Tegmark's New Book

[Kim Jones]

Maximus writes:


The Higgs Boson was predicted with the same tool as the planet Neptune and the radio wave: with mathematics. Why does our universe seem so mathematical, and what does it mean? In my new book, Our Mathematical Universe, which comes out today, I argue that it means that our universe isn't just described by math, but that it is math in the sense that we're all parts of a giant mathematical object, which in turn is part of a multiverse so huge that it makes the other multiverses debated in recent years seem puny in comparison.

At first glance, our universe doesn't seem very mathematical at all. The groundhog who trims our lawn has properties such as cuteness and fluffiness -- not mathematical properties. Yet we know that this groundhog -- and everything else in our universe -- is ultimately made of elementary particles such as quarks and electrons. And what properties does an electron have? Properties like -1, ½ and 1! We physicists call these properties electric charge, spin and lepton number, but those are just words that we've made up and the fundamental properties that an electron has are just numbers, mathematical properties. All elementary particles, the building blocks of everything around, are purely mathematical objects in the sense that they don't have any properties except for mathematical properties. The same goes for the space that these particles are in, which has only mathematical properties -- for example 3, the number of dimensions. If space is mathematical and everything in space is also mathematical, then the idea that everything is mathematical doesn't sound as crazy anymore.

That our universe is approximately described by mathematics means that some but not all of its properties are mathematical, and is a venerable idea dating back to the ancient Greeks. That it is mathematical means that all of its properties are mathematical, i.e., that it has no properties at all except mathematical ones. If I'm right and this is true, then it's good news for physics, because all properties of our universe can in principle be understood if we're intelligent and creative enough. For example, this challenges the common assumption that we can never understand consciousness. Instead, it optimistically suggests that consciousness can one day be understood as a form of matter, forming the most beautifully complex structure in space and time that our universe has ever known. Such understanding would enlighten our approaches to animals, unresponsive patients and future ultra-intelligent machines, with wide-ranging ethical, legal and technological implications.

As I argue in detail in my book, it also implies that our reality is vastly larger than we thought, containing a diverse collection of universes obeying all mathematically possible laws of physics. An advanced computer program could in principle start generating an atlas of all such mathematically possible universes. The discovery of other solar systems has taught us that 8, the number of planets in ours, doesn't tell us anything fundamental about reality, merely something about which particular solar system we inhabit -- the number 8 is essentially part of our cosmic ZIP code. Similarly, this mathematical atlas tells us that if we one day discover the equations of quantum gravity and print them on a T-shirt, we should not hübristically view these equations as the "Theory of Everything," but as information about our location in the mathematical atlas of the ultimate multiverse.

It's easy feel small and powerless when faced with this vast reality. Indeed, we humans have had this experience before, over and over again discovering that what we thought was everything was merely a small part of a larger structure: our planet, our solar system, our galaxy, our universe and perhaps a hierarchy of parallel universes, nested like Russian dolls. However, I find this empowering as well, because we've repeatedly underestimated not only the size of our cosmos, but also the power of our human mind to understand it. Our cave-dwelling ancestors had just as big brains as we have, and since they didn't spend their evenings watching TV, I'm sure they asked questions like "What's all that stuff up there in the sky?" and "Where does it all come from?". They'd been told beautiful myths and stories, but little did they realize that they had it in them to actually figure out the answers to these questions for themselves. And that the secret lay not in learning to fly into space to examine the celestial objects, but in letting their human minds fly. When our human imagination first got off the ground and started deciphering the mysteries of space, it was done with mental power rather than rocket power.

I find this quest for knowledge so inspiring that I decided to join it and become a physicist, and I've written this book because I want to share these empowering journeys of discovery, especially in this day and age when it's so easy to feel powerless. If you decide to read it, then it will be not only the quest of me and my fellow physicists, but our quest.

——————————————

OK - now rip into him! He may well be edging closer and closer to Bruno’s Comp but I think he will need a few Salvia trips to get past his clear and evident physicalism...

Kim Jones

============================

Kim Jones B.Mus.GDTL

Email: kimj...@ozemail.com.au
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"Never let your schooling get in the way of your education" - Mark Twain

[LizR]

Max's main lacuna is the nature of consciousness, which he describes as "what data feels like when it's being processed" - hardly a detailed theory. He starts his Mathematical Universe Hypothesis from the opposite pole to Bruno, so to speak. I wonder if it's possible for a particular mathemathical object to drop out of comp - after all, we do appear to live in a universe with a specific set of laws of physics. Are these the only ones that could be generated by comp (or generated by the existence of conscious beings in Platonia) ? Maybe one needs to somehow intersect comp with the MUH to get the full story!

[Richard Ruquist]

Most theories of everything (TOEs) like string theory are based on physics. But there are as well TOEs based on "mathematics" being fundamental to a physical reality based on science. In particular, one math-TOE is based on the discrete natural numbers famously used by Godel to derive his Incompleteness Theorems. Such math computational theories (math-comp) assume that the comp-machine has an infinite computation space. 

Our approach proposes that string cosmology limits comp-space as measured by the Bekenstein Bound/Lloyd Limit of available bits of information in a finite holographic universe. We conjecture that the cubic lattice of Calabi-Yau (CY) compact-manifolds, which pervade the space of each universe, is an arithmetic comp-machine (due to the compact manifolds being enumerable) and furthermore, that its comp-power is limited by the effective holographic size of the universe. 

Moreover, we conjecture that our universe's comp-machine is insufficiently precise, because of its limited size, to compute physical particles; and for that, a collection of all universes in an effectively infinite metaphysical space called the Metaverse, is necessary. A Metaverse comp-machine in such a large space is effectively complete and consistent. We further argue that all CY computations are instantaneous from a human perspective. 

These conjectures make possible Mind and Body consciousnesses in a Single-World Universe and a cosmic rebirth loop based on Smolin's Fecund Cosmology with Super-Massive Black Holes (SMBHs) giving birth to Metaverses.

http://vixra.org/abs/1303.0194

On Wed, Jan 8, 2014 at 1:36 AM, LizR <liz...@gmail.com> wrote:

Max's main lacuna is the nature of consciousness, which he describes as "what data feels like when it's being processed" - hardly a detailed theory. He starts his Mathematical Universe Hypothesis from the opposite pole to Bruno, so to speak. I wonder if it's possible for a particular mathemathical object to drop out of comp - after all, we do appear to live in a universe with a specific set of laws of physics. Are these the only ones that could be generated by comp (or generated by the existence of conscious beings in Platonia) ? Maybe one needs to somehow intersect comp with the MUH to get the full story!

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[spudb...@aol.com]

I plan to buy his book, but I always have my meta goal of making life better or less despairing for people. If the book, even, unintentionally, contributes to this, its all good, if its just number mumbling, I will always appreciate the creativity of the abstract mind/brain at work. Enviously, even. But unless myself or somebody else can process the work into something greater (better) it will fade back into my mental background. I respect the fact that others feel differently, and view the intellectual pursuit as a goal in itself.

 

Mitch

"Never let your schooling get in the way of your education" - Mark Twain




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[Alberto G. Corona]

That is not physicalism IMHO that is mathemathicalism

2014/1/8 Kim Jones <kimj...@ozemail.com.au>

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Alberto.

[Bruno Marchal]

On 08 Jan 2014, at 16:22, spudb...@aol.com wrote:

I plan to buy his book, but I always have my meta goal of making life better or less despairing for people. If the book, even, unintentionally, contributes to this, its all good, if its just number mumbling, I will always appreciate the creativity of the abstract mind/brain at work. Enviously, even. But unless myself or somebody else can process the work into something greater (better) it will fade back into my mental background. I respect the fact that others feel differently, and view the intellectual pursuit as a goal in itself.

It is hard for me to really separate the quest for truth from the quest for good. 

It is not that truth is good, as it is often not the case, but it is that lying when truth is not good makes things worse.

I am not sure you can help the others, except by helping yourself and give the example.

Help yourself and the others will help themselves.

With comp it is very plausibly true that hell is paved with the good intentions. 

As I said, put the grain of salt on all this, but I am pretty sure Tegmark tries to communicate something that he feel as good for its fellow.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Bruno Marchal]

On 08 Jan 2014, at 18:33, Alberto G. Corona wrote:

That is not physicalism IMHO that is mathemathicalism

It might be mathematicalism which keeps the physicalist identity thesis of the Aristotelian, and physicalize mathematical object. It still ignore the FPI, the reversal with arithmetic, the comp constraints. But I have not read the book, so I can't say. 

Arithmeticalism is already sufficient for the comp ontology, but mathematicalism is not enough for the inside view, unless "mathematics" is taken in a *very* large sense, capable of making sense of a mathematical consciousness (but this might be inconsistent with comp). Tegmark might still hide a piece of the mind-body problem under the rug.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[meekerdb]

I think to be conscious you need memory and a sense of time passage (although Bruno
disputes this when he comes back from a salvia trip). To escape solipism there must be
objects your perceive, some of which act like you, and on which you can act (c.f. Dr
Johnson). That implies that there must be a quasi-classical world in order to support
consciousness (at least human-like consciousness).

Brent

[LizR]

Those all seem like reasonable criteria. I imagine they could be fulfilled by a variety of physical laws (e.g. it probably wouldn't make a huge difference to the existence of human beings if light travelled 10% faster or slower). So presumably comp covers all possible physical laws which create conscious beings...

[Stephen Paul King]

Dear LizR,

   Tegmark's "What data feels like when it is processes" seems to require some ability to "tell the difference" whether it is being processed or it merely exists as Platonic strings of numbers, No?

  Did my hypothesis using Wheeler's Surprise 20 questions idea make any sense? My claim is that our shared experience of a physical world is the result of the demand for some level of mutual consistency upon which interactions between observers can obtain. If we could not agree on the 'basic laws" of a common background within which we have a sense of 'being in the world" there would be no interactions between us at all. We would have never overcome the solipsism problem that computations have as they are completely blind to physical hardware via the universality property: Software is invariant and insensitive to the physical hardware that might run it. Bruno does a good job showing this via his teleportation with delay argument.

[Stephen Paul King]

Dear Brent,

  I agree with you 100%! But that seems to imply that there is something "real" about the physical. I think that we can obtain a form of realism that does not involve a "god's eye view" by appealing to the possibility of coherent communication between multiple observers. Observers being defined as intersections of an infinite number of computations, ala Bruno's definition. We do not need an ontologically primitive physical world, we only need a "level of substitution" so that the "Yes, Doctor" choice is possible.

[LizR]

On 9 January 2014 14:16, Stephen Paul King <step...@charter.net> wrote:

Dear LizR,

   Tegmark's "What data feels like when it is processes" seems to require some ability to "tell the difference" whether it is being processed or it merely exists as Platonic strings of numbers, No?

Hm. I'm not sure! He requires a dynamic process, while the Platonic strings are "creating time indexically" - I'm not sure if these should give rise to different experiences, or not.

 

  Did my hypothesis using Wheeler's Surprise 20 questions idea make any sense? My claim is that our shared experience of a physical world is the result of the demand for some level of mutual consistency upon which interactions between observers can obtain. If we could not agree on the 'basic laws" of a common background within which we have a sense of 'being in the world" there would be no interactions between us at all. We would have never overcome the solipsism problem that computations have as they are completely blind to physical hardware via the universality property: Software is invariant and insensitive to the physical hardware that might run it. Bruno does a good job showing this via his teleportation with delay argument.

Yes, I would say that makes sense, but I am not sure how we do overcome this problem. (I may need to re-read some old posts...)

[Stephen Paul King]

Dear LizR,

  Creating time indexically (or otherwise) out maps to the natural ordering of integers will not work! We use some equivalent to a Godel numbering to code algorithms and distinguish them from each other, no? This break the natural order and thus making it unavailable as an absolute quotienting of the integers that can be pointed to as the order of events that is imposed from the static and timeless Platonic realm.

  If we are going to use a dynamic process, when lets us one that makes sense. One example of a ontological process is found in Prof. Kitada's work where he ties to the fundamental undecidability of truth values of physical states in a universal wave function, ala the Wheeler-Dewitt equation. Louis Kauffman uses a similar reasoning in his Eigenforms. Why not just bite the bullet and drop the idea that Being is fundamental and the Becoming is some illusion?

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[meekerdb]

On 1/8/2014 5:20 PM, Stephen Paul King wrote:

Dear Brent,

  I agree with you 100%! But that seems to imply that there is something "real" about the physical. I think that we can obtain a form of realism that does not involve a "god's eye view" by appealing to the possibility of coherent communication between multiple observers. Observers being defined as intersections of an infinite number of computations, ala Bruno's definition. We do not need an ontologically primitive physical world, we only need a "level of substitution" so that the "Yes, Doctor" choice is possible.

Notice that you had to put "real" in scare quotes - because it isn't clear what it means.  I think the conclusion is that, in Bruno's MGA, the inert program needs to include a great deal, essentially a whole universe.  That doesn't make it wrong, but to me it makes it less interesting.  It would be surprising than an inert program could implement consciousness in this world, since it couldn't interact with this world.  But if it's conscious within it's own world, then it's just like any other simulation (e.g. The Matrix).

Brent

On Wednesday, January 8, 2014 5:40:33 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:

On 1/7/2014 10:36 PM, LizR wrote:
> Max's main lacuna is the nature of consciousness, which he describes as "what data feels
> like when it's being processed" - hardly a detailed theory. He starts his Mathematical
> Universe Hypothesis from the opposite pole to Bruno, so to speak. I wonder if it's
> possible for a particular mathemathical object to drop out of comp - after all, we do
> appear to live in a universe with a specific set of laws of physics. Are these the only
> ones that could be generated by comp (or generated by the existence of conscious beings
> in Platonia) ? Maybe one needs to somehow intersect comp with the MUH to get the full story!

