I'd say everything that followed was that elaboration. In summary:
- if one wants to or not, it inevitably naturalises religion because it has to assume the divine leaves naturalistic traces and can thus be cajoled into answering our questions)
- it is only compatible with one of the (at least four) possible theological positions that have been argued over the centuries, to wit the "vulgar zombie version", and is incompatible with the theologically more rewarding ones
- it is inconsistent with other parts of the gospel, and in particular the non-recognition of Christ by other witnesses
- while it gives you as statement "there is some evidence for a (physical) resurrection" which may "feel" reassuring and comforting, it gives you also the equivalent statements (relative to the evidence given) "The evidence for Elvis being alive is much stronger than that of the resurrection of Christ" which is anything but. The problem is that naturalistic evidence can be quantified, quantification leads to commensurability, and that turns "it's a miracle" into "that's just silly". (this is I think related to the old argument David Hume made in "on miracles", possibly a direct corollary, though tbh I'd have to think that one through a bit more.
> >As all attempts to naturalise religion inevitably are.
> But I'm not trying to naturalise religion - I agree with you on the
> futility of that. As I've said to Bill, however, evidence and faith
> are not mutually exclusive; what we get in the Bible is *supporting*
> evidence. Faith is indeed required to overcome the shortfalls in that
> evidence and take it beyond the bare reported facts but that does not
> eliminate its supportive nature.
There is a simple and a more complex answer on this. The simple one is: even if you treat it as just "some" weak supporting" evidence, it still assumed that spiritual/supernatural events leave natural traces. That means you have to play by the rules of naturalistic evidence assessment, and that comes with a whole baggage of corollaries, inevitably. So I don't think the idea of a harmonious "supportive" relation works, not if you follow though through with the reasoning.
The more complex one in that "faith" , just like "belief" is a homonym, or at least has a very wide semantic field. In everyday language, we sometimes use "belief" for "less well confirmed" propositions, and contrast it with knowledge, as in "I don't know the answer, but I believe it is X". In philosophical contexts, we use it differently, as a perspective change. "Knowledge" then becomes "justified true believe", which means technically speaking, I should never say "I know X", only ever "I believe X", but we can say from an observer perspective about someone "He knew X". (terms and conditions apply, it might be different if X is a logical truth e.g.) And in religious contexts, we mean with "belief" something else entirely, "belief in" rather than "belief that", and not necessarily reducible to descriptive propositions. The problem is that these shades of meaning often get mixed up and confused.
With "faith" I'd say it's similar. In ordinary language, we use "faith" sometimes as a non-rational, non-evidential and in that sense lesser method to form an opinion. "Why do you think the guy you just elected will keep his promises? I have faith in him" (often despite that person's track record. Or as you implicitly do, as a sort of "last meter" crutch that makes sure you come to a decision after reasons have run out ("I looked at all the data, and all the score sheets, and whittled down the contenders to just two, but then time was running out so I put my faith in "Echoes in the Rain" at 20:1 at the Galway Races and what do you know...")
I'd say these correspond to the everyday notion of "belief" above, and make "faith" inherently suspicious, which is then why people feel the need to use it only when reason fails. And just as with the above, "faith" in the religious context ought in my view to be something categorically different, not a mere handmaiden to reason or an excuse - it can move mountains, all on its own.
>What it leads to is the interpretation of the resurrection as a vulgar zombie-apocalypse, that positively gets in the way of spiritual or redemptive (in Tilllich's sense) interpretation, and also creates conflicts with other passages of the text, in particular, Luke 24 13-16.
> Again, I don't follow your logic there, especially your reference to
> Luke 24 13-16.
We have two prima facie contradictory accounts One set of witnesses makes a positive ID. The other, despite excellent epistemic conditions (under the ADVOKATE factors on eyewitness testimony, ( amount of time, distance to object, visibility, known by witness etc ) fail to make an ID. If you treat this naturalistically, just ask yourself how you'd evaluate the totality of the evidence here - one witness claiming to have seen something inherently implausible, and several other witnesses in the same or better position not making an ID ("wasn't him, guv") As I said elsewhere, naturalism comes with baggage, one of it is testability of one piece of evidence against other pieces of evidence, and that's what we would have here.
