Challenge to MM.

[austin...@hotmail.com]

MM claims to have brute-forced my cipher in a 'mornings work' that he claims was 'trivial'.

I am challenging him here and now to prove what he says.

Herewith a sample of ciphertext for brute forcing by MM.

The original plaintext file and associated decrypted message text file have been lodged with a reader in the Comp.Lang.Ada group for producing later as verification of the ciphertext sample being supplied here.

Countdown starts now. - adacrypt

These integers are coefficients of a vector and are therefore taken in groups of three (no zero coefficients).
(820 4889 4221) (975 516 4001) and so on 1040 5411 3715 951 5277 3758 677 4548 4594 795 4864 4274 1065 5529 3584 1034 5346 3835 921 5178 3947 818 5078 4072 1057 5469 3858 757 4806 4446 1071 5552 3725 980 5354 3781 900 5129 4154 934 5301 3960 1056 5571 3551 780 5016 4259 689 4702 4585 591 4725 4487 981 5205 4007 659 4705 4582 1069 5405 3870 893 5203 3919 756 4816 4445 658 4702 4581 590 4649 4486 1055 5421 3856 924 5302 3950 809 4934 4393 979 5364 3786 854 5245 3880 582 4703 4478 942 5370 3743 621 4828 4310 742 5146 3996 924 5436 3599 853 5247 3879 655 4927 4239 720 5079 4031 950 5369 3751 855 5257 3881 1031 5558 3568 939 5405 3746 662 4892 4159 620 4872 4204 852 5268 3878 948 5378 3749 660 4949 4157 657 4950 4154 946 5406 3747 961 5441 3636 660 4895 4244 665 4929 4144 599 4807 4288 515 4653 4411 840 5201 3866 855 5254 3869 888 5447 3689 622 4774 4311 850 4882 4434 842 4717 4624 950 5142 4204 1161 5358 3962 902 4970 4399 1095 5227 4121 1073 5406 3880 1101 5270 4115 1101 5266 4127 882 4934 4451 836 4851 4525 941 5034 4249 1180 5400 3981 830 4737 4678 1010 5209 4036 939 4976 4436 835 4710 4617 1003 5251 4017 1068 5273 4082 951 5013 4430 1227 5561 3746 835 4989 4314 990 5384 3791 1018 5495 3693 804 4838 4388 929 5251 3955 703 4870 4287 1037 5361 3844 985 5295 4011 613 4639 4536 1064 5391 3865 954 5211 4097 763 4909 4242 1104 5486 3779 900 5286 3926 806 4854 4390 1040 5446 3835 886 5236 3918 1063 5457 3864 754 4994 4251 1059 5385 3860 797 4940 4381 730 4840 4314 817 4985 4296 1019 5550 3694 923 5146 4066 928 5311 3954 885 5234 3917 744 4875 4433 915 5309 3947 988 5386 3789 895 5157 4149 734 4974 4231 918 5213 3944 1104 5607 3599 735 5012 4214 751 4853 4335 815 5049 4126 816 5008 4295 1016 5616 3691 991 5426 4017 720 4946 4409 919 5323 3945 894 5419 3908 1041 5570 3842 1062 5688 3557 961 5428 3987 831 5239 4142 971 5505 3778 717 4877 4499 896 5235 4150 785 5111 4282 938 5421 3964 1009 5470 3816 907 5427 3921 960 5383 3986 698 5038 4282 819 5048 4298 1060 5744 3597 1005 5510 3806 809 4947 4477

[Richard Heathfield]

austin...@hotmail.com wrote:

> MM claims to have brute-forced my cipher in a 'mornings work' that he
> claims was 'trivial'.
>
> I am challenging him here and now to prove what he says.
>
> Herewith a sample of ciphertext for brute forcing by MM.
>
> The original plaintext file and associated decrypted message text file
> have been lodged with a reader in the Comp.Lang.Ada group for producing
> later as verification of the ciphertext sample being supplied here.

If the original plaintext file and associated decrypted message text file
are the same, why did you feel obliged to lodge them both? If they are not
the same, does your cryptosystem not fail the most basic of criteria - that
D(E(P,K),K) must equal P?

