Bruno's mathematical reality

[Edgar Owen]

All,

The fundamental nature of reality is examined in detail in my recent book on Reality available on Amazon under my name.

Marchal is on the right track, but reality consists not just of numbers (math) but is a running logical structure analogous to software that continually computes the current state of the universe. Just as software includes but doesn't consist only of numbers and math, so does reality. In fact the equations of physical science make sense only when embedded in a logical structure just as is the case in computational reality.

Modern science has a major lacuna, the notion that all of reality is mathematical, that prevents science from grasping the complete nature of reality. In truth all of reality is logical, as is software, and the mathematics is just a subset of the logic. After all, modern science with its misguided insistence that all of reality is mathematical, has had nothing useful to say about the nature of either consciousness or the present moment, the two most fundamental aspects of experience. However I present a computational based information approach to these in my book among many other things.

The second clarification that needs to be made to the post on Marchal's work is that human math and logic are distinct from the actual math and logic that computes reality. The human version is a generalized and extended approximation of the actual that differs from the actual logico-mathematical structure of reality in important ways (e.g. infinities and infinitesimals which don't actually exist in external reality).

I can explain further if anyone is interested, or you can read about it in my book...

Edgar Owen

[John Mikes]

Dear Edgar Owen: thanks for a post with reason. I am sorry to be too old to read your (any?) book so I take it from your present communication. You wrote  among others:

"...Modern science has a major lacuna, the notion that all of reality is mathematical, that prevents science from grasping the complete nature of reality. In truth all of reality is logical, as is software, and the mathematics is just a subset of the logic. After all, modern science with its misguided insistence that all of reality is mathematical, has had nothing useful to say about the nature of either consciousness or the present moment, the two most fundamental aspects of experience. However I present a computational based information approach to these in my book among many other things..."

 I doubt if we can have knowledge about "reality" at all, especially "the complete nature of it". 

I presume (hope?) you do not limit 'logical' to our present human logic? 

I arrived by speculating on the diverse facets of different authors what they call (their) coinsciousness a "response to relations" irrespective of the performer. 

Your other inconnu: the present moment appeared in my speculations to cut out "TIME" from the view we carry about our existence (I was unsuccessful). 

Finally: I hope what you deem "computational" is not restricted to a numbers-based mathematical lingo - rather a sophisticational ways of arriving at conclusions by ANY ways we may, or may not even know (com - putare).  

With best regards

John Mikes Ph.D., D.Sc.

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[Brian Tenneson]

I had a question about the quote below of Edgar's.  In what sense of 'compute' do you believe that something computes reality?  Also, I'm wondering if Laplace's demon is relevant.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Laplace%27s_demon

According to the article, we have:

In 2008, David Wolpert used Cantor diagonalization to disprove Laplace's demon. He did this by assuming that the demon is a computational device and showing that no two such devices can completely predict each other.^[5][6] If the demon were not contained within and computed by the universe, any accurate simulation of the universe would be indistinguishable from the universe to an internal observer, and the argument remains distinct from what is observable.

[Jason Resch]

On Fri, Dec 20, 2013 at 5:52 PM, Edgar Owen <edga...@att.net> wrote:

All,

The fundamental nature of reality is examined in detail in my recent book on Reality available on Amazon under my name.

Cool, it sounds quite interesting. I've added it to my wish list.

 

Marchal is on the right track, but reality consists not just of numbers (math) but is a running logical structure analogous to software that continually computes the current state of the universe.

Are you familiar with Bruno's UDA? ( http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html )

It shows that one's consciousness cannot be embedded in any one particular "digital universe". This is because when reality is viewed from the inside, one's next moment of experience may bifurcate or leap to any one of an infinite collection of consistent extensions to the computational state that gives rise to one's present moment of experience. 

 

Just as software includes but doesn't consist only of numbers and math, so does reality. In fact the equations of physical science make sense only when embedded in a logical structure just as is the case in computational reality.

Modern science has a major lacuna, the notion that all of reality is mathematical, that prevents science from grasping the complete nature of reality. In truth all of reality is logical, as is software, and the mathematics is just a subset of the logic. After all, modern science with its misguided insistence that all of reality is mathematical, has had nothing useful to say about the nature of either consciousness or the present moment, the two most fundamental aspects of experience.

The present moment, like the current "branch" in the multi-verse, and the current laws of physics, one's current location, name, and body they inhabit, are all indexical qualities of consciousness. They all provide the illusion of some privileged time, branch, universe, and person. In truth, we are in all times, all branches, all universes, and all experience is equally ours.

I saw from your book review it is heavily focused on relativity and time.  May I ask, what is your familiarity with QM, do you assume Everett's many-worlds in your book's reasoning? Do you find any relation between multi-verse theories and mathematical reality?

 

However I present a computational based information approach to these in my book among many other things.

The second clarification that needs to be made to the post on Marchal's work is that human math and logic are distinct from the actual math and logic that computes reality. The human version is a generalized and extended approximation of the actual that differs from the actual logico-mathematical structure of reality in important ways (e.g. infinities and infinitesimals which don't actually exist in external reality).

Are you saying real infinities exist only in our minds, or that our human math cannot access infinities which really exist?

 

I can explain further if anyone is interested, or you can read about it in my book...

Thanks, I look forward to both.

Jason

[LizR]

I don't have time to read many books (although I managed to get almost half way through BOI). However, can you explain what you mean about the universe being based on something that is "running" ? That seems to rely on the prior existence of time, which is one of the things a TOE should probably be expected to explain. Bruno's explanation involves the fact that apparently all posible computations exist in arithmetic, which prevents there being a need for time, which thereby becomes an emergent feature; hence the assumptions of his theory are minimal, and seem intuitively to be things that should logically exist, even if they didn't happen to give rise to any universes. Can you precis your theory in the way Bruno has? Assumptions plus derived consequences?

[meekerdb]

On 12/20/2013 3:52 PM, Edgar Owen wrote:

All,

The fundamental nature of reality is examined in detail in my recent book on Reality available on Amazon under my name.

Marchal is on the right track, but reality consists not just of numbers (math) but is a running logical structure analogous to software that continually computes the current state of the universe. Just as software includes but doesn't consist only of numbers and math, so does reality. In fact the equations of physical science make sense only when embedded in a logical structure just as is the case in computational reality.

Modern science has a major lacuna, the notion that all of reality is mathematical, that prevents science from grasping the complete nature of reality. In truth all of reality is logical, as is software, and the mathematics is just a subset of the logic.

After the difficulties of Russell and Whitehead, and Godel's incompleteness theorem I thought the idea that mathematics was a subset of logic had been laid to rest.

After all, modern science with its misguided insistence that all of reality is mathematical, has had nothing useful to say about the nature of either consciousness or the present moment, the two most fundamental aspects of experience. However I present a computational based information approach to these in my book among many other things.

The second clarification that needs to be made to the post on Marchal's work is that human math and logic are distinct from the actual math and logic that computes reality. The human version is a generalized and extended approximation of the actual that differs from the actual logico-mathematical structure of reality in important ways (e.g. infinities and infinitesimals which don't actually exist in external reality).

I'm interested in how you avoid infinities. Do you eschew even potential infinities?

Brent

I can explain further if anyone is interested, or you can read about it in my book...

Edgar Owen

[Edgar Owen]

Hi John,

First thanks for the complement on my post!

To address your points. Of course we do have some knowledge of reality. We have to have to be able to function within it which we most certainly do to varying degrees of competence. That is proof we do have sufficient knowledge of reality to function within it.

Yes, computations include logic as well as math.

Best,

Edgar

[Craig Weinberg]

For me, the critical issue for accounting for everything under a single reality theory is what I call the Presentation Problem. In simple terms, there is no logical reason for the logical universe to produce shapes, colors, flavors, or feelings of any kind when we already know that information processing can occur using only quantitatively formatted signals. I include under the Presentation Problem five well known or easily observed issues:

1. Hard Problem = Why is X presented as an experience?

(X = “information”, logical or physical functions, calcium waves, action potentials, Bayesian integrations, etc.)

2. Explanatory Gap = How and where is presentation accomplished with respect to X?

3. Binding Problem = How are presented experiences segregated and combined with each other? How do presentations cohere?

4. Symbol Grounding = How are experiences associated with each other on multiple levels of presentation? How do presentations adhere?

5. Mind Body Problem = Why do public facing presences and private facing presences seem ontologically exclusive and aesthetically opposite to each other?

http://multisenserealism.com/the-competition/the-presentation-problem/

Without tying all of these together in a plausible way, I don't see anything to recommend computation over physics or mythology or any other creation schema that can be supported.

Thanks,
Craig

[Bruno Marchal]

On 21 Dec 2013, at 00:52, Edgar Owen wrote:

All,

The fundamental nature of reality is examined in detail in my recent book on Reality available on Amazon under my name.

Marchal is on the right track, but reality consists not just of numbers (math)

Arithmetic is not just numbers, but numbers + some laws (addition and multiplication).

but is a running logical structure analogous to software

When you have the laws (addition and multiplication), it can be shown that a tiny part of arithmetic implement all possible computations (accepting Church thesis). Without Church thesis, you can still prove that that tiny part of arithmetic emulates (simulate exactly) all Turing (or all known) computations.

that continually computes the current state of the universe.

You mean the physical universe. Have you read my papers or posts? if we are machine, there is no physical reality that we can assume. the whole of physics must be derived from arithmetic.

Just as software includes but doesn't consist only of numbers and math, so does reality.

It depends on your initial assumption.

In fact the equations of physical science make sense only when embedded in a logical structure just as is the case in computational reality.

The computational reality is a tiny part of arithmetic. Logic is just a tool to explore such realities.

Modern science has a major lacuna, the notion that all of reality is mathematical,

Most scientists do not believe this, and indeed criticize my work for seeming to go in that direction. 

Then term like "reality" and "mathematical" are very fuzzy. 

Now, if we are machine, then it can be shown that for the ontology we need arithmetic, or any equivalent Turing universal system, and we *cannot* assume anything more (that is the key non obvious point). Then, it is shown that the physical reality is:

1) an internal aspect of arithmetic

2) despite this, it is vastly bigger than arithmetic and even that any conceivable mathematics. That is why I insist that the reality we can access to is not mathematical, but "theological". It contains many things provably escaping all possible sharable mathematics.

That arithmetic is (much) bigger viewed from inside than viewed from outside is astonishing, and is a sort of Skolem paradox (not a contradiction, just a weirdness).

that prevents science from grasping the complete nature of reality. In truth all of reality is logical, as is software, and the mathematics is just a subset of the logic.

I disagree, with all my respect. Even arithmetic escapes logic. It is logic which is just a branch of math, but math, even just arithmetic, escapes logic. Arithmetical truth escapes all effective theories (theories with checkable proofs).

After all, modern science with its misguided insistence that all of reality is mathematical,

I really do not believe this. Except for Tegmark and Schmidhuber, I doubt any scientist believes this. But its is a consequence of computationalism, for the ontology. Yet, the physical is purely epistemological, and go beyond mathematics. I show that all universal machine, when believeing in enough induction axioms, can discovered this by introspection only.

has had nothing useful to say about the nature of either consciousness or the present moment, the two most fundamental aspects of experience.

I suggest you read my sane paper.:

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html 

It explains the present moment by using Gödel form of indexical (with explicit fixed points), including the non communicable part, the qualia, and also the quanta (making computationalism testable).

In fact machines have already an incredibly rich and complex theology, and it is testable, as it should contain physics.

However I present a computational based information approach to these in my book among many other things.

The second clarification that needs to be made to the post on Marchal's work is that human math and logic are distinct from the actual math and logic that computes reality.

With computationalism, reality is not computed. Most of the arithmetical reality is already highly not computable.

The (partially) computable part of arithmetic is the sigma_1 part (the sentences having the shape ExP(x) with P decidable). Abobe it is no more computable.

The whole of the arithmetical reality is the union of all the sigma_i and pi_i parts, and is far beynd what we can compute or emulate with a computer.

The the human arithmetic and arithmetic are well distinguished in my presentations, so I am not sure to what you allude too. 

For computation, Church thesis makes it a *very* general human independent notion.

The human version is a generalized and extended approximation of the actual that differs from the actual logico-mathematical structure of reality in important ways (e.g. infinities and infinitesimals which don't actually exist in external reality).

You seem to assume a primitive physical universe. ("primitive" means that it would have to be assumed). 

I can explain further if anyone is interested, or you can read about it in my book...

I might take a look, but, with all my respect, I am not sure you grasp modern logic, as you seem to confuse computation, logic, and math, and to confuse digital physics (there is a physical reality and it is computable) with computationalism (3-I is  a machine), which entails that physics emerges from computations in a non computable way. Do you take into account the First person indeterminacy? This is not well known, but is really the basic block needed to see why the physical reality emerges non computably from very elementary computable arithmetic. Let me insist on that fundamental point: If my body can be emulated by a machine, then neither mind nor matter appearance can be entirely emulable by a machine.

