Ontology in the Age of Science [was: Free will is of a hollow debate]

[Dianelos Georgoudis]

Denis Loubet wrote:
> "Dianelos" <dian...@tecapro.com> wrote in message
> news:1128062737.7...@z14g2000cwz.googlegroups.com...
> >
> > Denis Loubet wrote:
> >> "someone4" <glenn....@btinternet.com> wrote in message
> > [snip]
> >
> >> > We have never detected awareness at all. There is no objective evidence
> >> > that you are aware.
> >>
> >> That's actually a good point. You are absolutely right. I stand
> >> corrected.
> >>
> >> Now that we cannot justify the existence of awareness, where does that
> >> leave
> >> our argument about free will? Well, first off, now there's no need to
> >> concoct a non-physical plane because awareness has been erased off the
> >> blackboard and no longer requires an explanation.
> >
> > I find this is an extremely curious statement. Awareness after all does
> > exist.
>
> Does it? You said: "We have never detected awareness at all. There is no
> objective evidence that you are aware."
>
> Why then, in the face of a total lack of evidence, would I conclude that
> awareness exists? Such a conclusion would not be justified. So if I am to be
> intellectually honest with myself, I must abandon the claim of awareness.

Wow! I certainly admire your chutzpah.

> > You have no doubts you are aware, no?
>
> Sure I have doubts. I hold nothing as 100% correct. Especially since you
> made such an excellent point when you said: "We have never detected
> awareness at all. There is no objective evidence that you are aware."
>
> > In what sense then has
> > awareness been "erased off the blackboard and no longer requires an
> > explanation"?
>
> Since you said: "We have never detected awareness at all. There is no
> objective evidence that you are aware."
>
> > On the contrary. Awareness is the most momentous fact we know and I can
> > imagine no other thing as important to explain.
>
> Then why did you say: "We have never detected awareness at all. There is no
> objective evidence that you are aware." What is a fact if not "objective
> evidence"? Awareness cannot be both a fact and not a fact at the same time,
> can it? You seem to be contradicting yourself.

OK. If I understand you correctly, your definition of existence is:

- Something exists only if it can be objectively detected (i.e. there
is objective evidence for it).

It's not completely clear what is meant by "objective" but I suppose
you would agree that an objective detection or evidence is something
that a scientific instrument can record.

Let's not overlook the fact that the definition above results in an
infinite regression: after all in order to know whether the objective
evidence itself exists or not, we would need to obtain objective
evidence for it too. Let's solve this problem by claiming that only a
finite depth of recurring pieces of objective evidence is needed, like:
"Something exists only if there is objective evidence for the objective
evidence for the objective evidence for it."
as
Now, you are familiar with the type of logical argument called
"reduction ad absurdum", or in other words that no true statement can
imply absurdities. I think this also applies to definitions, after all
a definition that implies absurdities is not a very useful one. So
let's see what the definition above implies.

First of all, obviously, it implies that God does not exist. But that's
ok, many people think so anyway.

Further, it implies that beauty does not exist, after all it cannot be
objectively detected. We must assume that beauty exists only as
processes in the brain of the people who experience it. Therefore
beauty in any sense will disappear when the last person dies. (Of
course, everything exists as an idea, including God, the perpetuum
mobile, and pink unicorns - but here we are interested in existents
that exist as things by themselves.)

The definition above also implies that numbers do not exist, for they
cannot be objectively detected. Again they only exist as ideas in the
brains of people, i.e. as some particular structure of synapses or
maybe some specific electrochemical processes therefore. Therefore
numbers in any sense did not exist before the first mathematical
thought ever thought.

What about the curvature of space (as Einstein's general relativity
posits)? Does it exist? At first it may seem so, but observe that
Newton thought that space is flat, and some scientist in the future may
come up with a better theory than Einstein's and claim that space is
zig-zag, or maybe a fractal. Now, what objectively exists does not
shift in or out of existence depending the latest scientific theory, so
we recognize that the curvature of space does not really exist by
itself, but represents only a model: an idea within the brains of
scientists - it too exists only as electrochemical processes in
brains, and it too will cease to exist when the last person dies.

Generalizing the above argument we immediately see that physical laws
too do not exist. I am sure you can fill in the details.

What about physical objects that are not immediately visible to our
senses, such as an electron? Do electrons exist? Now, quantum mechanics
teaches that an electron is a wave that has a non-zero amplitude in all
points of physical space, i.e. when an electron moves it passes through
every single point of space, albeit with different probabilities. Now,
no such thing has been objectively detected (and no real existent does
such magical stuff) so electrons must also be models created in the
scientists' brains for explaining what truly exists, for example the
beeps of an electron detector.

Of course, one may naively think that an electron detector detects
electrons, and that electrons do exist and only the electron properties
do not really exist except as scientific models. Only it is absurd to
claim that something exists but its properties (i.e. whatever we know
about it) do not, so the only reasonable thing to do is to only accept
the existence of things that can be detected directly - and not only
indirectly. After all if we allow for indirect detection (e.g. that the
beep heard records an electron because of this or that scientific
argument) then we open a backdoor through which anything can be made to
exist. For example one could claim that a machine that records the
symmetry and other characteristics of a face, detects the beauty of
this face. Or that the fact that the electron detector can actually
display the number or beeps is evidence that numbers exist.

Actually, up to now we haven't detected a really absurd implication of
the above definition. Sure, it does imply that neither beauty, nor
numbers, nor curvature of space, nor physical laws, nor electrons
really exist, which does contradict the colloquial way we use the word
"exist", but you can dug in your heels and claim that these are all
indeed just ideas and exist only as physical structures in the brains
of people, and that we colloquially use the word "exist" in a
metaphorical sense.

Things really get hairy when one applies this definition on oneself.
For example your sense of redness cannot be objectively detected, so it
does not exist - even though very curiously you do see redness, which
means that in your waking hours you very often see something that does
not exist. Indeed your definition of existence implies that the whole
of your awareness does not exist (hence you denial of awareness). So
neither does your free will exist. Neither does your sense of self.

So, in what sense exactly do *you* exist? You may say that your body
exists, but how would you know that? After all, you are not aware of
your body (your awareness does not exist, remember?). But suppose you
used the curious argument that even though your awareness does not
exist you are aware of things. Even then you could not use your
awareness of your body to argue for its existence, because a) you are
also aware of redness while redness does not exist, b) it's all
subjective anyway. So, puff!, by your definition it seems you don't
exist anymore. And this is the absurd implication of your definition,
because you cannot think yourself out of existence. Descartes would be
appalled.

Incidentally there is one more argument why "I exist" and "My body
exists" cannot be equivalent statements: I am absolutely certain about
the former, but not absolutely certain about the latter (see the brain
in a vat thought experiment).

Now, let's leave that flawed definition behind, and reconsider how
matters stand. Physical existence is physical sciences' concern and
field of study. Existence in general though is one of the basic fields
of study of philosophy (called ontology). From Plato to Bertrand
Russell it was well known that physical existence does not exhaust
reality. (By reality I mean the set of all existents.) Here is what
Russell (the well known logician, philosopher, and mathematician, and
one of the brightest minds of the twentieth century) wrote when
discussing the nature of matter: "When it is said that light *is*
waves, what is really meant is that waves are the physical cause of our
sensations of light. But light itself, the thing which seeing people
experience and blind people do not, is not supposed by science to form
any part of the world that is independent of us and our senses" [i.e.
the physical world]. Observe then that as he points out we use the word
"light" to denote two different things: a) light itself, i.e. our
subjective sensation (or sense-data as he put it) of light, and b) by
analogy what in the physical universe causes this sensation. Clear
thinking requires that we should not conflate the two. Russell goes on
to say that colors, sounds, and so on (i.e. all our sensations) are
absent from the scientific world of matter (see: "The Problems of
Philosophy" pag. 29 of the Oxford University Press paperback edition).
So if these parts of awareness called light, colors, sounds are absent
from the scientific world of matter, it means that the world of matter
does not exhaust everything there is. Russell, like the first modern
philosopher Descartes, taught that what we immediately know is our
subjective sense-data and that all other knowledge we discover is based
on these (as he carefully put it: "subjective things are the most
certain" - page 18 ibid). Indeed it is self-evident that we all start
with our subjective awareness and on this foundation we build the rest
of our knowledge including what we today colloquially call "objective"
knowledge. So to deny the existence of your awareness is not only
obviously impossible but also tantamount to denying your capacity for
knowing anything at all.

Now physicalism (or materialism, i.e. the ontological position that
everything is physical or that there are no kinds of things other than
physical things) is a very recent development mainly of the second half
of the twentieth century. It is so rife with paradoxes that it seems to
me that physicalism is less based on reason and more on a psychological
reaction to the great success of physics in the past century (created
by philosophers blinded by science like a deer by the headlight). The
many intents throughout the last decades to fit awareness within a
physicalist paradigm of reality has been so unsuccessful that one of
the more prominent members of that movement (David Chalmers) has
started proposing that consciousness must be considered a fundamental
principle of physical reality - which is another way to say that
consciousness does not fit in the physical universe that physics today
studies and that it is necessary to add something to our view of
physical reality in order to account for it. So it seems there is basic
agreement already and we are down to semantics: some say that
consciousness shows that reality is bigger than physical existence, and
some say that we must add something fundamental to physical existence
to account for consciousness.

So let come back to your last paragraph: I had written:

> > On the contrary. Awareness is the most momentous fact we know and I can
> > imagine no other thing as important to explain.

To which you responded:

> Then why did you say: "We have never detected awareness at all. There is no
> objective evidence that you are aware." What is a fact if not "objective
> evidence"? Awareness cannot be both a fact and not a fact at the same time,
> can it? You seem to be contradicting yourself.

It seems to me that by "fact" we denote knowledge that is completely
certain, at least for all practical purposes. By that measure
consciousness is the most factual of facts. The very existence of the
physical universe is less factual in comparison.

So, I would like to keep insisting that as consciousness is the most
momentous fact there is, intellectual honesty requires that we try to
understand it. (It's not important in the context of this post, but I
claim that the only way to understand consciousness is through the
concept of God. The fact that most religious claims are mythological,
superstitious or dogmatic is irrelevant, and should certainly not keep
us from this most momentous quest for understanding.)

Now, above I have criticized your definition of existence (at least as
I understood your thinking). It's easy enough to criticize when one is
not proposing something better. So here is the definition of existence
I would like to suggest:

- Something exists only when it explains something we experience.

I understand "explain" in the general sense of "making sense of", or of
detecting order or a pattern in the more superficial data of our
awareness. This can best be elucidated using examples from our own
experience and how we managed to make sense of it:

Let's go back to when we were newborn babies. At that time we couldn't
focus objects in front of our eyes; we were only aware of a soup of
visual stimuli. Little by little we discovered order in this visual
field, and - as we today know - we created synapses in our brain to
efficiently detect that order. For example we learned to quickly
organize the pixels of or visual field and detect the presence of, say,
an apple. So we learned to detect the "apple pattern" in our visual
field. Playing with apples, and with balls and stones and water, we
detected a deeper pattern, that of "things fall down". Later in school
we learned about gravity, which is an even deeper pattern in our
experience of the world around us (i.e. with more explanatory power)
than simply "things fall down". Gravity is not really a visible and
concrete pattern and it is therefore not really a physical object, but
is a deeper pattern that explains the how and the why of the movement
of more superficial patterns such like apples, stones, cannon balls, or
planets. Playing with the same kind of superficial patterns such as
stones and coins, we discovered (or were taught) other kind of patterns
related to counting and adding things together. The adding pattern is
indeed very conspicuous: every time we put three coins (or stones or
beans) together with two more coins (or stones or beans) and count the
elements in the resulting pile we always get five! This is a most
important pattern, deeper than the coin/stone/beans patterns because it
applies to all of them. We call this type of pattern depending on its
level of abstraction number, addition, or math.

Normally we say that all these patterns "exist", because they represent
relatively stable patterns in our field of awareness; they allow us to
make sense of the incredible variety of things we experience. Some are
superficial patterns like apples and coins, some are deeper like
gravity or numbers. Finally some patterns are so deep that they cannot
really be pointed at or taught about, but still represent levels of
organization we all manage to detect in our experience - such as
beauty. So we say that apples exist, gravity exists, numbers exist,
mathematical laws exist, and beauty exists.

The idea of "evidence" too represents a pattern, indeed a very deep
one. We empirically find that things do not exist independently of each
other, but normally interconnect and interlock with other patterns.
Therefore we expect the whole of reality to be interconnected. We get
immediately suspicious if something is claimed to exist simply hanging
in there by itself and with no apparent "connections" to other
existents. By the time we reach adulthood we have created a mental map
of reality that is a web like relation of patterns, and we expect any
further knowledge to extend that web or make it stronger. The fact that
atheists, for example, get so suspicious about the existence of God or
of beauty as things by themselves is that they don't detect the pattern
in the case of God, and they don't see how the pattern connects to
everything else that dominates their web of knowledge - the physical
universe - in the case of beauty.

Our thinking related to pattern recognition follows some patterns
itself - empirical patterns that we find help us think in a more
effective way. For example if A and B have roughly the same explanatory
power but B contradicts other existents we know, then we choose to
believe in the existence of A rather than of B. Similarly if A is
simpler than B we choose A (the Occam's razor). Also, B does not "fit"
as well with the web of the rest of existence then we choose A.
Finally, as a matter of fact, we often accept an existent on the power
of somebody else's opinion. So most people who accept that space is
curved do so because they trust scientists and not because they have
studied general relativity themselves and have directly experienced the
great explanatory power of curved space. Personally I believe that four
colors suffice to shade any flat map even though I haven't read the
relevant mathematical proof. Actually nobody really has, for it is
partly generated by computer, but I do trust the mathematicians who
worked on this, and they trust the computer. We simply know more about
existence than what we have time finding out ourselves. The web of
patterns that we find covers all reality is complemented by the web of
trust in the opinions of other people. In a way we think with more than
just our brain. That's maybe unfortunate but that's how it is.

As a final point, not all existence is equal, but depends on the myriad
factors we use to arrive at the relevant knowledge. The existence of
myself and the current state of my consciousness are absolutely
certain, but the existence of the physical universe is just a little
less then absolutely certain (we may exist as a brain in a vat). Going
very roughly from more certain to less certain existence we can point
at numbers, then beauty, then physical laws, then classical
near-experience physical objects such as apples, then galaxies, then
electrons, then curved space, then tachyons, then the ten spatial
dimensions of string theory, then the objects of dreams. The idea that
all existents can be neatly divided into two groups, objective things
whose existence is certain and subjective things whose existence is
not, is a gross oversimplification. It is also a very detrimental
belief, as often ontological discussions digress to fights about
objectivity.

Interestingly enough existential claims can be falsified even in those
cases where whether the claim is true or false would make not
difference whatsoever to what we experience. It is sufficient that
these claims make a difference to the quality of our understanding (for
example if we can apply the mental laws of non-contradiction,
simplicity and interconnectedness of reality to evaluate them).
Examples of such claims that are not experimentally falsifiable, but
can be evaluated nonetheless are:

- 1618 invisible dragons live in my garage (false)

- Only I am conscious and every other person is a zombie (false)

- The physical universe existed before anybody was around to think
about it (true)

- Everybody has the same subjective sense of redness (true, i.e. the
inverted spectrum hypothesis is wrong)

- The earth was created 6009 years ago including the much more ancient
looking fossils (false)

- We all exist within a computer simulation (false)

- We need a brain, or some comparable physical process, to be conscious
(false)

- Under general anesthesia we are fully conscious, even though several
parts of our brain are dormant and even though we cannot remember
anything afterwards (false)

- There is one absolute reality independent of our state of knowledge
of it (true)

- God exists (false or true - depending on the definition of God, see
bellow)

Now, if you think about each of these statements you'll see that it
makes absolutely no difference to what we experience right now whether
the statement is true or false. Nevertheless studying how well each of
these statements fits within our existing web of understanding we can
in principle decide whether the statement or its negation fits better.
Above I gave the truth values according to my own thinking; of course
you may disagree, but at least there is a common ground we can use to
discuss such disagreement. Also, above I simply recorded true or false,
leaving aside the important factor about how confident about each
judgment I am, i.e. how well each statement fits or does not fit within
the rest of my understanding. Fortunately most reasonable people would
agree about the basic features of this web of understanding (after all,
we assume that we experience life basically the same and that our
pattern detecting capabilities are similar), so I believe that the
above definition of existence can serve as the foundation for broad
agreement about these difficult ontological questions.

Now to the question of the existence of God. If by God we understand an
explanatory principle necessary for understanding the physical world,
then, after the recent advances of physics, we must conclude that God
does not exist. (The projected TOE - theory of everything - seems to be
completely different than the traditional descriptions of God.) If, on
the other hand, by God we understand an explanatory principle necessary
for understanding the whole of our experience (including our
consciousness, its qualities and structure) we must conclude that God
exists. A few comments: In either definition we posit that God is the
deepest pattern or the most overarching explanatory principle possible,
but the first definition is clearly inadequate because it overlooks a
huge part of reality. The second definition is the appropriate one, and
after some thinking the presence of God (the perfect being) becomes so
conspicuous that I would put my confidence in it higher than my
confidence in the existence of the physical universe. Incidentally the
advances of the physical sciences turn out to be helpful because they
teach were not to look for the God-pattern.

To finish this long post I would like to suggest a claim about
existence that is not falsifiable neither experimentally nor mentally:

- Things that exist (e.g. the physical world) would exist even if no
mind existed to know about that existence.

This statement may appear to make sense, but is in fact meaningless
because it claims knowledge about something (the existence of a thing)
while positing a context in which no knowledge is possible. That's
nonsensical. You cannot claim something where fundamentally nothing can
be known.

[Soul food]

"Dianelos Georgoudis" <dian...@tecapro.com> shamelessly dissembled:

>
>It's not completely clear what is meant by "objective"

That's *your* problem.

------------------------------------------------
"The real dichotomy in today's world is between reason and religion.
The future of civilisation rests upon how many people realise that and do something about it."

D Silverman FLAHN, SMLAHN

AA #2208

[someone4]

[snip]

Dianelos Georgoudis wrote:
>Examples of such claims that are not experimentally falsifiable, but
>can be evaluated nonetheless are:

>- 1618 invisible dragons live in my garage (false)

I think your 1618 invisible dragons would have to be more than
invisible for it not to be experimentally falsifiable.

Dianelos Georgoudis wrote:
>- Only I am conscious and every other person is a zombie (false)

I am not saying that you are wrong, but how can you claim this is
false?

Dianelos Georgoudis wrote:
>- The physical universe existed before anybody was around to think
>about it (true)

Again how can you say this is false, and does it include the
conception of God, or is 'anybody' just in regards to humans?

Dianelos Georgoudis wrote:
>- Everybody has the same subjective sense of redness (true, i.e. the
>inverted spectrum hypothesis is wrong)

Just out of interest, how do you know this is true, why can what I see
as red, not be swapped with what you see as green for example?

Dianelos Georgoudis wrote:
>- The earth was created 6009 years ago including the much more ancient
>looking fossils (false)

How do you evaluate such a statement?

Dianelos Georgoudis wrote:
>- We all exist within a computer simulation (false)

Again, how do you evaluate such a statement?

Dianelos Georgoudis wrote:
>- We need a brain, or some comparable physical process, to be conscious
>(false)

While I believe you to be correct, how did you evaluate this statement?

[snip]

[Dianelos Georgoudis]

someone4 wrote:
> [snip]
>
> Dianelos Georgoudis wrote:
> >Examples of such claims that are not experimentally falsifiable, but
> >can be evaluated nonetheless are:
>

Dear someone4, I can't answer your questions bellow before pointing out
the gist of my post:

1. That our worldview (i.e. our understanding of reality) consists of a
web of interrelated and interlocking patterns (where each pattern is an
existent) detected in our experience.

2. That the effective way to think about proposed existents is to
evaluate how well they extend or strengthen the already present web of
patterns.

3. That in order to achieve this we have empirically developed
effective mental practices such as non-contradiction, simplicity, and
good fit.

4. That this discipline allows us to evaluate such ontological
statements that are considered significant but that cannot be falsified
experimentally (i.e. within that part of reality we call physical
existence).

5. That this methodology can serve as a common ground for discussing
our differences of opinion, because we assume that each one of us
experiences life in basically the same way and that each one of us is
roughly equally capable of detecting patterns in that experience. Also
we empirically know that reasonably well educated people share the same
basic web of patterns.

To illustrate point 4 above I gave a list of non experimentally
falsifiable ontological statements, and my personal evaluation of them.
My hope was that the reader would apply the methodology above and
recognize that it gave reasonable results, which in most cases agreed
with the reader's previous opinion.

> >- 1618 invisible dragons live in my garage (false)
>
> I think your 1618 invisible dragons would have to be more than
> invisible for it not to be experimentally falsifiable.

Right. The claim of the existence of an invisible dragon in one's
garage is often compared to the claim of the existence of God in
alt.atheism; it's an insider thing. The idea is that the dragon is not
only invisible, but also insubstantial, and, in general, behaves
exactly as if it weren't there.

I reject this ontological claim because it does not extend or
strengthen my present web of patterns in any way. It does not violate
the non-contradiction principle, but it does violate both the
simplicity and the good-fit principles. Incidentally, the same argument
can be made for rejecting the existence of God, if defined only in
relation to physical existence.

> Dianelos Georgoudis wrote:
> >- Only I am conscious and every other person is a zombie (false)
>
> I am not saying that you are wrong, but how can you claim this is
> false?

It would violate the simplicity principle. If I were to integrate this
ontological claim in my web of patterns it would complicate things
without adding any strength or breadth to it.

> Dianelos Georgoudis wrote:
> >- The physical universe existed before anybody was around to think
> >about it (true)
>
> Again how can you say this is false, and does it include the
> conception of God, or is 'anybody' just in regards to humans?

Again, my sloppy writing. I meant other persons and not God. Here is
how I judge this claim: Interconnectedness abhors discontinuity. To
assume that the physical universe came into existence in all its
glorious complexity at the very instant the first person started
observing it is a monstrous discontinuity as compared to the ordinary
view that the physical universe started at the big bang and slowly
evolved stable matter, planets, chemistry and biology.

Now, you may think that my reasoning sounds like subjective taste.
Please observe that all reasoning is based on testing to see what works
and what doesn't in one's subject matter. Our subject matter here is a
map-like web of mental patterns and how it can best be extended or
strengthened.

> Dianelos Georgoudis wrote:
> >- Everybody has the same subjective sense of redness (true, i.e. the
> >inverted spectrum hypothesis is wrong)
>
> Just out of interest, how do you know this is true, why can what I see
> as red, not be swapped with what you see as green for example?

I think by now the gist of the methodology is clear. Assuming that
others see an inverted spectrum complicates matters without adding
nothing of value to our web of patterns.

> Dianelos Georgoudis wrote:
> >- The earth was created 6009 years ago including the much more ancient
> >looking fossils (false)
>
> How do you evaluate such a statement?

Interconnectedness abhors discontinuities.

> Dianelos Georgoudis wrote:
> >- We all exist within a computer simulation (false)
> Again, how do you evaluate such a statement?

Again, unnecessary complication.

In proposing a definition of existence and a methodology for deciding
ontological claims that are not experimentally falsifiable, I think
that I am not really adding something new but rather *illustrating*
what we have always being doing anyway when thinking about existence.
For example I think that most people would instinctively agree with all
my judgments above up to now. I only hope to have shown why we all
agree. We can now venture into deeper waters. My ultimate goal is to
posit the much debated existence of God in a meaningful context in
which agreement can be reached.

> Dianelos Georgoudis wrote:
> >- We need a brain, or some comparable physical process, to be conscious
> >(false)
>
> While I believe you to be correct, how did you evaluate this statement?

Very very simply, because I know all there is to know about my
consciousness long before having detected the brain-pattern. So the
former cannot require the latter.

In the past I have had trouble elucidating this point, so I wonder if I
may be luckier this time after having projected the whole process of
learning about existence into the geometric process of extending a
jigsaw puzzle-like game of interlocking individual patterns.

Incidentally, I am happy you already agreed with that last example -
I had ordered the examples from easiest to hardest as it were, and this
last claim is quite unpopular. There are other examples I found to be
even harder to "fit" than the God pattern (or maybe depend on the
previous realization of that pattern), but I prudently left them out of
the original post. These include the continuity of consciousness after
death, and, hardest of all, the question of who (besides humans and
God) is conscious.

[someone4]

>> Dianelos Georgoudis wrote:
>>>Examples of such claims that are not experimentally falsifiable, but
>>>can be evaluated nonetheless are:

>>Dianelos Georgoudis wrote:
>>>- 1618 invisible dragons live in my garage (false)

>someone4 wrote:
>> I think your 1618 invisible dragons would have to be more than
>> invisible for it not to be experimentally falsifiable.

Dianelos Georgoudis wrote:
>Right. The claim of the existence of an invisible dragon in one's
>garage is often compared to the claim of the existence of God in
>alt.atheism; it's an insider thing. The idea is that the dragon is not
>only invisible, but also insubstantial, and, in general, behaves
>exactly as if it weren't there.

>I reject this ontological claim because it does not extend or
>strengthen my present web of patterns in any way. It does not violate
>the non-contradiction principle, but it does violate both the
>simplicity and the good-fit principles. Incidentally, the same argument
>can be made for rejecting the existence of God, if defined only in
>relation to physical existence.

>> Dianelos Georgoudis wrote:
>>>- Only I am conscious and every other person is a zombie (false)

>someone4 wrote:
>> I am not saying that you are wrong, but how can you claim this is
>> false?

Dianelos Georgoudis wrote:
>It would violate the simplicity principle. If I were to integrate this
>ontological claim in my web of patterns it would complicate things
>without adding any strength or breadth to it.

>> Dianelos Georgoudis wrote:
>>>- The physical universe existed before anybody was around to think
>>>about it (true)

>someone4 wrote:
>> Again how can you say this is false, and does it include the
>> conception of God, or is 'anybody' just in regards to humans?

Dianelos Georgoudis wrote:
>Again, my sloppy writing. I meant other persons and not God. Here is
>how I judge this claim: Interconnectedness abhors discontinuity. To
>assume that the physical universe came into existence in all its
>glorious complexity at the very instant the first person started
>observing it is a monstrous discontinuity as compared to the ordinary
>view that the physical universe started at the big bang and slowly
>evolved stable matter, planets, chemistry and biology.

>Now, you may think that my reasoning sounds like subjective taste.
>Please observe that all reasoning is based on testing to see what works
>and what doesn't in one's subject matter. Our subject matter here is a
>map-like web of mental patterns and how it can best be extended or
>strengthened.

>> Dianelos Georgoudis wrote:
>>>- Everybody has the same subjective sense of redness (true, i.e. the
>>>inverted spectrum hypothesis is wrong)

>someone4 wrote:
>> Just out of interest, how do you know this is true, why can what I see
>> as red, not be swapped with what you see as green for example?

Dianelos Georgoudis wrote:
>I think by now the gist of the methodology is clear. Assuming that
>others see an inverted spectrum complicates matters without adding
>nothing of value to our web of patterns.

>> Dianelos Georgoudis wrote:
>>>- The earth was created 6009 years ago including the much more ancient
>>>looking fossils (false)

>someone4 wrote:
>> How do you evaluate such a statement?

Dianelos Georgoudis wrote:
>Interconnectedness abhors discontinuities.

It could be argued though, that if God created the universe there must
be a start somewhere. Many, given the evidence would place creation
back at the 'Big Bang', after all, there is scientific evidence
supporting the 'Big Bang', and the universe does indeed appear old.
This does indeed seem to conflict with even the essence of what we are
told in Genesis.

Though we are aware, and awareness has no shape, size or coordinates
within the physical plane, so it makes sense to think of a dimension of
awareness (the spiritual plane). With awareness we seem to have free
will, i.e. we are a causal agent within the world.

The laws of nature however seem to be deterministic. There appears to
be causes for the effects that we see.

If God created the universe, God also created the laws of nature.

There is then the question of why? Why did God create the universe, and
place souls (aware entities within it)?

One answer might be that it is a game, between God, and the Devil, to
see which it is better to be, selfless or selfish.

Anyway, getting to the point, given the initial state and the laws that
govern the universe (if indeed they are deterministic) all future
states would be determined until souls were placed into the game.
Therefore if you were God, would you sit around for billions of years
watching the board set itself up, or would you simply set up the board,
in the state it was determined to be, before souls were introduced?

The point being, is that if the board was set up in the state it was
determined to be, before souls were introduced, it would fit in with
all scientific evidence (and appear old), and also the essence of what
was said in Genesis (the universe is in a true sense young). This
conception also gives a purpose to our existence (to choose between
selflessness and selfishness).

