On Wednesday, April 13, 2022 at 8:55:48 PM UTC+3 meeke...@gmail.com (Brent) wrote:
Decoherence has gone part way in solving the when/where/what basis questions, but only part way.
As I wrote at the end of my first reply to your message, I share your concern about decoherence but I see the glass as half-full; that is, with a little more subtlety I hope that the matter can be formulated in clear terms.
Surely collapse is easier to handle as a general concept (except, on the other hand, that it requires new dynamics). I forgot to mention that my argument for deriving the Born Rule works with collapse, too -- so it is an alternative to Gleason's theorem.
Here I define colapse as an irreversible process, violating unitarity of course, and I keep it separate from randomisation. The latter means that each outcome is somehow randomised -- an assumption we can do without.
Collapse can also be described in a many-world formulation! It differs from the no-collapse MWI only in being irreversible.
My argument in outline is
1. assessment that MWI-with-collapse is workable;
2. therefore, outcomes of small enough measure can be neglected in practice;
3. now Everett's argument can proceed, concluding that the Born Rule is a practically safe assumption (to put it briefly).
So I have replaced two assumptions of Gleason's theorem, randomisation and non-contextuality, by the assessment of workability only.
If you don't feel comfortable yet with formulating collapse in a many-world setting, let us also assume randomisation (God plays dice), for the sake of the argument, in a single-world formulation. That is, we ASSUME the existence of probability; then the previous argument just guarantees that this probability follows the Born Rule.
Of course I favour the first version of the argument, using the many-world formulation of collapse, to avoid the "God plays dice" nightmare.
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Thanks for the comments so far, because they stirred my thinking and motivated fresh ideas, some of which I hope will prove helpful and worth discussing, if and when they mature.
George K.
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On 4/14/2022 2:00 PM, George Kahrimanis wrote:
On Wednesday, April 13, 2022 at 8:55:48 PM UTC+3 meeke...@gmail.com (Brent) wrote:
Decoherence has gone part way in solving the when/where/what basis questions, but only part way.
As I wrote at the end of my first reply to your message, I share your concern about decoherence but I see the glass as half-full; that is, with a little more subtlety I hope that the matter can be formulated in clear terms.
Surely collapse is easier to handle as a general concept (except, on the other hand, that it requires new dynamics). I forgot to mention that my argument for deriving the Born Rule works with collapse, too -- so it is an alternative to Gleason's theorem.
Here I define colapse as an irreversible process, violating unitarity of course, and I keep it separate from randomisation. The latter means that each outcome is somehow randomised -- an assumption we can do without.
Collapse can also be described in a many-world formulation! It differs from the no-collapse MWI only in being irreversible.
If you can throw away low probability branches, what's to stop you from throwing away all but one? You've already broken unitary evolution. If you read Hardy's axiomatization of QM you see that the difference between QM and classical mechanics turns on a single word in Axiom 5 Continuity: There exists a continuous reversible transformation on a system between any two pure states of that system.
My argument in outline is
1. assessment that MWI-with-collapse is workable;
2. therefore, outcomes of small enough measure can be neglected in practice;
Yes, I've wondered if a smallest non-zero probability could be defined consistent with the data.
3. now Everett's argument can proceed, concluding that the Born Rule is a practically safe assumption (to put it briefly).
So I have replaced two assumptions of Gleason's theorem, randomisation and non-contextuality, by the assessment of workability only.
If you don't feel comfortable yet with formulating collapse in a many-world setting, let us also assume randomisation (God plays dice), for the sake of the argument, in a single-world formulation. That is, we ASSUME the existence of probability; then the previous argument just guarantees that this probability follows the Born Rule.
Assume? Randomness is well motivated by evidence. And it's more random than just not knowing some inherent variable, because in the EPR experiment a randomized hidden variable can on explain the QM result if it's non-local.
Of course I favour the first version of the argument, using the many-world formulation of collapse, to avoid the "God plays dice" nightmare.
Why this fear of true randomness? We have all kinds of classical randomness we just attributed to "historical accident". Would it really make any difference it were due to inherent quantum randomness? Albrect and Phillips have made an argument that there is quantum randomness even nominally classical dynamics. https://arxiv.org/abs/1212.0953v3
Of course I favour the first version of the argument, using the many-world formulation of collapse, to avoid the "God plays dice" nightmare.
Why this fear of true randomness? We have all kinds of classical randomness we just attributed to "historical accident". Would it really make any difference it were due to inherent quantum randomness? Albrect and Phillips have made an argument that there is quantum randomness even nominally classical dynamics. https://arxiv.org/abs/1212.0953v3
True randomness implies unintelligibility; that is, no existing physical process for causing the results of measurements. AG
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A simple example of your point is a gas at some temperature and pressure, confined in some volume. For a given particle in the ensemble, we can't determine its exact path because we lack information about its interactions. But if we had that knowledge, we could determine its exact path, and any uncertainties in that information would translate into uncertainties in its path. But inherent randomness in QM is different and probably has nothing to do with the UP.
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I was aware of the limitation on precision implied by the HUP. I was addressing whether simultaneous measurements are possible despite the HUP. I think they are possible.
But my main point is that acausality is tantamount to unintelligible. IMO, there's a huge difference between being unable to perfectly predict the time evolution of a system, and it being uncaused. AG
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On 4/17/2022 6:33 PM, Alan Grayson wrote:
I was aware of the limitation on precision implied by the HUP. I was addressing whether simultaneous measurements are possible despite the HUP. I think they are possible.The HUP directly refers ideal measurements which are preparations. Each destructive measurement can simultaneously measure conjugate variables to arbitrary precision. But repeating the destructive measurements on exactly the same prepared system will then give a scatter of answers which satisfies the HUP.
