Although this distinction between comp and functionalism does, I think, make comp superior to either functionalism or materialism, it is still ultimately the wrong approach as it takes the story and characters for granted as an unexplained precipitate of linguistic roles and grammatical realizers. This is Searle, etc. The symbol grounding problem. In this respect, comp and functionalism are equivalent - both wrong in the same way and in the way that is orthogonal/perpendicular to the way that materialism is the wrong approach.
What must be understood about consciousness, and about Alice, is that nothing means anything without the possibility of perception and participation to begin with in the universe. There is, to my way of thinking, zero possibility of perception or participation experiences emerging from either as that relies on a free lunch where either the paper and ink, the words and sentences, or the bits and bytes can spontaneously illustrate Alice and her world, as well as spontaneously invent the concept of illustration itself - of color and shape, of the lilt of her voice, the relation of those things to each other and how they are presented not as separate aspects being related but as a whole character.
If we want to understand Alice as she is, not as she thinks of herself in terms of the pages, words, or bytes of her story, then I think we need to begin with the
reality of Alice as 'the given'. We don’t have to believe that she is
anything more than a character or that her life is anything other than a
story, but if the character and story were really the ground of being
for Alice, then the book of pages (brain hardware) and the language
typed through those pages (cognitive software) both make sense as ways
of stabilizing, controlling, and reproducing aspects of the story. The
book is what makes Alice in Wonderland a publicly accessible artifact
and the words are what mediate from the public spatial sense to the
private temporal sense.
To extend this a bit more, we could say that the private motive to open the book, read the words, and imagine the characters and scenes in the story are what bind the symbols to the private sense experience. Body needs the book, mind needs the words, but story needs the willing self. The story is not bytes or words or turning pages, it is intentionalized interior sensorimotive experience and nothing else. The map is not the territory.
What this means is that all of the levels discussed in the lecture are not personal or sub-personal at all, but rather they are different aspects of the impersonal: impersonal (surface-topological) and impersonal (syntactic-operational). I propose a whole other indispensable half of this picture of consciousness and experience of which to paraphrase Wittgenstein, we cannot speak, thereof we must remain silent. We can however, listen.
We cannot speak about the personal, but we can know what it is to be a
person. We can realize ourselves directly, as an autonomous presence
without converting ourselves into an external appearance or function. We
can let human experience be human experience on it's native level, in it's native language, and nothing less. We are not merely aggregates of bytes and cells nor fragments of inevitable evolutionary algorithms of speciation, we are also irreducibly people with irreducibly human bodies. We propagate a conscious experience directly into our environment of our own (quasi-free) will, out of our own anthropological sense and motive. Of course the sub-personal and super-personal levels inform and influence our every choice and desire, but that doesn't negate the fact that there is a something personal to which these choices and desires actually refer.
The psyche, to continue with the Alice in Wonderland metaphor, has a protagonist - an Alice. It has other characters too, and themes, and a plot, etc…or does it? Does it literally ‘have a plot’, or are stories more of an experience with multiple frequency layers of events, memories, and expectations? These are the kinds of considerations we would have to make if we want to look at what consciousness actually is scientifically. Maybe it is better not to try to do that, or maybe it shouldn't be the concern of science. I am okay with that. But we should not be confused about what we are doing when we work with the vehicles and shadows of consciousness - the names and numbers, substances and functions. If we lose the realism of the self, then we will make books that publish their own empty stories, written by focus-group algorithms about the wonders of algorithms and emptiness and self-publishing books.
Craig
----- Receiving the following content -----From: Craig WeinbergReceiver: everything-listTime: 2012-09-08, 09:10:48Subject: Alice and Wittgenstein: Materialism, Functionalism, and Comp
Here I present another metaphor to encapsulate by view of the relation between consciousness, information, and physicality by demonstrating the inadequacy of functionalist, computationalist, and materialist models and how they paint over the hard problem of consciousness with a choice of two flavors of the easy problem.