Anyway, not sure if what I have written makes sense to you, but I would
appeal to points 2 (the conception gives purpose to our existence, and
makes sense with regards to man made problems the world) and 3 (in that
if fits both the scientific evidence, and the essence of Genesis).

I'm not expecting you to agree with the conception by the way, I am
suggesting though that it is not a straight forward evaluation.

>> Dianelos Georgoudis wrote:
>>>- We all exist within a computer simulation (false)

>someone4 wrote:
>> Again, how do you evaluate such a statement?

Dianelos Georgoudis wrote:
>Again, unnecessary complication.

>In proposing a definition of existence and a methodology for deciding
>ontological claims that are not experimentally falsifiable, I think
>that I am not really adding something new but rather *illustrating*
>what we have always being doing anyway when thinking about existence.
>For example I think that most people would instinctively agree with all
>my judgments above up to now. I only hope to have shown why we all
>agree. We can now venture into deeper waters. My ultimate goal is to
>posit the much debated existence of God in a meaningful context in
>which agreement can be reached.

>> Dianelos Georgoudis wrote:
>>>- We need a brain, or some comparable physical process, to be conscious
>>>(false)

>someone4 wrote:
>> While I believe you to be correct, how did you evaluate this statement?

Dianelos Georgoudis wrote:
>Very very simply, because I know all there is to know about my
>consciousness long before having detected the brain-pattern. So the
>former cannot require the latter.

>In the past I have had trouble elucidating this point, so I wonder if I
>may be luckier this time after having projected the whole process of
>learning about existence into the geometric process of extending a
>jigsaw puzzle-like game of interlocking individual patterns.

>Incidentally, I am happy you already agreed with that last example -
>I had ordered the examples from easiest to hardest as it were, and this
>last claim is quite unpopular. There are other examples I found to be
>even harder to "fit" than the God pattern (or maybe depend on the
>previous realization of that pattern), but I prudently left them out of
>the original post. These include the continuity of consciousness after
>death, and, hardest of all, the question of who (besides humans and
>God) is conscious.

I'll be looking out for your posts. I wish you all the best with your
endeavour,

Glenn

[Dianelos Georgoudis]

someone4 wrote:
> >> Dianelos Georgoudis wrote:
[big snip]

> >>>- The earth was created 6009 years ago including the much more ancient
> >>>looking fossils (false)
>
> >someone4 wrote:
> >> How do you evaluate such a statement?
>
> Dianelos Georgoudis wrote:
> >Interconnectedness abhors discontinuities.
>
> It could be argued though, that if God created the universe there must
> be a start somewhere. Many, given the evidence would place creation
> back at the 'Big Bang', after all, there is scientific evidence
> supporting the 'Big Bang', and the universe does indeed appear old.
> This does indeed seem to conflict with even the essence of what we are
> told in Genesis.
>
> Though we are aware, and awareness has no shape, size or coordinates
> within the physical plane, so it makes sense to think of a dimension of
> awareness (the spiritual plane). With awareness we seem to have free
> will, i.e. we are a causal agent within the world.
>
> The laws of nature however seem to be deterministic. There appears to
> be causes for the effects that we see.

Well, not really. This is not terribly relevant, but as far as we know
the physical universe is fundamentally not deterministic. It only
*seems* to be deterministic on the level of the big objects (such as
stones) we interact with in our daily lives. Modern physics teaches
that the results of any experiment are always probabilistic, but with
larger sizes the expected outcome will happen with almost (but not
quite) absolute certainty. For example, if you let a stone free in the
air in front of you it's not quite correct to say that it is going to
fall; to be exact one should say that it will fall with extremely high
probability. (If the physical universe were deterministic the stone
would always fall.) There is an ongoing discussion about these matters
in the thread "Omniscience and free will" in alt.philosophy.

> If God created the universe, God also created the laws of nature.
>
> There is then the question of why? Why did God create the universe, and
> place souls (aware entities within it)?

In my previous posts I tried to show that everything we know about
existence represents the discovery of stable patterns (we call
existents) in our experience and how these patterns interrelate. I
compared this to playing a game of jigsaw puzzle where each piece is an
existent, and I explained that learning consists in both detecting a
pattern and detecting how it interrelates with our previously
constructed web of patterns. Also, patterns can be found within
patterns and even within the effective methodologies of connecting
patterns (of course, this goes far beyond the analogy of a jigsaw where
we can at most have two levels of patterns: the pieces we connect and
the picture we get after interconnecting them).

Now, I claim that all we can know about existence is discovered through
this process. Observe that the process is orderly, i.e. there is some
kind of sequence in that process and one can't make wild jumps in it.
For example one may have heard other people speak of the deepest and
most overarching pattern of all, God, but if one doesn't arrive at this
pattern oneself then one does not really understand it and therefore
all attempts to think about it are a haphazard process of trying to
make sense of other peoples' words. Even worse, some people who have
not detected the God pattern themselves may nevertheless express ideas
about God, which are based on words by an even more remote party.
That's, I think, why there is so much confusion when one discusses God
in rational terms. (Reason, by the way, is not the only path to become
aware of God, but the path of reason, or if you prefer the
philosophical path, is the one we discuss here.) Incidentally, this
type of thing happens not only in spiritual discussions (i.e.
discussions about patterns that cover consciousness too), as many
people argue about physics based only on hearsay too.

I am saying all this, because it seems to me that before even
discussing the deepest pattern (God), we should fist be quite clear
about more superficial patterns, such as the physical universe and how
it relates to us. So, even though I think I understand your question
above "Why did God create the universe, and place souls (aware
entities) within in?" I think that the question itself has some
problems that need clarifying first in order to avoid confusion. By
soul or "aware entity" you mean consciousness, but why would you say
that our consciousness is placed *within* the physical universe? Our
path towards knowledge starts (and is contingent on) our consciousness;
and the existence of the physical universe is one of the first patterns
we discover in what we are consciousness about. So it is clear that the
physical universe is placed within our consciousness - and not the
other way around. This much should be completely obvious: that the
physical world exists in our consciousness and not our consciousness in
the physical world. And this not because of some philosophical
argumentation, but because of the very condition of our existence.

Also your question above gratuitously introduces the idea of creator
God; it's not necessary to have discovered the God pattern before
wondering why - what connects - what is the meaning - of the
physical world existing in our consciousness. In fact this is a very
important question because it tries to make the first tentative
connection between what we know about what we are conscious about (i.e.
the physical world) with what we know about our consciousness itself
(the quality of its awareness and interaction with the physical world).
So this question is the first step in the quest of trying to find if
there is this overarching explanatory principle called God.

So I suggest that a cleaner form of your question is this: Why does the
physical world exist in our consciousness?

To try to answer this question (or in other words to try to find a
deeper pattern that connects our consciousness with the physical
universe it experiences) let us first assume that the physical universe
did *not* exist in our consciousness, i.e. that we weren't conscious of
the physical universe. It seems clear that this state of life would be
one of utter stupidity: being conscious without something to be
conscious about. Maybe after a very long time one might become aware of
oneself (even though I doubt it), but even then one would stay for ever
contemplating one's unchanging self. So it seems quite clear that what
the presence of the physical universe in our consciousness makes
possible is to learn; or in other words to make possible the start of
our path towards knowledge described in the previous posts.

So, it is learning (i.e. the possibility to attain knowledge) that
explains the presence of the physical universe in our consciousness. Of
course this is a very tentative connection. The next obvious question
would be: To learn what? This is a pregnant question. If you would only
consider the physical world itself the answer might be: "to learn
physics", but if you consider the whole of your experience of life the
question becomes much more interesting. If you think about how it is to
be alive, all the pain and joy, all the doubts and all the facts, the
presence of things and the presence of people - the whole enchilada -
I think you will come to the conclusion that what the whole of our
experience is uniquely efficient for is learning virtue. Here I am
omitting quite some argumentation that I think cements this conclusion;
let me know if you would like me to elaborate.

So I suggest that the answer to the question "Why does the physical
universe exist in our consciousness?" is "In order that we learn
virtue". I claim that one can come to this conclusion without having
discovered the God pattern, in other words while being an agnostic to
the question the existence of God. On the other hand, as you can
imagine, when one does find the God pattern, this answer plays a role
for discovering first that God has intentionality (i.e. is a
consciousness) and then that God is good.

> One answer might be that it is a game, between God, and the Devil, to
> see which it is better to be, selfless or selfish.

Well, I hope I shall not disappoint you or make you suspicious, but I
have not found any Devil pattern. The truth I have found is completely
free of fundamental evil as it were. From the way that Devil concept is
used I gather it rather means the absence of a pattern.

> Anyway, getting to the point, given the initial state and the laws that
> govern the universe (if indeed they are deterministic) all future
> states would be determined until souls were placed into the game.
> Therefore if you were God, would you sit around for billions of years
> watching the board set itself up, or would you simply set up the board,
> in the state it was determined to be, before souls were introduced?
>
> The point being, is that if the board was set up in the state it was
> determined to be, before souls were introduced, it would fit in with
> all scientific evidence (and appear old), and also the essence of what
> was said in Genesis (the universe is in a true sense young). This
> conception also gives a purpose to our existence (to choose between
> selflessness and selfishness).

Well, I don't understand why comparing what we today know with the
Genesis account is so important. Books form part of what we experience,
and they often represent knowledge discovered by other people - so
they are quite useful for learning. But if you are interested to learn
in a book about the origins of the physical universe then the Genesis
account is surely not the best place to look for that knowledge. At
least not if you follow your reason - which is our chosen path in
this thread. Incidentally, it is good to note that Christianity affirms
that reason cannot contradict spiritual truth (by "spiritual truth" I
understand all patterns close or implied in the concept of God).

> Anyway, not sure if what I have written makes sense to you, but I would
> appeal to points 2 (the conception gives purpose to our existence, and
> makes sense with regards to man made problems the world) and 3 (in that
> if fits both the scientific evidence, and the essence of Genesis).
>
> I'm not expecting you to agree with the conception by the way, I am
> suggesting though that it is not a straight forward evaluation.

Well, I think it is. I claim there is a straightforward path between
the whole of our experience and the deepest spiritual truths.

My endeavor is to show that "God exists" is a reasonable statement,
indeed a statement that carries a clear and unique meaning. Also to
show that as any other existent, the existence of God can and must be
based on explaining our experience of life. Finally to show kind of a
roadmap of how our everyday experience of life can be connected to the
existence of God, and also to the properties of God. What motivates
this endeavor is my frustration with the current state of the debate
between atheism and theism which puts in evidence the absence of any
common ground for reasonable discussion.

Nevertheless I expect this endeavor to be quite unpopular. On the
atheistic side because it has almost become an article of faith that
religion cannot be an enterprise of reason, and on the theistic side
because recently and very unfortunately the idea has taken hold in many
parts that God's revelation is to be found in the Bible. In fact, and
quite trivially, God's revelation is to be found in the whole of our
experience, and the Bible is a very small part of that experience.
Also, it seems to me, that anybody who values reason must come to the
conclusion that many parts of the Old Testament, which forms the
biggest part of the Bible, are really primitive (not to say
mythological) accounts, motivated more by the desire of justifying
Jewish nation building than the desire to search for truth. Most (if
not all) peoples in the past created such mythological accounts to
explain their roots and strengthen their cohesion, and it is a very
unfortunate accident of Western civilization that the Old Testament has
been raised to a status far beyond its reality.

[someone4]

>>>> Dianelos Georgoudis wrote:
>[big snip]
>>>>>- The earth was created 6009 years ago including the much more ancient
>>>>>looking fossils (false)

>>>someone4 wrote:
>>>> How do you evaluate such a statement?

>> Dianelos Georgoudis wrote:
>>>Interconnectedness abhors discontinuities.

>someone4 wrote:
>> It could be argued though, that if God created the universe there must
>> be a start somewhere. Many, given the evidence would place creation
>> back at the 'Big Bang', after all, there is scientific evidence
>> supporting the 'Big Bang', and the universe does indeed appear old.
>> This does indeed seem to conflict with even the essence of what we are
>> told in Genesis.

>> Though we are aware, and awareness has no shape, size or coordinates
>> within the physical plane, so it makes sense to think of a dimension of
>> awareness (the spiritual plane). With awareness we seem to have free
>> will, i.e. we are a causal agent within the world.

>> The laws of nature however seem to be deterministic. There appears to
>> be causes for the effects that we see.

Dianelos Georgoudis wrote:
>Well, not really. This is not terribly relevant, but as far as we know
>the physical universe is fundamentally not deterministic. It only
>*seems* to be deterministic on the level of the big objects (such as
>stones) we interact with in our daily lives. Modern physics teaches
>that the results of any experiment are always probabilistic, but with
>larger sizes the expected outcome will happen with almost (but not
>quite) absolute certainty. For example, if you let a stone free in the
>air in front of you it's not quite correct to say that it is going to
>fall; to be exact one should say that it will fall with extremely high
>probability. (If the physical universe were deterministic the stone
>would always fall.) There is an ongoing discussion about these matters
>in the thread "Omniscience and free will" in alt.philosophy.

Bohmian mechanics gives a deterministic description which explains all
phenomena governed by nonrelativistic statistical mechanics. That the
theory exists is proof that determinism can exist even at the quantum
level, and all the assurances that we were given that a deterministic
explanation was impossible were false.

Here is a link if you are interested
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qm-bohm/ , and there is another well
written essay by Jean Bricmont
http://www.fyma.ucl.ac.be/files/Turin.pdf regarding the issue.

That does not mean that we will ever be able to predict those events
however, as this would be limited by our ability as humans.

"Omniscience and free will" sounds different to what I am saying, it
sounds like it is going down the lines of if God is omniscient then
wouldn't it know what we are going to do etc, therefore have we really
got free will etc. In the conception I put forward, I would claim that
God does not know what we will do, though a multiverse of possibilities
could be considered.

>someone4 wrote:
>> If God created the universe, God also created the laws of nature.

>> There is then the question of why? Why did God create the universe, and
>> place souls (aware entities within it)?

That seems reasonable.

Dianelos Georgoudis wrote:
>I am saying all this, because it seems to me that before even
>discussing the deepest pattern (God), we should fist be quite clear
>about more superficial patterns, such as the physical universe and how
>it relates to us. So, even though I think I understand your question
>above "Why did God create the universe, and place souls (aware
>entities) within in?" I think that the question itself has some
>problems that need clarifying first in order to avoid confusion. By
>soul or "aware entity" you mean consciousness, but why would you say
>that our consciousness is placed *within* the physical universe? Our
>path towards knowledge starts (and is contingent on) our consciousness;
>and the existence of the physical universe is one of the first patterns
>we discover in what we are consciousness about. So it is clear that the
>physical universe is placed within our consciousness - and not the
>other way around. This much should be completely obvious: that the
>physical world exists in our consciousness and not our consciousness in
>the physical world. And this not because of some philosophical
>argumentation, but because of the very condition of our existence.

I have no problem with that conception, though it does seem that there
is a persistant physical universe that is presented to all of us. So I
used the conception of our consciousness being placed within the
physical universe, in the same sense as players in a multiplayer
virtual reality game being within the game.

Dianelos Georgoudis wrote:
>Also your question above gratuitously introduces the idea of creator
>God; it's not necessary to have discovered the God pattern before
>wondering why - what connects - what is the meaning - of the
>physical world existing in our consciousness. In fact this is a very
>important question because it tries to make the first tentative
>connection between what we know about what we are conscious about (i.e.
>the physical world) with what we know about our consciousness itself
>(the quality of its awareness and interaction with the physical world).
>So this question is the first step in the quest of trying to find if
>there is this overarching explanatory principle called God.

>So I suggest that a cleaner form of your question is this: Why does the
>physical world exist in our consciousness?

Yes that does seem a cleaner form of the question.

I can understand what you are saying, but it relies on your assumption
that the reason for having the physical plane presented to us is to
learn virtue. I obviously have a different conception in that it is to
choose between being selfless or selfish, which I think are the
essential differences between good and evil. The conceptions might not
appear that different, as by understanding the wisdom of following the
selfless path, virtue will have been learnt. The subtle difference is
that if the physical plane were presented to us purely to learn virtue,
it doesn't seem to work too well for a lot of people and some don't
seem to get a lesson, for example, a child murdered at a young age.
This can be explained in my conception though as it being a game
between the Selfless One and the Selfish One, the two winds of
inspiration.

>someone4 wrote:
>> One answer might be that it is a game, between God, and the Devil, to
>> see which it is better to be, selfless or selfish.

Dianelos Georgoudis wrote:
>Well, I hope I shall not disappoint you or make you suspicious, but I
>have not found any Devil pattern. The truth I have found is completely
>free of fundamental evil as it were. From the way that Devil concept is
>used I gather it rather means the absence of a pattern.

It doesn't disappoint me, nor am I suspicious of you, you seem to be
following your conception honestly. I do however disagree with you that
there isn't any Devil pattern. The Devil I would simply call the
Selfish One, and I do see a pattern of selfishness in the world, from
the "greed is good" conception in the late 20th century, to the failure
of some parties to sign up to the Kyoto agreement, the idealisation of
being a gangster, our treatment of animals, the list goes on and on.
All the man made problems of the world have selfish inspiration at
their root. Even the conception that the universe is deterministic if
we can or ever hope to determine it, which was used to disguise the
fact, that scientific discovery has always pointed towards there being
causes for effects, by confusing our ability to predict with underlying
determinism. It was a selfish perspective to look at it from.

>someone4 wrote:
>> Anyway, getting to the point, given the initial state and the laws that
>> govern the universe (if indeed they are deterministic) all future
>> states would be determined until souls were placed into the game.
>> Therefore if you were God, would you sit around for billions of years
>> watching the board set itself up, or would you simply set up the board,
>> in the state it was determined to be, before souls were introduced?

>>The point being, is that if the board was set up in the state it was
>>determined to be, before souls were introduced, it would fit in with
>>all scientific evidence (and appear old), and also the essence of what
>> was said in Genesis (the universe is in a true sense young). This
>> conception also gives a purpose to our existence (to choose between
>> selflessness and selfishness).

Dianelos Georgoudis wrote:
>Well, I don't understand why comparing what we today know with the
>Genesis account is so important. Books form part of what we experience,
>and they often represent knowledge discovered by other people - so
>they are quite useful for learning. But if you are interested to learn
>in a book about the origins of the physical universe then the Genesis
>account is surely not the best place to look for that knowledge. At
>least not if you follow your reason - which is our chosen path in
>this thread. Incidentally, it is good to note that Christianity affirms
>that reason cannot contradict spiritual truth (by "spiritual truth" I
>understand all patterns close or implied in the concept of God).

It is not important, it just so happens that the conception does unite
the essence of what is said in Genesis and scientific evidence. If the
Bible were looked at as the history of the two winds of inspiration
written by man, then we would only look for the essence of what was
being said, and could evaluate it accordingly. This is not a new
conception The Book of Tao (the selfless path) written by the Old Man
says:

The prophets are the flowering of Tao
And the origin of folly.
Therefore the noble man dwells in the heavy (base),
And not in the thinning (end).
He dwells in the fruit,
And not in the flowering (expression).
Therefore he rejects the one and accepts the other.

( If you are interested there is a good translation by Lin Yutang
http://terebess.hu/english/tao/yutang.html , the only criticism I have
of it is that where it says unkind, it would make more sense to me if
it said unbiased, though I haven't looked at the original chinese so I
don't know whether this is a valid change).

>someone4 wrote:
>> Anyway, not sure if what I have written makes sense to you, but I would
>> appeal to points 2 (the conception gives purpose to our existence, and
>> makes sense with regards to man made problems the world) and 3 (in that
>> if fits both the scientific evidence, and the essence of Genesis).

>> I'm not expecting you to agree with the conception by the way, I am
>> suggesting though that it is not a straight forward evaluation.

Dianelos Georgoudis wrote:
>Well, I think it is. I claim there is a straightforward path between
>the whole of our experience and the deepest spiritual truths.

I'm not saying there isn't, we just maybe disagree on what that path
is. I see a pattern of selflessness and selfishness, which I equate to
good and evil, and you don't. Thus our experience seems to lead us to
different spiritual truths.

>someone4 wrote:
>> I'll be looking out for your posts. I wish you all the best with your
>> endeavour,

See I have a different conception, I believe that God doesn't break the
laws of nature, as they are the very board that the game is played on,
and that both Selfless One and the Selfish One work purely by
inspiration. Many of the miracles (if not all) can be explained purely
by inspiration. That there are tamarisk trees in the Sinai area,
explains the physical presence of manna for example, that Moses left at
the time he did (the trees secrete there residue for 2 months of the
year) requires divine inspiration (there were too many other cases of
divine inspiration for them to collectively be considered a series of
flukes).

Anyway, as I said it might simply be a case of different recognised
patterns leading us to different spiritual truths. You don't seem to
see a pattern of selfishness in the world, and the folly of following
the selfish path, or rather you may, but see it as part of the lesson,
and disregard the possibility that the Bible could be an historical
account of the two winds of inspiration written by man.

Do you rule out the possibility of divine inspiration?

[Dianelos Georgoudis]

someone4 wrote:
> >>>> Dianelos Georgoudis wrote:
> >[big snip]
> >>>>>- The earth was created 6009 years ago including the much more ancient
> >>>>>looking fossils (false)
>
> >>>someone4 wrote:

[snip]

> >> The laws of nature however seem to be deterministic. There appears to
> >> be causes for the effects that we see.
>

> Dianelos Georgoudis wrote:
> >Well, not really. This is not terribly relevant, but as far as we know
> >the physical universe is fundamentally not deterministic. It only
> >*seems* to be deterministic on the level of the big objects (such as
> >stones) we interact with in our daily lives. Modern physics teaches
> >that the results of any experiment are always probabilistic, but with
> >larger sizes the expected outcome will happen with almost (but not
> >quite) absolute certainty. For example, if you let a stone free in the
> >air in front of you it's not quite correct to say that it is going to
> >fall; to be exact one should say that it will fall with extremely high
> >probability. (If the physical universe were deterministic the stone
> >would always fall.) There is an ongoing discussion about these matters
> >in the thread "Omniscience and free will" in alt.philosophy.
>

> Bohmian mechanics gives a deterministic description which explains all
> phenomena governed by nonrelativistic statistical mechanics. That the
> theory exists is proof that determinism can exist even at the quantum
> level, and all the assurances that we were given that a deterministic
> explanation was impossible were false.
>
> Here is a link if you are interested
> http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qm-bohm/ , and there is another well
> written essay by Jean Bricmont
> http://www.fyma.ucl.ac.be/files/Turin.pdf regarding the issue.

A deterministic explanation of physics is *always* possible. The
Bohmian mechanics you suggest is one of the interpretations that use a
huge number of *hidden* physical variables to introduce determinism
into what is, at its face, an indeterministic picture. So, indeed, it
can be done, even though it flies against Occam's razor (i.e. against
the principle of simplicity). The contrary is also true: an
indeterministic explanation of physics is *always* possible. Even if it
turned out that the best theory about matter were on its face
completely deterministic, one could suggest the existence of a huge
number of *hidden* demons moving things around in a deterministic
fashion. And if one of these demons fell asleep on her job, or simply
became mischievous, God could always move the universal clock back so
that we ultimately wouldn't notice. So: as we can interpret our
experience of reality one way or the other, I think that the most
practical strategy is to take at face value what science shows and be
done with it. Incidentally "interpretations" have little to do with
science itself, for science is about mathematical models of physical
reality. Interpretations are a metaphysical attempt to build a mental
model of physical reality, i.e. to imagine how physical reality
"really" is. The fact that mathematical models tend to incrementally
improve, whereas mental models tend to wildly oscillate, signifies that
the former do reflect physical reality whereas the later only reflect
our mental capacity to visualize it.

> That does not mean that we will ever be able to predict those events
> however, as this would be limited by our ability as humans.

Even deterministic systems become very quickly unpredictable. So the
matter of unpredictability is irrelevant one way or the other.

> "Omniscience and free will" sounds different to what I am saying, it
> sounds like it is going down the lines of if God is omniscient then
> wouldn't it know what we are going to do etc, therefore have we really
> got free will etc. In the conception I put forward, I would claim that
> God does not know what we will do, though a multiverse of possibilities
> could be considered.

Well, I find it easy to understand my experience by considering that
reality is spiritual (i.e. consciousness-like) with a physical plane in
it. So even though the physical plane forms part of spiritual space I
find that they are orthogonal as it were: spiritual knowledge cannot be
contradicted by what we observe on our physical plane, or, indeed, in
any kind of physical plane. For example there is nothing that we may
possibly observe in this physical reality, or any other physical
reality one would like to suggest, that can contradict or add to one's
subjective experience of redness, for example. In other words whatever
physical laws or facts one may discover now or in the future cannot
contradict and cannot add to one's knowledge of redness - or to one's
knowledge about anything pertaining to one's subjective consciousness.
So, as God's properties are spiritual they cannot be contradicted by
whatever we may find about the physical plane. What can contradict
claims about God's properties is other spiritual knowledge, and,
specifically, our intimate knowledge about our own consciousness.

[snip]

> Dianelos Georgoudis wrote:
> >I am saying all this, because it seems to me that before even
> >discussing the deepest pattern (God), we should fist be quite clear
> >about more superficial patterns, such as the physical universe and how
> >it relates to us. So, even though I think I understand your question
> >above "Why did God create the universe, and place souls (aware
> >entities) within in?" I think that the question itself has some
> >problems that need clarifying first in order to avoid confusion. By
> >soul or "aware entity" you mean consciousness, but why would you say
> >that our consciousness is placed *within* the physical universe? Our
> >path towards knowledge starts (and is contingent on) our consciousness;
> >and the existence of the physical universe is one of the first patterns
> >we discover in what we are consciousness about. So it is clear that the
> >physical universe is placed within our consciousness - and not the
> >other way around. This much should be completely obvious: that the
> >physical world exists in our consciousness and not our consciousness in
> >the physical world. And this not because of some philosophical
> >argumentation, but because of the very condition of our existence.
>

> I have no problem with that conception, though it does seem that there
> is a persistant physical universe that is presented to all of us.

When we sit together in a movie theater there is persistent silver
screen image presented to all of us, but this does not make us part of
the silver screen image. I understand what you mean, but it is an
obvious illusion; it's like when one gets scared when watching a movie:
in a way one forgets reality.

> So I
> used the conception of our consciousness being placed within the
> physical universe, in the same sense as players in a multiplayer
> virtual reality game being within the game.

I understand. And in most contexts it is more practical to speak as if
one were inside the physical universe; but it is important not to
forget that this is a figure of speech, and that in reality we do not
form part of the physical universe.

> Dianelos Georgoudis wrote:
> >Also your question above gratuitously introduces the idea of creator
> >God; it's not necessary to have discovered the God pattern before
> >wondering why - what connects - what is the meaning - of the
> >physical world existing in our consciousness. In fact this is a very
> >important question because it tries to make the first tentative
> >connection between what we know about what we are conscious about (i.e.
> >the physical world) with what we know about our consciousness itself
> >(the quality of its awareness and interaction with the physical world).
> >So this question is the first step in the quest of trying to find if
> >there is this overarching explanatory principle called God.
>
> >So I suggest that a cleaner form of your question is this: Why does the
> >physical world exist in our consciousness?
>

> Yes that does seem a cleaner form of the question.
>
> Dianelos Georgoudis wrote:

> I can understand what you are saying, but it relies on your assumption
> that the reason for having the physical plane presented to us is to
> learn virtue.

I did not present this as an assumption, but as a consequence of
thinking about the whole of one's experience and building an
interconnected web of patterns.

> I obviously have a different conception in that it is to
> choose between being selfless or selfish, which I think are the
> essential differences between good and evil. The conceptions might not
> appear that different, as by understanding the wisdom of following the
> selfless path, virtue will have been learnt. The subtle difference is
> that if the physical plane were presented to us purely to learn virtue,
> it doesn't seem to work too well for a lot of people and some don't
> seem to get a lesson, for example, a child murdered at a young age.
> This can be explained in my conception though as it being a game
> between the Selfless One and the Selfish One, the two winds of
> inspiration.

Well, for me the concepts of virtue and selflessness are quite close.
Specifically the Christian verbalization of virtue as "to love each
other as oneself", "to always forgive others", "to never return evil",
"to give one's money to the poor" are all actions that define what it
is to be selfless.

It seems to me that what you suggest above goes deeper than the
difference between virtue and selflessness: Now, we both suggest that
there is a deepest overarching pattern (or existent). I suggest it is a
perfect person, but you, if understand correctly, suggest that is a
struggle between two persons: a perfect person and its opposite. I
think that's our difference.