I think to be conscious you need memory and a sense of time passage (although Bruno
disputes this when he comes back from a salvia trip).  To escape solipism there must be
objects your perceive, some of which act like you, and on which you can act (c.f. Dr
Johnson). That implies that there must be a quasi-classical world in order to support
consciousness (at least human-like consciousness).

Brent

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[Jason Resch]

On Thu, Jan 9, 2014 at 12:11 AM, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:

On 1/8/2014 5:20 PM, Stephen Paul King wrote:

Dear Brent,

  I agree with you 100%! But that seems to imply that there is something "real" about the physical. I think that we can obtain a form of realism that does not involve a "god's eye view" by appealing to the possibility of coherent communication between multiple observers. Observers being defined as intersections of an infinite number of computations, ala Bruno's definition. We do not need an ontologically primitive physical world, we only need a "level of substitution" so that the "Yes, Doctor" choice is possible.

Notice that you had to put "real" in scare quotes - because it isn't clear what it means.  I think the conclusion is that, in Bruno's MGA, the inert program needs to include a great deal, essentially a whole universe.  That doesn't make it wrong, but to me it makes it less interesting.  It would be surprising than an inert program could implement consciousness in this world, since it couldn't interact with this world.  But if it's conscious within it's own world, then it's just like any other simulation (e.g. The Matrix).

Or how it already is (in a world created entirely within the confines of a hollow bone).

Jason 

[Stephen Paul King]

Dear Brent,

   I have given my definition of reality previously, but here it is again. For some collection of observers that can communicate, a reality is that which is incontrovertible. In other words, a reality is that which all observers agree. I do not like the idea of an a priori "reality" as such can be defined arbitrarily to suit one's whim.

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[Bruno Marchal]

But with comp the laws of physics are uniquely determined by a statistical sum on an infinity of computations, and is unique (modulo that multiplication by three, as physics appears in three hypostases). And the determination is based on the FPI, and so physics is NOT a priori Turing emulable. The evidence that physics seems computable is a problem for comp, not an evidence for it. Fortunately the *apparent* "collapse" might be non-computable enough for comp to be correct.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Alberto G. Corona]

"But with comp the laws of physics are uniquely determined by a
statistical sum on an infinity of computations"

Uniquely determined? That is like saying that The Buckingham Palace
is uniquely determined by the statistical sum of a infinity of pieces
of lego thrown in the site by infinite B52 bombers.

2014/1/9, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be>:

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Alberto.

[Edgar L. Owen]

Stephen,

I define 'Reality' in my book on the subject very simply as everything that exists. One must be careful to distinguish between actual external reality, of which there is only one, and individual 'realities' which vary widely across individuals and species, and which are all individual mental simulations of the areas of the actual external reality that form their environments.

Your definition of reality refers to similarities between individual simulated realities, not to the common external reality. 

Just because n observers all have the same reality simulation does not mean that is actually true of external reality, so your definition could just refer to agreement on an illusion, which is almost inevitable since almost all of the reality in which we believe we exist is actually a manufactured simulation in our own minds.

The actual reality is pure computationally evolving information in the presence of the substrate (what I call ontological energy) of reality. On the other hands the simulated realities in organismic minds manifest to the organisms as classical material worlds which they are not, and these vary quite widely among species....

Edgar

[Stephen Paul King]

Dear Edgar,

On Thu, Jan 9, 2014 at 8:18 AM, Edgar L. Owen <edga...@att.net> wrote:

Stephen,

I define 'Reality' in my book on the subject very simply as everything that exists.

I denote "everything that exist" as 'the Total Universe' or simply "Existence". The key is that such is independent of any contingency or property. Some have argued that existence = necessary possibility, a definition which I find most useful.

 

One must be careful to distinguish between actual external reality, of which there is only one,

This implies that its uniqueness is separable or isolatable from observers and can imply property definiteness independent of measurement. This is contradicted by the general non-commutativity of observables in QM. I try to be sure that my ontology does not contradict empirical facts. For example, position properties and momentum properties of objects cannot be considered as inherent in objects independent of measurement.

  I am attempting to explain how that uniqueness can to pass using Wheeler's Surprise 20 Questions concept. It allows us a method by which many a priori possible properties can be reduces to a single set that is common to many observers; a nice alternative to the mere postulation of a unique "actual external reality". 

 

and individual 'realities' which vary widely across individuals and species, and which are all individual mental simulations of the areas of the actual external reality that form their environments.

If there are multiple observers and they can communicate then it follows that there must be commonalities in their individual observations. Why not use that? Your alternative seems to be more of an 'act of faith' that our experiences are not some hallucination or simulation. Descartes discusses this in his Meditations and was not imaginative sufficiently to not appeal to an external "Deity" for an explanation as to why what we experience is not a hallucination or simulation.

  In my studies of philosophy I have often noticed that all the statements apply only to a single entity; almost never is the consequence of communicating and arriving on agreements between many entities considered. Maybe people that tend toward philosophy also tend to be mentally alienated from other persons... or autistic...

 

Your definition of reality refers to similarities between individual simulated realities, not to the common external reality. 

Yes, I don't like appeals to authority, explicit or implicit.

Just because n observers all have the same reality simulation does not mean that is actually true of external reality, so your definition could just refer to agreement on an illusion, which is almost inevitable since almost all of the reality in which we believe we exist is actually a manufactured simulation in our own minds.

Consider that n goes to infinity and that p is the probability of that an observer has experiences that can be matched up with those of another via some diffeomorphism... The probability that the individual experience are completely independent simulations becomes vanishingly small!

 

The actual reality is pure computationally evolving information in the presence of the substrate (what I call ontological energy) of reality. On the other hands the simulated realities in organismic minds manifest to the organisms as classical material worlds which they are not, and these vary quite widely among species....

Do you consider the computational complexity involved? It has been pointed out, for example by Stephen Wolfram, that faithfully simulating a physical system (such that any number of observers having an experience of "that systems" could agree that it is "the same system") is intractable (or at least NP-Complete).

  Experience is not a "magical" process! Its content can be quantified and related to measures of information and algorithmic complexity. Why don't you look into such?

[Bruno Marchal]

On 09 Jan 2014, at 12:23, Alberto G. Corona wrote:

> "But with comp the laws of physics are uniquely determined by a
> statistical sum on an infinity of computations"
>
> Uniquely determined? That is like saying that The Buckingham Palace
> is uniquely determined by the statistical sum of a infinity of pieces
> of lego thrown in the site by infinite B52 bombers.

You might confuse geography and physics. The (sigma_1) arithmetic is
the same for all, and the laws of physics must be given by the same
laws for any universal machine. Comp makes physics invariant for all
machine-observers, and entirely determined by the unique measure on
all computation, as seen from the 1p view. This should be clear from
the UD-Argument. Comp makes the primitive universe into a fairy tle,
but by doing so, it makes the physics much more solid (indeed physics
is deduced from addition and multiplication only, with comp at the
meta-level).

Bruno

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Alberto G. Corona]

But the UD argument predict that all the possible universes with all
possible laws will be produced. What is what makes our physical laws
"unique determined" by COMP?'

--
Alberto.

[Bruno Marchal]

On 09 Jan 2014, at 16:30, Alberto G. Corona wrote:

> But the UD argument predict that all the possible universes with all
> possible laws will be produced.

Where?

> What is what makes our physical laws
> "unique determined" by COMP?'

That happens already at the step seven.

I assume there that you, here and now, live in a physical universe
which run a universal dovetailer, without ever stopping.

Assuming comp, how do you predict "exactly", after step six, the
experience of dropping a pen in the air?
What is the probability that you will see falling on the ground?

You believe (because you assume comp and agreed up to step 6) that
your next immediate future first person state is determined by the FPI
on all the emulations of your actual states appearing in the UD* (the
complete execution of the UD). This involves infinitely many
computations (that should be an easy exercise in computer science: all
functions are implemented by infinitely many programs).
To compute the exact probability of the event "the "pen fall on the
ground", you must seek the ratio or proportion of all computation
going through your states where you see the pen falling on the
grounds, among all computations going through your states.

Computations is an arithmetical notion, and your actual state is given
by a relative number, encode locally by the doctor. The entire UD is
itself definable in arithmetic. So, in that step seven, if comp is
correct or believed by a rational agent, the rational agent had to
believe that physics, all physical predictions, is reduced to one
"simple law": basically a measure on the relative computations.
Physics has been reduced, in principle (of course) to a statistical
sum on all first person valid relative computations.

Below our substitution level, physics is not given by "one
computation" (or one universal numbers). Physics is given by an
infinity made of almost all computations. It involves a competition
among all universal numbers. "Almost all" means all those validating
your first person experience.
Then the math shows that the case of "probability one", for that
statistics on first person valid computations obeys a quantum logic.

In fact comp gives a criteria to distinguish geography (which depends
on many indexicals) and physics, which appears to be indexical
independent. Physics is even independent of the choice of the base of
the phi_i.

There is no "real" (ontic) physical reality, but still a *unique* (yet
relative, conditional) measure on consistent enumerable extensions on
all computations (going through your current states). (Unless comp is
false or that we are manipulated through a normal simulation).
Physics is transformed into the study of a lawful precise arithmetical
phenomenon of a type "first person plural experience".

You have to understand all this by yourself. Reread with attention and
concentration all UDA steps, as they are all used at once in the step
seven.

[Edgar L. Owen]

Stephen,

Please see my proximate answer to Terren a little above in which I answer most of your questions on the nature of experience.

You will see in that post I note that the computational information universe can be considered to consist of what I call 'Xperience' only (see that post for an explanation). If that is true then every information form in the universe can be considered a 'generic observer' that observes other information forms by computationally interacting with them. 

So in that sense I agree that since everything in the universe is effectively a generic observer that the universe itself consists entirely of observations and thus could not exist without some generic observers (since generic observers is all that exists in the universe in this view). In other words if ANYthing does exist, it must be a generic observer, thus the universe doesn't exist without it being observed in that sense. So in that sense I think we might agree.

With regards your last point. The computational information system of the universe is not dependent on human mathematical concepts since every state is immediately computed from its prior state by what we call the laws of nature, which are the ACTUAL math of reality by which it actively computes itself. Thus the actual math of reality is entirely logically self-consistent and logically complete. 

However it is true that individual organismic mental simulations can be inconsistent locally if they include false or self-contradictory premises. This includes most of human math, which is based on generalized approximations of actual reality math, and those generalizations introduce the well known problems addressed by Godel, Bruno etc. which DO NOT apply to the actual logico-mathematical system of reality.

Edgar

[Stephen Paul King]

Dear Bruno,

I have to agree with Alberto on this point.

On Thu, Jan 9, 2014 at 12:34 PM, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

On 09 Jan 2014, at 16:30, Alberto G. Corona wrote:

But the UD argument predict that all the possible universes with all
possible laws will be produced.

Where?

AR does not restrict the types of physical laws of universes that it can represent, so barring a separate mechanism I cannot see how Alberto's claim is false!

What is what makes our physical laws
"unique determined" by COMP?'

That happens already at the step seven.

Could you be more specific as to how?

 

I assume there that you, here and now, live in a physical universe which run a universal dovetailer, without ever stopping.

Assuming comp, how do you predict "exactly", after step six,  the experience of dropping a pen in the air?
What is the probability that you will see falling on the ground?

I think that Alberto is considering the character of physical laws, not probability distributions of particular processes that obey such laws.

 

You believe (because you assume comp and agreed up to step 6) that your next immediate future first person state is determined by the FPI on all the emulations of your actual states appearing in the UD* (the complete execution of the UD). This involves infinitely many computations (that should be an easy exercise in computer science: all functions are implemented by infinitely many programs).
To compute the exact probability of the event "the "pen fall on the ground", you must seek the ratio or proportion of all computation going through your states where you see the pen falling on the grounds, among all computations going through your states.

How can we generate probability distributions unless there is an unambiguous measure on the space of possible universes that can obtain from the infinitely many computations?

 

Computations is an arithmetical notion, and your actual state is given by a relative number, encode locally by the doctor. The entire UD is itself definable in arithmetic. So, in that step seven, if comp is correct or believed by a rational agent, the rational agent had to believe that physics, all physical predictions, is reduced to one "simple law": basically a measure on the relative computations. Physics has been reduced, in principle (of course) to a statistical sum on all first person valid relative computations.

It has always been my claim that the Doctor can only exist within some subset of universes that have persistence of matter. This would exclude, for example, universes that do not contain matter or do not persist for more than an instant. AFAIK, nothing in AR acts to partition up the universes into those that contain Doctors and those that do not.

 

Below our substitution level, physics is not given by "one computation" (or one universal numbers). Physics is given by an infinity made of almost all computations. It involves a competition among all universal numbers. "Almost all" means all those validating your first person experience.

Yes, but not just one "physics"! The level of substitution is itself induced by and emergent from physical laws, thus cannot be assumed prior to the mechanism that selects for particular physical laws.

 

Then the math shows that the case of "probability one", for that statistics on first person valid computations obeys a quantum logic.

Not necessarily! It only shows FPI. There are many "quantum logics". Which one are you considering? I would like to see how you obtain the general non-commutativity of observable operators from AR.