Above our comp substitution level, we are confronted with enumerable sets of universal numbers, and below the substitution level, we are confronted with a continuum of different computations involving all universal numbers simultaneously. In fact the problem of comp relies in the justification of the apparent computability of the known physical laws (the white rabbit problem).

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Bruno Marchal]

On 21 Dec 2013, at 17:36, John Mikes wrote:

Dear Edgar Owen: thanks for a post with reason. I am sorry to be too old to read your (any?) book so I take it from your present communication. You wrote  among others:

"...Modern science has a major lacuna, the notion that all of reality is mathematical, that prevents science from grasping the complete nature of reality. In truth all of reality is logical, as is software, and the mathematics is just a subset of the logic. After all, modern science with its misguided insistence that all of reality is mathematical, has had nothing useful to say about the nature of either consciousness or the present moment, the two most fundamental aspects of experience. However I present a computational based information approach to these in my book among many other things..."

 I doubt if we can have knowledge about "reality" at all, especially "the complete nature of it". 

I presume (hope?) you do not limit 'logical' to our present human logic? 

I arrived by speculating on the diverse facets of different authors what they call (their) coinsciousness a "response to relations" irrespective of the performer. 

Your other inconnu: the present moment appeared in my speculations to cut out "TIME" from the view we carry about our existence (I was unsuccessful). 

Finally: I hope what you deem "computational" is not restricted to a numbers-based mathematical lingo -

It is, by definition.

rather a sophisticational ways of arriving at conclusions by ANY ways we may, or may not even know (com - putare).  

That is not computability, but provability, or inductive inference, which are indeed NOT universal. There are as many ways to get conclusion than there exist thinking creatures. 

That is why Church thesis is truly miraculous. Limiting us on the arithmetical reality, all theories gives different theorems, but for computability (on any effective domain) all languages gives exactly the same class of computable functions.

Bruno

On Fri, Dec 20, 2013 at 6:52 PM, Edgar Owen <edga...@att.net> wrote:

All,

The fundamental nature of reality is examined in detail in my recent book on Reality available on Amazon under my name.

Marchal is on the right track, but reality consists not just of numbers (math) but is a running logical structure analogous to software that continually computes the current state of the universe. Just as software includes but doesn't consist only of numbers and math, so does reality. In fact the equations of physical science make sense only when embedded in a logical structure just as is the case in computational reality.

Modern science has a major lacuna, the notion that all of reality is mathematical, that prevents science from grasping the complete nature of reality. In truth all of reality is logical, as is software, and the mathematics is just a subset of the logic. After all, modern science with its misguided insistence that all of reality is mathematical, has had nothing useful to say about the nature of either consciousness or the present moment, the two most fundamental aspects of experience. However I present a computational based information approach to these in my book among many other things.

The second clarification that needs to be made to the post on Marchal's work is that human math and logic are distinct from the actual math and logic that computes reality. The human version is a generalized and extended approximation of the actual that differs from the actual logico-mathematical structure of reality in important ways (e.g. infinities and infinitesimals which don't actually exist in external reality).

I can explain further if anyone is interested, or you can read about it in my book...

Edgar Owen

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Bruno Marchal]

On 22 Dec 2013, at 01:00, Edgar Owen wrote:

> Hi John,
>
> First thanks for the complement on my post!
>
> To address your points. Of course we do have some knowledge of
> reality. We have to have to be able to function within it which we
> most certainly do to varying degrees of competence. That is proof we
> do have sufficient knowledge of reality to function within it.
>
> Yes, computations include logic as well as math.

Computations is only a very tiny part of arithmetic and thus of math.
Logic is something else, despite many i-rich interrelation with
computation and computability theory.

Computability can be represented in term of a very special case of
provability, and provability can be represented as a very special case
of computability, but those notion are very different and non
isomorphic.

Proof and mathematical theories are never universal. For
computability, we do have universality (that's why universal purpose
computer exists).

Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[John Mikes]

Bruno wrote:

"(JM)...Finally: I hope what you deem "computational" is not restricted to a numbers-based mathematical lingo - It is, by definition. ((ONE definition you happen to choose - JM)) (JM:)"...rather a sophisticational ways of arriving at conclusions by ANY ways we may, or may not even know (com - putare).

That is not computability, but provability, or inductive inference, which are indeed NOT  universal. There are as many ways to get conclusion than there exist thinking creatures.

That is why Church thesis is truly miraculous. Limiting us on the arithmetical reality, all  theories gives different theorems, but for computability (on any effective domain) all  languages gives exactly the same class of computable functions. Bruno

JM: Please, forget now about 'provability' WITHIN mathematics-related theories.  My parenthesis (com-putare) refers to the language-origin of the word:  PUT together AND THINK about it. That MAY include math, or other ways of  thinking. Maybe ways we do not even know about at our present development.  (You basically seem to be open for such).  John M

[Bruno Marchal]

That is not computability, but provability, or inductive inference, which are indeed NOT 

universal. There are as many ways to get conclusion than there exist thinking creatures. 

That is why Church thesis is truly miraculous. Limiting us on the arithmetical reality, all 

theories gives different theorems, but for computability (on any effective domain) all 

languages gives exactly the same class of computable functions.

Bruno

JM: Please, forget now about 'provability' WITHIN mathematics-related theories. 

OK. Those are indeed infinitely extendible.

My parenthesis (com-putare) refers to the language-origin of the word: 

Which is very nice to remind us. It is a nice etymology, which unfortunately describe more the notion of proof than of computation.

PUT together AND THINK about it. That MAY include math, or other ways of 

thinking. Maybe ways we do not even know about at our present development. 

(You basically seem to be open for such). 

Yes. Even by staying with the computationalist hypothesis (with the sense of Church, Turing, Post, etc.), we cannot circumscribe the non enumerable ways for machines to get knowledge. 

The more you understand machines/numbers, the more you get familiar with the idea that we really can only scratch the surface. Provably so if we are machine ourselves.

The universal machine is a born universal dissident. It eventually refutes all theories, making its learning ability without bounds.

If we are machines, we are bound to get an infinity of surprises (good or bad, this is part of the surprises).

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Stephen Paul King]

Dear Edger,

  Where does the "fire" come from that animates the "logic"?

On Friday, December 20, 2013 6:52:54 PM UTC-5, Edgar L. Owen wrote:

[spudb...@aol.com]

Your theory comes from Von Neumann, and Chaitin, and Wolfram, does it not, Edgar? That everything is a program or cellular automata, and "in the beginning was a program." Following along, what is this Logic comprised of (sort of like SPK's query) is it electrons, is it virtual particles, is it field lines? Where doth the logical structure sleep? In Planck Cells? I apologize if my questions annoy, but where is the computer network that computes the current state of the universe. Can we get MIT physicist Seth Lloyd to shake a stick or a laser pointer, or otherwise, display, where this abacus dwells? 

 

Thanks,

Mitch

[Stephen Paul King]

Hi Mitch,

   No, not a thing, as in "...what is this Logic comprised of...". If it is a "thing" then it could not possibly be any subset of the universe (this particular subset of the multiverse or the total multiverse). It would have to be the entire omniverse; all that exists. But that would not answer my question: What animates the logic? Where doth the fire emanate?

  Maybe the "fire", to use a word from my fav philosopher, is what is fundamental and all the "things" are its sub-invariants. (I have to invent a word here. What would you denote that which "remains the same" withing some transformation of some subset of all that exists?)

"Fire rests by changing." -- Heraclitus

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[meekerdb]

On 12/22/2013 5:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 22 Dec 2013, at 01:00, Edgar Owen wrote:
>
>> Hi John,
>>
>> First thanks for the complement on my post!
>>
>> To address your points. Of course we do have some knowledge of reality. We have to have
>> to be able to function within it which we most certainly do to varying degrees of
>> competence. That is proof we do have sufficient knowledge of reality to function within
>> it.
>>
>> Yes, computations include logic as well as math.
>
> Computations is only a very tiny part of arithmetic and thus of math. Logic is something
> else, despite many i-rich interrelation with computation and computability theory.
>
> Computability can be represented in term of a very special case of provability, and
> provability can be represented as a very special case of computability, but those notion
> are very different and non isomorphic.

But computable means halting and returning a value. In terms of measure aren't there
infinitely more non-terminating programs than terminating?

Brent

[Bruno Marchal]

On 22 Dec 2013, at 21:00, meekerdb wrote:

> On 12/22/2013 5:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>> On 22 Dec 2013, at 01:00, Edgar Owen wrote:
>>
>>> Hi John,
>>>
>>> First thanks for the complement on my post!
>>>
>>> To address your points. Of course we do have some knowledge of
>>> reality. We have to have to be able to function within it which we
>>> most certainly do to varying degrees of competence. That is proof
>>> we do have sufficient knowledge of reality to function within it.
>>>
>>> Yes, computations include logic as well as math.
>>
>> Computations is only a very tiny part of arithmetic and thus of
>> math. Logic is something else, despite many i-rich interrelation
>> with computation and computability theory.
>>
>> Computability can be represented in term of a very special case of
>> provability, and provability can be represented as a very special
>> case of computability, but those notion are very different and non
>> isomorphic.
>
> But computable means halting and returning a value.

That means "total" computable. But we know that the price of
universality is that some program might not stop on some input, and so
we will say that a computer computes even when it does not stop. In
particular, the universal dovetailing can be considered as a "non
stopping computation". After all that universal dovetailing machine is
doing something, OK?

> In terms of measure aren't there infinitely more non-terminating
> programs than terminating?

Both are enumerable, although not recursively enumerable. But the
measure is not on programs, but on the (possibly non terminating)
computations as viewed from the first person (relatively to its actual
states). This forces us to dovetail on infinite streams, and makes
such computations non enumerable, and the constraints provided by the
intensional nuances (notably the "material one (p sigma_1 + "& p" or
"& Dt" or both) suggests the existence of a quantum measure (and a
quantization).

Keep in mind that, as absurd it could seem to be, the UD does dovetail
on "you" (3p) embedded in a reality or emulating a computation which
iterate infinitely the WM-duplication. That explains quickly why your
maximally complete consistent extension will be 3p non enumerable.

Bruno

>
> Brent
>
>>
>> Proof and mathematical theories are never universal. For
>> computability, we do have universality (that's why universal
>> purpose computer exists).
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>>
>>
>>
>

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[meekerdb]

On 12/23/2013 6:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> In terms of measure aren't there infinitely more non-terminating programs than
>> terminating?
>
> Both are enumerable, although not recursively enumerable.

Even so, one can be much bigger than the other by most measures.

> But the measure is not on programs, but on the (possibly non terminating) computations
> as viewed from the first person (relatively to its actual states).

I'm not sure I understand the distinction between "programs" and "computations". Doesn't
every program produces a sequence of states which constitute a computation? And aren't
all the sequences assumed to be deterministic?

Brent

[Edgar L. Owen]

Bruno,

Thanks for your comments. However I think you are coming at Reality from the POV of human logico-mathematical theory whose results you are trying to impose on reality. My approach is to closely examine reality and then try to figure out how it works and what ITS innate rules and structures are.

I would probably agree with much of what you say, if you were saying it about human logico-mathematical structures, but the logico-mathematical structure of reality is not bound by human rules. It runs according to its own logic and science is the process of trying to figure out what those rules are and how they work...

For example, reality is clearly a computational process, and it runs against pure information which is the fundamental stuff of the universe. There is simply no other way current information states of reality could result from previous ones other than by a computational process. How that computational process works must be determined by examining reality itself. We may try to make sense of it in terms of traditional human math theory, but when there are differences then reality always trumps human math theory, which applies to human math rather than reality's logico-mathematical system.

Edgar

On Friday, December 20, 2013 6:52:54 PM UTC-5, Edgar L. Owen wrote:

[Edgar L. Owen]

Craig,

All this is explained in my book on Reality available on Amazon. The key insight to several of your questions is covered in Part IV: Mind and Reality. Basically the world we think we live in with shapes, colors, flavors and feelings etc. (various types of qualia) is actually a model of the actual external reality constructed in our minds. The actual external reality has none of these qualia and consists of evolving information only. When what mind adds to its internal model of reality is identified and subtracted all that remains is discovered to be an evolving information structure and thus that is the actual nature of external reality.

When this is understood the answers to most of your 5 points becomes clear. As to the nature of consciousness, the so called 'Hard Problem' there is a straightforward answer to that given also. I won't cover it in detail right now but basically it has to do with a deeper understanding of reality and how it self-manifests as opposed to waiting passively to be made conscious.

The modern misunderstanding of consciousness, that it's something that arises in human brains, can be compared to the ancient theory of vision in which it was mistakenly thought that vision involved the eyes shining light on external objects. That erroneous model still exists with respect to consciousness in which it is mistakenly thought that consciousness consists of brains shining consciousness on external objects.

The truth in both cases is that it is external reality that produces both light and the actual real presence of things in the present moment and both vision and consciousness are simply opening and participating in this self-manifestation of reality by an observer who then interprets the information content according to his own nature.