I understand the argument you use above against my view: a child
murdered at a young age does not have the opportunity to learn virtue
(or selflessness). The death of children is one example of the
so-called problem of evil, which does indeed represent a problem for
me: it's like a big hole in the web of patterns I am suggesting.
Whereas, according to your suggestion, the same child murdered at a
young age represents a "win" for the Selfish One, because an
opportunity to learn virtue (or selflessness) is cut short. And if the
Selfless one should ultimately win then there would no more deaths. I
see how your view makes sense.

I don't want to go very far with this, but I also find some
difficulties in your view. One problem I see is about time: Was this
struggle going on for ever or did it start at some point? If it didn't
start at some point then, presumably, it will go on for ever in the
future, but *eternal* struggle makes little sense to me. If it did
start at some point, then why? Worse: any reason that might be put
forward for the start of this struggle cannot guarantee that, after
stopping at some point, the struggle won't start again at some later
point for the same reason. Which again brings us to a repetitive state
of eternal struggles, which makes no sense to me. This steady state
view of reality contradicts my for now instinctive impression that
reality is evolutionary.

> >someone4 wrote:
> >> One answer might be that it is a game, between God, and the Devil, to
> >> see which it is better to be, selfless or selfish.
>

> Dianelos Georgoudis wrote:
> >Well, I hope I shall not disappoint you or make you suspicious, but I
> >have not found any Devil pattern. The truth I have found is completely
> >free of fundamental evil as it were. From the way that Devil concept is
> >used I gather it rather means the absence of a pattern.
>

> It doesn't disappoint me, nor am I suspicious of you, you seem to be
> following your conception honestly. I do however disagree with you that
> there isn't any Devil pattern. The Devil I would simply call the
> Selfish One, and I do see a pattern of selfishness in the world, from
> the "greed is good" conception in the late 20th century, to the failure
> of some parties to sign up to the Kyoto agreement, the idealisation of
> being a gangster, our treatment of animals, the list goes on and on.
> All the man made problems of the world have selfish inspiration at
> their root.

Yes, very well put. It does seem as there is a spirit of evil and
selfishness actively working in human society. But I note that the non
man-made problems must be also accounted for. Both account for the
so-called problem of evil.

> Even the conception that the universe is deterministic if
> we can or ever hope to determine it, which was used to disguise the
> fact, that scientific discovery has always pointed towards there being
> causes for effects, by confusing our ability to predict with underlying
> determinism. It was a selfish perspective to look at it from.

Here you lost me. I can't imagine how to consider the physical universe
indeterministic (which does indeed imply that are uncaused events)
would count as a selfish view.

> >someone4 wrote:
> >> Anyway, getting to the point, given the initial state and the laws that
> >> govern the universe (if indeed they are deterministic) all future
> >> states would be determined until souls were placed into the game.
> >> Therefore if you were God, would you sit around for billions of years
> >> watching the board set itself up, or would you simply set up the board,
> >> in the state it was determined to be, before souls were introduced?
>
> >>The point being, is that if the board was set up in the state it was
> >>determined to be, before souls were introduced, it would fit in with
> >>all scientific evidence (and appear old), and also the essence of what
> >> was said in Genesis (the universe is in a true sense young). This
> >> conception also gives a purpose to our existence (to choose between
> >> selflessness and selfishness).
>

> Dianelos Georgoudis wrote:
> >Well, I don't understand why comparing what we today know with the
> >Genesis account is so important. Books form part of what we experience,
> >and they often represent knowledge discovered by other people - so
> >they are quite useful for learning. But if you are interested to learn
> >in a book about the origins of the physical universe then the Genesis
> >account is surely not the best place to look for that knowledge. At
> >least not if you follow your reason - which is our chosen path in
> >this thread. Incidentally, it is good to note that Christianity affirms
> >that reason cannot contradict spiritual truth (by "spiritual truth" I
> >understand all patterns close or implied in the concept of God).
>

> It is not important, it just so happens that the conception does unite
> the essence of what is said in Genesis and scientific evidence. If the
> Bible were looked at as the history of the two winds of inspiration
> written by man, then we would only look for the essence of what was
> being said, and could evaluate it accordingly. This is not a new
> conception The Book of Tao (the selfless path) written by the Old Man
> says:
>
> The prophets are the flowering of Tao
> And the origin of folly.
> Therefore the noble man dwells in the heavy (base),
> And not in the thinning (end).
> He dwells in the fruit,
> And not in the flowering (expression).
> Therefore he rejects the one and accepts the other.
>
> ( If you are interested there is a good translation by Lin Yutang
> http://terebess.hu/english/tao/yutang.html , the only criticism I have
> of it is that where it says unkind, it would make more sense to me if
> it said unbiased, though I haven't looked at the original chinese so I
> don't know whether this is a valid change).
>
> >someone4 wrote:

> >> Anyway, not sure if what I have written makes sense to you, but I would
> >> appeal to points 2 (the conception gives purpose to our existence, and
> >> makes sense with regards to man made problems the world) and 3 (in that
> >> if fits both the scientific evidence, and the essence of Genesis).
>
> >> I'm not expecting you to agree with the conception by the way, I am
> >> suggesting though that it is not a straight forward evaluation.
>

> Dianelos Georgoudis wrote:
> >Well, I think it is. I claim there is a straightforward path between
> >the whole of our experience and the deepest spiritual truths.
>

> I'm not saying there isn't, we just maybe disagree on what that path
> is. I see a pattern of selflessness and selfishness, which I equate to
> good and evil, and you don't. Thus our experience seems to lead us to
> different spiritual truths.

Yes, but here is the point:

One can consider one's experience disconnectedly, as it were. And
that's ok as a first step. Here, when I consider my experience I do not
feel the Selfish One tugging on me - and neither really the Selfless
One pushing me forward. I do feel that my nature is built for goodness
but also that my nature is imperfect - so the struggle I feel is
between how I am and how I am meant to be. But to me this seems to be
an internal and not an external or cosmic struggle. Also I interpret
the greater patterns of selfishness that you noted above in society as
an emergent phenomenon of these internal struggles.

What I am suggesting in this thread though is that in order to
confidently understand existence, one must use the whole of one's
experience to build a strongly interconnected model of reality. This is
a much more stringent enterprise, as *all* patterns must ultimately fit
well with each other. If such an enterprise is feasible, then I think
it will be impossible to maintain for long a false view (i.e. believe
in the existence of a illusory pattern). The reason is that the more
one creates and strengthens the web of interconnections the more
problematical the fitting of false patterns becomes. Therefore any part
of reality one manages to study well will ultimately strengthen one's
capacity to distinguish between true and false patterns. In this
context I have found that the concept of beauty is extremely important.
Beauty represents an existent that we are all familiar with, is a very
deep pattern indeed, but one we spend very little effort thinking
about. I found that thinking about beauty and how it connects to other
existents is immensely helpful.

[snip]

> Dianelos Georgoudis wrote:
> >My endeavor is to show that "God exists" is a reasonable statement,
> >indeed a statement that carries a clear and unique meaning. Also to
> >show that as any other existent, the existence of God can and must be
> >based on explaining our experience of life. Finally to show kind of a
> >roadmap of how our everyday experience of life can be connected to the
> >existence of God, and also to the properties of God. What motivates
> >this endeavor is my frustration with the current state of the debate
> >between atheism and theism which puts in evidence the absence of any
> >common ground for reasonable discussion.
>
> >Nevertheless I expect this endeavor to be quite unpopular. On the
> >atheistic side because it has almost become an article of faith that
> >religion cannot be an enterprise of reason, and on the theistic side
> >because recently and very unfortunately the idea has taken hold in many
> >parts that God's revelation is to be found in the Bible. In fact, and
> >quite trivially, God's revelation is to be found in the whole of our
> >experience, and the Bible is a very small part of that experience.
> >Also, it seems to me, that anybody who values reason must come to the
> >conclusion that many parts of the Old Testament, which forms the
> >biggest part of the Bible, are really primitive (not to say
> >mythological) accounts, motivated more by the desire of justifying
> >Jewish nation building than the desire to search for truth. Most (if
> >not all) peoples in the past created such mythological accounts to

> >explain their roots and strengthen their cohesion, and it is a Tvery

> >unfortunate accident of Western civilization that the Old Testament has
> >been raised to a status far beyond its reality.
>

> See I have a different conception, I believe that God doesn't break the
> laws of nature, as they are the very board that the game is played on,
> and that both Selfless One and the Selfish One work purely by
> inspiration. Many of the miracles (if not all) can be explained purely
> by inspiration. That there are tamarisk trees in the Sinai area,
> explains the physical presence of manna for example, that Moses left at
> the time he did (the trees secrete there residue for 2 months of the
> year) requires divine inspiration (there were too many other cases of
> divine inspiration for them to collectively be considered a series of
> flukes).

Why do you worry about miracles? I don't understand the problem. I find
that whether miracles such as described in the scriptures really
happened or not is ultimately irrelevant. (Incidentally I do agree with
you that the rules of the game - the facts and laws of nature as we
experience them - are never broken in a public sense).

> Anyway, as I said it might simply be a case of different recognised
> patterns leading us to different spiritual truths. You don't seem to
> see a pattern of selfishness in the world, and the folly of following
> the selfish path, or rather you may, but see it as part of the lesson,
> and disregard the possibility that the Bible could be an historical
> account of the two winds of inspiration written by man.
>
> Do you rule out the possibility of divine inspiration?

That's a pregnant question. By "inspire" I understand "to spur on"; so
the question is about the possibility of the divine somehow spurring me
on. Rather than possibility I would like to discuss actuality: Does the
divine somehow spur me on? To this I would answer yes and no: On the
one hand I consider that the divine explains (or sustains) the fact of
my experience (i.e. that I exist), the how of my experience (i.e. my
internal, subjective world), and what I experience (i.e. the external,
objective world of physical reality). I do find a lot of inspiration
both in the how of my experience and in what I experience (in my
present condition these two are always connected). So in this sense the
divine does inspire me. On the other hand to affirm of some kind of
direct communication with the divine - the divine specifically
spurring *me* on - is a matter extremely difficult to define (it is
certainly not visions or voices) and extremely easy to misunderstand.
So I would rather leave this question open for now.

[Bob]

On 10 Oct 2005 02:12:01 -0700, "Dianelos Georgoudis"
<dian...@tecapro.com> wrote:

>A deterministic explanation of physics is *always* possible. The
>Bohmian mechanics you suggest is one of the interpretations that use a
>huge number of *hidden* physical variables to introduce determinism
>into what is, at its face, an indeterministic picture.

Since you are participating in another thread that is pretty much the
same as this one, I am not going to comment other than to point out
that the statement above is incorrect because it is based on vague
terms that are misapplied.

[someone4]

>>>>>> Dianelos Georgoudis wrote:
>>>[big snip]
>>>>>>>- The earth was created 6009 years ago including the much more ancient
>>>>>>>looking fossils (false)

>>>>>someone4 wrote:
>[snip]
>>>> The laws of nature however seem to be deterministic. There appears to
>>>> be causes for the effects that we see.

>> Dianelos Georgoudis wrote:
>>>Well, not really. This is not terribly relevant, but as far as we know
>>>the physical universe is fundamentally not deterministic. It only
>>>*seems* to be deterministic on the level of the big objects (such as
>>>stones) we interact with in our daily lives. Modern physics teaches
>>>that the results of any experiment are always probabilistic, but with
>>>larger sizes the expected outcome will happen with almost (but not
>>>quite) absolute certainty. For example, if you let a stone free in the
>>>air in front of you it's not quite correct to say that it is going to
>>>fall; to be exact one should say that it will fall with extremely high
>>>probability. (If the physical universe were deterministic the stone
>>>would always fall.) There is an ongoing discussion about these matters
>>>in the thread "Omniscience and free will" in alt.philosophy.

>someone4 wrote:
>> Bohmian mechanics gives a deterministic description which explains all
>> phenomena governed by nonrelativistic statistical mechanics. That the
>> theory exists is proof that determinism can exist even at the quantum
>> level, and all the assurances that we were given that a deterministic
>> explanation was impossible were false.

>> Here is a link if you are interested
>> http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qm-bohm/ , and there is another well
>> written essay by Jean Bricmont
>> http://www.fyma.ucl.ac.be/files/Turin.pdf regarding the issue.

Dianelos Georgoudis wrote:
>A deterministic explanation of physics is *always* possible. The
>Bohmian mechanics you suggest is one of the interpretations that use a
>huge number of *hidden* physical variables to introduce determinism
>into what is, at its face, an indeterministic picture.

There is only one hidden variable, the position of the particle.

Dianelos Georgoudis wrote:
>So, indeed, it
>can be done, even though it flies against Occam's razor (i.e. against
>the principle of simplicity). The contrary is also true: an
>indeterministic explanation of physics is *always* possible. Even if it
>turned out that the best theory about matter were on its face
>completely deterministic, one could suggest the existence of a huge
>number of *hidden* demons moving things around in a deterministic
>fashion. And if one of these demons fell asleep on her job, or simply
>became mischievous, God could always move the universal clock back so
>that we ultimately wouldn't notice. So: as we can interpret our
>experience of reality one way or the other, I think that the most
>practical strategy is to take at face value what science shows and be
>done with it. Incidentally "interpretations" have little to do with
>science itself, for science is about mathematical models of physical
>reality. Interpretations are a metaphysical attempt to build a mental
>model of physical reality, i.e. to imagine how physical reality
>"really" is. The fact that mathematical models tend to incrementally
>improve, whereas mental models tend to wildly oscillate, signifies that
>the former do reflect physical reality whereas the later only reflect
>our mental capacity to visualize it.

It can be argued that Bohmian mechanics is the simpler, more coherent
theory.

As Professor Goldstein suggests in the email correspondence with
Professor Weinberg (
http://www.mathematik.uni-muenchen.de/~bohmmech/BohmHome/weingold.htm
):

"For me, the main a priori idea is a demand for coherence: physical
theories should be clearly formulated, in sharp mathematical terms. In
particular, it should be clear what the theory is about.
Secondarily---and one might say as a consequence of the requirement of
coherence---the theory should not involve any subjective notions in its
very formulation, nor should it involve axioms concerned with
measurement, since the notion of measurement is much too vague.
(Theorems having implications for measurements are of course fine---and
presumably necessary if the consequences of the theory are to be
explored.) Finally, the theory should in some sense be simple, since
otherwise it does not provide us with much of an explanation of what we
wish to understand."

As he goes on to say regarding orthodox quantum mechanics:
"No textbook of which I am aware on the subject omits the measurement
postulates, and if one indeed takes these as independent axioms the
increase in complexity is far greater than we would have with the mere
addition of the guiding equation."

So I am not sure I would agree that Bohmian mechanics flies in the face
of Occam's razor.

>someone4 wrote:
>> That does not mean that we will ever be able to predict those events
>> however, as this would be limited by our ability as humans.

Dianelos Georgoudis wrote:
>Even deterministic systems become very quickly unpredictable. So the
>matter of unpredictability is irrelevant one way or the other.

I agree, the matter of unpredictability is irrelevant.

>someone4 wrote:
>> "Omniscience and free will" sounds different to what I am saying, it
>> sounds like it is going down the lines of if God is omniscient then
>> wouldn't it know what we are going to do etc, therefore have we really
>> got free will etc. In the conception I put forward, I would claim that
>> God does not know what we will do, though a multiverse of possibilities
>> could be considered.

Dianelos Georgoudis wrote:
>Well, I find it easy to understand my experience by considering that
>reality is spiritual (i.e. consciousness-like) with a physical plane in
>it. So even though the physical plane forms part of spiritual space I
>find that they are orthogonal as it were: spiritual knowledge cannot be
>contradicted by what we observe on our physical plane, or, indeed, in
>any kind of physical plane. For example there is nothing that we may
>possibly observe in this physical reality, or any other physical
>reality one would like to suggest, that can contradict or add to one's
>subjective experience of redness, for example. In other words whatever
>physical laws or facts one may discover now or in the future cannot
>contradict and cannot add to one's knowledge of redness - or to one's
>knowledge about anything pertaining to one's subjective consciousness.
>So, as God's properties are spiritual they cannot be contradicted by
>whatever we may find about the physical plane. What can contradict
>claims about God's properties is other spiritual knowledge, and,
>specifically, our intimate knowledge about our own consciousness.
>[snip]

I have no problem with that.

>> Dianelos Georgoudis wrote:
>>>I am saying all this, because it seems to me that before even
>>>discussing the deepest pattern (God), we should fist be quite clear
>>>about more superficial patterns, such as the physical universe and how
>>>it relates to us. So, even though I think I understand your question
>>>above "Why did God create the universe, and place souls (aware
>>>entities) within in?" I think that the question itself has some
>>>problems that need clarifying first in order to avoid confusion. By
>>>soul or "aware entity" you mean consciousness, but why would you say
>>>that our consciousness is placed *within* the physical universe? Our
>>>path towards knowledge starts (and is contingent on) our consciousness;
>>>and the existence of the physical universe is one of the first patterns
>>>we discover in what we are consciousness about. So it is clear that the
>>>physical universe is placed within our consciousness - and not the
>>>other way around. This much should be completely obvious: that the
>>>physical world exists in our consciousness and not our consciousness in
>>>the physical world. And this not because of some philosophical
>>>argumentation, but because of the very condition of our existence.

>someone4 wrote:
>> I have no problem with that conception, though it does seem that there
>> is a persistant physical universe that is presented to all of us.

Dianelos Georgoudis wrote:
>When we sit together in a movie theater there is persistent silver
>screen image presented to all of us, but this does not make us part of
>the silver screen image. I understand what you mean, but it is an
>obvious illusion; it's like when one gets scared when watching a movie:
>in a way one forgets reality.

I have no problem with it being an illusion, I am simply pointing out
that it seems to be a persistant illusion presented to all of us.

>someone4 wrote:
>> So I
>> used the conception of our consciousness being placed within the
>> physical universe, in the same sense as players in a multiplayer
>> virtual reality game being within the game.

Dianelos Georgoudis wrote:
>I understand. And in most contexts it is more practical to speak as if
>one were inside the physical universe; but it is important not to
>forget that this is a figure of speech, and that in reality we do not
>form part of the physical universe.

Yes, it is a figure of speech, and I am using it as such, simply to
convey the concept that it seems to be a persistent illusion presented
to all of us.

>> Dianelos Georgoudis wrote:

>>>Also your question above gratuitously introduces the idea of creator
>>>God; it's not necessary to have discovered the God pattern before
>>>wondering why - what connects - what is the meaning - of the
>>>physical world existing in our consciousness. In fact this is a very
>>>important question because it tries to make the first tentative
>>>connection between what we know about what we are conscious about (i.e.
>>>the physical world) with what we know about our consciousness itself
>>>(the quality of its awareness and interaction with the physical world).
>>>So this question is the first step in the quest of trying to find if
>>>there is this overarching explanatory principle called God.

>>>So I suggest that a cleaner form of your question is this: Why does the
>>>physical world exist in our consciousness?

>someone4 wrote:
>> I can understand what you are saying, but it relies on your assumption
>> that the reason for having the physical plane presented to us is to
>> learn virtue.

Dianelos Georgoudis wrote:
>I did not present this as an assumption, but as a consequence of
>thinking about the whole of one's experience and building an
>interconnected web of patterns.

But as I pointed out, below, the patterns you see might differ from a
patterns someone else sees, so there seemed to me to be the implicit
assumption that you had perceived the correct pattern.

>someone4 wrote:
>> I obviously have a different conception in that it is to
>> choose between being selfless or selfish, which I think are the
>> essential differences between good and evil. The conceptions might not
>> appear that different, as by understanding the wisdom of following the
>> selfless path, virtue will have been learnt. The subtle difference is
>> that if the physical plane were presented to us purely to learn virtue,
>> it doesn't seem to work too well for a lot of people and some don't
>> seem to get a lesson, for example, a child murdered at a young age.
>> This can be explained in my conception though as it being a game
>> between the Selfless One and the Selfish One, the two winds of
>> inspiration.

Dianelos Georgoudis wrote:
>Well, for me the concepts of virtue and selflessness are quite close.
>Specifically the Christian verbalization of virtue as "to love each
>other as oneself", "to always forgive others", "to never return evil",
>"to give one's money to the poor" are all actions that define what it
>is to be selfless.

>It seems to me that what you suggest above goes deeper than the
>difference between virtue and selflessness: Now, we both suggest that
>there is a deepest overarching pattern (or existent). I suggest it is a
>perfect person, but you, if understand correctly, suggest that is a
>struggle between two persons: a perfect person and its opposite. I
>think that's our difference.

>I understand the argument you use above against my view: a child
>murdered at a young age does not have the opportunity to learn virtue
>(or selflessness). The death of children is one example of the
>so-called problem of evil, which does indeed represent a problem for
>me: it's like a big hole in the web of patterns I am suggesting.
>Whereas, according to your suggestion, the same child murdered at a
>young age represents a "win" for the Selfish One, because an
>opportunity to learn virtue (or selflessness) is cut short. And if the
>Selfless one should ultimately win then there would no more deaths. I
>see how your view makes sense.

I wouldn't see the win for the Selfish One in the sense that the child
never got the opportunity to learn virtue. Imagine a scale where 0 is
selfless, 1 is selfish, and we all start off at 0.5. If the child died
while it was still at 0.5 then there is no net gain for the Selfish
One, it's net gain, would be that the murderer had been inspired to
move closer to 1. The Selfless one would ultimately win the game if the
wisdom of selflessness was throughout the world, and people were all 0
or very close to it.

Dianelos Georgoudis wrote:
>I don't want to go very far with this, but I also find some
>difficulties in your view. One problem I see is about time: Was this
>struggle going on for ever or did it start at some point? If it didn't
>start at some point then, presumably, it will go on for ever in the
>future, but *eternal* struggle makes little sense to me. If it did
>start at some point, then why? Worse: any reason that might be put
>forward for the start of this struggle cannot guarantee that, after
>stopping at some point, the struggle won't start again at some later
>point for the same reason. Which again brings us to a repetitive state
>of eternal struggles, which makes no sense to me. This steady state
>view of reality contradicts my for now instinctive impression that
>reality is evolutionary.

In my conception, the struggle would have started at the point that
which was once the Void, separated itself from it's selfish side, and
thus the Selfish One was created, and that which was once the Void
perfected itself as the Selfless One. The game is to see which it is
better to be, and once this is done, then eventually even the Selfish
One will see the wisdom of selflessness, though this would be a long
time after the game is finished. You can liken the whole process to
schizophrenia if you will, and in the end, it will be a healing
process.

>>>someone4 wrote:
>>>> One answer might be that it is a game, between God, and the Devil, to
>>>> see which it is better to be, selfless or selfish.

>> Dianelos Georgoudis wrote:
>>>Well, I hope I shall not disappoint you or make you suspicious, but I
>>>have not found any Devil pattern. The truth I have found is completely
>>>free of fundamental evil as it were. From the way that Devil concept is
>>>used I gather it rather means the absence of a pattern.

>someone4 wrote:
>> It doesn't disappoint me, nor am I suspicious of you, you seem to be
>> following your conception honestly. I do however disagree with you that
>> there isn't any Devil pattern. The Devil I would simply call the
>> Selfish One, and I do see a pattern of selfishness in the world, from
>> the "greed is good" conception in the late 20th century, to the failure
>> of some parties to sign up to the Kyoto agreement, the idealisation of
>> being a gangster, our treatment of animals, the list goes on and on.
>> All the man made problems of the world have selfish inspiration at
>> their root.

Dianelos Georgoudis wrote:
>Yes, very well put. It does seem as there is a spirit of evil and
>selfishness actively working in human society. But I note that the non
>man-made problems must be also accounted for. Both account for the
>so-called problem of evil.

What non man-made problems need to be accounted for? The game is
unbiased to either selfishness or selflessness. Nature is unkind,
unbiased, it is not kind, but neither is it spiteful.

>someone4 wrote:
>> Even the conception that the universe is deterministic if
>> we can or ever hope to determine it, which was used to disguise the
>> fact, that scientific discovery has always pointed towards there being
>> causes for effects, by confusing our ability to predict with underlying
>> determinism. It was a selfish perspective to look at it from.

Dianelos Georgoudis wrote:
>Here you lost me. I can't imagine how to consider the physical universe
>indeterministic (which does indeed imply that are uncaused events)
>would count as a selfish view.

It was not the concept of the universe being indeterministic that was a
selfish view. It was the concept of the universe being deterministic,
only if we can or ever hope to determine it, is to take a subjective
view on the matter. It confuses determinism with predictability. As you
have said, whether we can predict it or not is irrelevant. Therefore
the concept was an untruth. It was a selfish perspective, as it implied
that the workings of the physical plane, relied in some way, on our
ability.

>>>someone4 wrote:
>>>> Anyway, getting to the point, given the initial state and the laws that
>>>> govern the universe (if indeed they are deterministic) all future
>>>> states would be determined until souls were placed into the game.
>>>> Therefore if you were God, would you sit around for billions of years
>>>> watching the board set itself up, or would you simply set up the board,
>>>> in the state it was determined to be, before souls were introduced?

>>>>The point being, is that if the board was set up in the state it was
>>>>determined to be, before souls were introduced, it would fit in with
>>>>all scientific evidence (and appear old), and also the essence of what
>>>> was said in Genesis (the universe is in a true sense young). This
>>>> conception also gives a purpose to our existence (to choose between
>>>> selflessness and selfishness).

>> Dianelos Georgoudis wrote:
>>>Well, I don't understand why comparing what we today know with the
>>>Genesis account is so important. Books form part of what we experience,
>>>and they often represent knowledge discovered by other people - so
>>>they are quite useful for learning. But if you are interested to learn
>>>in a book about the origins of the physical universe then the Genesis
>>>account is surely not the best place to look for that knowledge. At
>>>least not if you follow your reason - which is our chosen path in
>>>this thread. Incidentally, it is good to note that Christianity affirms
>>>that reason cannot contradict spiritual truth (by "spiritual truth" I
>>>understand all patterns close or implied in the concept of God).

>someone4 wrote:
>> I'm not saying there isn't, we just maybe disagree on what that path
>> is. I see a pattern of selflessness and selfishness, which I equate to
>> good and evil, and you don't. Thus our experience seems to lead us to
>> different spiritual truths.

Dianelos Georgoudis wrote:
>Yes, but here is the point:

>One can consider one's experience disconnectedly, as it were. And
>that's ok as a first step. Here, when I consider my experience I do not
>feel the Selfish One tugging on me - and neither really the Selfless
>One pushing me forward. I do feel that my nature is built for goodness
>but also that my nature is imperfect - so the struggle I feel is
>between how I am and how I am meant to be. But to me this seems to be
>an internal and not an external or cosmic struggle. Also I interpret
>the greater patterns of selfishness that you noted above in society as
>an emergent phenomenon of these internal struggles.

Well the conception that I was putting forward, considers it to be a
case of internal struggles, in all of us, between selflessness and
selfishness. When I am considering the influence of the Selfless One
and Selfish One, I am not suggesting that they reveal themselves
blatantly, if they did, that would effectively remove your choice (the
whole point of the game). You would always be in communication with
them though, the physical plane would be presented to you by them (in
my conception), and I believe that some for example Jesus, or Moses
were divinely inspired.

Dianelos Georgoudis wrote:
>What I am suggesting in this thread though is that in order to
>confidently understand existence, one must use the whole of one's
>experience to build a strongly interconnected model of reality. This is
>a much more stringent enterprise, as *all* patterns must ultimately fit
>well with each other. If such an enterprise is feasible, then I think
>it will be impossible to maintain for long a false view (i.e. believe
>in the existence of a illusory pattern). The reason is that the more
>one creates and strengthens the web of interconnections the more
>problematical the fitting of false patterns becomes. Therefore any part
>of reality one manages to study well will ultimately strengthen one's
>capacity to distinguish between true and false patterns. In this
>context I have found that the concept of beauty is extremely important.
>Beauty represents an existent that we are all familiar with, is a very
>deep pattern indeed, but one we spend very little effort thinking
>about. I found that thinking about beauty and how it connects to other
>existents is immensely helpful.
>[snip]

I agree, though with the recognition of beauty comes the recognition of
ugliness, unless beauty is found in all things. I see no beauty in
selfishness, therefore beauty to me is found in a admiration of the
thought that is the physical plane, and in selfish acts.

>someone4 wrote:
>> See I have a different conception, I believe that God doesn't break the
>> laws of nature, as they are the very board that the game is played on,
>> and that both Selfless One and the Selfish One work purely by
>> inspiration. Many of the miracles (if not all) can be explained purely
>> by inspiration. That there are tamarisk trees in the Sinai area,
>> explains the physical presence of manna for example, that Moses left at
>> the time he did (the trees secrete there residue for 2 months of the
>> year) requires divine inspiration (there were too many other cases of
>> divine inspiration for them to collectively be considered a series of
>> flukes).