I came up with this thought exercise in response to this lecture: http://backdoorbroadcasting.net/2012/05/zoe-drayson-the-autonomy-of-the-mental-and-the-personalsubpersonal-distinction/
Consider "Alice in Wonderland"
Let's say that Alice is trying to decide whether she can describe herself in terms of being composed of the syntax of the letters, words, and sentences of the story from which she emerges, or whether she is composed of the bleached and pressed wood pulp and ink that are considered page parts of the whole book.
The former I would say corresponds to the functionalist view of Alice as "roles and realizers", while the materialist view of Alice corresponds to the mereological "parts and wholes". To extend the metaphor to computationalism I would make the distinction between functionalism and computationalism as the difference between the string of English words being equivalent to the story of Alice (functionalism) and the same thing but with the capacity for the string of words to translate themselves into any language.
- Materialism = pages in a book,
- Functionalism = English words in sentences (literature),
- Computationalism / Digital Functionalism = Amazon Kindle that translates literature into any language (customized literature).
Although this distinction between comp and functionalism does, I think, make comp superior to either functionalism or materialism, it is still ultimately the wrong approach as it takes the story and characters for granted as an unexplained precipitate of linguistic roles and grammatical realizers. This is Searle, etc. The symbol grounding problem. In this respect, comp and functionalism are equivalent - both wrong in the same way and in the way that is orthogonal/perpendicular to the way that materialism is the wrong approach.
What must be understood about consciousness, and about Alice, is that nothing means anything without the possibility of perception and participation to begin with in the universe. There is, to my way of thinking, zero possibility of perception or participation experiences emerging from either as that relies on a free lunch where either the paper and ink, the words and sentences, or the bits and bytes can spontaneously illustrate Alice and her world, as well as spontaneously invent the concept of illustration itself - of color and shape, of the lilt of her voice, the relation of those things to each other and how they are presented not as separate aspects being related but as a whole character.
If we want to understand Alice as she is, not as she thinks of herself in terms of the pages, words, or bytes of her story, then I think we need to begin with the reality of Alice as 'the given'. We don锟絫 have to believe that she is anything more than a character or that her life is anything other than a story, but if the character and story were really the ground of being for Alice, then the book of pages (brain hardware) and the language typed through those pages (cognitive software) both make sense as ways of stabilizing, controlling, and reproducing aspects of the story. The book is what makes Alice in Wonderland a publicly accessible artifact and the words are what mediate from the public spatial sense to the private temporal sense.
To extend this a bit more, we could say that the private motive to open the book, read the words, and imagine the characters and scenes in the story are what bind the symbols to the private sense experience. Body needs the book, mind needs the words, but story needs the willing self. The story is not bytes or words or turning pages, it is intentionalized interior sensorimotive experience and nothing else. The map is not the territory.
What this means is that all of the levels discussed in the lecture are not personal or sub-personal at all, but rather they are different aspects of the impersonal: impersonal (surface-topological) and impersonal (syntactic-operational). I propose a whole other indispensable half of this picture of consciousness and experience of which to paraphrase Wittgenstein, we cannot speak, thereof we must remain silent. We can however, listen.
We cannot speak about the personal, but we can know what it is to be a person. We can realize ourselves directly, as an autonomous presence without converting ourselves into an external appearance or function. We can let human experience be human experience on it's native level, in it's native language, and nothing less. We are not merely aggregates of bytes and cells nor fragments of inevitable evolutionary algorithms of speciation, we are also irreducibly people with irreducibly human bodies. We propagate a conscious experience directly into our environment of our own (quasi-free) will, out of our own anthropological sense and motive. Of course the sub-personal and super-personal levels inform and influence our every choice and desire, but that doesn't negate the fact that there is a something personal to which these choices and desires actually refer.
