Why Does the Universe Exist? Some Perspectives from Our Physics Project—Stephen Wolfram Writings

[Jason Resch]

https://writings.stephenwolfram.com/2021/04/why-does-the-universe-exist-some-perspectives-from-our-physics-project/ 

I found this fascinating. It appears to have many similarities with the type of physical reality that emerges from then universal dovetailer, with new ways of explaining it and some new insights.

Jason

[Telmo Menezes]

Hi Jason,

This is really interesting, thanks for sharing. Since Wolfram started going in this direction, something that occurs to me is this: hypergraphs are perhaps one of the most general mathematical constructs that can be conceived of. Almost everything else can be seen as a special case of hypergraphs. Like you say, with the update rules, we shouldn't be surprised if they are equivalent to the UD. My scepticism is this: is anything being gained in terms of explanatory power? Should we be surprised that such a powerful representation can contain the rules of our reality? I do admit that I have to study these ideas in more detail, and there is something really compelling about hypergraphs + update rules.

"As soon as one starts talking about “running programs” some people will immediately ask “On what computer?” But a key intellectual point is that computational processes can ultimately be defined completely abstractly, without reference to anything like a physical computer. "

Oh boy, John Clark is not going to like this :)

Telmo.

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[John Clark]

On Fri, Aug 12, 2022 at 3:04 AM Telmo Menezes <te...@telmomenezes.net> wrote:

> Oh boy, John Clark is not going to like this :)

Well, I like Stephen Wolfram and I agree 100% with the ASCII sequence that Stephen Wolfram's physical brain produced:

"As soon as one starts talking about “running programs” some people will immediately ask “On what computer?" But a key intellectual point is that computational processes can ultimately be defined completely abstractly, without reference to anything like a physical computer. "

All completely true, however you can't make a computation with a definition, not even if the definition is what a computation is. For a definition to make any sense you need a mind, and to have a mind you need a brain, and a brain needs to process information, and if a Turing Machine cannot process a given amount of information then nothing can. And nobody, I repeat absolutely nobody, has been able to make a Turing machine without using the laws of physics or has even propose a theory about how such a thing could be possible because, as I said in the above, you can't make a computation with nothing but a definition, in fact you can't do anything at all if all you have is a definition.

 > My scepticism is this: is anything being gained in terms of explanatory power? 

Although quite interesting so far Stephen Wolfram cellular automation ideas have been no help whatsoever to physicists, but perhaps someday they may be, maybe someday we'll find that quarks behave the way they do because of some simple cellular automation at work inside them, but even if that day comes to pass you're still not going to be able to make a Turing machine, or anything else, with just a definition.

John K Clark    See what's on my new list at  Extropolis

ewg

   

 

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[Jason Resch]

On Fri, Aug 12, 2022 at 2:04 AM Telmo Menezes <te...@telmomenezes.net> wrote:

Hi Jason,

This is really interesting, thanks for sharing. Since Wolfram started going in this direction, something that occurs to me is this: hypergraphs are perhaps one of the most general mathematical constructs that can be conceived of. Almost everything else can be seen as a special case of hypergraphs. Like you say, with the update rules, we shouldn't be surprised if they are equivalent to the UD. My scepticism is this: is anything being gained in terms of explanatory power? Should we be surprised that such a powerful representation can contain the rules of our reality? I do admit that I have to study these ideas in more detail, and there is something really compelling about hypergraphs + update rules.

That is a good question. I am not familiar with them myself, but my understanding is they do not provide for any form of computation beyond what is turing computable, so in that sense, I don't know that they provide any additional explanatory power beyond the simple statement that all computations exist.

A commenter on my site recently asked, what can we say about the "computer" that computes all these computations. My reply was:

"There is no single one. There are infinite varieties of different TMs, and all can exist Platonically/Arithmetically. Gregory Chaitin discovered an equation whose structure models LISP computers. There are likewise other equations corresponding to the Java Virtual Machine, and the Commodore 64. All these Turing machines, and their execution traces of every computer program they can run, exist in math in the same sense that the Mandelbrot set or the decimal expansion of Pi exist in math. Despite the infinite variety of architectures for different Turing machines, their equivalence (in the Turing computability sense) makes the question of “Which Turing machine is running this universe?” impossible to answer, beyond saying, “all of them are.”"

