Practicalities of Mind Uploading

[Dennis Ochei]

In the thread discussing comp the topic of whether uploading is possible came up. While tangentially related to comp, objections on the grounds of practical impossibility miss the point. But! The topic is still very interesting.

Is uploading possible? If so, when will we have it?

What fidelity is necessary?

Will the upload still be you?

Would you sign up for a destructive upload? Conservative?

Feel free to toss any other questions into the mix.

For the record, I think uploading is possible, that destructive uploading will come way sooner, I'm uncertain about fidelity, but I do think there could be a functional isomorphism that doesn't depend on on a structural one, i.e. 100 simplified neurons might be required to capture the behavior of one physical one. The substitution level i think is subcellular. I think uploading perserves identity and I might actually prefer a destructive upload, when I consider the disappointment of the me that wakes up still flesh and bone after a conservative upload.

[LizR]

Sorry to go off topic so soon :-) but at first glance the answer to this would appear to depend completely on the answer to Bruno's "yes doctor" - if one's consciousness is the result of computation at some level, and assuming Bruno's chain of reasoning is correct, then a destructive upload should be possible, and a conservative upload would give you a 50-50 chance of finding yourself uploaded. If there is something wrong with comp, e.g. non Turing emulable processes are involved, then it seems unlikely that any type of upload will upload you - unless you have a soul or something, in which case there is a 50-50 chance that a conservative upload will either kill the original anyway, or turn it into a zombie, or that the uploaded version will be soulless, whatever that means.

Another take on this is Tipler's, as used in "The Physics of Immortality", which is to assume that a simulation of the quantum state of your brain will be you (and hence we could be in an ancestor simulation, or wake up in one at any moment - if such things are possible, and are of high enough fidelity to reproduce simulated quantum states, and will actually exist somewhere, at some point in time - this is similar to a "Boltzman brain" argument, I suspect). I don't have enough knowledge of the relevant physics to comment on that one.

[Kim Jones]

On 23 Apr 2015, at 8:06 pm, LizR <liz...@gmail.com> wrote:

Sorry to go off topic so soon :-) but at first glance the answer to this would appear to depend completely on the answer to Bruno's "yes doctor" - if one's consciousness is the result of computation at some level, and assuming Bruno's chain of reasoning is correct, then a destructive upload should be possible, and a conservative upload would give you a 50-50 chance of finding yourself uploaded. If there is something wrong with comp, e.g. non Turing emulable processes are involved, then it seems unlikely that any type of upload will upload you - unless you have a soul or something, in which case there is a 50-50 chance that a conservative upload will either kill the original anyway, or turn it into a zombie, or that the uploaded version will be soulless, whatever that means.

Another take on this is Tipler's, as used in "The Physics of Immortality", which is to assume that a simulation of the quantum state of your brain will be you (and hence we could be in an ancestor simulation, or wake up in one at any moment - if such things are possible, and are of high enough fidelity to reproduce simulated quantum states, and will actually exist somewhere, at some point in time - this is similar to a "Boltzman brain" argument, I suspect). I don't have enough knowledge of the relevant physics to comment on that one.

Not forgetting good ol' Nick Bostrom and the evergreen 'Simulation Argument'

Was it Frank's idea originally? I always attributed this to Bostrom.

http://www.simulation-argument.com/

K

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[Stathis Papaioannou]

I'd say a simulation at the level of macromolecules would be
necessary: the type, number, approximate location of proteins. Above
that there is cellular anatomy and synaptic connections. Below that
there are small molecules such as neurotransmitters and ions, which
can be modelled from generic knowledge of neurons. It would be a
relatively straightforward matter to run the model and compare with
real neurons. The Blue Brain Project people think they will be able to
simulate a generic human brain by 2023, and then it would be several
more steps before a particular brain could be simulated - but I
suspect these guesses, like "when will we have human level AI" - will
keep being pushed back. If it behaves just like me then I would be
confident that the upload is me, and I wouldn't mind a destructive
upload.


--
Stathis Papaioannou

[spudb...@aol.com]

My sense of things is that if it's not your identity who's is it then? Pattern identity sorts it out. If it looks like you, and it thinks like you, has your attitudes, opinions, belief's, prejudices, likes, dislikes, feels like you, feels like your own tongue in your own mouth...that's you. Pattern identity says the body is the soul and identity. Easy, Peasy. If there are a million of you, with that feeling, and they all go off to have a million different experiences, going forward, then hypothetically, you all can meet at the end of time, so to speak, and all join together (Tipler style) into one totally, cosmic Liz. According to Steinhart, uploading is resurrection, or at least one branch of resurrection. 

[Dennis Ochei]

Where can I sign up to be a part of Cosmic Liz? =p

I've wondered if there exists an observer moment with all other observer moments as part of its consistent history.

I wonder what God's favorite dream is?

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[spudb...@aol.com]

Way above my intellectual pay grade. I have no idea whether at some wild moment people can combine together? We'd need a computer scientist who verse in neurobiology, or vice-versa. My best guess is, someday, far down the Light Cone, yes. If all things become virtual eventually, or that the computer processes that under-lie this universe is correct, then it seems really plausible, With Everett's MWI, many things are also plausible or David Lewis's modal realism (same thing). I view things at the inception of the universe(s) as being mathematical, computational, digital, as its basis. Call it a working hypothesis, or pure shit, whatever works for you. If we do view the universe as computational at its basis, then it opens up areas of study as well as certain existential benefits for our species. Nothing to lose. 

[LizR]

On 24 April 2015 at 06:39, spudboy100 via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:

My sense of things is that if it's not your identity who's is it then? Pattern identity sorts it out. If it looks like you, and it thinks like you, has your attitudes, opinions, belief's, prejudices, likes, dislikes, feels like you, feels like your own tongue in your own mouth...that's you.

The question is whether the you who was a biological entity experiences waking up as the uploaded version. If not, then to quote Larry Niven "I wouldn't rise in the damn thing" (a destructive teleporter, in his case).

Tipler claims that is guaranteed if you can duplicate - or, apparently, just simulate - the quantum state of your body (or brain, at least). That is, with no supernatural extras, the laws of physicss (supposedly) guarantee that a duplicated quantum state is indeed you, and you will actually experience waking up as the new version. (Indeed, the MWI also relies on this identity thesis to explain how observers can exist in a branching multiverse - and so does comp, of course.)

But there's no-cloning to consider - plus whether a simulated quantum state is the same as a real one...

[meekerdb]

On 4/23/2015 2:52 AM, Dennis Ochei wrote:
> In the thread discussing comp the topic of whether uploading is possible came up. While tangentially related to comp, objections on the grounds of practical impossibility miss the point. But! The topic is still very interesting.
>
> Is uploading possible? If so, when will we have it?
>
> What fidelity is necessary?
>
> Will the upload still be you?
>
> Would you sign up for a destructive upload? Conservative?
>
> Feel free to toss any other questions into the mix.
>
> For the record, I think uploading is possible, that destructive uploading will come way sooner,

In a way non-destructive uploading is already her. There's a computer scientist, who name
escapes me at the moment, who has been uploading his wife's memories and personality to an
AI. I've thought for a long time that there's a good business model in simulating elderly
people to "preserve" them for descendants; just a step beyond making video tapes of them
talking about their life.