Dianelos Georgoudis wrote:
>Why do you worry about miracles? I don't understand the problem. I find
>that whether miracles such as described in the scriptures really
>happened or not is ultimately irrelevant. (Incidentally I do agree with
>you that the rules of the game - the facts and laws of nature as we
>experience them - are never broken in a public sense).

They are evidence of divine inspiration.

>someone4 wrote:
>> Anyway, as I said it might simply be a case of different recognised
>> patterns leading us to different spiritual truths. You don't seem to
>> see a pattern of selfishness in the world, and the folly of following
>> the selfish path, or rather you may, but see it as part of the lesson,
>> and disregard the possibility that the Bible could be an historical
>> account of the two winds of inspiration written by man.

>> Do you rule out the possibility of divine inspiration?

Dianelos Georgoudis wrote:
>That's a pregnant question. By "inspire" I understand "to spur on"; so
>the question is about the possibility of the divine somehow spurring me
>on. Rather than possibility I would like to discuss actuality: Does the
>divine somehow spur me on? To this I would answer yes and no: On the
>one hand I consider that the divine explains (or sustains) the fact of
>my experience (i.e. that I exist), the how of my experience (i.e. my
>internal, subjective world), and what I experience (i.e. the external,
>objective world of physical reality). I do find a lot of inspiration
>both in the how of my experience and in what I experience (in my
>present condition these two are always connected). So in this sense the
>divine does inspire me. On the other hand to affirm of some kind of
>direct communication with the divine - the divine specifically
>spurring *me* on - is a matter extremely difficult to define (it is
>certainly not visions or voices) and extremely easy to misunderstand.
>So I would rather leave this question open for now.

Sure no problem.

[someone4]

sorry read back what I wrote, and where it said:
"I agree, though with the recognition of beauty comes the recognition
of ugliness, unless beauty is found in all things. I see no beauty in
selfishness, therefore beauty to me is found in a admiration of the
thought that is the physical plane, and in selfish acts"

There was an obvious typo, it should have read:

"I agree, though with the recognition of beauty comes the recognition
of ugliness, unless beauty is found in all things. I see no beauty in
selfishness, therefore beauty to me is found in a admiration of the

thought that is the physical plane, and in selfless acts"

[Bob]

On 10 Oct 2005 08:03:32 -0700, "someone4"
<glenn....@btinternet.com> wrote:

>>Even deterministic systems become very quickly unpredictable. So the
>>matter of unpredictability is irrelevant one way or the other.

>I agree, the matter of unpredictability is irrelevant.

People like Turing, Godel and Chaitin would take exception to your
rather cavalier attitude to what they regard as something quite
fundamental.

For Turing it was the uncomputable numbers and the Halting Problem,
two unknowables (unpredictables) which caused a famous mathematician,
Herman Wehl, to get so depressed he dispaired about mathematics. Godel
showed that formal rational systems were defective in certain
important ways, which caused David Hilbert to abandon his famous quest
for a mechanical system to derive all the propositions of mathematics.
And Chaitin has taken this even farther with his notions of the
unknowable to the point where he declares that a new age is upon us
which he calls "experimental mathematics".

The matter of the intrinsically unpredictable in Quantum Mechanics is
extremely fundamental in science, mathematics and logic. You can't
just sweep it under the rug with a couple pontifical statements,
unless of course you are theologians, in which case you have no
business pretending to be scientists.

[someone4]

>>Dianelos Georgoudis wrote:
>>>Even deterministic systems become very quickly unpredictable. So the
>>>matter of unpredictability is irrelevant one way or the other.

>someone4 wrote:
>>I agree, the matter of unpredictability is irrelevant.

Bob wrote:
>People like Turing, Godel and Chaitin would take exception to your
>rather cavalier attitude to what they regard as something quite
>fundamental.

>For Turing it was the uncomputable numbers and the Halting Problem,
>two unknowables (unpredictables) which caused a famous mathematician,
>Herman Wehl, to get so depressed he dispaired about mathematics. Godel
>showed that formal rational systems were defective in certain
>important ways, which caused David Hilbert to abandon his famous quest
>for a mechanical system to derive all the propositions of mathematics.
>And Chaitin has taken this even farther with his notions of the
>unknowable to the point where he declares that a new age is upon us
>which he calls "experimental mathematics".

>The matter of the intrinsically unpredictable in Quantum Mechanics is
>extremely fundamental in science, mathematics and logic. You can't
>just sweep it under the rug with a couple pontifical statements,
>unless of course you are theologians, in which case you have no
>business pretending to be scientists.

Sorry, I thought I had already replied to this. There is a difference
from Godel's conception of some mathematical truths being logically
unprovable, to the conception that because we can't predict something
(Uncertainty principle for one), reflects on whether the universe is
deterministic or indeterministic.

You could do with reading an essay 'Determinism, Chaos, and Quantum
Mechanics' by Jean Bricmont (Professor of Theoretical Physics at the
University of Louvain).

http://www.fyma.ucl.ac.be/files/Turin.pdf

He quite clearly shows that there is no reason to conclude that the
physical universe isn't deterministic, and that quantum randomness
actually does exist.

He acknowledges that our subjective experience suggests a dualistic
existence, but that is a side issue.

[someone4]

>>Dianelos Georgoudis wrote:
>>>Even deterministic systems become very quickly unpredictable. So the
>>>matter of unpredictability is irrelevant one way or the other.

>someone4 wrote:
>>I agree, the matter of unpredictability is irrelevant.

Bob wrote:
>People like Turing, Godel and Chaitin would take exception to your
>rather cavalier attitude to what they regard as something quite
>fundamental.

>For Turing it was the uncomputable numbers and the Halting Problem,
>two unknowables (unpredictables) which caused a famous mathematician,
>Herman Wehl, to get so depressed he dispaired about mathematics. Godel
>showed that formal rational systems were defective in certain
>important ways, which caused David Hilbert to abandon his famous quest
>for a mechanical system to derive all the propositions of mathematics.
>And Chaitin has taken this even farther with his notions of the
>unknowable to the point where he declares that a new age is upon us
>which he calls "experimental mathematics".

>The matter of the intrinsically unpredictable in Quantum Mechanics is
>extremely fundamental in science, mathematics and logic. You can't
>just sweep it under the rug with a couple pontifical statements,
>unless of course you are theologians, in which case you have no
>business pretending to be scientists.

You really just need to real an essay from Jean Bricmont ( Professor
of Theoretical Physics at the University of Louvain) 'Determinism,
Chaos Theory, and Quantum Mechanics' to read why unpredictability in
quantum mechanics (because of the Uncertainty Principle) doesn't mean
that the universe is indeterministic (as orthodox quantum mechanics
suggests, by asserting that Schrodingers equations represents the
probability amplitude). He also supports Bohmian mechanics btw, but it
is almost incidental to the concept that there is no reason to think
that the universe is not deterministic (that given the state at time(t)
and the laws of nature, all future states would be determined), and
that quantum randomness actually exists.

http://www.fyma.ucl.ac.be/files/Turin.pdf

[Publius]

"someone4" <glenn....@btinternet.com> wrote in
news:1129069798.9...@g14g2000cwa.googlegroups.com:

>>The matter of the intrinsically unpredictable in Quantum Mechanics is
>>extremely fundamental in science, mathematics and logic. You can't
>>just sweep it under the rug with a couple pontifical statements,
>>unless of course you are theologians, in which case you have no
>>business pretending to be scientists.

> You really just need to real an essay from Jean Bricmont ( Professor
> of Theoretical Physics at the University of Louvain) 'Determinism,
> Chaos Theory, and Quantum Mechanics' to read why unpredictability in
> quantum mechanics (because of the Uncertainty Principle) doesn't mean
> that the universe is indeterministic (as orthodox quantum mechanics
> suggests, by asserting that Schrodingers equations represents the
> probability amplitude). He also supports Bohmian mechanics btw, but it
> is almost incidental to the concept that there is no reason to think
> that the universe is not deterministic (that given the state at time(t)
> and the laws of nature, all future states would be determined), and
> that quantum randomness actually exists.

Bricmont's paper is a good effort to clarify the issues, esp. the first
section, "General Comments on Determinism" (or something to that effect,
haven't looked at it lately).

But he, like many other commentators on this issue, overlooks an
important point.

Determinism became an interesting and controversial thesis because of its
claim of predictability. A system is deterministic if any later state of
the system --- the values of all its variables at time T1 --- are given
by some function operating upon the present state T0 (or any earlier
state) of those variables.

Now, when LaPlace articulated this thesis he added that a being with an
intellect "sufficiently vast," having the necessary information regarding
the present state of the system, could predict any future state.

LaPlace was not thinking here of God, understood as an "infinite
intelligence." That would have rendered the thesis patently unscientific
(for one thing no one has any clue how to define an "infinite
intelligence"). He was thinking instead of something like a powerful ---
but definitely finite --- computer.

LaPlace added the predictability requirement in order to make the basic
deterministic claim empirical, *in principle*. For, if the future state
of a system is not predictable in principle from a present state, then
claiming that future state is a function of the present state is not
empirical. Nor is it rational, strictly speaking. It is no more than an
article of faith; it is a claim which is neither verifiable nor
falsifiable. You have no means of determining what will be the state of
the system at T1 except to wait for T1 to arrive. You may then possibly
be able to trace T1 through all intervening events backward to T0. But
that will establish no more than that T1 was determined by T0. You'll
still not be able to claim any *future* state or event is determined.

Bob solves this problem by assuming determinism as an axiom of thought.
There is no arguing with that. One discards axioms only if some other set
of axioms generates theories with more predictive power. Bricmont,
following Bohm, solves it with hidden variables.

But you have to wonder: what makes this thesis of determinism so precious
that it must be preserved at all costs?

[someone4]

>>Bob wrote:
>>>The matter of the intrinsically unpredictable in Quantum Mechanics is
>>>extremely fundamental in science, mathematics and logic. You can't
>>>just sweep it under the rug with a couple pontifical statements,
>>>unless of course you are theologians, in which case you have no
>>>business pretending to be scientists.

>someone4 wrote:
>> You really just need to real an essay from Jean Bricmont ( Professor
>> of Theoretical Physics at the University of Louvain) 'Determinism,
>> Chaos Theory, and Quantum Mechanics' to read why unpredictability in
>> quantum mechanics (because of the Uncertainty Principle) doesn't mean
>> that the universe is indeterministic (as orthodox quantum mechanics
>> suggests, by asserting that Schrodingers equations represents the
>> probability amplitude). He also supports Bohmian mechanics btw, but it
>> is almost incidental to the concept that there is no reason to think
>> that the universe is not deterministic (that given the state at time(t)
>> and the laws of nature, all future states would be determined), and
>> that quantum randomness actually exists.

Bricmont, overlooks no such thing, and separates the conception of
predictability and determinism, he points out that determinism is a
metaphysical question, and considers that the universe may be
deterministic or indeterministic. He simply points out that contrary to
claims that a deterministic explanation of quantum phenomena could not
exist, that there is no reason to think that, and in fact a
deterministic explanation does exist, Bohmian mechanics. Yes you are
right, there is a hidden variable in Bohmian mechanics, in Bohmian
mechanics the particle has a position (independent of whether we are
observing it or not), even if we can't detect it without altering it.

Bob believes in orthodox quantum mechanics, and quantum randomness.
With randomness the universe cannot of ever been deterministic. Quantum
randomness and determinism are incompatible. Bob argues that the
Schrodinger equation is deterministic, but ignores the fact that in
orthodox quantum mechanics it is thought to represent the probability
amplitude, thus making orthodox quantum mechanics an indeterministic
theory.

Publius wrote:
>But you have to wonder: what makes this thesis of determinism so precious
>that it must be preserved at all costs?

It is not so precious that it must be preserved at all costs. Though
behind scientific enterprise is the concept of finding the cause behind
an effect, and when we can't find or think of one, why should we
abandon this concept, and consider randomness rather than considering
that we have reached a point where we are ignorant of the cause, given
the history of scientific discovery of causes behind the effects?

Though there are other reasons for favouring Bohmian mechanics over
orthodox quantum mechanics, as Professor Goldstein outlines in his
conversation with Professor Weinberg
http://www.mathematik.uni-muenchen.de/~bohmmech/BohmHome/weingold.htm :

------------
And as a matter of fact I myself do not accept the idea that a physical
theory must be deterministic---and my support for Bohmian mechanics in
no way rests on a desire to restore determinism to physics.

For me, the main a priori idea is a demand for coherence: physical
theories should be clearly formulated, in sharp mathematical terms. In
particular, it should be clear what the theory is about.
Secondarily---and one might say as a consequence of the requirement of
coherence---the theory should not involve any subjective notions in its
very formulation, nor should it involve axioms concerned with
measurement, since the notion of measurement is much too vague.
(Theorems having implications for measurements are of course fine---and
presumably necessary if the consequences of the theory are to be
explored.) Finally, the theory should in some sense be simple, since
otherwise it does not provide us with much of an explanation of what we
wish to understand.

What I like about Bohmian mechanics is that it is by far the simplest
formulation of nonrelativistic quantum mechanics satisfying the
requirements of coherence and objectivity (in the above sense). Two
equations, Schr\"odinger's and the de Broglie Bohm guiding equation
(dQ/dt = J/rho), completely express the theory. From these simple
equations the rest of the quantum formalism flows.
------------

For me personally, that the physical universe is deterministic makes
sense. It also happens to allow the conception of the universe being
created in essence as told in Genesis, i.e. just before souls were
introduced. Given the initial state at the 'Big Bang', and the laws of
nature, the state at which the universe would have been in before souls
were introduced would have been determined. Therefore if you were God,

would you sit around for billions of years watching the board set

itself up, or would just set the board up in the state it was
determined to be, before souls were introduced?

[Bob]

On 11 Oct 2005 15:56:06 -0700, "someone4"
<glenn....@btinternet.com> wrote:

>There is a difference
>from Godel's conception of some mathematical truths being logically
>unprovable, to the conception that because we can't predict something
>(Uncertainty principle for one), reflects on whether the universe is
>deterministic or indeterministic.

I am not so sure about that. Godel's problem, Turing's problems, and
Chaitin's problems all arise because the algorithm to compute a
particular number does not exist. It would seem that unknowablilty,
responsible for quantum indeterminacy (NOT "non-determinism, which is
a completely different issue from indeterminancy), arises because on
uncomputability.

>You could do with reading an essay 'Determinism, Chaos, and Quantum
>Mechanics' by Jean Bricmont (Professor of Theoretical Physics at the
>University of Louvain).

>http://www.fyma.ucl.ac.be/files/Turin.pdf

I will take a look anyway but the first sign of pontification and it's
bye bye.

>He quite clearly shows that there is no reason to conclude that the
>physical universe isn't deterministic, and that quantum randomness
>actually does exist.

Then he agrees that QM is deterministic. He must know orthodox QM.

>He acknowledges that our subjective experience suggests a dualistic
>existence, but that is a side issue.

He may be shifting Worldviews without acknowledging it. That is what
causes most of the confusion in metaphysics - the shifing from an
objective Realist to a subjective Idealist/Mystical Worldview. If you
are going to discuss physics and metaphysics, then you must stick with
the Realist Worldview, or else you will wander off in the subjective
weeds of Idealism/Mysticism.

[Bob]

On 11 Oct 2005 16:02:10 -0700, "someone4"
<glenn....@btinternet.com> wrote:

>You really just need to real an essay from Jean Bricmont ( Professor
> of Theoretical Physics at the University of Louvain) 'Determinism,
>Chaos Theory, and Quantum Mechanics' to read why unpredictability in
>quantum mechanics (because of the Uncertainty Principle) doesn't mean
>that the universe is indeterministic (as orthodox quantum mechanics
>suggests, by asserting that Schrodingers equations represents the
>probability amplitude).

I do not like the use of terms like "indeterministic" without a
detailed context, because the reader has no real idea what is meant by
the term.

Quantum Determinism means that the wave function has a value at all
time. Therefore everything there is to know about the system is known.
There are aspects that are intrinsically unknowable but that does not
mean the wave function is fully determined at all times.

The Schrodinger Equation provides the reason for this, because it uses
Unitary operators. The result is that the Schrodinger Equation is
fully deterministic and therefore so is the wave function.

Don't confuse quantum determinism with quantum indeterminancy. They
are two very different things. Quantum indeterminancy means there are
aspects of the system that are intrinsically unknowable. But that does
not mean that the wave function is non-deterministic.

All this going abck and forth over two words.

>that quantum randomness actually exists.

I do not like the term "random" used without a detailed context
anymore than I like the term "nondeterministic" used without a
detailed context. If by "randomness" it is meant that there are things
that are intrinsically unknowable, then of course I fully agree.

>http://www.fyma.ucl.ac.be/files/Turin.pdf

I will have a look.

[Bob]

On 11 Oct 2005 16:02:10 -0700, "someone4"
<glenn....@btinternet.com> wrote:

>You really just need to real an essay from Jean Bricmont

>http://www.fyma.ucl.ac.be/files/Turin.pdf

I have a problem right at the very outset. He claims:

"Determinism is one of those words over which many people get
involved in disputes, partly because it is rarely defined."

That is not true, as the good professor should know if he read books
on orthodox QM.

But I will go along for the ride, because he is right when he says:

"Hence, it is often unclear what the discussion is about."

He starts off by pointing out that a "trivial" definition of
determinism is "unpredictability". He then states that this is NOT
what is meant by determinism. Bravo, Professor! Finally someone who
agrees with what I have been saying all along. Unpredictibility (aka
"Unknowability") leads to "quantum indeterminancy" which is not the
same as "quantum determinism".

I notice he cites ET Jaynes, some of whose works I have read. He is
the one who claims that QM has two aspects: ontological and
epistemological. I do not know if that really provides any insight. He
does, however, claim that QM can be understood in classical terms by
invoking an "information principle" - a kind of entropy or maybe
reverse entropy. Information Physics is fashionable today.

Here's where we part company. The professor asserts:

"As far as I can see, nothing has ever been proposed except pure
randomness! Or, in other words, events with no cause."

I vehemently disagree with any implication that "randomness" is the
same as "acausality".

Then he takes off on Free Will, asserting (or is it pontificating):

"Our feeling of free will is not that there is some intrinsically
random process at workin our minds,"

My assertion - the subject of the original thread earlier - It is
intrinsic unknowability that causes free will.

I have to say bye bye to the good professor - too much to argue with
him about and no way to do it. Also he shifts from the objective
Realist Worldview to the subjective Idealist/Mystical Worldview in
mid-paragraph, and that always results in confusion.

[Bob]

On Tue, 11 Oct 2005 22:24:41 -0500, Publius
<m.pu...@nospam.comcast.net> wrote:

>Determinism became an interesting and controversial thesis because of its
>claim of predictability.

That claim is wrong.

As the good professor points out, man has known for a long time that
not everything in the world is predictable. But that does not mean
that the world is non-deterministically.

The face that a (fair) coin lands on when tossed is unpredictable, but
the entire process that the coin undergoes from the initial moment it
is tossed in the air to the final moment that it lies on the table
with one face exposed is totally 100% completely deterministic.

And so is the process of radioactive decay. At every moment the wave
function for the entire system has a value which provides all the
information about the state of the system that can be known. Just
because the wave function informs us that there are aspects of the
process that are intrinsically unknowable does not mean that the
process is non-deterministic in the physical sense.

[Bob]

On 12 Oct 2005 02:53:46 -0700, "someone4"
<glenn....@btinternet.com> wrote:

>>Bob solves this problem by assuming determinism as an axiom of thought.

I do no such thing.

>Bricmont, overlooks no such thing, and separates the conception of
>predictability and determinism, he points out that determinism is a
>metaphysical question,

Indeed it is, but it is also something that physics addresses.
Determinism is a physics concept as well as a metaphysics concept.

Remember that metaphysics is built upon physics.

>and considers that the universe may be
>deterministic or indeterministic. He simply points out that contrary to
>claims that a deterministic explanation of quantum phenomena could not
>exist, that there is no reason to think that, and in fact a
>deterministic explanation does exist, Bohmian mechanics.

Quantum Mechanics is intrinsically deterministic. There is no need to
invoke Bohm or any other speculation.

The reason QM is deterministic is because the Schrodinger Equation
employs Unitary operators.

You really do need to study that in order to appreciate why QM is
fully deterministic.

>Bob believes in orthodox quantum mechanics, and quantum randomness.

Only when the term is carefully defined in the context of QM. I have
done that earlier in this forum in one of the threads.

I would prefer to use the term "unknowablilty" because it is very
clear what is meant. To say that the decay time for a particular atom
is "random" does not get across what is really going on. To say that
the decay time for a particular atom is "intrinsically unknowable"
says everything - once you show why. The reason for "unknowability" in
QM is because the quantity is irrelevant to the underlying process and
there is no algorithm to compute it. It is a piece of information we
imagine to be useful but QM is telling us that it is not. The decay
process does not care which atoms decay when, it only cares that the
probability per unit time is a constant, and therefore enough of any
atoms decay. Which ones decay is irrelevant.

This is not new - you find the same thing when you ask which electrons
are flowing in a conductor. It is irrelevant which ones as long as
some are flowing. In fact it is this interchangability under
permutation rules that leads to the concept of a fermion.

>With randomness the universe cannot of ever been deterministic. Quantum
>randomness and determinism are incompatible.

That statement makes no sense. Best to ignore it.

>Bob argues that the
>Schrodinger equation is deterministic,

Real physicists know that it is deterministic because it uses Unitary
operators.

>but ignores the fact that in

>orthodox quantum mechanics it is thought to represent the probability
>amplitude, thus making orthodox quantum mechanics an indeterministic
>theory.

That is totally incorrect. In the first place I am not ignoring the
fact that QM is probabilistic. What I am saying is that the
probabilistic nature of QM does not make QM "indeterministic". That is
your claim, and it is completely wrong.

>For me personally, that the physical universe is deterministic makes
>sense. It also happens to allow the conception of the universe being
>created in essence as told in Genesis, i.e. just before souls were
>introduced. Given the initial state at the 'Big Bang', and the laws of
>nature, the state at which the universe would have been in before souls
>were introduced would have been determined. Therefore if you were God,
>would you sit around for billions of years watching the board set
>itself up, or would just set the board up in the state it was
>determined to be, before souls were introduced?

I believe the Universe, which is the totality of all material worlds,
not just our little dinky universe, was never created in time - it is
eternal. It is a manifestation of Existence, of Being, and therefore
has been around for as long as Being has been around, which is
forever.

That way I avoid those nasty singularities that physicists do not
like. If you want something that looks like the BB to explain the way
our universe is evolving at the moment, then Superstring Theory has an
explanation that does not require arbitrary singularities. Brian
Greene has two books on this subject, with the second one including
the material from the first one.

[someone4]

>someone4 wrote:
>>You really just need to real an essay from Jean Bricmont
>>http://www.fyma.ucl.ac.be/files/Turin.pdf

Bob wrote:
>I have a problem right at the very outset. He claims:

>"Determinism is one of those words over which many people get
>involved in disputes, partly because it is rarely defined."

>That is not true, as the good professor should know if he read books
>on orthodox QM.

Orthodox quantum mechanics is an indeterministic theory Bob.

Bob wrote:
>But I will go along for the ride, because he is right when he says:
>"Hence, it is often unclear what the discussion is about."

>He starts off by pointing out that a "trivial" definition of
>determinism is "unpredictability". He then states that this is NOT
>what is meant by determinism. Bravo, Professor! Finally someone who
>agrees with what I have been saying all along. Unpredictibility (aka
>"Unknowability") leads to "quantum indeterminancy" which is not the
>same as "quantum determinism".

No Bob, I think you need to read the whole paper, he is simply saying
that whether the universe is deterministic (i.e. given the state at t,
and the laws of nature, the future is fixed), or not, is not related to
our ability to predict it.

Bob wrote:
>I notice he cites ET Jaynes, some of whose works I have read. He is
>the one who claims that QM has two aspects: ontological and
>epistemological. I do not know if that really provides any insight. He
>does, however, claim that QM can be understood in classical terms by
>invoking an "information principle" - a kind of entropy or maybe
>reverse entropy. Information Physics is fashionable today.

>Here's where we part company. The professor asserts:

>"As far as I can see, nothing has ever been proposed except pure
>randomness! Or, in other words, events with no cause."

>I vehemently disagree with any implication that "randomness" is the
>same as "acausality".

I know you do, but it pretty much is, as there is no causal link
between any given cause for the random event, and the particular
outcome.

Bob wrote:
>Then he takes off on Free Will, asserting (or is it pontificating):

>"Our feeling of free will is not that there is some intrinsically
>random process at workin our minds,"

>My assertion - the subject of the original thread earlier - It is
>intrinsic unknowability that causes free will.

Can you not see his point? It seems like we can consciously choose what
we do, not that we are randomly driven.

Bob wrote:
>I have to say bye bye to the good professor - too much to argue with
>him about and no way to do it. Also he shifts from the objective
>Realist Worldview to the subjective Idealist/Mystical Worldview in
>mid-paragraph, and that always results in confusion.

I personally thought it was a clearly written and easy to follow essay.
It seems that you don't like it because it doesn't say what you want it
to say.

[someone4]

>someone4 wrote:
>>There is a difference
>>from Godel's conception of some mathematical truths being logically
>>unprovable, to the conception that because we can't predict something
>>(Uncertainty principle for one), reflects on whether the universe is
>>deterministic or indeterministic.

Bob wrote:
>I am not so sure about that. Godel's problem, Turing's problems, and
>Chaitin's problems all arise because the algorithm to compute a
>particular number does not exist. It would seem that unknowablilty,
>responsible for quantum indeterminacy (NOT "non-determinism, which is
>a completely different issue from indeterminancy), arises because on
>uncomputability.

>someone4 wrote:
>>You could do with reading an essay 'Determinism, Chaos, and Quantum
>>Mechanics' by Jean Bricmont (Professor of Theoretical Physics at the
>>University of Louvain).
>>http://www.fyma.ucl.ac.be/files/Turin.pdf

Bob wrote:
>I will take a look anyway but the first sign of pontification and it's
>bye bye.

>someone4 wrote:
>>He quite clearly shows that there is no reason to conclude that the
>>physical universe isn't deterministic, and that quantum randomness
>>actually does exist.

Bob wrote:
>Then he agrees that QM is deterministic. He must know orthodox QM.

QM is indeterministic Bob, can you not understand that? Just because
Schrodingers equation is deterministic doesn't matter, because in
orthodox QM it represents the probability amplitude, which makes QM an
indeterministic theory. Look up determinism, and understand what it
means.

>someone4 wrote:
>>He acknowledges that our subjective experience suggests a dualistic
>>existence, but that is a side issue.

Bob wrote:
>He may be shifting Worldviews without acknowledging it. That is what
>causes most of the confusion in metaphysics - the shifing from an
>objective Realist to a subjective Idealist/Mystical Worldview. If you
>are going to discuss physics and metaphysics, then you must stick with
>the Realist Worldview, or else you will wander off in the subjective
>weeds of Idealism/Mysticism.

He is not confused at all, unlike yourself, with the concept of
determinism.

[someone4]

>>Publius wrote:
>>>Bob solves this problem by assuming determinism as an axiom of thought.

Bob wrote:
>I do no such thing.

>someone4 wrote:
>>Bricmont, overlooks no such thing, and separates the conception of
>>predictability and determinism, he points out that determinism is a
>>metaphysical question,

Bob wrote:
>Indeed it is, but it is also something that physics addresses.
>Determinism is a physics concept as well as a metaphysics concept.

>Remember that metaphysics is built upon physics.

Yes Bob, but you don't even understand what determinism is. You think
orthodox QM is a deterministic theory, and it isn't.

>someone4 wrote:
>>and considers that the universe may be
>>deterministic or indeterministic. He simply points out that contrary to
>>claims that a deterministic explanation of quantum phenomena could not
>>exist, that there is no reason to think that, and in fact a
>>deterministic explanation does exist, Bohmian mechanics.

Bob wrote:
>Quantum Mechanics is intrinsically deterministic. There is no need to
>invoke Bohm or any other speculation.

>The reason QM is deterministic is because the Schrodinger Equation
>employs Unitary operators.

>You really do need to study that in order to appreciate why QM is
>fully deterministic.

You really need to understand what determinism means. The Schrodinger
Equation is deterministic yes, it is the guiding wave in the Bohmian
mechanics which is a deterministic theory. In orthodox QM though, it is
considered to represent the probability amplitude, and thus orthodox QM
is an indeterministic theory.

>someone4 wrote:
>>Bob believes in orthodox quantum mechanics, and quantum randomness.

Bob wrote:
>Only when the term is carefully defined in the context of QM. I have
>done that earlier in this forum in one of the threads.