But if you give up the "physical observation eyewitness model", reconciling the two accounts gets straightforward. All of the people here make the same spiritual experience - in my preferred redemptive reading, from a feeling of deepest depression and utter despair came a sudden, massive, totally unexpected (and unearned.... ) and unexplainable lifting of the spirit and a realisation of unbounded freedom (freedom which then explains the subsequent actions of the Apostle, which otherwise would make them look simply suicidal) At Easter, creation took a deep breath and said "all is well, we are home now". NOT just " some single person I care and was worried about turns out to be OK after all", that would have been way too egotistic, but literally "everything is (going to be) all right".
The people most directly affected with this don't initially understand this, and then, as humans do, try in varying degrees successfully to verbalise this and make sense of this experience. That explains the time lapse also for Maria Magdalena between the "physical" seeing (which would have been instantaneous) and the "recognition" part. None of this works well when interpreted as an ordinary physical observation, we would not expect it to happen like this given everything we know about facial recognition
>
> >
> >I would agree with you that as a matter of terminology, even extremely weak evidence is still evidence. I'd go even further and would argue that even evidence that later turned out to be misleading is evidence, (I remember some discussions with John H on this, where we disagreed on that point)
> That is the key point I have been trying to make - rather fruitlessly
> so far. Abner, endorsed by Bill, said that belief in the Resurrection
> is "pure faith" implying that there is NO evidence. What I am arguing
> is that there is *some* evidence even if it is not necessarily
> conclusive.
And I'd say you both underestimate or devalue faith here, just from opposite directions. And I don't think they work in synergy either, as this gives you again the "handmaiden role" of faith that makes it look like an excuse for the failure of reason
> >
> >But apart from coming in degrees, the type of evidence that we use in court has also a range of other properties that you would not necessarily want in a religious context. One is the one Bill alluded to - it requires consistency in application, and I'd add, it inevitably gives you then a scale that allows comparisons. So it inevitably leads to statements of the form "The evidence for the resurrection is weaker, or at best as strong as, that for XYZ" where given what we are dealing here with more or less forces you to substitute for the XYZ things absolutely nobody or hardly anybody believes, from lots of "ancient "pagan" religions to lots of Victorian ghost stories. I'd say subjective certainty in faith where the content of the belief is incommensurable from any other belief is already much preferable over treating it as something that is made quantifiable and with that comparable and ranked on a scale.
> >
> >But I think it is worse than that. Nothing is just "evidence" observations are evidence for or against a theory, and have to be evaluated with these two conflicting theories in mind, Which for instance for the observation of the empty grave means that it can't really distinguish between a supernatural resurrection and simp grave robbery (they produce the same expected observation.
> Whether the evidence is reliable or conclusive is matter of debate and
> I tread cautiously in getting into any legal argument with you but as
> I understand it, circumstantial evidence is measured on its overall
> weight and extent.
That misses a bit my point. Often, people say things like "DNA is evidence" or "confessions are evidence", or even worse, ""DNA is highly reliable evidence" or ""DNA is strong evidence" etc My students do this exactly once, and then I shout at them a lot, and then they don't do it again, at least not in my presence :o)
Nothing is just "evidence", let alone "strong/weak/conclusive/" etc evidence. The same "fact", a DNA match between say the suspect and a trace on the victim in a rape case, can be extremely important, IF the defense hypothesis is that someone else than the accused was the perpetrator, and utterly irrelevant IF the defence hypothesis is that it was consensual. With other words, an observation or data point becomes evidence only ever when there are two mutually exclusive hypothesis (in a legal context, the defense and the prosecution hypothesis), it is capable of increasing the probability of the one and lower the one of the other, and can only get assigned a weight once a whole number of background probabilities is factored in,. The old Forensic Science Service developed for this reason the "hierarchy of propositions", one of the best tools in my view to reason about evidence.
Or as R v Kilbourne[1973] AC 729, 756 put it
“Evidence is relevant if it is logically probative or disprobative of some matter which requires proof … relevant (i e logically probative or disprobative) evidence is evidence which makes the matter which requires proof more or less probable"
So in our case that creates a number of problems for the "evidential" account of the Gospel, One is more technical and I'd say less of an issue theologically, the other is more a theological problem. The first is the one about the background probabilities. You said e.g. that Bill dismisses the Gospel account "without any reason". But that is of course not true, quite on the contrary. He has lost and lots of contrary observations - every time someone dies and stays dead. That forms the prior probabilities against which the Gospel account would need to be evaluated, to assign "any" evidential weight. And here you run not only into Hume's problem and its corollary above, you get into all sorts of issues with consistency.