Brent

[Bruce Kellett]

LizR wrote:
>
> But there's no-cloning to consider - plus whether a simulated quantum
> state is the same as a real one...

No-cloning of an unknown quantum state is simply the statement that
there is no unitary operator that will enable you to transfer the
properties of one unknown quantum state to another.

Simulating a quantum state might be another matter. Quantum states are
generally described in terms of some basis in Hilbert space. The
coefficients of the expansion in that basis are arbitrary complex
numbers, subject to the usual normalization conventions for the state.
If you want to simulate this state, you have to simulate these
coefficients to arbitrary precision. This is not possible in finite time
with a digital computer. However, if an infinite number of calculations
are routinely possible for a Turing machine in Platonia, then who knows?

I will give my proof that these coefficients are indeed dense in the
complex plane at a later time, if required.

Bruce

[Stathis Papaioannou]

The inability to clone a particular quantum state at will does not
mean a copy of the quantum state cannot exist, and in fact in a large
enough universe it will exist, without anyone putting any effort into
creating it. But it is unreasonable to insist that a copy of a brain
must be identical to the quantum level when in ordinary life our
brains undergo gross (compared to the quantum level) changes, and we
feel that we survive.


--
Stathis Papaioannou

[Bruce Kellett]

The existence of another identical quantum state may well be possible,
but it can never be proved that /this/ quantum state is identical to
/that/ state when both are generic unknown states.

I don't think this has anything to do with the brain or consciousness.
All is really demonstrates is that the universe as a whole is not Turing
emulable -- but we probably knew that anyway.

Bruce

[LizR]

The point of using quantum states is that the universe guarantees they are indistinguishable, and hence unless consciousness is magic / supernatural it must be identical in quantum-identical brains. It's possible the substitution level for consciousness is above the quantum level, but (allegedly) it can't be any lower.

However, why would infinite precision be required to simulate them? I thought the point of quantum states was that they're discrete?

[Bruce Kellett]

The Hilbert spaces for continuous observables such as position and
momentum are infinite dimensional, so the eigenvalues are continuous.
But the main point is that a generic state is a superposition of the
basis vectors of the relevant Hilbert space, with arbitrary complex
coefficients. The absolute squared value of these coefficients are
probabilities (Born Rule). There is no smallest probability, so infinite
precision is required to simulate the generic quantum state. This
doesn't even require infinite dimensional Hilbert space -- the expansion
coefficients are still general complex numbers even in the two-state
spin projection Hilbert space.

Bruce

[spudb...@aol.com]

How about this? MWI, if true, refutes the no-clonning conundrum.  

-----Original Message-----
From: LizR <liz...@gmail.com>
To: everything-list <everyth...@googlegroups.com>
Sent: Thu, Apr 23, 2015 5:39 pm
Subject: Re: Practicalities of Mind Uploading

[LizR]

On 24 April 2015 at 23:03, spudboy100 via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:

How about this? MWI, if true, refutes the no-clonning conundrum.  

Yes, that's my opinion too - but it doesn't allow US to do it. The MWI is constantly duplicating quantum states, indeed there are infinite numbers of copies of the entire universe's quantum state waiting to differentiate.

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 24 April 2015 at 21:03, spudboy100 via Everything List

<everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:
> How about this? MWI, if true, refutes the no-clonning conundrum.

It was never a conundrum.


--
Stathis Papaioannou

[spudb...@aol.com]

Yes, MWI is mind-blasting. Having said that, that despite great difficulty, would in theory, Liz could then be re-constructed with better and better science. In fact, Steinhart proposes that one could upload or teleport, one or more Liz's into different environments' and different universes. Liz could be copied into, say 3, different terrariums and live 3 different lives, for arguments sake. Down the millennia, Liz^5 and Liz^22 could reunite and conjoin at some point. Mind numbing for Liz today?  well, me too. Identity over time and place seems a fluid thing, dynamic.However, perhaps Liz at age 3 would view Liz at age 21 as scary and no fun? So, we all might sneer at our future self's beyond the sod. 

-----Original Message-----
From: LizR <liz...@gmail.com>
To: everything-list <everyth...@googlegroups.com>
Sent: Fri, Apr 24, 2015 7:25 am
Subject: Re: Practicalities of Mind Uploading

[spudb...@aol.com]

For some, its a conundrum, or in any case see it as a block to cloning, or a slam dunk into the trash bin of physics and philosophy. For me, no. 

-----Original Message-----
From: Stathis Papaioannou <stat...@gmail.com>
To: everything-list <everyth...@googlegroups.com>
Sent: Fri, Apr 24, 2015 7:57 am
Subject: Re: Practicalities of Mind Uploading

> wrote:
> How about this? MWI, if true,
refutes the no-clonning conundrum.

It was never a conundrum.


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Stathis Papaioannou

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[Bruce Kellett]

LizR wrote:
> On 24 April 2015 at 23:03, spudboy100 via Everything List
> <everyth...@googlegroups.com

> <mailto:everyth...@googlegroups.com>> wrote:
>
> How about this? MWI, if true, refutes the no-clonning conundrum.
>
>
> Yes, that's my opinion too - but it doesn't allow US to do it. The MWI
> is constantly duplicating quantum states, indeed there are infinite
> numbers of copies of the entire universe's quantum state waiting to
> differentiate.

Until they differentiate via decoherence, there are no multiple worlds.

Bruce

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Friday, April 24, 2015, spudboy100 via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:

For some, its a conundrum, or in any case see it as a block to cloning, or a slam dunk into the trash bin of physics and philosophy. For me, no. 

Philosophically there is no problem with the no clone theorem, since even if a perfect copy is needed to preserve consciousness the no clone theorem does not preclude perfect copying.

Practically there is no problem with the no clone theorem since your brain undergoes gross change from moment to moment and you feel that you remain the same person.

--
Stathis Papaioannou

[Quentin Anciaux]

That's true, unless even in principle what gives rise to consciousness is not duplicable, accessible to us... (It's dubious, since our reality/nature did succeed to make it; at the very least for me). But if reality as it isn doesn't give us access to that (whatever we do, forever, because it is impossible like going faster than the speed of light under relativity, or going before the big bang as the time is beginning with it... and that indeed assumes a theory like computationalism is false), then it is a problem even phisophisically (that is if you still want to follow logic and still want what you're saying to be meaningfull) 

Quentin

--
Stathis Papaioannou

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All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy Batty/Rutger Hauer)

[Quentin Anciaux]

2015-04-25 0:29 GMT+02:00 Quentin Anciaux <allc...@gmail.com>:

2015-04-24 23:07 GMT+02:00 Stathis Papaioannou <stat...@gmail.com>:

On Friday, April 24, 2015, spudboy100 via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:

For some, its a conundrum, or in any case see it as a block to cloning, or a slam dunk into the trash bin of physics and philosophy. For me, no. 

Philosophically there is no problem with the no clone theorem, since even if a perfect copy is needed to preserve consciousness the no clone theorem does not preclude perfect copying.