I can explain further if anyone is interested, or you can read my book which covers Mind and Reality and explains what Consciousness is quite thoroughly.

Edgar

On Friday, December 20, 2013 6:52:54 PM UTC-5, Edgar L. Owen wrote:

[Edgar L. Owen]

Brent,

I don't avoid infinities but Reality does. When one understands what infinities are and how they are defined as an unending and uncompletable process of addition it is quite clear that nothing physical can be infinite.

As I've posted in other replies Reality is a computational system like running software. Godel and the implications for the Principia don't apply to the logico-mathematical computational system of reality, they apply only to human logico-mathematical systems.

The logico-mathematical system of Reality simply computes one state of the universe from the previous. There are no statements out of the blue that are subject to proof which what Godel, Halting, Russell and Whitehead are all about.

It's like trying to apply these to a piece of software, there is no relevance, in this case reality's software....

Edgar

On Friday, December 20, 2013 6:52:54 PM UTC-5, Edgar L. Owen wrote:

[Bruno Marchal]

On 23 Dec 2013, at 20:11, Edgar L. Owen wrote:

Bruno,

Thanks for your comments. However I think you are coming at Reality from the POV of human logico-mathematical theory whose results you are trying to impose on reality.

Not at all. I start from molecular biology, which suggest we are Turing emulable, and I derive consequences only from that assumption. I don't defend any truth. I just say, if we are machine then ...

My approach is to closely examine reality and then try to figure out how it works and what ITS innate rules and structures are.

Not sure what you mean by "examining reality". 

I would probably agree with much of what you say, if you were saying it about human logico-mathematical structures, but the logico-mathematical structure of reality is not bound by human rules.

In which logic? What are your starting assumption? You seem to be unaware that a "reality" is only an assumption (except for consciousness here and now). We might be dreaming, for example.

It runs according to its own logic and science is the process of trying to figure out what those rules are and how they work...

For example, reality is clearly a computational process,

It cannot be. Independently of any assumption.

and it runs against pure information which is the fundamental stuff of the universe. There is simply no other way current information states of reality could result from previous ones other than by a computational process.

You seem to ignore the UD-Argument. It refutes that idea.

How that computational process works must be determined by examining reality itself. We may try to make sense of it in terms of traditional human math theory, but when there are differences then reality always trumps human math theory, which applies to human math rather than reality's logico-mathematical system.

I need to know exactly what is your theory, which seems to be non computationalist. You need non-comp to get a primitive physical reality.

Bruno

Edgar

On Friday, December 20, 2013 6:52:54 PM UTC-5, Edgar L. Owen wrote:

All,

The fundamental nature of reality is examined in detail in my recent book on Reality available on Amazon under my name.

Marchal is on the right track, but reality consists not just of numbers (math) but is a running logical structure analogous to software that continually computes the current state of the universe. Just as software includes but doesn't consist only of numbers and math, so does reality. In fact the equations of physical science make sense only when embedded in a logical structure just as is the case in computational reality.

Modern science has a major lacuna, the notion that all of reality is mathematical, that prevents science from grasping the complete nature of reality. In truth all of reality is logical, as is software, and the mathematics is just a subset of the logic. After all, modern science with its misguided insistence that all of reality is mathematical, has had nothing useful to say about the nature of either consciousness or the present moment, the two most fundamental aspects of experience. However I present a computational based information approach to these in my book among many other things.

The second clarification that needs to be made to the post on Marchal's work is that human math and logic are distinct from the actual math and logic that computes reality. The human version is a generalized and extended approximation of the actual that differs from the actual logico-mathematical structure of reality in important ways (e.g. infinities and infinitesimals which don't actually exist in external reality).

I can explain further if anyone is interested, or you can read about it in my book...

Edgar Owen

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[Stephen Paul King]

Dear Edgar,

   Welcome to the group! It is always wonderful to have new perspectives and ideas added to the discussion. I have a question. When we talk about how "reality is clearly a computational process, and it runs against pure information which is the fundamental stuff of the universe", is that computation one that is equivalent to a single light-like foliation of the physical universe or are you summing over all possible foliations? (A light-like foliation is the surface of a light-cone and thus there is a clear chain of causal events.)

  It seems to me that it is a mistake to assume that there is a single Turing Machine equivalent computation involved in our universe as it can be easily proven that gravity and accelerations (the "same thing" via the principle of equivalence) prevent the possibility of a single light-like foliation that captures all events in our universe. Therefore if we are to consider a computational notion of reality, it cannot be singular. It has to be many computations: one for each possible foliation.

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[Edgar Owen]

Brent,

I don't avoid infinities but Reality does. When one understands what infinities are and how they are defined as an unending and uncompletable process of addition it is quite clear that nothing physical can be infinite.

As I've posted in other replies Reality is a computational system like running software. Godel and the implications for the Principia don't apply to the logico-mathematical computational system of reality, they apply only to human logico-mathematical systems.

The logico-mathematical system of Reality simply computes one state of the universe from the previous. There are no statements out of the blue that are subject to proof which what Godel, Halting, Russell and Whitehead are all about.

It's like trying to apply these to a piece of software, there is no relevance, in this case reality's software....

Edgar

[Edgar Owen]

Bruno,

Thanks for your comments. However I think you are coming at Reality from the POV of human logico-mathematical theory whose results you are trying to impose on reality. My approach is to closely examine reality and then try to figure out how it works and what ITS innate rules and structures are.

I would probably agree with much of what you say, if you were saying it about human logico-mathematical structures, but the logico-mathematical structure of reality is not bound by human rules. It runs according to its own logic and science is the process of trying to figure out what those rules are and how they work...

For example, reality is clearly a computational process, and it runs against pure information which is the fundamental stuff of the universe. There is simply no other way current information states of reality could result from previous ones other than by a computational process. How that computational process works must be determined by examining reality itself. We may try to make sense of it in terms of traditional human math theory, but when there are differences then reality always trumps human math theory, which applies to human math rather than reality's logico-mathematical system.

Edgar

[Edgar Owen]

Mitch,

No, my theory comes not from those gentlemen, but (at least hopefully) from reality itself.

As to where reality's 'computer network' exists see my previous reply to Mitch where I explain in a fair amount of detail trying to answer his excellent question...

Edgar

[Edgar Owen]

Stephen,

A very important point which I cover extensively in my book, but rather subtle to grasp.

Reality clearly exists. There is something really here now and actual and happening. The totality of that is defined as reality and I refer to its 'stuff' (non-physical but real and actual) as an entity I call 'ontological energy'. It is somewhat similar to the ancient concept of Tao.

This ontological energy is originally formless, similar to a generalized quantum vacuum, and contains the possibilities of all information forms which can arise within it. Similar to a formless sea of water whose nature determines what forms of waves, currents and ripples which can arise within it.

The universe, at its fundamental level, is all the information forms that are actualized within ontological energy, beginning with the big bang, and which continue to evolve according to the laws of nature (the logico-mathematics of reality which we have been discussing).

Thus the complete picture of reality consists of the original formless sea (logical space) of ontological energy and all the evolving forms which exist within it. These forms, everything in the universe, are pure information only and have no self-substances other than the ontological energy in which they arise. Just as the self-substances of all wave forms in water is only water.

Now to answer your question, it is the fact that the information forms are forms that exist in the sea of reality (the ontological energy) that makes them real and actual, and the fact that happening is one of the fundamental aspects of ontological energy that gives them the fire of life as they continually computationally evolve to manifest the real actual universe. This is why the information structures of reality are real and actual but those of computer software simulating something is not, because they run in reality rather than some silicon computer....

The universe can/must be considered a living entity in the sense that it is self-animated from within. There is no external force that moves it and there could not be since by definition it includes everything. Therefore the universe is a living entity, and our life and the life of all things comes from the fact that we are information forms, programs, that run within reality.

This is the source of the 'fire' that animates the information....

Edgar

[Edgar Owen]

Craig,

All this is explained in my book on Reality available on Amazon. The key insight to several of your questions is covered in Part IV: Mind and Reality. Basically the world we think we live in with shapes, colors, flavors and feelings etc. (various types of qualia) is actually a model of the actual external reality constructed in our minds. The actual external reality has none of these qualia and consists of evolving information only. When what mind adds to its internal model of reality is identified and subtracted all that remains is discovered to be an evolving information structure and thus that is the actual nature of external reality.

When this is understood the answers to most of your 5 points becomes clear. As to the nature of consciousness, the so called 'Hard Problem' there is a straightforward answer to that given also. I won't cover it in detail right now but basically it has to do with a deeper understanding of reality and how it self-manifests as opposed to waiting passively to be made conscious.

The modern misunderstanding of consciousness, that it's something that arises in human brains, can be compared to the ancient theory of vision in which it was mistakenly thought that vision involved the eyes shining light on external objects. That erroneous model still exists with respect to consciousness in which it is mistakenly thought that consciousness consists of brains shining consciousness on external objects.

The truth in both cases is that it is external reality that produces both light and the actual real presence of things in the present moment and both vision and consciousness are simply opening and participating in this self-manifestation of reality by an observer who then interprets the information content according to his own nature.

I can explain further if anyone is interested, or you can read my book which covers Mind and Reality and explains what Consciousness is quite thoroughly.

Edgar

[Edgar L. Owen]

Stephen,

Thanks for the welcome to the group. It's certainly far superior to most and the members should be commended!

To address your questions. No, the computations of the universe exist don't run in a physical reality. Physical reality emerges from these computations as they are interpreted in human, and other organism's, mental models of reality. 

Light cones are important but emerge FROM computational reality as dimensionalization emerges from quantum events. (See my post on the quantum aspects of my work in a separate topic of that title).

Light cones are how we visually see and confirm the 4-dimensional hyperspherical geometry of our universe. We actually see all 4-dimensions all the time as we look down our light cones. Our 4-dimensional universe lies clear before us. No tricks needed!

Therefore your gravity=acceleration argument (which is of course true) doesn't apply. There is a single self-consistent universal  computational system at the information level. Different relativistic views of this reality, with different light cones, are just different ways different observers view and interpret the dimensional aspects of this single universal computational reality in their respective frames as they emerge from quantum events.

Best,

Edgar

[Stephen Paul King]

Hi Edgar,

On Tue, Dec 24, 2013 at 1:33 PM, Edgar L. Owen <edga...@att.net> wrote:

Stephen,

Thanks for the welcome to the group. It's certainly far superior to most and the members should be commended!

:-)

 

To address your questions. No, the computations of the universe exist don't run in a physical reality. Physical reality emerges from these computations as they are interpreted in human, and other organism's, mental models of reality. 

I would agree! There is not any "separate" hardware that the computations could be said to "run on" in any absolute sense; that is the point that I was asking about! The "reality" emerges from the computations, yes. But there is something interesting here that can be learned from the concept of a "virtual machine" that is used in real world computers . 

  A virtual machine is a program that acts as if it where hardware for some other program. So we have the idea that computations can see each other as hardware and thus the notion that "the computations of the universe do run on a physical reality" if and only if we restrict the notion of "computations of the universe" into subsets that can not be merged or cleanly dovetailed into each other.

 

Light cones are important but emerge FROM computational reality as dimensionalization emerges from quantum events. (See my post on the quantum aspects of my work in a separate topic of that title).

Ah, that will not work if your concept of computation generates the causal relations between observed events. As I pointed out previously, the universe we observe is not one that can be said to have a causal ordering that all observers (regardless of their frames of reference) can agree upon. This may seem to be a crazy and even obviously wrong statement to make, but think about it. Any time we think of events in the physical world and their ordering (in time) we have to consider the inertial frame of the observers and we notice that there will always be observers (with different inertial frames) that cannot agree on the order of events. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Relativity_of_simultaneity

   Therefore, when considering the usual notion of the computation of the universe, we can not assume a single computation as such is equivalent to a single sequence of computational events or a string of numbers. There is a different view of computation that does not involve strings of numbers of sequences of events that I am investigating. See: http://chorasimilarity.wordpress.com/2013/12/17/glc-actors-what-are-for-and-why-are-interesting/

 

Light cones are how we visually see and confirm the 4-dimensional hyperspherical geometry of our universe. We actually see all 4-dimensions all the time as we look down our light cones. Our 4-dimensional universe lies clear before us. No tricks needed!

Umm, we disagree!

 

Therefore your gravity=acceleration argument (which is of course true) doesn't apply. There is a single self-consistent universal  computational system at the information level. Different relativistic views of this reality, with different light cones, are just different ways different observers view and interpret the dimensional aspects of this single universal computational reality in their respective frames as they emerge from quantum events.

Your idea might work if you ignore the fact that quantum mechanics does not allow all events to be uniquely ordered  in a global way. Information of positions is generally incompatible with information of momenta. If you are only considering position information, cool. One can obtain a single 4-d universe that is computable by a single computation. But that is a static universe and we don't live in it. 

  Our universe evolves. Objects in it have measurable momenta, spin, charge and positions. Computations of it cannot be said to be uniquely defined into a single string. The same argument holds for the reverse: The universe as a computation is *many* distinct computations, not just one.