But the bigger problem is that if you treat this really as a naturalistic eyewitness account, it forces your hand regarding the possible theological interpretations. That is the "data" "witness X saw that Y" is evidence for "Y" only because our background causal theory how observations work, how the eye works etc etc , and that means it can only be evidence for the "physical zombie" version, and contradict the spiritual etc version. They are not different aspects of the same thing, and IF any of the other is the correct position, then the witness statements loses its evidential value That's because if we assume either of them the preconditions for reliable witnessing are not any longer given - witness evidence is evidence because of what we know about the way the eye reacts to physical bodies etc
My own experience of this is limited to sitting
> through one murder trial where the evidence against the defendant was
> entirely circumstantial [1] but the judge explained this to the jury
> with the single strand vs rope metaphor i.e. a single piece of
> circumstantial evidence may be weak like a single strand of a rope but
> when all the pieces of evidence are interlocked together, they can
> form a strong case just as a number of strands interlocked together
> can form a very strong rope.
That's both true and dangerous. It's absolutely correct when done properly. One aspect of this is as I said above, connect the bare observation and data with the competing hypothesis, and show for each pair of them how the evidence in question favours one over the other. In particular, keep track of the fact that disproving a proposition is always easier than proving one. 1 point of correspondence of a fingerprint match is not stronger than 8 or 16 or 32 points IF one of them has also a clear scar that rules out a possible match, here addition leads you astray. And crucially, make sure you avoid double counting, that is to add them, they must be independent, otherwise you get the Sally Clarke miscarriage of justice.
In the below, I'd say quite a bit of your evidence fails this test- in particular one a prediction is made (foretelling) , and observation of events after that risks to be tainted by that expectation etc.
>
> I gave the Gospel accounts as a particular example and, on their own,
> they could be explained away as you say by a claim of misdiagnosis of
> death. When begin to add you add in other factors, however, such as
> the way Jesus foretold his death and Resurrection and the reaction of
> the authorities (bribing the guards to change their story), that adds
> weight to the evidence. Again to be clear, I am not claiming that that
> makes the evidence conclusive, only that there is some degree of
> *supporting* evidence.
I'd say quite a lot of single point of failures here, and in particular a discounting of the "author effect", that is you hear them through a single narrator.
> >The reports of having seen Jesus fare a bit better, ( we grant here that they are genuine eyewitness reports and leave aside for the purpose of this analysis the possibility that they are later inventions, additions, misunderstandings and misreporting etc). So we read them ex hypothesis as "bare observations" - but now we really have a badly evidenced zombie walking around, because that physical reading is the only one the reported observations would be evidence for. With the additional problems that if we now test the hypothesis, an immediate problem becomes a) that this observation does not distinguish
> >between a resurrection theory and one where his death was just misdiagnosed, which would be the much more natural explanation
> >b) even if granted that he had really died, why only so few people saw Jesus, and
> >c) even worse, why , as Luke indicates, some of those who should have identified him did not.
> >
> > So once treated like ordinary evidence, it becomes inevitably subject to testing against other evidence (or the lack of it) .
> >
> >So in exchange for treating the Gospels as "ordinary evidence", you only get an extremely weakly supported, part contradicted, theologically least palatable. Tillich's classification is helpful here even if one does not adopt his preferred solution. Treating the Gospel as a mere physical eyewitness account leads inevitably to the physical resurrection reading, which was a comparative latecomer: "Theologically speaking, it is a rationalization of the resurrection event, interpreting it with physical categories and making the benchmark of the facticity of the resurrection the presence or absence of a
> >physical body occupying a specific place Immediately the absurd question arises: what happened to the molecules which comprise the corpse of
> > Jesus of Nazaret. In this question, the mere absurdity becomes almost blasphemy."
> >
> >And what you lose are the much more theologically rewarding readings of the text, the spiritual interpretation (which I'd say is by now mainstream) . And of course also Tillich's reading as restitution, which I always thought the most compelling:
> >
> > "This theory concerning the event which underlies the symbol of Resurrection dismisses physical as well as spiritualistic literalism.
