EOM.
> IHA = ?
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Specifically, will the time dilation of a clock in an accelerating frame, be the same as a clock as measured for a clock in a the observer's accelerating frame, where v in the LT is the instantaneous velocity of the clock in the observer's frame at every time t in the observer's frame?
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> Please answer the question defining this thread.
> Specifically, will the time dilation of a clock in an accelerating frame, be the same as a clock as measured for a clock in a the observer's accelerating frame
I don't understand the question, if they're both accelerating at the same rate then they're in the same reference frame.
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Specifically, will the time dilation of a clock in an accelerating frame, be the same as a clock as measured for a clock in a the observer's accelerating frame, where v in the LT is the instantaneous velocity of the clock in the observer's frame at every time t in the observer's frame?
On Tuesday, November 15, 2022 at 10:54:06 PM UTC-7 Alan Grayson wrote:
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On Tue, Nov 15, 2022 at 9:50 PM Alan Grayson <agrays...@gmail.com> wrote:
> Please answer the question defining this thread.
The answer is yes, provided that the acceleration is produced by a force, such as you'd get with a rocket. In General Relativity gravity is not considered a force, it's just the way things move if Spacetime is curved in a certain way, and to figure out what that curvature is you need to know how much mass there is in the area and how it's distributed, and you need to know General Relativity
> Specifically, will the time dilation of a clock in an accelerating frame, be the same as a clock as measured for a clock in a the observer's accelerating frameI don't understand the question, if they're both accelerating at the same rate then they're in the same reference frame. And again, Special Relativity can't deal with gravity. According to Special Relativity if you're sitting quietly in a gravitational well, as you would be if you were on the Earth's surface, you're not accelerating, but according to General Relativity you're accelerating upward at 9.8 meters per second per second, and if you observe somebody in distant deep space far from any source of gravity and they were keeping a constant distance from you their wristwatch would seem to be moving slightly faster than normal, and to them your wristwatch would seem to be moving slightly slower than normal.
You need both Special Relativity and General Relativity to make the corrections necessary for the Global Positioning Satellite system to work.
A GPS Satellite is moving fast compared to a clock on the ground so Special Relativity says the clock on the satellite will lose 7210 nanoseconds a day, but the satellite clock is further from the Earth's center so it's in a weaker gravitational field, and because of that General Relativity says the satellite clock will gain 45850 nanoseconds a day relative to the clock on the ground. So the two theories together predict the satellite clock will gain 45850 −7210 = 38,640 nanoseconds a day relative to a clock on the ground. If we stuck with Newton and this relativistic correction was not taken into account map positions would be off by about 6 miles a day, and the error would be cumulative
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EOM.
> Setting aside relativity for the nonce, the workability of transversable wormholes is getting more, better!
https://journals.aps.org/prd/abstract/10.1103/PhysRevD.106.104024
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On Wed, Nov 16, 2022 at 7:25 PM <spudb...@aol.com> wrote:> Setting aside relativity for the nonce, the workability of transversable wormholes is getting more, better!
https://journals.aps.org/prd/abstract/10.1103/PhysRevD.106.104024The trouble with the idea that a Black Hole is the mouth of a wormhole is that the other end of the wormhole should be a White Hole and nobody has ever detected one
LC: If we have two accelerating frames accelerating at the same rate but in opposite directions, do the Laws of Physics transform according to the LT where v in the LT is now the instantaneous relative velocity of the frames at every time t? AG
JC: take notice. These are the TWO frames I was referring to previously. Also, in answering the question posed in this thread, I don't think it matters if the acceleration is produced by a force or by gravity. This is what I conclude from Brent's diagram. Do you agree? AG
On Wednesday, November 16, 2022 at 5:05:32 PM UTC-7 Lawrence Crowell wrote:
Accelerated frames can be addressed with special relativity.
LC
On Monday, November 14, 2022 at 2:14:46 PM UTC-6 agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
EOM.
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Ah, and Minkowski's higher dimension appears to require Willem DeSitter to step in and re-normalize the view from such an observer. My thinking is, would this be some sort of tachyonic field in some kind of Lorentzian Manifold? You may know, but I cannot.
> A stable wormhole requires threading by negative energy density. Since no such negative energy field is know and it's existence would imperil the stability of matter, its existence seems highly unlikely.
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> That's an energy density lower than the surrounding vacuum. The conducting plates exclude longer wavelengths relative to their spacing. This is not the same as negative energy in the vacuum.