Practically there is no problem with the no clone theorem since your brain undergoes gross change from moment to moment and you feel that you remain the same person.

Little corrections (there are surely others grammar mistakes and orthographical  but anyway....)

That's true, unless even in principle what gives rise to consciousness is not duplicable, accessible to us... (It's dubious, since our reality/nature did succeed to make us conscious; at the very least me). But if reality as it is doesn't give us access to that (whatever we do, forever, because it is impossible like going faster than the speed of light under relativity, or going before the big bang as the time is beginning with it... and that indeed assumes a theory like computationalism is false), then it is a problem even philosophically (that is if you still want to follow logic and still want what you're saying to be meaningfull) 

Quentin

 

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Stathis Papaioannou

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All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy Batty/Rutger Hauer)

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Saturday, April 25, 2015, Quentin Anciaux <allc...@gmail.com> wrote:

2015-04-24 23:07 GMT+02:00 Stathis Papaioannou <stat...@gmail.com>:

On Friday, April 24, 2015, spudboy100 via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:

For some, its a conundrum, or in any case see it as a block to cloning, or a slam dunk into the trash bin of physics and philosophy. For me, no. 

Philosophically there is no problem with the no clone theorem, since even if a perfect copy is needed to preserve consciousness the no clone theorem does not preclude perfect copying.

Practically there is no problem with the no clone theorem since your brain undergoes gross change from moment to moment and you feel that you remain the same person.

That's true, unless even in principle what gives rise to consciousness is not duplicable, accessible to us... (It's dubious, since our reality/nature did succeed to make it; at the very least for me). But if reality as it isn doesn't give us access to that (whatever we do, forever, because it is impossible like going faster than the speed of light under relativity, or going before the big bang as the time is beginning with it... and that indeed assumes a theory like computationalism is false), then it is a problem even phisophisically (that is if you still want to follow logic and still want what you're saying to be meaningfull) 

The no clone theorem refers to physical copying, so it isn't relevant if consciousness is due to something else, like an immaterial soul.

--
Stathis Papaioannou

[Quentin Anciaux]

I know.

so it isn't relevant if consciousness is due to something else, like an immaterial soul.

It is if perfect physical copying is not enough because it misses something.

[Quentin Anciaux]

Le 25 avr. 2015 01:25, "Quentin Anciaux" <allc...@gmail.com> a écrit :
>
>
> Le 25 avr. 2015 01:21, "Stathis Papaioannou" <stat...@gmail.com> a écrit :
> >
> >
> >
> > On Saturday, April 25, 2015, Quentin Anciaux <allc...@gmail.com> wrote:
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> 2015-04-24 23:07 GMT+02:00 Stathis Papaioannou <stat...@gmail.com>:
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> On Friday, April 24, 2015, spudboy100 via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:
> >>>>
> >>>> For some, its a conundrum, or in any case see it as a block to cloning, or a slam dunk into the trash bin of physics and philosophy. For me, no. 
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> Philosophically there is no problem with the no clone theorem, since even if a perfect copy is needed to preserve consciousness the no clone theorem does not preclude perfect copying.
> >>>
> >>> Practically there is no problem with the no clone theorem since your brain undergoes gross change from moment to moment and you feel that you remain the same person.
> >>>
> >>
> >> That's true, unless even in principle what gives rise to consciousness is not duplicable, accessible to us... (It's dubious, since our reality/nature did succeed to make it; at the very least for me). But if reality as it isn doesn't give us access to that (whatever we do, forever, because it is impossible like going faster than the speed of light under relativity, or going before the big bang as the time is beginning with it... and that indeed assumes a theory like computationalism is false), then it is a problem even phisophisically (that is if you still want to follow logic and still want what you're saying to be meaningfull) 
> >
> >
> > The no clone theorem refers to physical copying,
>
> I know.
>
> so it isn't relevant if consciousness is due to something else, like an immaterial soul.
>
> It is if perfect physical copying is not enough because it misses something.

So to try to be clearer, if reality as it is does not give us access to what makes us conscious because whatever it is that makes us conscious is not in any of the physical properties, then even if you were able to make such a perfect physical copy, it would still not be you or even conscious because by definition that perfect copy does not have the conscious property which is not physical and cannot therefore be copied.
Quentin

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Saturday, April 25, 2015, Quentin Anciaux <allc...@gmail.com> wrote:

Le 25 avr. 2015 01:25, "Quentin Anciaux" <allc...@gmail.com> a écrit :
>
>
> Le 25 avr. 2015 01:21, "Stathis Papaioannou" <stat...@gmail.com> a écrit :
> >
> >
> >
> > On Saturday, April 25, 2015, Quentin Anciaux <allc...@gmail.com> wrote:
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> 2015-04-24 23:07 GMT+02:00 Stathis Papaioannou <stat...@gmail.com>:
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> On Friday, April 24, 2015, spudboy100 via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:
> >>>>
> >>>> For some, its a conundrum, or in any case see it as a block to cloning, or a slam dunk into the trash bin of physics and philosophy. For me, no. 
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> Philosophically there is no problem with the no clone theorem, since even if a perfect copy is needed to preserve consciousness the no clone theorem does not preclude perfect copying.
> >>>
> >>> Practically there is no problem with the no clone theorem since your brain undergoes gross change from moment to moment and you feel that you remain the same person.
> >>>
> >>
> >> That's true, unless even in principle what gives rise to consciousness is not duplicable, accessible to us... (It's dubious, since our reality/nature did succeed to make it; at the very least for me). But if reality as it isn doesn't give us access to that (whatever we do, forever, because it is impossible like going faster than the speed of light under relativity, or going before the big bang as the time is beginning with it... and that indeed assumes a theory like computationalism is false), then it is a problem even phisophisically (that is if you still want to follow logic and still want what you're saying to be meaningfull) 
> >
> >
> > The no clone theorem refers to physical copying,
>
> I know.
>
> so it isn't relevant if consciousness is due to something else, like an immaterial soul.
>
> It is if perfect physical copying is not enough because it misses something.

So to try to be clearer, if reality as it is does not give us access to what makes us conscious because whatever it is that makes us conscious is not in any of the physical properties, then even if you were able to make such a perfect physical copy, it would still not be you or even conscious because by definition that perfect copy does not have the conscious property which is not physical and cannot therefore be copied. 

Yes, so the no clone theorem is not relevant whether consciousness is or is not due to something physical.

--
Stathis Papaioannou

[LizR]

You mean the MWI doesn't duplicate quantum states? (i.e. after they differentiate, they're different, and beforehand they're identical) ... good point.

(Even after decoherence there aren't multiple worlds, just areas that have differentiated within the multiverse, which can't spread FTL).

[spudb...@aol.com]

Why should quantum states be so hard to identify and describe? Heisenberg's  uncertainty principle states that we cannot know a particles position and velocity at the same time. But nothing prevents us from describing where a particle WAS and how fast it was moving, 2 hours ago, just not right now, at the same time. If we throw away immediacy we have Heisenberg describing the world exactly-in the immediate and maybe the remote past. or whats a david deutsch for? 

