Aaronson/Penrose

[Brent Meeker]

Scott Aaronson's blog on his debate with Roger Penrose is probably of interest to the list:

“Can computers become conscious?”: My reply to Roger Penrose
June 2nd, 2016
A few weeks ago, I attended the Seven Pines Symposium on Fundamental Problems in Physics outside Minneapolis, where I had the honor of participating in a panel discussion with Sir Roger Penrose.  The way it worked was, Penrose spoke for a half hour about his ideas about consciousness (Gödel, quantum gravity, microtubules, uncomputability, you know the drill), then I delivered a half-hour “response,” and then there was an hour of questions and discussion from the floor.  Below, I’m sharing the prepared notes for my talk, as well as some very brief recollections about the discussion afterward.  (Sorry, there’s no audio or video.)  I unfortunately don’t have the text or transparencies for Penrose’s talk available to me, but—with one exception, which I touch on in my own talk—his talk very much followed the outlines of his famous books, The Emperor’s New Mind and Shadows of the Mind.

Read the rest at   http://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/

Brent

[Bruce Kellett]

This is interesting, and I would like to spend more time on it, but one thing struck me as I was leafing through....

"The third place where I part ways with Roger is that I wish to maintain what’s sometimes called the Physical Church-Turing Thesis: the statement that our laws of physics can be simulated to any desired precision by a Turing machine (or at any rate, by a probabilistic Turing machine).  That is, I don’t see any compelling reason, at present, to admit the existence of any physical process that can solve uncomputable problems.  And for me, it’s not just a matter of a dearth of evidence that our brains can efficiently solve, say, NP-hard problems, let alone uncomputable ones—or of the exotic physics that would presumably be required for such abilities.  It’s that, even if I supposed we could solve uncomputable problems, I’ve never understood how that’s meant to enlighten us regarding consciousness."

This relates to my current obsession with the universal applicability of Bell's theorem (and other inequalities such as that of CHSH). Consider the statement of the Church-Turing thesis: "the statement that our laws of physics can be simulated to any desired precision by a Turing machine (or at any rate, by a probabilistic Turing machine)". This is not true for Bell-type experiments on entangled particle pairs. To be more precise, the correlations produced from measurements on entangled pairs at spacelike separations cannot be reproduced by any computational process. A recent review (arXiv: 1303.2849, RMP 86 (2014) pp419-478) points out that violations of the Bell inequalities can be taken as clear confirmation the separated experimenters making the measurements had not communicated: if they had communicated during the experiment then the inequalities would be satisfied. The corollary is that there is no possible local computational algorithm (not involving recourse to the effects of quantum entanglement) that can produce correlations that violate the Bell inequalities. In other words, the laws of physics cannot be simulated to any desired precision by a Turing machine. (I don't think solving NP problems has anything much to do with it.....)

This is where one looks for a non-Turing-emulable aspect of physics. This may or may not undermine AI, but it certainly sinks mathematical universe proposals such as those by Tegmark or Marchal.

Bruce

[scerir]

Bruce:

This relates to my current obsession with the universal applicability of
Bell's theorem (and other inequalities such as that of CHSH). Consider the
statement of the Church-Turing thesis: "the statement that our laws of physics
can be simulated to any desired precision by a Turing machine (or at any rate,
by a probabilistic Turing machine)". This is not true for Bell-type experiments
on entangled particle pairs. To be more precise, the correlations produced from
measurements on entangled pairs at spacelike separations cannot be reproduced

by any computational process. [....]

### Unless something strange is going on here. In example, I'm trying to
understand something J.Christian wrote recently.. See Appendix D, page 8 and 9
in this paper https://arxiv.org/pdf/1501.03393v6.pdf

BTW L. Accardi, (Accardi and Regoli, 2000, 2001; Accardi, Imafuku and Regoli,
2002) has claimed to have produced a suite of computer programmes, to be run on
a network of computers, which will simulate a violation of Bell's inequalites.
See also http://arxiv.org/pdf/1507.00106v3.pdf

[Stathis Papaioannou]

A simpler example of non-computability is true (as opposed to pseudo-) randomness. If quantum mechanics is correct, true randomness is a feature of the universe. But while a computer cannot be programmed to give a true random number, an observer in a deterministically branching virtual world will experience true randomness because there is no way he - or even an omnipotent being - can know which branch he will end up in. This has been discussed at length by Bruno with his duplication thought experiments, and also by Tegmark. 

--
Stathis Papaioannou

[Bruce Kellett]

On 3/06/2016 8:22 pm, 'scerir' via Everything List wrote:
> Bruce:
> This relates to my current obsession with the universal applicability of
> Bell's theorem (and other inequalities such as that of CHSH). Consider the
> statement of the Church-Turing thesis: "the statement that our laws of physics
> can be simulated to any desired precision by a Turing machine (or at any rate,
> by a probabilistic Turing machine)". This is not true for Bell-type experiments
> on entangled particle pairs. To be more precise, the correlations produced from
> measurements on entangled pairs at spacelike separations cannot be reproduced
> by any computational process. [....]
>
> ### Unless something strange is going on here. In example, I'm trying to
> understand something J.Christian wrote recently.. See Appendix D, page 8 and 9
> in this paper https://arxiv.org/pdf/1501.03393v6.pdf

Joy Christian has been trying to disprove Bell's theorem for ages. There
is a fundamental mistake in her argument -- She claims that Bell
replaces a sum of expectation values by the expectation value of a sum
(see equations D3 and D4 of the paper you reference). But Bell does no
such thing: such a replacement is, of course, invalid, but Bell does not
do this. What actually happens is that the hypothesis of independence
(locality) is used to replace the expectation value of the product with
the product of expectation values. This is explained very clearly in the
review I referenced by Brunner et al, arXiv: 1303.2849. In Section 1B,
Brunner gives the argument against the computability of the quantum
results that violate the inequalities. The point is that the proof of
Bell's theorem is not limited to correlations on entangled pairs -- it
applies to any sets of correlations between measurements on a series of
observables with a limited number of outcomes each. For example, an
experiment in which there are only two measurement choices (x or y), and
where the possible outcomes take two values (a,b in {-1,+1}. When the
process is truly local, the inequalities hold however the data are
generated. Computer simulations are local,so cannot reproduce the
quantum violations of the inequalities.

Bruce

[Brent Meeker]

If the world is a simulation, i.e. is being computed by a Turing machine, then the computation can implement non-local hidden variables and violate Bell's inequality in the simulated world (in fact all its variables would be non-local since locality and spacetime would just be computed phenomena).