I think hypergraphs, then, would be just one more mathematical object we could add to the heap of Turing universal mathematical objects which could (and would, if Platonism is correct) underlie the computations of our universe/experiences.

 

"As soon as one starts talking about “running programs” some people will immediately ask “On what computer?” But a key intellectual point is that computational processes can ultimately be defined completely abstractly, without reference to anything like a physical computer. "

My same reply also provided an explanation/argument, which is applicable to anyone who accepts simple truths concerning abstract objects have definite and objective true/false values, paired with a rejection of philosophical zombies. I think John rejects zombies, so he would have to reject objective truth to believe a physical computer is necessary to produce observers. Below is what I wrote:

The way I like to think about it is this: If one is willing to believe that truth values for mathematical relations like “2 + 2 = 4” can exist and be true independently of the universe or someone writing it down, or a mathematician thinking about it, that is all you need.

For if the truth values of certain simple relations have an independent existence, then so to do the truth values of far more complex equations. Let’s call the Diophantine equation that computes the Wave Function of the Hubble Volume of our universe “Equation X”. Now then, it becomes a question of pure arithmetic, whether it is true or false that:

“In Equation X, does the universal state variable U, at time step T contain a pattern of electrons that encode to the string:

‘why does the existence of Universal Equations imply the existence of iterative search processes for solutions?'”

If that question has a definitive objective truth, then it is the case that in the universe U, at time step T, in equation X, there is some person in that universe who had a conscious thought, and wrote it down and it got organized into a pattern of electrons which anyone who inspects this vast equation with its huge variables could see.

Once you get to this point, the last and final step is to reject the possibility that the patterns found in these equations, which behave and act like they are conscious, and claim to be conscious, are philosophical zombies. In other words, to accept that they are conscious beings, just like those who exist in “physical” universes (assuming there is any possible distinction between a physical universe, and a physical universe computed by a Platonic or Arithmetic Turing Machine).

Jason

 

Oh boy, John Clark is not going to like this :)

Telmo.

Am Do, 11. Aug 2022, um 20:35, schrieb Jason Resch:

https://writings.stephenwolfram.com/2021/04/why-does-the-universe-exist-some-perspectives-from-our-physics-project/ 

I found this fascinating. It appears to have many similarities with the type of physical reality that emerges from then universal dovetailer, with new ways of explaining it and some new insights.

Jason

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[Brent Meeker]

On 8/12/2022 10:56 AM, Jason Resch wrote:

Below is what I wrote:

The way I like to think about it is this: If one is willing to believe that truth values for mathematical relations like “2 + 2 = 4” can exist and be true independently of the universe or someone writing it down, or a mathematician thinking about it, that is all you need.

But it's truth value does depend on someone assigning the value "t" to some axioms and all mathematical truth values are nothing but "t" arbitrarily assigned to some axioms plus some rules of inference that preserve "t".  "t" has little to do with what it true in the world.

Brent

[John Clark]

On Fri, Aug 12, 2022 at 1:56 PM Jason Resch <jason...@gmail.com> wrote:

> I think John rejects zombies,

Yes and I have a very good reason for doing so. I know for a fact I am conscious and the evidence is overwhelming that Darwinian evolution is correct, but if you could have intelligent behavior without consciousness then natural selection could never have invented it, yet it did. Therefore the only logical conclusion is that consciousness is the inevitable byproduct of intelligence.

 >so he would have to reject objective truth to believe a physical computer is necessary to produce observers. Below is what I wrote:

 The way I like to think about it is this: If one is willing to believe that truth values for mathematical relations like “2 + 2 = 4” can exist and be true independently of the universe

But I don't believe that. If there were zero or even just one thing in the entire universe then the very concept of "2" would be meaningless, as would the concept of additon. In fact if there was just one thing then there would be nothing because the best definition of "nothing" that I know of is infinite unbounded homogeneity.

John K Clark    See what's on my new list at  Extropolis

idb

[Jason Resch]

If there were zero objects in the universe then the concept of zero would necessarily exist to preserve the property of the number of physical objects in that nothing.

If the concept of zero exists then at least 'one' abstract entity must exist, the one number zero.