  It has always seemed to me that you assume that physics is classical and this has always bothered me, given that we have very good evidence that our common universe IS NOT Classical.

 

In fact comp gives a criteria to distinguish geography (which depends on many indexicals) and physics, which appears to be indexical independent. Physics is even independent of the choice of the base of the phi_i.

How? What does it depend on? Maybe I do not know your definition of "physics"...

 

There is no "real" (ontic) physical reality, but still a *unique* (yet relative, conditional)  measure on consistent enumerable extensions on all computations (going through your current states).

I agree with this.

 

(Unless comp is false or that we are manipulated through a normal simulation).
Physics is transformed into the study of a lawful precise arithmetical phenomenon of a type "first person plural experience".

Not unless we are only considering a solipsistic observer! To obtain physics we need some means to define interactions and communications between multiple separable observers. This is a Bodies (plural) problem. Each observer can be shown to have FPI by your argument, but that is about it. Everything else requires more assumptions, like maybe some kind of ASSA.

 

You have to understand all this by yourself. Reread with attention and concentration all UDA steps, as they are all used at once in the step seven.

Step seven can be confusing to even the highly attentive and intelligent among us.

Bruno

2014/1/9, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be>:

2014/1/9, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be>:

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[Stephen Paul King]

Dear Edgar,

  I cannot find that post that you reference. COuld you forward to to me privately?

[Stephen Paul King]

Dear Edgar,

  Check out this article by S. Wolfram:

http://www.stephenwolfram.com/publications/academic/undecidability-intractability-theoretical-physics.pdf

[Edgar L. Owen]

Stephen,

I have some familiarity with Wolframs CA, I played with them myself many years ago, but don't find much that applies to the present discussion, or that sheds much light on reality IMHO...

Edgar

[Stephen Paul King]

Dear Edgar,

   The article has nothing to do with Cellular automata. It has to do with computational aspects of physical systems. You might find it informative.

[LizR]

On 10 January 2014 03:04, Stephen Paul King <Step...@provensecure.com> wrote:

Dear Edgar,

On Thu, Jan 9, 2014 at 8:18 AM, Edgar L. Owen <edga...@att.net> wrote:

Stephen,

I define 'Reality' in my book on the subject very simply as everything that exists.

I denote "everything that exist" as 'the Total Universe' or simply "Existence". The key is that such is independent of any contingency or property. Some have argued that existence = necessary possibility, a definition which I find most useful.

That works for me, the only things that are necessarily possible appear to be the rules of logic and arithmetic.

[LizR]

On 10 January 2014 06:50, Stephen Paul King <Step...@provensecure.com> wrote:

Dear Bruno,

I have to agree with Alberto on this point.

On Thu, Jan 9, 2014 at 12:34 PM, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

On 09 Jan 2014, at 16:30, Alberto G. Corona wrote:

But the UD argument predict that all the possible universes with all
possible laws will be produced.

Where?

AR does not restrict the types of physical laws of universes that it can represent, so barring a separate mechanism I cannot see how Alberto's claim is false!

I too made this claim recently. I assumed that an infinity of computations producing all possible experiences would include experiences of different physical laws (e.g. the speed of light 1 km/hr faster). Why wouldn't it? Does comp uniquely determine c?

 

[Bruno Marchal]

On 09 Jan 2014, at 18:50, Stephen Paul King wrote:

Dear Bruno,

I have to agree with Alberto on this point.

Alberto was only missing step seven. You can comment my answer to Alberto. 

On Thu, Jan 9, 2014 at 12:34 PM, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

On 09 Jan 2014, at 16:30, Alberto G. Corona wrote:

But the UD argument predict that all the possible universes with all
possible laws will be produced.

Where?

AR does not restrict the types of physical laws of universes that it can represent, so barring a separate mechanism I cannot see how Alberto's claim is false!

See my answer to Alberto, or reread the UDA.

What is what makes our physical laws
"unique determined" by COMP?'

That happens already at the step seven.

Could you be more specific as to how?

 

I assume there that you, here and now, live in a physical universe which run a universal dovetailer, without ever stopping.

Assuming comp, how do you predict "exactly", after step six,  the experience of dropping a pen in the air?
What is the probability that you will see falling on the ground?

I think that Alberto is considering the character of physical laws, not probability distributions of particular processes that obey such laws.

It is computation. that are not physical processes at all.

To avoid the consequence that physics is uniquely defined in arithmetic for all universal machine, you need to reify matter and mind with non computable attributes.

 

You believe (because you assume comp and agreed up to step 6) that your next immediate future first person state is determined by the FPI on all the emulations of your actual states appearing in the UD* (the complete execution of the UD). This involves infinitely many computations (that should be an easy exercise in computer science: all functions are implemented by infinitely many programs).
To compute the exact probability of the event "the "pen fall on the ground", you must seek the ratio or proportion of all computation going through your states where you see the pen falling on the grounds, among all computations going through your states.

How can we generate probability distributions unless there is an unambiguous measure on the space of possible universes that can obtain from the infinitely many computations?

Exactly! probabilities exists only if there is a non ambiguous measure. So if comp is true, and if this does not make the moon evaporating, it means the measure exists.

I also give the math of the "measure one". The logic of the "certainty case", and it is a quantum logic.

 

Computations is an arithmetical notion, and your actual state is given by a relative number, encode locally by the doctor. The entire UD is itself definable in arithmetic. So, in that step seven, if comp is correct or believed by a rational agent, the rational agent had to believe that physics, all physical predictions, is reduced to one "simple law": basically a measure on the relative computations. Physics has been reduced, in principle (of course) to a statistical sum on all first person valid relative computations.

It has always been my claim that the Doctor can only exist within some subset of universes that have persistence of matter.

Then you can deduce from the UDA that comp is incompatible with your theory. 

This would exclude, for example, universes that do not contain matter or do not persist for more than an instant. AFAIK, nothing in AR acts to partition up the universes into those that contain Doctors and those that do not.

Define "universe" in the comp theory.

 

Below our substitution level, physics is not given by "one computation" (or one universal numbers). Physics is given by an infinity made of almost all computations. It involves a competition among all universal numbers. "Almost all" means all those validating your first person experience.

Yes, but not just one "physics"! The level of substitution is itself induced by and emergent from physical laws,

Reread step seven.

thus cannot be assumed prior to the mechanism that selects for particular physical laws.

You are assuming a physical primitive universe. I do not. I am agnostic on this. But don't add an assumption in a reasoning, that is terribly confusing.

If you understand the reasoning, and still assume a physical primitive universe, then comp is non valid in your theory. You have to say no to the digitalist doctor. 

 

Then the math shows that the case of "probability one", for that statistics on first person valid computations obeys a quantum logic.

Not necessarily! It only shows FPI.

?

There are many "quantum logics". Which one are you considering?

The one isolated in the UDA and AUDA. I get three of them, actually.

I would like to see how you obtain the general non-commutativity of observable operators from AR.

  It has always seemed to me that you assume that physics is classical and this has always bothered me, given that we have very good evidence that our common universe IS NOT Classical.

I have never assumed physics to be classical. You should read the text. On the contrary I show how much comp makes the physical reality quantum like, both in UDA and in arithmetic (AUDA).

 

In fact comp gives a criteria to distinguish geography (which depends on many indexicals) and physics, which appears to be indexical independent. Physics is even independent of the choice of the base of the phi_i.

How? What does it depend on? Maybe I do not know your definition of "physics"...

The science of justifying the sharable events in our neighborhood, or the science of the "3p" measurable number predictions (which actually will appear to be 1p plural only).

 

There is no "real" (ontic) physical reality, but still a *unique* (yet relative, conditional)  measure on consistent enumerable extensions on all computations (going through your current states).

I agree with this.

Then physics is unique. Physics is what makes the pen dropped in the air falling on the ground. That is reduced into an arithmetical problem, by comp.

 

(Unless comp is false or that we are manipulated through a normal simulation).
Physics is transformed into the study of a lawful precise arithmetical phenomenon of a type "first person plural experience".

Not unless we are only considering a solipsistic observer!

Not at all. We don't know that. Everett confirms comp + non solipsism.

To obtain physics we need some means to define interactions and communications between multiple separable observers.

Then you are doing just physics, and completely miss the comp explanation of the origin of physics and consciousness. You might need to (re)study the UDA.

This is a Bodies (plural) problem.

And comp translated that very problem into a measure problem on all computations. That is what makes comp interesting: it translates that body problem in a problem in arithmetic.

Each observer can be shown to have FPI by your argument, but that is about it. Everything else requires more assumptions, like maybe some kind of ASSA.

 

You have to understand all this by yourself. Reread with attention and concentration all UDA steps, as they are all used at once in the step seven.

Step seven can be confusing to even the highly attentive and intelligent among us.

Just say what you don't understand. As I said, step seven used the fact that you are familiar with the 1p/3p distinction and with the six preceding steps. 

You don't need to believe in comp to understand the reasoning.

Bruno

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[Alberto G. Corona]

Bruno:
Sorry but I do not understood point seven when I read it and I do not
understand you now.

I understand Solomonoff theorem about inductive inference that involve
infinite computations and probabilities, but Solomonoff has a
selection criteria : the algoritmic complexity theorem uses the
algorithmic complexity as the weight or probability of each
computation and it has a clear formula for the probability of the
"next step" in a sequence, that is, to make an induction by means of
"competing" computations.

The metaphisics of solomonoff say something like: "the world is
governed by laws as simple as possible compatible with the phenomena
observed, but we must take into account unobserved phenomena that may
demand more complex algorithms so we apply a decreasing but not null
probability to all computations that predict the known facts"

For a moment I though that yours is a kind of solomonoff inductive
inference translated into a numerical mysticism, as substance of
things instead as a method of induction or discovery of laws. But I do
not see your selection criteria among infinite computations and no
procedure, no formula. And moreover, I do not understand your
metaphysics.

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[Bruno Marchal]

Just consider the FPI on UD*. If comp does not uniquely determine c, we will access to situation where c is different, and c is no more a constant. 

(from my "physicist" intuition about the quantum vacuum and the photon, I think that h and c might be constant).

Where does such constants come from? Well some arithmetical relation can depend on them for getting the right measure. We are of course a long way to solve this, to say the least. My point is just that the comp people *have to do* this to figure out the "correct" 1p/3p relationship and target better the mind-body problem. By using the self-referential G/G* distinction, we can handle the many different sort of person points of view, both on the rationally justifiable and the true but non rationally justifiable.

Bruno

 

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[Stephen Paul King]

Dear LizR,

  There is an interdependency that should not be ignored between the objects that express the quantities and relations that are represented by the logic and arithmetic. A universe that does not contain any persistent entities would not be capable of expressing numbers or statements. See what I mean?

  By Necessary Possibility I am denoting the underlying (ontological) potential for objects to interact and perform actions and for representations to "be about" those objects, existence itself is featureless and without any particular property. It is purely "isness". 

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[meekerdb]

I think the question is whether comp determines that the world is (locally) Lorentz invariant.  If it is, then c is just a unit conversion factor between the + and - signature terms.  It's value is arbitrary, like "how many feet in a mile", which is why it is now an exact number in SI units.

Brent

[LizR]

On 10 January 2014 10:33, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:

I think the question is whether comp determines that the world is (locally) Lorentz invariant.  If it is, then c is just a unit conversion factor between the + and - signature terms.  It's value is arbitrary, like "how many feet in a mile", which is why it is now an exact number in SI units.

Oh yes, I seem to remember that physicists like to set c (and h?) to 1.

So does comp predict that any TOE will have a unique solution - namely the one we experience? So is this an alternative to the WAP - we experience a universe compatible with our existence because such a universe has to drop out of the interations of conscious beings in Platonia?

[Stephen Paul King]

Dear Bruno,

  My worry is that you continue to attribute the properties of change to what which is by definition static, eternal and changeless. How does Becoming emerge from Being? I avoid this problem altogether by pointing out that Being can be easily shown to emerge from Becoming: it is the automorphisms, invariances and fixed points.

more comments below.

On Thu, Jan 9, 2014 at 2:04 PM, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

On 09 Jan 2014, at 18:50, Stephen Paul King wrote:

Dear Bruno,

I have to agree with Alberto on this point.

Alberto was only missing step seven. You can comment my answer to Alberto. 

On Thu, Jan 9, 2014 at 12:34 PM, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

On 09 Jan 2014, at 16:30, Alberto G. Corona wrote:

But the UD argument predict that all the possible universes with all
possible laws will be produced.

Where?

AR does not restrict the types of physical laws of universes that it can represent, so barring a separate mechanism I cannot see how Alberto's claim is false!

See my answer to Alberto, or reread the UDA.

What is what makes our physical laws
"unique determined" by COMP?'

That happens already at the step seven.

Could you be more specific as to how?

 

I assume there that you, here and now, live in a physical universe which run a universal dovetailer, without ever stopping.

Assuming comp, how do you predict "exactly", after step six,  the experience of dropping a pen in the air?
What is the probability that you will see falling on the ground?

I think that Alberto is considering the character of physical laws, not probability distributions of particular processes that obey such laws.

It is computation. that are not physical processes at all.

To avoid the consequence that physics is uniquely defined in arithmetic for all universal machine, you need to reify matter and mind with non computable attributes.

You have never addressed exactly how this "uniqueness" of definition obtains as there is no mechanism for explaining interactions other than the "Yes, Doctor". I have repeatedly pointed out that the Doctor and the ability to Bet on the Doctor's success (or failure) only obtains after some form of physical world is available.