Brent

This is where one looks for a non-Turing-emulable aspect of physics. This may or may not undermine AI, but it certainly sinks mathematical universe proposals such as those by Tegmark or Marchal.

Bruce

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[Telmo Menezes]

There is, however, evidence that physical systems can solve NP-hard
problems -- e.g: protein folding.

[Brent Meeker]

What do you mean by "computer simulations are local". Of course the
computation is performed locally, but it may compute or simulate
non-local processes.

Brent

[Bruno Marchal]

On 03 Jun 2016, at 12:22, 'scerir' via Everything List wrote:

Bruce:
This relates to my current obsession with the universal applicability of
Bell's theorem (and other inequalities such as that of CHSH). Consider the
statement of the Church-Turing thesis: "the statement that our laws of physics
can be simulated to any desired precision by a Turing machine (or at any rate,
by a probabilistic Turing machine)". This is not true for Bell-type experiments
on entangled particle pairs. To be more precise, the correlations produced from
measurements on entangled pairs at spacelike separations cannot be reproduced
by any computational process. [....]

That is correct, but is already a theorem of computationalism. Given that any piece of observable matter is given by the statistics on your first person experience on the whole UD*, a priori "matter" is *not* simulable "in real time" nowehere. But as Deutch saw for quantum computer: a quantum computer, which exploits that statistics directly, can simulate any other quantum computer or quantum events (giving sense to a physical "CT" thesis, which has nothing to do with the usual Church-Turing thesis, and which is an open problem).

Note that the quantum computer, for example, does not violate Church Turing thesis, and a classical computer can emulate any quantum computable events, albeit not in real" or "polynomial" time. And to get the Bell's violation inequality, you need to interview the creatures inside the simulations.

Logicians have the tools to define the first person and third person views in precise (mathematical, arithmetical) terms.

Open problem: is physics only the "music of the primes"? It might be that the distribution of primes, seen globally (like with the Riemann zeta function)  already encodes the full sigma_1 complexity, and thus a universal dovetailer. That might be a way to tackle the Riemann hypothesis. Then there is evidence it might emulate a sort of nuclear quantum chaotical "physical" regime (Work by Berry, Montgomery, ...). (I talked about such type of theory some time ago). 

The number 24 has some hidden power to, ... (Might some day make a post on that. It plays some role in the irreducible group representations theory).

In the meantime the more mathematically inclined can listen to John Baez reason to love the number 24:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vzjbRhYjELo

Mine are more related to the partition number theory (which I sometimes used to illustrate the remarkable complexity of the additive theory of numbers):

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aj4FozCSg8g

God created the natural numbers, and told them to add and multiply. Then the number 24 hypnotized all the universal numbers and made them believe in gravitation, space, time, wave and particles ... (grin).

I always fear that the number theorists find the physical reality before the theologians, which might make us dismiss the (G* minus G) part of (self) reality for another millennium ...

Bruno

### Unless something strange is going on here. In example, I'm trying to
understand something J.Christian wrote recently.. See Appendix D, page 8 and 9
in this paper https://arxiv.org/pdf/1501.03393v6.pdf

BTW L. Accardi, (Accardi and Regoli, 2000, 2001; Accardi, Imafuku and Regoli,
2002) has claimed to have produced a suite of computer programmes, to be run on
a network of computers, which will simulate a violation of Bell's inequalites.
See also http://arxiv.org/pdf/1507.00106v3.pdf

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Bruce Kellett]

On 4/06/2016 4:16 am, Brent Meeker wrote:

On 6/3/2016 1:28 AM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 3/06/2016 4:39 pm, Brent Meeker wrote:

Scott Aaronson's blog on his debate with Roger Penrose is probably of interest to the list:

“Can computers become conscious?”: My reply to Roger Penrose
June 2nd, 2016
A few weeks ago, I attended the Seven Pines Symposium on Fundamental Problems in Physics outside Minneapolis, where I had the honor of participating in a panel discussion with Sir Roger Penrose.  The way it worked was, Penrose spoke for a half hour about his ideas about consciousness (Gödel, quantum gravity, microtubules, uncomputability, you know the drill), then I delivered a half-hour “response,” and then there was an hour of questions and discussion from the floor.  Below, I’m sharing the prepared notes for my talk, as well as some very brief recollections about the discussion afterward.  (Sorry, there’s no audio or video.)  I unfortunately don’t have the text or transparencies for Penrose’s talk available to me, but—with one exception, which I touch on in my own talk—his talk very much followed the outlines of his famous books, The Emperor’s New Mind and Shadows of the Mind.

Read the rest at   http://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/

This is interesting, and I would like to spend more time on it, but one thing struck me as I was leafing through....

"The third place where I part ways with Roger is that I wish to maintain what’s sometimes called the Physical Church-Turing Thesis: the statement that our laws of physics can be simulated to any desired precision by a Turing machine (or at any rate, by a probabilistic Turing machine).  That is, I don’t see any compelling reason, at present, to admit the existence of any physical process that can solve uncomputable problems.  And for me, it’s not just a matter of a dearth of evidence that our brains can efficiently solve, say, NP-hard problems, let alone uncomputable ones—or of the exotic physics that would presumably be required for such abilities.  It’s that, even if I supposed we could solve uncomputable problems, I’ve never understood how that’s meant to enlighten us regarding consciousness."

This relates to my current obsession with the universal applicability of Bell's theorem (and other inequalities such as that of CHSH). Consider the statement of the Church-Turing thesis: "the statement that our laws of physics can be simulated to any desired precision by a Turing machine (or at any rate, by a probabilistic Turing machine)". This is not true for Bell-type experiments on entangled particle pairs. To be more precise, the correlations produced from measurements on entangled pairs at spacelike separations cannot be reproduced by any computational process. A recent review (arXiv: 1303.2849, RMP 86 (2014) pp419-478) points out that violations of the Bell inequalities can be taken as clear confirmation the separated experimenters making the measurements had not communicated: if they had communicated during the experiment then the inequalities would be satisfied. The corollary is that there is no possible local computational algorithm (not involving recourse to the effects of quantum entanglement) that can produce correlations that violate the Bell inequalities. In other words, the laws of physics cannot be simulated to any desired precision by a Turing machine. (I don't think solving NP problems has anything much to do with it.....)

If the world is a simulation, i.e. is being computed by a Turing machine, then the computation can implement non-local hidden variables and violate Bell's inequality in the simulated world (in fact all its variables would be non-local since locality and spacetime would just be computed phenomena).