Now 'two' abstract numbers exist, 'one' and 'zero'. Et cetera.

Jason

"The Tao begets one; one begets two; two begets three; three begets the myriad things."

-- Lao Tzu

[Jason Resch]

The physical world chugs along with anyone having to assign to assign values, or apply rules of inference.

Why can't the same be true for other platonic objects?

Jason

[Brent Meeker]

Because "Platonic" means "exists only in imagination".

Brent

[John Clark]

On Fri, Aug 12, 2022 at 3:09 PM Jason Resch <jason...@gmail.com> wrote:

> If there were zero objects in the universe then the concept of zero would necessarily exist to preserve the property of the number of physical objects in that nothing. If the concept of zero exists then at least 'one' abstract entity must exist, the one number zero. Now 'two' abstract numbers exist, 'one' and 'zero'. Et cetera.

You're making the argument that there must be more than just one thing in the universe and therefore it can not consist of infinite unbounded homogeneity, and therefore the universe is not nothing, and therefore the universe is something, and therefore it exists. And that's all very fine but it's irrelevant because your claim was that 2+2=4 would exist even if the universe did not. I maintain it would not. I'm certainly not saying  2+2 =4 has no meaning, I'm saying it has a meaning precisely because the universe exists. I'm saying that physics is more fundamental than mathematics.  

John K Clark    See what's on my new list at  Extropolis 

mta

[Jason Resch]

You defined nothing as a universe of zero physical objects. And have said a number N is meaningless without at least N things in that universe to count.

Is zero meaningless in a universe with zero physical things?

You might argue that it is, but I would say zero is necessary for the operation and preservation of such a universe of zero objects. Otherwise without some rule saying "the number of physical objects is and shall always be 0" what is to stop the nothing from becoming a universe having a non zero number of objects?

I don't see any way from escaping the necessity of rules and the number zero, for a nothing of the kind you describe.

Not do I see a way for zero to exist apart from all the other numbers. Zero has properties, including factors. The factors of zero include all integers.

Jason

[Jason Resch]

Perhaps conventionally.

But perhaps physical existence is platonic existence (i.e. all self-consistent structures exist, all rule based formal systems, etc.). 

This would account for fine-tuning, and plausibly yield an answer to "why quantum mechanics?"

Jason

Brent

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[John Clark]

On Fri, Aug 12, 2022 at 3:41 PM Jason Resch <jason...@gmail.com> wrote:

> You defined nothing as a universe of zero physical objects.

I also said the universe could not exist if it only had one physical object because I defined "nothing" as infinite unbounded homogeneity. If you have a better definition of "nothing" I'd like to hear it.   

> Is zero meaningless in a universe with zero physical things?

If the universe had zero (or only one) physical things then even "meaning" would be meaningless, and so would "meaningless". But those things do have meaning therefore I can deduce that the universe does not consist of infinite unbounded homogeneity, and therefore the universe must contain more than just one thing;  

> I don't see any way from escaping the necessity of rules and the number zero,

I don't either if you want to describe how the universe works because mathematics is the best language to do that. English is a useful language too but the word "cow" cannot give milk and the definition of a computation cannot perform a computation.  

John K Clark    See what's on my new list at  Extropolis 

apl

 

[Mindey]

The way I like to think about it is this: If one is willing to believe that truth values for mathematical relations like “2 + 2 = 4” can exist and be true independently of the universe

Definition is not nothing. Definition is an implicit program.

I defined "nothing" as infinite unbounded homogeneity. If you have a better definition of "nothing" I'd like to hear it. 

I define "nothing" as absence of information about any aspect (projection axis, defining semantic dimension) whatsoever.

If the concept of zero exists then at least 'one' abstract entity must exist, the one number zero.

By this definition of "nothing", all possible projection axes (aspects, or points of view to which the projection ought to be zero by definition of "nothing") must therefore exist to define it. Thus, an assumption of nothingness explodes not just into "one abstract entity", but all possible imaginary entities with respect to which information amount can be measured, and said to be zero.

This definition of "nothing", as a kind of inverse of "everything", implies, or invites us to imagine all possible things.

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[Joel Dietz]

 > My scepticism is this: is anything being gained in terms of explanatory power? 