  Absent a physical world there is no Doctor. An entity that is emergent can do no work prior to its emergence.

 

You believe (because you assume comp and agreed up to step 6) that your next immediate future first person state is determined by the FPI on all the emulations of your actual states appearing in the UD* (the complete execution of the UD). This involves infinitely many computations (that should be an easy exercise in computer science: all functions are implemented by infinitely many programs).
To compute the exact probability of the event "the "pen fall on the ground", you must seek the ratio or proportion of all computation going through your states where you see the pen falling on the grounds, among all computations going through your states.

How can we generate probability distributions unless there is an unambiguous measure on the space of possible universes that can obtain from the infinitely many computations?

Exactly! probabilities exists only if there is a non ambiguous measure. So if comp is true, and if this does not make the moon evaporating, it means the measure exists.

One could replace "comp" with "Almighty Pink Unicorn" and make the same argument.

I also give the math of the "measure one". The logic of the "certainty case", and it is a quantum logic.

Math is measure one only after the fact that we can have thoughts of it. Arguing that it is prior to our math loving minds is a doctrine of faith without any hope of falsifiability.

 

 

Computations is an arithmetical notion, and your actual state is given by a relative number, encode locally by the doctor. The entire UD is itself definable in arithmetic. So, in that step seven, if comp is correct or believed by a rational agent, the rational agent had to believe that physics, all physical predictions, is reduced to one "simple law": basically a measure on the relative computations. Physics has been reduced, in principle (of course) to a statistical sum on all first person valid relative computations.

It has always been my claim that the Doctor can only exist within some subset of universes that have persistence of matter.

Then you can deduce from the UDA that comp is incompatible with your theory. 

No! The only difference between my thinking and your, ultimately, is how far we push the banishment of "concreteness" of a physical world. My claim is that you go too far in banishing it completely and thus you have a arithmetic body problem. I do not claim that the physical is ontologically primitive, it is emergent in a sense from the interactions between observers. (Observers being defined by your method.)

This would exclude, for example, universes that do not contain matter or do not persist for more than an instant. AFAIK, nothing in AR acts to partition up the universes into those that contain Doctors and those that do not.

Define "universe" in the comp theory.

AFAIK, there is no definition of a universe in the comp theory other than a weak argument that all universes are represented in the existence of the Integers.

 

Below our substitution level, physics is not given by "one computation" (or one universal numbers). Physics is given by an infinity made of almost all computations. It involves a competition among all universal numbers. "Almost all" means all those validating your first person experience.

Yes, but not just one "physics"! The level of substitution is itself induced by and emergent from physical laws,

Reread step seven.

thus cannot be assumed prior to the mechanism that selects for particular physical laws.

You are assuming a physical primitive universe. I do not. I am agnostic on this. But don't add an assumption in a reasoning, that is terribly confusing.

 Wrong! Why do you keep making this claim? I have claimed that that which is ontologically primitive cannot be either physical nor logical. It must be property neutral. I have discussed how the Stone duality allows us to argue that both the material physical world and the logical mathematical world co-emerge from that neutral foundation such that self-reference is a natural property that does not need a magical source.

If you understand the reasoning, and still assume a physical primitive universe, then comp is non valid in your theory. You have to say no to the digitalist doctor. 

You simply do not read and think about what I write. How is it possible for me to "assume a physical primitive universe" and claim that that which is ontologically primitive can have no particular properties at all and be consistent? Note the "and" word in that sentence...

 

Then the math shows that the case of "probability one", for that statistics on first person valid computations obeys a quantum logic.

Not necessarily! It only shows FPI.

?

There are many "quantum logics". Which one are you considering?

The one isolated in the UDA and AUDA. I get three of them, actually.

I would like to see how you obtain the general non-commutativity of observable operators from AR.

  It has always seemed to me that you assume that physics is classical and this has always bothered me, given that we have very good evidence that our common universe IS NOT Classical.

I have never assumed physics to be classical. You should read the text. On the contrary I show how much comp makes the physical reality quantum like, both in UDA and in arithmetic (AUDA).

The teleportation argument that you use is impossible by the rules of QM, which has a no-cloning theorem. Without cloning your FPI argument cannot be made, thus you are assuming that all properties of an object can be scanned, stored (the delay mechanism) and reproduced faithfully. This is only possible in a Newtonian/Laplacean type universe, thus you assume classical physics.

QED

 

In fact comp gives a criteria to distinguish geography (which depends on many indexicals) and physics, which appears to be indexical independent. Physics is even independent of the choice of the base of the phi_i.

How? What does it depend on? Maybe I do not know your definition of "physics"...

The science of justifying the sharable events in our neighborhood, or the science of the "3p" measurable number predictions (which actually will appear to be 1p plural only).

I do not comprehend your use of the word "science" here. Maybe you consider anything that can be described using a formal symbolic language to be "science". OK... I use Bacon's definitions... observe phenomena, form a quantitative hypothesis explaining the phenomena, test the hypothesis, reject hypothesis if falsified by data, repeat process.

 

There is no "real" (ontic) physical reality, but still a *unique* (yet relative, conditional)  measure on consistent enumerable extensions on all computations (going through your current states).

I agree with this.

Then physics is unique. Physics is what makes the pen dropped in the air falling on the ground. That is reduced into an arithmetical problem, by comp.

Umm, I would start with explaining Thermodynamics.

 

(Unless comp is false or that we are manipulated through a normal simulation).
Physics is transformed into the study of a lawful precise arithmetical phenomenon of a type "first person plural experience".

Not unless we are only considering a solipsistic observer!

Not at all. We don't know that. Everett confirms comp + non solipsism.

No, Everett assumes non-solipsism via a plurality of observers and the ability to record currently measured data and compare it to future data. Everett assumes time.

To obtain physics we need some means to define interactions and communications between multiple separable observers.

Then you are doing just physics, and completely miss the comp explanation of the origin of physics and consciousness. You might need to (re)study the UDA.

I have other work to do.

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[Stephen Paul King]

Dear Brent,

  Kevin Knuth has been able to show how local Lorentz invariance emerges from relations between multiple observers! See his talk here http://pirsa.org/10050054/ (all the way to the end). The Q&A portion is amazing!

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[Stephen Paul King]

Dear LizR,

  That is the key question that remains, IMHO, unanswered.

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[LizR]

On 10 January 2014 06:50, Stephen Paul King <Step...@provensecure.com> wrote:

 

(Unless comp is false or that we are manipulated through a normal simulation).
Physics is transformed into the study of a lawful precise arithmetical phenomenon of a type "first person plural experience".

Not unless we are only considering a solipsistic observer! To obtain physics we need some means to define interactions and communications between multiple separable observers. This is a Bodies (plural) problem. Each observer can be shown to have FPI by your argument, but that is about it. Everything else requires more assumptions, like maybe some kind of ASSA.

I also agree with Stephen here. Comp does seem to imply solipsism, I think we've discussed  this before but I don't recall the answer - is it an open problem?

[Edgar L. Owen]

Stephen,

You are correct here. Something has to move to compute anything. What moves is what I call happening, which is a basic aspect of reality. At the risk of drawing criticisms again, happening is the present moment in which all of reality exists. Present moment time effectively provides the processor cycles that drive the computations of all information forms in the computational universe. Part of what is then computed is clock time according to the well known relativistic rules.

This is how my theory solves this problem with Bruno's (and other's) comp which you correctly point out.

Edgar

Bruno

2014/1/9, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be>:

2014/1/9, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be>:

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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[Stephen Paul King]

Dear Edgar,

  Qualitatively I can agree with your ideas here. I am trying for a model that we can obtain predictions from one way or another. As I see things, a "present moment" is a "moment of becoming" having both physical system and logical representational aspects. I cannot see a way to have a single "present moment" that is singular and absolute. There cannot be a single observer that can take in all events and construct a single unambiguous narrative from them. To do so would require violating the general non-commutativity of observables (like position and momentum) from which the heisenberg uncertainty principle flows and the diffeomorphism invariance of GR. It is best to abandon all hope on that concept and go with a strictly local concept of the present moment.

  There has to be a finite upper bound on the information content (distinctions that make a difference) of a present moment and we can connect these to computational ideas. 

  My own thinking about clocks and time is guided, mostly, by the work of Prof. Hitoshi Kitada. His theory of Local Time solves the problem of time for both GR and QM by showing how they are related in an observer independent way.

[Edgar L. Owen]

Stephen,

There is no "single observer that can take in all events...". I never said that and don't believe it.

However there has to be a single universal processor cycling for a computational universe to work. That single universal processor cycle is the present moment P-time. All computations occur simultaneously as these cycles occur. All individual observers, clock times etc. occur and are computed within this actual extant presence of the computational space of reality.

Edgar

[Edgar L. Owen]

Stephen,

PS: Because a computational universe computes all the observer dependent clock time frames of individual observers, that computational universe must stand outside individual observers and their clock times which are all computed within it. Thus there must be a common universal present moment outside of and independent of clock times and observers in which all those computations take place at the same time (in the same present moment, obviously not the same clock times which are being computed). That's the only way the twins can have different computed clock times in the same present moment, because that's where the computations are taking place...

Edgar

[Edgar L. Owen]

Stephen,

PPS: A computational universe, IF it computes clock times which it must, absolutely requires something besides clock time to be moving to provide the processor cycles for those computations to occur within. That something is a universal (extending across all of computational space) present moment time.

It simply has to exist for comp to work....

Edgar

[LizR]

On 10 January 2014 14:01, Edgar L. Owen <edga...@att.net> wrote:

Stephen,

There is no "single observer that can take in all events...". I never said that and don't believe it.

However there has to be a single universal processor cycling for a computational universe to work. That single universal processor cycle is the present moment P-time. All computations occur simultaneously as these cycles occur. All individual observers, clock times etc. occur and are computed within this actual extant presence of the computational space of reality.

There has to be a single processor computing the state of the universe?!

I know that's possible in principle, what with the C-T thesis and all that, but it's a bit of a limitation to put on your ideas. (Or maybe it has 10^80 cores? :-)

[Edgar L. Owen]

Liz,

No, there is not a single universal processor, there is a single processor CYCLE. All information states are effectively their own processors, so the computational universe consists of myriads of processors, as many as there are information states (more or less). But all these myriads of processors all cycle their computations together in the same present moment, i.e. in the SAME computational space.

Saying there is a universal present moment is effectively the same as saying there is a single computational space in which all the computations of the universe occur.

If all computations occur in a single universal computational space there has to be a single universal present moment in that computational space that provides the happening for those computations to occur.

Edgar

[Stephen Paul King]

Dear Edgar,

  What you describe sounds very much like Bruno's UD, just clothed in different descriptive language. My problem with it is that in the re requirement that it "computes all the observer dependent clock time frames of individual observers" its ability to be considered as a reference for a "common universal present moment" vanishes and becomes a non-quantity. Such a quantity cannot exist, if self-non-contradiction is necessary. Let me explain in more detail!

   Let us stipulate that there exist a countable (at least!) infinity of observers (one per inertial rest frame that has different content from another) and that each of these observers has its very own "present moment". Is there a transformation that would take the content of any one and transform it into that of any other? There must be in order for the concept of a "common universal present moment outside of and independent of clock times and observers in which all those computations take place at the same time". Can you see how and why that is?

  Now, for this transformation to exist, what parameter has to change in the individual observer's computations? I submit that it is the length of the duration of the "present moment". The duration between tick and tock has to disappear, making time disappear as a parameter, for what is time if the duration vanishes? At best it is only an ordering of events, and nothing more.

  OK, now that the duration aspect of time is required to vanish and all that it left is the ordering of events, what is it that determines what order the event occur in? There isn't anything unless one can somehow use the natural ordering of the integers - the fact that 1 is less than 2 and 2 is less than 3, etc.- to in some sense "be" the ordering of events.

   What does the a string of naturally ordered numbers compute?

  

[Stephen Paul King]

Dear LizR,

  Exactly. That requirement of a single computer is deeply troublesome for me.

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[Stephen Paul King]

Dear Edgar,

  The integers can be considered as a computation of clock times. Take a number, add one, repeat. ...

[Edgar L. Owen]

Stephen,

There is NO such requirement. See my response to Liz..

Edgar

On Thursday, January 9, 2014 8:45:40 PM UTC-5, Stephen Paul King wrote:

Dear LizR,

  Exactly. That requirement of a single computer is deeply troublesome for me.

On Thu, Jan 9, 2014 at 8:16 PM, LizR <liz...@gmail.com> wrote:

On 10 January 2014 14:01, Edgar L. Owen <edga...@att.net> wrote:

Stephen,

There is no "single observer that can take in all events...". I never said that and don't believe it.

However there has to be a single universal processor cycling for a computational universe to work. That single universal processor cycle is the present moment P-time. All computations occur simultaneously as these cycles occur. All individual observers, clock times etc. occur and are computed within this actual extant presence of the computational space of reality.

There has to be a single processor computing the state of the universe?!

I know that's possible in principle, what with the C-T thesis and all that, but it's a bit of a limitation to put on your ideas. (Or maybe it has 10^80 cores? :-)

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[Edgar L. Owen]

Stephen,

That is nonsensical. Integers can represent millions or billions of things so integers don't create clock time. Numbers describe clock time but they are NOT clock time...

Edgar

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[LizR]

What IS clock time?

[meekerdb]

On 1/9/2014 5:15 PM, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
> Stephen,
>
> PPS: A computational universe, IF it computes clock times which it must, absolutely
> requires something besides clock time to be moving to provide the processor cycles for
> those computations to occur within. That something is a universal (extending across all
> of computational space) present moment time.

