiving the following content -----

From: Craig Weinberg

Receiver: everything-list

Time: 2012-09-11, 09:48:04

Subject: Re: Re: Re: What must the perceiver be like?

On Tuesday, September 11, 2012 9:10:46 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote:

Hi Craig Weinberg

 

But the universe IS created.

I can say that God IS created too. Here goes: God IS created.

Whatever created the universe would have to also be the universe, or an arbitrary conceptual partition thereof.
 

 

I  believe that Satan wrote the Koran, but not the Bible,

Hahahaha. Well that works out nicely for you then. No cognitive bias there.

 

for the Bible asks us to love and forgive each other. 

Writing that would burn the Devil's fingers.

Haha, why, because malicious predators aren't allowed to suggest that their prey be meek and mild? You don't think this message would come in handy in Bronze Age societies for establishing political order under a priesthood class on behalf of military leaders? Is the Devil a wolf that is forbidden to wear sheep's clothing? You think that the Devil could tempt and lie to people by announcing that he is the Devil? If I were the Devil, I would be most interested in recruiting priests, police, judges, teachers, politicians, businessmen, etc. What would be the point of tempting degenerate sinners who I already own?
 

So the koran seems to omit the part about loving

and forgiving each other.

Does it? I haven't read the Koran. A brief Googling reveals:

锟斤拷. But if you pardon and exonerate and forgive, Allah is Ever-Forgiving, Most Merciful.� [Qur锟�n, 64: 14]

锟�old to forgiveness, command what is right, and turn away from the ignorant.� [Qur锟�n, 7:199]

锟斤拷 They should rather pardon and overlook. Would you not love Allah to forgive you? Allah is Ever-Forgiving, Most Merciful.� [Qur锟�n, 24:22]

[Roger Clough]

Hi Craig Weinberg

 

OK, yuh got me.

 

 

Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net

9/11/2012

Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him

so that everything could function."

----- Receiving the following content -----

From: Craig Weinberg

Receiver: everything-list

Time: 2012-09-11, 10:36:50

Subject: Re: Re: Re: Re: What must the perceiver be like?

��. But if you pardon and exonerate and forgive, Allah is Ever-Forgiving, Most Merciful. [Qur� n, 64: 14]

� old to forgiveness, command what is right, and turn away from the ignorant. [Qur� n, 7:199]

�� They should rather pardon and overlook. Would you not love Allah to forgive you? Allah is Ever-Forgiving, Most Merciful. [Qur� n, 24:22]

To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/bgi232s9G0AJ.

[Craig Weinberg]

Hey, I didn't know either until I looked it up just now. I just know that there are good and bad people everywhere, under every form of government and ideology, religion and secular category.

锟斤拷. But if you pardon and exonerate and forgive, Allah is Ever-Forgiving, Most Merciful. [Qur锟�n, 64: 14]

锟�old to forgiveness, command what is right, and turn away from the ignorant. [Qur锟� n, 7:199]

锟斤拷 They should rather pardon and overlook. Would you not love Allah to forgive you? Allah is Ever-Forgiving, Most Merciful. [Qur锟� n, 24:22]

[Bruno Marchal]

On 11 Sep 2012, at 14:52, Craig Weinberg wrote:

Hi Roger,

On Tuesday, September 11, 2012 8:36:47 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote:

Hi Craig Weinberg  

The Creator is not created. So no problem.

Why not just say The Universe is not created. So no problem?

You are right. "God create the universe" can be an explanation, or a progress toward an explanation only if the notion of God in use is conceptually simpler than the universe.

I think Arithmetic (with a big A, it means the whole set of first order arithmetical true propositions, to fix the thing) is like that.

Bruno

What does the idea of an uncreated Creator add that has any explanatory power? Would the idea of a Creator seem obvious if the Bible didn't exist?

What if you found out that the Bible was actually written by people's demons who mixed truth with lies over centuries to cause confusion, oppression, and cruelty. If I were Satan, why wouldn't I tell people that I am God and make them write a book which causes fear, superstition, and misery (even if the cost is that it has some very good side effects as well)? Not to suggest that you doubt your faith, but logically, the idea of a Bible seems contrary to the purposes of a Creator who endows his creations with direct capacities to make sense of his creation (including themselves). Does he want us to know he exists or doesn't he? If so, why write a bunch of crazy ambiguous scriptures that vary from place to place? If not, why allow such blasphemous confusions to thrive?