On Fri, Nov 18, 2022 at 4:51 PM Brent Meeker <meeke...@gmail.com> wrote:
> That's an energy density lower than the surrounding vacuum. The conducting plates exclude longer wavelengths relative to their spacing. This is not the same as negative energy in the vacuum.
If you assume the surrounding vacuum has a zero energy density, which is an entirely reasonable assumption to make because that is a pretty good definition of a vacuum,
and if the volume between the plates has a lower energy density than that, then I don't see how something can be less than zero without being negative.
7fc
pl6On 11/18/2022 3:38 AM, John Clark wrote:
> A stable wormhole requires threading by negative energy density. Since no such negative energy field is know and it's existence would imperil the stability of matter, its existence seems highly unlikely.
In the Casimir Effect (which has been experimentally confirmed) the narrow space between 2 flat conducting plates has a negative energy density, and that causes an attraction between the 2 plates because there is more energy outside the plates pushing the plates together than there is between the plates pushing the plates apart.
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As I see it quantum mechanics has features of being a type of Bayesian update system with mutual information. A single system can give a string of outputs, say by running an electron through a sequence of Stern-Gerlach experiments, which will give a statistical distribution of outcomes based on the orientation of the different SG apparatuses. However, to understand the statistical properties one must perform this experiment multiple times, for to assume any string of outcomes with a single electron gives the total statistical distribution is to assume the ergodic principle. Bayesian statistics is not entirely consistent with the ergodic principle. I see this as holding regardless of what interpretation of quantum mechanics one holds to. With science in general experiments are performed on multiple systems and with repeated trials, whether the experiments test the effectiveness of a medication or are looking for the Higgs particle. Science addresses nature not in some existential level according to what always "is" with a system, but rather as a set of outcomes of various trials.
The nature of quantum wave function is not explicitly knowable. Bohr said the wave function is just a predictive device meant to predict probability outcomes, and it has no effectiveness at telling us how an outcome obtains. This is the epistemic perspective. Everettian MWI is an ontological interpretation, but again it gives us no information for predicting any particular outcome. This appears in what I have seen so far of this what Deutsch is trying to argue. In effect this is an appeal to some type of local hidden variable. Since neither epistemic or ontic interpretations tell us anything about how an outcome applies, the existential nature of the wave function is not decidable.
A quantum interpretation is not something that is proven by quantum mechanics. It can only be consistent with quantum mechanics, say in that it does not contradict quantum mechanical results. The Bohm QM interpretation originally proposed a local hidden variable, but since this contradicts QM and so the Bohmians accepted a non-local hidden variable or "beable," within a rather clumsy system. Deutsch is attempting to localize a hidden variable IMO.
This interestingly points to issues with quantum gravitation. One of the things that is strange is that in cosmology a lot of what we think of as hard facts about physics do not apply. One of these is conservation of energy. There are various types of solutions to the Einstein field equation. These are from the close field to far field, Petrov type D solutions corresponding to black holes, type II and III solutions that correspond to intermediate gravity field, and type N solutions that are far field solutions and gravitational waves or radiation. These have dynamics on a contact manifold determined by Nöther’s theorem and Killing vectors. These also have a distribution of occurrences in the world. The universe does not, and further it has only one outcome. Quantum cosmology is not something that fits within a standard scientific paradigm.
All of these ideas of multiverse, or black hole vacuum generation of cosmologies and so forth are so red-shifted away that we may never be able to observe any consequence of them. This is particularly the case with inflation. In effect these sorts of “pre-cosmic” theories may be sort of quantum gravitational hidden variables that are completely unobservable.
I think that Deutsch is proposing something that is a type of hidden variable that will contradict QM on some level. Deutsch has proposed these things before, where at one time he said there splitting of the worlds was determined by some scalar field that an experimenter could observe and predict the outcome.
LC
> The experimenter is just one copy
> Many worlds does not explain why I, for example, see only z-spin-up and not z-spin-down. To make sense of that, we need a viable concept of probability and the Born rule.
> Many worlds does not explain why I, for example, see only z-spin-up and not z-spin-down.
> And Many worlds assumes a probabilistic interpretation, contradicting the argument that Deutsch is making.
> You can't get separate worlds in which different copies of the observer see different outcomes without assuming the Born rule.
> So that small amplitudes correspond to low probabilities.