Although quite interesting so far Stephen Wolfram cellular automation ideas have been no help whatsoever to physicists, but perhaps someday they may be, maybe someday we'll find that quarks behave the way they do because of some simple cellular automation at work inside them, but even if that day comes to pass you're still not going to be able to make a Turing machine, or anything else, with just a definition.

I just gave a TedX talk on this topic (https://youtu.be/HhNnnKV-h_Q) but, in short, Wolfram's ideas about the ruliad are extremely helpful for formalizing physics as a set of transformations and, as such, you can begin to create a ruleset and test various variations. We are doing this starting with a physics engine (i.e. a procedurally generated game worlds with variables physics playable in various game engines including UE5), but the implication is you can potentially test various rulesets and see what coheres into a meaningful and observable phenomena. 

In that sense, this is like a testing kit to see what other dimensions are possible. 

 

ewg

   

 

Hi Jason,

This is really interesting, thanks for sharing. Since Wolfram started going in this direction, something that occurs to me is this: hypergraphs are perhaps one of the most general mathematical constructs that can be conceived of. Almost everything else can be seen as a special case of hypergraphs. Like you say, with the update rules, we shouldn't be surprised if they are equivalent to the UD. My scepticism is this: is anything being gained in terms of explanatory power? Should we be surprised that such a powerful representation can contain the rules of our reality? I do admit that I have to study these ideas in more detail, and there is something really compelling about hypergraphs + update rules.

"As soon as one starts talking about “running programs” some people will immediately ask “On what computer?” But a key intellectual point is that computational processes can ultimately be defined completely abstractly, without reference to anything like a physical computer. "

Oh boy, John Clark is not going to like this :)

Telmo.

Am Do, 11. Aug 2022, um 20:35, schrieb Jason Resch:

https://writings.stephenwolfram.com/2021/04/why-does-the-universe-exist-some-perspectives-from-our-physics-project/ 

I found this fascinating. It appears to have many similarities with the type of physical reality that emerges from then universal dovetailer, with new ways of explaining it and some new insights.

Jason

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[John Clark]

On Fri, Aug 12, 2022 at 4:49 PM Mindey <min...@mindey.com> wrote:

> I defined "nothing" as infinite unbounded homogeneity. If you have a better definition of "nothing" I'd like to hear it. 

> I define "nothing" as absence of information about any aspect (projection axis, defining semantic dimension) whatsoever.

 

I think my definition is more fundamental because Information is physical, it takes physical energy to erase information, and there is a limit to how much of it a given volume can contain and it is proportional to the area of the surface of that volume. Purely abstract things don't have that property, it would be silly to ask how much something abstract like love a sphere with a radius of 1 meter could contain, but it would not be silly to ask how much information it could contain.  And you can't have information without a discontinuity of some sort, and you can't have a discontinuity if everything is just one thing because the smallest bit of information there is involves a change from on to off.   

Also, your definition is somewhat circular because "absence" already implies the thing you're trying to define.

John K Clark    See what's on my new list at  Extropolis 

ggf

[Brent Meeker]

On 8/12/2022 12:41 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

On Fri, Aug 12, 2022, 3:33 PM John Clark <johnk...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Fri, Aug 12, 2022 at 3:09 PM Jason Resch <jason...@gmail.com> wrote:

> If there were zero objects in the universe then the concept of zero would necessarily exist to preserve the property of the number of physical objects in that nothing. If the concept of zero exists then at least 'one' abstract entity must exist, the one number zero. Now 'two' abstract numbers exist, 'one' and 'zero'. Et cetera.

You're making the argument that there must be more than just one thing in the universe and therefore it can not consist of infinite unbounded homogeneity, and therefore the universe is not nothing, and therefore the universe is something, and therefore it exists. And that's all very fine but it's irrelevant because your claim was that 2+2=4 would exist even if the universe did not. I maintain it would not. I'm certainly not saying  2+2 =4 has no meaning, I'm saying it has a meaning precisely because the universe exists. I'm saying that physics is more fundamental than mathematics.  

You defined nothing as a universe of zero physical objects. And have said a number N is meaningless without at least N things in that universe to count.

Is zero meaningless in a universe with zero physical things?