No it doesn't, c.f. William K. Wooters "Time Replaced by Quantum Correlations" IJTP v223
n8 1984.

>
> It simply has to exist for comp to work....

You suffer from a severe lack of imagination.

Brent

[Edgar L. Owen]

Stephen,

I'll let you judge any correspondence or lack thereof between UD and my theories. I see very little if any and don't think it important.

There is no "countable infinity" of observers because there are no actual infinities because reality is finite. A big difference between human and reality math. Lack of infinities in reality math. Thus your example doesn't apply to actual reality.

And you are making the same old mistake of trying to compute present moment time backwards from various clock times. That doesn't work because you've got the whole process backwards...

Present moment time is PRIOR to all computations, it's the happening aspect of logical reality space in which computations occur. Therefore it has no measure in the sense that clock times do because it is prior to all measure.

Just review what I actually said in the previous several posts about present time and leave it at that and let's not get sidetracked into the previous unproductive present time discussions again.

[Edgar L. Owen]

Liz,

Obviously clock time is the time that clocks measure. What else would it be?

Edgar

[LizR]

Maybe I got confused. I thought you were talking about processor cycle time - the time that is prior to all the various times that occur in the computed reality. The question is, what is that time? (whatever it should be called)

[Edgar L. Owen]

Common Liz, I just spent the last number of posts telling you and Stephen what it is... Don't make me repeat myself...

Edgar

[LizR]

No you spent them telling me what it does. I'd like to know what it is.

[Edgar L. Owen]

Brent,

That seems to assume a prior existence of "quantum correlations" in a non-computational universe. Anyway it's just another unproven speculative theory. Why post it as if it proves something?

Edgar

[Stephen Paul King]

Dear Edgar,

  You wrote: "there is not a single universal processor, there is a single processor CYCLE. All information states are effectively their own processors, so the computational universe consists of myriads of processors, as many as there are information states (more or less). But all these myriads of processors all cycle their computations together in the same present moment, i.e. in the SAME computational space."

  As someone deeply involved in studying distributed computation from the inside and the outside, I have to tell you, there is no difference between "a single computer" and "a myriad of processors that all cycle their computations together". That is a difference that does not make a difference. Unless you take concurrency into account (and it does not seem that you do) there is no distiction between a single processor running "the universe as a computation" or a huge number of processors running in parallel as you describe.

  The problem is that if the distribution of physical processors is wide enough in space and the processors have different associated velocities in their motions, there is no such a thing as a single frame of simultaneity for them all to be said to be "cycling together in the same present moment". Nope.

   Add to that simultaneity problem the problem of resource allocation and one has a real mess! (Forget about the intractability issues...) There seems to be a lot of bad thinking when it comes to what exactly is a computation. Let me try a definition of "computation":

Any transformation of information.

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[Edgar L. Owen]

No Liz, I told you what it IS. It's the happening in computational space that enables computations to take place since something has to move for computations to occur. All it DOES is provide the processor cycle for computations.

You seem to be nit picking...

Edgar

[Edgar L. Owen]

Stephen,

Your error here is assuming the computations take place in a single "wide" physical dimensional space. They don't. They take place in a purely computational space prior to the existence of physical dimensional spacetime. Physical dimensional spacetime is a product of the computations. They don't exist within it. Therefore there is no spacetime separation between computations. They exist in a purely logical space prior to dimensionalization which they compute.

Edgar

On Thursday, January 9, 2014 10:06:33 PM UTC-5, Stephen Paul King wrote:

Dear Edgar,

  You wrote: "there is not a single universal processor, there is a single processor CYCLE. All information states are effectively their own processors, so the computational universe consists of myriads of processors, as many as there are information states (more or less). But all these myriads of processors all cycle their computations together in the same present moment, i.e. in the SAME computational space."

  As someone deeply involved in studying distributed computation from the inside and the outside, I have to tell you, there is no difference between "a single computer" and "a myriad of processors that all cycle their computations together". That is a difference that does not make a difference. Unless you take concurrency into account (and it does not seem that you do) there is no distiction between a single processor running "the universe as a computation" or a huge number of processors running in parallel as you describe.

  The problem is that if the distribution of physical processors is wide enough in space and the processors have different associated velocities in their motions, there is no such a thing as a single frame of simultaneity for them all to be said to be "cycling together in the same present moment". Nope.

   Add to that simultaneity problem the problem of resource allocation and one has a real mess! (Forget about the intractability issues...) There seems to be a lot of bad thinking when it comes to what exactly is a computation. Let me try a definition of "computation":

Any transformation of information.

On Thu, Jan 9, 2014 at 9:28 PM, Edgar L. Owen <edga...@att.net> wrote:

Stephen,

There is NO such requirement. See my response to Liz..

Edgar

On Thursday, January 9, 2014 8:45:40 PM UTC-5, Stephen Paul King wrote:

Dear LizR,

  Exactly. That requirement of a single computer is deeply troublesome for me.

On Thu, Jan 9, 2014 at 8:16 PM, LizR <liz...@gmail.com> wrote:

On 10 January 2014 14:01, Edgar L. Owen <edga...@att.net> wrote:

Stephen,

There is no "single observer that can take in all events...". I never said that and don't believe it.

However there has to be a single universal processor cycling for a computational universe to work. That single universal processor cycle is the present moment P-time. All computations occur simultaneously as these cycles occur. All individual observers, clock times etc. occur and are computed within this actual extant presence of the computational space of reality.

There has to be a single processor computing the state of the universe?!

I know that's possible in principle, what with the C-T thesis and all that, but it's a bit of a limitation to put on your ideas. (Or maybe it has 10^80 cores? :-)

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[meekerdb]

On 1/9/2014 7:07 PM, Edgar L. Owen wrote:

No Liz, I told you what it IS. It's the happening in computational space that enables computations to take place since something has to move for computations to occur. All it DOES is provide the processor cycle for computations.

You seem to be nit picking...

Edgar

On Thursday, January 9, 2014 9:56:19 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote:

No you spent them telling me what it does. I'd like to know what it is.

On 10 January 2014 15:54, Edgar L. Owen <edga...@att.net> wrote:

Common Liz, I just spent the last number of posts telling you and Stephen what it is... Don't make me repeat myself...

I don't know why there is this concern about Edgar's computations.  It's seems very much like Bruno's, except Bruno's Universal computer is running all possible programs (by dovetailing). The time that appears on clocks is a computed ordering relation which is conjugate to the conserved quantity called "energy".

Brent

[Stephen Paul King]

Dear Edgar,

   Could you be more specific about the properties of "computational space"? What are its metrics, its topological properties, its parameters, etc.? 

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[Stephen Paul King]

Dear Brent,

On Thu, Jan 9, 2014 at 11:19 PM, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:

On 1/9/2014 7:07 PM, Edgar L. Owen wrote:

No Liz, I told you what it IS. It's the happening in computational space that enables computations to take place since something has to move for computations to occur. All it DOES is provide the processor cycle for computations.

You seem to be nit picking...

Edgar

On Thursday, January 9, 2014 9:56:19 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote:

No you spent them telling me what it does. I'd like to know what it is.

On 10 January 2014 15:54, Edgar L. Owen <edga...@att.net> wrote:

Common Liz, I just spent the last number of posts telling you and Stephen what it is... Don't make me repeat myself...

I don't know why there is this concern about Edgar's computations.  It's seems very much like Bruno's, except Bruno's Universal computer is running all possible programs (by dovetailing).

AFAIK, I agree. I see little difference except for semantics.

 

The time that appears on clocks is a computed ordering relation which is conjugate to the conserved quantity called "energy".

I don't know how time (the flow of event to event) or its conjugate emerges from either Bruno or Edgar's proposed theories. Both seem to assume a timeless and static domain from which everything, literally, emerges. I would like to better understand the mechanism of the emergence.

 

Brent

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[LizR]

On 10 January 2014 16:07, Edgar L. Owen <edga...@att.net> wrote:

No Liz, I told you what it IS. It's the happening in computational space that enables computations to take place since something has to move for computations to occur. All it DOES is provide the processor cycle for computations.

You seem to be nit picking...

No, I'm interested in examining your theory more closely. A "happening in computational space" is not a concept I'm familiar with. Can you express that in mathematical language, perhaps? To give you an example, in special relativity, space-time is a four dimensional manifold with various properties. What is your universal present moment?

PS If  you intend to practice science, you'd better get used to nit-picking.

[LizR]

Bruno's dovetailer is supposedly running (if that's the word) in an abstract space, while Edgar's processor units are, as far as one can tell, intended to be in some sense physical. It's clear what Bruno's ontology is based on, he makes it explicit in his axioms. It isn't clear what Edgar's ontology is based on - he seems to be assuming that time and some form of computation are fundamental properties of the universe, but not what those computers are running on (by Turing equivalence, I assume they COULD be running on a desktop PC in some other universe) or what his "universal present moment" consists of - is it a linear dimensio, say? But then it appears to be quantised, since it only supports discrete computational steps. Can time be quantised? What are the implications? Do things like the Landauer limit come into his theory?

The concern is, I suspect, due to...

a) a lack of rigour, either logical or mathematical, in describing the theory

b) a lack of testable results, or indications of how one gets from the theory to the observed reality

c) a bad attitude

[meekerdb]

On 1/9/2014 8:26 PM, Stephen Paul King wrote:

Dear Brent,

On Thu, Jan 9, 2014 at 11:19 PM, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:

On 1/9/2014 7:07 PM, Edgar L. Owen wrote:

No Liz, I told you what it IS. It's the happening in computational space that enables computations to take place since something has to move for computations to occur. All it DOES is provide the processor cycle for computations.

You seem to be nit picking...

Edgar

On Thursday, January 9, 2014 9:56:19 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote:

No you spent them telling me what it does. I'd like to know what it is.

On 10 January 2014 15:54, Edgar L. Owen <edga...@att.net> wrote:

Common Liz, I just spent the last number of posts telling you and Stephen what it is... Don't make me repeat myself...

I don't know why there is this concern about Edgar's computations.� It's seems very much like Bruno's, except Bruno's Universal computer is running all possible programs (by dovetailing).

AFAIK, I agree. I see little difference except for semantics.

�

The time that appears on clocks is a computed ordering relation which is conjugate to the conserved quantity called "energy".

I don't know how time (the flow of event to event) or its conjugate emerges from either Bruno or Edgar's proposed theories. Both seem to assume a timeless and static domain from which everything, literally, emerges. I would like to better understand the mechanism of the emergence.

Look up the paper by Wooters that I cited, or the earlier one he wrote with Don Page.� It's not mysterious, it's the same question to be answered in any block universe model.� The talk by Knuth you cited was a nice attempt.� As one of the commenters noted, it's seems questionable to base the structure on causality, but it seems to me that Knuth's assumption of ordering was weaker than physical causality.�

Brent

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[Stephen Paul King]

Dear Brent,

On Fri, Jan 10, 2014 at 12:27 AM, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:

On 1/9/2014 8:26 PM, Stephen Paul King wrote:

Dear Brent,

On Thu, Jan 9, 2014 at 11:19 PM, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:

On 1/9/2014 7:07 PM, Edgar L. Owen wrote:

No Liz, I told you what it IS. It's the happening in computational space that enables computations to take place since something has to move for computations to occur. All it DOES is provide the processor cycle for computations.

You seem to be nit picking...

Edgar

On Thursday, January 9, 2014 9:56:19 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote:

No you spent them telling me what it does. I'd like to know what it is.

On 10 January 2014 15:54, Edgar L. Owen <edga...@att.net> wrote:

Common Liz, I just spent the last number of posts telling you and Stephen what it is... Don't make me repeat myself...

I don't know why there is this concern about Edgar's computations.  It's seems very much like Bruno's, except Bruno's Universal computer is running all possible programs (by dovetailing).

AFAIK, I agree. I see little difference except for semantics.

 

The time that appears on clocks is a computed ordering relation which is conjugate to the conserved quantity called "energy".

I don't know how time (the flow of event to event) or its conjugate emerges from either Bruno or Edgar's proposed theories. Both seem to assume a timeless and static domain from which everything, literally, emerges. I would like to better understand the mechanism of the emergence.

Look up the paper by Wooters that I cited, or the earlier one he wrote with Don Page.  It's not mysterious, it's the same question to be answered in any block universe model. 

I think that I have read it. I have been plowing through papers on that subject for about 10 years now...

 

The talk by Knuth you cited was a nice attempt.  As one of the commenters noted, it's seems questionable to base the structure on causality, but it seems to me that Knuth's assumption of ordering was weaker than physical causality. 

Right, it is not based on causality, just ordering like 1 < 2 but for values that are not strictly numbers. The most basic idea involved in any interaction... It is the associativity property that generates the neat stuff. :-)

 

Brent

 

Brent

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[Bruno Marchal]

On 09 Jan 2014, at 22:32, Stephen Paul King wrote:

Dear LizR,

  There is an interdependency that should not be ignored between the objects that express the quantities and relations that are represented by the logic and arithmetic. A universe that does not contain any persistent entities would not be capable of expressing numbers or statements.

Yes. But arithmetic contains many relatively persistent beings.

See what I mean?

  By Necessary Possibility

In which modal logic?

I am denoting the underlying (ontological) potential for objects to interact and perform actions and for representations to "be about" those objects, existence itself is featureless and without any particular property. It is purely "isness". 

In whch theory?