On Sun, Nov 20, 2022 at 7:29 PM Bruce Kellett <bhkel...@gmail.com> wrote:
> The experimenter is just one copy
And that pinpoints the error in your logic right there.
> Many worlds does not explain why I, for example, see only z-spin-up and not z-spin-down. To make sense of that, we need a viable concept of probability and the Born rule.Gleason's theorem proved mathematically that if you want this thing called "probability" to have the property that it is always positive and never negative, and the property that if you add up all the "probabilities" they always add up to exactly 100% , then the Born Rule can be derived from quantum mechanics provided you make the assumption of non-reality (sometimes called Quantum contextuality), that is to say if you assume that an unmeasured quality does NOT have one and only one value. Many Worlds does make that assumption, or rather it makes the assumption that Schrodinger's equation means what it says, and once you do that you have no choice but to accept non-reality. You can still save reality but to do so you must make additional assumptions (such as the assumption that Schrodinger's equation does NOT mean what it says), that's why some call Many Worlds bare bones, no nonsense quantum mechanics, it has no silly bells and whistles cluttering things up. And that's the sort of thing William of Ockham would approve of.
I admit that does not prove Many Worlds is correct but at least it passes its first test, and it proves that conventional everyday assumptions about the nature of reality must be dead wrong; you're never going to find a quantum interpretation that feels obvious and intuitively true and is also consistent with experimental observations. So if Many Worlds is incorrect then something even stranger must be true.
> Many worlds does not explain why I, for example, see only z-spin-up and not z-spin-down.
And Bruce Kellett does not explain what exactly the personal pronoun "I" means in the context of Many Worlds. In Many Worlds for every state that the laws of physics allows a particle to be in there is a Bruce Kellett observing that state; so of course Mr. I will observe one and only one state.
John K Clark See what's on my new list at Extropolis
trb
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He's wrong that frequentism does not empirically support probability statements. He goes off on a tangent by referring to "other gamblers". Nothing in physics is certain, yet Deutsch takes a bunch of definite assertions and claims they alone are the real physics.
On Tue, Nov 22, 2022 at 11:08 AM Brent Meeker <meeke...@gmail.com> wrote:
He's wrong that frequentism does not empirically support probability statements. He goes off on a tangent by referring to "other gamblers". Nothing in physics is certain, yet Deutsch takes a bunch of definite assertions and claims they alone are the real physics.
His critique of frequentism is just a recap of arguments that are well known -- you cannot ground probability theory in frequentism, or the idea that probabilities are nothing more than ratios of long-run frequencies. Long-run frequencies might approximate the probabilities, but they cannot be used to ground probability theory -- for well known reasons. I agree that he goes off on a number of irrelevant tangents, and he is wrong to suppose that frequentism is a main-stream theory of probability (at least, these days).
Bruce
On 11/20/2022 4:28 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On Mon, Nov 21, 2022 at 2:52 AM smitra <smi...@zonnet.nl> wrote:
Probability cannot be a fundamental concept in physics as explained
here:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wfzSE4Hoxbc
I'm afraid Deutsch is a bit too glib in this lecture. He hasn't, despite his best efforts, removed probability from physics. For example, in quantum mechanics, he has not explained why, if one measures the z-spin of a spin-half particle prepared in an eigenstate of x-spin, one gets only one result -- either z-spin-up or z-spin-down. If one has eliminated probability, one should be able to explain which result one gets, and why. It is no solution to say that with many-worlds, that both results are obtained by disjoint copies of the experimenter. The experimenter is just one copy, and one would have to explain the result for each individual separately. Many worlds does not explain why I, for example, see only z-spin-up and not z-spin-down. To make sense of that, we need a viable concept of probability and the Born rule.
Bruce
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On 11/21/2022 4:33 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On Tue, Nov 22, 2022 at 11:08 AM Brent Meeker <meeke...@gmail.com> wrote:
He's wrong that frequentism does not empirically support probability statements. He goes off on a tangent by referring to "other gamblers". Nothing in physics is certain, yet Deutsch takes a bunch of definite assertions and claims they alone are the real physics.
His critique of frequentism is just a recap of arguments that are well known -- you cannot ground probability theory in frequentism, or the idea that probabilities are nothing more than ratios of long-run frequencies. Long-run frequencies might approximate the probabilities, but they cannot be used to ground probability theory -- for well known reasons. I agree that he goes off on a number of irrelevant tangents, and he is wrong to suppose that frequentism is a main-stream theory of probability (at least, these days).