<snip>

--
Richard Heathfield
Email: rjh at cpax dot org dot uk
"Usenet is a strange place" - dmr 29 July 1999
Sig line 4 vacant - apply within

[austin...@hotmail.com]

I am trying to cover all eventualities - this reader has a track record of pathetic excuses and escape routes. I did think it was unnecessary at the time but I thought it won't do any harm if the decrypted messagetext goes along also just to alert the holder of the proof file(s)- adacrypt

[austin...@hotmail.com]

This challenge is clearly based in vector cryptography. It simulates Eve (standard pseudonym for the illegal cryptanalyst) intercepting a batch of ciphertext and trying to decrypt it by brute force methods - quite obviously she cannot ask Alice which variant of cipher from your portfolio of vector cryptography did you use when you encrypted this batch of ciphertext.

adacrypt

[austin...@hotmail.com]

On Friday, December 19, 2014 11:37:08 AM UTC, Richard Heathfield wrote:

It is not beyond the bounds of possibility that MM will claim that the ciphertext cannot be decrypted by any means because there is no such plaintext file to begin with i.e. there is no solution. - sending the message text along with the plaintext to a trusted third party helps repudiate that - come to think of it this is absolutely essential given that MM will grasp at any straw if it gets him out his empty brag - adacrypt

[Richard Heathfield]

austin...@hotmail.com wrote:

<snip>

>
> It is not beyond the bounds of possibility that MM will claim that the
> ciphertext cannot be decrypted by any means because there is no such
> plaintext file to begin with i.e. there is no solution. - sending the
> message text along with the plaintext to a trusted third party helps
> repudiate that - come to think of it this is absolutely essential given
> that MM will grasp at any straw if it gets him out his empty brag -

Does this make any sense at all to anyone other than Mr O'Byrne?

[FromTheRafters]

Richard Heathfield used his keyboard to write :

> austin...@hotmail.com wrote:
>
> <snip>
>>
>> It is not beyond the bounds of possibility that MM will claim that the
>> ciphertext cannot be decrypted by any means because there is no such
>> plaintext file to begin with i.e. there is no solution. - sending the
>> message text along with the plaintext to a trusted third party helps
>> repudiate that - come to think of it this is absolutely essential given
>> that MM will grasp at any straw if it gets him out his empty brag -
>
> Does this make any sense at all to anyone other than Mr O'Byrne?

No. Could he explain his definition of terms?

[MM]

On Friday, 19 December 2014 15:11:54 UTC+2, Richard Heathfield wrote:
> Does this make any sense at all to anyone other than Mr O'Byrne?

Not to me.

M
--

[MM]

On Friday, 19 December 2014 13:29:34 UTC+2, austin...@hotmail.com wrote:
> MM claims to have brute-forced my cipher in a 'mornings work' that he claims was 'trivial'.

Correct. I claim this.

> I am challenging him here and now to prove what he says.

I did that already. You ignored me.

> Herewith a sample of ciphertext for brute forcing by MM.

Bugger off and do the challenge properly. I've told you how I would accept
such a challenge.

I'm not playing this rigged game.

M
--

[MM]

On Friday, 19 December 2014 16:27:11 UTC+2, FromTheRafters wrote:
> Richard Heathfield used his keyboard to write :

> > Does this make any sense at all to anyone other than Mr O'Byrne?
>
> No. Could he explain his definition of terms?

No. He never does.

M
--

[MM]

On Friday, 19 December 2014 13:37:08 UTC+2, Richard Heathfield wrote:
> > The original plaintext file and associated decrypted message text file
> > have been lodged with a reader in the Comp.Lang.Ada group for producing
> > later as verification of the ciphertext sample being supplied here.
>
> If the original plaintext file and associated decrypted message text file
> are the same, why did you feel obliged to lodge them both? If they are not
> the same, does your cryptosystem not fail the most basic of criteria - that
> D(E(P,K),K) must equal P?

I may be wrong here, but I think this C.L.A reader is going to be a little
surprised to find that he is AOB's confidante. The conversation up to this
point has him about as sceptical as the readers of this group, and agreeing
to nothing.

M
--

[Prof Craver]

Hi,

Can you post a link to the program you used to generate this ciphertext?

It won't be practical for anyone to respond to a decryption challenge unless it is absolutely unambiguous what algorithm was used, preferably by providing source code.

--S

[MM]

That is insufficient. :-)

https://groups.google.com/d/msg/sci.crypt/X9rl9unbms0/2PpK3AhNFp4J

... gets you a good way to running a challenge, but is not complete. AOB
needs to demonstrate an understanding of Kerckhoffs' principles and
general scientific testing.

