Sure, I really think that intuition, abstraction itself, is the greatest precept of mathematics,
so as a constructivist, there's really so much to be said that it's pointed out that so-and-so,
said, "all mathematics" or "geometry" or "the logic", provides a subject and a classification,
that the intuitionist and intuitionistic surrounds even make for that "axiomatization" is as so,
"what if" and "any what if", that's though "theory", again of course, is both "the theory that's
reality's" and "all the rest of any of the theories", that a usual axiom is there are two halves
of the universe of theories: one is all reality and the other is none, yet at least, some (flights
of reality).
This way at least "theory is never wrong", while at the same time, with truth up front and throughout,
"must be a better theory".
This is so fundamental that it's couched in all philosophy and an entire, more or less,
entire East-West canon, and Western Canon, "reason", to say so much in so much time,
of what results a study, say of "foundations" as "classical foundations".
So, these days it's again "paleo-classical", that most terms what are super and extra,
like energy and entelechia, are new again, if though read from the "originals" or 2500
years ago, "paleo-classical modern inclusive extra-classical", so, what happens is that
the "post-modern, paleo-classical", approach, is digging up all sorts the recorded library,
of "authority", in science, reminding that the discussions concerned are same, and able
to gently, or generously, interpret the paleo-classical, as in some intent ideal:
that according to the canon, what's intended is even better than what's received,
"Perfect Plato: Never Wrong", and "What Plato might've said: if you defined what
he knew and thought", or, "Reading Plato: as if it always has to make sense".
It's easier in an imperfect world if "imperfect", it's perfect.
Then bounds and limits, it's most always usual that a symbolic calculator doesn't much
need the same space of arithmetic and language as all its expressions, ....
So, it's an intuitionist constructivist mathematics, and in the elementary, what's
central is central and what's primary is primary, elements in axiomatics, what's fundamental,
that mathematics also has a fundamental model, to the real.
"It's a continuum mechanics, ..., it's a set theory, ..., it's a gauge theory, ...", according
to mathematical science, that's about what it is.
(...A current working theory that current working theory altogether is sufficient, one model,
"that there is one".)
Then what I wrote is called an "apologetics", for foundations, so it wouldn't be algebraically
void or otherwise "un-conscientious" all the deliberation why "set theory", is viewed through
this generous lens, "never was wrong, since it was fixed", up into "paradoxes of set theory"
and "paradoxes of classical logic with ambiguity of the double-negative", "explanations of
continuum mechanics by quantum mechanics", "total field effects in universal gauge theory",
for my own interest I just wanted a neat table of formalisms, that in effect coordinate with
symbolry and other formalisms, providing fundamental theorems and lemmas, "non-paradoxes
of the extra-ordinary in set theory and extra-founded in ordinal theory", where there are
only sets in set theory and only ordinals in ordinal theory.
If there's one variable we all share it's time.
So, for set theory, Set Theory, there's Georg Cantor's et alia's Mengenlehre, set theory,
(set book or set reading), then it's not that difficult or so many pages, to write out
all the support for reasoning according to ZF and ZFC set theory, providing the usual
support and opinion to real analysis, and the open topology of the complete ordered field
or the real numbers algebra's complete ordered field and Dedekind completeness providing
Cauchy completeness, Eudoxus/Dedekind/Cauchy, what you do is you entirely separate the
"generous reading and perfect lens of the received principles the associated forms",
from, "that each restriction of comprehension establishes an incompleteness".
I.e., whether sets and classes are the same or different, "in a theory those being the objects
and there is only one relation, elt, but the reflexive or inverse part of the relation is contains,
or either way as the sole indicator in the theory relation", sets and classes are no different,
until up above axiomatics, results that at least an entirely different theory results,
when the relation is reflexive besides inverse, i.e. containing itself, reflexive, or together contained
in a greater, union and pairing.
Then the other way leads right to Cantor's and Russell's paradox what for relation,
show that there are other ways to resolve these paradoxes entirely theories of their own.
Then "that surely being intuitionistic the what must be constructivist", is also "that
being what also makes upon what rests the entire theory".
Trust in theory, ....
A working theory is usually whatever its elements "are". Trust in theory then "is that
they are", things are as they are, then trust in science has "or last least aren't not",
knowing "I don't know everything".
So, people with a lot of time to study it call all of mathematics, science, physics, and
so on one thing all the way to reason and philosophy, then that the entire industry,
is "foundations".
These days there's "axiomatic, descriptive set theory", which is fundamental that sets
are elementary and primary and central and in suitable organizations of type, the contents
of sets, that it is "descriptive" what the set "is", as its contents from the language of set
theory, are its own, "set", or class, of constants unique to the description.
Sets are only sets in set theory, there are only sets in set theory. All the rest attachment
is under model theory, or proof theory equivalently, then "descriptive set theory", is the
usual notion, of any sort use of sets in mathematics, in a sense, where the constants are
one model. So, the idea of that "the language of sets, must be a class, simply to indicate
this overall organization of description, and models", helps explain why "thus pretty much
all of mathematics has a descriptive set theory, vis-a-vis, fundamental set theory".