Sure, Bell's theorem only rules out local hidden variables. If you simulate non-local hidden variables (i.e., get the separated experimenters to communicate non-locally), then of course you can reproduce the quantum correlations. But I was under the impression  that the computationalist goal was to eliminate non-locality. Separated experimenters, with as much computing power as necessary, cannot simulate the quantum correlations by performing only local computations.

Bruce

[Bruce Kellett]

See my other response. If the experimenters are spacelike separated and
perform computations locally, they cannot reproduce the quantum
correlations. If you choose to simulate the whole scenario, you still
cannot reproduce the quantum correlations without introducing non-local
hidden variables. In other words, the world we observe is intrinsically
non-local.

Bruce

[Brent Meeker]

As I understand it, Tegmark proposes that the world is computed, as in a simulation.  Bruno proposes that there are infinitely many threads of computations which include the experience of infinitely many different worlds for observers whose experience is computed in those worlds.  "Separate" or "non-local" are attributes of the simulated spacetime and dynamics.

Brent

[Brent Meeker]

Right. But that doesn't mean it's not computable.

Brent

[Bruno Marchal]

On 03 Jun 2016, at 12:22, 'scerir' via Everything List wrote:

> Bruce:
> This relates to my current obsession with the universal
> applicability of
> Bell's theorem (and other inequalities such as that of CHSH).
> Consider the
> statement of the Church-Turing thesis: "the statement that our laws
> of physics
> can be simulated to any desired precision by a Turing machine (or at
> any rate,
> by a probabilistic Turing machine)".

To be sure, this has nothing to do with Church thesis. Church thesis
is just the thesis that Intuitively Computable = Turing Computable. It
does not refer to physical-computable. Intuitively computable means
that there is a an algorithm, human sharable, that we can use to
compute a function in some finite (but arbitrarlly long) time on each
input.

> This is not true for Bell-type experiments
> on entangled particle pairs. To be more precise, the correlations
> produced from
> measurements on entangled pairs at spacelike separations cannot be
> reproduced
> by any computational process. [....]

For this I refer to my post of yesterday. Quantm computer do not
violate Church thesis, but do violate the thesis that all universal
machine can emulate each other in polynomial time. (time is used here
in the computer science theoretical sense, it is not necessarily the
physical time).

Bruno

>
> ### Unless something strange is going on here. In example, I'm
> trying to
> understand something J.Christian wrote recently.. See Appendix D,
> page 8 and 9
> in this paper https://arxiv.org/pdf/1501.03393v6.pdf
>
> BTW L. Accardi, (Accardi and Regoli, 2000, 2001; Accardi, Imafuku
> and Regoli,
> 2002) has claimed to have produced a suite of computer programmes,
> to be run on
> a network of computers, which will simulate a violation of Bell's
> inequalites.
> See also http://arxiv.org/pdf/1507.00106v3.pdf
>
>
>

[Bruno Marchal]

You can simulate the whole (multiversial) structure, and the observers will find that from their perspective, Bell's inequality are violated. From outside, we can see (like Everett saw) that it is just a case of self-duplication FPI. (Which brings us back to the preceding thread of course).

Bruno

Bruce

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[Bruce Kellett]

Locally, Alice and Bob can simulate anything they like, and they can simulate universes with non-local hidden variables,  and predict that within those worlds the Bell inequalities are violated. But when they get back to their own world and compare their results, they will find that the correlations between their separate simulations of the results of spin measurements at arbitrary angles invariably satisfy the inequalities. In other words, they cannot, jointly, simulate the quantum results in any world that they both inhabit. The MWI view from outside is no different -- non-locality is inescapable.

Bruce

[Bruce Kellett]

On 5/06/2016 3:31 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:

I think you are trying to move the goal posts here.... The original
argument about non-locality in MWI was the contention by people like
Price, Tipler, Brown, and Christian that Bell made certain assumptions
that were not true in the Everetttian approach. Their conclusion was
that his theorem was not applicable to the MWI, rendering the argument
that local hidden variables were ruled out inapplicable in that case.
(Though Joy Christian tries to go further and argues that Bell made a
trivial mistake that rendered his 'theorem' invalid in all
interpretations.) I have rebutted the various claims of these papers in
other posts: Bell does not depend on such ill-defined things as
counterfactual definiteness, and certainly does not assume that
experiments have only single outcomes. My conclusion is that Bell's
theorem is valid universally -- merely changing the interpretation does
not alter that, and thus non-locality has been shown to be intrinsic to
quantum mechanics.

You are now attempting to change the argument: you appear now to accept
that individual experimenters will see the quantum world as non-local,
but that this is merely an observer-dependent effect, arising from
self-location in the multiverse: another instance of FPI. I think that
you have to do a bit more work on this changed approach to non-locality:
I think you will find that the argument does not work like the FPI
account of apparent indeterminism in a deterministic universe. Bell's
theorem applies to every set of correlations obtained by experimenters
in every branch of the universal wave function -- there is no 'external'
perspective from which Bell' s theorem does not apply. If there were,
there would have to be a local account available from the 'bird'
perspective, and there is no such account. If you claim that there is,
then the onus is on you to produce that account. The singlet state

|psi> = (|+>|-> - |->|+>)/sqrt(2)

is the wave function from the 'bird' perspective, and particles 1 and 2
are separated in the 'bird' perspective as much as in any 'frog'
perspective. Going outside the perspective of the individual
experimenters does not actually gain you anything in this instance.

Bruce

[Bruno Marchal]

You don't need to simulate hidden non- local variable. You need to just simulate the wave function. It will take a super-exponential time to do so, but the many couples of Alice and Bob will all (except for a negligeable subset) detect non-locality in their respective branches, although we, from outside, will know that noting non-local ever happened. The non-locality will only be a FPI statistical appearances.

It is the same for "our" multiverse. It obeys a deterministic local equations, and non-locality in all branches are a local relative appearance, like the indeterminacy itself.

Bruno

Bruce

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[Bruno Marchal]

He is forced to use it when he talk about some Alice and Bob doing a
simultaneous measurement and getting definite outcome.

> and certainly does not assume that experiments have only single
> outcomes.

Then he show non-locality appearance in all branch, but it does not
show the need of any non-local action for that. he proves just the
many-world.

> My conclusion is that Bell's theorem is valid universally -- merely
> changing the interpretation does not alter that, and thus non-
> locality has been shown to be intrinsic to quantum mechanics.

Then he shows only appearance of non-locality on (almost) all
branches, or entangled relative states. Only when we abstract all
branches and keep one, does action at a distance needed to violate the
inequality.