I personally won't be taking up AOB's "offer" unless he stands to lose a
chunk of money if I win. I told him this a day or two ago. Characteristically
he didn't listen.

M
--

[austin...@hotmail.com]

The details are known to one person in another group - I have offered the program source code to him.

In answer to Richard Heathfield's broadcast

there are three possible outcomes to my challenge
1) MM successfully brute forces my test piece and I accede to that.
2) MM does not successfully brute force my test piece and he accedes to having failed.
3) MM says the test was rigged and its impossible for him or indeed anybody to cryptanalyse the sample of ciphertext.

This latter is the most likely result

I hope that answers the question of why send the decrypted message to the trusted third part - it proves that it is bona fide and that it can be decrypted.

This is a repeat of his last attempt at bluffing his way some years ago - he's even using the same jargon - 'rigged test' is one of his favourite cants!!!

A chunk of money - how revolting can you get in a case like this. It's all escapism.

This is exactly what I expected and is why I chose to lodge documentary evidence with a trusted third party.

adacrypt
2

[Richard Heathfield]

austin...@hotmail.com wrote:

> On Friday, December 19, 2014 3:32:15 PM UTC, Prof Craver wrote:
>> Hi,
>>
>> Can you post a link to the program you used to generate this ciphertext?
>>
>> It won't be practical for anyone to respond to a decryption challenge
>> unless it is absolutely unambiguous what algorithm was used, preferably
>> by providing source code.
>>
>> --S
>
> The details are known to one person in another group - I have offered the
> program source code to him.

So what you're saying is that you don't subscribe to Kerckhoffs's Principle?

You appear to be attempting to demonstrate that your cryptosystem is secure
by posting a ciphertext-only challenge, saying only that you have lodged the
plaintext with someone you won't name.

> there are three possible outcomes to my challenge
> 1) MM successfully brute forces my test piece and I accede to that.

Conclusion: cryptosystem broken.

> 2) MM does not successfully brute force my test piece and he accedes to
> having failed.

Conclusion: cryptosystem is probably broken. Proof: cryptosystem's champion
will not provide the mechanism (the source code for the program), and has
provided only one very short ciphertext, whereas a truly robust cryptosystem
will withstand not only publication of the source code but also all manner
of attacks.

> 3) MM says the test was rigged and its impossible for him
> or indeed anybody to cryptanalyse the sample of ciphertext.

Conclusion: cryptosystem is probably broken (see above).

>
> This latter is the most likely result
>
> I hope that answers the question of why send the decrypted message to the
> trusted third part - it proves that it is bona fide and that it can be
> decrypted.

No, it doesn't prove that at all. It just proves that you claim you've sent
a message, *twice*, to someone you won't name (or two different messages, in
which case your cryptosystem is broken because a cryptosystem is supposed to
restore the original data).

> This is a repeat of his last attempt at bluffing his way some years ago -
> he's even using the same jargon - 'rigged test' is one of his favourite
> cants!!!

Well, prove him wrong! Here's how you do that:

1) publish the source code - it should be well-written, idiomatic code
without any attempt at obfuscation;
2) encrypt at least ten messages, each consisting of at least 10KB of
English prose;
3) provide at least 100 consecutive bytes of known plaintext for each
message, clearly identifying which plaintext is contained in which message
(this makes checking a lot easier - it doesn't have to be the /first/ 100
bytes, if that makes you any happier).

That would, I think, be a fair test. A good cryptosystem ought to be able to
resist attack under those conditions without any problems whatsoever.

Would Mr Murray agree with that?

>
> A chunk of money - how revolting can you get in a case like this. It's all
> escapism.

How about if Mr Murray were to guarantee to donate the money to charity?
Would that satisfy you?

>
> This is exactly what I expected and is why I chose to lodge documentary
> evidence with a trusted third party.

Trusted by whom?

[austin...@hotmail.com]

All that filibuster and deceit - the cryptography algorithm has been in full public view for at least ten years - claiming that it is contradictory to Kerckhoff's Principle (which is not a law anyway but it is being respected) is ludicrous.

What a farcical simulation of a breach of security !!!

This is just what I expected from MM.

adacrypt

[MM]

On Friday, 19 December 2014 19:20:03 UTC+2, Richard Heathfield wrote:
> 1) publish the source code - it should be well-written, idiomatic code
> without any attempt at obfuscation;

(The current code does not meet the above description).