Bruno

On Thu, Jan 9, 2014 at 1:55 PM, LizR <liz...@gmail.com> wrote:

On 10 January 2014 03:04, Stephen Paul King <Step...@provensecure.com> wrote:

Dear Edgar,

On Thu, Jan 9, 2014 at 8:18 AM, Edgar L. Owen <edga...@att.net> wrote:

Stephen,

I define 'Reality' in my book on the subject very simply as everything that exists.

I denote "everything that exist" as 'the Total Universe' or simply "Existence". The key is that such is independent of any contingency or property. Some have argued that existence = necessary possibility, a definition which I find most useful.

That works for me, the only things that are necessarily possible appear to be the rules of logic and arithmetic.

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[Bruno Marchal]

On 09 Jan 2014, at 22:45, LizR wrote:

On 10 January 2014 10:33, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:

I think the question is whether comp determines that the world is (locally) Lorentz invariant.  If it is, then c is just a unit conversion factor between the + and - signature terms.  It's value is arbitrary, like "how many feet in a mile", which is why it is now an exact number in SI units.

Oh yes, I seem to remember that physicists like to set c (and h?) to 1.

So does comp predict that any TOE will have a unique solution - namely the one we experience? So is this an alternative to the WAP - we experience a universe compatible with our existence because such a universe has to drop out of the interations of conscious beings in Platonia?

It is not the same. WAP use a form of ASSA, where comp uses only RSSA. (Absolute versus Relative self sampling assumptions).

We might revise step seven, as this should be understood from it. Any TOE (that is any first order logical specification of any universal system taken in the ontology) must give rise to the same physics, at least for each pints of view. It gives the same theology, more generally, and physics is defined through it.

We can come back on this. 

Bruno

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[LizR]

On 10 January 2014 21:54, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

On 09 Jan 2014, at 22:45, LizR wrote:

On 10 January 2014 10:33, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:

I think the question is whether comp determines that the world is (locally) Lorentz invariant.  If it is, then c is just a unit conversion factor between the + and - signature terms.  It's value is arbitrary, like "how many feet in a mile", which is why it is now an exact number in SI units.

Oh yes, I seem to remember that physicists like to set c (and h?) to 1.

So does comp predict that any TOE will have a unique solution - namely the one we experience? So is this an alternative to the WAP - we experience a universe compatible with our existence because such a universe has to drop out of the interations of conscious beings in Platonia?

It is not the same. WAP use a form of ASSA, where comp uses only RSSA. (Absolute versus Relative self sampling assumptions).

Ah, I don't quite understand that but I feel like a dim light migvht have appeared.

 

We might revise step seven, as this should be understood from it. Any TOE (that is any first order logical specification of any universal system taken in the ontology) must give rise to the same physics, at least for each pints of view. It gives the same theology, more generally, and physics is defined through it.

Remind me, which is step 7?

We can come back on this. 

Yes please. This is very interesting!

[Bruno Marchal]

On 09 Jan 2014, at 22:57, Stephen Paul King wrote:

Dear Bruno,

  My worry is that you continue to attribute the properties of change to what which is by definition static, eternal and changeless.

That's a worry about "block-reality" notion. The explanation for comp is not different than the explanation from special relativity. Time is an inside relative view. 

How does Becoming emerge from Being?

The being emulate, in the computer science mathematical sense, all becomings, which interfere statistically.

I avoid this problem altogether by pointing out that Being can be easily shown to emerge from Becoming:

But how do you define becoming, and in which theory?

As long as you don't put the cards on the table, you will remain too much fuzzy to be able to express the non understanding, and that makes you close to "bad philosophy" I'm afraid.

Bruno

Bruno

2014/1/9, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be>:

2014/1/9, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be>:

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[Bruno Marchal]

On 09 Jan 2014, at 23:00, Stephen Paul King wrote:

Dear LizR,

  That is the key question that remains, IMHO, unanswered.

It is answered, completely.

On Thu, Jan 9, 2014 at 4:45 PM, LizR <liz...@gmail.com> wrote:

On 10 January 2014 10:33, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:

I think the question is whether comp determines that the world is (locally) Lorentz invariant.  If it is, then c is just a unit conversion factor between the + and - signature terms.  It's value is arbitrary, like "how many feet in a mile", which is why it is now an exact number in SI units.

Oh yes, I seem to remember that physicists like to set c (and h?) to 1.

So does comp predict that any TOE will have a unique solution - namely the one we experience?

Only from what we have just experienced before. Comp does not predict the existence of the moon, but should predict the physical laws, that is, what is invariant for all observers/machines. 

So is this an alternative to the WAP - we experience a universe compatible with our existence because such a universe has to drop out of the interations of conscious beings in Platonia?

As I said, comp uses only a conditional probability, not a bayesian relation, which can still be used for geography and history. But the physical laws are defined by the general measure on the computation, which must exist with comp, and is given by the material points of view (Bp & Dt, mainly).

Bruno

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[LizR]

This is a fascinating but difficult subject - is being or becoming more mysterious? In a way becoming is stranger than positing something that is merely eternally there, perhaps from logical necessity. It's hard for us as time-bound beings to imagine a block universe - or multiverse - although reading "By his bootstraps" by Robert Heinlein may help! He clearly "got" the block universe concept, as was shown in his first published story "Lifeline" as well as the wonderful (and slightly disturbing) "All you zombies" - written in one day in 1958, iirc.

[Bruno Marchal]

On 09 Jan 2014, at 23:34, LizR wrote:

On 10 January 2014 06:50, Stephen Paul King <Step...@provensecure.com> wrote:

(Unless comp is false or that we are manipulated through a normal simulation).
Physics is transformed into the study of a lawful precise arithmetical phenomenon of a type "first person plural experience".

Not unless we are only considering a solipsistic observer! To obtain physics we need some means to define interactions and communications between multiple separable observers. This is a Bodies (plural) problem. Each observer can be shown to have FPI by your argument, but that is about it. Everything else requires more assumptions, like maybe some kind of ASSA.

I also agree with Stephen here. Comp does seem to imply solipsism, I think we've discussed  this before but I don't recall the answer - is it an open problem?

Normally, the Bp & Dt should evacuate individual solipsism. If the physics appears in Bp & Dt & p, we would get a first person plural solipsism. Comp is not solipsist per se, because arithmetic emulates all relations between all universal numbers, but the definite responses will depends on the physics that we derive from arithmetic, and so it is partially an open problem. We cannot exclude totally all form of solipsism, but what is usually called "doctrinal solipsism" is avoided by the realist stance on machines evolution in arithmetic, and by the fact that Bp & p (the intuionist first person attached to a machine) is NOT the criteria of what is real for the machine (which is in both Bp and p, but not in Bp & p).

Bruno

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[Bruno Marchal]

On 10 Jan 2014, at 02:16, LizR wrote:

On 10 January 2014 14:01, Edgar L. Owen <edga...@att.net> wrote:

Stephen,

There is no "single observer that can take in all events...". I never said that and don't believe it.

However there has to be a single universal processor cycling for a computational universe to work. That single universal processor cycle is the present moment P-time. All computations occur simultaneously as these cycles occur. All individual observers, clock times etc. occur and are computed within this actual extant presence of the computational space of reality.

There has to be a single processor computing the state of the universe?!

I know that's possible in principle, what with the C-T thesis and all that,

I don't think that there can be a single or multiple processor computing "the state of the universe". In fact there is no such universe. The universe is an appearance emerging, from below the substitution level, on all computations going through our current state. A single computation can hardly do that a priori, although this is not excluded, but this would lead to a newtonian-like type of reality. Everett confirms that such a computation cannot be unique, which is the default stance in the comp theory, although we cannot avoid at this stage some possible conspiracy by numbers leading to a unique computable reality.

Bruno 

but it's a bit of a limitation to put on your ideas. (Or maybe it has 10^80 cores? :-)

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[Bruno Marchal]

On 10 Jan 2014, at 02:31, Edgar L. Owen wrote:

Liz,

No, there is not a single universal processor, there is a single processor CYCLE. All information states are effectively their own processors, so the computational universe consists of myriads of processors, as many as there are information states (more or less). But all these myriads of processors all cycle their computations together in the same present moment, i.e. in the SAME computational space.

What is it? 

Saying there is a universal present moment is effectively the same as saying there is a single computational space in which all the computations of the universe occur.

Yes, that exists, but out of time and space. that exists in a tiny part of the arithmetical reality.

If all computations occur in a single universal computational space there has to be a single universal present moment in that computational space that provides the happening for those computations to occur.

Occurrence is a relative notion. Something occur to universal numbers x relatively to others universal numbers y.

Bruno

Edgar

On Thursday, January 9, 2014 8:16:03 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote:

On 10 January 2014 14:01, Edgar L. Owen <edga...@att.net> wrote:

Stephen,

There is no "single observer that can take in all events...". I never said that and don't believe it.

However there has to be a single universal processor cycling for a computational universe to work. That single universal processor cycle is the present moment P-time. All computations occur simultaneously as these cycles occur. All individual observers, clock times etc. occur and are computed within this actual extant presence of the computational space of reality.

There has to be a single processor computing the state of the universe?!

I know that's possible in principle, what with the C-T thesis and all that, but it's a bit of a limitation to put on your ideas. (Or maybe it has 10^80 cores? :-)

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[LizR]

On 10 January 2014 22:27, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

I don't think that there can be a single or multiple processor computing "the state of the universe". In fact there is no such universe. The universe is an appearance emerging, from below the substitution level, on all computations going through our current state. A single computation can hardly do that a priori, although this is not excluded, but this would lead to a newtonian-like type of reality. Everett confirms that such a computation cannot be unique, which is the default stance in the comp theory, although we cannot avoid at this stage some possible conspiracy by numbers leading to a unique computable reality.

Surely a single computer could run the UD, at least until it wore out?

 

[Bruno Marchal]

On 10 Jan 2014, at 02:44, Stephen Paul King wrote:

Dear Edgar,

  What you describe sounds very much like Bruno's UD, just clothed in different descriptive language. My problem with it is that in the re requirement that it "computes all the observer dependent clock time frames of individual observers" its ability to be considered as a reference for a "common universal present moment" vanishes and becomes a non-quantity. Such a quantity cannot exist, if self-non-contradiction is necessary. Let me explain in more detail!

   Let us stipulate that there exist a countable (at least!) infinity of observers (one per inertial rest frame that has different content from another) and that each of these observers has its very own "present moment". Is there a transformation that would take the content of any one and transform it into that of any other? There must be in order for the concept of a "common universal present moment outside of and independent of clock times and observers in which all those computations take place at the same time". Can you see how and why that is?

  Now, for this transformation to exist, what parameter has to change in the individual observer's computations? I submit that it is the length of the duration of the "present moment". The duration between tick and tock has to disappear, making time disappear as a parameter, for what is time if the duration vanishes? At best it is only an ordering of events, and nothing more.

  OK, now that the duration aspect of time is required to vanish and all that it left is the ordering of events, what is it that determines what order the event occur in? There isn't anything unless one can somehow use the natural ordering of the integers - the fact that 1 is less than 2 and 2 is less than 3, etc.- to in some sense "be" the ordering of events.

   What does the a string of naturally ordered numbers compute?

You forget that "just the ordering" is NOT Turing universal. You need to explicitly assume the addition and multiplication law to get the Turing universality, and all computations. Then all computations are computed.

Bruno

  

On Thu, Jan 9, 2014 at 8:09 PM, Edgar L. Owen <edga...@att.net> wrote:

Stephen,

PS: Because a computational universe computes all the observer dependent clock time frames of individual observers, that computational universe must stand outside individual observers and their clock times which are all computed within it. Thus there must be a common universal present moment outside of and independent of clock times and observers in which all those computations take place at the same time (in the same present moment, obviously not the same clock times which are being computed). That's the only way the twins can have different computed clock times in the same present moment, because that's where the computations are taking place...

Edgar

On Thursday, January 9, 2014 7:34:35 PM UTC-5, Stephen Paul King wrote:

Dear Edgar,

  Qualitatively I can agree with your ideas here. I am trying for a model that we can obtain predictions from one way or another. As I see things, a "present moment" is a "moment of becoming" having both physical system and logical representational aspects. I cannot see a way to have a single "present moment" that is singular and absolute. There cannot be a single observer that can take in all events and construct a single unambiguous narrative from them. To do so would require violating the general non-commutativity of observables (like position and momentum) from which the heisenberg uncertainty principle flows and the diffeomorphism invariance of GR. It is best to abandon all hope on that concept and go with a strictly local concept of the present moment.

  There has to be a finite upper bound on the information content (distinctions that make a difference) of a present moment and we can connect these to computational ideas. 

  My own thinking about clocks and time is guided, mostly, by the work of Prof. Hitoshi Kitada. His theory of Local Time solves the problem of time for both GR and QM by showing how they are related in an observer independent way.

On Thu, Jan 9, 2014 at 7:06 PM, Edgar L. Owen <edga...@att.net> wrote:

Stephen,

You are correct here. Something has to move to compute anything. What moves is what I call happening, which is a basic aspect of reality. At the risk of drawing criticisms again, happening is the present moment in which all of reality exists. Present moment time effectively provides the processor cycles that drive the computations of all information forms in the computational universe. Part of what is then computed is clock time according to the well known relativistic rules.

This is how my theory solves this problem with Bruno's (and other's) comp which you correctly point out.