But my main point is that acausality is tantamount to unintelligible. IMO, there's a huge difference between being unable to perfectly predict the time evolution of a system, and it being uncaused. AG
Is there? Even if the unpredicitability is in-principle? What is the huge difference?
Brent
But my main point is that acausality is tantamount to unintelligible. IMO, there's a huge difference between being unable to perfectly predict the time evolution of a system, and it being uncaused. AG
Is there? Even if the unpredicitability is in-principle? What is the huge difference?
Brent
So what, in your view, bugged AE about probability in QM? AG
A deterministic clockwork universe vs a lawless universe (see Svozil, Arxiv,2000). I think QM is in between.
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So what, in your view, bugged AE about probability in QM? AG
> the Pilot Wave theory assumes each particle has a definite position and momentum.
> It doesn't violate the HUP because the HUP simply limits what we can measure.
On Mon, Apr 18, 2022 at 2:17 PM Alan Grayson <agrays...@gmail.com> wrote:> the Pilot Wave theory assumes each particle has a definite position and momentum.That's true but unlike Many Worlds Pilot Wave theory is non-local, it postulates there is a mysterious force of some sort that is undiminished by distance in which two particles billions of light years apart can INSTANTLY affect each other without affecting anything in between. It seems to me if that were the case then we'd have to know everything before we could know anything, and that does not conform with observation because although we don't know everything we do know some things. If the universe was really non-local we couldn't even make approximate predictions regardless of if things were deterministic or not.Copenhagen assumes a particle has NO position and momentum if it has not been measured. Pilot Wave theory assumes a particle has ONE position and momentum if it has not been measured. Many Worlds assumes Schrodinger's equation means what it says so a particle has EVERY position and momentum the equation allows regardless of if it has been measured or not.> It doesn't violate the HUP because the HUP simply limits what we can measure.Then you should like Many Worlds because it says everything happens because of Schrodinger's equation, and Schrodinger's equation is 100% deterministic.
Many Worlds explains why that, although from the multiverse point of view things are as deterministic as Schrödinger's equation, to any particular observer in one of those worlds there would be a limit to how accurate his predictions can be.
> If S's equation represented a horse race, with probabilities changing during the race -- of the order of final results -- why do you think the race continues in other worlds, with all combinations of outcomes?
> We've discussed this before, many times.
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On Tue, Apr 19, 2022 at 11:31 AM Alan Grayson <agrays...@gmail.com> wrote:> If S's equation represented a horse race, with probabilities changing during the race -- of the order of final results -- why do you think the race continues in other worlds, with all combinations of outcomes?Because until Alan Grayson sees the end of the race, or somebody tells Alan Grayson about it, Alan Grayson can't be certain what world Alan Grayson is in. Alan Grayson could be in a world where horse X won or Alan Grayson could be in a world where horse Y won, until Alan Grayson receives more information Alan Grayson would have to say the odds are 50-50.
> you claim, without argument, that all possible outcomes are realized.
On Tue, Apr 19, 2022 at 12:08 PM Alan Grayson <agrays...@gmail.com> wrote:> you claim, without argument, that all possible outcomes are realized.I don't need to make an argument for that because the one and only assumption that Many Worlds makes, perhaps "axiom" would be a better word, is that Schrödinger's Equation means what it says.
>> I don't need to make an argument for that because the one and only assumption that Many Worlds makes, perhaps "axiom" would be a better word, is that Schrödinger's Equation means what it says.> But S's equation just gives the time dependent probabilities BEFORE a measurement is taken. You've added an additional postulate without any justification. AG
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On Tue, Apr 19, 2022 at 12:42 PM Alan Grayson <agrays...@gmail.com> wrote:>> I don't need to make an argument for that because the one and only assumption that Many Worlds makes, perhaps "axiom" would be a better word, is that Schrödinger's Equation means what it says.> But S's equation just gives the time dependent probabilities BEFORE a measurement is taken. You've added an additional postulate without any justification. AGSchrödinger's Equation is time independent,
>> Schrödinger's Equation is time independent,> Then why, for example, does the solution for a free particle spread out as time progresses? AG
> the SE wouldn't be time-dependent unless the SE is time-dependent.
On Tue, Apr 19, 2022 at 5:46 PM Alan Grayson <agrays...@gmail.com> wrote:> the SE wouldn't be time-dependent unless the SE is time-dependent.I can't argue with that, and a banana wouldn't be a banana unless a banana was a banana.
On 4/14/2022 2:00 PM, George Kahrimanis wrote:
On Wednesday, April 13, 2022 at 8:55:48 PM UTC+3 meeke...@gmail.com (Brent) wrote:
Decoherence has gone part way in solving the when/where/what basis questions, but only part way.
As I wrote at the end of my first reply to your message, I share your concern about decoherence but I see the glass as half-full; that is, with a little more subtlety I hope that the matter can be formulated in clear terms.
Surely collapse is easier to handle as a general concept (except, on the other hand, that it requires new dynamics). I forgot to mention that my argument for deriving the Born Rule works with collapse, too -- so it is an alternative to Gleason's theorem.
Here I define colapse as an irreversible process, violating unitarity of course, and I keep it separate from randomisation. The latter means that each outcome is somehow randomised -- an assumption we can do without.
Collapse can also be described in a many-world formulation! It differs from the no-collapse MWI only in being irreversible.