Sent from AOL Mobile Mail

-----Original Message-----
From: LizR <liz...@gmail.com>

To: everything-list <everyth...@googlegroups.com>
Sent: Fri, Apr 24, 2015 09:38 PM
Subject: Re: Practicalities of Mind Uploading

[Russell Standish]

On Thu, Apr 23, 2015 at 12:08:02PM -0700, Dennis Ochei wrote:
> Where can I sign up to be a part of Cosmic Liz? =p
>
> I've wondered if there exists an observer moment with all other observer
> moments as part of its consistent history.
>
> I wonder what God's favorite dream is?
>

I would say no, as the combination of all possible observer moments
should feel like nothing (at all). Revisit arguments in ToN, chapter
3.

You can feel like something if not all possible observer moments are
included, so you will need to give a theory for why that is.

--

----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpc...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au
----------------------------------------------------------------------------

[Russell Standish]

On Fri, Apr 24, 2015 at 11:27:26AM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> LizR wrote:
> >
> >But there's no-cloning to consider - plus whether a simulated
> >quantum state is the same as a real one...
>
> No-cloning of an unknown quantum state is simply the statement that
> there is no unitary operator that will enable you to transfer the
> properties of one unknown quantum state to another.
>
> Simulating a quantum state might be another matter. Quantum states
> are generally described in terms of some basis in Hilbert space. The
> coefficients of the expansion in that basis are arbitrary complex
> numbers, subject to the usual normalization conventions for the
> state. If you want to simulate this state, you have to simulate
> these coefficients to arbitrary precision. This is not possible in
> finite time with a digital computer.

Not sure I follow you here. Arbitrary precision does not mean infinite
precision. If I want my calculation to be accurate to 300 digits, then
it can be calculated to 300 digits precision within finite time. If I
then want it to 600 digits, I can do that also, but very likely it
will 10^300 times as long.

> However, if an infinite number
> of calculations are routinely possible for a Turing machine in
> Platonia, then who knows?
>
> I will give my proof that these coefficients are indeed dense in the
> complex plane at a later time, if required.
>

The set Q x Qi is dense in the complex plane, and each point in that
set can be specified precisely to infinite precision.

> Bruce

>
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[meekerdb]

In Everett's MWI the mulitple "worlds" are just projections of the one state-of-the-multivers onto different (approximately) orthogonal subspaces.  There's no duplicating of states.  And in any case the no-cloning theorem doesn't prohibit there being multiple copies of a state, it just prevents you from measuring an unknown state completely so that you know you have duplicated it.  You can make copies of a state you know (i.e. prepare). And you could coincidentally make a copy of an unknown state - you just wouldn't be able to know it was a copy.

Brent

[meekerdb]

On 4/24/2015 4:31 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

Le 25 avr. 2015 01:25, "Quentin Anciaux" <allc...@gmail.com> a écrit :
>
>
> Le 25 avr. 2015 01:21, "Stathis Papaioannou" <stat...@gmail.com> a écrit :
> >
> >
> >
> > On Saturday, April 25, 2015, Quentin Anciaux <allc...@gmail.com> wrote:
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> 2015-04-24 23:07 GMT+02:00 Stathis Papaioannou <stat...@gmail.com>:
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> On Friday, April 24, 2015, spudboy100 via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:
> >>>>
> >>>> For some, its a conundrum, or in any case see it as a block to cloning, or a slam dunk into the trash bin of physics and philosophy. For me, no. 
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> Philosophically there is no problem with the no clone theorem, since even if a perfect copy is needed to preserve consciousness the no clone theorem does not preclude perfect copying.
> >>>
> >>> Practically there is no problem with the no clone theorem since your brain undergoes gross change from moment to moment and you feel that you remain the same person.
> >>>
> >>
> >> That's true, unless even in principle what gives rise to consciousness is not duplicable, accessible to us... (It's dubious, since our reality/nature did succeed to make it; at the very least for me). But if reality as it isn doesn't give us access to that (whatever we do, forever, because it is impossible like going faster than the speed of light under relativity, or going before the big bang as the time is beginning with it... and that indeed assumes a theory like computationalism is false), then it is a problem even phisophisically (that is if you still want to follow logic and still want what you're saying to be meaningfull) 
> >
> >
> > The no clone theorem refers to physical copying,
>
> I know.
>
> so it isn't relevant if consciousness is due to something else, like an immaterial soul.
>
> It is if perfect physical copying is not enough because it misses something.

So to try to be clearer, if reality as it is does not give us access to what makes us conscious because whatever it is that makes us conscious is not in any of the physical properties,

What does "access" mean in the above.  I have access to my consciousness; I can reflect that I'm conscious, a kind of inner perception.  What other "access" could there be?  Do you mean the ability to make a copy or a conscious thing?

then even if you were able to make such a perfect physical copy, it would still not be you or even conscious because by definition that perfect copy does not have the conscious property which is not physical and cannot therefore be copied.

You seem to define "access" as an ability to physically reproduce, and then you say if we don't have access we can't physically reproduce consciousness.  Which is then reduced to a tautology.

Brent

[meekerdb]

On 4/24/2015 7:23 PM, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote:
> Why should quantum states be so hard to identify and describe? Heisenberg's uncertainty
> principle states that we cannot know a particles position and velocity at the same time.

But we can. It's just that if we prepare the particle in the same state again and measure
we'll get different values and the more precisely we measure q the more scatter we get in
the measure of p.

Brent

[Quentin Anciaux]

Le 25 avr. 2015 08:59, "meekerdb" <meek...@verizon.net> a écrit :
>
> On 4/24/2015 4:31 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>
>>
>> Le 25 avr. 2015 01:25, "Quentin Anciaux" <allc...@gmail.com> a écrit :
>> >
>> >
>> > Le 25 avr. 2015 01:21, "Stathis Papaioannou" <stat...@gmail.com> a écrit :
>> > >
>> > >
>> > >
>> > > On Saturday, April 25, 2015, Quentin Anciaux <allc...@gmail.com> wrote:
>> > >>
>> > >>
>> > >>
>> > >> 2015-04-24 23:07 GMT+02:00 Stathis Papaioannou <stat...@gmail.com>:
>> > >>>
>> > >>>
>> > >>>
>> > >>> On Friday, April 24, 2015, spudboy100 via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>> > >>>>
>> > >>>> For some, its a conundrum, or in any case see it as a block to cloning, or a slam dunk into the trash bin of physics and philosophy. For me, no. 
>> > >>>
>> > >>>
>> > >>> Philosophically there is no problem with the no clone theorem, since even if a perfect copy is needed to preserve consciousness the no clone theorem does not preclude perfect copying.
>> > >>>
>> > >>> Practically there is no problem with the no clone theorem since your brain undergoes gross change from moment to moment and you feel that you remain the same person.
>> > >>>
>> > >>
>> > >> That's true, unless even in principle what gives rise to consciousness is not duplicable, accessible to us... (It's dubious, since our reality/nature did succeed to make it; at the very least for me). But if reality as it isn doesn't give us access to that (whatever we do, forever, because it is impossible like going faster than the speed of light under relativity, or going before the big bang as the time is beginning with it... and that indeed assumes a theory like computationalism is false), then it is a problem even phisophisically (that is if you still want to follow logic and still want what you're saying to be meaningfull) 
>> > >
>> > >
>> > > The no clone theorem refers to physical copying,
>> >
>> > I know.
>> >
>> > so it isn't relevant if consciousness is due to something else, like an immaterial soul.
>> >
>> > It is if perfect physical copying is not enough because it misses something.
>>
>> So to try to be clearer, if reality as it is does not give us access to what makes us conscious because whatever it is that makes us conscious is not in any of the physical properties,
>
>
> What does "access" mean in the above.  I have access to my consciousness; I can reflect that I'm conscious, a kind of inner perception.  What other "access" could there be?  Do you mean the ability to make a copy or a conscious thing?