Edgar

On Thursday, January 9, 2014 4:57:20 PM UTC-5, Stephen Paul King wrote:

Dear Bruno,

  My worry is that you continue to attribute the properties of change to what which is by definition static, eternal and changeless. How does Becoming emerge from Being? I avoid this problem altogether by pointing out that Being can be easily shown to emerge from Becoming: it is the automorphisms, invariances and fixed points.

more comments below.

 

(Unless comp is false or that we are manipulated through a normal simulation).

Physics is transformed into the study of a lawful precise arithmetical phenomenon of a type "first person plural experience".

Not unless we are only considering a solipsistic observer!

Not at all. We don't know that. Everett confirms comp + non solipsism.

No, Everett assumes non-solipsism via a plurality of observers and the ability to record currently measured data and compare it to future data. Everett assumes time.

To obtain physics we need some means to define interactions and communications between multiple separable observers.

Then you are doing just physics, and completely miss the comp explanation of the origin of physics and consciousness. You might need to (re)study the UDA.

I have other work to do.

This is a Bodies (plural) problem.

And comp translated that very problem into a measure problem on all computations. That is what makes comp interesting: it translates that body problem in a problem in arithmetic.

Each observer can be shown to have FPI by your argument, but that is about it. Everything else requires more assumptions, like maybe some kind of ASSA.

 

Bruno

2014/1/9, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be>:

2014/1/9, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be>:

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[Alberto G. Corona]

2014/1/10, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be>:

>
> On 09 Jan 2014, at 23:00, Stephen Paul King wrote:
>
>> Dear LizR,
>>
>> That is the key question that remains, IMHO, unanswered.
>
> It is answered, completely.
>

Stephen, LizR

From what I can understand, once cleared from
arithmetic-logic-metaphysic misticism, the determination of the laws
from infinite "competitive" computations follow Solomonoff's theorem
of inductive inference.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Solomonoff 's_theory_of_inductive_inference

Or it should. But the problem is that Bruno did not gives a weight for
each computation in order to stablish the outcome of what the pencil
does in the air. Neither the algorithmic complexity of each
computation (Solomonoff) nor any other. Therefore, it is a complete
chaos cut by some magic 1p collapse of computations, following QM
fashion. And there is where the aritmetic-logic-metaphysic mysticism
does his job.

[Bruno Marchal]

On 10 Jan 2014, at 03:46, Edgar L. Owen wrote:

Stephen,

I'll let you judge any correspondence or lack thereof between UD and my theories. I see very little if any and don't think it important.

Apparently, you have just accept the step 0 (the definition of comp, the survival with the artficial brain), so you will need to accept the consequences, or to find a flaw.

There is no "countable infinity" of observers because there are no actual infinities because reality is finite.

You need a quite powerful crystal ball to know that.

A big difference between human and reality math. Lack of infinities in reality math.

Your computational space is finite? Please define it.

Thus your example doesn't apply to actual reality.

And you are making the same old mistake of trying to compute present moment time backwards from various clock times. That doesn't work because you've got the whole process backwards...

Present moment time is PRIOR to all computations,

So time is more primitive than the comp space?

it's the happening aspect of logical reality space in which computations occur. Therefore it has no measure in the sense that clock times do because it is prior to all measure.

Just review what I actually said in the previous several posts about present time and leave it at that and let's not get sidetracked into the previous unproductive present time discussions again.

We are just trying to put meaning on your words.

Bruno

Edgar

On Thursday, January 9, 2014 8:44:47 PM UTC-5, Stephen Paul King wrote:

Dear Edgar,

  What you describe sounds very much like Bruno's UD, just clothed in different descriptive language. My problem with it is that in the re requirement that it "computes all the observer dependent clock time frames of individual observers" its ability to be considered as a reference for a "common universal present moment" vanishes and becomes a non-quantity. Such a quantity cannot exist, if self-non-contradiction is necessary. Let me explain in more detail!

   Let us stipulate that there exist a countable (at least!) infinity of observers (one per inertial rest frame that has different content from another) and that each of these observers has its very own "present moment". Is there a transformation that would take the content of any one and transform it into that of any other? There must be in order for the concept of a "common universal present moment outside of and independent of clock times and observers in which all those computations take place at the same time". Can you see how and why that is?

  Now, for this transformation to exist, what parameter has to change in the individual observer's computations? I submit that it is the length of the duration of the "present moment". The duration between tick and tock has to disappear, making time disappear as a parameter, for what is time if the duration vanishes? At best it is only an ordering of events, and nothing more.

  OK, now that the duration aspect of time is required to vanish and all that it left is the ordering of events, what is it that determines what order the event occur in? There isn't anything unless one can somehow use the natural ordering of the integers - the fact that 1 is less than 2 and 2 is less than 3, etc.- to in some sense "be" the ordering of events.

   What does the a string of naturally ordered numbers compute?

  

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Alberto G. Corona]

2014/1/10, Alberto G. Corona <agoc...@gmail.com>:

... Job that I do not know how it is possible if a computation that
does everithing OK until it convert the pencil in a fat female soprano
(with big algorithmic complexity) is equally compatible with all my 1p
observations until that moment, is equally probable than the
computation with much less algorithmic complexity that does its job
right and moves the pencil gracefully without emitting molesting
noises.

So anything goes

--
Alberto.

[Bruno Marchal]

On 10 Jan 2014, at 04:13, Edgar L. Owen wrote:

Stephen,

Your error here is assuming the computations take place in a single "wide" physical dimensional space. They don't. They take place in a purely computational space prior to the existence of physical dimensional spacetime. Physical dimensional spacetime is a product of the computations. They don't exist within it. Therefore there is no spacetime separation between computations. They exist in a purely logical space prior to dimensionalization which they compute.

Does this not contradict your statement that the present moment is prior to the computations, as I think you just said?

bruno

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[Bruno Marchal]

In steps 0-6, you grasped that from a first person perspective we are unaware of the reconstitution delays, that they does not change the probability calculus (if it exists) and that this remains true for the change between "physical implementation" and "physical virtual implementation".

In step 7, you are supposed to be in a physical universe containing a never stopping execution of a UD. So it is like in step six, except that the indeterminacy domain is infinite. You can realize then that to predict (in a conceptual and in an exact way) any first person experience you can have, like when doing a pizza, you need to apply the "probability calculus" on all your "reconstitutions" in the UD* (the complete running of the UD). So physics is reduced to that probability calculus on all your computations. OK?

We can come back on this. 

Yes please. This is very interesting!

Thanks. tell me if you (re)saw the step 7 point.

Bruno

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[Bruno Marchal]

Yes; but the UD is not the physical reality. A priori the physical reality is not emulated by the UD, although infinitely many approximations are emulated. But the "real" (first person observable) physical reality is defined by the statistical sum on all computations,including all those UD-approximations, which might be or not Turing emulable (a priori not, but there are technical nuances, which I prefer not to explain right now).

Bruno

 

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[Bruno Marchal]

On 09 Jan 2014, at 20:39, Alberto G. Corona wrote:

> Bruno:
> Sorry but I do not understood point seven when I read it and I do not
> understand you now.

No problem. I am here to explain (or discover a flaw!).


>
> I understand Solomonoff theorem about inductive inference that involve
> infinite computations and probabilities, but Solomonoff has a
> selection criteria : the algoritmic complexity theorem uses the
> algorithmic complexity as the weight or probability of each
> computation and it has a clear formula for the probability of the
> "next step" in a sequence, that is, to make an induction by means of
> "competing" computations.

This does not work, as that type of informùation suppress all the
redundancies existing in the arithmetical computations.



>
> The metaphisics of solomonoff say something like: "the world is
> governed by laws as simple as possible compatible with the phenomena
> observed, but we must take into account unobserved phenomena that may
> demand more complex algorithms so we apply a decreasing but not null
> probability to all computations that predict the known facts"

That's what we need to do in comp, and it works, but only thanks to
the redundancy of the UD work, or arithmetic.
(this is related to the creative/productive pairs of Emil Post, as
opposd to the simple/immune pairs, by the same Emil Post, and later
rediscovered by Chaitin).
The "algorithmic" information suppresses the "natural" weight (the one
given by the FPI) on the computations.



>
> For a moment I though that yours is a kind of solomonoff inductive
> inference

It works with all kind of inductive inference. I use the general
theory by Blum, Case and Smith. Explicitely so in "conscience and
mecanism", but it is very easy, so I am quick on this on this list. I
can say more on this, but sometimes it is more distracting than
informative.



> translated into a numerical mysticism, as substance of
> things instead as a method of induction or discovery of laws.

Just follow the reasoning. It is not a theory of inductive inference,
but the (unique) machine (ideally correct one) theology, testable as
it contains the physics.



> But I do
> not see your selection criteria

Your own consciousness. That is already the case in step 3. I do not
see what you don't see.



> among infinite computations and no
> procedure, no formula.


Quote my latest explanation to you or Edgar, or Stephen. Then AUDA
gives the precise equations and the formula. But UDA gives the
complete (less constructive) explanations, even the theoretical
procedure to predict the behavior of a falling pen. What don't you
understand? Are you sure you get well the first six steps?


> And moreover, I do not understand your
> metaphysics.

Which metaphysics? AR, or "yes doctor" ? Please try to make a specific
critics.
There is no metaphysics, actually, only a precise assumption on the
relation between consciousness and computation.

Bruno


>
> 2014/1/9, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be>:
>>

>> On 09 Jan 2014, at 18:50, Stephen Paul King wrote:
>>
>>> Dear Bruno,
>>>
>>> I have to agree with Alberto on this point.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Alberto was only missing step seven. You can comment my answer to
>> Alberto.
>>
>>
>>
>>>
>>>

>>> You believe (because you assume comp and agreed up to step 6) that
>>> your next immediate future first person state is determined by the
>>> FPI on all the emulations of your actual states appearing in the UD*
>>> (the complete execution of the UD). This involves infinitely many
>>> computations (that should be an easy exercise in computer science:
>>> all functions are implemented by infinitely many programs).
>>> To compute the exact probability of the event "the "pen fall on the
>>> ground", you must seek the ratio or proportion of all computation
>>> going through your states where you see the pen falling on the
>>> grounds, among all computations going through your states.
>>>
>>> How can we generate probability distributions unless there is an
>>> unambiguous measure on the space of possible universes that can
>>> obtain from the infinitely many computations?
>>
>> Exactly! probabilities exists only if there is a non ambiguous
>> measure. So if comp is true, and if this does not make the moon
>> evaporating, it means the measure exists.
>>

>> I also give the math of the "measure one". The logic of the
>> "certainty
>> case", and it is a quantum logic.
>>
>>
>>
>>>
>>>
>>>

>>> Computations is an arithmetical notion, and your actual state is
>>> given by a relative number, encode locally by the doctor. The entire
>>> UD is itself definable in arithmetic. So, in that step seven, if
>>> comp is correct or believed by a rational agent, the rational agent
>>> had to believe that physics, all physical predictions, is reduced to
>>> one "simple law": basically a measure on the relative computations.
>>> Physics has been reduced, in principle (of course) to a statistical
>>> sum on all first person valid relative computations.
>>>
>>>
>>> It has always been my claim that the Doctor can only exist within
>>> some subset of universes that have persistence of matter.
>>
>> Then you can deduce from the UDA that comp is incompatible with your
>> theory.
>>
>>
>>
>>

>>> This would exclude, for example, universes that do not contain
>>> matter or do not persist for more than an instant. AFAIK, nothing in
>>> AR acts to partition up the universes into those that contain
>>> Doctors and those that do not.
>>
>> Define "universe" in the comp theory.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>>
>>>
>>>

>>> Below our substitution level, physics is not given by "one
>>> computation" (or one universal numbers). Physics is given by an
>>> infinity made of almost all computations. It involves a competition
>>> among all universal numbers. "Almost all" means all those validating
>>> your first person experience.
>>>
>>> Yes, but not just one "physics"! The level of substitution is itself
>>> induced by and emergent from physical laws,
>>
>> Reread step seven.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>> thus cannot be assumed prior to the mechanism that selects for
>>> particular physical laws.
>>
>> You are assuming a physical primitive universe. I do not. I am
>> agnostic on this. But don't add an assumption in a reasoning, that is
>> terribly confusing.
>>

>> If you understand the reasoning, and still assume a physical
>> primitive
>> universe, then comp is non valid in your theory. You have to say no
>> to
>> the digitalist doctor.
>>
>>
>>
>>>
>>>

>>> Then the math shows that the case of "probability one", for that
>>> statistics on first person valid computations obeys a quantum logic.
>>>
>>> Not necessarily! It only shows FPI.
>>
>> ?
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>> There are many "quantum logics". Which one are you considering?
>>
>> The one isolated in the UDA and AUDA. I get three of them, actually.
>>
>>
>>
>>> I would like to see how you obtain the general non-commutativity of
>>> observable operators from AR.
>>> It has always seemed to me that you assume that physics is
>>> classical and this has always bothered me, given that we have very
>>> good evidence that our common universe IS NOT Classical.
>>
>> I have never assumed physics to be classical. You should read the
>> text. On the contrary I show how much comp makes the physical reality
>> quantum like, both in UDA and in arithmetic (AUDA).
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>>
>>>
>>>

>>> In fact comp gives a criteria to distinguish geography (which
>>> depends on many indexicals) and physics, which appears to be
>>> indexical independent. Physics is even independent of the choice of
>>> the base of the phi_i.
>>>
>>> How? What does it depend on? Maybe I do not know your definition of
>>> "physics"...
>>
>>
>> The science of justifying the sharable events in our neighborhood, or
>> the science of the "3p" measurable number predictions (which actually
>> will appear to be 1p plural only).
>>
>>
>>
>>>
>>>
>>>

>>> There is no "real" (ontic) physical reality, but still a *unique*
>>> (yet relative, conditional) measure on consistent enumerable
>>> extensions on all computations (going through your current states).
>>>
>>> I agree with this.
>>
>> Then physics is unique. Physics is what makes the pen dropped in the
>> air falling on the ground. That is reduced into an arithmetical
>> problem, by comp.
>>
>>
>>
>>>
>>>
>>>

>>> (Unless comp is false or that we are manipulated through a normal
>>> simulation).
>>> Physics is transformed into the study of a lawful precise
>>> arithmetical phenomenon of a type "first person plural experience".
>>>
>>> Not unless we are only considering a solipsistic observer!
>>
>> Not at all. We don't know that. Everett confirms comp + non
>> solipsism.
>>
>>
>>
>>

>>> To obtain physics we need some means to define interactions and
>>> communications between multiple separable observers.
>>
>> Then you are doing just physics, and completely miss the comp
>> explanation of the origin of physics and consciousness. You might
>> need
>> to (re)study the UDA.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>

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[Bruno Marchal]

On 10 Jan 2014, at 10:43, Alberto G. Corona wrote:

> 2014/1/10, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be>:
>>
>> On 09 Jan 2014, at 23:00, Stephen Paul King wrote:
>>
>>> Dear LizR,
>>>
>>> That is the key question that remains, IMHO, unanswered.
>>
>> It is answered, completely.
>>
>
> Stephen, LizR
>
> From what I can understand, once cleared from
> arithmetic-logic-metaphysic misticism, the determination of the laws
> from infinite "competitive" computations follow Solomonoff's theorem
> of inductive inference.
>
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Solomonoff
> 's_theory_of_inductive_inference
>
> Or it should. But the problem is that Bruno did not gives a weight for
> each computation in order to stablish the outcome of what the pencil
> does in the air.