>
> You are now attempting to change the argument: you appear now to
> accept that individual experimenters will see the quantum world as
> non-local, but that this is merely an observer-dependent effect,
> arising from self-location in the multiverse:

That is what I try to explain since the beginning. Indeterminacy and
non-locality are statistical first person plural appearances.

> another instance of FPI. I think that you have to do a bit more work
> on this changed approach to non-locality: I think you will find that
> the argument does not work like the FPI account of apparent
> indeterminism in a deterministic universe. Bell's theorem applies to
> every set of correlations obtained by experimenters in every branch
> of the universal wave function -- there is no 'external' perspective
> from which Bell' s theorem does not apply. If there were, there
> would have to be a local account available from the 'bird'
> perspective,

But that exists: the Schroedinger wave equation.

> and there is no such account. If you claim that there is, then the
> onus is on you to produce that account. The singlet state
>
> |psi> = (|+>|-> - |->|+>)/sqrt(2)
>
> is the wave function from the 'bird' perspective, and particles 1
> and 2 are separated in the 'bird' perspective as much as in any
> 'frog' perspective. Going outside the perspective of the individual
> experimenters does not actually gain you anything in this instance.

But it makes no sense to say that particles 1 and 2, when separated,
belongs to the same branches. Bell can say that because it assumes
only one branch (so to speak) in which case there is a mysterious
spooky action at a distance. But if they are space-like separated, we
get the non-locality appearances only for those Alice and Bob wich
will be able to meet at some points, and the math shows that this
linearly and locally implied such appearances, despite the wave
evolved locally at all time in the phase space. There should be no
problem as you seem to accept the definition of worlds by set of
events/objects close for interaction. If Alice and Bob are space like
separated, they just cannot belong to the same woirld: it makes no
sense.

[Brent Meeker]

I don't think anyone (except Joy Christian) argues that Bell's theorem
does not apply in MWI - I certainly don't think that. But I think that
"which universe" is a non-local hidden variable in MWI and so explains
the correlation without violating Bell's theorem.

Brent

[Brent Meeker]

On 6/5/2016 4:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 05 Jun 2016, at 01:26, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 5/06/2016 3:31 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 04 Jun 2016, at 01:28, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 4/06/2016 4:16 am, Brent Meeker wrote:

If the world is a simulation, i.e. is being computed by a Turing machine, then the computation can implement non-local hidden variables and violate Bell's inequality in the simulated world (in fact all its variables would be non-local since locality and spacetime would just be computed phenomena).

Sure, Bell's theorem only rules out local hidden variables. If you simulate non-local hidden variables (i.e., get the separated experimenters to communicate non-locally), then of course you can reproduce the quantum correlations. But I was under the impression  that the computationalist goal was to eliminate non-locality. Separated experimenters, with as much computing power as necessary, cannot simulate the quantum correlations by performing only local computations.

You can simulate the whole (multiversial) structure, and the observers will find that from their perspective, Bell's inequality are violated. From outside, we can see (like Everett saw) that it is just a case of self-duplication FPI. (Which brings us back to the preceding thread of course).

Locally, Alice and Bob can simulate anything they like, and they can simulate universes with non-local hidden variables,  and predict that within those worlds the Bell inequalities are violated. But when they get back to their own world and compare their results, they will find that the correlations between their separate simulations of the results of spin measurements at arbitrary angles invariably satisfy the inequalities. In other words, they cannot, jointly, simulate the quantum results in any world that they both inhabit. The MWI view from outside is no different -- non-locality is inescapable.

You don't need to simulate hidden non- local variable. You need to just simulate the wave function.

Which depends on both spatial variables of the particles in an EPR experiment and so it non-local.

Brent

[Bruce Kellett]

That was the central argument that sought to establish that MWI was
local -- MWIers claim that Bell assumed something in his proof that
does not hold in MWI, so the theorem does not apply to MWI. The
conclusion they want to draw is that since the Bell inequalities are
inapplicable in MWI, observation of violations of the inequalities can
not be interpreted as evidence of non-locality. I think that argument is
dead -- Bell did not assume counterfactual definiteness, and even if he
did, that would not have affected his proof. Also, he did not need to
assume that experiments had only one result -- the theorem applies to
correlations between decohered experimental results, and thus applies
equally to all branches of the wave function (if you want to think in
MWI terms).

> But I think that "which universe" is a non-local hidden variable in
> MWI and so explains the correlation without violating Bell's theorem.

I have difficulty in working out what this means. The quantum
correlations do not violate Bell's theorem, Bell's theorem simply states
that the quantum correlations cannot be explained by any local
interactions, visible or hidden. The question of "which universe" in the
many worlds approach might be considered to be a non-local hidden
variable, but that does not take you any distance towards an explanation
of the correlations. As you point out elsewhere, all that is required is
the wave function itself -- the wave function predicts the observed
correlations, and because it refers to both of the separated particles
simultaneously, it is, in itself, non-local. No further explanation is
required.

Bruce

[Brent Meeker]

On 6/5/2016 4:05 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>> I don't think anyone (except Joy Christian) argues that Bell's
>> theorem does not apply in MWI - I certainly don't think that.
>
> That was the central argument that sought to establish that MWI was
> local -- MWIers claim that Bell assumed something in his proof that
> does not hold in MWI, so the theorem does not apply to MWI. The
> conclusion they want to draw is that since the Bell inequalities are
> inapplicable in MWI, observation of violations of the inequalities can
> not be interpreted as evidence of non-locality. I think that argument
> is dead -- Bell did not assume counterfactual definiteness,

I guess it depends on what fact you counter. Even if the hidden
variable is probabilistic, its the realized random value that is shared
by the particles and so that's implicitly assuming counterfactual
definiteness at the hidden variable level: if the random value had been
something else the measurement values would be something different.

> and even if he did, that would not have affected his proof. Also, he
> did not need to assume that experiments had only one result -- the
> theorem applies to correlations between decohered experimental
> results, and thus applies equally to all branches of the wave function
> (if you want to think in MWI terms).

Right.

Brent

[Bruce Kellett]

On 6/06/2016 7:41 am, Brent Meeker wrote:

On 6/5/2016 4:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 05 Jun 2016, at 01:26, Bruce Kellett wrote:

Locally, Alice and Bob can simulate anything they like, and they can simulate universes with non-local hidden variables,  and predict that within those worlds the Bell inequalities are violated. But when they get back to their own world and compare their results, they will find that the correlations between their separate simulations of the results of spin measurements at arbitrary angles invariably satisfy the inequalities. In other words, they cannot, jointly, simulate the quantum results in any world that they both inhabit. The MWI view from outside is no different -- non-locality is inescapable.