The psyche, to continue with the Alice in Wonderland metaphor, has a protagonist - an Alice. It has other characters too, and themes, and a plot, etc锟給r does it? Does it literally 锟絟ave a plot�, or are stories more of an experience with multiple frequency layers of events, memories, and expectations? These are the kinds of considerations we would have to make if we want to look at what consciousness actually is scientifically. Maybe it is better not to try to do that, or maybe it shouldn't be the concern of science. I am okay with that. But we should not be confused about what we are doing when we work with the vehicles and shadows of consciousness - the names and numbers, substances and functions. If we lose the realism of the self, then we will make books that publish their own empty stories, written by focus-group algorithms about the wonders of algorithms and emptiness and self-publishing books.
Craig
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Hi Craig WeinbergI seem to be a voice crying in the wilderness. So be it, but...When you say "Here I present ", how or where does the "I" fit into your philosophy ?You cannot have thinking or consciousness or intelligence or perception withut it.Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net9/8/2012Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent himso that everything could function."
----- Receiving the following content -----From: Craig WeinbergReceiver: everything-listTime: 2012-09-08, 09:10:48Subject: Alice and Wittgenstein: Materialism, Functionalism, and Comp
Here I present another metaphor to encapsulate by view of the relation between consciousness, information, and physicality by demonstrating the inadequacy of functionalist, computationalist, and materialist models and how they paint over the hard problem of consciousness with a choice of two flavors of the easy problem.
I came up with this thought exercise in response to this lecture: http://backdoorbroadcasting.net/2012/05/zoe-drayson-the-autonomy-of-the-mental-and-the-personalsubpersonal-distinction/
Consider "Alice in Wonderland"
Let's say that Alice is trying to decide whether she can describe herself in terms of being composed of the syntax of the letters, words, and sentences of the story from which she emerges, or whether she is composed of the bleached and pressed wood pulp and ink that are considered page parts of the whole book.
The former I would say corresponds to the functionalist view of Alice as "roles and realizers", while the materialist view of Alice corresponds to the mereological "parts and wholes". To extend the metaphor to computationalism I would make the distinction between functionalism and computationalism as the difference between the string of English words being equivalent to the story of Alice (functionalism) and the same thing but with the capacity for the string of words to translate themselves into any language.
- Materialism = pages in a book,
- Functionalism = English words in sentences (literature),
- Computationalism / Digital Functionalism = Amazon Kindle that translates literature into any language (customized literature).
Although this distinction between comp and functionalism does, I think, make comp superior to either functionalism or materialism, it is still ultimately the wrong approach as it takes the story and characters for granted as an unexplained precipitate of linguistic roles and grammatical realizers. This is Searle, etc. The symbol grounding problem. In this respect, comp and functionalism are equivalent - both wrong in the same way and in the way that is orthogonal/perpendicular to the way that materialism is the wrong approach.
What must be understood about consciousness, and about Alice, is that nothing means anything without the possibility of perception and participation to begin with in the universe. There is, to my way of thinking, zero possibility of perception or participation experiences emerging from either as that relies on a free lunch where either the paper and ink, the words and sentences, or the bits and bytes can spontaneously illustrate Alice and her world, as well as spontaneously invent the concept of illustration itself - of color and shape, of the lilt of her voice, the relation of those things to each other and how they are presented not as separate aspects being related but as a whole character.
If we want to understand Alice as she is, not as she thinks of herself in terms of the pages, words, or bytes of her story, then I think we need to begin with the reality of Alice as 'the given'. We don锟� have to believe that she is anything more than a character or that her life is anything other than a story, but if the character and story were really the ground of being for Alice, then the book of pages (brain hardware) and the language typed through those pages (cognitive software) both make sense as ways of stabilizing, controlling, and reproducing aspects of the story. The book is what makes Alice in Wonderland a publicly accessible artifact and the words are what mediate from the public spatial sense to the private temporal sense.
To extend this a bit more, we could say that the private motive to open the book, read the words, and imagine the characters and scenes in the story are what bind the symbols to the private sense experience. Body needs the book, mind needs the words, but story needs the willing self. The story is not bytes or words or turning pages, it is intentionalized interior sensorimotive experience and nothing else. The map is not the territory.