Craig

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Bruno Marchal]

On 11 Sep 2012, at 15:09, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Craig Weinberg

 

But the universe IS created.

 

I  believe that Satan wrote the Koran, but not the Bible,

for the Bible asks us to love

Lovable entities are loved without asking.

Asking someone to love someone is giving someone an impossible task. 

and forgive each other. 

Only your victim can forgive you, and only if you can show sincere remorse.

Writing that would burn the Devil's fingers.

So the koran seems to omit the part about loving

and forgiving each other.

Hmm... you (unwillingly) supports the idea that Satan wrote the bible, I'm afraid.

Those texts are human texts, and the ideas sleeping there have to be studied with some distances and cautiousness. Here you are just insulting many people unecessarily, and perhaps on a more complex point than you thought.  Who really can *ask* for love, if only a non lovable entity?

In some reality God send in Hell only, and all, those who ask for forgiveness, as it is a confession of sin.

The protegorian virtue can be taught only by practices, illustrations and examples, and died through discourses, institutionalization, normativity, traditions (?), etc. (I am less sure for tradition, as it can incarnate spectacles and memories of examples, but too much repetitions make the sense sleepy).

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Craig Weinberg]

On Tuesday, September 11, 2012 2:06:36 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 11 Sep 2012, at 14:52, Craig Weinberg wrote:

Hi Roger,

On Tuesday, September 11, 2012 8:36:47 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote:

Hi Craig Weinberg  

The Creator is not created. So no problem.

Why not just say The Universe is not created. So no problem?

You are right. "God create the universe" can be an explanation, or a progress toward an explanation only if the notion of God in use is conceptually simpler than the universe.

I think Arithmetic (with a big A, it means the whole set of first order arithmetical true propositions, to fix the thing) is like that.

I would agree with you Bruno, except that I don't see any possibility of Arithmetic needing to feel, but I can easily see why things that feel might need to relate to each other arithmetically. Numbers don't itch, but things that itch might want to keep track of how much it itches and how long by quantifying the experience.

If we ourselves were not alive and having these experiences, I would agree that logically Arithmetic is necessary and sufficient to explain a universe (just not the universe that we live in).

Craig

Craig

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

Craig,

You may want to look at

Galen Strawson, Selves: An Essay in Revisionary Metaphysics

He proves that selves exist. Interestingly enough he does it based on
the materialist framework.

p. 11 �For the moment, though, the brief is to show that selves exist,
and that they�re things or objects or �substances� of some sort, and
hence, given materialism, physical objects. One possibility is that
there are in fact no better candidates for the title of �physical
object� than selves � even if there are others that are as good.�

p. 11 �This last suggestion is likely to strike many as obviously false,
but this reaction may stem in part from a failure to think through what
it is for something to be physical, on a genuine or realistic
materialist view, and, equally, from a failure to think through what it
is for something to be a thing or object.�

Evgenii
--
http://blog.rudnyi.ru/2012/09/selves-an-essay-in-revisionary-metaphysics.html




On 08.09.2012 15:10 Craig Weinberg said the following:

[Craig Weinberg]

On Sunday, September 16, 2012 12:34:47 PM UTC-4, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

Craig,

You may want to look at

Galen Strawson, Selves: An Essay in Revisionary Metaphysics

He proves that selves exist. Interestingly enough he does it based on
the materialist framework.

p. 11 �For the moment, though, the brief is to show that selves exist,
and that they�re things or objects or �substances� of some sort, and
hence, given materialism, physical objects. One possibility is that
there are in fact no better candidates for the title of �physical
object� than selves � even if there are others that are as good.�

p. 11 �This last suggestion is likely to strike many as obviously false,
but this reaction may stem in part from a failure to think through what
it is for something to be physical, on a genuine or realistic
materialist view, and, equally, from a failure to think through what it
is for something to be a thing or object.�

Evgenii
--
http://blog.rudnyi.ru/2012/09/selves-an-essay-in-revisionary-metaphysics.html

Thanks Evgenii. I have been meaning to check out Strawson for a while actually. I agree that the self is physically and concretely real, but I don't think it is an object. The self is the subject. I see and agree with what Strawson is saying about the necessity of expanding our sense of what is physical, and I understand why he thinks it makes sense to think of the self as more of a 'thing' than anything - and I would agree, except that 'thing' is a term of objectification. I can only see myself as a thing in theory. In fact, who I am has no thingness at all from my own perspective. There is no object here, nothing which can be defined in terms of size, weight, temperature, etc. A subject is made of qualities that have only figurative dimensions, not literal body qualities.