>I would prefer to use the term "unknowablilty" because it is very
>clear what is meant. To say that the decay time for a particular atom
>is "random" does not get across what is really going on. To say that
>the decay time for a particular atom is "intrinsically unknowable"
>says everything - once you show why. The reason for "unknowability" in
>QM is because the quantity is irrelevant to the underlying process and
>there is no algorithm to compute it. It is a piece of information we
>imagine to be useful but QM is telling us that it is not. The decay
>process does not care which atoms decay when, it only cares that the
>probability per unit time is a constant, and therefore enough of any
>atoms decay. Which ones decay is irrelevant.

>This is not new - you find the same thing when you ask which electrons
>are flowing in a conductor. It is irrelevant which ones as long as
>some are flowing. In fact it is this interchangability under
>permutation rules that leads to the concept of a fermion.

With Bohmian mechanics though, radioactive decay is not thought to be
uncomputable.

>someone4 wrote:
>>With randomness the universe cannot of ever been deterministic. Quantum
>>randomness and determinism are incompatible.

Bob wrote:
>That statement makes no sense. Best to ignore it.

It makes perfect sense. As I have already explained to you determinism
is defined as:

http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=determinism
"de·ter·min·ism P Pronunciation Key (d-tûrm-nzm)
n.
The philosophical doctrine that every state of affairs, including every
human event, act, and decision is the inevitable consequence of
antecedent states of affairs"

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Determinism
"Determinism is the philosophical proposition that every event,
including human cognition and action, is causally determined by an
unbroken chain of prior occurrences. No mysterious miracles or totally
random events occur. If there has been even one indeterministic event
since the beginning of time, then determinism is false."

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/#1.3
"A standard characterization of determinism states that every event is
causally necessitated by antecedent events.[4] Within this essay, we
shall define determinism as the metaphysical thesis that the facts of
the past, in conjunction with the laws of nature, entail every truth
about the future. According to this characterization, if determinism is
true, then, given the actual past, and holding fixed the laws of
nature, only one future is possible at any moment in time. Notice that
an implication of determinism as it applies to a person's conduct is
that, if determinism is true, there are (causal) conditions for that
person's actions located in the remote past, prior to her birth, that
are sufficient for each of her actions."

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/determinism-causal/
"Determinism: The world is governed by (or is under the sway of)
determinism if and only if, given a specified way things are at a time
t, the way things go thereafter is fixed as a matter of natural law."

If there were randomness as proposed by quantum mechanics by the
conception that the Schrodinger equation represents the probability
amplitude, then none of the definitions above would hold, the universe
would be indeterministic. Before you claim that these are simply
philosophical definitions of determinism, look at the one given by Jean
Bricmont in http://www.fyma.ucl.ac.be/files/Turin.pdf , page 3. It is
the same in conception. That is what is meant by determinism, whether
you like it or not.

>someone4 wrote:
>>Bob argues that the
>>Schrodinger equation is deterministic,

Bob wrote:
>Real physicists know that it is deterministic because it uses Unitary
>operators.

>someone4 wrote:
>>but ignores the fact that in
>>orthodox quantum mechanics it is thought to represent the probability
>>amplitude, thus making orthodox quantum mechanics an indeterministic
>>theory.

Bob wrote:
>That is totally incorrect. In the first place I am not ignoring the
>fact that QM is probabilistic. What I am saying is that the
>probabilistic nature of QM does not make QM "indeterministic". That is
>your claim, and it is completely wrong.

Yes it does, it is not just my claim, I have given you five definitions
of determinism above, including one by a Professor of Theoretical
Physics. If you can't understand what determinism is, then that is your
problem.

>someone4 wrote:
>>For me personally, that the physical universe is deterministic makes
>>sense. It also happens to allow the conception of the universe being
>>created in essence as told in Genesis, i.e. just before souls were
>>introduced. Given the initial state at the 'Big Bang', and the laws of
>>nature, the state at which the universe would have been in before souls
>>were introduced would have been determined. Therefore if you were God,
>>would you sit around for billions of years watching the board set
>>itself up, or would just set the board up in the state it was
>>determined to be, before souls were introduced?

Bob wrote:
>I believe the Universe, which is the totality of all material worlds,
>not just our little dinky universe, was never created in time - it is
>eternal. It is a manifestation of Existence, of Being, and therefore
>has been around for as long as Being has been around, which is
>forever.

Well, I tend to use Occam's razor when it comes to Everett's
many-histories approach, and therefore discard it.

[Bob]

On 12 Oct 2005 07:28:03 -0700, "someone4"
<glenn....@btinternet.com> wrote:

>QM is indeterministic Bob, can you not understand that?

Because it is not "indeterministic", not when you use that term the
way real physicists use it.

But we are again wasting time nitpicking over vague terminology. Let's
move on.

[Bob]

On 12 Oct 2005 07:18:58 -0700, "someone4"
<glenn....@btinternet.com> wrote:

>Orthodox quantum mechanics is an indeterministic theory Bob.

There you go again with that ill-defined term.

There is determinism and there is indeterminancy. I know what each of
those terms means in the context of QM. I do not know what the term
"indeterministic" means. It could mean either "non-determinism" or it
could mean "indeterminancy".

What you need to do is get beyond all this nitpicking over terms. What
is it that you have to say about the nature of the Universe (please,
no more of Bohm's conjectures).

We seem to agree that there are aspects of a quantum system that are
"intrinsically unknowable" (for a classical system there aspects that
are "practically unknowable"). I have give a very detailed analysis of
one such quantum system and explained why a certain aspect is
intrinsically unknowable and what that has to do with "quantum
randomness".

>No Bob, I think you need to read the whole paper, he is simply saying
>that whether the universe is deterministic (i.e. given the state at t,
>and the laws of nature, the future is fixed), or not, is not related to
>our ability to predict it.

Is that your definition of "determinism", namely that the future is
fixed?

> there is no causal link
>between any given cause for the random event, and the particular
>outcome.

That is completely incorrect. In the case of radioactive decay, the
cause of any particular atom's decay is Vacuum fluctuations. It is
they that cause the atom to decay. The fact that we cannot know the
details of which fluctuations cause which atoms to decay does not mean
that the decay process is uncaused.

Now you are using the term "random" to argue acausality. That is
completely incorrect. Just because an event can be labeled "random"
does not mean it is uncaused.

>Can you not see his point? It seems like we can consciously choose what
>we do, not that we are randomly driven.

I do not know what you mean by "randomly driven". That term could mean
just about anything.

>>I have to say bye bye to the good professor - too much to argue with
>>him about and no way to do it. Also he shifts from the objective
>>Realist Worldview to the subjective Idealist/Mystical Worldview in
>>mid-paragraph, and that always results in confusion.

>I personally thought it was a clearly written and easy to follow essay.
>It seems that you don't like it because it doesn't say what you want it
>to say.

Does that really surprise you, that I do not care for an article that
says things I disagree with?

[Bob]

On 12 Oct 2005 07:45:48 -0700, "someone4"
<glenn....@btinternet.com> wrote:

>you don't even understand what determinism is. You think
>orthodox QM is a deterministic theory, and it isn't.

I know what determinism means in QM. I studied QM and I published
original articles in basic research in refereed journals like The
Physical Review in QM. And I am here to tell you that orthodox QM is a
deterministic theory based on the meaning of deterministic.

Quantum Deterministic means that the wave function is well defined for
all times t for the process under consideration, regardless of whether
there are intrinsically unknown quantities associated with the
process.

In classical physics it is necessary to know everything about the
state of a system at any time so you can calculate the state of the
system at the next time. If radioactive decay were classical, you
would have to know whether any particular atom had decayed or not
because the state of the system depends on such facts. You cannot the
classical evolution of the classical system without knowing everything
about it.

Indeed you can do statistical mechanics on the system which averages
over the detailed behavior of particular atoms. But you will not be
able to derive the lineshape of the energy spectrum for photons
created when atoms decay because that calculation is not possible in
classical physics.

In QM such a calculation is possible abd what it tells you is that the
time of the decay of any particular particle is not relevant to the
process. The only thing that is relevant is that some atoms do decay
such that the probability per unit time is a constant. IOW, a certain
numer of atoms do have to decay per unit time for the process to be
operative but it does not matter which atoms they are.

That is radically different from classical physics where either you
must know the detailed behavior of every atom or you do not get what
you want from the calculation. QM gives you as much as you can know
and the rest is "intrinsically unknowable".

>>You really do need to study that in order to appreciate why QM is
>>fully deterministic.

>You really need to understand what determinism means. The Schrodinger
>Equation is deterministic yes

Then how can you make this statement, like you did above:

>"You think orthodox QM is a deterministic theory, and it isn't."

If the Schrodinger Equation is deterministic, that means the wave
function is deterministic. If the wave function is deterministic, then
QM is deterministic because everything you can ever hope to know is
contained in the wave function.

It is you who is struggling to understand the meaning of
"deterministic". You will never understand it fully unless you learn
about Unitary operators.

>thus orthodox QM is an indeterministic theory.

Yet you say that the Schrodinger Equation is "deterministic". Then you
say QM is not deterministic. Something got lost in the translation.

>With Bohmian mechanics though, radioactive decay is not thought to be
>uncomputable.

Neither is it in classical physics. However it is not possible to
construct a theory of spontaneous emission in classical physics.

The closest analog to spontaneous emission is the classical system
where a small metal sphere (a BB) is inside a rotating drum, the
latter which has a small hole in its side slightly larger in diameter
than the BB. The BB will rattle around inside the drum until it
happens to find the hole and escape, thereby simulating spontaneous
emission.

How would you go about calculating the spectral lineshape of the
kinetic energy of BBs emitted in such a manner? The lineshape would
depend on a detailed knowledge of the BB's internal dynamics. Even
then you cannot hope to solve any aspect of the problem analytically.

So you resort to a computer to do the calculation. But after a few
collisions, the highly non-linear equations would produce results with
significant errors due to the imprecision of the computer word size.
You can make the computer larger, but it would have to grow
exponentially larger with each interation. Eventually you would run
into limitations imposed by the size of the Universe.

>As I have already explained to you determinism
>is defined as:

>http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=3Ddeterminism

>The philosophical doctrine...

I am not interested in philosophical doctrines when it comes to
Quantum Determinism. I know what Determinism in physics, both
classical and quantum physics. It is not a philosophical concept - it
is a physical concept. It has to do with being able to determine the
next state of a system from the preceding state. You can do that in
classical and quantum physics both. The Schrodinger Equation allows
you to do that because its operators are Unitary.

>http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Determinism
>"Determinism is the philosophical proposition that every event,
>including human cognition and action, is causally determined by an
>unbroken chain of prior occurrences. No mysterious miracles or totally
>random events occur. If there has been even one indeterministic event
>since the beginning of time, then determinism is false."

Here is the definition according to QM, using the wording above as
much as possible:

"Determinism is the proposition in physics that every physical event,

is causally determined by an unbroken chain of prior occurrences."

I left out a lot of stuff that is not relevant, or is just plain
incorrect. For example, the claim that "No ... totally
random events occur." I do not know of any so-called "totally random
events" in nature. There are aspects of certain events that can be
described as random, such as the time when any particular radioactive
decay occurs, but the process of decay is not "totally random" by any
stretch of the imagination.

"JUST BECAUSE AN ASPECT OF AN EVENT IS INTRINSICALLY UNKNOWABLE DOES
NOT MEAN THAT THE EVENT ITSELF IS TOTALLY RANDOM."

This the fallacy that you and many others have been making. A coin
toss has random aspects to it, namely which face the coin will land
on, but the process of tossing the coin and its landing on a face is
not totally random.

>http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/#1.3
>"A standard characterization of determinism states that every event is
>causally necessitated by antecedent events.

I agree with that as far as it goes. Notice that it does not say that
you must know every aspect of an event for there to be determinism.

Just because the time when any particular atom will decay is
intrinsically unknowable does not mean that "every decay is causally
necessitated by antecedent events." The cause of the decay process is
Vacuum fluctuations - they are the antecedent events which causally
necessitate the decay of an atom to occur.

Just because QM tells us that it makes no difference which particular
atom has decayed in order to calculate the energy lineshape does not
mean that the causal chain has been broken. If you take away the
Vacuum fluctuations, there will be no decay because you have removed
the cause of the decay process.

>>I believe the Universe, which is the totality of all material worlds,
>>not just our little dinky universe, was never created in time - it is
>>eternal. It is a manifestation of Existence, of Being, and therefore
>>has been around for as long as Being has been around, which is
>>forever.

>Well, I tend to use Occam's razor when it comes to Everett's
>many-histories approach, and therefore discard it.

I was not describing any multiuniverse theory. I discard them too, but
not because of Occam's Razor.

I was describing what Superstring Theory tells us is possible, namely
our little universe is part of a much larger one,

[Roger Johansson]

Bob wrote:

> I am not interested in philosophical doctrines when it comes to
> Quantum Determinism. I know what Determinism in physics, both
> classical and quantum physics. It is not a philosophical concept - it
> is a physical concept.

No. It a religious concept, and that's why it causes so much confusion
when applied to other fields like science, cosmology, etc..

> >http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Determinism
> >"Determinism is the philosophical proposition that every event,
> >including human cognition and action, is causally determined by an

Wikipedia is good in all areas which are not in any way related to
religion, politics, language and social ideas, because it is written by
american
students, and contains enormous amounts of american religious views,
political views, and all areas which can be tainted by those views.

There is constant struggle from more reasonable people to write
more neutral international views, but the american youngsters
are very quick to delete anything which does not fit into the
american flood of creationist and capitalist propaganda,
which all american youngsters minds have been filled with during their
upbringing and education, and which they see as the absolute truth.
It is like a religious conviction so they feverishly defend those
views.

Non-american writers have largely given up and let the americans
build their gigantic pile of american ways to see everything.

--
Roger J.

[Bob]

On 12 Oct 2005 07:45:48 -0700, "someone4"
<glenn....@btinternet.com> wrote:

>As I have already explained to you determinism is defined as:

>http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=3Ddeterminism

It finally dawned on me as I was fixing lunch. Those definitions above
are classical. And they are, with obvious limitations, true for
classical physics. Classical Physics is totally deterministic. No one
argues against that.

The problem comes when we consider Quantum Mechanics. Those defintions
fo determinism above, being classical, are not applicable to QM. As
everyone knows, QM is not Classical Physics (except in the limiting
case of very large quantum numbers).

No wonder you and the others are so confused - you don't know that QM
is not the same as Classical Physics. That's why you are trying to
force a classical definition onto something that is not classical at
all, namely Quantum Mechanics.

[Bob]

On 12 Oct 2005 10:15:26 -0700, "Roger Johansson" <roge...@gmail.com>
wrote:

>> I am not interested in philosophical doctrines when it comes to
>> Quantum Determinism. I know what Determinism in physics, both
>> classical and quantum physics. It is not a philosophical concept - it
>> is a physical concept.

>No. It a religious concept, and that's why it causes so much confusion
>when applied to other fields like science, cosmology, etc..

It could be a psychological concept for all I know, but that does not
matter. What matters in the context of QM is that determinism has a
physical meaning, namely that the Universe evolves by a connected
series of causes and their effects. That connected series is described
by the wave function. However, not everything you might want to know
is described, in particular when it is intrinsically unknowable. But
just because you cannot know some aspect of a quantum process does not
make it non-determinant. The Universe operates quite well without our
knowing what is really going on.

>Non-american writers have largely given up and let the americans
>build their gigantic pile of american ways to see everything.

Quantum Determinism was postulated by European physicists.

[someone4]

Bob wrote:
>Here is the definition according to QM, using the wording above as
>much as possible:

>"Determinism is the proposition in physics that every physical event,
>is causally determined by an unbroken chain of prior occurrences."

So given a random event which can have outcomes of A, B or C, what is
the unbroken chain of prior occurrences that cause B to happen rather
than A or C?

[Bob]

On 12 Oct 2005 17:25:15 -0700, "someone4"
<glenn....@btinternet.com> wrote:

I do not know what you mean by "unbroken chain" in that context.

I used the term in the sense that there is some cause for every event,
even if we do not know all the details of the event. For example, the
decay of a particular atom is caused by Vacuum fluctations. It does
not make any difference which fluctuations caused the decay as long as
some did. In fact in QM it is meaningless to ask which ones did
because it doesn't matter.

If I tell you that waves capsized a boat, does it make any difference
which ones did? If I tell you that it doesn't matter which waves
capsized the boat as long as some waves did, then does that mean the
capsizing of the boat is without cause. That would be absurd.

[someone4]

>>Bob wrote:
>>>Here is the definition according to QM, using the wording above as
>>>much as possible:
>>>"Determinism is the proposition in physics that every physical event,
>>>is causally determined by an unbroken chain of prior occurrences."

>someone4 wrote:
>>So given a random event which can have outcomes of A, B or C, what is
>>the unbroken chain of prior occurrences that cause B to happen rather
>>than A or C?

Bob wrote:
>I do not know what you mean by "unbroken chain" in that context.

>I used the term in the sense that there is some cause for every event,
>even if we do not know all the details of the event. For example, the
>decay of a particular atom is caused by Vacuum fluctations. It does
>not make any difference which fluctuations caused the decay as long as
>some did. In fact in QM it is meaningless to ask which ones did
>because it doesn't matter.

>If I tell you that waves capsized a boat, does it make any difference
>which ones did? If I tell you that it doesn't matter which waves
>capsized the boat as long as some waves did, then does that mean the
>capsizing of the boat is without cause. That would be absurd.

You supplied a definition of determinism:

"Determinism is the proposition in physics that every physical event,
is causally determined by an unbroken chain of prior occurrences."

I am simply asking you for a random event which can have outcomes A, B,
or C, when the outcome is B, do you think that there is an unbroken
chain of prior occurrences that causally determined it to be B (in line
with your definition)?

[Dianelos Georgoudis]

Bob wrote:
> On 12 Oct 2005 17:25:15 -0700, "someone4"
> <glenn....@btinternet.com> wrote:
>
> >>Here is the definition according to QM, using the wording above as
> >>much as possible:
>
> >>"Determinism is the proposition in physics that every physical event,
> >>is causally determined by an unbroken chain of prior occurrences."
>
> >So given a random event which can have outcomes of A, B or C, what is
> >the unbroken chain of prior occurrences that cause B to happen rather
> >than A or C?
>
> I do not know what you mean by "unbroken chain" in that context.
>
> I used the term in the sense that there is some cause for every event,
> even if we do not know all the details of the event. For example, the
> decay of a particular atom is caused by Vacuum fluctations.

Whose value is an intrinsically unknown quantity. And whose cause is
another vacuum fluctuation of intrinsically unknown quantity too.

So determinism in physical reality is contingent on intrinsically
unknown quantities. What is the practical difference then with the
alternative view that there is no determinism in physical reality?
(Observe I am discussing whether physical reality is deterministic, not
whether quantum mechanics is deterministic.) Whether one holds one view
or the other does not affect any calculations, does it?

I do not claim that I see some error in your thinking. Personally I do
find it distasteful to claim that everything has a cause, even though
at small sizes everything happens because of causes that are
intrinsically unknown. I feel that the alternative ontological view
that in very small sizes things happen without any cause to be more
direct and simpler, and also to be more intellectually satisfying
explaining all classical size causal phenomena on statistical laws. In
your case, is there any reason beside taste that induces you to claim
that all events, no matter how small, have a cause?

> It does
> not make any difference which fluctuations caused the decay as long as
> some did. In fact in QM it is meaningless to ask which ones did
> because it doesn't matter.
>
> If I tell you that waves capsized a boat, does it make any difference
> which ones did?

I see what you mean. You are saying that we know some wave
deterministically capsized the boat, even in those contexts where we
cannot point out exactly which wave. This is a good analogy, but there
is a difference: In the case of a classical boat it's always possible
in principle to point out which wave capsized it; whereas in QM it is
in principle impossible to point out which quantum fluctuation caused
the radioactive atom to decay. Some people feel this is an essential
difference.

> If I tell you that it doesn't matter which waves
> capsized the boat as long as some waves did, then does that mean the
> capsizing of the boat is without cause. That would be absurd.

ok.

[Publius]

sp...@uce.gov (Bob) wrote in news:434dafce.13997031@news-
server.houston.rr.com:

> If I tell you that waves capsized a boat, does it make any difference
> which ones did? If I tell you that it doesn't matter which waves
> capsized the boat as long as some waves did, then does that mean the
> capsizing of the boat is without cause. That would be absurd.

No, because usually it does not matter which waves capsized the boat. But
sometimes it does --- if it is a tsunami wave, for example. In that case we
may wish to track that wave to prevent further damage.

The fact that information may at times be unimportant for some purpose at
hand does not imply that it does not exist, and might be important in some
other circumstances.

[Bob]

On 13 Oct 2005 00:19:53 -0700, "someone4"
<glenn....@btinternet.com> wrote:

>I am simply asking you for a random event which can have outcomes A, B,
>or C, when the outcome is B, do you think that there is an unbroken
>chain of prior occurrences that causally determined it to be B (in line
>with your definition)?

Any I have been trying to tell you that in QM, such details cannot be
known. But just because we can't know them does not mean they do not
happen causally.

You need to look at quantum randomness in a different way. Instead of
effects A, B, C, consider one effect with multiple possible causes.
Consider, for example, the decay of a particular radioactive atom.
There are many possible causal chains, because there are many possible
ways that Vacuum fluctuations can cause the decay to occur. QM is
telling us that the particular causal chain is irrelevant for purposes
of telling us what we can know about the process.

You may want to know the exact details but QM is not going to tell you
because there is no algorithm to compute those details. Nature is
deterministic to the extent that some causal chain did occur. But
Nature won't tell us because it is not possible to know in advance.

Such is the nature of things when you build on complete randomness,
which is what Vacuum fluctuations are.

[Bob]

On 13 Oct 2005 00:45:31 -0700, "Dianelos Georgoudis"
<dian...@tecapro.com> wrote:

>> I used the term in the sense that there is some cause for every event,
>> even if we do not know all the details of the event. For example, the
>> decay of a particular atom is caused by Vacuum fluctations.

>Whose value is an intrinsically unknown quantity. And whose cause is
>another vacuum fluctuation of intrinsically unknown quantity too.

>So determinism in physical reality is contingent on intrinsically
>unknown quantities.

No, determinism is based on things we know, not things we can't know.

Consider the simplest model of the Vacuum. It is the reservoir of all
Zero Point Motion, the condition of matter when there are no particles
present. Originally the Vacuum consisted of the electromagnetic field,
but later more fields were added. Whatever they may be, and that
depends on the theory at hand, suffice it to say that the Vacuum is
filled with Zero Point Motion of quantum fields in general.

There are in principle an infinite number of fluctuations each
characterized by an energy and momentum. It is this infinite reservoir
of quantum field fluctuations that causes randomness in QM. It also
causes unknowablility in QM. But because these flutuatuations are the
source of all particles in the Universe, it is the cause of quantum
events. QM is fully deterministic in that regard.

Just because there are intrinsically unknowable quantities that
originate because of Vacuum fluctuations does not mean that the events
that occur are not caused by these fluctuations. What QM is telling us
is that it does not make any difference which particular fluctuations
are the cause, just that some fluctuations are the cause.

You look out of your window and see a storm brewing. Lightnening
strikes and you ask whether it is possible to know the cause of that
event. The cause is the motion of air molecules, but you cannot
possibly hope to know which ones were the cause. You know some of them
had to be the cause and at the same time you realize that it is not
possible to know which ones. But does it make any difference in terms
of how lightening happens?

In this analogy the lightening strike is equivalent to the decay of a
radioactive atom, and the chaotic motion air molecules is equivalent
to Vacuum fluctuations.

>What is the practical difference then with the
>alternative view that there is no determinism in physical reality?

You are using the classical meaning and I am using the meaning in QM.
They are not the same.

The practical difference is the conclustion that is inferred. There
are those who would take your statement one step further and claim
that the Universe has acausal events. But that is not true and that
cannot be inferred when we talk about Quantum Determinancy.

>(Observe I am discussing whether physical reality is deterministic, not
>whether quantum mechanics is deterministic.) Whether one holds one view
>or the other does not affect any calculations, does it?

I am using the term "determinism" in the context of QM. As far as I am
concerned that is the same as using it in the context of physical
reality, because QM is a comprehensive theory of which classical
physics is a subset under a limiting condition.

>Personally I do find it distasteful to claim that everything has a cause,

Why? Don't you like order? Don't you realize that there can be no
order is there is no causality?

>at small sizes everything happens because of causes that are
>intrinsically unknown.

The causes in general are not unknown. It's certain details that are
unknown because they are irrelevant to the process. What difference
does it make which atom decays when for the purposes of knowing the
energy spectrum? Regardless of what atoms decay when, the energy
spectrum will be Lorentzian.

>I feel that the alternative ontological view
>that in very small sizes things happen without any cause to be more
>direct and simpler,

One huge problem - there would be no physics.

>In your case, is there any reason beside taste that induces you to claim
>that all events, no matter how small, have a cause?

1) Because that's what physics says is the case. Quantum Mechanics is
built on causality because it uses Unitary operators.

2) Because if there are no causes, there can be no order. Order
reflects the causal chain, how events follows from causes. If events
do not follow from causes, then they just "happen" and you cannot have
any order that way.

3) Because Being itself is ordered, and it is that order which allows
other Being to arise. You cannot make anything without an ordered
design. A handful of crap is not ordered - and that's all it is - a
handful of undesigned, unordered crap.

>You are saying that we know some wave
>deterministically capsized the boat

Yes.

>even in those contexts where we
>cannot point out exactly which wave.

Yes. Just because we cannot point out which wave capsized the boat
does not mean that no wave capsized the boat.

This is a good analogy, but there
>is a difference: In the case of a classical boat it's always possible
>in principle to point out which wave capsized it; whereas in QM it is
>in principle impossible to point out which quantum fluctuation caused
>the radioactive atom to decay. Some people feel this is an essential
>difference.

That's because it is a crucial difference. But that doesn't change the
fact that some Vacuum fluctuations caused a particular atom to decay,
even though we can't know which ones.

>
>> If I tell you that it doesn't matter which waves
>> capsized the boat as long as some waves did, then does that mean the
>> capsizing of the boat is without cause. That would be absurd.
>
>ok.

It would appear that you are well on your way to grasping the rather
difficult concept of Quantum Determinism. The first step is to realize
that it is not the same as Classical Determinism, which is what
determinism in both classical physics and philosophy is based on. The
next step is to drop the false association of unknowablility with
acausality. Then you must understand that because there are an
exceedingly large number (some would say "infinite") of different
kinds of fluctuations in the Vacuum, we cannot hope to know the exact
details of what caused the event, but that does not mean that some
fluctuations did cause it.

[Bob]

You are nitpicking.

[wbarwell]

Bob wrote:

> On 13 Oct 2005 00:45:31 -0700, "Dianelos Georgoudis"
> <dian...@tecapro.com> wrote:
>
>>> I used the term in the sense that there is some cause for
>>> every event, even if we do not know all the details of the
>>> event. For example, the decay of a particular atom is caused
>>> by Vacuum fluctations.
>
>>Whose value is an intrinsically unknown quantity. And whose
>>cause is another vacuum fluctuation of intrinsically unknown
>>quantity too.
>
>>So determinism in physical reality is contingent on
>>intrinsically unknown quantities.
>
> No, determinism is based on things we know, not things we can't
> know.
>
> Consider the simplest model of the Vacuum. It is the reservoir
> of all Zero Point Motion, the condition of matter when there
> are no particles present. Originally the Vacuum consisted of
> the electromagnetic field, but later more fields were added.
> Whatever they may be, and that depends on the theory at hand,
> suffice it to say that the Vacuum is filled with Zero Point
> Motion of quantum fields in general.

This goes back to Paul Dirac. The original vaccum contained
positive and negative energy. Dirac came up with this idea to
explain why an electron does not spontaneously dump its energy
and drop to the lowest energy state. It is because we are
in a field of energy, negative energy that prevents such things.
Peopel were sceptical of Dirac's ideas until his claims particles
like electrons will have an exact anti-particle. The positron,
and anti-electron proved to be an existant particle as claimed.
From the Heisenburg uncertainty principle, the idea that these
positive and negative energy fields could create virtual
particles was derived. It turns out that virtual particles that
exchange energy between particles in everyday physics sometimes
borrow energy fro these fields, the Universe as we know it would
not exist without these energy fields. And we know that virtual
particles do pop in and out of existance in pairs and mutually
destroy themselves in vast numbers.