1a) The key variables and keyspace are made abundantly, firmly and finally
clear.

Instructions are supplied for setting up the so-called "mutual database"
and are written clearly enough that an untrained operator could do this
unsupervised, with minimal chance of error.

> 2) encrypt at least ten messages, each consisting of at least 10KB of
> English prose;

Before this, demonstrate that a cipher exchange works, with disclosure of
the keys.

> 3) provide at least 100 consecutive bytes of known plaintext for each
> message, clearly identifying which plaintext is contained in which message
> (this makes checking a lot easier - it doesn't have to be the /first/ 100
> bytes, if that makes you any happier).

> That would, I think, be a fair test. A good cryptosystem ought to be able to
> resist attack under those conditions without any problems whatsoever.
>
> Would Mr Murray agree with that?

With my additions, yes.

> > A chunk of money - how revolting can you get in a case like this. It's all
> > escapism.
>
> How about if Mr Murray were to guarantee to donate the money to charity?
> Would that satisfy you?

It would satisfy me.

> > This is exactly what I expected and is why I chose to lodge documentary
> > evidence with a trusted third party.
>
> Trusted by whom?

Exactly.

M
--

[MM]

On Friday, 19 December 2014 20:04:30 UTC+2, austin...@hotmail.com wrote:
> What a farcical simulation of a breach of security !!!

What is farcical is how you changed your scrambling parameters
when the challenge was to show how your cipher just needed
"two small integers" to protect the plaintext, and the scrambling
parameters were supposed to be exchanged in the clear.

THAT is a violation of Kerckhoffs' principle. As you did it
surreptitiously, thereafter claiming victory, I accused you
of cheating, and folks who were still interested agreed.

M
--

[MM]

On Friday, 19 December 2014 19:20:03 UTC+2, Richard Heathfield wrote:

> That would, I think, be a fair test. A good cryptosystem ought to be able to
> resist attack under those conditions without any problems whatsoever.

A protocol that AOB utterly failed to follow, that is pretty cast-iron is seen
here:

https://groups.google.com/d/msg/sci.crypt/N24iozbGiVY/M4RxV_UEej4J

Point 5 is where AOB cheated, as his Bob would have been unable to read
the ciphertext due to surreptitious tampering with cipher parameters.

M
--

[Richard Heathfield]

> All that filibuster and deceit - the cryptography algorithm has been in
> full public view for at least ten years -

I haven't claimed otherwise. What I'm saying is that the actual source code
must be published, together with any other parts of the cryptosystem. The
only part you can keep secret is the key.

> claiming that it is
> contradictory to Kerckhoff's Principle (which is not a law anyway but it
> is being respected) is ludicrous.

I'm not claiming that anything is contradictory to Kerckhoffs's Principle.
I'm saying that you appear not to subscribe to that principle. Otherwise,
you would publish the full details of the mechanism, and that includes
source code. *Have* you published the source code? If so, fine, provided
that it is the same code that you are using to encipher the challenge texts.

> What a farcical simulation of a breach of security !!!

I don't think anyone's yet claiming that security has been breached. What is
on offer is a chance for you to demonstrate that your cryptosystem is
capable of resisting a known-plaintext attack, despite the publication of
the source code and all relevant parts of the mechanism (except the key
itself). If it can resist an attack on ten 10KB English prose plaintexts
(separately enciphered but with the same key), each of which has 100
contiguous bytes of known text, that is good evidence in favour of its
quality. What's more, Mr Murray will end up with egg all over his face. If
that isn't a sufficient incentive for you, I don't know what is.

If you're not prepared to do the work of preparing ten 10KB English prose
plaintexts, simply translate the program into ISO C code, and I'll gladly
host the contest on your behalf. But I think you'd prefer to host it
yourself, wouldn't you?

> This is just what I expected from MM.

I'm sorry to say this, but refusal to expose your cryptosystem to a real
test is just what I expected from you.

Mr Murray: if he cries off, you'll have some free time on your hands, in
which case I will cheerfully design a cipher for you to have a crack at,
under the same conditions (except that this would just be for fun - I have
no illusions about my ability to invent a secure cryptosystem).

[MM]

On Friday, 19 December 2014 21:30:07 UTC+2, Richard Heathfield wrote:
> Mr Murray: if he cries off, you'll have some free time on your hands, in
> which case I will cheerfully design a cipher for you to have a crack at,
> under the same conditions (except that this would just be for fun - I have
> no illusions about my ability to invent a secure crypto system).