If you can throw away low probability branches, what's to stop you from throwing away all but one? You've already broken unitary evolution. If you read Hardy's axiomatization of QM you see that the difference between QM and classical mechanics turns on a single word in Axiom 5 Continuity: There exists a continuous reversible transformation on a system between any two pure states of that system.
My argument in outline is
1. assessment that MWI-with-collapse is workable;
2. therefore, outcomes of small enough measure can be neglected in practice;
Yes, I've wondered if a smallest non-zero probability could be defined consistent with the data.
3. now Everett's argument can proceed, concluding that the Born Rule is a practically safe assumption (to put it briefly).
So I have replaced two assumptions of Gleason's theorem, randomisation and non-contextuality, by the assessment of workability only.
If you don't feel comfortable yet with formulating collapse in a many-world setting, let us also assume randomisation (God plays dice), for the sake of the argument, in a single-world formulation. That is, we ASSUME the existence of probability; then the previous argument just guarantees that this probability follows the Born Rule.
Assume? Randomness is well motivated by evidence. And it's more random than just not knowing some inherent variable, because in the EPR experiment a randomized hidden variable can on explain the QM result if it's non-local.
Of course I favour the first version of the argument, using the many-world formulation of collapse, to avoid the "God plays dice" nightmare.
Why this fear of true randomness? We have all kinds of classical randomness we just attributed to "historical accident". Would it really make any difference it were due to inherent quantum randomness? Albrect and Phillips have made an argument that there is quantum randomness even nominally classical dynamics. https://arxiv.org/abs/1212.0953v3
Brent
Thanks for the comments so far, because they stirred my thinking and motivated fresh ideas, some of which I hope will prove helpful and worth discussing, if and when they mature.
George K.
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On Friday, April 15, 2022 at 12:41:03 PM UTC-6 meeke...@gmail.com wrote:
On 4/14/2022 2:00 PM, George Kahrimanis wrote:
On Wednesday, April 13, 2022 at 8:55:48 PM UTC+3 meeke...@gmail.com (Brent) wrote:
Decoherence has gone part way in solving the when/where/what basis questions, but only part way.
As I wrote at the end of my first reply to your message, I share your concern about decoherence but I see the glass as half-full; that is, with a little more subtlety I hope that the matter can be formulated in clear terms.
Surely collapse is easier to handle as a general concept (except, on the other hand, that it requires new dynamics). I forgot to mention that my argument for deriving the Born Rule works with collapse, too -- so it is an alternative to Gleason's theorem.
Here I define colapse as an irreversible process, violating unitarity of course, and I keep it separate from randomisation. The latter means that each outcome is somehow randomised -- an assumption we can do without.
Collapse can also be described in a many-world formulation! It differs from the no-collapse MWI only in being irreversible.
If you can throw away low probability branches, what's to stop you from throwing away all but one? You've already broken unitary evolution. If you read Hardy's axiomatization of QM you see that the difference between QM and classical mechanics turns on a single word in Axiom 5 Continuity: There exists a continuous reversible transformation on a system between any two pure states of that system.
My argument in outline is
1. assessment that MWI-with-collapse is workable;
2. therefore, outcomes of small enough measure can be neglected in practice;
Yes, I've wondered if a smallest non-zero probability could be defined consistent with the data.
3. now Everett's argument can proceed, concluding that the Born Rule is a practically safe assumption (to put it briefly).
So I have replaced two assumptions of Gleason's theorem, randomisation and non-contextuality, by the assessment of workability only.
If you don't feel comfortable yet with formulating collapse in a many-world setting, let us also assume randomisation (God plays dice), for the sake of the argument, in a single-world formulation. That is, we ASSUME the existence of probability; then the previous argument just guarantees that this probability follows the Born Rule.
Assume? Randomness is well motivated by evidence. And it's more random than just not knowing some inherent variable, because in the EPR experiment a randomized hidden variable can on explain the QM result if it's non-local.
Of course I favour the first version of the argument, using the many-world formulation of collapse, to avoid the "God plays dice" nightmare.
Why this fear of true randomness? We have all kinds of classical randomness we just attributed to "historical accident". Would it really make any difference it were due to inherent quantum randomness? Albrect and Phillips have made an argument that there is quantum randomness even nominally classical dynamics. https://arxiv.org/abs/1212.0953v3The authors regard quantum fluctuations as fundamental. How are they defined? AG
On Wednesday, April 20, 2022 at 5:21:47 PM UTC-6 Alan Grayson wrote:On Friday, April 15, 2022 at 12:41:03 PM UTC-6 meeke...@gmail.com wrote:
On 4/14/2022 2:00 PM, George Kahrimanis wrote:
On Wednesday, April 13, 2022 at 8:55:48 PM UTC+3 meeke...@gmail.com (Brent) wrote:
Decoherence has gone part way in solving the when/where/what basis questions, but only part way.
As I wrote at the end of my first reply to your message, I share your concern about decoherence but I see the glass as half-full; that is, with a little more subtlety I hope that the matter can be formulated in clear terms.
Surely collapse is easier to handle as a general concept (except, on the other hand, that it requires new dynamics). I forgot to mention that my argument for deriving the Born Rule works with collapse, too -- so it is an alternative to Gleason's theorem.
Here I define colapse as an irreversible process, violating unitarity of course, and I keep it separate from randomisation. The latter means that each outcome is somehow randomised -- an assumption we can do without.
Collapse can also be described in a many-world formulation! It differs from the no-collapse MWI only in being irreversible.
If you can throw away low probability branches, what's to stop you from throwing away all but one? You've already broken unitary evolution. If you read Hardy's axiomatization of QM you see that the difference between QM and classical mechanics turns on a single word in Axiom 5 Continuity: There exists a continuous reversible transformation on a system between any two pure states of that system.