Much radioactivity is cause not by any such "fluctuations" but
from the fact particles do not have a real location.
In many atoms, the neutrons and protons are bound by the strong
forces, but in less stable isotopes there are extra neutrons
that do not exactly fit. They move around and there are always
neutrons that are not quite fitting inside a round, balanced
theoretically stable nucleaus. A neutron, alone, has a half life
of 11 minutes. It is not stable, due to the weak nuclear force,
because its quarks are not in a stable configuration. Given
time, one quark will convert to a more stable configuration and
a proton and energetic electron is left behind.
A nucleus is stable, but since there is no real location for
a neutron, form time to time, odd neutron out will statisticall
be so far outside the nucleus, that the weak nuclear force has
preference over the strong nuclear force. Their real position
is not truely a position at all. You don't get that in the
quantum world. That is part of the Heisenburg uncertainty
principle. The idea of a particle as a thing with exact
location is not true, the real world at that level does not work
that way. because an odd man out neutron spends a statistical
part of its life outside the strong force, there is a
statistical chance it will eventually be caught outside when the
weak force at random allows its quarks to change and create a
proton and electron pair, and you have spontaneous fission.
This is determined by the nature of an isotope and its
arrangement of neutrons, which is a complex subject in itself.

The exact detail change the probabilities of a neutron's
time outside the strong force and exact halflife resulting
from that situation which is dependent on the uncertainty
principle which allows a neutron to tunnel outside the
confines of the nucleus proper for a brief amount of time.
The more the neutrons do this, the shorter the half life.

There are differing forms of fission, for example a neutron being
clobbered by a very fast moving and energetic neutron.

Cheerful Charlie

--
The official spokesman of the Foxes said
today that investigation into what happened
to the henhouse may be needed.

Cheerful Charlie

[someone4]

>someone4 wrote:
>>I am simply asking you for a random event which can have outcomes A, B,
>>or C, when the outcome is B, do you think that there is an unbroken
>>chain of prior occurrences that causally determined it to be B (in line
>>with your definition)?

Bob wrote:
>Any I have been trying to tell you that in QM, such details cannot be
>known. But just because we can't know them does not mean they do not
>happen causally.

>You need to look at quantum randomness in a different way. Instead of
>effects A, B, C, consider one effect with multiple possible causes.
>Consider, for example, the decay of a particular radioactive atom.
>There are many possible causal chains, because there are many possible
>ways that Vacuum fluctuations can cause the decay to occur. QM is
>telling us that the particular causal chain is irrelevant for purposes
>of telling us what we can know about the process.

>You may want to know the exact details but QM is not going to tell you
>because there is no algorithm to compute those details. Nature is
>deterministic to the extent that some causal chain did occur. But
>Nature won't tell us because it is not possible to know in advance.

>Such is the nature of things when you build on complete randomness,
>which is what Vacuum fluctuations are.

So given the definition you supplied:

"Determinism is the proposition in physics that every physical event,

is causally determined by an unbroken chain of prior occurrences."

And given that you are calling QM a deterministic theory. Are you
saying that when an atom decays (radioactive decay) that even though it
appears random, that the decay was actually causally determined by an
unbroken chain of prior occurrences? Or are you claiming that there is
no such chain and the decay was truly random, in which case QM is an
indeterministic theory, as it doesn't even fit in with the definition
you supplied.

[Bob]

On Thu, 13 Oct 2005 15:49:10 -0500, wbarwell <wbar...@mylinuxisp.com>
wrote:

>And we know that virtual
>particles do pop in and out of existance in pairs and mutually
>destroy themselves in vast numbers.

How do we know that? What is the direct experimental evidence?

>Much radioactivity is cause not by any such "fluctuations" but
>from the fact particles do not have a real location.

I stated at the outset that I was discussing the Heitler model of
spontaneous emission, which applies to isomeric transitions.

I have no desire to start a general discussion of nuclear physics.

[Bob]

On 13 Oct 2005 16:14:03 -0700, "someone4"
<glenn....@btinternet.com> wrote:

>So given the definition you supplied:
>"Determinism is the proposition in physics that every physical event,
>is causally determined by an unbroken chain of prior occurrences."

I never supplied any such definition. As I have emphasized several
times, the term "determinism" is too vague to be meaningful unless it
is taken in context. In the context of classical physics, it means
something like what you have stated above. In QM it means that the
wave function is known at all times, and therefore causality is
obeyed. But you cannot understand that from some philosophical
definition - you must understand it from Unitary operators.

>And given that you are calling QM a deterministic theory.

No, not given that. I don't accept that statement as the correct
meaning of quantum determinism. Quantum determinism is a property of
the Schrodinger Equation due to the use of Unitary operators.

>Are you
>saying that when an atom decays (radioactive decay) that even though it
>appears random,

Youa re being very sloppy with your statements. The decay does not
appear random. The time when a decay occurs is random. Again you are
trying to slip something past us. By claiming that the decay process
appears random, you are going to claim that it is acausal. But the
decay process is not random and therefore it is not acausal.

>that the decay was actually causally determined by an
>unbroken chain of prior occurrences? Or are you claiming that there is
>no such chain and the decay was truly random, in which case QM is an
>indeterministic theory, as it doesn't even fit in with the definition
>you supplied.

You never give up, do you. Always trying to pull a fast one.

You can put lipstick on your pig any way you want but it will never
become Miss America.

[Bob]

On 13 Oct 2005 16:14:03 -0700, "someone4"
<glenn....@btinternet.com> wrote:

I think you had asked me earlier to furnish some references regarding
the demise of the Copenhagen Interpretation. There are two ways to go
about this, one is to study the history of quantum entanglement, the
impact it had on Bell's inequalities and the inexorable conclusion
that resulted regarding Copenhagen. It was entanglement + Bell that
did Copenhagen in. Even Wikipedia gets that much right.

The other approach is to read the contemporary articles on quantum
physics on websites such as LASL (Los Alamos Scientific Laboratories).
I can get you started with a paper which reminds me of the proposals
of ET Jaynes, a strong proponent of Information Theory. This paper
deals directly with the measurement problem, which was the centerpiece
of Copenhagen. Fortunately it leaves out the Phenomenology. However,
it is far from being orthodox QM.

http://xxx.lanl.gov/abs/quant-ph/9610005

Negative entropy in quantum information theory
By Nicolas J. Cerf, Chris Adami

We present a quantum information theory that allows for the consistent
description of quantum entanglement. It parallels classical (Shannon)
information theory but is based entirely on density matrices, rather
than probability distributions, for the description of quantum
ensembles. We find that, unlike in Shannon theory, conditional
entropies can be negative when considering quantum entangled systems
such as an Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen pair, which leads to a violation of
well-known bounds of classical information theory. Negative quantum
entropy can be traced back to "conditional'' density matrices which
admit eigenvalues larger than unity. A straightforward definition of
mutual quantum entropy, or "mutual entanglement'', can also be
constructed using a "mutual'' density matrix. Such a unified
information-theoretic description of classical correlation and quantum
entanglement clarifies the link between them: the latter can be viewed
as "super-correlation'' which can induce classical correlation when
considering a ternary or larger system.

[wbarwell]

Bob wrote:

> On Thu, 13 Oct 2005 15:49:10 -0500, wbarwell
> <wbar...@mylinuxisp.com> wrote:
>
>>And we know that virtual
>>particles do pop in and out of existance in pairs and mutually
>>destroy themselves in vast numbers.
>
> How do we know that? What is the direct experimental evidence?

Yes. Google Casamir effect.
Casamir, a Dutch physicist was interested in VPs as it
was important to work he was doing with Van Der Walls forces and
similar. Starting from first principles he calculated the
amount of particles and forces they might put on real life
matter.
He calculated if you had two small plates and placed them close
together, many VP photons pairs would be excluded from between
the plates, and photons hitting the outside of the plates would
push the closed with a certain amount of force. A few years
ago, it became possible thanks to microscopic sized machines
etched out of silicon to try this experiment directly. It
worked as predicted within 5% of Casamir's predicted force.
This has been done several times now with various test gear.

Before that it was tested indirectly. Long ago, Shroedinger's
equations were witten telling how a given particle would act on
the quantum level. But Schroedinger's equations could not be
really tested dierctly because they took too much math. Then we
got super computers and physicists could run Schroedinger
equations for various particles and compare the results to
actual lab observations of particles. The equations were off by
about 10%. Why? It turned out Schroedinger did not count on
virtual particles, which influenced results. Once that was
accounted for, Schroedinger's equations worled as expected.

This stuff has real world testable consequences.

>
>>Much radioactivity is cause not by any such "fluctuations" but
>>from the fact particles do not have a real location.
>
> I stated at the outset that I was discussing the Heitler model
> of spontaneous emission, which applies to isomeric transitions.
>
> I have no desire to start a general discussion of nuclear
> physics.

Depends on what kind of spontaneous isotope decay you are talking
about.
I thought it intensely interesting that the real reason some
stuff decays is that it really has no real and actual location
as such until it does do something. Which can be decay thanks
to the fact it is temporarily located by random quantum
indeterminancy outside of the strong nuclear force's range.

Its not just that we cannot know the location, it actually
has no hard and fast location to know.

Which is bizarre when you think of it. Epicurus tried
to save free will from a determinate universe of atoms
by imagining every once in a while atoms swerved, thus
breaking strict determinancy, for which many laughed at
the ad hocism of the idea. He'd have loved quantum physics.

Particles with no real true location that sometimes decay because
of that fact kills strict Laplacian determinancy dead.

This also accounts for some bizarre double slit
experiment results.

[Bob]

On Thu, 13 Oct 2005 22:58:18 -0500, wbarwell <wbar...@mylinuxisp.com>
wrote:

>>>And we know that virtual
>>>particles do pop in and out of existance in pairs and mutually
>>>destroy themselves in vast numbers.

>> How do we know that? What is the direct experimental evidence?

>Yes. Google Casamir effect.

I don't need to - I already am familiar with the Casimir Effect.

The effect is explained by fluctuations, not virtual pair production.

>He calculated if you had two small plates and placed them close
>together, many VP photons pairs would be excluded from between
>the plates,

He did no such thing. He did not compute anything about "VP photon
pairs". He computed the result based on photons, not photon pairs.

[someone4]

>someone4 wrote:
>>So given the definition you supplied:
>>"Determinism is the proposition in physics that every physical event,
>>is causally determined by an unbroken chain of prior occurrences."

Bob wrote:
>I never supplied any such definition.

Yes you did, see
http://groups.google.com/group/alt.philosophy/browse_frm/thread/06649abc17bc9b2e/54eafdd01d8b0525#54eafdd01d8b0525

Under where I gave the definition from
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Determinism .

You said it was the definition according to QM. You now claim that
though QM doesn't actually fit the definition, that the definition is
wrong, and deny supplying it.

[snip rest of justification of why even though it doesn't fit the
definition of determinism that you supplied, but now deny, that QM is
determinisitic]

[someone4]

>someone4 wrote:
>>So given the definition you supplied:
>>"Determinism is the proposition in physics that every physical
event,
>>is causally determined by an unbroken chain of prior occurrences."
Bob wrote:
>I never supplied any such definition.

(sorry seemed to have previously posted wrong link)

[someone4]

>someone4 wrote:
>>So given the definition you supplied:
>>"Determinism is the proposition in physics that every physical
>>event,
>>is causally determined by an unbroken chain of prior occurrences."

Bob wrote:
>I never supplied any such definition.

Again sorry about the repeated posts, seem to be having trouble
supplying the correct link, hopefully this time it will work.

Yes you did, see
http://groups.google.com/group/alt.philosophy/msg/c3d868c4b9f87f15

[Bob]

On 14 Oct 2005 01:54:52 -0700, "someone4"
<glenn....@btinternet.com> wrote:

>>I never supplied any such definition.

>Yes you did, see
>http://groups.google.com/group/alt.philosophy/browse_frm/thread/06649abc17bc9b2e/54eafdd01d8b0525#54eafdd01d8b0525

That link is not pointing to the post you want.

Please repost the entire context of my statement.

Because of the confusion surrounding the use of vague terms like
determinism, I will concede that even I sometimes make a statement
that is not as clear as I want. I would rather we avoid using these
terms and concentrate on the real issue, which is casuality.
Ultimately what it comes down to is the justification of acasuality in
QM because of intrinsically unknown quantities. Notice I did not have
to use either the word "determinism" or "random".

By now you should know precisely what I mean by "intrinsically
unknowable", having spent the past week discussing just about every
aspect there is to discuss on this and other threads. Suffice it to
say that a quantity that is intrinsically unknowable is also correctly
described as being "truly random". But most importantly, it means
"uncomputable" in the Church-Turing sense and in the Chaitin sense
that no algorithm exists that is substantially smaller than the number
itself. IOW, these intrinsically unknowable quantities are that way
because there is no way to compute them. That means they are
irrelevent to the process under consideration, because they can't and
they don't contribute to the evolution of the wave function.

The real question revolves around causality. Forget about vague terms
like determinism, which has a different meaning in classical physics
than it does in quantum physics. Leave out the equally vague term
"random". Those terms only confuses things.

Does the existence of intrinsically unknowable quantities mean that
the process which is being considered acausal. I maintain that it does
not, that regardless of the existence of intrinsically unknowable
quantities, causality is fully operational. The process evolves
according to the wave function which is calculated using the
Schrodinger Equation which employs Unitary operators. The use of
Unitary operators guaranteed that causality is preserved in the wave
function.

In classical physics we can, in principle, calculate the cause and
effect behavior of every participant. But in QM we find that such
details are intrinsically unknowable as well as being irrelevant. It
makes no difference as far as the wave function is concerned which
particles are involved at the detailed level, as long as some
particles are involved. The fact that some particles are involved in
causal behavior is what preserves causality even when QM does not
provide the kinds of details we expect from classical processes.

If you have such a large number of Vacuum fluctuations that it appears
infinite compared to the Universe, then what possible difference does
it make which fluctuations are the cause of a particular instance of
radioactive decay? We know there must be some fluctuations
responsible, and since any one of those in the Vaccum qualify as
candidates for that role (as long as they obey the Schrodinger
Equation), it makes no difference which ones it is.

It makes no difference if Joe or Harry dipped Suzie's pigtails in the
ink well. Her hair is full of ink because some boy did it, and that
fact of reality makes no difference who the specific culprit is.

[Publius]

sp...@uce.gov (Bob) wrote in
news:434f9a0...@news-server.houston.rr.com:

> Because of the confusion surrounding the use of vague terms like
> determinism, I will concede that even I sometimes make a statement
> that is not as clear as I want. I would rather we avoid using these
> terms and concentrate on the real issue, which is casuality.
> Ultimately what it comes down to is the justification of acasuality in
> QM because of intrinsically unknown quantities. Notice I did not have
> to use either the word "determinism" or "random".

Way back near the beginning of this thread I suggested a terminology for
resolving this confusion. I.e., a system is:

1. *Strongly deterministic* if it is fully causal (all states of the system
are functions of previous states) AND those future states are predictable
in principle (future states could be predicted without exceeding the
resources available in the system). This is the "classical" (LaPlacian)
position;

2. *Weakly deterministic* if is is fully causal, but not predictable in
principle. This is the position adopted by most modern physicists;

3. *Very weakly deterministic* if it largely causal, but admits of some
uncaused events.

Now the problem is, if the system is not predictable (not strongly
deterministic), then unless the causes of all detected events are known
empirically, it is not possible to distinguish system #2 from system #3.

[Bob]

On Fri, 14 Oct 2005 08:09:41 -0500, Publius
<m.pu...@nospam.comcast.net> wrote:

>Way back near the beginning of this thread I suggested a terminology for
>resolving this confusion. I.e., a system is:

The problem is that for everyone else these ad hoc terms are more
confusing than the original. The best thing is not to use vague terms,
because they are not useful. Their use shows sloppy thinking.

[wbarwell]

Bob wrote:

> On Thu, 13 Oct 2005 22:58:18 -0500, wbarwell
> <wbar...@mylinuxisp.com> wrote:
>
>>>>And we know that virtual
>>>>particles do pop in and out of existance in pairs and
>>>>mutually destroy themselves in vast numbers.
>
>>> How do we know that? What is the direct experimental
>>> evidence?
>
>>Yes. Google Casamir effect.
>
> I don't need to - I already am familiar with the Casimir
> Effect.
>
> The effect is explained by fluctuations, not virtual pair
> production.

Not my understanding of how it works.
Since there is a small space between the plates, that excludes
photon VP pairs above a certain size from appearing there.
So there can be more VP photon pairs outside the plates.

It is strickly a matter of numbers of VP pairs.

Fluctuations is nonsense.

[wbarwell]

someone4 wrote:

QM is roughly deterministtic but not at all strictly
deterministic. It is deterministic in a statistical
sense only.

The point to all of this is strict determinism, LaPlace's
demon, the strict determinism of Stoic philosophy, is dead.

Epicurus was correct in his instincts if not his solution
to atomic determinism.

[Publius]

wbarwell <wbar...@mylinuxisp.com> wrote in news:11l0dsgftmco804
@corp.supernews.com:

> It is strickly a matter of numbers of VP pairs.
>
>
> Fluctuations is nonsense.

VPs and quantum fluctuations are both nonsense. Or at least, equally
nonsensical. They are hypothesized phenomena.

[Bob]

On Fri, 14 Oct 2005 18:14:45 -0500, wbarwell <wbar...@mylinuxisp.com>
wrote:

>> The effect is explained by fluctuations, not virtual pair
>> production.

>Not my understanding of how it works.

That's because you do not understand how it works.

There is no need to refer to any "VP photons". Ordinary individual
photons will work.

Why are we off on this VP tangent? Are you trying to argue acausality
from VP photons? Good luck.

[Bob]

On Fri, 14 Oct 2005 22:46:05 -0500, Publius
<m.pu...@nospam.comcast.net> wrote:

>> It is strickly a matter of numbers of VP pairs.

>> Fluctuations is nonsense.

>VPs and quantum fluctuations are both nonsense. Or at least, equally
>nonsensical. They are hypothesized phenomena.

The existence of Vacuum fluctuations is on pretty solid ground.

VP are another matter which I agree is hypothesized.
It is interesting to note that contemporary field theories do not rely
on virtual pairs.

In fact in electron-positron production, the two photons that create
them come from two separate processes in the Vacuum. Furthermore, the
only reason there are two photons involved is to satisfy conservation
laws, not because the Vacuum intrinsically is populated solely by
pairs.

[Bob]

On Fri, 14 Oct 2005 18:18:14 -0500, wbarwell <wbar...@mylinuxisp.com>
wrote:

>QM is roughly deterministtic but not at all strictly deterministic.

That is not scientific. What you want to say is that QM is "quantum
deterministic" but not "classical deterministic". I agree that
classical determinism is "stronger" than quantum determinism. But that
does not detract one bit from the importance of quantum determinism.

The thing that is "determined" in quantum determinism is the wave
function. It is well-defined for all time. The fact that it does not
allow you to reconstruct the detailed history of every event in the
process is a limitation imposed by the fact that such details are
intrinsically unknowable, not because they are acausal or
"non-deterministic" in the classical sense.

>It is deterministic in a statistical sense only.

That is not the way to state quantum determinism. Quantum determinism
is a property of the wave function, not the statistical interpretation
of its modulus. Everytime you try to force QM into a classical
paradigm, you are going to run into trouble. QM is not a classical
theory.

Anyway, there are classical systems that exhibit statistical
uncertainty - and some of them look almost identical to QM.

For example, put a million BBs in a 55 gallon drum with a small hole
in the side and rotate the drum. You will observe a constant rate of
BBs coming out the hole per unit time. But you cannot know which
particular BBs come out in advance.

That's because the process inside, although fully classical and
therefore philosophically deterministic, cannot be computed with any
machine we can build. For all effects and purposes, the process of BBs
coming out is uncomputable. There is no algorithm that will fit on a
computer less than the size of the entire Universe.

Yet the process inside is not quantum mechanical.

>The point to all of this is strict determinism, LaPlace's
>demon, the strict determinism of Stoic philosophy, is dead.

>Epicurus was correct in his instincts if not his solution
>to atomic determinism.

Those are not instances of quantum determinism.

[Dianelos Georgoudis]

Right, but does this mean that this stuff (i.e. virtual pairs) has also
real world existence? Does it objectively exist as a thing in itself?
Maybe it exists only as an idea inside the brains of physicists - an
idea useful for explaining observations - but virtual pairs may not
exist as real objects out there.

I would like to copy here text from a post by Publius dated Oct 15 in
this same thread:

wbarwell:

>> It is strickly a matter of numbers of VP pairs.
>> Fluctuations is nonsense.

Publius:

>VPs and quantum fluctuations are both nonsense. Or at least, equally
>nonsensical. They are hypothesized phenomena.

So are VPs and quantum fluctuations real or hypothetical? I claim that
the physicalist paradigm does not offer any objective way to decide and
leaves it pretty much open to subjective taste where one draws the line
between objective existents and conceptual models.

In fact the current discussion evidences some rather strong claims I
made in another post about the limitations of physicalism.
Incidentally, and before anybody's mental antibodies get provoked, I
would like to explain that by "spiritual paradigm" I simply mean a
paradigm of reality strictly based on reason and common experience; but
which incorporates not only our observations of the physical universe
but also the subjective sense of our consciousness. Here is a copy of
the relevant part:

Again, thinking as a physicalist, I am not sure whether I would claim
that the wave function of an electron exists. I can model reality (and
experimentally confirm my model) by using the wave function, but does
this mean that the wave function physically exists? And if it does not
physically exist, does it make sense to say that an electron physically
exists? It seems to me that contrary to what many people think the
question of existence is not so clear-cut in the physicalist paradigm.
If something can be objectively observed then it certainly objectively
exists, but electrons, for example, cannot be directly observed. So
things are more difficult than they seem in physicalism.

I guess what I am doing is turning the table on physicalism: Not only
does physicalism restrict one's knowledge about existents, but even on
its own subject matter of physical existence physicalism is far less
clear-cut than what many admirers of science think. Incidentally, for
me science is the intellectual enterprise of mathematically modeling
physical reality as we experience it - a practical enterprise as we
find it helps us control our physical environment. What really exists
and what doesn't remains the subject matter of the philosophical field
of ontology - and if one restricts oneself in the physicalist
paradigm the question of what physically exists becomes fuzzy.

What I claim here is rather strong. I am comparing two paradigms of
reality: the physicalist paradigm and the spiritual paradigm, and I
claim that the latter not only can explain much that the former can't,
but even - strikingly - that the latter gives a much more precise
meaning to what physically exists than the physicalist paradigm itself.

Nothing succeeds like success. My basic argument is that the spiritual
paradigm is more successful then the physicalist paradigm. This is a
little unfair because the spiritual paradigm cannot be any less
powerful than the physicalist paradigm, as it incorporates it. What
justifies the spiritual paradigm is that it has much more explanatory
power than the physicalist paradigm.

----

Here is the entire (long) post:
http://groups.google.com/group/aus.religion.christian/msg/b3043d83ae0e031c

[Bob]

On 15 Oct 2005 07:22:13 -0700, "Dianelos Georgoudis"
<dian...@tecapro.com> wrote:

>Publius:
>>VPs and quantum fluctuations are both nonsense. Or at least, equally
>>nonsensical. They are hypothesized phenomena.

>So are VPs and quantum fluctuations real or hypothetical?

If any of you knew any physics you would know what the quantum vacuum
was all about. It is the reservoir of Zero Point Motion of the quantum
fields.

In Quantum Electrodynamics, the quantum field consists of quantized
electromagnetic waves - photons. If the quantum number is zero, then
the EM field for that photon has a Zero Point Motion, which resides in
the Vacuum.

If the quantum field theory is about other physical entities, like
quarks or superstrings, then the quantum fields consist of those
entities appropriate to the theory.

There is no need to create pairs in the quantum field to produce
fluctuations. The fluctuations are caused by the Zero Point Motion.
The notion of pairs of particles came from an old theory by Dirac.

[Publius]

sp...@uce.gov (Bob) wrote in news:43513d01.10750375@news-
server.houston.rr.com:

>>>VPs and quantum fluctuations are both nonsense. Or at least, equally
>>>nonsensical. They are hypothesized phenomena.

>>So are VPs and quantum fluctuations real or hypothetical?

> If any of you knew any physics you would know what the quantum vacuum
> was all about. It is the reservoir of Zero Point Motion of the quantum
> fields.

You are merely substituting one hypothetical phenomenon for another.
Quantum fields and zero point motion are no more "real" than VPs or quarks
or impetus or evil humors which cause disease, for that matter. At least,
in the sense of "real" you are both using.

More in my response to DG, forthcoming in a few.

[Publius]

"Dianelos Georgoudis" <dian...@tecapro.com> wrote in
news:1129386133.2...@o13g2000cwo.googlegroups.com:

> So are VPs and quantum fluctuations real or hypothetical? I claim that
> the physicalist paradigm does not offer any objective way to decide
> and leaves it pretty much open to subjective taste where one draws the
> line between objective existents and conceptual models.

The physicalist paradigm (I know what you mean here, but some other readers
may not) does provide a way to decide. It is not, and cannot be, an
"objective" way, however, if by the "objective world" one means the world as
it exists independently of how we perceive it, or whether we perceive it.
That is because the only data we have is sense data --- the perceived
phenomena. We can observe patterns within that data; those patterns that seem
the most stable and to have the most depth (meaning that the patterns extend
across different sense modalities) are the most "real." They are our
criterion of "reality." Trees, rocks, dogs, apples, raindrops, other humans
are our paradigms of "real" things.

Other things can be "real" if they help us explain the paradigm "real"
things. So atoms, quarks, fields, vacuum fluctuations, circles, square roots,
imaginary numbers (numbers of all kinds), are "real" if they serve to explain
and thus allow us to anticipate future experience. They remain "real" as long
as they better serve that purpose than the entities postulated by any
alternative theory.

So we can decide whether a postulated entity or process is "real" or
hypothetical. It is hypothetical until it has demonstrated its predictive
power. It becomes "real" when it becomes the most powerful predictor we can
come up with, for the phenomena we're trying to explain with it.

[Bob]

On Sat, 15 Oct 2005 15:21:13 -0500, Publius
<m.pu...@nospam.comcast.net> wrote:

>Quantum fields and zero point motion are no more "real" than VPs or quarks
>or impetus or evil humors which cause disease, for that matter. At least,
>in the sense of "real" you are both using.

You don't care much for QM.

[Publius]

sp...@uce.gov (Bob) wrote in
news:4352019...@news-server.houston.rr.com:

>>Quantum fields and zero point motion are no more "real" than VPs or
>>quarks or impetus or evil humors which cause disease, for that matter.
>>At least, in the sense of "real" you are both using.
>
> You don't care much for QM.

Ah, but I do. I think QM is one of the best scientific theories we've
managed to cook up. See the response to DG.

[Bob]

On Sun, 16 Oct 2005 03:49:00 -0500, Publius
<m.pu...@nospam.comcast.net> wrote:

>> You don't care much for QM.

>Ah, but I do. I think QM is one of the best scientific theories we've
>managed to cook up. See the response to DG.

I should have said you don't care much for orthodox QM.

Otherwise why all the contortions?

[Dianelos Georgoudis]

So, you are saying that vacuum fluctuations are real, but that virtual
particles are not?

If so, how did you arrive to this knowledge? In other words what kind
of discipline of reason brought you to believe that A is real but B is
only conceptual and does not represent something that really exists?

[Dianelos Georgoudis]

For me determinism is a simple concept expressing the idea that the
future of a system is fixed, i.e. that there can be only one future for
there is only one possibility open for the system's evolution. For
example, some people (including Einstein) find reason to believe that
the physical universe is deterministic - our sense of free will and
what QM on its face says notwithstanding.

Causality seems to me to be a more synthetic notion, and therefore I
think it's a bad idea to define determinism in function of causality.
For example, one often reads that causality means that every event has
a previous cause. But a photon passing through the left slit in the two
slits experiment does have a previous cause, namely the shooting of the
photon. Nevertheless there are two possible futures: the photon passing
through the left or through the right slit. So a universe can be both
causal and non deterministic (according to the above definitions).
Therefore we must distinguish between two types of causality. The above
definition is about "necessary causality". It seems to me that
determinism is equivalent only to "sufficient causality", defined as
that every event has a previous cause that is sufficient (for bringing
about this event).

Taking all this into account I would like to suggest the following
definitions, in relation to any system (and observe that they do not
depend on the notion of causality):

1. Determinism means that the system can evolve only through one
future; i.e. the future of the system is fixed.

1a. Practically predictable determinism means that the system's future
is fixed and can be predicted in praxis.

1b. Theoretically predictable determinism means that the system's
future is fixed, but can only be predictable in principle, and not in
praxis. ("In principle" can mean "absolutely or logically impossible"
or merely "impossibly according to the resources and laws of physical
reality", so we could specify some sub-classes here.)

1c. Weakly predictable determinism means that the system's future is
fixed, but it is praxis possible to make some predictions about its
future (e.g. probabilistic predictions).

1d. Null predictable determinism means that the system's future is
fixed, but it is impossible, even in principle, to make any kind of
predictions.