Access means the ability to copy the property that makes a conscious person conscious. If perfect physical copy cannot copy that even so it is a complete physical copy missing nothing physically speaking, because even that property is not comprised in the physical properties we have copied, by definition that copy would not be conscious. Again to be clear that's not what I believe, but it.'s an argument against that the in principle copy is always possible and meaningfull whatever reality is.

Quentin

>
>
>> then even if you were able to make such a perfect physical copy, it would still not be you or even conscious because by definition that perfect copy does not have the conscious property which is not physical and cannot therefore be copied.
>
>
> You seem to define "access" as an ability to physically reproduce, and then you say if we don't have access we can't physically reproduce consciousness.  Which is then reduced to a tautology.
>
> Brent
>

[John Clark]

On Thu, Apr 23, 2015  LizR <liz...@gmail.com> wrote:

 

> a destructive upload should be possible, and a conservative upload would give you a 50-50 chance of finding yourself uploaded.

Would give who a 50-50 chance of being uploaded?

 

> If there is something wrong with comp [...]

There is plenty wrong with Bruno's "comp", but there is nothing wrong with computationalism.

  John K Clark  

 

[John Clark]

On Thu, Apr 23, 2015  LizR <liz...@gmail.com> wrote:

> The question is whether the you who was a biological entity experiences waking up as the uploaded version.

If the "you" who woke up this morning is the same "you" that went to sleep last night then the answer to the above question is obvious. If the "you" who woke up this morning is NOT the same "you" that went to sleep last night then the answer to the above question is unimportant. 

> Tipler claims

Tipler's old claims were interesting but later proven to be wrong, Tipler's new claims are insane.

 

> that is guaranteed if you can duplicate - or, apparently, just simulate - the quantum state of your body

That would be VAST overkill! The quantum state of your body changes about a hundred thousand million billion trillion times every second of your life, but subjectively it doesn't cause a loss of personal identity, and in a case like this subjectivity is far more important than objectivity.

  John K Clark

 

[Bruno Marchal]

On 25 Apr 2015, at 17:58, John Clark wrote:

On Thu, Apr 23, 2015  LizR <liz...@gmail.com> wrote:

 

> a destructive upload should be possible, and a conservative upload would give you a 50-50 chance of finding yourself uploaded.

Would give who a 50-50 chance of being uploaded?

 

> If there is something wrong with comp [...]

There is plenty wrong with Bruno's "comp",

You told me that you have never read the paper above step 3. 

The only error" you mentioned would be the FPI, that is step 3. But you never reply when we show you the error you made, and then made again and again, and again.

but there is nothing wrong with computationalism.

You never replied to the explanation that all known form of computationalism implies "comp" (the weaker form of it). So, the consequence of "comp" applies to all of them.

Bruno

  John K Clark  

 

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 26 April 2015 at 02:19, John Clark <johnk...@gmail.com> wrote:

>> > that is guaranteed if you can duplicate - or, apparently, just simulate
>> > - the quantum state of your body
>
>
> That would be VAST overkill! The quantum state of your body changes about a
> hundred thousand million billion trillion times every second of your life,
> but subjectively it doesn't cause a loss of personal identity, and in a case
> like this subjectivity is far more important than objectivity.

That's right - and you can also undergo far greater changes to your
brain than those and still survive:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phineas_Gage


--
Stathis Papaioannou

[Jason Resch]

On Thu, Apr 23, 2015 at 4:52 AM, Dennis Ochei <do.inf...@gmail.com> wrote:

In the thread discussing comp the topic of whether uploading is possible came up. While tangentially related to comp, objections on the grounds of practical impossibility miss the point. But! The topic is still very interesting.

Is uploading possible?

Yes according to computationalism, the currently-dominant theory of mind.

 

If so, when will we have it?

I estimate by 2045. It is ultimately a matter of computational power and storage capacity. Imagine several high resolution microscopes/video cameras taking high resolution images as a frozen/plastinated brain is ablated (by laser, thin slicing, etc.) layer by layer. If the video resolution is great enough then the video recordings of watching the entire brain be destroyed in this way would provide sufficient information to reconstruct every neuronal connection. Harvard has a project ATLUM which automates this kind of brain scanning. As a process subject to information processing, it will follow the same trajectory of our increasing computing power.

We currently have uploaded worms (nematodes) with 302 neurons: openwork.org

Fruit flies have about 100x as many neurons (around 100,000), we need roughly 7 more doublings in computing power until we have openfruitfly.org

Mice have 100 times as many neurons as fruit flies, 10,000,000, we need 7 more doublings in computing power to get to openmouse.org

Cats have 100 times as many neurons as mice, 1 billion, we need 7 more doublings in computing power to get to opencat.org

Humans have 100 times as many neurons as cats 100 billion, we need 7 more doublings in computing power to get to openhuman.org

So this is a total of 28 doublings away. If computers double in power every year, we'll have openhuman.org by 2043.

What fidelity is necessary?

That's a good question. I would hope knowing every type of neuron and all the connections between them would be sufficient. If 100 bytes is sufficient to describe every neuronal connection in enough detail, then it would take 77 PB to store the roughly 770 trillion connections.

 

Will the upload still be you?

As much as the man who wakes up in your bed next morning is you (assuming computationalism)

 

Would you sign up for a destructive upload? Conservative?

Yes, if others had gone before me and demonstrated satisfaction with the results.

 

Feel free to toss any other questions into the mix.

For the record, I think uploading is possible, that destructive uploading will come way sooner,

Way sooner is relative, when technological growth accelerates exponentially. If we're talking about post-singularity technological progress, it might come only a few minutes later.

 

I'm uncertain about fidelity, but I do think there could be a functional isomorphism that doesn't depend on on a structural one, i.e. 100 simplified neurons might be required to capture the behavior of one physical one. The substitution level i think is subcellular. I think uploading perserves identity and I might actually prefer a destructive upload, when I consider the disappointment of the me that wakes up still flesh and bone after a conservative upload.

Nice. See you on the other side. (hopefully).

Jason

 

[Jason Resch]

On Fri, Apr 24, 2015 at 9:59 PM, Russell Standish <li...@hpcoders.com.au> wrote:

On Fri, Apr 24, 2015 at 11:27:26AM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> LizR wrote:
> >
> >But there's no-cloning to consider - plus whether a simulated
> >quantum state is the same as a real one...
>
> No-cloning of an unknown quantum state is simply the statement that
> there is no unitary operator that will enable you to transfer the
> properties of one unknown quantum state to another.
>
> Simulating a quantum state might be another matter. Quantum states
> are generally described in terms of some basis in Hilbert space. The
> coefficients of the expansion in that basis are arbitrary complex
> numbers, subject to the usual normalization conventions for the
> state. If you want to simulate this state, you have to simulate
> these coefficients to arbitrary precision. This is not possible in
> finite time with a digital computer.