My argument in outline is
1. assessment that MWI-with-collapse is workable;
2. therefore, outcomes of small enough measure can be neglected in practice;
Yes, I've wondered if a smallest non-zero probability could be defined consistent with the data.
3. now Everett's argument can proceed, concluding that the Born Rule is a practically safe assumption (to put it briefly).
So I have replaced two assumptions of Gleason's theorem, randomisation and non-contextuality, by the assessment of workability only.
If you don't feel comfortable yet with formulating collapse in a many-world setting, let us also assume randomisation (God plays dice), for the sake of the argument, in a single-world formulation. That is, we ASSUME the existence of probability; then the previous argument just guarantees that this probability follows the Born Rule.
Assume? Randomness is well motivated by evidence. And it's more random than just not knowing some inherent variable, because in the EPR experiment a randomized hidden variable can on explain the QM result if it's non-local.
Of course I favour the first version of the argument, using the many-world formulation of collapse, to avoid the "God plays dice" nightmare.
Why this fear of true randomness? We have all kinds of classical randomness we just attributed to "historical accident". Would it really make any difference it were due to inherent quantum randomness? Albrect and Phillips have made an argument that there is quantum randomness even nominally classical dynamics. https://arxiv.org/abs/1212.0953v3The authors regard quantum fluctuations as fundamental. How are they defined? AG
I think I get it. Whereas before QM we could attribute single, unpredictABLE outcomes to ignorance of initial conditions, and but with QM our understanding is augmented; now we can attribute it to ... nothing? AG
Brent
Thanks for the comments so far, because they stirred my thinking and motivated fresh ideas, some of which I hope will prove helpful and worth discussing, if and when they mature.
George K.
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In my current way of thinking, the disagreement between Alan Grayson and John K. Clark is about two subtly different concepts under the same name, "probability". For example, when I read "80% chance of rain today", I may think that in some possible futures it will not rain (so probability is meaningless), yet I feel an instinctive urge for protection from bad weather, so I take my umbrella. We are programmed to act in this way, due to Darwinian selection -- but it is a different matter to claim that QM (without collapse) issues a probability for each possible outcome so that then we are rationally obliged to apply Maximisation of Expected Utility. I grant the former but not the latter.
Part of the trouble is that serious philosophical issues about probability are still debated, so that there are traps for anyone who deals with these things. Here is an example.
> [...] until Alan Grayson sees the end of the race, or somebody tells Alan Grayson about it, Alan Grayson can't be certain what world Alan Grayson is in. Alan Grayson could be in a world where horse X won or Alan Grayson could be in a world where horse Y won, until Alan Grayson receives more information Alan Grayson would have to say the odds are 50-50.
If you mean that on sheer ignorance the odds are 50-50, we need some clarifications. Strictly speaking, zero information implies "undefined probability", or "imprecise probability between 0 and 1". The reason it is commonly mistaken as 50-50 is an implied strategy, flipping a coin in case of ignorance, but then the odds are of the coin instead of the object of the bet. (This strategy works only if the agent is free to choose which side of the bet she underwrites.)
For the instrumentalists among us (glad to have you, BTW): the question of interest to me is not about which way is best to derive probability from QM -- that would be a pointless discussion, I agree! The question is whether all of them beg the question, so that we have to think of a rational decision theory without probability.
Although Everett's argument (whose improvement I have proposed) grants that in the long run (that is, large samples) the Born Rule is practically certain to apply, this is not technically the same as probability for each single outcome -- though I admit that it works the same, to trigger an instinctive impulse. But for a RATIONAL decision theory this probability is not granted, IMO.
I can give examples of a decision theory w/o probability, but they would dilute the focus of this message.
George K. --
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Does Bell's theorem exclude ignorance as a hidden variable? AG
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>> [...] until Alan Grayson sees the end of the race, or somebody tells Alan Grayson about it, Alan Grayson can't be certain what world Alan Grayson is in. Alan Grayson could be in a world where horse X won or Alan Grayson could be in a world where horse Y won, until Alan Grayson receives more information Alan Grayson would have to say the odds are 50-50.
> If you mean that on sheer ignorance the odds are 50-50, we need some clarifications.
> Strictly speaking, zero information implies "undefined probability",
> For the instrumentalists among us (glad to have you, BTW): the question of interest to me is not about which way is best to derive probability from QM -- that would be a pointless discussion,
>The question is whether all of them beg the question, so that we have to think of a rational decision theory without probability.
> Although Everett's argument (whose improvement I have proposed) grants that in the long run (that is, large samples) the Born Rule is practically certain to apply, this is not technically the same as probability for each single outcome -- though I admit that it works the same,
> for a RATIONAL decision theory this probability is not granted,
--AG
Does Bell's theorem exclude ignorance as a hidden variable? AG
Ignorance is a constant.
Brent
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On 4/21/2022 3:03 PM, George Kahrimanis wrote:
[...] Strictly speaking, zero information implies "undefined probability", or "imprecise probability between 0 and 1". The reason it is commonly mistaken as 50-50 is an implied strategy, flipping a coin in case of ignorance, but then the odds are of the coin instead of the object of the bet. (This strategy works only if the agent is free to choose which side of the bet she underwrites.)
If the odds 50/50 can apply to the coin...because you don't know which way it will come down...then the same concept applies to the horse race.
[...] we have to think of a rational decision theory without probability.
Rational decision theory only exists because of uncertainty. If there were no uncertainty one wouldn't need theory to inform your choice, you would directly by value.