You don't need to simulate hidden non- local variable. You need to just simulate the wave function.

Which depends on both spatial variables of the particles in an EPR experiment and so it non-local.

Precisely. I think there is some degree of confusion around the terms 'local' and 'non-local'. The wave function is non-local in that it refers to the two separated particles as a single entity, without specifying any particular interaction between them. This is a simple consequence of the fact that the wave function resides in configuration space, and any suggestion of a 'local mechanical' connection between the remote particles is lost when we move back into physical space in order to compare the quantum predictions coming from the wave function to our experimental results.

When people ask for a 'local' explanation of anything, they are thinking in terms of a 'mechanism', such as the exchange of  particle that can carry information in a local way. If they think of a 'non-local' interaction, they still think in this mechanistic way by considering a faster-than-light tachyonic exchange that is completely analagous to the subluminal particle exchange characteristic of normal local interactions. Such thinking is inapplicable to the wave function in quantum mechanics. When the wave function is describing two or more particles, it is intrinsically non-local in that in certain circumstances the wave function describes a single state, even though its parts might be widely separated in space. This form of intrinsic non-locality does not have any 'mechanism' underlying it -- there is no subluminal or superluminal particle exchange going on in the background to hold the dispersed state together! The non-locality is intrinsic: it cannot be reduced to some local mechanistic account.

Bruce

[Bruce Kellett]

On 6/06/2016 9:24 am, Brent Meeker wrote:
> On 6/5/2016 4:05 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>>> I don't think anyone (except Joy Christian) argues that Bell's
>>> theorem does not apply in MWI - I certainly don't think that.
>>
>> That was the central argument that sought to establish that MWI was
>> local -- MWIers claim that Bell assumed something in his proof that
>> does not hold in MWI, so the theorem does not apply to MWI. The
>> conclusion they want to draw is that since the Bell inequalities are
>> inapplicable in MWI, observation of violations of the inequalities
>> can not be interpreted as evidence of non-locality. I think that
>> argument is dead -- Bell did not assume counterfactual definiteness,
>
> I guess it depends on what fact you counter. Even if the hidden
> variable is probabilistic, its the realized random value that is
> shared by the particles and so that's implicitly assuming
> counterfactual definiteness at the hidden variable level: if the
> random value had been something else the measurement values would be
> something different.

That is built into the generic concept of hidden variables that Bell
uses -- they can (probabilistically) take on a range of values, and the
measurement results will depend on what value they have in any
particular instance. There is no assumption of conterfactual
definiteness embedded here, or anywhere else for that matter. (Other
than the bland statement that if things had been different, things would
have been different!)

Bruce

[Bruce Kellett]

On 5/06/2016 9:44 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 05 Jun 2016, at 08:39, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>
>> another instance of FPI. I think that you have to do a bit more work
>> on this changed approach to non-locality: I think you will find that
>> the argument does not work like the FPI account of apparent
>> indeterminism in a deterministic universe. Bell's theorem applies to
>> every set of correlations obtained by experimenters in every branch
>> of the universal wave function -- there is no 'external' perspective
>> from which Bell' s theorem does not apply. If there were, there would
>> have to be a local account available from the 'bird' perspective,
>
> But that exists: the Schroedinger wave equation.

As has been pointed out, that itself refers to two separated locations,
so is intrinsically non-local.

>> and there is no such account. If you claim that there is, then the
>> onus is on you to produce that account. The singlet state
>>
>> |psi> = (|+>|-> - |->|+>)/sqrt(2)
>>
>> is the wave function from the 'bird' perspective, and particles 1 and
>> 2 are separated in the 'bird' perspective as much as in any 'frog'
>> perspective. Going outside the perspective of the individual
>> experimenters does not actually gain you anything in this instance.
>
>
> But it makes no sense to say that particles 1 and 2, when separated,
> belongs to the same branches. Bell can say that because it assumes
> only one branch (so to speak) in which case there is a mysterious
> spooky action at a distance. But if they are space-like separated, we
> get the non-locality appearances only for those Alice and Bob wich
> will be able to meet at some points, and the math shows that this
> linearly and locally implied such appearances, despite the wave
> evolved locally at all time in the phase space. There should be no
> problem as you seem to accept the definition of worlds by set of
> events/objects close for interaction. If Alice and Bob are space like
> separated, they just cannot belong to the same woirld: it makes no sense.

That claim makes no sense. You are making an elementary logical blunder
-- Separate worlds do not interact, objects with spacelike separation do
not interact, therefore spacelike separation implies separate worlds.
That argument is equivalent to: all As are Bs, therefore this B is an A.

Separate branches arise only from decohered quantum interactions.
Preparing a singlet state and sending the particles off in separate
directions does not create separate worlds -- particles 1 and 2 are in
the same world until the spin measurements are made. Then multiple
worlds are generated, which eventually pair up so that worlds in which
correlations can be defined appear. For the singlet state under
consideration, these correlations violate the Bell inequalities in all
branches. The wave function evolves locally and linearly in
configuration space -- that is seen as non-locality in physical space.
There is no "outside view" of configurations space, so the non-locality
is intrinsic to the "bird" view of the wave function in physical space,
just as it is to the "frog" view from within a particular branch. No
local account of this physics exists.

Bruce

[Brent Meeker]

I think what Bruno is arguing is that decoherence is a local process, so
that although Bob and Alice's results are locally decohered, so they can
observe and record them, that only the results in which Alice and Bob's
measurements are as predicted by the wave function will be
non-orthogonal and can interact in the future where their light cones
overlap.

Brent

[Bruce Kellett]

That seems unexceptionable. Only measurement results as predicted by the
wave function can actually be observed. But this has little direct
bearing on the locality issue. The correlations could be local only if
the wave function for the separated observers were factorizable, and
this is not the case for the singlet wave function. Hence the
observation of non-local correlations.

Bruce

[scerir]

Precisely. I think there is some degree of confusion around the terms 'local' and 'non-local'. The wave function is non-local in that it refers to the two separated particles as a single entity, without specifying any particular interaction between them. This is a simple consequence of the fact that the wave function resides in configuration space, and any suggestion of a 'local mechanical' connection between the remote particles is lost when we move back into physical space in order to compare the quantum predictions coming from the wave function to our experimental results.