What this means is that all of the levels discussed in the lecture are not personal or sub-personal at all, but rather they are different aspects of the impersonal: impersonal (surface-topological) and impersonal (syntactic-operational). I propose a whole other indispensable half of this picture of consciousness and experience of which to paraphrase Wittgenstein, we cannot speak, thereof we must remain silent. We can however, listen.
We cannot speak about the personal, but we can know what it is to be a person. We can realize ourselves directly, as an autonomous presence without converting ourselves into an external appearance or function. We can let human experience be human experience on it's native level, in it's native language, and nothing less. We are not merely aggregates of bytes and cells nor fragments of inevitable evolutionary algorithms of speciation, we are also irreducibly people with irreducibly human bodies. We propagate a conscious experience directly into our environment of our own (quasi-free) will, out of our own anthropological sense and motive. Of course the sub-personal and super-personal levels inform and influence our every choice and desire, but that doesn't negate the fact that there is a something personal to which these choices and desires actually refer.
The psyche, to continue with the Alice in Wonderland metaphor, has a protagonist - an Alice. It has other characters too, and themes, and a plot, etc锟�r does it? Does it literally 锟�ave a plot�, or are stories more of an experience with multiple frequency layers of events, memories, and expectations? These are the kinds of considerations we would have to make if we want to look at what consciousness actually is scientifically. Maybe it is better not to try to do that, or maybe it shouldn't be the concern of science. I am okay with that. But we should not be confused about what we are doing when we work with the vehicles and shadows of consciousness - the names and numbers, substances and functions. If we lose the realism of the self, then we will make books that publish their own empty stories, written by focus-group algorithms about the wonders of algorithms and emptiness and self-publishing books.
----- Receiving the following content -----From: Craig WeinbergReceiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-09-09, 13:27:09Subject: Re: Alice and Wittgenstein: Materialism, Functionalism, and Comp
If we want to understand Alice as she is, not as she thinks of herself in terms of the pages, words, or bytes of her story, then I think we need to begin with the reality of Alice as 'the given'. We don� have to believe that she is anything more than a character or that her life is anything other than a story, but if the character and story were really the ground of being for Alice, then the book of pages (brain hardware) and the language typed through those pages (cognitive software) both make sense as ways of stabilizing, controlling, and reproducing aspects of the story. The book is what makes Alice in Wonderland a publicly accessible artifact and the words are what mediate from the public spatial sense to the private temporal sense.
To extend this a bit more, we could say that the private motive to open the book, read the words, and imagine the characters and scenes in the story are what bind the symbols to the private sense experience. Body needs the book, mind needs the words, but story needs the willing self. The story is not bytes or words or turning pages, it is intentionalized interior sensorimotive experience and nothing else. The map is not the territory.
What this means is that all of the levels discussed in the lecture are not personal or sub-personal at all, but rather they are different aspects of the impersonal: impersonal (surface-topological) and impersonal (syntactic-operational). I propose a whole other indispensable half of this picture of consciousness and experience of which to paraphrase Wittgenstein, we cannot speak, thereof we must remain silent. We can however, listen.
We cannot speak about the personal, but we can know what it is to be a person. We can realize ourselves directly, as an autonomous presence without converting ourselves into an external appearance or function. We can let human experience be human experience on it's native level, in it's native language, and nothing less. We are not merely aggregates of bytes and cells nor fragments of inevitable evolutionary algorithms of speciation, we are also irreducibly people with irreducibly human bodies. We propagate a conscious experience directly into our environment of our own (quasi-free) will, out of our own anthropological sense and motive. Of course the sub-personal and super-personal levels inform and influence our every choice and desire, but that doesn't negate the fact that there is a something personal to which these choices and desires actually refer.