 

Best,

Edgar

On Friday, December 20, 2013 6:52:54 PM UTC-5, Edgar L. Owen wrote:

All,

The fundamental nature of reality is examined in detail in my recent book on Reality available on Amazon under my name.

Marchal is on the right track, but reality consists not just of numbers (math) but is a running logical structure analogous to software that continually computes the current state of the universe. Just as software includes but doesn't consist only of numbers and math, so does reality. In fact the equations of physical science make sense only when embedded in a logical structure just as is the case in computational reality.

Modern science has a major lacuna, the notion that all of reality is mathematical, that prevents science from grasping the complete nature of reality. In truth all of reality is logical, as is software, and the mathematics is just a subset of the logic. After all, modern science with its misguided insistence that all of reality is mathematical, has had nothing useful to say about the nature of either consciousness or the present moment, the two most fundamental aspects of experience. However I present a computational based information approach to these in my book among many other things.

The second clarification that needs to be made to the post on Marchal's work is that human math and logic are distinct from the actual math and logic that computes reality. The human version is a generalized and extended approximation of the actual that differs from the actual logico-mathematical structure of reality in important ways (e.g. infinities and infinitesimals which don't actually exist in external reality).

I can explain further if anyone is interested, or you can read about it in my book...

Edgar Owen

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[Bruno Marchal]

On 22 Dec 2013, at 19:20, Edgar Owen wrote:

Bruno,

Thanks for your comments. However I think you are coming at Reality from the POV of human logico-mathematical theory whose results you are trying to impose on reality.

See previous answer to this. Church thesis makes computations as solid as numbers, and those does not depend on humans at all, or show me the dependence (and define "humans").

My approach is to closely examine reality

Physical reality, mathematical reality, arithmetical reality? They all kicks back. 

and then try to figure out how it works and what ITS innate rules and structures are.

I would probably agree with much of what you say, if you were saying it about human logico-mathematical structures, but the logico-mathematical structure of reality is not bound by human rules.

That's my point.

It runs according to its own logic and science is the process of trying to figure out what those rules are and how they work...

For this we have to agree on some "independent truth". Mine are simple and precise; basically logic + the axiom of elementary arithmetic.

For example, reality is clearly a computational process,

That is refuted by the UDA. 

and it runs against pure information which is the fundamental stuff of the universe. There is simply no other way current information states of reality could result from previous ones other than by a computational process.

Some solution of differential equation can be non computable. then with comp, some physical facts emerge in a non computable manner.

How that computational process works must be determined by examining reality itself.

How could we examine reality itself. We measure numbers and correlation between some of those numbers, the rest is in big parts in our (real) imagination.

We may try to make sense of it in terms of traditional human math theory, but when there are differences then reality always trumps human math theory, which applies to human math rather than reality's logico-mathematical system.

You seem to be anti-realist in math. This means comp should not even have any sense. I am not sure what you mean by "computational". I use it in its standard sense of Turing computable. I delete "Turing" using Church Turing thesis.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Bruno Marchal]

On 22 Dec 2013, at 20:04, Spudb...@aol.com wrote:

Your theory comes from Von Neumann, and Chaitin, and Wolfram, does it not, Edgar? That everything is a program or cellular automata, and "in the beginning was a program." Following along, what is this Logic comprised of (sort of like SPK's query) is it electrons, is it virtual particles, is it field lines? Where doth the logical structure sleep? In Planck Cells? I apologize if my questions annoy, but where is the computer network that computes the current state of the universe.

In the arithmletical reality which probably emulates all computations (in the standard sense of computer science).

But the Wolfram theory is incorrect, as it assumes comp, and don't take the FPI into account (nor even the quantum one).

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[spudb...@aol.com]

Are we not presuming, structure, or a-priori, existence of something, doing this processing, this work? Idea-wise, Wolfram and Von Neumann's cellular automata, also known as programs. I am not saying there is a programmer (like Herr Doctor Scmidhuber has pondered) but there seems to be a pre-existing program, producing your Arithmetic. Platonism is great, but I am doubtful that the magic of self organization can come up with forms all on its own. Before the chicken came the animal that preceded the chicken-maybe a raptor, forget the egg. 

[Bruno Marchal]

On 25 Dec 2013, at 18:40, Spudb...@aol.com wrote:

Are we not presuming, structure, or a-priori, existence of something, doing this processing, this work?

In the UDA we assume a "Turing universal", or "sigma_1-complete" physical reality, in some local sense. 

We need this to just explain what is a computer, alias, universal machine, alias universal number (implemented or not in a physical reality).

Note that we do not assume a *primitive physical reality*. In comp, we are a priori agnostic on this. The UDA, still will explains that such "primitiveness" cannot solve the mind-body problem when made into a dogma/assumption-of-primitiveness.

Then in AUDA, keeping comp at the meta-level, I eliminate all assumptions above very elementary arithmetic (Robinson Arithmetic).

The little and big bangs, including the taxes, and why it hurts is derived from basically just 

Kxy = x

Sxyz = xz(yz)

or just

x + 0 = x  

x + s(y) = s(x + y) 

 x *0 = 0

 x*s(y) = x*y + x 

Idea-wise, Wolfram and Von Neumann's cellular automata, also known as programs.

I cannot parse this sentence.

I am not saying there is a programmer (like Herr Doctor Scmidhuber has pondered) but there seems to be a pre-existing program, producing your Arithmetic.

?

I assume arithmetic. No more than any scientists. I define programs in arithmetic. I don't define arithmetic in programs.

We need to assume a sigma_1 complete reality, as we cannot get them from less. But to reason further, and extracts the big bangs from arithmetic, we need to define in RA, the notion of observers, reason, and this is done in the usual mathematical manner, which happens, for computer science, to be entirely build in term of numbers relations and functions, some describable, some not, in arithmetical sentences.

Platonism is great,

Platonism is a theorem in arithmetic, once you bet that it exists a level of description of yourself where you are Turing emulable.

But the arithmetical realism used by comp is a far weaker hypothesis: it is just the hypothesis that the elementary closed arithmetical sentences, like Ex(x+1=2), are true, or false. It is assumed by 99,9999% of scientists.

This is very important spudboy, I am just a humble logician which says that if you believe that you can survive with a digital brains (physical, if you want), then physics becomes a sub-branch of computer science, which is already (although not so well known) a branch of number theory.

Mechanism has been a long time ally to materialism, but the discovery of the universal machine illustrates that mechanism is more an ally of the "question to king Milinda" or to Neoplatonism.

but I am doubtful that the magic of self organization can come up with forms all on its own.

It cannot happen from just logic and addition.

It cannot happen from just logic and multiplication.

It happens from the conjunction of logic, addition and multiplication.

Before the chicken came the animal that preceded the chicken-maybe a raptor, forget the egg. 

The comp TOE, isolated through UDA and the AUDA, assumes the less. The TOE is already taught in elementary school.

I have never heard one parent complaining of any form of brainwashing, or propaganda when taught in elementary mathematical propositions, so I think that doubting arithmetical realism is just obscurantist obstructive type of bad faith, and it hides the fact that comp leads to Platonism, in the philosophical or metaphysical, or theological, sense.

I am a scientist. I put the assumption on the table. They are quite weak, and I reason from there.

You seem to ignore the relations between computer science and arithmetic, but this is standard in theoretical computer science.

You seem to assume a primitive physical universe, but the UDA shows that this does not even make sense, in case the comp substitution level exist.

You need to convince yourself by following the reasoning, and study a bit of computer science. A tiny part of the arithmetical reality contains the whole of the computable, and the arithmetical reality is vaster as it "knows" about the termination or non termination of algorithm or class of algorithms, etc. The observers are emulated in that tiny parts of arithmetic, but what is true about them and about their experiences extends the whole arithmetical, the whole analytical, and even quite plausibly/arguably the whole mathematical (in the current sense of mathematical).

I am not proposing anything new, just pointing on the incompatibility between mechanist and materialist cognitive sciences, and showing how computer science translates the mind-body problem into a body belief  problem in arithmetic. The conversation with the Lôbian machine is just the beginning of the solution, in the most ideal case.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Stephen Paul King]

Dear Bruno,

On Fri, Dec 27, 2013 at 11:11 AM, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

On 25 Dec 2013, at 18:40, Spudb...@aol.com wrote:

Are we not presuming, structure, or a-priori, existence of something, doing this processing, this work?

In the UDA we assume a "Turing universal", or "sigma_1-complete" physical reality, in some local sense. 

Could this "Turing universal/sigma_1-complete in a local sense" be the exact criteria required to define the observations 3-experiences of individuals or is it the 1-experiences of individuals (observers) in keeping with the definition of an observer as the intersection of infinitely many computations?

 

We need this to just explain what is a computer, alias, universal machine, alias universal number (implemented or not in a physical reality).

Note that we do not assume a *primitive physical reality*. In comp, we are a priori agnostic on this. The UDA, still will explains that such "primitiveness" cannot solve the mind-body problem when made into a dogma/assumption-of-primitiveness.

It has always seemed to me that UDA cannot solve the mind-body problem strictly because it cannot comprehend the existence of "other minds".

 

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[LizR]

On 28 December 2013 05:51, Stephen Paul King <Step...@provensecure.com> wrote:

It has always seemed to me that UDA cannot solve the mind-body problem strictly because it cannot comprehend the existence of "other minds".

Actually, I have wondered about this. How do all these "threads of computation" which are assumed to exist in arithmetic actually manage to communicate with each other?

[Stephen Paul King]

Hi LizR,

   That is what is not explicitly explained! I could see how one might make an argument based on Godel numbers and a choice of a numbering scheme could show the existence of a string of numbers that, if run on some computer, would generate a description of the interaction of several actors. But this ignores the problems of concurrency and "point of view". The best one might be able to do, AFAIK, is cook up a description of the interactions of many "observers" -each one is an intersection of infinitely many computations, but such a description would itself be the content of some observer's point of view that assumes a choice of Godel numbering scheme.

  Something doesn't seem right about this!

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[LizR]

On 28 December 2013 11:55, Stephen Paul King <Step...@provensecure.com> wrote:

Hi LizR,

   That is what is not explicitly explained! I could see how one might make an argument based on Godel numbers and a choice of a numbering scheme could show the existence of a string of numbers that, if run on some computer, would generate a description of the interaction of several actors. But this ignores the problems of concurrency and "point of view". The best one might be able to do, AFAIK, is cook up a description of the interactions of many "observers" -each one is an intersection of infinitely many computations, but such a description would itself be the content of some observer's point of view that assumes a choice of Godel numbering scheme.

  Something doesn't seem right about this!

It seems to suggest "multi-solipsism" or something along those lines - which doesn't make it wrong, of course.

I await Bruno's answer with interest. I think he has already said something about this, but I don't recall it being satisfactory, at least to my limited understanding.

[Jason Resch]

I am also interested to hear what Bruno has to say.  My perspective is that most of the computations that support you and I are not isolated and short-lived "computational Boltzmann brains" but much larger, long-running computations such as those that correspond to a universe in which life adapts and evolves.  The starting conditions for these is much less constrained, and therefore it is far more probable to result in conscious computations such as ours than the case where the computation supporting your brain experiencing this moment is some initial condition of a very specific program. Certainly, those programs exist too, but they are much rarer. They appear in the UD much less frequently than say the program corresponding to the approximate laws of physics of this universe.  It takes far more data to describe your brain than it does to describe the physical system on which it is based.

So we are (mostly) still "in the same universe", and so we can interact with and affect the consciousness of other people.

Jason

[Stephen Paul King]

Dear LizR,

   Multi-solipsism, exactly! We each live in our very own "world" and all interactions between pairs of separable entities are supported at lower levels where the pair collapse to a single entity. This would be very similar to Bruno's "substitution level".

On Fri, Dec 27, 2013 at 6:03 PM, LizR <liz...@gmail.com> wrote:

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[Stephen Paul King]

Dear Jason,

Interleaving below.

On Fri, Dec 27, 2013 at 6:20 PM, Jason Resch <jason...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Fri, Dec 27, 2013 at 6:03 PM, LizR <liz...@gmail.com> wrote:

On 28 December 2013 11:55, Stephen Paul King <Step...@provensecure.com> wrote:

Hi LizR,

   That is what is not explicitly explained! I could see how one might make an argument based on Godel numbers and a choice of a numbering scheme could show the existence of a string of numbers that, if run on some computer, would generate a description of the interaction of several actors. But this ignores the problems of concurrency and "point of view". The best one might be able to do, AFAIK, is cook up a description of the interactions of many "observers" -each one is an intersection of infinitely many computations, but such a description would itself be the content of some observer's point of view that assumes a choice of Godel numbering scheme.

  Something doesn't seem right about this!

It seems to suggest "multi-solipsism" or something along those lines - which doesn't make it wrong, of course.

I await Bruno's answer with interest. I think he has already said something about this, but I don't recall it being satisfactory, at least to my limited understanding.