On Thu, Apr 21, 2022 at 6:04 PM George Kahrimanis <geka...@gmail.com> wrote:> Strictly speaking, zero information implies "undefined probability",
Sure, but[...]
> For the instrumentalists among us (glad to have you, BTW): the question of interest to me is not about which way is best to derive probability from QM -- that would be a pointless discussion,It would be pointless because we have known from experiment for nearly a century that the best way to obtain probability from quantum mechanics is to take the square of the absolute value of a particle's wave-function, a.k.a. the Born rule.
>The question is whether all of them beg the question, so that we have to think of a rational decision theory without probability.Even in the days before quantum mechanics, as soon as physicists started thinking about thermodynamics they knew that a rational decision theory without probability was not viable.
> Although Everett's argument (whose improvement I have proposed) grants that in the long run (that is, large samples) the Born Rule is practically certain to apply, this is not technically the same as probability for each single outcome -- though I admit that it works the same,I would argue that if X works the same as Y then technically X is Y.
> for a RATIONAL decision theory this probability is not granted,IF that's true THEN a RATIONAL man will consistently make predictions about the outcome of an experiment that are inferior to the predictions that an IRRATIONAL man would make. So there would be no point to rationality or being "rational". THEREFORE I conclude that your above statement is not true.
>>> Strictly speaking, zero information implies "undefined probability",>> Sure, but [...]> Sorry, but if it is undefined then there is no "but".
> my point was to prepare the reader for a version of the Born rule concerning large samples only, instead of single outcomes.
>>> Although Everett's argument (whose improvement I have proposed) grants that in the long run (that is, large samples) the Born Rule is practically certain to apply, this is not technically the same as probability for each single outcome -- though I admit that it works the same,>> I would argue that if X works the same as Y then technically X is Y.> Careful! You trimmed off the end of my sentence: "... it works the same, to trigger an instinctive impulse".
> Sorry for my sloppy syntax: I meant "it works the same, with regard to triggering an instinctive impulse". Noy always, not necessarily.
> Instead of "technically" you should have "practically", in the sense "a technical distinction without a practical difference".
>>> for a RATIONAL decision theory this probability is not granted,>> IF that's true THEN a RATIONAL man will consistently make predictions about the outcome of an experiment that are inferior to the predictions that an IRRATIONAL man would make. So there would be no point to rationality or being "rational". THEREFORE I conclude that your above statement is not true.> (I emphasised "rational" as opposed to an experimentally derived decision theory.)
> Moreover, rationality is about organising certain basic irrational pursuits, typically thinkgs like security, food, sex, and entertainment; priorities are for to the agent to define.
> Not a black-or-white dichotomy, therefore.
> Example. When I have a choice between acting recklessly and acting carefully, and my spirit of adventure overcomes my instict of survival, a rational argument IMO is to think of my insurance: they will increase the premium or drop me if they classify me as a reckless man. I need insurance because of uncertainty, to protect my future selves as well as my loved ones in future branches in which I will not exist.
>>>> Schrödinger's Equation is time independent,>>> Then why, for example, does the solution for a free particle spread out as time progresses? AG>> As time progresses things change, that is in fact what time means. So if something spreads out as time progresses if you reverse time then that "something" would converge. Schrodinger's wave equation works in either direction, no information is lost so if you know what the wave looks like now you can figure out what it will look like tomorrow and also figure out what it looked like yesterday.> If you don't know that the SE is time DEPENDENT, at least one of its forms, you should refrain from posing as a expert on its interpretation
> Further, in the case of a free particle, the solution changes its form as tIme goes backward,
> your comment shows ignorance of what time dependence means. AG
On Sat, Apr 23, 2022 at 11:05 AM Alan Grayson <agrays...@gmail.com> wrote:>>>> Schrödinger's Equation is time independent,>>> Then why, for example, does the solution for a free particle spread out as time progresses? AG>> As time progresses things change, that is in fact what time means. So if something spreads out as time progresses if you reverse time then that "something" would converge. Schrodinger's wave equation works in either direction, no information is lost so if you know what the wave looks like now you can figure out what it will look like tomorrow and also figure out what it looked like yesterday.> If you don't know that the SE is time DEPENDENT, at least one of its forms, you should refrain from posing as a expert on its interpretationYou've forgotten how all this started, you said "but S's equation just gives the time dependent probabilities BEFORE a measurement is taken" , and I made it clear that Schrödinger's Equation is independent of if time is going forwards or backwards, so if you know what the quantum wave of a particle is today the day after a measurement has been taken then Schrödinger's Equation can tell you what the quantum wave will be tomorrow, and also what the quantum wave was the day before yesterday, the day before a measurement will be taken. This is my exact quote and I still stand by every word of it:"Schrödinger's Equation is time independent, it works just as well forwards or backwards, so "before" or "after" are irrelevant terms. And Schrödinger makes no use of "measurement" and says nothing about it".So there are only two conclusions possible, either Schrödinger's Equation is just wrong and needs to be drastically modified, or Many Worlds is correct. I think Schrödinger's Equation works pretty well just as it is.
> As for the Sagan issue, as I distinctly recall that I posted the citations to those articles,
> and a second paper. possibly just with Sagan or just with Morrison, in 1967 or 1968.
> David Morrison (check him out on Wiki)
> And No, I wasn't at Harvard,
> but working at the Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory, located at 67 Garden Street, in Cambridge MA.
> One or both were printed in The Astronomical Journal. I also told you that my real name is NOT Grayson,
> As for Roswell, for someone who firmly believes in the most fantastical and improbable interpretation of QM,
> Do you have a clue, or do you just like to demonstrate how closed you are to unusual phenomena?