Craig

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

On 16.09.2012 19:03 Craig Weinberg said the following:

>
>
> On Sunday, September 16, 2012 12:34:47 PM UTC-4, Evgenii Rudnyi
> wrote:
>>
>> Craig,
>>
>> You may want to look at
>>
>> Galen Strawson, Selves: An Essay in Revisionary Metaphysics
>>
>> He proves that selves exist. Interestingly enough he does it based
>> on the materialist framework.
>>

>> p. 11 �For the moment, though, the brief is to show that selves
>> exist, and that they�re things or objects or �substances� of

>> some sort, and hence, given materialism, physical objects. One
>> possibility is that there are in fact no better candidates for the

>> title of �physical object� than selves � even if there are
>> others that are as good.�
>>
>> p. 11 �This last suggestion is likely to strike many as obviously

>> false, but this reaction may stem in part from a failure to think
>> through what it is for something to be physical, on a genuine or
>> realistic materialist view, and, equally, from a failure to think

>> through what it is for something to be a thing or object.�

>>
>> Evgenii --
>>
>> http://blog.rudnyi.ru/2012/09/selves-an-essay-in-revisionary-metaphysics.html
>>
>>
>>
>
>>
Thanks Evgenii. I have been meaning to check out Strawson for a while
> actually. I agree that the self is physically and concretely real,
> but I don't think it is an object. The self is the subject. I see and
> agree with what Strawson is saying about the necessity of expanding
> our sense of what is physical, and I understand why he thinks it
> makes sense to think of the self as more of a 'thing' than anything -
> and I would agree, except that 'thing' is a term of objectification.
> I can only see myself as a thing in theory. In fact, who I am has no
> thingness at all from my own perspective. There is no object here,
> nothing which can be defined in terms of size, weight, temperature,
> etc. A subject is made of qualities that have only figurative
> dimensions, not literal body qualities.
>

According to Strawson, what exists as a thing is

SUBJECT OF EXPERIENCE-AS-SINGLE-MENTAL-THING

for short SESMET.

Hence no contradiction.

Evgenii

[Stephen P. King]

On 9/16/2012 12:34 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
> Craig,
>
> You may want to look at
>
> Galen Strawson, Selves: An Essay in Revisionary Metaphysics
>
> He proves that selves exist. Interestingly enough he does it based on
> the materialist framework.
>
> p. 11 �For the moment, though, the brief is to show that selves exist,
> and that they�re things or objects or �substances� of some sort, and
> hence, given materialism, physical objects. One possibility is that
> there are in fact no better candidates for the title of �physical
> object� than selves � even if there are others that are as good.�
>
> p. 11 �This last suggestion is likely to strike many as obviously
> false, but this reaction may stem in part from a failure to think
> through what it is for something to be physical, on a genuine or
> realistic materialist view, and, equally, from a failure to think
> through what it is for something to be a thing or object.�
>
> Evgenii

Dear Evgenii,

I disagree. Strawson does not "prove" or offer a proof here. He
merely states an equality. TO prove that equality he must show that the
necessary and sufficient condition of "selves" exists in (assuming
materialism), "physical objects". I have read his papers, he fails.

--
Onward!

Stephen

http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html

[Craig Weinberg]

On Sunday, September 16, 2012 2:42:20 PM UTC-4, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

According to Strawson, what exists as a thing is

SUBJECT OF EXPERIENCE-AS-SINGLE-MENTAL-THING

for short SESMET.

Hence no contradiction.

Evgenii

I think the word 'exists' can be confusing. I reserve the term 'insist' for phenomenological subjects. Through my mental participation, I can insist that Bugs Bunny's dog is a 'thing', but to say that this is a single thing that now exists in the universe is misleading. I try to reserve 'exist' for the contents of exterior public realism.

Subjects then, are never a single anything, but rather neither single nor multiple experiential potentials. They are trans-rational and a-mereological diffractions which vary and resist varying to different extents in different contexts of perception and participation. Subjects are the opposite of things. They have no location or appearance, but they also do not lack a location or appearance. They are qualia.

Craig

[Stephen P. King]

OK! Then Strawson cannot claim to be a materialist.