When people ask for a 'local' explanation of anything, they are thinking in terms of a 'mechanism', such as the exchange of  particle that can carry information in a local way. If they think of a 'non-local' interaction, they still think in this mechanistic way by considering a faster-than-light tachyonic exchange that is completely analagous to the subluminal particle exchange characteristic of normal local interactions. Such thinking is inapplicable to the wave function in quantum mechanics. When the wave function is describing two or more particles, it is intrinsically non-local in that in certain circumstances the wave function describes a single state, even though its parts might be widely separated in space. This form of intrinsic non-locality does not have any 'mechanism' underlying it -- there is no subluminal or superluminal particle exchange going on in the background to hold the dispersed state together! The non-locality is intrinsic: it cannot be reduced to some local mechanistic account.

Bruce

### Yuval Ne'eman suggested a fibre bundle "embedding" of EPR non-locality, in this paper

http://www.iaea.org/inis/collection/NCLCollectionStore/_Public/27/026/27026800.pdf

its a sort of geometrical solution.

Btw it seems that also Zeilinger is suggesting a solution in terms of a re-definition of space-time.

"Then quantum entanglement describes a situation where information exists about possible correlations between possible future results of possible future measurements without any information existing for the individual measurements. The latter explains quantum randomness, the first quantum entanglement. And both have significant consequences for our customary notions of causality. It remains to be seen what the consequences are for our notions of space and time, or space-time for that matter. Space-time itself cannot be above or beyond such considerations. I suggest we need a new deep analysis of space-time, a conceptual analysis maybe analogous to the one done by the Viennese physicist-philosopher Ernst Mach who kicked Newton’s absolute space and absolute time form their throne. The hope is that in the end we will have new physics analogous to Einstein’s new physics in the two theories of relativity.” A.Zeilinger

     

[Bruno Marchal]

On 05 Jun 2016, at 23:41, Brent Meeker wrote:

On 6/5/2016 4:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 05 Jun 2016, at 01:26, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 5/06/2016 3:31 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 04 Jun 2016, at 01:28, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 4/06/2016 4:16 am, Brent Meeker wrote:

If the world is a simulation, i.e. is being computed by a Turing machine, then the computation can implement non-local hidden variables and violate Bell's inequality in the simulated world (in fact all its variables would be non-local since locality and spacetime would just be computed phenomena).

Sure, Bell's theorem only rules out local hidden variables. If you simulate non-local hidden variables (i.e., get the separated experimenters to communicate non-locally), then of course you can reproduce the quantum correlations. But I was under the impression  that the computationalist goal was to eliminate non-locality. Separated experimenters, with as much computing power as necessary, cannot simulate the quantum correlations by performing only local computations.

You can simulate the whole (multiversial) structure, and the observers will find that from their perspective, Bell's inequality are violated. From outside, we can see (like Everett saw) that it is just a case of self-duplication FPI. (Which brings us back to the preceding thread of course).

Locally, Alice and Bob can simulate anything they like, and they can simulate universes with non-local hidden variables,  and predict that within those worlds the Bell inequalities are violated. But when they get back to their own world and compare their results, they will find that the correlations between their separate simulations of the results of spin measurements at arbitrary angles invariably satisfy the inequalities. In other words, they cannot, jointly, simulate the quantum results in any world that they both inhabit. The MWI view from outside is no different -- non-locality is inescapable.

You don't need to simulate hidden non- local variable. You need to just simulate the wave function.

Which depends on both spatial variables of the particles in an EPR experiment and so it non-local.

I don't see that. The singlet state make the first person sharable probabilities depending on state of far away particles, but when measurement are done, each person just localize itself, and its EPR-partner, in some branches where the states have always been well defined. The non separability is due to the fact that the results are determined by interfering (amplitudes of) probabilities, but those are explained by the FPI on the first person experiences on all relevant (= similar to me at the correct description level or below) states. 

The non-locality is purely phenomenological. My probability to stay here (from my first person perspective) is 1 minus the probability that I appear elsewhere (with naive mechanism + naive physics). In that sense computationalism is super-non local, but that does not entail the existence of physical action/interaction at a distance. 

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Bruno Marchal]

Come on. It was not an argument in logic, but in quantum mechanics. It
is a consequence of the linearity of both the evolution and the tensor
product. Once you define a world by a set closed for interaction (or
possible interaction), space-like separations orthogonalize the
realities. It just makes no sense to singularize Alice and Bob in one
world/relative-branch when they are entangled with the singlet state.

>
> Separate branches arise only from decohered quantum interactions.

Not in the MWI. If you decide to fix some base, you can consider that
the branches are separated at the start. It is the differentiation
view of Deutsch, which works also for the universal machine's "many-
dreams" interpretation of arithmetic. The Y = ll rule. IN QM it is
just that
a(b + c) = ab + ac if a is an observer, he does not need to look at
the particle state b/c to be multiplied.

Of course, from the digital mechanist view, all this talk is
premature. It is just that I don't see any spooky action at a distance
in the MW.

> Preparing a singlet state and sending the particles off in separate
> directions does not create separate worlds -- particles 1 and 2 are
> in the same world until the spin measurements are made. Then
> multiple worlds are generated, which eventually pair up so that
> worlds in which correlations can be defined appear. For the singlet
> state under consideration, these correlations violate the Bell
> inequalities in all branches. The wave function evolves locally and
> linearly in configuration space -- that is seen as non-locality in
> physical space.

Somehow that would please a digital mechanist, as this would make the
physical even less real. But I am not convinced by your argument.

> There is no "outside view" of configurations space, so the non-
> locality is intrinsic to the "bird" view of the wave function in
> physical space, just as it is to the "frog" view from within a
> particular branch. No local account of this physics exists.

I think we might disagree about what we mean by "physical world".
Space-like-separated world can interfere probabilistically without any
possible interactions in between. Quantum non separability can exist
between space-like separated worlds, but as we can hope, without any
need of physical interaction or causation between them.

[Bruce Kellett]

On 7/06/2016 2:00 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 06 Jun 2016, at 03:20, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 5/06/2016 9:44 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:

But it makes no sense to say that particles 1 and 2, when separated, belongs to the same branches. Bell can say that because it assumes only one branch (so to speak) in which case there is a mysterious spooky action at a distance. But if they are space-like separated, we get the non-locality appearances only for those Alice and Bob wich will be able to meet at some points, and the math shows that this linearly and locally implied such appearances, despite the wave evolved locally at all time in the phase space. There should be no problem as you seem to accept the definition of worlds by set of events/objects close for interaction. If Alice and Bob are space like separated, they just cannot belong to the same woirld: it makes no sense.