I am also interested to hear what Bruno has to say.  My perspective is that most of the computations that support you and I are not isolated and short-lived "computational Boltzmann brains" but much larger, long-running computations such as those that correspond to a universe in which life adapts and evolves.

I agree. I have never been happy with the Boltzman brain argument because it seems to assume that the probability distribution of "spontaneous" BBs is independent of the complexity of the content of the minds associated with those brains. I have been studying this relationship between complexity or "expressiveness" of a B.B. My first guesstimation is that there is something like a Zift's Law in the distribution: the more expressive a BB the less chance it has to exist and evolve at least one "cycle" of its computation. (After all, computers have to be able to run one clock cycle to be said that they actually "compute" some program...)

 

 The starting conditions for these is much less constrained, and therefore it is far more probable to result in conscious computations such as ours than the case where the computation supporting your brain experiencing this moment is some initial condition of a very specific program. Certainly, those programs exist too, but they are much rarer.

RIght, but how fast do they get rarer?

 

They appear in the UD much less frequently than say the program corresponding to the approximate laws of physics of this universe.

 It takes far more data to describe your brain than it does to describe the physical system on which it is based.

How do you estimate this? Are you assuming that a lot of data can be compressed using symmetries and redundancies. This looks like a Kolmogorov complexity/entropy... 

 

So we are (mostly) still "in the same universe", and so we can interact with and affect the consciousness of other people.

From my reasoning, the appearance that we are "in the same universe" is a by product of bisimilarities in the infinity of computations that are each of us. In other words, there  are many computations that are running Stephen that are identical to and thus are the same computation to many of the computations that are running Jason.

  This gives an overlap between our worlds and thus the appearance of a common world for some collection of "observers". The cool thing is that this implies that there are underlaps; computations that are not shared or bisimilar between all of us. COuld those be the ones that we identify as "ourselves"?

 

Jason

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[LizR]

This sounds like a way to get Max Tegmark's mathematical universe hypothesis out of comp. It also sounds like a way to get Edgar Owen's cellular automaton universe, or whatever it should be called (though not the part about the present moment being the only thing that exists, but that's an unnecessary add-on anyway imho).

[Jason Resch]

On Fri, Dec 27, 2013 at 6:33 PM, Stephen Paul King <Step...@provensecure.com> wrote:

Dear Jason,

Interleaving below.

On Fri, Dec 27, 2013 at 6:20 PM, Jason Resch <jason...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Fri, Dec 27, 2013 at 6:03 PM, LizR <liz...@gmail.com> wrote:

On 28 December 2013 11:55, Stephen Paul King <Step...@provensecure.com> wrote:

Hi LizR,

   That is what is not explicitly explained! I could see how one might make an argument based on Godel numbers and a choice of a numbering scheme could show the existence of a string of numbers that, if run on some computer, would generate a description of the interaction of several actors. But this ignores the problems of concurrency and "point of view". The best one might be able to do, AFAIK, is cook up a description of the interactions of many "observers" -each one is an intersection of infinitely many computations, but such a description would itself be the content of some observer's point of view that assumes a choice of Godel numbering scheme.

  Something doesn't seem right about this!

It seems to suggest "multi-solipsism" or something along those lines - which doesn't make it wrong, of course.

I await Bruno's answer with interest. I think he has already said something about this, but I don't recall it being satisfactory, at least to my limited understanding.

I am also interested to hear what Bruno has to say.  My perspective is that most of the computations that support you and I are not isolated and short-lived "computational Boltzmann brains" but much larger, long-running computations such as those that correspond to a universe in which life adapts and evolves.

I agree. I have never been happy with the Boltzman brain argument because it seems to assume that the probability distribution of "spontaneous" BBs is independent of the complexity of the content of the minds associated with those brains. I have been studying this relationship between complexity or "expressiveness" of a B.B. My first guesstimation is that there is something like a Zift's Law in the distribution: the more expressive a BB the less chance it has to exist and evolve at least one "cycle" of its computation. (After all, computers have to be able to run one clock cycle to be said that they actually "compute" some program...)

 

 The starting conditions for these is much less constrained, and therefore it is far more probable to result in conscious computations such as ours than the case where the computation supporting your brain experiencing this moment is some initial condition of a very specific program. Certainly, those programs exist too, but they are much rarer.

RIght, but how fast do they get rarer?

It's hard to say. We would have to develop some model for estimating the Kolmogorov complexity (and maybe also incorporate frequency) of different programs and their relation to a given mind.

 

 

They appear in the UD much less frequently than say the program corresponding to the approximate laws of physics of this universe.

 It takes far more data to describe your brain than it does to describe the physical system on which it is based.

How do you estimate this?

The UDA is a comparatively short program, and provably contains the program that is identical to your mind.  Similarly, all of the known laws of physics could fit on a couple sheets of paper.  QM seems to suggest that all possible solutions to certain equations exist, and so there is no need to specify the initial conditions of the universe (which would require much more information to describe than your brain).

 

Are you assuming that a lot of data can be compressed using symmetries and redundancies. This looks like a Kolmogorov complexity/entropy... 

Somewhat. I think how frequently a program is referenced / instantiated by other non-halting programs may play a role.

 

 

So we are (mostly) still "in the same universe", and so we can interact with and affect the consciousness of other people.

From my reasoning, the appearance that we are "in the same universe" is a by product of bisimilarities in the infinity of computations that are each of us. In other words, there  are many computations that are running Stephen that are identical to and thus are the same computation to many of the computations that are running Jason.

Yes. We would be programs instantiated within a (possibly but not necessarily) shared, larger program.

 

  This gives an overlap between our worlds and thus the appearance of a common world for some collection of "observers".

Right.

 

The cool thing is that this implies that there are underlaps; computations that are not shared or bisimilar between all of us.

Yes, I agree.  In some branches of the MW, perhaps you were born but I was not, or I was, and you weren't.

 

COuld those be the ones that we identify as "ourselves"?

 

Personal identity can become a very difficult subject, since there may be paths through which my program evolves to become you, and vice versa.

Jason

[Edgar L. Owen]

Jason,

You state "The UDA is a comparatively short program, and provably contains the program that is identical to your mind."

You can't be serious! As stated that's the most ridiculous statement I've heard here today in all manner of respects!

Edgar

[LizR]

On 28 December 2013 13:56, Jason Resch <jason...@gmail.com> wrote:

The UDA is a comparatively short program, and provably contains the program that is identical to your mind.

To be more precise (I hope) - assuming that thoughts, experiences etc are a form of computation at some level, the output (or trace) of the UDA, which I seem to recall is designated UDA*, will eventually generate those thoughts, experiences etc. Though if run on a PC it would probably take a few googol years to do so (and require many hubble volumes of storage space too, I imagine).

However, arithmetical realism assumes that the trace of the UDA already exists timelessly.

 

 Similarly, all of the known laws of physics could fit on a couple sheets of paper.  QM seems to suggest that all possible solutions to certain equations exist, and so there is no need to specify the initial conditions of the universe (which would require much more information to describe than your brain).

This sounds like the "Theory of Nothing" again.....? 

[LizR]

On 28 December 2013 14:03, Edgar L. Owen <edga...@att.net> wrote:

Jason,

You state "The UDA is a comparatively short program, and provably contains the program that is identical to your mind."

You can't be serious! As stated that's the most ridiculous statement I've heard here today in all manner of respects!

Jason was shorthanding somewhat. I've expanded on his statement in my last post.

[Stephen Paul King]

Hi Jason,

I snipped the portion of the thread out to cut of the tail... Interleaving in Blue.

I am also interested to hear what Bruno has to say.  My perspective is that most of the computations that support you and I are not isolated and short-lived "computational Boltzmann brains" but much larger, long-running computations such as those that correspond to a universe in which life adapts and evolves.

I agree. I have never been happy with the Boltzman brain argument because it seems to assume that the probability distribution of "spontaneous" BBs is independent of the complexity of the content of the minds associated with those brains. I have been studying this relationship between complexity or "expressiveness" of a B.B. My first guesstimation is that there is something like a Zift's Law in the distribution: the more expressive a BB the less chance it has to exist and evolve at least one "cycle" of its computation. (After all, computers have to be able to run one clock cycle to be said that they actually "compute" some program...)

 

 The starting conditions for these is much less constrained, and therefore it is far more probable to result in conscious computations such as ours than the case where the computation supporting your brain experiencing this moment is some initial condition of a very specific program. Certainly, those programs exist too, but they are much rarer.

RIght, but how fast do they get rarer?

It's hard to say. We would have to develop some model for estimating the Kolmogorov complexity (and maybe also incorporate frequency) of different programs and their relation to a given mind.

{spk} Do you have an candidate "toy models" of a mind that would work? What can be constructed following Bruno's idea of an observer: an intersection of infinitely many computations (of finite length?)

Would any "universal number do"? Isn't a Universal number always at max Kolmogorov entropy? If we add arbitrary prefixes to a Universal number, does it remain "Universal"?

 

 

They appear in the UD much less frequently than say the program corresponding to the approximate laws of physics of this universe.

 It takes far more data to describe your brain than it does to describe the physical system on which it is based.

How do you estimate this?

The UDA is a comparatively short program, and provably contains the program that is identical to your mind.  Similarly, all of the known laws of physics could fit on a couple sheets of paper.  QM seems to suggest that all possible solutions to certain equations exist, and so there is no need to specify the initial conditions of the universe (which would require much more information to describe than your brain).

{spk} Sure! Any finite program will be "smaller" an an infinite one! LOL. But I am skeptical of the claim that even if it exists, finding it is HARD. If you don't actually have a means to implement it on a physical machine what good is an existential proof of it in some theory?

  This is why I often wonder if this entire conversation exercise in futility! :_( What does it really mean to say that a mind is a finite program when such has measure zero in the Reals (which is where we should embed the NxN->N idea in the first place. I loath Kronecker's claim! It is synonymous to "Man is the measure of all things".

 

Are you assuming that a lot of data can be compressed using symmetries and redundancies. This looks like a Kolmogorov complexity/entropy... 

Somewhat. I think how frequently a program is referenced / instantiated by other non-halting programs may play a role.

{spk} Like citations or Friending. LOL, nice! But what prevents such a scheme from being regular, generating a complete graph with a homogeneous connectedness or a purely random connectedness? 

Real world networks are, at best, "small world" on average and thus are far different from what we expect from our considerations of ensembles of NxN->N strings. 

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Small-world_network

"A small-world network is a type of mathematical graph in which most nodes are not neighbors of one another, but most nodes can be reached from every other by a small number of hops or steps. Specifically, a small-world network is defined to be a network where the typical distance L between two randomly chosen nodes (the number of steps required) grows proportionally to the logarithm of the number of nodes N in the network, that is:^[1]

 

 

So we are (mostly) still "in the same universe", and so we can interact with and affect the consciousness of other people.

From my reasoning, the appearance that we are "in the same universe" is a by product of bisimilarities in the infinity of computations that are each of us. In other words, there  are many computations that are running Stephen that are identical to and thus are the same computation to many of the computations that are running Jason.

Yes. We would be programs instantiated within a (possibly but not necessarily) shared, larger program.

{spk} So we get the UD at the end of the day thinking that way?.

 

  This gives an overlap between our worlds and thus the appearance of a common world for some collection of "observers".

Right.

 

The cool thing is that this implies that there are underlaps; computations that are not shared or bisimilar between all of us.

Yes, I agree.  In some branches of the MW, perhaps you were born but I was not, or I was, and you weren't.

{spk} I am wanting to think of this as a massive constraint scheme. The interaction of any one observer limits the possible interactions with other  observers. This limits the total set of set of possible interactions for all observers all the way down to only a few possible interactions are allowed for all observers if they are interacting.

 

COuld those be the ones that we identify as "ourselves"?

 

Personal identity can become a very difficult subject, since there may be paths through which my program evolves to become you, and vice versa.

{spk} I agree and this implies that in a deep way, we are one and the same observer! Deciding the path that connects a pair of observers, I think, is equivalent to computing the smooth diffeomorphism between the pair of manifolds that each experiences as a "world".

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[Jason Resch]

On Fri, Dec 27, 2013 at 8:03 PM, Edgar L. Owen <edga...@att.net> wrote:

Jason,

You state "The UDA is a comparatively short program, and provably contains the program that is identical to your mind."

My apologies, I meant the "UD" which short for "Universal Dovetailer", not the UDA, which is the "Universal Dovetailer Argument".

 

You can't be serious!

I am.

 

As stated that's the most ridiculous statement I've heard here today in all manner of respects!

What, may I ask, is so ridiculous about the statement?

The UD is a program that executes all programs. If your mind is a program, then it is executed by the UD.

Jason

 

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[LizR]

What I think Jason is saying is that the TRACE of the UD (knowns as UD* - I made the same mistake!) will eventually contain your mind. See my previous post for an elaboration.

[Stephen Paul King]

Hi Jason,

  Could you discuss the "trace of the UD" that LizR mentioned? How is it computed? Could you write an explicit example? I have never been able to grok it.