The psyche, to continue with the Alice in Wonderland metaphor, has a protagonist - an Alice. It has other characters too, and themes, and a plot, etc� r does it? Does it literally � ave a plot , or are stories more of an experience with multiple frequency layers of events, memories, and expectations? These are the kinds of considerations we would have to make if we want to look at what consciousness actually is scientifically. Maybe it is better not to try to do that, or maybe it shouldn't be the concern of science. I am okay with that. But we should not be confused about what we are doing when we work with the vehicles and shadows of consciousness - the names and numbers, substances and functions. If we lose the realism of the self, then we will make books that publish their own empty stories, written by focus-group algorithms about the wonders of algorithms and emptiness and self-publishing books.
Craig
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Hi Craig Weinberg
I think that the perceiver must be a lot like the creator interms of its not being an endless regress of homunculi.There has to be either a stopping point or an entrance tothe nonphysical from the physical, the unextendedfrom the extended.
Platonia's All is such an entity.
Another might be the limit in terms of size of what a substance is.For you can't seem to get any smaller than Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle,which would be a stopping point.Leibniz speaks in terms of reflectors.Elsewhere, perhaps in Leibniz, the perceiver is characterized asbeing a unity, a whole, a point of focus.
It mustalso be very wideband, to take in much at one glance.And allow info coming in from many directrions and angles at once.
Maxwell's Demon also seems to be at least part of a candidate.And I have guessed that intelligence itself must be the perceiver.
If we want to understand Alice as she is, not as she thinks of herself in terms of the pages, words, or bytes of her story, then I think we need to begin with the reality of Alice as 'the given'. We don锟�have to believe that she is anything more than a character or that her life is anything other than a story, but if the character and story were really the ground of being for Alice, then the book of pages (brain hardware) and the language typed through those pages (cognitive software) both make sense as ways of stabilizing, controlling, and reproducing aspects of the story. The book is what makes Alice in Wonderland a publicly accessible artifact and the words are what mediate from the public spatial sense to the private temporal sense.
To extend this a bit more, we could say that the private motive to open the book, read the words, and imagine the characters and scenes in the story are what bind the symbols to the private sense experience. Body needs the book, mind needs the words, but story needs the willing self. The story is not bytes or words or turning pages, it is intentionalized interior sensorimotive experience and nothing else. The map is not the territory.
What this means is that all of the levels discussed in the lecture are not personal or sub-personal at all, but rather they are different aspects of the impersonal: impersonal (surface-topological) and impersonal (syntactic-operational). I propose a whole other indispensable half of this picture of consciousness and experience of which to paraphrase Wittgenstein, we cannot speak, thereof we must remain silent. We can however, listen.
We cannot speak about the personal, but we can know what it is to be a person. We can realize ourselves directly, as an autonomous presence without converting ourselves into an external appearance or function. We can let human experience be human experience on it's native level, in it's native language, and nothing less. We are not merely aggregates of bytes and cells nor fragments of inevitable evolutionary algorithms of speciation, we are also irreducibly people with irreducibly human bodies. We propagate a conscious experience directly into our environment of our own (quasi-free) will, out of our own anthropological sense and motive. Of course the sub-personal and super-personal levels inform and influence our every choice and desire, but that doesn't negate the fact that there is a something personal to which these choices and desires actually refer.
The psyche, to continue with the Alice in Wonderland metaphor, has a protagonist - an Alice. It has other characters too, and themes, and a plot, etc锟�r does it? Does it literally 锟�ave a plot , or are stories more of an experience with multiple frequency layers of events, memories, and expectations? These are the kinds of considerations we would have to make if we want to look at what consciousness actually is scientifically. Maybe it is better not to try to do that, or maybe it shouldn't be the concern of science. I am okay with that. But we should not be confused about what we are doing when we work with the vehicles and shadows of consciousness - the names and numbers, substances and functions. If we lose the realism of the self, then we will make books that publish their own empty stories, written by focus-group algorithms about the wonders of algorithms and emptiness and self-publishing books.
Craig
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Hi Craig Weinberg
The Creator is not created. So no problem.