That claim makes no sense. You are making an elementary logical blunder -- Separate worlds do not interact, objects with spacelike separation do not interact, therefore spacelike separation implies separate worlds. That argument is equivalent to: all As are Bs, therefore this B is an A.

Come on. It was not an argument in logic, but in quantum mechanics. It is a consequence of the linearity of both the evolution and the tensor product. Once you define a world by a set closed for interaction (or possible interaction), space-like separations orthogonalize the realities. It just makes no sense to singularize Alice and Bob in one world/relative-branch when they are entangled with the singlet state.

Spacelike separations do not orthogonalize anything. A world is closed for interaction, but that is not the best defining characteristic of a world. In MWI, worlds are produced by decoherence following an interaction (be it a measurement or some other interaction). Decoherence into the environment inevitably results in the production of soft IR photons that escape from the region. These photons are not recoverable, so once decoherence has progressed to reasonable degree, the situation is not reversible:  the IR photons can never be retrieved and put back into the interaction region, so once the possibilities have decohered, the process is irreversible in principle, not just FAPP. It is this irreversibility that precludes further interference or interaction between the worlds. So irreversibility is the defining characteristic of separate worlds, not just lack of interaction.

Given this, Alice and Bob separate into different branches/worlds only following an interaction -- only when they measure their part of the singlet state. It makes no sense to claim that this happens before such interaction with the state because before any measurement has been made, the situation is completely reversible and there is only one world.

Separate branches arise only from decohered quantum interactions.

Not in the MWI. If you decide to fix some base, you can consider that the branches are separated at the start. It is the differentiation view of Deutsch, which works also for the universal machine's "many-dreams" interpretation of arithmetic. The Y = ll rule.  IN QM it is just that

a(b + c) = ab + ac   if a is an observer, he does not need to look at the particle state b/c to be multiplied.

That is just playing with words, and Deutsch's approach reduces the concept of "separate worlds" to meaninglessness -- the concept becomes so fluid as to become useless. One is very much better advised to limit the idea of separate worlds to the irreversibility following a decohered interaction.

Of course, from the digital mechanist view, all this talk is premature. It is just that I don't see any spooky action at a distance in the MW.

Preparing a singlet state and sending the particles off in separate directions does not create separate worlds -- particles 1 and 2 are in the same world until the spin measurements are made. Then multiple worlds are generated, which eventually pair up so that worlds in which correlations can be defined appear. For the singlet state under consideration, these correlations violate the Bell inequalities in all branches. The wave function evolves locally and linearly in configuration space -- that is seen as non-locality in physical space.

Somehow that would please a digital mechanist, as this would make the physical even less real. But I am not convinced by your argument.

My logic is secure. You haven't refuted my basic arguments as yet.

There is no "outside view" of configurations space, so the non-locality is intrinsic to the "bird" view of the wave function in physical space, just as it is to the "frog" view from within a particular branch. No local account of this physics exists.

I think we might disagree about what we mean by "physical world".  Space-like-separated world can interfere probabilistically without any possible interactions in between. Quantum non separability can exist between space-like separated worlds, but as we can hope, without any need of physical interaction or causation between them.

That sounds like you actually do accept the standard concept of non-locality in quantum mechanics! Spacelike separated particles can interfere probabilistically without any possible interactions (mechanistic force-field exchanges) between them: that is precisely what is meant by non-locality in this context.

I think you have been too tied up with a mechanistic interpretation of non-locality -- you appear to think that it necessarily involves FTL exchange of some particle or other mechanistic influence.  But this is not necessarily the case -- we don't actually postulate non-local hidden variables of this type because that would represent an attempt to give a "local" account of "non-locality". All that is involved is that the singlet state is a unity, even though the entangled particles might be widely separated. This is reflected in the fact that the wave function itself is intrinsically non-local -- it is local and deterministic only in configuration space, not in 3-dimensional physical space.

Bruce

[Bruno Marchal]

On 07 Jun 2016, at 04:24, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 7/06/2016 2:00 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 06 Jun 2016, at 03:20, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 5/06/2016 9:44 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:

But it makes no sense to say that particles 1 and 2, when separated, belongs to the same branches. Bell can say that because it assumes only one branch (so to speak) in which case there is a mysterious spooky action at a distance. But if they are space-like separated, we get the non-locality appearances only for those Alice and Bob wich will be able to meet at some points, and the math shows that this linearly and locally implied such appearances, despite the wave evolved locally at all time in the phase space. There should be no problem as you seem to accept the definition of worlds by set of events/objects close for interaction. If Alice and Bob are space like separated, they just cannot belong to the same woirld: it makes no sense.

That claim makes no sense. You are making an elementary logical blunder -- Separate worlds do not interact, objects with spacelike separation do not interact, therefore spacelike separation implies separate worlds. That argument is equivalent to: all As are Bs, therefore this B is an A.

Come on. It was not an argument in logic, but in quantum mechanics. It is a consequence of the linearity of both the evolution and the tensor product. Once you define a world by a set closed for interaction (or possible interaction), space-like separations orthogonalize the realities. It just makes no sense to singularize Alice and Bob in one world/relative-branch when they are entangled with the singlet state.

Spacelike separations do not orthogonalize anything. A world is closed for interaction, but that is not the best defining characteristic of a world. In MWI, worlds are produced by decoherence following an interaction (be it a measurement or some other interaction). Decoherence into the environment inevitably results in the production of soft IR photons that escape from the region. These photons are not recoverable, so once decoherence has progressed to reasonable degree, the situation is not reversible:  the IR photons can never be retrieved and put back into the interaction region, so once the possibilities have decohered, the process is irreversible in principle, not just FAPP. It is this irreversibility that precludes further interference or interaction between the worlds. So irreversibility is the defining characteristic of separate worlds, not just lack of interaction.

Given this, Alice and Bob separate into different branches/worlds only following an interaction -- only when they measure their part of the singlet state. It makes no sense to claim that this happens before such interaction with the state because before any measurement has been made, the situation is completely reversible and there is only one world.

Separate branches arise only from decohered quantum interactions.

Not in the MWI. If you decide to fix some base, you can consider that the branches are separated at the start. It is the differentiation view of Deutsch, which works also for the universal machine's "many-dreams" interpretation of arithmetic. The Y = ll rule.  IN QM it is just that
a(b + c) = ab + ac   if a is an observer, he does not need to look at the particle state b/c to be multiplied.