Those two papers were published around 54 years ago, so their references aren't at my fingertips.
The titles were, "The Martian Wave of Darkening and Related Phenomena",
> and "Hypersensitization of Infrared Sensitive Plates (or Emulsions)".
> You seem obsessed with this issue. More important is the bridge issue as it effects the MWI. AG
On Sat, Apr 23, 2022 at 5:22 PM Alan Grayson <agrays...@gmail.com> wrote:> You seem obsessed with this issue. More important is the bridge issue as it effects the MWI. AGYeah, if I had been caught telling a whopper as large as the one you told I'd want to change the subject too.
> Suppose I told you I am the obscure one, having faded from my previous glory of working the Great One, Carl Sagan? Would that help?
I get it. No problem with those bridges. After all, Sean Carroll endorses it and he's on the facuty of Caltech! AG
On Sun, Apr 24, 2022 at 2:18 PM Alan Grayson <agrays...@gmail.com> wrote:I get it. No problem with those bridges. After all, Sean Carroll endorses it and he's on the facuty of Caltech! AGWell I don't get it, I have no idea what you're talking about.
> Maybe because you're mentally retarded? You posted Sean's "explanation" for where the energy comes from to create the world's which infatuate you! If a world has 1% probability of existing according to Born's rule, it has 1% of the original total energy!
> This is pure genius, from Caltech!
On Sun, Apr 24, 2022 at 7:12 PM Alan Grayson <agrays...@gmail.com> wrote:> Maybe because you're mentally retarded? You posted Sean's "explanation" for where the energy comes from to create the world's which infatuate you! If a world has 1% probability of existing according to Born's rule, it has 1% of the original total energy!I've explained this to you before but that time I used words that an intelligent adult should understand, but you didn't, so this time I'll imagine I'm speaking to a child with a learning disability, maybe that will work. We've known for a long time there's no way to detect the absolute energy level of anything, we can only detect the energy difference between two things, but there is no way an observer in one universe can compare his energy level with an observer in another universe, so the fact that one universe may have 10 times more energy than another has no observable consequences to anybody in either universe.
On Sun, Apr 24, 2022 at 7:12 PM Alan Grayson <agrays...@gmail.com> wrote:> Maybe because you're mentally retarded? You posted Sean's "explanation" for where the energy comes from to create the world's which infatuate you! If a world has 1% probability of existing according to Born's rule, it has 1% of the original total energy!I've explained this to you before but that time I used words that an intelligent adult should understand, but you didn't, so this time I'll imagine I'm speaking to a child with a learning disability, maybe that will work. We've known for a long time there's no way to detect the absolute energy level of anything, we can only detect the energy difference between two things, but there is no way an observer in one universe can compare his energy level with an observer in another universe, so the fact that one universe may have 10 times more energy than another has no observable consequences to anybody in either universe.
> This is pure genius, from Caltech!Any professor of theoretical physics at Caltech is one hell of a lot smarter than you Mr. Carl Sagan co-author, Mr. Flying-Saucer-Men-Landed-In-Roswell-New-Mexico, And unlike you I'm damn sure he knows enough grade school physics to understand that you need to obtain hyper sonic speed to get into Earth orbit.
On Sunday, April 24, 2022 at 6:28:02 PM UTC-6 johnk...@gmail.com wrote:On Sun, Apr 24, 2022 at 7:12 PM Alan Grayson <agrays...@gmail.com> wrote:> Maybe because you're mentally retarded? You posted Sean's "explanation" for where the energy comes from to create the world's which infatuate you! If a world has 1% probability of existing according to Born's rule, it has 1% of the original total energy!I've explained this to you before but that time I used words that an intelligent adult should understand, but you didn't, so this time I'll imagine I'm speaking to a child with a learning disability, maybe that will work. We've known for a long time there's no way to detect the absolute energy level of anything, we can only detect the energy difference between two things, but there is no way an observer in one universe can compare his energy level with an observer in another universe, so the fact that one universe may have 10 times more energy than another has no observable consequences to anybody in either universe.> This is pure genius, from Caltech!Any professor of theoretical physics at Caltech is one hell of a lot smarter than you Mr. Carl Sagan co-author, Mr. Flying-Saucer-Men-Landed-In-Roswell-New-Mexico, And unlike you I'm damn sure he knows enough grade school physics to understand that you need to obtain hyper sonic speed to get into Earth orbit.
I was thinking of level flight at supersonic speed, not escape velocity.
As for papers with CS, there was a third one, where Carl promised to put my name first. It involved the atmosphere of Jupiter, and a series solution, the convergence of which in closed form that I determined. Over the next year I asked him when he would write it. He was always affirmative but did nothing, which left a lasting negative impression. I would have preferred his candidness; possibly that the numerical results, obtained by Morrison, didn't reveal any interesting physics. I never disclosed my serious dissatisfaction, and later had him write a letter of recommendation for a position at JPL. I got the job and worked there from 1984 to 1998 on the Galileo Project, eventually becoming the Flight Software Cognizant Engineer. The software never failed, except in very few trivial instances. AG
> This is what Sean Carroll actually says in his book "Something Deeply Hidden":"Well", replied Alice. "Just think about ordinary textbook quantum mechanics. Given a quantum state, we can calculate the total energy it describes. As long as the wave function evolves strictly according to the Schrodinger equation, that energy is conserved, right?" ...."Not all worlds are created equal. Think about the wave function. When it describes multiple branched worlds, we can calculate the total amount of energy by adding up the amount of energy in each world, times the weight (the amplitude squared) for that world. When one world divides in two, the energy in each world is basically the same as it previously was in the single world (as far as anyone living inside is concerned), but their contributions to the total energy of the wave function of the universe have divided in half, since their amplitudes have decreased. Each world got a bit thinner, although its inhabitants can't tell the difference." (page 173)In other words, Sean is saying that energy conservation works for the multiverse, and he implies that it also works in each individual branch. This is nonsense -- you can't have both. If energy is conserved over the multiverse, then it cannot be conserved in each branch separately,
> Energy conservation is routinely observed and checked in individual branches.