----- Receiving the following content -----From: Craig WeinbergReceiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-09-11, 08:52:16Subject: Re: Re: What must the perceiver be like?
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Hi Craig Weinberg
But the universe IS created.
I believe that Satan wrote the Koran, but not the Bible,
for the Bible asks us to love and forgive each other.Writing that would burn the Devil's fingers.
So the koran seems to omit the part about lovingand forgiving each other.
----- Receiving the following content -----From: Craig WeinbergReceiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-09-11, 09:48:04Subject: Re: Re: Re: What must the perceiver be like?
On Tuesday, September 11, 2012 9:10:46 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote:Hi Craig WeinbergBut the universe IS created.
I can say that God IS created too. Here goes: God IS created.
Whatever created the universe would have to also be the universe, or an arbitrary conceptual partition thereof.
I believe that Satan wrote the Koran, but not the Bible,
Hahahaha. Well that works out nicely for you then. No cognitive bias there.
for the Bible asks us to love and forgive each other.Writing that would burn the Devil's fingers.
Haha, why, because malicious predators aren't allowed to suggest that their prey be meek and mild? You don't think this message would come in handy in Bronze Age societies for establishing political order under a priesthood class on behalf of military leaders? Is the Devil a wolf that is forbidden to wear sheep's clothing? You think that the Devil could tempt and lie to people by announcing that he is the Devil? If I were the Devil, I would be most interested in recruiting priests, police, judges, teachers, politicians, businessmen, etc. What would be the point of tempting degenerate sinners who I already own?
So the koran seems to omit the part about lovingand forgiving each other.
Does it? I haven't read the Koran. A brief Googling reveals:
锟斤拷. But if you pardon and exonerate and forgive, Allah is Ever-Forgiving, Most Merciful.� [Qur锟絘n, 64: 14]
锟紿old to forgiveness, command what is right, and turn away from the ignorant.� [Qur锟絘n, 7:199]
锟斤拷 They should rather pardon and overlook. Would you not love Allah to forgive you? Allah is Ever-Forgiving, Most Merciful.� [Qur锟絘n, 24:22]
To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/81MGgWxT2k0J.
Hi Craig Weinberg
You're certainly welcome to your beliefs.OK, I was wrong about forgiving your neighbor,but I don't think that the Koran asks you to love your neighbor.
Yes, I've travelled a lot.Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net9/11/2012Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent himso that everything could function."
----- Receiving the following content -----From: Craig WeinbergReceiver: everything-listTime: 2012-09-11, 09:48:04Subject: Re: Re: Re: What must the perceiver be like?
On Tuesday, September 11, 2012 9:10:46 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote:Hi Craig WeinbergBut the universe IS created.
I can say that God IS created too. Here goes: God IS created.
Whatever created the universe would have to also be the universe, or an arbitrary conceptual partition thereof.
I believe that Satan wrote the Koran, but not the Bible,
Hahahaha. Well that works out nicely for you then. No cognitive bias there.
for the Bible asks us to love and forgive each other.Writing that would burn the Devil's fingers.
Haha, why, because malicious predators aren't allowed to suggest that their prey be meek and mild? You don't think this message would come in handy in Bronze Age societies for establishing political order under a priesthood class on behalf of military leaders? Is the Devil a wolf that is forbidden to wear sheep's clothing? You think that the Devil could tempt and lie to people by announcing that he is the Devil? If I were the Devil, I would be most interested in recruiting priests, police, judges, teachers, politicians, businessmen, etc. What would be the point of tempting degenerate sinners who I already own?
So the koran seems to omit the part about lovingand forgiving each other.