But frequencies are how we test probabilistic theories.
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The problem lies with the notion of probability, he explains here that
it cannot refer to anything in the physics world as an exact statement:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wfzSE4Hoxbc&t=1036s
That's then a problem for a fundamental theory of physics as such a
theory must refer to statements about nature that are exactly true.
On 11/21/2022 4:38 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On Tue, Nov 22, 2022 at 11:35 AM Brent Meeker <meeke...@gmail.com> wrote:
But frequencies are how we test probabilistic theories.
Testing is not a theoretical grounding of the theory.
It's not the axiomatic ground of Kolmogorov's theory. But so what? We tested Euclid's theory of geometry by making measurements which weren't in his axioms. That doesn't mean Euclid's wasn't a good theory of geometry. I can see Deutsch crossing off Pythagora's theorem saying, "No matter how precise our instruments they only yield rational quantities!" Physics is not mathematics and it's never going to have data to infinitely many decimal places. That frequencies only yield rational number approximations to Born rule predictions doesn't seem like a big deal to me.
On 22-11-2022 02:45, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> On Tue, Nov 22, 2022 at 12:12 PM smitra <smi...@zonnet.nl> wrote:
>
>> The problem lies with the notion of probability, he explains here
>> that
>> it cannot refer to anything in the physics world as an exact
>> statement:
>>
>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wfzSE4Hoxbc&t=1036s
>>
>> That's then a problem for a fundamental theory of physics as such a
>> theory must refer to statements about nature that are exactly true.
>
> No statements in physics are exactly true.
>
> Bruce
>
The problem with probability is actually the other way around. It's
impossible to rigorously define probability in purely physical terms.
Therefore the exact formulation of the laws of physics cannot refer to
probability.
On Tue, Nov 22, 2022 at 12:44 PM Brent Meeker <meeke...@gmail.com> wrote:
On 11/21/2022 4:38 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On Tue, Nov 22, 2022 at 11:35 AM Brent Meeker <meeke...@gmail.com> wrote:
But frequencies are how we test probabilistic theories.
Testing is not a theoretical grounding of the theory.
It's not the axiomatic ground of Kolmogorov's theory. But so what? We tested Euclid's theory of geometry by making measurements which weren't in his axioms. That doesn't mean Euclid's wasn't a good theory of geometry. I can see Deutsch crossing off Pythagora's theorem saying, "No matter how precise our instruments they only yield rational quantities!" Physics is not mathematics and it's never going to have data to infinitely many decimal places. That frequencies only yield rational number approximations to Born rule predictions doesn't seem like a big deal to me.
What is a probability? We can't define it as a limiting frequency, since repeats of a sequence of measurements of a spin are going to give a range of answers for the frequency of spin-up, and this sequence converges to some limit only in probability. That is then circular -- probability is defined in terms of probability.
Perhaps 'probability' is a primitive concept -- not definable in terms of anything physical. Nevertheless, like language, it is essential for our understanding of our experience of the world.
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What about the idea of grounding the notion of probability in terms of the frequency in the limit of a hypothetical infinite series of trials, what philosophers call "hypothetical frequentism"? The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy discussion of this at https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/probability-interpret/#FreInt notes the objection that the limit depends on the order we count the trials, but it seems pretty natural to use temporal ordering in this case. Aside from the philosophical objection that we don't have any clear a priori justification for privileging temporal ordering in this way, are there any objections of a more technical nature to hypothetical frequentism with temporal ordering (scenarios where it would give you a different answer from standard probability theory), or are the objections purely philosophical?
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>> some call Many Worlds bare bones, no nonsense quantum mechanics, it has no silly bells and whistles cluttering things up. And that's the sort of thing William of Ockham would approve of.
> It has an infinite number of other worlds, most differing from this world only in unobservable ways.
> In comparison, taking the Born rule to mean what it says seems like modest addition to the theory.
> Testing is not a theoretical grounding of the theory.
> What is a probability?
> Temporal ordering implies that we have actually completed an infinite series of tosses, and that is never possible.
> We then have to assume that the first N trials form a "typical" subset, and how do you ever justify that?
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On Mon, Nov 21, 2022 at 6:31 PM Brent Meeker <meeke...@gmail.com> wrote:
>> some call Many Worlds bare bones, no nonsense quantum mechanics, it has no silly bells and whistles cluttering things up. And that's the sort of thing William of Ockham would approve of.