Not sure I follow you here. Arbitrary precision does not mean infinite
precision. If I want my calculation to be accurate to 300 digits, then
it can be calculated to 300 digits precision within finite time. If I
then want it to 600 digits, I can do that also, but very likely it
will 10^300 times as long.

Doesn't it only double the amount of processing time to go from 300 digit precision numbers to 600 digit precision numbers?

Jason

[spudb...@aol.com]

For whatever its worth. David Deustch's solution to grandfather paradox eclipses this objection. Time travelers go back to a duplicate universe and kill grand dad, or Jack the Ripper, before he can do harm to the people in his lifespan. The travelers return to an unchanged world, but they did change reality in the universe next door. There's no reason why states cannot be duplicated as long as they don't violate Heisenberg's uncertainty rule. If we go back to Einstein's GR block universe/frame, you can copy anything in the past (light cone?) and duplicate it somewhere else. As long as you can glom past info, you can dupe it. Nothing with Einstein's GR, Heisenberg's Uncertainty, or Deutsches' Grand dad shot in another universe, prevents duping.

In Everett's MWI the mulitple "worlds" are just projections of the one state-of-the-multivers onto different (approximately) orthogonal subspaces.  There's no duplicating of states.  And in any case the no-cloning theorem doesn't prohibit there being multiple copies of a state, it just prevents you from measuring an unknown state completely so that you know you have duplicated it.  You can make copies of a state you know (i.e. prepare). And you could coincidentally make a copy of an unknown state - you just wouldn't be able to know it was a copy.

Brent

 

 

 

-----Original Message-----
From: meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net>
To: everything-list <everyth...@googlegroups.com>
Sent: Sat, Apr 25, 2015 2:52 am
Subject: Re: Practicalities of Mind Uploading

[spudb...@aol.com]

WMAP was flawed according to the latest sky survey announced recently. The big acceleration has long ago reversed and heat death here we come. Tipler's new claims are wrapped in his theology, yet can be instructional none the less, unless you feel that uploading and antimatter weapons are logically impossible forever? Yes, his omega point is over kill, but this was for lots of other mindful things aside from resurrection, which is the greater importance to humans. There seem to be better ways then the long wait offered by Tipler. One way, is to comprehend that at basis, the universe and the info it contains is available and transportable, and has evolved this way for a very long time.

 

 

-----Original Message-----
From: John Clark <johnk...@gmail.com>
To: everything-list <everyth...@googlegroups.com>
Sent: Sat, Apr 25, 2015 12:19 pm
Subject: Re: Practicalities of Mind Uploading

[Russell Standish]

Depends on the algorithm. To compute the addition of two numbers, you
need only double the time for double precision. Multiplication is
quadratic if I remember my primary school arithmetic correctly (don't
quote me on this). But computing polynomial approximations to
transcendental functions takes way longer, as many more terms are
required to achieve the stated precision.

[LizR]

According to the latest Scientific American, Moore's Law stopped working about 10 years ago. I'm not sure if or how this affects the prognostications for AIs, mind simulation etc, though.

[Russell Standish]

On Mon, Apr 27, 2015 at 01:48:40PM +1200, LizR wrote:
> According to the latest Scientific American, Moore's Law stopped working
> about 10 years ago. I'm not sure if or how this affects the
> prognostications for AIs, mind simulation etc, though.

The only thing that stopped 10 years ago was the increase in CPU clock
speed.

That was never Moore's law, though, which refers to density of
transistors for a given price point. That has very much continued to
increase. I can now buy CPUs with 50 cores for the price of a dual
core system 10 years ago. And each core has almost an order of
magnitude performance improvement due to architectural improvements
(eg more cache, hyperthreading, SIMD/vector instructions etc). That's
about 200 x performance improvement over a decade, about double what
Moore's would predict. But its all parallel computing - its not going
the make Microsoft Word any less of a dog.

Cheers

[LizR]

Yes that's more of less what SA said - they've got around the clock speed limit by multiplying cores, but they can't get around the fact that components can't be scaled below (I think) 14nm without that transistors leaking electrons - at least not without some radical new technology. So it was about whether some new paradigm is on the way to keep things heading towards the what's his name - begins with L I think's - limit. (Memristors nanotubes etc)

Anyway, have you read the article? You can probably make more intelligent comments on it than me.

PS Laudauer?!?

[Dennis Ochei]

Hmm... I think you can speed this up if you precompute and stick the answers in a lookup table. Of course, you still have to calculate the index of the answer

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[Bruce Kellett]

LizR wrote:
> Yes that's more of less what SA said - they've got around the clock
> speed limit by multiplying cores, but they can't get around the fact
> that components can't be scaled below (I think) 14nm without that
> transistors leaking electrons - at least not without some radical new
> technology. So it was about whether some new paradigm is on the way to
> keep things heading towards the what's his name - begins with L I
> think's - limit. (Memristors nanotubes etc)

Actually, what I took from the article was that future improvements in
computing are going to be driven by the commercial imperative of
profits. This is not likely to happen by pursuing faster processors and
memory chips per se.
"...our vision of computers themselves is evolving. It turns out that we
do not want stand-alone, oraclelike "thinking machines" as much as late
20th-century science-fiction writers thought we would. ... Instead, the
relentless pursuit of lower cost per function will be driven by
so-called heterogeneous computing."

Bruce

[LizR]

I think it goes without saying that the whole enterprise is mainly driven by the profit motive (although of course there have been significant injections from other areas, little things like the internet!) But the profit motive requires that people keep buying, and that requires that computers (in all their forms) continue to improve, since they don't tend to wear out THAT quickly. As someone one told me, the safest thing you can do to avoid losing your precious data is set up computers for specific functions - one to do word processing, for example - and keep them disconnected from the outside world; once they do what you want, never upgrade anything. We have in fact done this with an old Windows XP PC which is only ever used for putting home videos onto DVDs (although nowadays we don't do that so often, memory sticks being the medium of choice now). However, most people want the latest gadgets, and regularly upgrade desktop and laptop computers, but they only do so because they have continually improved in performance in various ways, enabling software to keep getting more features (some consider this a bad thing, but anyway - as a heavy user of Word and various other applications I have found myself forced to keep running to stand still...)

What interested me was the ideas about how they might go about continuing to meet this challenge, insofar as I could grasp them.

[LizR]

I should have added - the writer doesn't know enough science fiction. He says the SF writers were wrong to invent HAL but then goes on to describe what is effectively Asimov style robots. Asimov had a better idea of an omniintelligent environment - as much as anyone did, at least - than Clarke did.

[John Clark]

On Thu, Apr 23, 2015  Dennis Ochei <do.inf...@gmail.com> wrote:

> Is uploading possible? 