You're on!

But this won't be a fair fight; I suspect you are competent! ;-) It may be fun
though.

M
--

[David Eather]

On Fri, 19 Dec 2014 21:29:30 +1000, <austin...@hotmail.com> wrote:

> MM claims to have brute-forced my cipher in a 'mornings work' that he
> claims was 'trivial'.
>
> I am challenging him here and now to prove what he says.
>
> Herewith a sample of ciphertext for brute forcing by MM.
>

<snip>

Stop doing this shit.

MM did write and publish a brute force program that worked and cracked
your published cryptosystem, that you called 'unbreakable', in seconds.

After that you cheated by surreptitiously changing encryption parameters
that were unrelated to the key.

You are being ridiculous.

[David Eather]

On Sat, 20 Dec 2014 01:32:13 +1000, Prof Craver <xcott...@gmail.com>
wrote:

of course he won't, and he will probably not even answer your reply

[David Eather]

Seriously,

MM published code that found the keys for your published cipher in
seconds. In cryptographic terms your pants were pulled down and you were
spanked publicly. It is true and it happened, even if you don't accept or
understand it.

[Dex]

> It simulates Eve (standard pseudonym for the illegal cryptanalyst)

What if Eve is lawfully employed as a cryptanalyst



--- news://freenews.netfront.net/ - complaints: ne...@netfront.net ---

[MM]

On Saturday, 20 December 2014 08:29:56 UTC+2, Dex wrote:
> > It simulates Eve (standard pseudonym for the illegal cryptanalyst)
>
> What if Eve is lawfully employed as a cryptanalyst

He never understood this properly. One of his very many misconceptions.

M
--

[MM]

Thank you, David.

This is why I want my next effort to have financial implications. If that
nasty fellow won't believe that he's been beaten, then I want a big hole
in his wallet to provide a wake-up slap.

M
--

[simon.jo...@gmail.com]

On Friday, 19 December 2014 15:04:04 UTC, MM wrote:

> I may be wrong here, but I think this C.L.A reader is going to be a little
> surprised to find that he is AOB's confidante. The conversation up to this
> point has him about as sceptical as the readers of this group, and agreeing
> to nothing.

Do you think AOB has me in mind? because if so I am _very_ surprised.

[MM]

No, its not you :-). The One((tm)) took it in his stride quite well.

M
--

[Prof Craver]

On Friday, December 19, 2014 1:04:30 PM UTC-5, austin...@hotmail.com wrote:
>
> All that filibuster and deceit - the cryptography algorithm has been in
> full public view for at least ten years - claiming that it is
> contradictory to Kerckhoff's Principle (which is not a law anyway but it
> is being respected) is ludicrous.

If the algorithm has been in full public view for ten years, then you should be able to provide us with the algorithm you used to generate the challenge ciphertext.

There is no need to keep it secret---only the key or plaintext needs to be kept secret as part of the challenge. Contrariwise, it is not practical for someone to test a challenge ciphertext without the specific algorithm used.

Others are alleging that you slightly changed your algorithm after someone published a program to brute-force a previous version of it. If that is indeed the case, it is vitally important that you publish the exact algorithm you have used to generate the ciphertext.

--S

[austin...@hotmail.com]

I must take it reluctantly that you are used to living in an unreal academic world where simulations of attacks are done in classrooms quite unlike real life interception of ciphertext where Eve has nothing to go by.

[Richard Heathfield]

austin...@hotmail.com wrote:

> On Saturday, December 20, 2014 7:51:50 PM UTC, Prof Craver wrote:

<snip>

>> There is no need to keep it secret---only the key or plaintext needs to
>> be kept secret as part of the challenge. Contrariwise, it is not
>> practical for someone to test a challenge ciphertext without the specific
>> algorithm used.
>>
>> Others are alleging that you slightly changed your algorithm after
>> someone published a program to brute-force a previous version of it. If
>> that is indeed the case, it is vitally important that you publish the
>> exact algorithm you have used to generate the ciphertext.
>

> I must take it reluctantly that you are used to living in an unreal
> academic world where simulations of attacks are done in classrooms quite
> unlike real life interception of ciphertext where Eve has nothing to go
> by.

Are you conceding that the security of your cryptosystem relies on some of
its details being kept secret?