Meaning is a relation between a sentence and a fact or other sentence.  "Zero" is meaningless except for the relations we attribute to it in sentences.  It is interesting that in Peano's axioms zero is defined negatively as "The integer that is not the successor of n for all n."

You might argue that it is, but I would say zero is necessary for the operation and preservation of such a universe of zero objects.

So why don't you conclude there can be no universe of zero objects.  And what exactly is an object?  It's not a term that appears in quantum field theory?

Otherwise without some rule saying "the number of physical objects is and shall always be 0" what is to stop the nothing from becoming a universe having a non zero number of objects?

That's actually a well worked out theory, c.f. Hartle-Hawking, that nothing became a universe.  Lawrence Krauss wrote a book about it.

I don't see any way from escaping the necessity of rules and the number zero, for a nothing of the kind you describe.

Not do I see a way for zero to exist apart from all the other numbers.

That's "t" under Peano's axioms.

Zero has properties, including factors. The factors of zero include all integers.

Oh, well that proves it's real.

Brent

[Brent Meeker]

On 8/12/2022 12:56 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

On Fri, Aug 12, 2022, 3:29 PM Brent Meeker <meeke...@gmail.com> wrote:

On 8/12/2022 12:13 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

On Fri, Aug 12, 2022, 2:18 PM Brent Meeker <meeke...@gmail.com> wrote:

On 8/12/2022 10:56 AM, Jason Resch wrote:

Below is what I wrote:

The way I like to think about it is this: If one is willing to believe that truth values for mathematical relations like “2 + 2 = 4” can exist and be true independently of the universe or someone writing it down, or a mathematician thinking about it, that is all you need.

But it's truth value does depend on someone assigning the value "t" to some axioms and all mathematical truth values are nothing but "t" arbitrarily assigned to some axioms plus some rules of inference that preserve "t".  "t" has little to do with what it true in the world.

The physical world chugs along with anyone having to assign to assign values, or apply rules of inference.

Why can't the same be true for other platonic objects?

Because "Platonic" means "exists only in imagination".

Perhaps conventionally.

But perhaps physical existence is platonic existence (i.e. all self-consistent structures exist, all rule based formal systems, etc.).

Given a sufficiently broad definition of "exists".   Just like 2+2=5 for sufficiently large values of 2.

This would account for fine-tuning, and plausibly yield an answer to "why quantum mechanics?"

One can "account" for anything in words.

Brent

[Jason Resch]

Not exactly. The existence of a plentitude implies observers should find themselves entwines with an environment having many-histories.

If there was no QM, that would rule out the existence of a plentitude.

Jason

Brent

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[Brent Meeker]

On 8/12/2022 2:29 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

On Fri, Aug 12, 2022, 5:25 PM Brent Meeker <meeke...@gmail.com> wrote:

On 8/12/2022 12:56 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

On Fri, Aug 12, 2022, 3:29 PM Brent Meeker <meeke...@gmail.com> wrote:

On 8/12/2022 12:13 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

On Fri, Aug 12, 2022, 2:18 PM Brent Meeker <meeke...@gmail.com> wrote:

On 8/12/2022 10:56 AM, Jason Resch wrote:

Below is what I wrote:

The way I like to think about it is this: If one is willing to believe that truth values for mathematical relations like “2 + 2 = 4” can exist and be true independently of the universe or someone writing it down, or a mathematician thinking about it, that is all you need.

But it's truth value does depend on someone assigning the value "t" to some axioms and all mathematical truth values are nothing but "t" arbitrarily assigned to some axioms plus some rules of inference that preserve "t".  "t" has little to do with what it true in the world.

The physical world chugs along with anyone having to assign to assign values, or apply rules of inference.

Why can't the same be true for other platonic objects?

Because "Platonic" means "exists only in imagination".

Perhaps conventionally.

But perhaps physical existence is platonic existence (i.e. all self-consistent structures exist, all rule based formal systems, etc.).

Given a sufficiently broad definition of "exists".   Just like 2+2=5 for sufficiently large values of 2.

This would account for fine-tuning, and plausibly yield an answer to "why quantum mechanics?"

One can "account" for anything in words.

Not exactly. The existence of a plentitude implies observers should find themselves entwines with an environment having many-histories.

You don't know that the environment has more than one history.

If there was no QM, that would rule out the existence of a plentitude.