Yes, unless the religious crap about the soul turns out to be real, but I think it more likely that Santa Claus will turn out to be real.   

> If so, when will we have it?

In one sense we *might* have it today. If the blood in your brain is replaced with a sort of biological antifreeze and then the temperature of your brain is reduced to liquid nitrogen temperatures enough information might be retained so that you could be uploaded when technology advances enough (scientific advances are unnecessary for this). And it doesn't matter how long you objectively remain at a liquid nitrogen temperature because subjectively it will be instantaneous. 

That's why I spent $80,000 to be frozen when I die, it *might* work and if it doesn't I won't be any deader. 

  John K Clark 

 

[meekerdb]

Yeah, no need for computing power on your desk, just let it all be done on the cloud - we're all connected to the NSA computers anyway, let them do it.

Brent

[meekerdb]

On 4/27/2015 1:35 AM, LizR wrote:

I think it goes without saying that the whole enterprise is mainly driven by the profit motive (although of course there have been significant injections from other areas, little things like the internet!) But the profit motive requires that people keep buying, and that requires that computers (in all their forms) continue to improve, since they don't tend to wear out THAT quickly.

Then why can't I buy a laptop with as big a display (1920x1200) as my five year old HP.  I think personal computers have already gone past their peak of functionality and the "improvements" now are in the profit margin and the minds of the marketing department.

Brent

[Quentin Anciaux]

2015-04-27 19:18 GMT+02:00 meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net>:

On 4/27/2015 1:35 AM, LizR wrote:

I think it goes without saying that the whole enterprise is mainly driven by the profit motive (although of course there have been significant injections from other areas, little things like the internet!) But the profit motive requires that people keep buying, and that requires that computers (in all their forms) continue to improve, since they don't tend to wear out THAT quickly.

Then why can't I buy a laptop with as big a display (1920x1200) as my five year old HP. 

Maybe because you can buy laptop with better display, like 4k resolution...

http://www.toshiba.com/us/p50t

And maybe because a lot of new things are done with mobile devices... there are phones that will have 4k display next year...

 

I think personal computers have already gone past their peak of functionality and the "improvements" now are in the profit margin and the minds of the marketing department.

Brent

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[meekerdb]

On 4/27/2015 10:25 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

2015-04-27 19:18 GMT+02:00 meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net>:

On 4/27/2015 1:35 AM, LizR wrote:

I think it goes without saying that the whole enterprise is mainly driven by the profit motive (although of course there have been significant injections from other areas, little things like the internet!) But the profit motive requires that people keep buying, and that requires that computers (in all their forms) continue to improve, since they don't tend to wear out THAT quickly.

Then why can't I buy a laptop with as big a display (1920x1200) as my five year old HP. 

Maybe because you can buy laptop with better display, like 4k resolution...

http://www.toshiba.com/us/p50t

And maybe because a lot of new things are done with mobile devices... there are phones that will have 4k display next year...

But having twice the resolution on a smaller screen is worthless.  My HP has a 17" screen and 1920x1200 is plenty of resolution for my old eyes.  Going to a 15.6" screen with 3840x2160 is NOT an improvement (to say nothing having to use Windoze 8.1).  If they're going to make 3840x2160 graphics they should put them on the bigger screens, not the smaller ones!?


Brent

[Quentin Anciaux]

I'm sorry, you were talking about resolution, not screen size.

So what ? 4k screen are new in laptop (and anywhere else), but you can buy a 60" TV 4k screen, if you want... 17" 4k laptops are due to arrive this year, if they're not already there... those laptops have not only better screen than your old HP, they are way more powerful... So what's your point ? Innovation and better PC and better GPU and better screen are still done... Your old HP cannot make latest games for example running with full details at the screen resolution it offers... latest high end laptop can... you don't play ? What exists doesn't please you ? You don't play games ? fine, keep your old HP but don't pretend they don't exists, they do.

Quentin  

Brent

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[meekerdb]

On 4/27/2015 2:28 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

I'm sorry, you were talking about resolution, not screen size.

So what ? 4k screen are new in laptop (and anywhere else), but you can buy a 60" TV 4k screen, if you want... 17" 4k laptops are due to arrive this year, if they're not already there.

They're not.  I've been looking to buy one since the first 4K laptops were announced.  But doubling the resolution still doesn't make up for losing 17% of the screen area.  The resolution was already as high as useful for a 17" screen.

I can buy a 60" 4K TV, but I can't take it with me.

Brent

[LizR]

My point was that they are doing - or trying to do - whatever they think will make people want to buy them. However, I agree that PCs as such have probably peaked (but they are very useful for writers such as myself, even so).

[LizR]

I did wonder why you wanted more resolution on a small screen - given that one selling point of laptops is their small size. I guess you were just disagreeing for the sake of it, as usual.

[meekerdb]

I wanted more resolution on a 17" screen, 1920x1200 instead of 1920x1080.  I wasn't disagreeing with anything except that 4K resolution on a laptop is not an improvement.  You're nit picking.

Brent

[Quentin Anciaux]

Le 28 avr. 2015 00:37, "meekerdb" <meek...@verizon.net> a écrit :
>
> On 4/27/2015 2:28 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>
>> I'm sorry, you were talking about resolution, not screen size.
>> So what ? 4k screen are new in laptop (and anywhere else), but you can buy a 60" TV 4k screen, if you want... 17" 4k laptops are due to arrive this year, if they're not already there.

17" 4k will arrive this year, are you claiming it's false?

Bigger screen and It's not a laptop anymore. But if you like your old computer, keep it.

Quentin

>
>
> They're not.  I've been looking to buy one since the first 4K laptops were announced.  But doubling the resolution still doesn't make up for losing 17% of the screen area.  The resolution was already as high as useful for a 17" screen.
>
> I can buy a 60" 4K TV, but I can't take it with me.
>
> Brent
>

[meekerdb]

On 4/27/2015 10:20 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

Le 28 avr. 2015 00:37, "meekerdb" <meek...@verizon.net> a écrit :
>
> On 4/27/2015 2:28 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>
>> I'm sorry, you were talking about resolution, not screen size.
>> So what ? 4k screen are new in laptop (and anywhere else), but you can buy a 60" TV 4k screen, if you want... 17" 4k laptops are due to arrive this year, if they're not already there.

17" 4k will arrive this year, are you claiming it's false?

No, I'm just saying they aren't available; and I think the in terms of screen real estate, a 17" 3840x2160 is actually a step down in functionality from a 17" 1920x1200.  Sure it's got more resolution, but my eye isn't good enough to benefit much from the higher resolution.  But I will miss that loss of 17% of screen area.  So returning to the original point I think that supports my case that laptops have peaked in functionality and now they're just adding bells and whistles.

Bigger screen and It's not a laptop anymore. But if you like your old computer, keep it.

I will keep it (in fact I've got two).  But it's noticeably slow.  That's why I was hoping for some real improvement.

Brent

[LizR]

On 28 April 2015 at 11:58, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:

You're nit picking.

Hah. Pot, kettle.