2. Indeterminism means that the system can evolve through different
futures; i.e. the future of the system is not fixed.

2a. Null predictable indeterminism means that the system can evolve
through different futures and we can't predict anything about how it
will evolve even in principle.

2b. Theoretically predictable indeterminism means that the system can
evolve through different futures and that we can only in principle but
not in praxis predict some things about how it will evolve.

2c. Weakly predictable indeterminism means that even though the system
can evolve through different futures we can in praxis predict some
things about how it will evolve.

Examples I can think of:

Practically predictive determinism is found in counting, the decimal
expansion of pi up to a point, and in most systems of Newtonian
mechanics.

Theoretically predictable determinism is found in some mathematical
"undecidable" problems such as the halting problem.

Weakly predictable determinism is found in chaotic systems and in some
the interpretations of quantum mechanics.

I cannot find a good example of null predictable determinism. Maybe it
exists in some theological ideas of predetermination.

Absolute indeterminism is found in a fully random mathematical
variable, e.g. whether the tossing of a coin will come heads or tails.

I cannot find any example of theoretically predictable indeterminism.

Weakly predictable indeterminism is found in most mathematical models
of randomness (e.g. the tossing of a thousand coins), in statistical
models of physical reality, and in some interpretations of quantum
mechanics.

Now in the context of the physical universe, and depending on one's
ontological position about physical reality, modern science teaches
that that it is either a case of weakly predictable determinism or of
weakly predictable indeterminism. As far as calculations are concerned
the distinction is irrelevant.

Personally, and thinking from within the physicalist paradigm of
reality, I embrace the view of an indeterministic universe because:

a) It removes some problems related to free will. Consciousness is
already hard enough for physicalism to burden it with one more
problematic aspect.

b) It removes the requirement to assume that information was almost
infinitely compressed at the big bang.

c) It removes a contradiction I see with the second law of
thermodynamics.

d) It is more consistent with what at least superficially quantum
experiments tell us.

e) Does not avoid paradoxes in QM - nothing apparently does within
physicalism - but at least simplifies (for my taste) the understanding
of quantum mechanics.

f) Gives me a very elegant view of the physical universe: everything at
quantum sizes is random and acausal, and even so almost everything at
my size seems to be orderly and causal. Apparent physical order and
causality become emergent phenomena of a random and acausal reality. So
the world we observe ourselves seems highly orderly and even so in
principle everything remains possible, and everything can be broken
albeit at low probability. So there is a non-zero probability of the
statue of Liberty suddenly materializing in Tiananmen Square, and of
the moon suddenly turning into cheese. But if no physical facts are
absolutely certain, can physical laws be far behind? Now physics has
not yet been unified, but I speculate that no physical law is absolute,
so E=mc2 holds only probabilistically too. Not only is this fun, it
also resonates well with my sense of how a complex universe should be.
I wonder if some time down the road we might not find that a
deterministic universe following absolute laws cannot exceed some
particular measure of complexity.

[Bob]

On 17 Oct 2005 00:14:47 -0700, "Dianelos Georgoudis"
<dian...@tecapro.com> wrote:

>So, you are saying that vacuum fluctuations are real, but that virtual
>particles are not?

Pairs. The discussion is about the necessity for pairs in the vacuum.
While some processes require a pair of photons, not all processes do.
Radioactive decay does not.

>If so, how did you arrive to this knowledge? In other words what kind
>of discipline of reason brought you to believe that A is real but B is
>only conceptual and does not represent something that really exists?

Orthodox Quantum Field Theory.

There is a book that is accessible to the layman which explains QFT:

Quantum Field Theory in a Nutshell
By A. Zee
Princeton U. Press 2003
518 pages
ISBN: 0691010196

[Bob]

On 17 Oct 2005 02:47:02 -0700, "Dianelos Georgoudis"
<dian...@tecapro.com> wrote:

>For me determinism is a simple concept expressing the idea that the
>future of a system is fixed, i.e. that there can be only one future for
>there is only one possibility open for the system's evolution.

That's the classical definition of determinism, which applies to
classical systems in principle. But it is not the quantum definition.

In QM the wave function is claimed to be the repositiory of all
information about the system that can be known. It is deterministic
because the Schrodinger Equation is deterministic.

What that means is that the wave function has a value at every point
in time, which means that everything that can be known is known at
every point in time. The fact that there are intrinsically unknowable
quantities does not change the deterministic character of QM.

What you are struggling with is the fact that QM is radically
different from classical physics, not because it uses probability -
there are several classical theories that employ probability theory -
but because QM tells you in no uncertain terms that there are
quantities that are intrinsically unknowable.

The keyword here is "intrinsically". In classical physics it is
theoretically possible to know all quantities associated with a
classical process. Even the coin toss or the drum with BBs can be
fully known in principle. The use of probability in those instances is
a practical matter because there is not enough computing resources to
know everything even if it is knowable in principle.

But the picture is fundamentally different in QM. Here we have
quantities associated with a quantum process which are intrinsically
unknowable because QM tells us they are. Classical physics never tells
us that any quantity is unknown. But QM does, and that is one of the
most fundamental differences between the two.

But it gets even more fundamental. This is not just an epistemological
thing but an ontological thing. That's because these intrinsically
unknowable quantities are uncomputable. There is no basis in reality
for computing their values - no algorithm exists to make the
computation.

The reason there are intrinsically unknowable quantities in QM is
because there is no way to know them. That means that even God cannot
know them because they are ontologically unknowable. At least this is
what Existential Metaphysics tells us. Maybe there is some way for God
to know everything on the Supernatural level, but we don't have access
to that level. Anyway, if God could know what these values are, then
there would result a contradiction with QM - and we would not want
that, would we?

Because of the existence of intrinsically unknowable quantities in QM,
your classical definition of determinism is not applicable because it
relies on full knowledge of all quantities associated with a process.

Fluctuations in the vacuum are responsible for spontaneous emission
like simple radioactive decay, according to the Heitler model. These
fluctuations are the Zero Point Motion of the electromagnetic field.
The EM field pervades all of the Universe. Therefore in a very real
sense the time when a particular atom decays, which is intrinsically
unknowable according to QM, is determined by the EM field everywhere
in the Universe.

Indeed fluctuations local to the atom are the immediate cause of
decay, but those fluctuations arise because of other fluctuations
elsewhere in the vacuum, according to Quantum Field Theory. It is not
unreasonable to imagine that a hurricane destroys New Orleans because
of air fluctuations off the coast of West Africa earlier.

There is another physical entity that is caused by all the matter in
the Universe, more so by matter farther away than close. That is
inertia, and according to Mach's Theory of inertia, which was endorsed
by Big Al himself, the inertia we experience on Earth is largely due
to matter at the edge of our universe.

You can read about this in:

Gravitation and Inertia (Princeton Series in Physics)
by Ignazio Ciufolini, John Archibald Wheeler (Editor)
Hardcover - 498 pages (July 1995)
Princeton Univ Pr; ISBN: 0691033234

[Publius]

"Dianelos Georgoudis" <dian...@tecapro.com> wrote in

news:1129542422.1...@o13g2000cwo.googlegroups.com:

> For me determinism is a simple concept expressing the idea that the
> future of a system is fixed, i.e. that there can be only one future
> for there is only one possibility open for the system's evolution. For
> example, some people (including Einstein) find reason to believe that
> the physical universe is deterministic - our sense of free will and
> what QM on its face says notwithstanding.

That system would be "fully causal."

> Causality seems to me to be a more synthetic notion, and therefore I
> think it's a bad idea to define determinism in function of causality.
> For example, one often reads that causality means that every event has
> a previous cause. But a photon passing through the left slit in the
> two slits experiment does have a previous cause, namely the shooting
> of the photon. Nevertheless there are two possible futures: the photon
> passing through the left or through the right slit. So a universe can
> be both causal and non deterministic (according to the above
> definitions).

I think we are agreeing so far, in substance. But causality and determinism
are interdefined; one is not more "synthetic" than the other. There are
only two senses (as far as I know) in which the evolution of a system can
be said to be "fixed:" 1) if all events are caused by prior ones, or 2) all
events are scripted in advance. In the latter case state A is not the cause
of state B; A and B have nothing essential to do with each other. Rather,
both A and B are called for by the script. In the next run C could follow
A. None of the states are caused by any prior state. They are all
determined by the (external) script. So if you adopt predestination, you
can dispense with the notion of causality, except for the causal relation
between the script and the system ("God is the cause of all things").

If you don't like predestination, then you need causes operating inside the
system (events causing other events) for its evolution to be "fixed."

The system you describe above would be "very weakly deterministic" per the
def. I suggested. The system is causal, but not fully causal. Emitting the
photon is only a partial cause of the appearance of the photon at the left
slit. The remaining causal factors (if any) are unknown.

> Therefore we must distinguish between two types of
> causality. The above definition is about "necessary causality". It
> seems to me that determinism is equivalent only to "sufficient
> causality", defined as that every event has a previous cause that is
> sufficient (for bringing about this event).

"Sufficient causality" is the same thing I've been calling "fully causal"
(I think).

I think your defs do depend upon the notion of causality, but that it is
left implicit. If the evolution of the system is fixed, partly or
completely, something must fix it. What your defs do, though, is leave
predestination in the picture, while mine did not.

It is interesting, though, that all your defs depend upon predictability. I
think that (accurately) reflects the fact the without predictability, the
only way we can make sense of the concept of determinism is via
predestination. Bob, and physicists generally, wish to separate causality
from predictability.

> I cannot find a good example of null predictable determinism. Maybe it
> exists in some theological ideas of predetermination.

Ha! :-)

> I cannot find any example of theoretically predictable indeterminism.

Of course not. Indeterminism and unpredictability are related
biconditionally.

> Now in the context of the physical universe, and depending on one's
> ontological position about physical reality, modern science teaches
> that that it is either a case of weakly predictable determinism or of
> weakly predictable indeterminism. As far as calculations are concerned
> the distinction is irrelevant.

Yes. What matters is the degree of predictability. One can sensibly claim a
system is determined (fixed, fully causal) only to the extent that it is
predictable.

> Apparent physical order and
> causality become emergent phenomena of a random and acausal reality.

That is Zurek's view. Classical phenomena are emergent structures in a
random or chaotic substrate.

http://arxiv.org/pdf/quant-ph/0405161

> So the world we observe ourselves seems highly orderly and even so in
> principle everything remains possible, and everything can be broken
> albeit at low probability. So there is a non-zero probability of the
> statue of Liberty suddenly materializing in Tiananmen Square, and of
> the moon suddenly turning into cheese. But if no physical facts are
> absolutely certain, can physical laws be far behind? Now physics has
> not yet been unified, but I speculate that no physical law is
> absolute, so E=mc2 holds only probabilistically too. Not only is this
> fun, it also resonates well with my sense of how a complex universe
> should be. I wonder if some time down the road we might not find that
> a deterministic universe following absolute laws cannot exceed some
> particular measure of complexity.

The N-body problem should provide a clue.

[Dianelos Georgoudis]

Bob wrote:
> On 17 Oct 2005 00:14:47 -0700, "Dianelos Georgoudis"
> <dian...@tecapro.com> wrote:
>
> >So, you are saying that vacuum fluctuations are real, but that virtual
> >particles are not?
>
> Pairs. The discussion is about the necessity for pairs in the vacuum.
> While some processes require a pair of photons, not all processes do.
> Radioactive decay does not.
>
> >If so, how did you arrive to this knowledge? In other words what kind
> >of discipline of reason brought you to believe that A is real but B is
> >only conceptual and does not represent something that really exists?
>
> Orthodox Quantum Field Theory.

I thought that scientific theories only model reality, but make no
claims about what reality is "really" like. What in QFT justifies the
view that vacuum fluctations are real and not only a conceptual model?

> There is a book that is accessible to the layman which explains QFT:
>
> Quantum Field Theory in a Nutshell
> By A. Zee
> Princeton U. Press 2003
> 518 pages
> ISBN: 0691010196

Thanks for the reference, this seems to be an excellent book and I
shall try to read it - even though for me math is what is essential in
physics, so reading layman books without doing the math is for me like
reading the menu without tasting the food.

[Bob]

On Mon, 17 Oct 2005 16:43:09 -0500, Publius
<m.pu...@nospam.comcast.net> wrote:

>There are
>only two senses (as far as I know) in which the evolution of a system can
>be said to be "fixed:" 1) if all events are caused by prior ones, or 2) all
>events are scripted in advance. In the latter case state A is not the cause
>of state B; A and B have nothing essential to do with each other. Rather,
>both A and B are called for by the script.

That's called "correlation" and is a phenomenon of QM.

Pauli's Exclusion Principle prevents any two Fermions from occupying
the same quantum state at the same time. A Fermion can be identified
from its half-integer spin, such as an electron. Those particles with
full-integer spin, such as a photon, are called Bosons and can occupy
the same quantum state.

This property of Fermions leads to some extremely important physical
effects. One of them is the periodic table of the elements. Another is
"correlation" which, for example, alters the behavior of electrons in
metals and semiconductors. Correlation is a collective phenomenon - so
there is no way to identify which particle is responsible for the
behavior of any other particle.

This is why using the classical definition of determinism is confusing
in QM. That is why Quantum Determinism falls back on the wave function
for its meaning. As long as the wave function is well-defined for each
point in time, the system is deemed to be Quantum Deterministic.
That's because the wave function contains all the information about
the system that is knowable.

The fact that QM yields intrinsically unknowable quantities and
therefore makes classical determinism meaningless does not mean that
causality is not operative. In QM the notion of causality takes on a
different meaning than in classical physics. In QM causality generally
means that the wave function obeys the conservation laws. It does not
mean that we can know if particle A is directly responsible for the
behavior of particle B, because that is not how the wave function
describes the behavior of the system.

If want to know how a particular electron in a conductor or
semiconductor behaves, the best you can do is accept the results of QM
regarding the effects of correlation, among other things. The best you
can say is that the electron system comprised of all the electrons
behaved collectively in a particular manner which is called
correlation. It is not possible to require a classical description -
and it is wrong to conclude that because you can't that causality is
not operative.

Causality is fully operative but it is not the kind you are used to in
classical physics. Imagine that drum full of BBs hitting one another
as the drum rotates. When one of the BBs comes out of the drum thru
that small hole in the side, all you can really say is that the entire
collection of BBs inside caused that to happen. You know that there
was, however, a precise causal chain, but you cannot compute it
because there is no computer big enough to do the calculation.

In the case of QM, you cannot discover the causal chain because there
is no causal chain per se. What there is that is different from
classical physics is a cooperative effect of participants to cause the
effect. It is literally true that any particular radioactive atom
decays because of the cooperative effect of all the fluctuations in
the Vacuum. There is no A -> B -> C causal chain. There is only
{A,B,C...Z ad infinitum} acting collectively to cause the decay.

The fact that the discrete picture of classical physics is replaced by
the collective picture of QM is one of the fundamental reasons why QM
is to radically different from classical physics. But that's what
happens when you rely on a "wave" function to describe the behavior of
the system. These "waves" are collective, not discrete. The interact
with one another to all orders, whereas discrete particles are usually
restricted to nearest neighbors and perhaps a small distance beyond.

In a very real sense, when you witness something like the decay of a
radioactive atom, you can say that the reason that happened is because
of the collective behavior of the entire Universe. No longer is
causality confined to local settings. All the fluctuations in the
entire Vacuum are described by the wave function and therefore all you
can say is that all the fluctuations in the Vacuum CAUSED the decay to
happen.

You are never going to understand any of this if you continue to
insist that physical reality behave classically. Your classical
notions of determinism and causality are not going to work for QM. So
give it up and learn some real QM - then you will see that causality
is fully operative on a grand scale, namely the entire Universe
participates collectively thru the wave function to cause every single
event that happens.

There is another Universe-wide phenomenon in Relativity - inertia.
According to Mach's Principle, inertia is caused by the mass of the
entire Universe, and most of that inertia is caused by mass at the
outer extent of the Universe. The inertia due to our Galaxy alone is
extremely small.

So modern physics paints an entirely different picture of how the
Universe behaves, one which defies classical descriptions including
those of determinism and causality.

[Bob]

On 18 Oct 2005 00:29:24 -0700, "Dianelos Georgoudis"
<dian...@tecapro.com> wrote:

>I thought that scientific theories only model reality, but make no
>claims about what reality is "really" like.

That is one metaphysical school that mathematicians like.

If you adopt the Worldview of Existential Realism, then Existential
Metaphysics tells you that Physics is ontological as well as
epistemological. How else could physicists make such accurate
predictions if Physics were only a model?

>What in QFT justifies the
>view that vacuum fluctations are real and not only a conceptual model?

QFT alone does not justify anything. You must decide in advance what
Worldview you will adopt.

>for me math is what is essential in physics,

The entities in mathematics are not real objective entities. There is
no such thing as a Circle in real objective reality. But there is
something called an electron. It is very real.

Mathematics requires a subjective Worldview because its constructs are
in the mind. Physics requires an objective Worldview because its
constructs are in the real objective world.

Mathematics is necessary for physics to work but it is not sufficient.

>so reading layman books without doing the math is for me like
>reading the menu without tasting the food.

There is plenty of mathematics in that book.

[Dianelos Georgoudis]

Well, I agree with you in the particulars, but it seems to me that this
is not what physicalism is about. I would like to suggest the following
definition:

Physicalism is the view that everything that exists is ultimately
physical, i.e. consists of or is reducible to matter in some form and
configuration within physical space and time. Matter can have the form
of energy too, or maybe of fields. Further, configurations of matter
can be very complex. For example in the brain we have beside of
hundreds of billions of synapses, electrochemical processes and
signals, electrical fields and, who knows, maybe quantum level physical
phenomena - all going on at the same time in some extremely complex
organization.

Now, as a practical matter, I have found that when one asks a
physicalist whether numbers exist, the answer is yes, but only as
physical instantiations within the brains of people. For example I have
found that physicalists agree with the statement "When the last
intelligent being dies numbers will disappear too". In other words,
things such as numbers, justice, beauty, redness exist, yes, but only
within the brains of people. For something really to exist, it must
exist not only as an idea instantiated as some physical configuration
or process within the brains of people, but must exist by itself -
completely independently of the state or even the existence of brains.
So, for a typical physicalist, numbers, justice, beauty and redness do
not "really" exist, while stones, apples and the moon "really" exist.

My argument is that physicalism in this sense is an incoherent
ontological position, even a grossly incoherent one. For example if
one's subjective sense of redness is of something that does not really
exist, it means that we pass most of our waking life being aware of
things that do not really exist. Even worse, I claim that physicalism
does not offer any way to distinguish what really exists (i.e. exists
outside of peoples' brains) except maybe in the most trivial cases. The
reason is that as a matter of fact physical science throughout history
has made different claims about physical existents. For example Newton
said that there exists a gravitations force field in flat space,
Einstein that there exists curved space and no force field, and a
future scientist may claim that what exists is a fractal space full of
quivering dodecagons. As in physicalism things that really exist are
not supposed to go in and out of existence depending of the discovery
of the latest scientific theory this implies that all these existents
claimed by science must exist only inside the scientists' brains. This
of course includes the wave function which according to quantum
mechanics describes the electron. But then, in what sense does the
electron really exist? One physicalist may of course claim that
electrons really exist, but then another can claim that electrons only
exist as ideas inside the brains of scientists, who, after all, make
some pretty crazy claims about the properties of electrons. How is a
third physicalist to decide between the two views? As you have found
out yourself there are physicalists who claim that a hurricane is not
something that really exists, but only exists as an idea within peoples
brains - who recognize a pattern in weather photos. There are even
some physicalists who claim that our subjective awareness of free will
is an illusion, and that even consciousness is an illusion. Others
insist that the most esoteric and strange of scientific ideas, such the
multiverse, represent things that really exist.

So, I posit the fact (easily evidenced by the discussions in such
forums as alt.atheism) that physicalists do not agree between
themselves what really exists and what not, and that physicalism does
not offer a way to decide what exists and what not. I claim that the
latter is not some kind of temporary failure of physicalism, or maybe a
sign that most physicalists have not studied physicalism well enough,
but that physicalism makes it impossible to define a way to distinguish
between what exists by itself and what only exists as an idea in
peoples' brains. Here is how I justify this claim: If all physicalists
accept that there is even one thing that only exists inside peoples'
brains then any physicalist can claim that similarly any other thing
exists only inside peoples' brains. Now, all physicalists accept that
Santa Claus only exists inside peoples' brains. The fact that some
people, namely children, find in the existence of Santa Claus a good
explanation for what they experience is irrelevant. Therefore, the fact
that scientists find in the existence of electrons a good explanation
of what they experience is equally irrelevant. In both cases the
phenomena are real, but the explanations can be construed as being only
conceptual. Similarly then anything whose existence is claimed only
based on its explanatory power can be construed as existing only inside
peoples' brains where such explanations are formed. Of course any
existents of not obvious explanatory power, such as beauty, can also be
construed as existing only inside peoples' brains. Which leads us back
to the possible existence of such directly experienced things as
stones, apples and the moon. I could rest my case here and concede that
physicalism is coherent at least in its claim that these directly
visible things really exist - but I think I can justify an even
stronger claim. After all, physicalism implies that we may all
experience the world as brains in a vat, or even from inside a computer
simulation. The former case implies that not even stones, apples and
the moon need exist outside of our brains (and that our brains may be
very different from what we think), and the latter case implies that
not even our brains need physically exist.

Now, when confronted with the above argument a physicalist may answer
thus: "I is true that in physicalism no one thing necessarily exists as
a matter of logic, but this does not mean that a physicalist cannot
make a reasonable decision about what really exists and what not.
Physicalism is not an automatic system, but requires the application of
reason. By applying reason all physicalists agree that Santa Claus does
not exist and virtually all physicalists agree that stones exist, i.e.
that we do not exist as brains in a vat or inside a computer
simulation. The latter is not proved in any logical sense in
physicalism, but is judged by almost all physicalist as the most
reasonable belief."

To which I would answer that in this case physicalism is either
incoherent or ultimately based on subjective judgment and belief. Both
possibilities explain why physicalists do not now and will never be
able to agree between themselves about what really exists. After all
there is at least one physicalist, you have some time back pointed out
to me, who argues that our existence inside a computer simulation is
the most reasonable belief.

Leaving physicalism behind, I find that our ontological view (in the
sense that the recognition of patterns in our experience justifies
existence) has the huge advantage that it opens up a way for objective
agreement about what exists and what not - as long as we
axiomatically accept that we all basically experience life in the same
way and possess the same ability for pattern recognition. So we agree
that apples, numbers, electrons, hurricanes, physical laws, and beauty
exist - and we may even come to agree that God exists. Also our
ontology gives us the possibility of pushing things in and out of
existence depending on the discovery of stronger or more overarching
patterns - something that does in fact happen both in personal life
and in the history of humanity.

In short, whereas physicalism does not offer an objective way to decide
existence, our ontology does. Incidentally I am not well versed in the
various -isms. Isn't our ontology, which basically says: "Something
exists if it is a pattern we detect in our experience", idealism?

[Publius]

"Dianelos Georgoudis" <dian...@tecapro.com> wrote in

news:1129655429.5...@g49g2000cwa.googlegroups.com:

> Now, as a practical matter, I have found that when one asks a
> physicalist whether numbers exist, the answer is yes, but only as
> physical instantiations within the brains of people. For example I
> have found that physicalists agree with the statement "When the last
> intelligent being dies numbers will disappear too". In other words,
> things such as numbers, justice, beauty, redness exist, yes, but only
> within the brains of people. For something really to exist, it must
> exist not only as an idea instantiated as some physical configuration
> or process within the brains of people, but must exist by itself -
> completely independently of the state or even the existence of brains.
> So, for a typical physicalist, numbers, justice, beauty and redness do
> not "really" exist, while stones, apples and the moon "really" exist.

That is somewhat different from what I'd thought you meant by
"physicalism." I'd thought you used that term for those who held that all
of "reality" could located on the "physical plane" (the usual 4-
dimensional spatiotemporal coordinate framework), in contrast to your 2-
plane theory, which adds a spiritual plane.

The view you describe above is pretty standard materialism, which often
goes hand in hand with naive realism. And of course I agree that those
are not tenable positions.

> As you have found out yourself there are physicalists who claim that a
> hurricane is not something that really exists, but only exists as an
> idea within peoples brains - who recognize a pattern in weather
> photos.

Heh. Wasn't that wild?

> After
> all, physicalism implies that we may all experience the world as
> brains in a vat, or even from inside a computer simulation. The former
> case implies that not even stones, apples and the moon need exist
> outside of our brains (and that our brains may be very different from
> what we think), and the latter case implies that not even our brains
> need physically exist.

You may be interested in "Simulation Argument? Not!", here:

http://www.newliberalreview.com

> Leaving physicalism behind, I find that our ontological view (in the
> sense that the recognition of patterns in our experience justifies
> existence) has the huge advantage that it opens up a way for objective
> agreement about what exists and what not - as long as we
> axiomatically accept that we all basically experience life in the same
> way and possess the same ability for pattern recognition. So we agree
> that apples, numbers, electrons, hurricanes, physical laws, and beauty
> exist - and we may even come to agree that God exists. Also our
> ontology gives us the possibility of pushing things in and out of
> existence depending on the discovery of stronger or more overarching
> patterns - something that does in fact happen both in personal life
> and in the history of humanity.

Agreed. "To be is to be the value of a bound variable in a theory with
more explanatory power than any available alternative theory." So what is
real and not real will change with the power and sophistication of our
explanations. But the paradigm "real" things --- apples, stones, and the
like --- will not likely change unless we or the world changes
drastically.

> In short, whereas physicalism does not offer an objective way to
> decide existence, our ontology does. Incidentally I am not well versed
> in the various -isms. Isn't our ontology, which basically says:
> "Something exists if it is a pattern we detect in our experience",
> idealism?

Sort of. But classical idealism does not tie the reality of patterns
(concepts, ideas) to their explanatory value. This is more Kantian
idealism. That view argues that there is an external world out there, of
some sort, but we can never know how faithfully our conceptual picture
represents it. It is the "noumena;" but all we can ever observe are
phenomena. So why then postulate it? Because without it, we have no
prospect of explaining the phenomena.

[andy-k]

> But classical idealism does not tie the reality of patterns
> (concepts, ideas) to their explanatory value. This is more Kantian
> idealism. That view argues that there is an external world out there, of
> some sort, but we can never know how faithfully our conceptual picture
> represents it. It is the "noumena;" but all we can ever observe are
> phenomena. So why then postulate it? Because without it, we have no
> prospect of explaining the phenomena.

There seems to be some sleight of hand here -- sort of like "let's pretend
we have an explanation" inexplicably becomes "we have an explanation".

[Dutch]

"Publius" <m.pu...@nospam.comcast.net> wrote
> "Dianelos Georgoudis" <dian...@tecapro.com> wrote
>

>> Now, as a practical matter, I have found that when one asks a
>> physicalist whether numbers exist, the answer is yes, but only as
>> physical instantiations within the brains of people. For example I
>> have found that physicalists agree with the statement "When the last
>> intelligent being dies numbers will disappear too". In other words,
>> things such as numbers, justice, beauty, redness exist, yes, but only
>> within the brains of people.

> The view you describe above is pretty standard materialism, which often

> goes hand in hand with naive realism. And of course I agree that those
> are not tenable positions.

Sorry to burst in here, but could you explain briefly, why is that view not
tenable? It seems correct to me. Another example of things that exist only
in the brains of people are "rights". What is the alternative view of such
things? Please use plain english, I'm not familar with philosphical
terminology.

[Publius]

sp...@uce.gov (Bob) wrote in
news:4354f184...@news-server.houston.rr.com:

> If want to know how a particular electron in a conductor or
> semiconductor behaves, the best you can do is accept the results of QM
> regarding the effects of correlation, among other things. The best you
> can say is that the electron system comprised of all the electrons
> behaved collectively in a particular manner which is called
> correlation. It is not possible to require a classical description -
> and it is wrong to conclude that because you can't that causality is
> not operative.
>
> Causality is fully operative but it is not the kind you are used to in
> classical physics.

I have snipped much of the QM stuff because I have no quarrel with it.

The problem here is that both causality and determinism are classical
concepts. The concept of causality holds that a distinct, discriminable
event may have a distinct, discriminable cause. For two events related in
that way, the causal event, when fully specified, is *sufficient* to
produce the effect --- it will yield the effect each and every time. It
is not *necessary* to produce the effect, since a given effect may have
more than one cause.

We have fully specified a cause when we can produce the desired effect
with it on each and every trial. Once we are able to do that, any further
specification of the causal event would be superfluous.