On Fri, Dec 27, 2013 at 9:29 PM, LizR <liz...@gmail.com> wrote:

What I think Jason is saying is that the TRACE of the UD (knowns as UD* - I made the same mistake!) will eventually contain your mind. See my previous post for an elaboration.

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[LizR]

On 28 December 2013 15:31, Stephen Paul King <Step...@provensecure.com> wrote:

Hi Jason,

  Could you discuss the "trace of the UD" that LizR mentioned? How is it computed? Could you write an explicit example? I have never been able to grok it.

This is something that I also find it rather hard to get my head around. I think the argument goes that the trace of the UD exists in arithmetic, along with all other computations, and indeed everything else (infinity is a big place, I guess...!)

The hard bit is understanding how one state of UD* can "know" that it is part of a computation when it's just "there" (a bit like a slice thru a block universe, perhaps). Perhaps this involves something like Fred Hoyle's pigeon hole idea from "October the first is too late" - a fab book, by the way, as I imagine everyone here already knows.

[Jason Resch]

On Fri, Dec 27, 2013 at 8:52 PM, Stephen Paul King <Step...@provensecure.com> wrote:

Hi Jason,

I snipped the portion of the thread out to cut of the tail... Interleaving in Blue.

I am also interested to hear what Bruno has to say.  My perspective is that most of the computations that support you and I are not isolated and short-lived "computational Boltzmann brains" but much larger, long-running computations such as those that correspond to a universe in which life adapts and evolves.

I agree. I have never been happy with the Boltzman brain argument because it seems to assume that the probability distribution of "spontaneous" BBs is independent of the complexity of the content of the minds associated with those brains. I have been studying this relationship between complexity or "expressiveness" of a B.B. My first guesstimation is that there is something like a Zift's Law in the distribution: the more expressive a BB the less chance it has to exist and evolve at least one "cycle" of its computation. (After all, computers have to be able to run one clock cycle to be said that they actually "compute" some program...)

 

 The starting conditions for these is much less constrained, and therefore it is far more probable to result in conscious computations such as ours than the case where the computation supporting your brain experiencing this moment is some initial condition of a very specific program. Certainly, those programs exist too, but they are much rarer.

RIght, but how fast do they get rarer?

It's hard to say. We would have to develop some model for estimating the Kolmogorov complexity (and maybe also incorporate frequency) of different programs and their relation to a given mind.

{spk} Do you have an candidate "toy models" of a mind that would work?

I don't..

 

What can be constructed following Bruno's idea of an observer: an intersection of infinitely many computations (of finite length?)

It seems like it might explain some phenomena of QM.

 

Would any "universal number do"?

That is what Bruno speculatively has suggested. I am not so sure. Sometimes I think an "if-then-else-statement" contains all that is fundamentally required for consciousness, or at least, to be an atom of consciousness.

 

Isn't a Universal number always at max Kolmogorov entropy?

I don't think so. The tape of a Turing machine might be very compressible.  Most .exe files, compress about 80% in my experience, using tools such as UPX ( http://upx.sourceforge.net ).

 

If we add arbitrary prefixes to a Universal number, does it remain "Universal"?

That's a question for Bruno.  I don't know. :-)

 

 

 

They appear in the UD much less frequently than say the program corresponding to the approximate laws of physics of this universe.

 It takes far more data to describe your brain than it does to describe the physical system on which it is based.

How do you estimate this?

The UDA is a comparatively short program, and provably contains the program that is identical to your mind.  Similarly, all of the known laws of physics could fit on a couple sheets of paper.  QM seems to suggest that all possible solutions to certain equations exist, and so there is no need to specify the initial conditions of the universe (which would require much more information to describe than your brain).

{spk} Sure! Any finite program will be "smaller" an an infinite one! LOL.

:-)

 

But I am skeptical of the claim that even if it exists, finding it is HARD. If you don't actually have a means to implement it on a physical machine what good is an existential proof of it in some theory?

Our computers are growing in power exponentially.  I think eventually progress on these questions can be made, it might take a few decades though.

 

  This is why I often wonder if this entire conversation exercise in futility! :_( What does it really mean to say that a mind is a finite program when such has measure zero in the Reals (which is where we should embed the NxN->N idea in the first place.

The reals aren't necessary and don't need to be supposed.  Our measure may be close to zero, but I don't think it is zero.

 

I loath Kronecker's claim! It is synonymous to "Man is the measure of all things".

What is his claim?  I am not familiar with it.

 

 

Are you assuming that a lot of data can be compressed using symmetries and redundancies. This looks like a Kolmogorov complexity/entropy... 

Somewhat. I think how frequently a program is referenced / instantiated by other non-halting programs may play a role.

{spk} Like citations or Friending. LOL, nice!

Cool. I am not familiar with Friending.  Do you have links or quotations?

 

But what prevents such a scheme from being regular, generating a complete graph with a homogeneous connectedness or a purely random connectedness? 

I think it may be more like a fractal, as ever more detailed computations take ever finer divergences and nuances.

 

Real world networks are, at best, "small world" on average and thus are far different from what we expect from our considerations of ensembles of NxN->N strings. 

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Small-world_network

"A small-world network is a type of mathematical graph in which most nodes are not neighbors of one another, but most nodes can be reached from every other by a small number of hops or steps. Specifically, a small-world network is defined to be a network where the typical distance L between two randomly chosen nodes (the number of steps required) grows proportionally to the logarithm of the number of nodes N in the network, that is:^[1]

I think it is quite possible different conscious states, or observers, are related in a "small-world network". Interesting idea.

 

 

 

So we are (mostly) still "in the same universe", and so we can interact with and affect the consciousness of other people.

From my reasoning, the appearance that we are "in the same universe" is a by product of bisimilarities in the infinity of computations that are each of us. In other words, there  are many computations that are running Stephen that are identical to and thus are the same computation to many of the computations that are running Jason.

Yes. We would be programs instantiated within a (possibly but not necessarily) shared, larger program.

{spk} So we get the UD at the end of the day thinking that way?.

Yes, but perhaps (almost) no-one considers the UD as their physical reality, there are intermediate programs, and programs within programs, that can exist in between. No one can say for sure whether their program is an execution within the UD, or the execution of program that exists independent of the UD.

 

 

  This gives an overlap between our worlds and thus the appearance of a common world for some collection of "observers".

Right.

 

The cool thing is that this implies that there are underlaps; computations that are not shared or bisimilar between all of us.

Yes, I agree.  In some branches of the MW, perhaps you were born but I was not, or I was, and you weren't.

{spk} I am wanting to think of this as a massive constraint scheme. The interaction of any one observer limits the possible interactions with other  observers. This limits the total set of set of possible interactions for all observers all the way down to only a few possible interactions are allowed for all observers if they are interacting.

If time is finite we are surely limited, but I think computationalism ensures our immortality, the existence of all possible experiences, and the identity of all souls.

 

 

COuld those be the ones that we identify as "ourselves"?

 

Personal identity can become a very difficult subject, since there may be paths through which my program evolves to become you, and vice versa.

{spk} I agree and this implies that in a deep way, we are one and the same observer! Deciding the path that connects a pair of observers, I think, is equivalent to computing the smooth diffeomorphism between the pair of manifolds that each experiences as a "world".

Yes, I think we may have more of a "life web", than the "life tree" suggested by Everett. In a reality so filled with possible experiences, intersections are all but guaranteed.

Jason

 

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[LizR]

I think friending is something to do with facebook, or similar social media, so I think SPK is saying that programmes which reference other programmes give them more reality. (Or something like that! :-)

[Jason Resch]

On Fri, Dec 27, 2013 at 9:31 PM, Stephen Paul King <Step...@provensecure.com> wrote:

Hi Jason,

  Could you discuss the "trace of the UD" that LizR mentioned? How is it computed? Could you write an explicit example? I have never been able to grok it.

Bruno has written an actual UD in the LISP programming language.  I will write a simple one in pseudo-code below:

List listOfPrograms = new List[]; # Empty list 

int i = 0;

while (true)

{

   # Create a program corresponding to the binary expansion of the integer i

   Program P = createProgramFromInteger(i); 

   # Add the program to a list of programs we have generated so far

   listOfPrograms.add(P);

   # For each program we have generated that has not halted, execute one instruction of it

   for each (Program p in listOfPrograms)

   {

     if (p.hasHalted() == false)

     {

        executeOneInstruction(p);

     }

   }

   # Finally, increment i so a new program is generated the next time through

   i = i + 1;

}

Any program, and whether or not it ever terminates can be translated to a statement concerning numbers in arithmetic. Thus mathematical truth captures the facts concerning whether or not any program executes forever, and what all of its intermediate states are. If these statements are true independently of you and me, then the executions of these programs are embedded in arithmetical truth and have a platonic existence.  The first, second, 10th, 1,000,000th, and 10^100th, and 10^100^100th state of the UD's execution are mathematical facts which have definite values, and all the conscious beings that are instantiated and evolve and write books on consciousness, and talk about the UD on their Internet, etc. as part of the execution of the UD are there, in the math.

Jason

 

[LizR]

There is one point to add which I think you've missed, Jason (apologies if I've misunderstood). The UD generates the first instruction of the first programme, then the first instruction of the second programme, and so on. Once it has generated the first instruction of every possible programme, it then adds the second instruction of the first programme, the second instruction of the second programme, and so on. This is why it's called a dovetailer, I believe, and stops it running into problems with non-halting programmes, or programmes that would crash, or various other contingencies...

This isn't intrinsic to the UD, which could in principle write the first programme before it moves on to the next one - but it allows it to avoid certain problems caused by having a programme that writes other programmes.

...I think. I'm sure Bruno will let me know if that's wrong.

:)

[LizR]

PS I like the "while (true)" statement. What would Pontius Pilate have made of that? :-)

[Stephen Paul King]

Hi Jason,

On Fri, Dec 27, 2013 at 9:53 PM, Jason Resch <jason...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Fri, Dec 27, 2013 at 8:52 PM, Stephen Paul King <Step...@provensecure.com> wrote:

Hi Jason,

I snipped the portion of the thread out to cut of the tail... Interleaving in Blue.

I am also interested to hear what Bruno has to say.  My perspective is that most of the computations that support you and I are not isolated and short-lived "computational Boltzmann brains" but much larger, long-running computations such as those that correspond to a universe in which life adapts and evolves.

I agree. I have never been happy with the Boltzman brain argument because it seems to assume that the probability distribution of "spontaneous" BBs is independent of the complexity of the content of the minds associated with those brains. I have been studying this relationship between complexity or "expressiveness" of a B.B. My first guesstimation is that there is something like a Zift's Law in the distribution: the more expressive a BB the less chance it has to exist and evolve at least one "cycle" of its computation. (After all, computers have to be able to run one clock cycle to be said that they actually "compute" some program...)

 

 The starting conditions for these is much less constrained, and therefore it is far more probable to result in conscious computations such as ours than the case where the computation supporting your brain experiencing this moment is some initial condition of a very specific program. Certainly, those programs exist too, but they are much rarer.

RIght, but how fast do they get rarer?

It's hard to say. We would have to develop some model for estimating the Kolmogorov complexity (and maybe also incorporate frequency) of different programs and their relation to a given mind.

{spk} Do you have an candidate "toy models" of a mind that would work?

I don't..

 

What can be constructed following Bruno's idea of an observer: an intersection of infinitely many computations (of finite length?)

It seems like it might explain some phenomena of QM.

 

Would any "universal number do"?

That is what Bruno speculatively has suggested. I am not so sure. Sometimes I think an "if-then-else-statement" contains all that is fundamentally required for consciousness, or at least, to be an atom of consciousness.

Umm, the closest concept of a mind as an atom that makes sense to me is Lou Kauffman's Eigenforms...

 

 

Isn't a Universal number always at max Kolmogorov entropy?

I don't think so. The tape of a Turing machine might be very compressible.  Most .exe files, compress about 80% in my experience, using tools such as UPX ( http://upx.sourceforge.net ).

I wonder if that fact can be exploited...

 

 

If we add arbitrary prefixes to a Universal number, does it remain "Universal"?

That's a question for Bruno.  I don't know. :-)

 

 

 

They appear in the UD much less frequently than say the program corresponding to the approximate laws of physics of this universe.

 It takes far more data to describe your brain than it does to describe the physical system on which it is based.

How do you estimate this?

The UDA is a comparatively short program, and provably contains the program that is identical to your mind.  Similarly, all of the known laws of physics could fit on a couple sheets of paper.  QM seems to suggest that all possible solutions to certain equations exist, and so there is no need to specify the initial conditions of the universe (which would require much more information to describe than your brain).

{spk} Sure! Any finite program will be "smaller" an an infinite one! LOL.

:-)

 

But I am skeptical of the claim that even if it exists, finding it is HARD. If you don't actually have a means to implement it on a physical machine what good is an existential proof of it in some theory?

Our computers are growing in power exponentially.  I think eventually progress on these questions can be made, it might take a few decades though.