[Quentin Anciaux]

2015-04-28 7:59 GMT+02:00 meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net>:

On 4/27/2015 10:20 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

Le 28 avr. 2015 00:37, "meekerdb" <meek...@verizon.net> a écrit :
>
> On 4/27/2015 2:28 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>
>> I'm sorry, you were talking about resolution, not screen size.
>> So what ? 4k screen are new in laptop (and anywhere else), but you can buy a 60" TV 4k screen, if you want... 17" 4k laptops are due to arrive this year, if they're not already there.

17" 4k will arrive this year, are you claiming it's false?

No, I'm just saying they aren't available; and I think the in terms of screen real estate, a 17" 3840x2160 is actually a step down in functionality from a 17" 1920x1200.  Sure it's got more resolution, but my eye isn't good enough to benefit much from the higher resolution.  But I will miss that loss of 17% of screen area.  So returning to the original point I think that supports my case that laptops have peaked in functionality and now they're just adding bells and whistles.

So anything even proof you're wrong support your case... well then yes... in dreamland.

Quentin 

Bigger screen and It's not a laptop anymore. But if you like your old computer, keep it.

I will keep it (in fact I've got two).  But it's noticeably slow.  That's why I was hoping for some real improvement.

Brent

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[Quentin Anciaux]

2015-04-28 8:37 GMT+02:00 Quentin Anciaux <allc...@gmail.com>:

2015-04-28 7:59 GMT+02:00 meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net>:

On 4/27/2015 10:20 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

Le 28 avr. 2015 00:37, "meekerdb" <meek...@verizon.net> a écrit :
>
> On 4/27/2015 2:28 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>
>> I'm sorry, you were talking about resolution, not screen size.
>> So what ? 4k screen are new in laptop (and anywhere else), but you can buy a 60" TV 4k screen, if you want... 17" 4k laptops are due to arrive this year, if they're not already there.

17" 4k will arrive this year, are you claiming it's false?

No, I'm just saying they aren't available; and I think the in terms of screen real estate, a 17" 3840x2160 is actually a step down in functionality from a 17" 1920x1200.  Sure it's got more resolution, but my eye isn't good enough to benefit much from the higher resolution.  But I will miss that loss of 17% of screen area.  So returning to the original point I think that supports my case that laptops have peaked in functionality and now they're just adding bells and whistles.

So anything even proof you're wrong support your case... well then yes... in dreamland.

And the so called bells and whistles, are just more powerful GPU/CPU/Bigger RAM space, SSD... miniatirusation, just nothing at all, you're right, just bells and whistlles.

And I'm sure again, that make your case too, because you're right so you're right. It's easy to think like you.

Quentin

Quentin 

Bigger screen and It's not a laptop anymore. But if you like your old computer, keep it.

I will keep it (in fact I've got two).  But it's noticeably slow.  That's why I was hoping for some real improvement.

Brent

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[Russell Standish]

On Mon, Apr 27, 2015 at 10:59:33PM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
>
> No, I'm just saying they aren't available; and I think the in terms
> of screen real estate, a 17" 3840x2160 is actually a step down in
> functionality from a 17" 1920x1200. Sure it's got more resolution,
> but my eye isn't good enough to benefit much from the higher
> resolution. But I will miss that loss of 17% of screen area. So
> returning to the original point I think that supports my case that
> laptops have peaked in functionality and now they're just adding
> bells and whistles.

Manufacturers will be driven to approximate the 9:5 aspect ratio of
the movie screen, because for some reason, the number one use of a
laptop is as an expensive television set. Probably Pirate Bay has
something to do with this.

Unfortunately, the rest of us who'd prefer a much more square 5:4
aspect ratio will just have to put up.

[Quentin Anciaux]

2015-04-28 9:58 GMT+02:00 Russell Standish <li...@hpcoders.com.au>:

On Mon, Apr 27, 2015 at 10:59:33PM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
>
> No, I'm just saying they aren't available; and I think the in terms
> of screen real estate, a 17" 3840x2160 is actually a step down in
> functionality from a 17" 1920x1200.  Sure it's got more resolution,
> but my eye isn't good enough to benefit much from the higher
> resolution.  But I will miss that loss of 17% of screen area.  So
> returning to the original point I think that supports my case that
> laptops have peaked in functionality and now they're just adding
> bells and whistles.

Manufacturers will be driven to approximate the 9:5 aspect ratio of
the movie screen, because for some reason, the number one use of a
laptop is as an expensive television set. Probably Pirate Bay has
something to do with this.

Unfortunately, the rest of us who'd prefer a much more square 5:4
aspect ratio will just have to put up.

In the end what he misses is the 16:10 or 5:4 aspect ratio, not the screen size per se or resolution. It's true that now, every screens are 16:9. 

I suppose there aren't much demand for it, or the demand is not as high as the supplemental cost to manufacture them...

But I can't agree that because of that you can say no innovations are done... that's ignoring everything else that make up a computer... a computer is not a screen... personnaly I have three displays on my PC (two external and the laptop one), and I find it more important and useful than a single 16:10/5:4 screen.

Quentin

Cheers
--

----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Prof Russell Standish                  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics      hpc...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales          http://www.hpcoders.com.au
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[LizR]

I like a wide display, it lets me put things next to each other (e.g. an email and a word doc) which is often quite handy. On a squarer screen they always tended to overlap too much. Actually I have two screens, one is old and squareish the other new and wideish. Between them I have just about enough space to do whatever I want. How did I used to manage with one VGA monitor (and the damn thing wasn't even flat. I mean, come on...!)

[meekerdb]

On 4/28/2015 2:11 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

2015-04-28 9:58 GMT+02:00 Russell Standish <li...@hpcoders.com.au>:

On Mon, Apr 27, 2015 at 10:59:33PM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
>
> No, I'm just saying they aren't available; and I think the in terms
> of screen real estate, a 17" 3840x2160 is actually a step down in
> functionality from a 17" 1920x1200.  Sure it's got more resolution,
> but my eye isn't good enough to benefit much from the higher
> resolution.  But I will miss that loss of 17% of screen area.  So
> returning to the original point I think that supports my case that
> laptops have peaked in functionality and now they're just adding
> bells and whistles.

Manufacturers will be driven to approximate the 9:5 aspect ratio of
the movie screen, because for some reason, the number one use of a
laptop is as an expensive television set. Probably Pirate Bay has
something to do with this.

Unfortunately, the rest of us who'd prefer a much more square 5:4
aspect ratio will just have to put up.

In the end what he misses is the 16:10 or 5:4 aspect ratio, not the screen size per se or resolution. It's true that now, every screens are 16:9. 

I suppose there aren't much demand for it, or the demand is not as high as the supplemental cost to manufacture them...

But I can't agree that because of that you can say no innovations are done... that's ignoring everything else that make up a computer... a computer is not a screen... personnaly I have three displays on my PC (two external and the laptop one), and I find it more important and useful than a single 16:10/5:4 screen.

I too have multiple screens, but I still need to be able to use the laptop alone sometimes.  I didn't mean to say there were NO improvements in laptops...that was more tongue in cheek.  That's why I'd like to buy a laptop with faster processing.  But so far I've judged that the loss of screen real estate outweighs the advantage of faster processor, touch screen, built in camera, blue-tooth,...

Brent