> No one has ever checked energy conservation in the multiverse.
> The idea that this energy is conserved in the multiverse derives from the observation that the Schrodinger equation is time translation invariant.
> The trouble with Sean's glib response to the question is that in each branch of the multiverse, we can measure the energy both before and after the supposed split.
> If I want to check energy conservation in neutron decay, I compare the mass-energy of the original neutron to the sum of the mass-energies of the decay products plus any kinetic energy of these decay products.
> While I was at JPL[...]
On Sun, Apr 24, 2022 at 9:09 PM Bruce Kellett <bhkel...@gmail.com> wrote:> The trouble with Sean's glib response to the question is that in each branch of the multiverse, we can measure the energy both before and after the supposed split.Neither before or after the split are you measuring the absolute total energy in anything, in any energy measurement you're measuring the relative energy of something against a standard measure. If you say a particle has X units of energy calibrated against some standard measure, then after a measurement (and thus after a split) if you want to measure the energy in the decay products of the particle you do it by comparing them against the same standard measure, but that's impossible because any act of measurement splits a universe. So both the energy in the decay products and the energy of the standard measure of energy are decreased by 1/2 (or by however many times the universe splits), so you still get X units of Energy and the world still looks the same to you despite it having only half the total absolute energy. It all comes down to the fact that you never measure the absolute energy of something, you always measure the relative energy.
> If I want to check energy conservation in neutron decay, I compare the mass-energy of the original neutron to the sum of the mass-energies of the decay products plus any kinetic energy of these decay products.You left out a few steps. You compare the mass-energy of the original neutron against a standard calibration measure, and then you measure the mass-energies of the decay products plus any kinetic energy of these decay products against a standard measure.
> You appear to be assuming that one measures energy against some reference energy. So that if both your reference and the thing you are measuring change by the same factor, you do not see any difference.
> That is true enough, but we do not always measure energy by comparison with some reference energy. Sometimes we use other laws of physics. For example, most of the energy in our immediate environment is mass energy, coming from the relation E = mc^2. So we can consider mass as a surrogate for energy. Mass can routinely be measured by weighing, assuming that the gravitational constant does not change.
> But that standard measure may not simply be another energy or mass. It could be the force on a charge in an electric field,
> or the measure on a spring balance in the gravitational field.
> "Alan Grayson" is my pseudo-name of choice,
> and I could prove I was co-author on those papers, but [...]
On Mon, Apr 25, 2022 at 9:31 AM Alan Grayson <agrays...@gmail.com> wrote:> "Alan Grayson" is my pseudo-name of choice,Sure it is.> and I could prove I was co-author on those papers, but [...]Sure you can.
> Any publications? Any degrees? You must have done SOMETHING! Time to come clean. AG
csb
Nothing humble about you. Sagan was my boss for 18 months. I never claimed he was a friend. What university did you attend? I am a Cornell graduate, School of Arts and Sciences. I had a physics course with Philip Morrison. During the Cuban Missile Crisis I correctly predicted the outcome, but still got a "gentleman's" C in my course on International Relations. That's Cornell (at its worst). AG
On Mon, Apr 25, 2022 at 8:08 AM Bruce Kellett <bhkel...@gmail.com> wrote:> That is true enough, but we do not always measure energy by comparison with some reference energy. Sometimes we use other laws of physics. For example, most of the energy in our immediate environment is mass energy, coming from the relation E = mc^2. So we can consider mass as a surrogate for energy. Mass can routinely be measured by weighing, assuming that the gravitational constant does not change.The only reason we think the gravitational constant does not change is because when we measure the potential gravitational energy in something today against a standard calibration energy we find that we get the same number of energy units that we got yesterday when we measured the potential gravitational energy it was in against a standard calibration energy.
Despite Carroll's protestations (and the similar protestations of others), energy cannot be conserved in the multiverse -- each split must duplicate the energy of the whole as many times as there are branches.
Hmm. You AG obviously haven't seen the state of education today with its corrosive, racial, and sexually preferenced faith movements? The mentioning of the Missiles of October moment and predicting the outcome is an interesting claim. Me, being a wimp, except when its time to retaliate, would have demurred from JFK's placing of Jupiter missiles in Turkey. A provocation, yet what do I call Khrushchev's walling up of Berlin in 1961? Monday morning quarterbacking is what I do, and today is a monday. For Putin, as JC has objected to, I'd offer Putin the right to place hypersonic missiles in "Cuber," ah, Cuba like in 1962. Why? Face saving for Putin with the Russian establishment and population, in exchange for Ukraine withdrawal, and a Neutrality agreement, with whomever?
Ok, thanks for your response, AG. You are forecasting that the EU and or the US and Canada will continue to send, antitank and anti-aircraft missiles into Ukraine. Are you concerned that this will be successful, even with a Russian onslaught against the insertion of these into the Ukraine?Do you see a Russian attempt to wreck NATO countries via a conventional roll forward as with the Soviets and the Fulda Gap push? The notion that the demoralized Russian soldiers just stopping the madness on their own, goes against what the Soviets did in WW2. The NKVD has their own barrage battalions of troops to ensure that no Russian soldier retreated from the front line. So why not FSB or GRU troops today?