I am currently working with my colleges on a project proposal to research a novel form of computation. It has forced me to re-evaluate a lot of my long held ideas about computation. FOr example, what does it mean for a computation to be non-deterministic and unbounded without falling into Turings black hole of Non-halting programs (never finding a end state). 

  It seems that sometimes a finite cycle of solutions is good enough to be an output of a computation! Kinda like the draw finish in Chess.

 

 

  This is why I often wonder if this entire conversation exercise in futility! :_( What does it really mean to say that a mind is a finite program when such has measure zero in the Reals (which is where we should embed the NxN->N idea in the first place.

The reals aren't necessary and don't need to be supposed.  Our measure may be close to zero, but I don't think it is zero.

That hypothesis work right up till one starts actually beilding software and runs into synchronization of packet problems. Hardware acts is analogue in many many ways. (Planck's constant is freaking small.)

 

 

I loath Kronecker's claim! It is synonymous to "Man is the measure of all things".

What is his claim?  I am not familiar with it.

God created the Integers, all else is the invention of man.

 

 

Are you assuming that a lot of data can be compressed using symmetries and redundancies. This looks like a Kolmogorov complexity/entropy... 

Somewhat. I think how frequently a program is referenced / instantiated by other non-halting programs may play a role.

{spk} Like citations or Friending. LOL, nice!

Cool. I am not familiar with Friending.  Do you have links or quotations?

Facebook... Google+ adds, twitter follows, etc. The way that the real world creates small networks. I am looking at this from the point of view of how "trust" propagates in networks.

 

 

But what prevents such a scheme from being regular, generating a complete graph with a homogeneous connectedness or a purely random connectedness? 

I think it may be more like a fractal, as ever more detailed computations take ever finer divergences and nuances.

Sure. I have found lots of power law behavior.

 

Real world networks are, at best, "small world" on average and thus are far different from what we expect from our considerations of ensembles of NxN->N strings. 

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Small-world_network

"A small-world network is a type of mathematical graph in which most nodes are not neighbors of one another, but most nodes can be reached from every other by a small number of hops or steps. Specifically, a small-world network is defined to be a network where the typical distance L between two randomly chosen nodes (the number of steps required) grows proportionally to the logarithm of the number of nodes N in the network, that is:^[1]

I think it is quite possible different conscious states, or observers, are related in a "small-world network". Interesting idea.

Exactly, but is this the result of "similarities in thinking" or formal bisimilarity? "birds of a feather do tend to flock together"....

 

 

 

 

So we are (mostly) still "in the same universe", and so we can interact with and affect the consciousness of other people.

From my reasoning, the appearance that we are "in the same universe" is a by product of bisimilarities in the infinity of computations that are each of us. In other words, there  are many computations that are running Stephen that are identical to and thus are the same computation to many of the computations that are running Jason.

Yes. We would be programs instantiated within a (possibly but not necessarily) shared, larger program.

{spk} So we get the UD at the end of the day thinking that way?.

Yes, but perhaps (almost) no-one considers the UD as their physical reality, there are intermediate programs, and programs within programs, that can exist in between. No one can say for sure whether their program is an execution within the UD, or the execution of program that exists independent of the UD.

Why not? I am happy with the UD idea, as long as I can expect that some physical system somewhere and somehow has a non-zero change of "running it". I do not buy the "Platonic Walls as turing tape" idea at all!

 

 

 

  This gives an overlap between our worlds and thus the appearance of a common world for some collection of "observers".

Right.

 

The cool thing is that this implies that there are underlaps; computations that are not shared or bisimilar between all of us.

Yes, I agree.  In some branches of the MW, perhaps you were born but I was not, or I was, and you weren't.

{spk} I am wanting to think of this as a massive constraint scheme. The interaction of any one observer limits the possible interactions with other  observers. This limits the total set of set of possible interactions for all observers all the way down to only a few possible interactions are allowed for all observers if they are interacting.

If time is finite we are surely limited, but I think computationalism ensures our immortality, the existence of all possible experiences, and the identity of all souls.

AFAIK, time is always limited for observers as the intersection of infinitely many computations because only finite differences "can make a difference". People tend to forget that infinite sets have very different measures and mereologies compared to finite but very large sets.

 

 

 

COuld those be the ones that we identify as "ourselves"?

 

Personal identity can become a very difficult subject, since there may be paths through which my program evolves to become you, and vice versa.

{spk} I agree and this implies that in a deep way, we are one and the same observer! Deciding the path that connects a pair of observers, I think, is equivalent to computing the smooth diffeomorphism between the pair of manifolds that each experiences as a "world".

Yes, I think we may have more of a "life web", than the "life tree" suggested by Everett. In a reality so filled with possible experiences, intersections are all but guaranteed.

I have thought about that. It seems that the web has a ultrametric order to it. Lives, on average, are "connected" only via their common ancestor.

[Stephen Paul King]

Dear Jason,

  ISTM that the line " For each program we have generated that has not halted, execute one instruction of it for each (Program p in listOfPrograms)" is buggy. 

It assumes that the space of "programs that do not halt" is accessible. How?

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[Jason Resch]

On Fri, Dec 27, 2013 at 10:20 PM, LizR <liz...@gmail.com> wrote:

There is one point to add which I think you've missed, Jason (apologies if I've misunderstood). The UD generates the first instruction of the first programme, then the first instruction of the second programme, and so on. Once it has generated the first instruction of every possible programme, it then adds the second instruction of the first programme, the second instruction of the second programme, and so on.

If it did work like this, it would never get to run the second instruction of any program, since there is a countable infinity of possible programs.

 

 This is why it's called a dovetailer, I believe, and stops it running into problems with non-halting programmes, or programmes that would crash, or various other contingencies...

This is addressed by not trying to run any one program to its completion, instead it gives each program it has generated up to that point some time on the CPU.

 

This isn't intrinsic to the UD, which could in principle write the first programme before it moves on to the next one - but it allows it to avoid certain problems caused by having a programme that writes other programmes.

There is no program with the UD encountering programs that themselves instantiate other programs.  Indeed, the UD encounters itself, infinitely often.

 

...I think. I'm sure Bruno will let me know if that's wrong.

:)

PS I like the "while (true)" statement. What would Pontius Pilate have made of that? :-)

:-)  Good question, I haven't the faintest idea.  I could have used "while (i == i)" but then if someday Brent's paralogic takes over, it might fail.

Jason

[Stephen Paul King]

Hi Jason,

"Any program, and whether or not it ever terminates can be translated to a statement concerning numbers in arithmetic. Thus mathematical truth captures the facts concerning whether or not any program executes forever, and what all of its intermediate states are.

"

this also captures every instance of random numbers as well. What method is deployed to ensure that a program is not just a "regular" random number and not some random number prefixed on a "real" halting program?

Truth is not a measure zero set, or is it?

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[Jason Resch]

On Fri, Dec 27, 2013 at 10:41 PM, Jason Resch <jason...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Fri, Dec 27, 2013 at 10:20 PM, LizR <liz...@gmail.com> wrote:

There is one point to add which I think you've missed, Jason (apologies if I've misunderstood). The UD generates the first instruction of the first programme, then the first instruction of the second programme, and so on. Once it has generated the first instruction of every possible programme, it then adds the second instruction of the first programme, the second instruction of the second programme, and so on.

If it did work like this, it would never get to run the second instruction of any program, since there is a countable infinity of possible programs.

 

 This is why it's called a dovetailer, I believe, and stops it running into problems with non-halting programmes, or programmes that would crash, or various other contingencies...

This is addressed by not trying to run any one program to its completion, instead it gives each program it has generated up to that point some time on the CPU.

 

This isn't intrinsic to the UD, which could in principle write the first programme before it moves on to the next one - but it allows it to avoid certain problems caused by having a programme that writes other programmes.

There is no program with the UD encountering programs that themselves instantiate other programs.  Indeed, the UD encounters itself, infinitely often.

I meant "There is no problem"

Jason

[Stephen Paul King]

Hi Jason,

"The first, second, 10th, 1,000,000th, and 10^100th, and 10^100^100th state of the UD's execution are mathematical facts ..." Umm, how? Godel and Matiyasevich would disagree! If there does not exist a program that can evaluate whether or not a UD substring is a faithful representation of a "true theorem", then how is it "a fact"?

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[LizR]

Yeah, sorry, I re-read your post and realised I'd misunderstood, so I deleted my post (thinking you hadn't replied...I forgot the time delay and the fact we're in different reference frames :)

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[Jason Resch]

On Fri, Dec 27, 2013 at 10:39 PM, Stephen Paul King <Step...@provensecure.com> wrote:

Dear Jason,

  ISTM that the line " For each program we have generated that has not halted, execute one instruction of it for each (Program p in listOfPrograms)" is buggy. 

It assumes that the space of "programs that do not halt" is accessible. How?

We never know a prior if a program will halts or not.  However, once a program has reached a halted stated it is immediately apparent.  If the function name was "willThisProgramHalt()", then I agree it would be a buggy program. :-)

The UD as I wrote it executes all programs, whether they will halt or not, but it never wastes time trying to run another instruction of a program that has halted.  This is only an optimization, and I added it only to reduce the ambiguity of "running another instruction of a program that has halted".

Jason

 

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[LizR]

On 28 December 2013 16:44, Stephen Paul King <Step...@provensecure.com> wrote:

Hi Jason,

"The first, second, 10th, 1,000,000th, and 10^100th, and 10^100^100th state of the UD's execution are mathematical facts ..." Umm, how? Godel and Matiyasevich would disagree! If there does not exist a program that can evaluate whether or not a UD substring is a faithful representation of a "true theorem", then how is it "a fact"?

That depends on whether the UD is deterministic or not. If it is, then, its Nth state is a fact. (It doesn't need to be run or evaluated, and the Nth state may be a fact that nobody knows, like the googolth digit of pi, assuming no one's worked that out.)

[Stephen Paul King]

Cool!

[Jason Resch]

On Fri, Dec 27, 2013 at 10:42 PM, Stephen Paul King <Step...@provensecure.com> wrote:

Hi Jason,

"Any program, and whether or not it ever terminates can be translated to a statement concerning numbers in arithmetic. Thus mathematical truth captures the facts concerning whether or not any program executes forever, and what all of its intermediate states are.

"

this also captures every instance of random numbers as well.

It is not clear to me what "random" means in arithmetical truth.

Randomness can appear from the perspectives of observers, but I don't see how it can arise in arithmetic.

 

What method is deployed to ensure that a program is not just a "regular" random number and not some random number prefixed on a "real" halting program?

It don't see how it makes a difference.

 

Truth is not a measure zero set, or is it?

I don't understand this question..  Could you clarify?

Jason

 

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[Jason Resch]

On Fri, Dec 27, 2013 at 10:54 PM, LizR <liz...@gmail.com> wrote:

On 28 December 2013 16:44, Stephen Paul King <Step...@provensecure.com> wrote:

Hi Jason,

"The first, second, 10th, 1,000,000th, and 10^100th, and 10^100^100th state of the UD's execution are mathematical facts ..." Umm, how? Godel and Matiyasevich would disagree! If there does not exist a program that can evaluate whether or not a UD substring is a faithful representation of a "true theorem", then how is it "a fact"?

That depends on whether the UD is deterministic or not.

It is. The evolution of any Turing machines is deterministic.

 

If it is, then, its Nth state is a fact. (It doesn't need to be run or evaluated, and the Nth state may be a fact that nobody knows, like the googolth digit of pi, assuming no one's worked that out.)

Right. :-)

The fact that I remember drinking a glass of water is as much a mathematical fact about the UD, as the fact as the third decimal digit of Pi is 4.

Jason

[Stephen Paul King]

How do we distinguish a program from a string of random numbers. (Consider OTP encryptions).

[Stephen Paul King]

Hi jason,

  Do programs have to be "deterministic". What definition of deterministic are you using?

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[Stephen Paul King]

I ask this because I am studying Carl Hewitt's Actor Model...

[LizR]

Clearly programmes don't have to be deterministic. They could contain a source of genuine randomness, in principle.

I don't think the UD does, however.

The definition of deterministic would be - gives the same output on each run (given that the UD has no input).

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[Jason Resch]

On Fri, Dec 27, 2013 at 10:44 PM, Stephen Paul King <Step...@provensecure.com> wrote:

Hi Jason,

"The first, second, 10th, 1,000,000th, and 10^100th, and 10^100^100th state of the UD's execution are mathematical facts ..." Umm, how? Godel and Matiyasevich would disagree! If there does not exist a program that can evaluate whether or not a UD substring is a faithful representation of a "true theorem", then how is it "a fact"?

The mathematical fact to which I am referring is only a basic and straight-forward statement like "the binary representation of the state of UD after executing 100..00th steps is '1010101111010...0010". It is not a question of whether or not that binary string refers to anything that is true or not, only what its particular value happens to be.

Jason

 

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[Jason Resch]

On Fri, Dec 27, 2013 at 11:01 PM, Stephen Paul King <Step...@provensecure.com> wrote:

How do we distinguish a program from a string of random numbers. (Consider OTP encryptions).

By "we" do you mean the UD or something else?