> >[...] and places at the center of its analysis the religious meaning of the Resurrection for the disciples (and their followers), in contrast to
> > their previous state of negativity and despair. This view is the ecstatic confirmation of the indestructible unity of the New Being and
> > its bearer, Jesus of Nazareth. In eternity they belong together. In contrast to the physical, the spiritualistic, and the psychological
> > theories concerning the Resurrection event, one could call this the "restitution theory". According to it, the Resurrection is the
> >restitution of Jesus as Christ, a restitution which is rooted in the personal unity between Jesus and God and in the impact of this unity on
> > the minds of the apostles."
> I'm not familiar with Tillich's ideas, is he actually discarding the
> *physical* Resurrection or is he just emphasising the far more
> important spiritual impact of it? If so, then I am in total agreement
> with him and I don't think he is saying anything particularly
> different to most theologians in that regard.
I'd say he sees them as mutually exclusive, and would deny that you can mix and match them while staying consistent - that part of his work is largely descriptive, i.e. he maps the positions he found in church history, and they seem to lump clearly into groups)
> >
> >With other words, the Gospels do not report a set of massively ambiguous observations, something done through the physical senses and subject to its limitations, but a profound life-changing experience of a transformation of a relationship - Christ-the-man has become now "The Church", not any longer an individual (hence Luke, unrecognisable for some, at least temporarily), ecstatic and experiential rather than descriptive-factual.
> ====================================
>
> [1] The case was for the murder of my sister-in-law and the defendant
> was found guilty on a unanimous verdict by the jury. You may well have
> knowledge of the case - it was the first case in the UK where a
> previous conviction was revealed to the jury due to the similarity
> between the two crimes. It was also the first whole-life tariff given
> in Northern Ireland though the Court of Appeal later set a 35-year
> tariff.
>
https://attracta.martinharran.com
Oh Martin, I'm so terribly sorry to hear that, that must have been a terrible experience! And it is arguably too close personally for you for a mere academic discussion - so tell me when to stop, or just ignore the next part, it's just about the law.
There had been cases before that where "similar fact evidence" had been admitted, and it was arguably never prohibited in English law, it was just very difficult to meet the admissibility threshold in practice (unless the accused brought up his " pastgood character" himself) . It was a case two years later, O'Brien (Respondent) v. Chief Constable of South Wales Police that finally settled the issue. I know both cases well, I was member of the expert group of the Scottish Law Commission when we discussed what to do with the Moorov doctrine, that permitted this type of evidence since the 1930s. Some of the arguments at the time had a strong theological flavour, some of the more skeptical voices in our group were concerned how the permissibility of previous convictions evidence "fits" theologically with the belief in the possibility of redemption, or in its secular version with the aspiration of the prison system to reeducate and rehabilitate (if prisons did what they claim they do, should a previous conviction not count in favour of the accused?) The judge in your sister-in-laws case touches on that debate in his decision, and turns it on its head for sentencing purposes, but that is the background of the debate.
I wasn't too worried about this, but had my own misgivings with the doctrine, as intuitive it is. It also has a bearing on the discussion above, what exactly is the evidence that is submitted, and what is it evidence for? The way the jury sees is is that the evidence is "the accused did crimes of that type in the past" and this is evidence for "he is still having a preponderance for violence". And if that would be the evidence, that would make sense for some crimes at least (and possible be evidence against the prosecution in some other cases, where we know that people are extremely unlikely to reoffend). But that's of course not what happens. Instead, the evidence that is submitted is "This person has a previous conviction" and this is evidence for "This person has committed a crime". But that's of course highly problematic. Remember the miscarriages of justice in the 1980s, when " speaking with Irish accent in the broad vicinity of an explosion" was all the evidence the police needed, and the rest were "confession after accident in custody". - if you ended up with one of these false convictions, your chances that you got another one would have massively increased. Crucially, the defense is not allowed, procedurally, to bring up the safety of the old conviction - an anomaly and deviation from normal rules of evidence without principled justification. (the reason is merely efficiency and costs) .
So I argued for stricter safeguards, and normal limitation to cases with "unlikely similarity" like the burglar who always took a piece of wallpaper as trophy - also because in most of the cases where this is not case, the other evidence is typically strong enough anyway. In your case, I (and our Scottish Fiscal) were surprised that the prosecution had introduced this as evidence, as it seemed unnecessary in our experience, while risking an appeal.