austin...@hotmail.com wrote:
> [...]
> I'm waiting to hear from you PM !!
>
> Its Vector Cryptography!! - remember.
>
> No arguments - just spell out what you want from me!
Since it seems you can not click on a link, here are the rules copied
from the above posted link:
> 1 - the challenge must respect Kerckhoffs's principle. This means that
> you have to publish the _exact_ algorithm that you are going to use to
> generate the challenge files. You must also make very clear what is
> "secret" and that you are allowed to change without disclosing, and what
> is sent in each message. In a normal "block cypher" or "stream cypher",
> the communications protocols built on top of those are already well
> understood and are implicit in any test. In your case, you have to
> clarify the communications protocol, too. You have to write out exactly
> what Alice must do when she wants to send a few messages and what Bob
> must do to receive them.
>
> 2 - the challenge files should be the same as requested before. You must
> stop with the "known plaintext attacks are too hard" nonsense. Many
> devices in the real world have to survive known plaintext attacks
> (set-top boxes, satellite receivers, cell phones, etc., etc.) and all
> the decent algorithms survive them perfectly well. Since we're making
> everything cristal clear: you need to publish 2 plaintexts with their
> respective ciphertexts and a ciphertext that you don't publish the
> plaintext of. If we can recover the plaintext, you lose the challenge.
> Each of the plaintexts should be at least 4kB in size.
>
> 3 - all the files (the program + challenge data, not secret data) must
> be placed in a zip file and offered for download from your site, with
> the title "challenge files" (or something like that) so that ANYONE can
> download and see the files. No more of this "I've already sent the
> files" and "PM says the files are so and so, but no one can confirm" crap.
>
> 4 - we need an incentive: you have to promise on your honor that if your
> cypher doesn't withstand the challenge you'll stop posting your
> ramblings about vector cryptography on sci.crypt. No more "You did that,
> but that was just because of a small mistake. The underlying principle
> is intact" crap.
I actually forgot another rule, because I thought that it should be
obvious, but it is better to write it out:
5 - in case I give up, you need to demonstrate how Bob could decipher
the ciphertext with just the information he was supposed to know, thus
revealing the secret data at that point.
"As far as we know, our computer has never had an undetected error."
Weisert