Now using Sarin or Tabun or Soman or VX against the Ukrainians would seemingly be countered by the Ukrainian troops fighting in donated tox suits, and the strategy would then bring the fighting as quick as possible to the Russian troops. This, guaranteeing a mix of those fighting protected versus unprotected. I am suspecting that outside of Spetznaz, most Russian draftees will no be so protected?
I will still hold open the possibility of giving Vlad an out, but you could be totally accurate regarding the Russkie mindset. I am not sure what circumstances would produce an ouster of Vlad, if such is even conceivable?
-----Original Message-----
From: Alan Grayson <agrays...@gmail.com>
To: Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com>
Sent: Mon, Apr 25, 2022 7:26 pm
Subject: Re: aiming to complete Everett's derivation of the Born Rule
On Monday, April 25, 2022 at 3:19:07 PM UTC-6 spudb...@aol.com wrote:Hmm. You AG obviously haven't seen the state of education today with its corrosive, racial, and sexually preferenced faith movements? The mentioning of the Missiles of October moment and predicting the outcome is an interesting claim. Me, being a wimp, except when its time to retaliate, would have demurred from JFK's placing of Jupiter missiles in Turkey. A provocation, yet what do I call Khrushchev's walling up of Berlin in 1961? Monday morning quarterbacking is what I do, and today is a monday. For Putin, as JC has objected to, I'd offer Putin the right to place hypersonic missiles in "Cuber," ah, Cuba like in 1962. Why? Face saving for Putin with the Russian establishment and population, in exchange for Ukraine withdrawal, and a Neutrality agreement, with whomever?This won't work in the present situation. Firstly, Putin will never willingly withdraw. And it was already tried! Remember the Budapest Memoranum of 1994? The Russians can't be trusted, and any agreement allowing any territorial concessions would be Munich 2.0. In this situation the Russians will regroup and try another day to conquer Ukraine. The only answer is to continue the fight until the Russians realize that tanks, towed and self-propelled artillery are obsolete against Javalins, INLAWS, etc. and counter-battery artillery. Eventually, the Russian soldiers will become so demoralized that they'll refuse to fight. Putin will likely use chemical weapons and blame the Ukrainians for their use. But it won't be decisive, and IMO tactical nukes will probably not be used. AG
>> The only reason we think the gravitational constant does not change is because when we measure the potential gravitational energy in something today against a standard calibration energy we find that we get the same number of energy units that we got yesterday when we measured the potential gravitational energy it was in against a standard calibration energy.> Sure, a spring balance needs to be calibrated against some standard mass. But we do not calibrate every day. Once the scale is set, we assume that the spring constant or whatever remains the same, so that recalibration is not necessary.
> So if all energies (including mass) drop by 90%, we will be able to detect this as long as the spring constant does not also change by this amount. Springs tend to rely on the electromagnetic properties of metals, and these will not change just because we measure a spin component in the next room.
> I used a spring balance to compare a mass against the gravitational field, where I assumed that Newton's constant does not change on a spin measurement. If all energies (and masses) drop by 50% in each branch of the spin measurement, then the mass of the earth decreases by 50%, and the local acceleration due to gravity, g, also drops by 50%. Now consider a simple pendulum: the period of swing is T = 2*pi*sqr(L/g), where L is the length of the pendulum. If g drops by 50%,[...]
>> The only reason we think the gravitational constant does not change is because when we measure the potential gravitational energy in something today against a standard calibration energy we find that we get the same number of energy units that we got yesterday when we measured the potential gravitational energy it was in against a standard calibration energy.
> Sure, a spring balance needs to be calibrated against some standard mass. But we do not calibrate every day. Once the scale is set, we assume that the spring constant or whatever remains the same, so that recalibration is not necessary.
You're right, it's not necessary because as long as the test mass and the mass standard decrease by an equal percentage you're always gonna get the same result and you'll never notice that anything has changed.
> So if all energies (including mass) drop by 90%, we will be able to detect this as long as the spring constant does not also change by this amount. Springs tend to rely on the electromagnetic properties of metals, and these will not change just because we measure a spin component in the next room.
If Many Worlds is correct then of course the spring constant will change because the world will split due to ANY measurement, and the absolute non-relative amount of energy of EVERY type will decrease.
> I used a spring balance to compare a mass against the gravitational field, where I assumed that Newton's constant does not change on a spin measurement. If all energies (and masses) drop by 50% in each branch of the spin measurement, then the mass of the earth decreases by 50%, and the local acceleration due to gravity, g, also drops by 50%. Now consider a simple pendulum: the period of swing is T = 2*pi*sqr(L/g), where L is the length of the pendulum. If g drops by 50%,[...]But g does NOT drop by 50% and I never said it did, I said the gravitational potential energy drops by 50%, and that will happen if the mass/energy of a gravitationally bound system drops by 50% even if g remains constant. If yesterday I measured the mass/energy of a pendulum and of the entire earth against an energy standard and I measure those things again today against today's energy standard, and if the mass/energy of the pendulum and the earth and today's energy standard have all decreased by 50%, then I will get the same measured value that I got yesterday even if g really is the same as it was yesterday.
And yes the force that the earth is pulling down on that pendulum would only be half as strong as it was yesterday, HOWEVER the inertia (which is proportional to the mass/energy) of the pendulum would only be half as much as it was yesterday, so the two changes with cancel out and the pendulum would fall with the same acceleration that it did yesterday, and the period of its swing would be the same too.
John K Clark See what's on my new list at Extropolis
maq
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