Determinism, classically understood, is the thesis that *every*
determinate, discriminable event has a cause, as defined above. Hence for
every event E we are able to discriminate (distinguish from another
event), we should be able to find a corresponding distinct, discriminable
causal event C, and we should be able to specify that causal event
precisely enough to reliably generate E. It is not enough to specify C
with only enough precision that we can reliably generate some one of a
set of events, say, E1 through E10. As long as we can distinguish among
E1, E2, and the other members of that set, until we can select exactly
which one will be produced, we have not fully specified C for those E's.

Causality does not imply determinism. Determinism is a metaphysical or
scientific thesis about causality. Denying determinism does not entail
denying causality; denying determinism is only to deny what the
determinist thesis specifically states: that each and every discriminable
event has distinct, discriminable cause.

What distinguishes metaphysical from scientific determinism (classically
understood) is predictability. Being able to predict an event given a
prior event is a substitute for actually observing the relationship
between the two events. If we have a method for predicting events, and we
validate that method by observing that events occur as predicted (all
that we try), then we have grounds for believing other events within the
scope of the method are determinate as well. In other words, we have a
theory that passes every test we give it.

If we can neither observe the causal antecedent of an event, nor reliably
predict those events with a validated theory, then continuing to claim
they have causes (that they are determined) ceases to be a scientific
thesis. It is only a metaphysical one.

The problem (from the point of view of classical determinism) with QM is
that it does not specify causal events precisely enough. We can specify a
cause for a set of events. But we cannot select which member of that set
the cause will yield. Yet, we can discriminate among those members; we
can tell them apart. So from a classical point of view, that cause has
not been fully specified.

I understand (as does DG, I'm sure) what "quantum determinism" states and
implies. But the method underdetermines outcomes. It does not permit us
to predict which slit the photon will pass through on each and every
trial, for each and every photon. It can predict a great deal, but until
it can predict each and every discriminable event, we are not entitled to
conclude that the system is (classically) deterministic.

Now I'm sure you'll agree that the system is not classically
deterministic; you'll say that it is quantum deterministic. And so it is.
But quantum determinism is a rather less bold and thus less interesting
thesis.

There is a way, however, to preserve for quantum determinism all the
"boldness" of classical determinism. That would happen if it could never
make any difference which slit the photon passes through --- that all
events "downline" from the passage through the slit must be the same,
regardless of which slit is traversed. (That was the point of my cat
example, not superimposed states ala Copenhagen). Would you argue that is
the case?

> You are never going to understand any of this if you continue to
> insist that physical reality behave classically.

No! The universe, to all appearances, does NOT behave classically. That
is a given. We do not disagree about that. The only thing we are
disagreeing about is whether we can properly describe it using such
classical terms as "deterministic" and even "causality." Rather than try
to redefine those terms, as some QM theorists wish to do, better to admit
(it seems to me) that the universe is indeterminsitic and that some
events may not have causes. And then accept it for what it is.

> So modern physics paints an entirely different picture of how the
> Universe behaves, one which defies classical descriptions including
> those of determinism and causality.

Agreed. :-)

[Publius]

"andy-k" <spam.free@last> wrote in
news:_3n5f.612$m4...@newsfe2-win.ntli.net:

> There seems to be some sleight of hand here -- sort of like "let's
> pretend we have an explanation" inexplicably becomes "we have an
> explanation".

It does seem that way, doesn't it?

But an external world of some sort is demanded by the logic of explanation
itself. Explanation consists of relating causes to effects. That is all
explanation is. For most of the phenomena we experience, no cause for them
is apparent within experience itself. So if we wish to explain them, we
must postulate causes lying outside of experience.

If we have no interest in explaining our experience, then we can forego the
"noumena."

[Publius]

"Dutch" <n...@email.com> wrote in news:11lc15e...@news.supernews.com:

>> The view you describe above is pretty standard materialism, which
>> often goes hand in hand with naive realism. And of course I agree
>> that those are not tenable positions.
>
> Sorry to burst in here, but could you explain briefly, why is that
> view not tenable? It seems correct to me. Another example of things
> that exist only in the brains of people are "rights". What is the
> alternative view of such things? Please use plain english, I'm not
> familar with philosphical terminology.

Did you read DG's post? He gave several reasons.

Rights are theoretical constructs, just like triangles, numbers, quarks,
electromagnetic fields, etc. They are "real" if they have explanatory
power.

[Roger Johansson]

Publius wrote:

> Rights are theoretical constructs, just like triangles, numbers, quarks,
> electromagnetic fields, etc. They are "real" if they have explanatory
> power.

Rights are only real if the people vote for it, in a democracy.

In other forms of government rights are real only if
the army and the police back them up with violence.

--
Roger J.

[andy-k]

> But an external world of some sort is demanded by the logic of explanation
> itself. Explanation consists of relating causes to effects. That is all
> explanation is. For most of the phenomena we experience, no cause for them
> is apparent within experience itself. So if we wish to explain them, we
> must postulate causes lying outside of experience.

What's your view on Hume's treatment of causation?

[Bob]

On 19 Oct 2005 04:24:18 -0700, "Roger Johansson" <roge...@gmail.com>
wrote:

>> Rights are theoretical constructs, just like triangles, numbers, quarks,
>> electromagnetic fields, etc. They are "real" if they have explanatory
>> power.

>Rights are only real if the people vote for it, in a democracy.

Please, would you look up what is meant by the term "democracy" before
you banty it about. Plato considered democracy to the the last stage
before tyranny (cf. The Republic, Book XIII).

Essential rights are based on man's nature. The right to survival is
based on the fact that man is alive.

What you are attempting to talk about is justice. It is not democracy
which protects rights, it is Common Law. Under Common Law, the
legitimacy of any man-made law is based on the consent of the
governed. There is no voting involved.

>In other forms of government rights are real only if
>the army and the police back them up with violence.

That's what Chairman Mao said, "Justice is at the end of a gun
barrel."

BTW, America is a fascist dictatorship, not a democracy, not even a
constitutional republic anymore. Read the 14th Amendment and see why.

--

If you build a man a fire and he will be warm for a day. If you
set a man on fire, he will be warm for the rest of his life.

[Bob]

On Wed, 19 Oct 2005 03:54:50 -0500, Publius
<m.pu...@nospam.comcast.net> wrote:

>> Causality is fully operative but it is not the kind you are used to in
>> classical physics.

>The problem here is that both causality and determinism are classical
>concepts.

The problem is you insist on claiming that causality and determinism
are only classical concepts. You won't accept the fact that quantum
causality and quantum determinism are perfectly well defined.

Once you overcome this problem, you will begin understanding what
causality and determinism in QM are all about. Until then, you will
continue to thrash about like a fish out of water.

[Bob]

On Wed, 19 Oct 2005 03:54:50 -0500, Publius
<m.pu...@nospam.comcast.net> wrote:

>The concept of causality holds that a distinct, discriminable
>event may have a distinct, discriminable cause.

That's the classical meaning - it is not the quantum meaning.

In QM there are no "distinct, discriminable" anything. That's because
the evolution of the system is determined by the wave function, which
takes all possible contributing factors into account at the same time.

>The problem (from the point of view of classical determinism) with QM is
>that it does not specify causal events precisely enough.

You have stated that backwards. The correct statement is that QM
specifies all that can be known about a system. If QM does not specify
a quantity, then it is because that quantity cannot be specified.

QM tell us that there are intrinsically unknowable quantities, but we
don't accept it because we insist on hanging on to the old classical
picture of the Universe where in principle we are able to know
everything we want to know about a process. QM says that for certain
processes, called "quantum mechanical processes" that is not possible.

That is not just an epistemological statement but an ontological
statement as well. The intrinsic unknowability is not a flaw of QM, it
is an ontological fact of the real objective world. The reason for
intrinsically unknowable quantities is because there is no algorithm
for doing the computation. Reality does not yield information about
intrinsically unknowable quantities because there is no information
possible.

The process involved is such that the intrinsically unknowable
quantity is irrelevant. For example, it makes no difference to the
process of radioactive decay which particular atoms decay, only that
some atoms decay. That is not true for classical processes where the
exact details of A -> B -> C are crucial to the process. QM says that
some quantities are not important in detail.

We can specify a
>cause for a set of events. But we cannot select which member of that set
>the cause will yield. Yet, we can discriminate among those members; we
>can tell them apart. So from a classical point of view, that cause has
>not been fully specified.

You are thinking backwards. Instead of attempting to focus on what you
claim is a single cause and then track it to the single event is
causes, in QM you must accept that the entire set of all causes is
responsible for the event. All the fluctuations of the Vacuum
participate in the decay process. The wave function is the sum of all
causes.

>But quantum determinism is a rather less bold and thus less interesting
>thesis.

That's only because you do not understand QM.

Try calculating the energy lineshape for photons emitted in
radioactive decay using classical methods. You can't do it. Yet QM
rather easily provides the answer, a Lorentzian lineshape with a width
parameter related to the reciprocal half-life of the isotope.

Quantum determinism is far more interesting than classical
determinism.

[Roger Johansson]

Bob wrote:

> >Rights are only real if the people vote for it, in a democracy.

> Please, would you look up what is meant by the term "democracy" before

I have worked for democracy all my life and I know what it
means in real life.

If you live in a politically and culturally backward part of the world
you may not have such clear concepts in political matters.
Then you can learn from others, see how they use words like democracy.

> you banty it about. Plato considered democracy to the the last stage
> before tyranny (cf. The Republic, Book XIII).

What he considered 200 years ago has no influence on how
we see democracy in the modern world.

> Essential rights are based on man's nature. The right to survival is
> based on the fact that man is alive.

Playing with words now again?

If you are alone in a jungle with real lions you have no right to live,
no matter if you are alive or not.

The rights you have in society are based on what laws we have
created and which we defend with the help of police and army.

> >In other forms of government rights are real only if
> >the army and the police back them up with violence.

> That's what Chairman Mao said, "Justice is at the end of a gun
> barrel."

He was right about that, of course. The ultimate power in
the creationist world is violence.

As long as the capitalists enjoy the protection of the state
they have property rights which are upheld with violence.

When the people create a consitution and laws to protect your
rights in a democratic society you have the rights this democracy
gives you.

> BTW, America is a fascist dictatorship, not a democracy, not even a
> constitutional republic anymore. Read the 14th Amendment and see why.

Have the american people educated themselves and have the people
taken power, have they created the rights they want in a society?

> If you build a man a fire and he will be warm for a day. If you
> set a man on fire, he will be warm for the rest of his life.

All these men set on fire are spreading a lot of fear and violence,
social domination and opression of less speeded people,
so please stop setting men on fire.

Creating speeded minds in men's heads is creationism, and it
has destroyed the world for thousands of years.

We are trying hard to abolish this creationist religion, so stop
spreading it.

--
Roger J.

[Bob]

On 19 Oct 2005 06:32:01 -0700, "Roger Johansson" <roge...@gmail.com>
wrote:

>If you are alone in a jungle with real lions you have no right to live,

>no matter if you are alive or not.

Of course I have the essential right to live in that setting. The fact
that the lions are capable of infringing on that right does not mean I
do not have it.

>The rights you have in society are based on what laws we have
>created and which we defend with the help of police and army.

Seig Heil! Spoken like a true Statist.

Where I live our essential rights do not depend on any godless
collectivist state.

>When the people create a consitution and laws to protect your
>rights in a democratic society you have the rights this democracy
>gives you.

The state does not grant essential rights.

Come to East Texas and try spouting that commie crap in a bar on
Saturday night. You will find yourself chained to the back of a
pickup.

--

[Matt Silberstein]

On 18 Oct 2005 10:10:29 -0700, in alt.atheism , "Dianelos Georgoudis"
<dian...@tecapro.com> in
<1129655429.5...@g49g2000cwa.googlegroups.com> wrote:

[snip]

>
>Physicalism is the view that everything that exists is ultimately
>physical, i.e. consists of or is reducible to matter in some form and
>configuration within physical space and time. Matter can have the form
>of energy too, or maybe of fields. Further, configurations of matter
>can be very complex. For example in the brain we have beside of
>hundreds of billions of synapses, electrochemical processes and
>signals, electrical fields and, who knows, maybe quantum level physical
>phenomena - all going on at the same time in some extremely complex
>organization.
>
>Now, as a practical matter, I have found that when one asks a
>physicalist whether numbers exist, the answer is yes, but only as
>physical instantiations within the brains of people. For example I have
>found that physicalists agree with the statement "When the last
>intelligent being dies numbers will disappear too". In other words,
>things such as numbers, justice, beauty, redness exist, yes, but only
>within the brains of people. For something really to exist, it must
>exist not only as an idea instantiated as some physical configuration
>or process within the brains of people, but must exist by itself -
>completely independently of the state or even the existence of brains.
>So, for a typical physicalist, numbers, justice, beauty and redness do
>not "really" exist, while stones, apples and the moon "really" exist.

I have just stepped in here and don't know any of the background in
this thread. That said, your last statement is wrong. I am a
physicalist, justice et. al. exist, they really exist, but they exist
as concepts instantiated in human brains.

>My argument is that physicalism in this sense is an incoherent
>ontological position, even a grossly incoherent one. For example if
>one's subjective sense of redness is of something that does not really
>exist, it means that we pass most of our waking life being aware of
>things that do not really exist.

The incoherence comes from your error about physicalism, not from the
ontology. Redness exists, but it is a judgment people make. What is
incoherent, IMO, is the notion that "redness" has an existence
separate from any physical objects.

>Even worse, I claim that physicalism
>does not offer any way to distinguish what really exists (i.e. exists
>outside of peoples' brains) except maybe in the most trivial cases.

Why is existing inside brains not real?

>The
>reason is that as a matter of fact physical science throughout history
>has made different claims about physical existents. For example Newton
>said that there exists a gravitations force field in flat space,
>Einstein that there exists curved space and no force field, and a
>future scientist may claim that what exists is a fractal space full of
>quivering dodecagons. As in physicalism things that really exist are
>not supposed to go in and out of existence depending of the discovery
>of the latest scientific theory this implies that all these existents
>claimed by science must exist only inside the scientists' brains.

The simplest answer is that we were wrong about how we thought things
work. The world is what the world is, our thinking about that does not
change it. For a more detailed answer look at some modern philosophy
of science. It is to some large extent for a scientist to say, in the
context you are talking about, that gravity exists. In modern
terminology I would say that "gravity" is the best current explanation
for the observations. If and when we learn more we will change the
explanation. The reality does not change due to our increased
knowledge.

> This
>of course includes the wave function which according to quantum
>mechanics describes the electron. But then, in what sense does the
>electron really exist? One physicalist may of course claim that
>electrons really exist, but then another can claim that electrons only
>exist as ideas inside the brains of scientists, who, after all, make
>some pretty crazy claims about the properties of electrons.

You have now pretty much lost any connection to physicalism.
"Electron" is a human concept delineating things in the world for our
comprehension and prediction. "Electron" is our conceptualization of
stuff *in the world*. That thing over there (pointing furiously)
exists, so does that (pointing elsewhere). Our naming does not change
that.

>How is a
>third physicalist to decide between the two views? As you have found
>out yourself there are physicalists who claim that a hurricane is not
>something that really exists,

Where did someone say that?

>but only exists as an idea within peoples
>brains - who recognize a pattern in weather photos.

"Hurricane" is a name we give to particular patterns of weather. The
weather exists no matter what we call it and no matter if we observe
it or not. There is no sharp distinction in the world between a
tropical depression, a tropical storm, and a hurricane. In that
restricted sense hurricanes don't exist, there is just weather and we
name, for our convenience, particular sets. Hurricane is a storm out
over the ocean, "Hurricane" is a concept instantiated in human brains.
Both are physical things and have physical existence. The error comes
when people think that "hurricane" ("red", "justice", etc.) has an
existence outside of both the things and humans.

>There are even
>some physicalists who claim that our subjective awareness of free will
>is an illusion,

What do you mean "even"? The question of whether or not free will is
an illusion pre-dates physicalism by some centuries.

>and that even consciousness is an illusion.

And others, myself for instance, who says that free will and
consciousness is clearly real and physical. Free will and
consciousness is something we humans have. Now as to the real and not
imagined qualities of free will and consciousness, that is a different
question. That I see myself as an entity with free will does not mean
that the world is not deterministic. Which is still a question that is
separate from physicalism.

>Others
>insist that the most esoteric and strange of scientific ideas, such the
>multiverse, represent things that really exist.

So maybe you have found questions that have nothing to do with
physicalism.

>So, I posit the fact (easily evidenced by the discussions in such
>forums as alt.atheism) that physicalists do not agree between
>themselves what really exists and what not, and that physicalism does
>not offer a way to decide what exists and what not.

What a surprise. Physicalism is an ontological position, it is a view
on what it means to exist, not on what does exist.

>I claim that the
>latter is not some kind of temporary failure of physicalism, or maybe a
>sign that most physicalists have not studied physicalism well enough,
>but that physicalism makes it impossible to define a way to distinguish
>between what exists by itself and what only exists as an idea in
>peoples' brains.

The world is what the world is, human concepts about the world are
human concepts about the world. Physicalism gives you a very useful
way to make that distinction, what it says is that those are the only
two useful options.

>Here is how I justify this claim: If all physicalists
>accept that there is even one thing that only exists inside peoples'
>brains then any physicalist can claim that similarly any other thing
>exists only inside peoples' brains.

I have no idea why that follows.

> Now, all physicalists accept that
>Santa Claus only exists inside peoples' brains. The fact that some
>people, namely children, find in the existence of Santa Claus a good
>explanation for what they experience is irrelevant.

The existence of Santa Claus is not an ontological position, it is
something to learn from observing the world itself. People, even
physicalists, can be wrong.

>Therefore, the fact
>that scientists find in the existence of electrons a good explanation
>of what they experience is equally irrelevant. In both cases the
>phenomena are real, but the explanations can be construed as being only
>conceptual.

You got that right. The phenomena is real, our concepts are our
concepts.

>Similarly then anything whose existence is claimed only
>based on its explanatory power can be construed as existing only inside
>peoples' brains where such explanations are formed.

But the phenomena will still exist no matter what explanations we
have.

>Of course any
>existents of not obvious explanatory power, such as beauty, can also be
>construed as existing only inside peoples' brains.

Where do you suggest it exists?

>Which leads us back
>to the possible existence of such directly experienced things as
>stones, apples and the moon. I could rest my case here and concede that
>physicalism is coherent at least in its claim that these directly
>visible things really exist - but I think I can justify an even
>stronger claim. After all, physicalism implies that we may all
>experience the world as brains in a vat, or even from inside a computer
>simulation.

There is nothing in physicalism that particularly supports such
solipsistic notions. The problem of brains in a vat exists no matter
what ontological assertions you wish to make.

>The former case implies that not even stones, apples and
>the moon need exist outside of our brains (and that our brains may be
>very different from what we think), and the latter case implies that
>not even our brains need physically exist.
>
>Now, when confronted with the above argument a physicalist may answer
>thus: "I is true that in physicalism no one thing necessarily exists as
>a matter of logic,

A good point. Things exist as a matter of observation, not logic.

>but this does not mean that a physicalist cannot
>make a reasonable decision about what really exists and what not.
>Physicalism is not an automatic system, but requires the application of
>reason.

Has someone suggested otherwise?

>By applying reason all physicalists agree that Santa Claus does
>not exist

But "Santa Claus" certainly does.

[snip]

>Both
>possibilities explain why physicalists do not now and will never be
>able to agree between themselves about what really exists.

Again, the question of what really exists is not an ontological one
but an observational one. And people can disagree or even be wrong.

[snip]

>Leaving physicalism behind, I find that our ontological view (in the
>sense that the recognition of patterns in our experience justifies
>existence) has the huge advantage that it opens up a way for objective
>agreement about what exists and what not - as long as we
>axiomatically accept that we all basically experience life in the same
>way and possess the same ability for pattern recognition.

Of course such axiomatic claim is not objectively justified. You are
hand waving away the problem, but it still exists. I would not mind
except that you complain that physicalism faces the problem a bit more
head on. (I disagree that it does, no one can or really bothers to
deal with the brain in a vat problem. No one except Philosophy 101
students.)

>So we agree
>that apples, numbers, electrons, hurricanes, physical laws,

Physical laws exist? Really now? Where do they exist? I am not denying
that the Universe seems to act, and may even really act, in a lawful
manner. I am asking where are these laws existing and how, then, do
things obey them?

>and beauty exist

Where does beauty exist?

>- and we may even come to agree that God exists. Also our
>ontology gives us the possibility of pushing things in and out of
>existence depending on the discovery of stronger or more overarching
>patterns - something that does in fact happen both in personal life
>and in the history of humanity.

Do you really think that things in the world will exist and not exist
depending on what you see?

>In short, whereas physicalism does not offer an objective way to decide
>existence, our ontology does. Incidentally I am not well versed in the
>various -isms. Isn't our ontology, which basically says: "Something
>exists if it is a pattern we detect in our experience", idealism?

No.

--
Matt Silberstein

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[Roger Johansson]

Bob wrote:

> >When the people create a consitution and laws to protect your
> >rights in a democratic society you have the rights this democracy
> >gives you.

> The state does not grant essential rights.

The state I live in grants all citizens a lot of rights,
and it upholds them too.

> Come to East Texas and try spouting that commie crap in a bar on
> Saturday night. You will find yourself chained to the back of a
> pickup.

See, your system is based on violence too.

Not regulated violence under democratic control,
but something closer to mob rule.

Your level of education and civilization tells a lot about
the country you live in, and what kind of make-believe
democracy you have there.

--
Roger J.

[Bob]

On Wed, 19 Oct 2005 15:25:23 GMT, Matt Silberstein
<RemoveThisPref...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:

>they really exist, but they exist
>as concepts instantiated in human brains.

I do not dispute that since essential rights are mental constructs.

The real question is what are these essential rights based on.

[Bob]

On 19 Oct 2005 08:48:58 -0700, "Roger Johansson" <roge...@gmail.com>
wrote:

>The state I live in grants all citizens a lot of rights,

You live in a godless collectivist state. I don't.

>and it upholds them too.

And withdraws them to suit its purposes.

>> Come to East Texas and try spouting that commie crap in a bar on
>> Saturday night. You will find yourself chained to the back of a
>> pickup.

>See, your system is based on violence too.

Of course it is - for the purpose of protecting the essential rights
of individuals. But no one claims that they or the govt grants those
rights. They are based on our human nature - the kind of being we are.

>
>Not regulated violence under democratic control,
>but something closer to mob rule.

So-called democracy is mob rule.

I have seen that in action, like the Waco Massacre and forced
segregation.

>Your level of education and civilization tells a lot about
>the country you live in, and what kind of make-believe
>democracy you have there.

There is no democracy where you live. You live in a godless
collectivist state, a totalitarian dictatorship run by a criminal
ruling class.

I live in Texas, which is a whole other country. It is a place where
people respect God-enabled Individualism ruled by Common Law.

[Robibnikoff]

"Bob" <sp...@uce.gov> wrote in message
news:4356aa1b...@news-server.houston.rr.com...

snip

> I live in Texas, which is a whole other country. It is a place where
> people respect God-enabled Individualism ruled by Common Law.

And where you can shoot people who trespass on your property. Woo fucking
hoo!
--
Robyn
Resident Witchypoo
#1557
Science doesn't burn people at the stake for disagreeing - Vic Sagerquist

[turtoni]

> Bob:

> I live in Texas, which is a whole other country.

you write like a romantic bob.

> It is a place where people respect God-enabled Individualism ruled by
> Common Law.

well it's good to hear there's at least some respect there.

turtoni - and i'm glad you enjoy the texas conditioning.

[Dutch]

"Publius" <m.pu...@nospam.comcast.net> wrote in message
news:q_adnSHybJJ...@comcast.com...

> "Dutch" <n...@email.com> wrote in news:11lc15e...@news.supernews.com:
>
>>> The view you describe above is pretty standard materialism, which
>>> often goes hand in hand with naive realism. And of course I agree
>>> that those are not tenable positions.
>>
>> Sorry to burst in here, but could you explain briefly, why is that
>> view not tenable? It seems correct to me. Another example of things
>> that exist only in the brains of people are "rights". What is the
>> alternative view of such things? Please use plain english, I'm not
>> familar with philosphical terminology.
>
> Did you read DG's post? He gave several reasons.

Holy crap! I asked for brief and plain english.. but OK, I read it and it
seems to go on so long as to mix different concepts and therefore draw false
conclusions. For example "red" exists in nature as a property of the way
certain matter absorbs light, even though outside the human mind it's not
called or even seen as "red" in the way our brains think of it. Justice on
the other hand is a human concept totally. It would disappear if the human
brain disappeared from the scene.

> Rights are theoretical constructs,

Yes, they're like rules of behaviour, or rather properties that can be
inferred from rules of behaviour.

> just like triangles, numbers, quarks,
> electromagnetic fields, etc.

NO! Some of those exist *in nature* independent of the human brain, of that
we can be quite confident. Rights do not. I don't think numbers do either,
they are simply abstract ideas of the human brain.

>They are "real" if they have explanatory
> power.

The point is not whether or not they are "real", rights are real *as a
concept* because we act as if they are. The point I thought is whether or
not their existence can be seen to be soley dependent on the human brain. So
I'm saying reality is a mixture of these "made-up" things we use to explain
and organize our existences and objects and phenomena that carry on
regardless.

[Dutch]

"Roger Johansson" <roge...@gmail.com> wrote in message
news:1129721058.2...@z14g2000cwz.googlegroups.com...

They could still be seen as real, as an "idea" even though systematically
violated. The point is that they disappear totally if the human brain is
removed from the equation.

[Dutch]

"Bob" <sp...@uce.gov> wrote in message

news:43564254...@news-server.houston.rr.com...

> On 19 Oct 2005 04:24:18 -0700, "Roger Johansson" <roge...@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>>> Rights are theoretical constructs, just like triangles, numbers, quarks,
>>> electromagnetic fields, etc. They are "real" if they have explanatory
>>> power.
>
>>Rights are only real if the people vote for it, in a democracy.
>
> Please, would you look up what is meant by the term "democracy" before
> you banty it about. Plato considered democracy to the the last stage
> before tyranny (cf. The Republic, Book XIII).
>
> Essential rights are based on man's nature. The right to survival is
> based on the fact that man is alive.

There is no such thing as a right to survival.

[Publius]

"Roger Johansson" <roge...@gmail.com> wrote in

news:1129721058.2...@z14g2000cwz.googlegroups.com:

>> Rights are theoretical constructs, just like triangles, numbers, quarks,
>> electromagnetic fields, etc. They are "real" if they have explanatory
>> power.
>
> Rights are only real if the people vote for it, in a democracy.

Yeah, I know. The people of Indiana briefly thought the same thing about
the value of pi. Fortunately, wiser minds prevailed.

Maybe you can explain how "the people" acquired the right to vote? Try not
to beg the question.

[Publius]

"Roger Johansson" <roge...@gmail.com> wrote in

news:1129728721....@g44g2000cwa.googlegroups.com:

>> you banty it about. Plato considered democracy to the the last stage
>> before tyranny (cf. The Republic, Book XIII).
>
> What he considered 200 years ago has no influence on how
> we see democracy in the modern world.

Heh. More Rogerian history there. Perhaps he attended Cambridge?

[Publius]

"andy-k" <spam.free@last> wrote in
news:daq5f.1310$S_1...@newsfe5-win.ntli.net:

> What's your view on Hume's treatment of causation?

I think he was dead right. That was Kant's launching point. There are no
"necessary connexions" apparent in phenomena. Hence, if we wish to explain
them, we'll have to assume them *a priori*. We can then proceed to concoct
explanations, and test them by their predictive power.

[Dutch]

"Bob" <sp...@uce.gov> wrote

> On Wed, 19 Oct 2005 15:25:23 GMT, Matt Silberstein
> <RemoveThisPref...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
>
>>they really exist, but they exist
>>as concepts instantiated in human brains.
>
> I do not dispute that since essential rights are mental constructs.
>
> The real question is what are these essential rights based on.

They're based on some human ideals, the desire for social stability and
safety, a sense of empathy, compassion, and fairness.

Rights are way of describing/enacting the effects and implications of a
complex social structure.

[Matt Silberstein]

On Wed, 19 Oct 2005 16:00:01 -0500, in alt.atheism , Publius
<m.pu...@nospam.comcast.net> in <3sadndVeptx...@comcast.com>
wrote:

I think you all had better find some common meaning for this word
"right". Are you speaking from a political, moral, or religious
context?

As for your "killer" question, let me give you a similar one: if
"rights" exist outside of people, where do they exist?

My personal view on these things tends to be what I consider practical
and so I take a political view of rights. Rights are things we humans
grant to each other in the context of a community. They are not things
that exist outside of that context or outside of human. Women in the
U.S. acquired the right to vote from the U.S. government. The
government acquires rights from the consent, writ large, of the
government. (That is, consent can be more or less voluntary.)