Does it? I haven't read the Koran. A brief Googling reveals:
锟斤拷. But if you pardon and exonerate and forgive, Allah is Ever-Forgiving, Most Merciful.� [Qur锟�n, 64: 14]
锟�old to forgiveness, command what is right, and turn away from the ignorant.� [Qur锟�n, 7:199]
锟斤拷 They should rather pardon and overlook. Would you not love Allah to forgive you? Allah is Ever-Forgiving, Most Merciful.� [Qur锟�n, 24:22]
----- Receiving the following content -----From: Craig WeinbergReceiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-09-11, 10:36:50Subject: Re: Re: Re: Re: What must the perceiver be like?
��. But if you pardon and exonerate and forgive, Allah is Ever-Forgiving, Most Merciful. [Qur� n, 64: 14]
� old to forgiveness, command what is right, and turn away from the ignorant. [Qur� n, 7:199]
�� They should rather pardon and overlook. Would you not love Allah to forgive you? Allah is Ever-Forgiving, Most Merciful. [Qur� n, 24:22]
To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/bgi232s9G0AJ.
锟斤拷. But if you pardon and exonerate and forgive, Allah is Ever-Forgiving, Most Merciful. [Qur锟�n, 64: 14]
锟�old to forgiveness, command what is right, and turn away from the ignorant. [Qur锟� n, 7:199]
锟斤拷 They should rather pardon and overlook. Would you not love Allah to forgive you? Allah is Ever-Forgiving, Most Merciful. [Qur锟� n, 24:22]
Hi Roger,
On Tuesday, September 11, 2012 8:36:47 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote:Hi Craig Weinberg
The Creator is not created. So no problem.
Why not just say The Universe is not created. So no problem?
What does the idea of an uncreated Creator add that has any explanatory power? Would the idea of a Creator seem obvious if the Bible didn't exist?
What if you found out that the Bible was actually written by people's demons who mixed truth with lies over centuries to cause confusion, oppression, and cruelty. If I were Satan, why wouldn't I tell people that I am God and make them write a book which causes fear, superstition, and misery (even if the cost is that it has some very good side effects as well)? Not to suggest that you doubt your faith, but logically, the idea of a Bible seems contrary to the purposes of a Creator who endows his creations with direct capacities to make sense of his creation (including themselves). Does he want us to know he exists or doesn't he? If so, why write a bunch of crazy ambiguous scriptures that vary from place to place? If not, why allow such blasphemous confusions to thrive?
Craig
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Hi Craig WeinbergBut the universe IS created.I believe that Satan wrote the Koran, but not the Bible,for the Bible asks us to love
and forgive each other.
Writing that would burn the Devil's fingers.So the koran seems to omit the part about lovingand forgiving each other.
On 11 Sep 2012, at 14:52, Craig Weinberg wrote:Hi Roger,
On Tuesday, September 11, 2012 8:36:47 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote:Hi Craig Weinberg
The Creator is not created. So no problem.
Why not just say The Universe is not created. So no problem?You are right. "God create the universe" can be an explanation, or a progress toward an explanation only if the notion of God in use is conceptually simpler than the universe.I think Arithmetic (with a big A, it means the whole set of first order arithmetical true propositions, to fix the thing) is like that.
Craig,
You may want to look at
Galen Strawson, Selves: An Essay in Revisionary Metaphysics
He proves that selves exist. Interestingly enough he does it based on
the materialist framework.
p. 11 �For the moment, though, the brief is to show that selves exist,
and that they�re things or objects or �substances� of some sort, and
hence, given materialism, physical objects. One possibility is that
there are in fact no better candidates for the title of �physical
object� than selves � even if there are others that are as good.�
p. 11 �This last suggestion is likely to strike many as obviously false,
but this reaction may stem in part from a failure to think through what
it is for something to be physical, on a genuine or realistic
materialist view, and, equally, from a failure to think through what it
is for something to be a thing or object.�
Evgenii
--
http://blog.rudnyi.ru/2012/09/selves-an-essay-in-revisionary-metaphysics.html
According to Strawson, what exists as a thing is
SUBJECT OF EXPERIENCE-AS-SINGLE-MENTAL-THING
for short SESMET.
Hence no contradiction.
Evgenii