[Edgar L. Owen]

Jason,

Let me point out one fatal problem with Bruno's theory as you present it.

According to you there is some single processor that runs all this UD stuff, but the truth is that in actual computational reality every logical element functions as a processor so all computations proceed at once in every cycle of time. This is the only way everything in the universe could possibly get computed. A computation here can't possibly wait for one on the other side of the universe!

If Bruno's UD requires a single processor of reality it simply cannot describe actual computational reality.....

Edgar

[Stephen Paul King]

Hi Jason,

  "It is not a question of whether or not that binary string refers to anything that is true or not, only what its particular value happens to be." No no no! We can not make statements without showing how their proof are accessible!

Consider the i-th through j_th values of pi's expansion in binary. If it is a finite string, how do we know that it is a Turing machine program?

[Jason Resch]

On Fri, Dec 27, 2013 at 11:03 PM, Stephen Paul King <Step...@provensecure.com> wrote:

Hi jason,

  Do programs have to be "deterministic". What definition of deterministic are you using?

All Turing-equivalent computation is deterministic.  By deterministic I mean the (N+1)th state of the machine is exactly and unambiguously defined by the Nth state of the machine.

Jason 

 

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[Stephen Paul King]

Dear Edgar,

  In Bruno's Platonia there is no such thing as "time" so we can not make arguments involving "cycles of time". All just "exists".

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[Stephen Paul King]

Hi Jason,

On Fri, Dec 27, 2013 at 11:08 PM, Jason Resch <jason...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Fri, Dec 27, 2013 at 11:01 PM, Stephen Paul King <Step...@provensecure.com> wrote:

How do we distinguish a program from a string of random numbers. (Consider OTP encryptions).

By "we" do you mean the UD or something else?

What "else" is there?

[Stephen Paul King]

If it is Markov, the BB problem automatically follows.

On Fri, Dec 27, 2013 at 11:12 PM, Stephen Paul King <Step...@provensecure.com> wrote:

Hi Jason,

  It is Markov... OK.

[Stephen Paul King]

Hi Jason,

  It is Markov... OK.

[Jason Resch]

On Fri, Dec 27, 2013 at 11:06 PM, LizR <liz...@gmail.com> wrote:

Clearly programmes don't have to be deterministic. They could contain a source of genuine randomness, in principle.

That source, if it is within the program, would necessarily be deterministic.  If it is external to the program, then it is more properly treated as an input to the program rather than a part of the program itself.

In practice, computers draw on sources of environmental noise such as delays between keystrokes, timing of the reception of network traffic, and delays in accessing data off of hard drives, etc. These steps are necessary precisely because programs cannot produce randomness on their own.

 

Jason

[Edgar L. Owen]

Stephen,

Even worse, and less applicable to reality if it's really true, but Jason is clearly talking about sequences of computations, and befores and afters. How can sequences occur if there's no time? And how does time arise?

Seems awfully unrealistic to me....

Edgar

[Jason Resch]

On Fri, Dec 27, 2013 at 11:08 PM, Edgar L. Owen <edga...@att.net> wrote:

Jason,

Let me point out one fatal problem with Bruno's theory as you present it.

According to you there is some single processor that runs all this UD stuff, but the truth is that in actual computational reality every logical element functions as a processor so all computations proceed at once in every cycle of time. This is the only way everything in the universe could possibly get computed. A computation here can't possibly wait for one on the other side of the universe!

I don't see why not.  By this reasoning, it would be impossible to simulate the neurons of a brain brain (which operate in parallel) on a single-core CPU, but this violates the Church-Turing thesis. A single sequential computation can compute and emulate everything a multi-processor CPU can.

 

If Bruno's UD requires a single processor of reality it simply cannot describe actual computational reality.....

See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Church–Turing_thesis

Jason

 

On Friday, December 27, 2013 10:41:39 PM UTC-5, Jason wrote:

On Fri, Dec 27, 2013 at 10:20 PM, LizR <liz...@gmail.com> wrote:

There is one point to add which I think you've missed, Jason (apologies if I've misunderstood). The UD generates the first instruction of the first programme, then the first instruction of the second programme, and so on. Once it has generated the first instruction of every possible programme, it then adds the second instruction of the first programme, the second instruction of the second programme, and so on.

If it did work like this, it would never get to run the second instruction of any program, since there is a countable infinity of possible programs.

 

 This is why it's called a dovetailer, I believe, and stops it running into problems with non-halting programmes, or programmes that would crash, or various other contingencies...

This is addressed by not trying to run any one program to its completion, instead it gives each program it has generated up to that point some time on the CPU.

 

This isn't intrinsic to the UD, which could in principle write the first programme before it moves on to the next one - but it allows it to avoid certain problems caused by having a programme that writes other programmes.

There is no program with the UD encountering programs that themselves instantiate other programs.  Indeed, the UD encounters itself, infinitely often.

 

...I think. I'm sure Bruno will let me know if that's wrong.

:)

PS I like the "while (true)" statement. What would Pontius Pilate have made of that? :-)

:-)  Good question, I haven't the faintest idea.  I could have used "while (i == i)" but then if someday Brent's paralogic takes over, it might fail.

Jason

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[LizR]

On 28 December 2013 17:15, Jason Resch <jason...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Fri, Dec 27, 2013 at 11:06 PM, LizR <liz...@gmail.com> wrote:

Clearly programmes don't have to be deterministic. They could contain a source of genuine randomness, in principle.

That source, if it is within the program, would necessarily be deterministic.  If it is external to the program, then it is more properly treated as an input to the program rather than a part of the program itself.

In practice, computers draw on sources of environmental noise such as delays between keystrokes, timing of the reception of network traffic, and delays in accessing data off of hard drives, etc. These steps are necessary precisely because programs cannot produce randomness on their own.

I knew that - honest! :-)

I was answering the question as posed. I believe that in practice all real-world programmes are deterministic, and (more to the point) the UD is.

[Edgar L. Owen]

Jason,

You might be able to theoretically simulate it but certainly not compute it in real time which is what reality actually does which is my point.

Edgar

[Jason Resch]

On Fri, Dec 27, 2013 at 11:09 PM, Stephen Paul King <Step...@provensecure.com> wrote:

Hi Jason,

  "It is not a question of whether or not that binary string refers to anything that is true or not, only what its particular value happens to be." No no no! We can not make statements without showing how their proof are accessible!

The proof is straight forward. Run the UD and see what the state is.

Are you objecting that it does not have a definite value because you or I are not capable of computing it?

Did the 100th digit of Pi not exist until the first human computed it?

 

Consider the i-th through j_th values of pi's expansion in binary. If it is a finite string, how do we know that it is a Turing machine program?

All integers can be mapped directly to Turing machine programs.  Consider Java: it uses a byte-code where every byte is an instruction for the Java virtual machine.  Every string of bytes can therefore be considered as a sequence of instructions for the Java virtual machine to execute.

[LizR]

On 28 December 2013 17:19, Edgar L. Owen <edga...@att.net> wrote:

Stephen,

Even worse, and less applicable to reality if it's really true, but Jason is clearly talking about sequences of computations, and befores and afters. How can sequences occur if there's no time? And how does time arise?

This is why you have to fully understand the theory before attempting to refute it. 

Seems awfully unrealistic to me....

The "argument from incredulity" has not carried much weight for a long time in science.

[Stephen Paul King]

Hi Edgar,

  But here is the thing. If we assume timelessness, Bruno is CORRECT! THe question then becomes: What is "time"?

[Jason Resch]

On Fri, Dec 27, 2013 at 11:11 PM, Stephen Paul King <Step...@provensecure.com> wrote:

Hi Jason,

On Fri, Dec 27, 2013 at 11:08 PM, Jason Resch <jason...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Fri, Dec 27, 2013 at 11:01 PM, Stephen Paul King <Step...@provensecure.com> wrote:

How do we distinguish a program from a string of random numbers. (Consider OTP encryptions).

By "we" do you mean the UD or something else?

What "else" is there?

It doesn't matter whether i will be translated to a non-sensical or useful program, all i's map to programs, and all programs can be executed one instruction at a time.

Jason

[Stephen Paul King]

Hi LizR and Jason,

  Responding to both of you. I don't understand the claim of determinism is "random noise" is necessary for the computations. Turing machines require exact pre-specifiability. Adding noise oracles is cheating!

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[Jason Resch]

On Fri, Dec 27, 2013 at 11:13 PM, Stephen Paul King <Step...@provensecure.com> wrote:

If it is Markov, the BB problem automatically follows.

"BB = Boltzmann Brains" ?

What is the problem?  BB's exist in the UD, as we discussed above, but they seem like they would have a low measure compared to brains that arise from less specific initial conditions.

Jason

[LizR]

On 28 December 2013 17:23, Edgar L. Owen <edga...@att.net> wrote:

Jason,

You might be able to theoretically simulate it but certainly not compute it in real time which is what reality actually does which is my point.

"In real time" ?! In comp (and many TOEs) time is emergent. To take a parallel example that should be close to your heart, suppose you're an AI living in the matrix and it's simulating reality for you. You aren't aware of this but believe yourself to be say a human writer who is participating in an online discussion. Suppose it takes a million years to simulate one second of your experience. How would you know? You can only compare your experience of time with in-matrix clocks, which all run at the speed you'd expect.

It's the same for any theory which tries to compute reality. 

[Jason Resch]

On Fri, Dec 27, 2013 at 11:19 PM, Edgar L. Owen <edga...@att.net> wrote:

Stephen,

Even worse, and less applicable to reality if it's really true, but Jason is clearly talking about sequences of computations, and befores and afters. How can sequences occur if there's no time?

The sequence is defined naturally by the successive states of the computation.

 

And how does time arise?

From the first-person perspectives of the conscious entities that may arise within those computations.

 

Seems awfully unrealistic to me....

How so / what specifically do you find unrealistic?

Jason

 

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[LizR]

On 28 December 2013 17:23, Jason Resch <jason...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Fri, Dec 27, 2013 at 11:09 PM, Stephen Paul King <Step...@provensecure.com> wrote:

Hi Jason,

  "It is not a question of whether or not that binary string refers to anything that is true or not, only what its particular value happens to be." No no no! We can not make statements without showing how their proof are accessible!

The proof is straight forward. Run the UD and see what the state is.

Are you objecting that it does not have a definite value because you or I are not capable of computing it?

Did the 100th digit of Pi not exist until the first human computed it?

...and got it wrong, as it turned out! But how come? If he'd made it up, it would have been fixed by that erronious calculation. Yet later mathematicians were able to spot the mistake and their calculations all agreed, even using different methods.

Which kind of indicates that there was a 100th digit of pi even before life appeared in the universe.

[LizR]

On 28 December 2013 17:27, Stephen Paul King <Step...@provensecure.com> wrote:

Hi LizR and Jason,

  Responding to both of you. I don't understand the claim of determinism is "random noise" is necessary for the computations. Turing machines require exact pre-specifiability. Adding noise oracles is cheating!

Who said random noise was necessary? I said the UD, at least, is completely deterministic.

[Stephen Paul King]

Hi Jason,

On Fri, Dec 27, 2013 at 11:23 PM, Jason Resch <jason...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Fri, Dec 27, 2013 at 11:09 PM, Stephen Paul King <Step...@provensecure.com> wrote:

Hi Jason,

  "It is not a question of whether or not that binary string refers to anything that is true or not, only what its particular value happens to be." No no no! We can not make statements without showing how their proof are accessible!

The proof is straight forward. Run the UD and see what the state is.

Run it, on what hardware? ??

 

Are you objecting that it does not have a definite value because you or I are not capable of computing it?

Did the 100th digit of Pi not exist until the first human computed it?

Pfft, that is a red herring and you know it! Why even mention humans? If numbers exist, then that existence has nothing at all to do with humans or aliens of black clouds. It is merely the necessary possibility that the numbers are not inconsistent. If they were inconsistent, then all that would exist is noise. And we are back to my question. What decodes the noise into "meaningful" strings? 

 

 

Consider the i-th through j_th values of pi's expansion in binary. If it is a finite string, how do we know that it is a Turing machine program?

All integers can be mapped directly to Turing machine programs.  Consider Java: it uses a byte-code where every byte is an instruction for the Java virtual machine.  Every string of bytes can therefore be considered as a sequence of instructions for the Java virtual machine to execute.

SO it is OK to include the java code that generates noise. There are your oracles! Pick one. Whoops, how is the selection made?

[LizR]

On 28 December 2013 17:27, Jason Resch <jason...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Fri, Dec 27, 2013 at 11:13 PM, Stephen Paul King <Step...@provensecure.com> wrote:

If it is Markov, the BB problem automatically follows.

"BB = Boltzmann Brains" ?

Yes. 

What is the problem?  BB's exist in the UD, as we discussed above, but they seem like they would have a low measure compared to brains that arise from less specific initial conditions.

Very very low measure, apparently. I've never met one.

[Stephen Paul King]

This "low measure", how is its "lowness" determined? What is doing the comparing operation?

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