> It has an infinite number of other worlds, most differing from this world only in unobservable ways.
Yes.> In comparison, taking the Born rule to mean what it says seems like modest addition to the theory.
From experimentation we know for a fact the Born Rule means what it says and is correct, but if you are not satisfied with the "shut up and calculate" philosophy and if there were NOT "an infinite number of other worlds most differing from this world only in unobservable ways" then you're out of luck; if that's true I don't think there would be any hope of achieving an intuitive understanding of why the Born Rule is correct
, and so you must instead just learn to be satisfied with shut up and calculate.
After all, many philosophers, including some really great ones like Dirac, are just not interested in philosophy.
John K Clark See what's on my new list at Extropolis6te
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I think the important point is that probability theory is just mathematics, like calculus or linear algebra. It has applications in which it is given different interpretations: frequentism, degree of belief, measure, decision theory, etc. Often its application entails moving from one interpretation to another.
Brent
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One result that might lend itself to a hypothetical frequentist take on QM probabilities is discussed by David Z Albert on p. 237-238 of the book The Cosmos of Science, those pages can be read at https://books.google.com/books?id=_HgF3wfADJIC&lpg=PP1&pg=PA238#v=onepage&q&f=false . He considers a scenario where a measuring device is interacting with an infinite series of identically prepared quantum systems, and creating a "pointer state" that tells you just the fraction of those systems that showed a certain result (like an electron being spin-up), and he considers what happens if we analyze this scenario without invoking the collapse postulate or the Born rule, instead just modeling the measurements as entanglement between the measuring system and the system being measured. After a finite number of trials the pointer will be in a superposition of states, but in the infinite limit, all the amplitude becomes concentrated on the eigenstate of the pointer measurement operator where the pointer shows the correct quantum-mechanical probability (for example, "1/2 of all trials showed spin-up").This type of collapse-free derivation of something like probability in the infinite limit is also discussed in section 5 of the paper at https://www.academia.edu/6975159/Quantum_dispositions_and_the_notion_of_measurement starting on p. 12, apparently the result is known as "Mittelstaedt's theorem". I suppose this result can't really explain why we seem to see definite outcomes (as opposed to superpositions) after a finite number of trials without some additional QM interpretation, but it at least has a "flavor" reminiscent of hypothetical frequentism.
> I don't see how MWI adds to intuitive understanding of the Born rule. It's not agreed among MWI advocates how different outcomes occur with different weights (which is just another "probability" measure) or in different numbers so there can be branch counting.
>I have no problem with calculating probabilities.
> Apparently though some people experience existential angst when told the world isn't deterministic.
On Tue, Nov 22, 2022 at 4:28 PM Brent Meeker <meeke...@gmail.com> wrote:
> I don't see how MWI adds to intuitive understanding of the Born rule. It's not agreed among MWI advocates how different outcomes occur with different weights (which is just another "probability" measure) or in different numbers so there can be branch counting.Branch counting won't work if you assume there are an infinite number of worlds but one and only one Mr.You, but if there is also an infinite number of Brent Meekers who physically differ from each other in ways that are so sub microscopically tiny they make no subjective difference it does work.
A string that is 6 inches long and one 7 inches long both have an infinite number of points, but if I put 80 of the 6 inch strings into a hat and 20 of the 7 inch ones and are blindfolded close and pick one out of the hat at random and asked to make a bet on which sort of string I picked I would place the odds at a 80% chance it would be 6 inches and 20% it would be 7 inches. And if I consistently played that game and used those odds I would soon make a lot of money.
John K Clark See what's on my new list at Extropolis
muq
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>> Branch counting won't work if you assume there are an infinite number of worlds but one and only one Mr.You, but if there is also an infinite number of Brent Meekers who physically differ from each other in ways that are so sub microscopically tiny they make no subjective difference it does work.
> Right, provided you specify that the entanglement with result X vs Y be random, independently distributed over the infinite number.
> But to me that seems less intuitive than just the Born Rule.
> I know Everettians will say the infinite branches of Brent Meeker are just different projections of the World Vector and although we can ignore all the projections except the one we observed, by keeping all the unobserved ones we've avoided saying the wave function collapsed. We can't say exactly where and when, but we're sure there was a continuous process of splitting.
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