You think God couldn't have created other Newtonian worlds?

Brent

[Jason Resch]

If there is an infinite plenitude of individually distinct Newtonian worlds, observers within that reality will experience indeterminnace in their observations due to the fact that each observer's mind has an infinity of incarnations across different Newtonian universes in the plentitude. Even God could perhaps not eliminate that indeterminnace as experienced by most observers in such a reality. The feat might be like making a square circle.

Jason

[Brent Meeker]

In a Newtonian multitude even observer would be distinct and would have only one instance.  There would be no indeterminance.

Brent

Even God could perhaps not eliminate that indeterminnace as experienced by most observers in such a reality. The feat might be like making a square circle.

Jason

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[Jason Resch]

Why do you say they would be distinct?

Say four different Newtonian universes all contain Alice's brain in state S. Can Alice predict what she will see next, or which universe she happens to be in?

(See attached brain states image)

"It is impossible for any observer to deduce with certainty on the basis of her observations and memory which world she is a part of. That is, there are always many different worlds for which being contained in them is compatible with everything she knows, but which imply different predictions for future observations."

-- Markus Müller in “Could the physical world be emergent instead of fundamental, and why should we ask?” (2017)

Jason

Brent

Even God could perhaps not eliminate that indeterminnace as experienced by most observers in such a reality. The feat might be like making a square circle.

Jason

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[Brent Meeker]

They're either distinct or identical and identical universes are the same universe, c.f. Laplace and the identity of indiscernibles.

Brent

[Jason Resch]

The universes can be different while the same brain state of a particular observer is found between two or more universes.

Jason

Brent

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[Brent Meeker]

In that case they are distinct universes.  Universes include brains.

Brent

[Stathis Papaioannou]

Identical physical states in a deterministic world would evolve identically, as would any supervening mental states. However, a supervenient relationship is such that multiple different physical states can give rise to the same mental state. The different physical states may then evolve differently giving different subsequent mental states. Subjectively, this would mean that your next mental state is undetermined. This idea has been used by the philosopher Christian List to propose a mechanism for libertarian free will in a determined world. I don’t think that works because indeterminacy is not a good basis for free will (the main problem with libertarian free will), but it is an interesting idea nonetheless.

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Stathis Papaioannou

[ronaldheld]

Is this vaguely related to Tegmark's mathematical structures? 

[John Clark]

On Sat, Aug 13, 2022 at 12:49 AM Stathis Papaioannou <stat...@gmail.com> wrote:

> Identical physical states in a deterministic world would evolve identically, as would any supervening mental states.

Yes. 

 > However, a supervenient relationship is such that multiple different physical states can give rise to the same mental state.

True, and in that situation things would not be reversible; a cellular automation like Conway's LIFE is not reversible and for the same reason. Something can be 100% deterministic in the forward time dimension but not in the backward time dimension, but so far at least nobody has any experimental evidence that fundamental physics has that property, fundamental physics can't explain why you can't unscramble an egg, you need more than the laws of physics to explain that you need to invoke initial conditions. That situation could change if some of Stephen Wolfram's ideas turn out to be correct, but so far there is no evidence that they are.  

 > The different physical states may then evolve differently giving different subsequent mental states. Subjectively, this would mean that your next mental state is undetermined. 

You never know for sure what you're going to do next until you actually do it because sometimes you change your mind at the last second, but there is nothing profound or mystical in that, a two dollar calculator doesn't know what it's gonna put up on its screen when you type in 2+2 until it has finish the calculation.  

> This idea has been used by the philosopher Christian List to propose a mechanism for libertarian free will in a determined world. I don’t think that works because indeterminacy is not a good basis for free will (the main problem with libertarian free will), but it is an interesting idea nonetheless.

I've never heard of him but if he's like most philosophers he will have gone on and on about why we have free will without once asking himself what the term "free will" is even supposed to mean; I've never heard a philosopher give a definition of it that wasn't either circular or just pure gibberish. I feel it might be helpful if before philosophers start talking about whether human beings have a certain property they first make clear what that property is, and only after that would it be appropriate to discuss if humans happen to have that property or not.  I don't demand that the definition be perfect but I don't think it's too much to ask that they give me at least a general idea of approximately what the hell they're talking about when they say "free will".