[Roger Clough]

Hi Craig and Evgenii,

Thanks for the suggestion to look at Strawson.

IMHO Unfortunately he starts off with the wacky assumption
that the self is physical. Garbage in, garbage out.


Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net
9/17/2012

Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him
so that everything could function."
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Craig Weinberg
Receiver: everything-list

Time: 2012-09-16, 13:03:09

Subject: Re: Alice and Wittgenstein: Materialism, Functionalism, and Comp

On Sunday, September 16, 2012 12:34:47 PM UTC-4, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
Craig,

You may want to look at

Galen Strawson, Selves: An Essay in Revisionary Metaphysics

He proves that selves exist. Interestingly enough he does it based on
the materialist framework.

p. 11 For the moment, though, the brief is to show that selves exist,
and that they re things or objects or substances of some sort, and

hence, given materialism, physical objects. One possibility is that

there are in fact no better candidates for the title of physical
object than selves even if there are others that are as good.

p. 11 This last suggestion is likely to strike many as obviously false,

but this reaction may stem in part from a failure to think through what
it is for something to be physical, on a genuine or realistic
materialist view, and, equally, from a failure to think through what it
is for something to be a thing or object.

Evgenii
--
http://blog.rudnyi.ru/2012/09/selves-an-essay-in-revisionary-metaphysics.html




Thanks Evgenii. I have been meaning to check out Strawson for a while actually. I agree that the self is physically and concretely real, but I don't think it is an object. The self is the subject. I see and agree with what Strawson is saying about the necessity of expanding our sense of what is physical, and I understand why he thinks it makes sense to think of the self as more of a 'thing' than anything - and I would agree, except that 'thing' is a term of objectification. I can only see myself as a thing in theory. In fact, who I am has no thingness at all from my own perspective. There is no object here, nothing which can be defined in terms of size, weight, temperature, etc. A subject is made of qualities that have only figurative dimensions, not literal body qualities.

Craig



On 08.09.2012 15:10 Craig Weinberg said the following:
> Here I present another metaphor to encapsulate by view of the
> relation between consciousness, information, and physicality by
> demonstrating the inadequacy of functionalist, computationalist, and
> materialist models and how they paint over the hard problem of
> consciousness with a choice of two flavors of the easy problem.
>
> I came up with this thought exercise in response to this lecture:
> http://backdoorbroadcasting.net/2012/05/zoe-drayson-the-autonomy-of-the-mental-and-the-personalsubpersonal-distinction/
>
> Consider "Alice in Wonderland"
>
> Let's say that Alice is trying to decide whether she can describe
> herself in terms of being composed of the syntax of the letters,
> words, and sentences of the story from which she emerges, or whether
> she is composed of the bleached and pressed wood pulp and ink that
> are considered page parts of the whole book.
>

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[Evgenii Rudnyi]

On 16.09.2012 21:56 Stephen P. King said the following:

Hi Stephen,

You are right that this is not a mathematical proof. On the other hand,
he discusses assumptions assuming which one comes to the existence of
selves, as he defines this term. Nagel has nicely characterized his book
at "a work of shameless metaphysics� and it seems to be the very right
description of the book.

I would also say that it is unclear how useful would be his definition
and proofs.

Interestingly enough, at the end of this book he comes to an eternal
question of metaphysics whether in the Universe there is one object or
several and he does not exclude the possibility that there is only one
object in the Universe. My thought at this point (while reading the
discussion on religion here) was that in this case it does not matter
how we refer to this object.

Evgenii

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

On 16.09.2012 23:51 Stephen P. King said the following:

> On 9/16/2012 2:42 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

...

>> According to Strawson, what exists as a thing is
>>
>> SUBJECT OF EXPERIENCE-AS-SINGLE-MENTAL-THING
>>
>> for short SESMET.
>>
>> Hence no contradiction.
>>
>> Evgenii
>>
> OK! Then Strawson cannot claim to be a materialist.
>

Why not? His point was that a materialist must accept that experiences
exist.

Evgenii

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

On 17.09.2012 13:20 Roger Clough said the following:

> Hi Craig and Evgenii,
>
> Thanks for the suggestion to look at Strawson.
>
> IMHO Unfortunately he starts off with the wacky assumption that the
> self is physical. Garbage in, garbage out.

What he means by physical is might be different thought. I think that he
supports panpsychism, hence, I guess, physical by his includes mental as
well.

Evgenii