I can't. Nobody can't. But the UD does it. And we must derive the
weight from computer science and arithmetic ONLY, if not we are just
doing physics, but the UDA points is that we cannot do that. We can
only derive the weight by the logic of self-reference, and that is
begin in the AUDA part.

> Neither the algorithmic complexity of each
> computation (Solomonoff) nor any other.

The algorithmic complexity has to fail, as, as I just said, it
elmiminates the redundancy, which is the only thing given the weight,
by the FPI.

> Therefore, it is a complete
> chaos cut by some magic 1p collapse of computations, following QM
> fashion.

No, following only self-duplication/multiplication. Then it is like
Everett QM, without collapse, only local first person consciousness of
result of measurement.

> And there is where the aritmetic-logic-metaphysic mysticism
> does his job.

You dont' seem to do the hard work. The only mysticism in play is what
is formalized by the G*/G difference, unavoidable by machine
incompleteness, and used only to separate what the machine can
communicate, and what she cannot communicate but still access as true
for her. That is not used in the UDA, only in the math part (AUDA). In
the UDA, the only mysticism used is the belief that we can survive
with a digital brain/body.

Bruno




http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Bruno Marchal]

Yes, that is the white rabbit problem. Most of my earlier posts on
this list has consisted in explaining why algorithmic complexity
cannot work. It surely plays some role, but we have to extract it from
the redundancy, no imposed it, as this would mock the consciousness
invariance, and the FPI invariance which follows from comp.
Of course, if you think you can eliminate the white rabbit with only
algorithmic complexity, please do, but you will have to explain why
the 'non algorithmically simple programs' do no more interfere with
the FPI global indeterminacy, and by the delay invariance for the 1p
experiences, that does not seem obvious at all.
You do seem close to grasp the problem.

Bruno



>
> --
> Alberto.

[Alberto G. Corona]

In any case the problem is in your theory. QM predict a infinite small
probability for white rabbits, while yours infer a decent amount of
them until some cut criteria emerges. And that is not my work, but
yours.

What is FPI? Although it often seems so, this is not a group devoted
to obtaining a certification on Bruno Marchall comp theories. You
have to be more didactic and can not rely on your writings when asking
concrete questions. If the number of acronyms + theology, logic and
psychologic concepts mixed in single statements grows when the
conversation gets more concrete, then it is no surprise that people
don´t understand you. There are many didactic tricks that you refuse
to use like metaphors and examples. And this gives to me the
impression that you are hiding consciously or uncosnciously a great
flaw.

And my observation is that no one understand you in what is original
in your theory. Apart from the brilliant and interesting first steps.
That is why I read you with attention.

But until now I don´t find a satisfactory explanation and you confess
that there is not, for the abundance of white rabbits in your theory.
You simply say: the fact that we have no fat soprano singers and white
rabbits aroud, and the fact that comp is true (sorry, it is a theory
that all of us must assume if we are gong to talk in this list) means
that comp have no such flaw and is a task of everyone to find how.

No . It is a task of yourself.

From my side, I have my own explanation of why algorithmic complexity
plays a role in solomonoff theory of universal induction, without
taking it as an axiom .. And this is the computational nature of life.
That is not the immaterial computation of yours, but the material
computation subject to resource limits of biological systems. I did my
job.

http://ilevolucionista.blogspot.com.es/2008/06/ockham-razor-and-genetic-algoritms-life.html

I simply ask for yours.

>
> Bruno
>
>
>
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>
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[Jason Resch]

Liz,

I think Edgar's computational reality can be consistent with the computational theory of mind if you somehow constrain reality to be small and finite.

The moment you let the universe be very big (eternal inflation) then you also get an infinite number of computers built by aliens in distant galaxies, any of which might be simulating you, and the same consequences Bruno points out apply.

My question to Edgar is why do you believe reality is finite? This seems to contradict a number of current scientific theories.

Also, when do you believe reality was created?  And how do you explain it's origins?

Jason

[Terren Suydam]

Bruno,

It seems that the UDA implies that physics is uniquely determined - but only for a particular point of view.  So I, Terren, experience one and only one physics, because my consciousness is the selection criteria among the infinity of computations going through my state. But what about Glak, a being in an alternative physics?  Glak's consciousness selects a unique/invariant physics for Glak, but that emergent physical universe Glak experiences is characterized by laws that are different from what I experience.

Terren

[Stephen Paul King]

Dear Terren,

  Good question! I ask that you take what you wrote and add the following question: How do Glak and Terren Communicate?

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[Terren Suydam]

Hi Stephen, 

Well, I'm not sure if what I'm asking is even coherent within the UDA, as it may betray a misunderstanding on my part. But if that's not the case, then it seems to me that I could never communicate with Glak because our consciousnesses are selecting different universes within the infinite possibilities of experiences traced by the UD. It's analogous to asking how we could communicate with someone outside of our light cone.

Terren

[Bruno Marchal]

That is the result. Yes, it is a problem for comp (which is just
mechanism after Church, Kleene, Turing, Post).
Then, using the most classical theory of knowledge, the problem
becomes a problem in arithmetic.

> QM predict a infinite small
> probability for white rabbits, while yours infer a decent amount of
> them until some cut criteria emerges. And that is not my work, but
> yours.

QM predict all this by using comp, or an unintelligible dualist theory
of observation.

Yes, with comp we must derive the wave or the matrix from self-
observation, itself extracted from arithmetical self-references
(Gödel, Löb, Solovay).




>
> What is FPI?

First Person Indeterminacy. UDA step 3.

> Although it often seems so, this is not a group devoted
> to obtaining a certification on Bruno Marchall comp theories.

I have a theorem in a theory (or class of theories extended in an
effective sense).

> You
> have to be more didactic and can not rely on your writings when asking
> concrete questions. If the number of acronyms + theology, logic and
> psychologic concepts mixed in single statements grows when the
> conversation gets more concrete, then it is no surprise that people
> don´t understand you.

Who does not understand? If you have a problem of understanding, just
ask. The subject matter (the mind-body problem) is everything but
simple. Yet we can reason, even get startling conclusions from
admitting very weak form of mechanism.

> There are many didactic tricks that you refuse
> to use like metaphors and examples.

I avoid metaphor indeed, but that is the custom in science. Examples?
You can find them in the textbook. And/or you can ask any one when you
feel the need.

> And this gives to me the
> impression that you are hiding consciously or uncosnciously a great
> flaw.

?

>
> And my observation is that no one understand you in what is original
> in your theory.

?

> Apart from the brilliant and interesting first steps.
> That is why I read you with attention.

Where precisely the flaw appears?

>
> But until now I don´t find a satisfactory explanation and you confess
> that there is not, for the abundance of white rabbits in your theory.

I am a scientist. I do not defend any theory. I just reduce the mind-
body problem into a purely arithmetical "belief in body" problem.

I illustrate that with computer science, and usual definitions in
theology and metaphysics, when we assume comp, we can translate
theological problem into problem of number theory or computer science.

> You simply say: the fact that we have no fat soprano singers and white
> rabbits aroud, and the fact that comp is true (sorry, it is a theory
> that all of us must assume if we are gong to talk in this list) means
> that comp have no such flaw and is a task of everyone to find how.
>
> No . It is a task of yourself.

No. It is a task for all honest or correct universal machine trying to
figure out why there is something and why does it hurt.

May be you are not interested in fundamental question. We cannot know
the truth, but we can try theories. Computationalism makes sense, as
we don't know non computable laws in nature, except for the wave
collapse, for those who believe it is physical.

Even a quantum computer is Turing emulable, and I do not bound the
substitution level. Then most of the consequences remains true for
most of the "non-comp" machine's extensions.

I don't know if comp is true or not, I just explains the consequences,
and show their testability.

>
> From my side, I have my own explanation of why algorithmic complexity
> plays a role in solomonoff theory of universal induction, without
> taking it as an axiom .. And this is the computational nature of life.
> That is not the immaterial computation of yours, but the material
> computation subject to resource limits of biological systems. I did my
> job.
>
> http://ilevolucionista.blogspot.com.es/2008/06/ockham-razor-and-genetic-algoritms-life.html

I basically agree with that.
Yet, such explanation relies on comp, I think, and all what I say is
that with comp we must somehow extend that form of evolution for the
laws of physics themselves, through a form of dream competitions, to
put it roughly.

How can a Turing emulable process distinguish in the first person way
a computation in nature from a computation in arithmetic?

>
> I simply ask for yours.

UDA, the 8, or 7, steps gives a problem for any one accepting comp,
including your's in the link provided, unless you can answer the
question above.

I am just illustrating that comp makes it possible to reason more
rigorously, thanks to computer science and the mathematical discovery
of the "universal" numbers/systems/interpreters/machines/theories/...

UDA is the problem, and AUDA is the computer's response to that
problem, already precise enough on some physics that it can be tested.
(and up to now it fits, so comp+classical theory of knowledge is not
yet refuted).

I just take fully the consequence of two facts: the incompleteness
theorem, and the fact that the machine can prove their own
incompleteness theorem.

I am not solving a problem, I am just saying that if comp is true;
then there is a big door to push, in some different direction than the
Aristotelian one, on the fundamental.

Bruno

>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
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>

[Bruno Marchal]

On 10 Jan 2014, at 16:23, Jason Resch wrote:

Liz,

I think Edgar's computational reality can be consistent with the computational theory of mind if you somehow constrain reality to be small and finite.

OK.

The moment you let the universe be very big (eternal inflation) then you also get an infinite number of computers built by aliens in distant galaxies, any of which might be simulating you, and the same consequences Bruno points out apply.

OK. But the universe might need to be robust too, which, in passing, I am not sure our local cosmos can be, even if infinite, unless there is really infinite room at the bottom, which I doubt. The UD has toe become unboundedly large ...

My question to Edgar is why do you believe reality is finite? This seems to contradict a number of current scientific theories.

Also, when do you believe reality was created?  And how do you explain it's origins?

Good questions.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Stephen Paul King]

Dear Terren,

On Fri, Jan 10, 2014 at 12:15 PM, Terren Suydam <terren...@gmail.com> wrote:

Hi Stephen, 

Well, I'm not sure if what I'm asking is even coherent within the UDA, as it may betray a misunderstanding on my part.

I agree, interaction and the question of different physical laws for different observers is not well defined in the UDA.

 

But if that's not the case, then it seems to me that I could never communicate with Glak because our consciousnesses are selecting different universes within the infinite possibilities of experiences traced by the UD. It's analogous to asking how we could communicate with someone outside of our light cone.

I am trying to not assume that a space-time is defined a priori.

[Terren Suydam]

Stephen,

On Fri, Jan 10, 2014 at 1:04 PM, Stephen Paul King <Step...@provensecure.com> wrote:

Dear Terren,

On Fri, Jan 10, 2014 at 12:15 PM, Terren Suydam <terren...@gmail.com> wrote:

Hi Stephen, 

Well, I'm not sure if what I'm asking is even coherent within the UDA, as it may betray a misunderstanding on my part.

I agree, interaction and the question of different physical laws for different observers is not well defined in the UDA.

I disagree, as interactions are just yet more programs instantiated in UD*. Programs (universal numbers) can be embedded within other programs. I think it helps to remember that the infinity of computations going through our respective states are happening below the substitution level... so that our interactions, such as they are, exist at emergent levels much higher than the level being simulated.

 

But if that's not the case, then it seems to me that I could never communicate with Glak because our consciousnesses are selecting different universes within the infinite possibilities of experiences traced by the UD. It's analogous to asking how we could communicate with someone outside of our light cone.

I am trying to not assume that a space-time is defined a priori.

I don't understand your comment, we're talking about emergent physics.

Terren