Real cryptosystems, the sort that are used in the real world to protect real
secret data such as bank transactions, require only the key to be kept
secret. Their security is not compromised by revelation of the algorithm.
(And it's just as well, because otherwise any employee with access to the
algorithm would become a target for kidnap, blackmail, or bribery.)

So - either your cryptosystem relies on security by obscurity (in which case
it is self-evidently not as robust as those that don't), or it doesn't, in
which case you'll be happy to post the precise details.

[Prof Craver]

On Saturday, December 20, 2014 3:42:06 PM UTC-5, austin...@hotmail.com

>
> I must take it reluctantly that you are used to living in an unreal
> academic world where simulations of attacks are done in classrooms quite
> unlike real life interception of ciphertext where Eve has nothing to go
> by.

In the grand majority of real-world crypto applications, the cipher algorithm is known. Whenever your browser makes an https connection, it uses known algorithms. Whenever someone uses popular encryption software, it uses known algorithms. Almost all encrypted connections on the Internet use well-known software that employ known algorithms.

In the rare situation where someone is foolish enough to keep an algorithm secret in the real world, it is swiftly reverse-engineered.

I would therefore argue the opposite point of view: in the classroom, a cipher is just used by Alice and Bob. In the real world, encryption has to be used by a lot of people, and therefore available in some form. This alone implies that the algorithm will be known. On top of that, no encryption algorithm will see widespread use without being published, as part of the process of peer review.

In short, you really should provide the specific algorithm used to create your ciphertext.

--S

[MM]

On Saturday, 20 December 2014 22:42:06 UTC+2, austin...@hotmail.com wrote:
> I must take it reluctantly that you are used to living in an unreal academic world
> where simulations of attacks are done in classrooms quite unlike real life
> interception of ciphertext where Eve has nothing to go by.

No. The "unreal academic world" is reality. You didn't know that? Good grief!

Eve knows the protocol, the cipher, and sometimes the key, and very often has
a good guess at the plaintext.

Eve still wants to know *more*, and the cipher's job is to thwart this.

M
--

[Jens Stuckelberger]

I don't think he's able to understand that he's been beaten. I
mean, he was beaten years ago, and he comes coming back for more. I think
we are talking about an individual with serious mental problems; it does
not matter what you, or anybody else, do: he'll keep coming back for more.

[Bruce Stephens]

On Saturday, 20 December 2014 22:19:27 UTC, Jens Stuckelberger wrote:

> I don't think he's able to understand that he's been beaten. I
> mean, he was beaten years ago, and he comes coming back for more. I think
> we are talking about an individual with serious mental problems; it does
> not matter what you, or anybody else, do: he'll keep coming back for more.

I'm not sure about "serious mental problems". I'd just suggest he's confused
(about almost everything relevant).

[MM]

On Sunday, 21 December 2014 00:19:27 UTC+2, Jens Stuckelberger wrote:
> I don't think he's able to understand that he's been beaten. I
> mean, he was beaten years ago, and he comes coming back for more. I think
> we are talking about an individual with serious mental problems; it does
> not matter what you, or anybody else, do: he'll keep coming back for more.

If the has a £1000-sized hole in his wallet as a result of losing a challenge,
he may at least STFU.

M
--

[MM]

On Sunday, 21 December 2014 00:26:31 UTC+2, Bruce Stephens wrote:
> I'm not sure about "serious mental problems". I'd just suggest he's confused
> (about almost everything relevant).

As confusion goes, this one is impressively big.

M
--

[Andrew Swallow]

In the real world a copy of the encryption equipment can be obtained by
stealing it. This may involve killing the guards. Where Eve works for
the government this can be legal.

Andrew Swallow

[Jens Stuckelberger]

Since he's obviously impervious to reasoning, convinced that he's
in possession of the absolute truth, and that he's a genious while the
rest of the world are a bunch of morons, unable to appreciate his
greatness, I really think that he is well beyond confused, and that his
mental problems are serious. Other than pestering this forum, he's
probably harmless though.

[davidw...@gmail.com]

Is the ciphertext quoted on 12/19 created from CryptoAppCipher1 on the adacryptpages.com site? If so, was it created using the same set of multipliers, coefficients, and other 1000-long or 14250-long numerical lists embodied in Case/When statements, with the only variation being the values in the "Key Pad" section of the Ada code? Or was it created with different multipliers, coefficients, and other numerical lists?

DaveW

[David Eather]

unlikely - aob has always cheated by changing non-secret parameters