That is just playing with words, and Deutsch's approach reduces the concept of "separate worlds" to meaninglessness -- the concept becomes so fluid as to become useless. One is very much better advised to limit the idea of separate worlds to the irreversibility following a decohered interaction.

That does not exist. In principle quantum erasure is always possible. In practice that is quickly impossible, but reason of BIG numbers, but the wave, or the unitary evolution, is always reversible. 

Of course, from the digital mechanist view, all this talk is premature. It is just that I don't see any spooky action at a distance in the MW.

Preparing a singlet state and sending the particles off in separate directions does not create separate worlds -- particles 1 and 2 are in the same world until the spin measurements are made. Then multiple worlds are generated, which eventually pair up so that worlds in which correlations can be defined appear. For the singlet state under consideration, these correlations violate the Bell inequalities in all branches. The wave function evolves locally and linearly in configuration space -- that is seen as non-locality in physical space.

Somehow that would please a digital mechanist, as this would make the physical even less real. But I am not convinced by your argument.

My logic is secure. You haven't refuted my basic arguments as yet.

I have and others too.

There is no "outside view" of configurations space, so the non-locality is intrinsic to the "bird" view of the wave function in physical space, just as it is to the "frog" view from within a particular branch. No local account of this physics exists.

I think we might disagree about what we mean by "physical world".  Space-like-separated world can interfere probabilistically without any possible interactions in between. Quantum non separability can exist between space-like separated worlds, but as we can hope, without any need of physical interaction or causation between them.

That sounds like you actually do accept the standard concept of non-locality in quantum mechanics! Spacelike separated particles can interfere probabilistically without any possible interactions (mechanistic force-field exchanges) between them: that is precisely what is meant by non-locality in this context.

I think you have been too tied up with a mechanistic interpretation of non-locality -- you appear to think that it necessarily involves FTL exchange of some particle or other mechanistic influence.  But this is not necessarily the case -- we don't actually postulate non-local hidden variables of this type because that would represent an attempt to give a "local" account of "non-locality". All that is involved is that the singlet state is a unity, even though the entangled particles might be widely separated. This is reflected in the fact that the wave function itself is intrinsically non-local -- it is local and deterministic only in configuration space, not in 3-dimensional physical space.

You are the one who seem to accept that such a non-locality is not physical, but due to the internal relative FPI. If you agree there is no FTL action in any physical realities, I guess we agree, then.

Bruno

Bruce

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Bruce Kellett]

On 7/06/2016 6:57 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 07 Jun 2016, at 04:24, Bruce Kellett wrote:

That is just playing with words, and Deutsch's approach reduces the concept of "separate worlds" to meaninglessness -- the concept becomes so fluid as to become useless. One is very much better advised to limit the idea of separate worlds to the irreversibility following a decohered interaction.

That does not exist. In principle quantum erasure is always possible. In practice that is quickly impossible, but reason of BIG numbers, but the wave, or the unitary evolution, is always reversible.

That is false. As I explained earlier in the post, decoherence into the warm thermal environment will always result in IR photons. These escape at the velocity of light and can never be captured to be returned -- this is an in principle limitation on the possibility of reversibility. Reversibility is possible only in very special and tightly controlled situations. In general, the formation of distinct worlds is irreversible in principle.

Bruce

[Bruce Kellett]

On 7/06/2016 6:57 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:

I have always been clear that no FTL mechanistic disturbance was
involved in quantum non-locality. We seems to agree on that. However,
"the internal relative FPI" is just a sequence of words that has little
meaning in this context. Why not just accept that the observed results
come from the standard evolution of the wave function, so the observed
non-locality is just a property of the wave function -- no mystery or
magical FPI about it at all.

Bruce

[smitra]

On 07-06-2016 11:03, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> On 7/06/2016 6:57 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> On 07 Jun 2016, at 04:24, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>>
>>> That is just playing with words, and Deutsch's approach reduces
>>> the concept of "separate worlds" to meaninglessness -- the concept
>>> becomes so fluid as to become useless. One is very much better
>>> advised to limit the idea of separate worlds to the
>>> irreversibility following a decohered interaction.
>>
>> That does not exist. In principle quantum erasure is always
>> possible. In practice that is quickly impossible, but reason of BIG
>> numbers, but the wave, or the unitary evolution, is always
>> reversible.
>
> That is false. As I explained earlier in the post, decoherence into
> the warm thermal environment will always result in IR photons. These
> escape at the velocity of light and can never be captured to be

> returned -- this is an _in principle_ limitation on the possibility of

> reversibility. Reversibility is possible only in very special and
> tightly controlled situations. In general, the formation of distinct
> worlds is irreversible in principle.
>

This has nothing to do with reversibility. Reversibility has to do with
whether the information about the initial state is present in the final
state, not whether you can imagine a situation where you cannot actually
reverse the time evolution in practice. Note that infrared photons
escaping is not going to cause information loss at the fundamental
level. It may look that way when doing practical computations by
treating the system under consideration in an effective way using
density matrices where you trace out the environmental degrees of
freedom.

Saibal

[Brent Meeker]

On 6/7/2016 1:57 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 07 Jun 2016, at 04:24, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 7/06/2016 2:00 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 06 Jun 2016, at 03:20, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 5/06/2016 9:44 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:

But it makes no sense to say that particles 1 and 2, when separated, belongs to the same branches. Bell can say that because it assumes only one branch (so to speak) in which case there is a mysterious spooky action at a distance. But if they are space-like separated, we get the non-locality appearances only for those Alice and Bob wich will be able to meet at some points, and the math shows that this linearly and locally implied such appearances, despite the wave evolved locally at all time in the phase space. There should be no problem as you seem to accept the definition of worlds by set of events/objects close for interaction. If Alice and Bob are space like separated, they just cannot belong to the same woirld: it makes no sense.

That claim makes no sense. You are making an elementary logical blunder -- Separate worlds do not interact, objects with spacelike separation do not interact, therefore spacelike separation implies separate worlds. That argument is equivalent to: all As are Bs, therefore this B is an A.

Come on. It was not an argument in logic, but in quantum mechanics. It is a consequence of the linearity of both the evolution and the tensor product. Once you define a world by a set closed for interaction (or possible interaction), space-like separations orthogonalize the realities. It just makes no sense to singularize Alice and Bob in one world/relative-branch when they are entangled with the singlet state.

Spacelike separations do not orthogonalize anything. A world is closed for interaction, but that is not the best defining characteristic of a world. In MWI, worlds are produced by decoherence following an interaction (be it a measurement or some other interaction). Decoherence into the environment inevitably results in the production of soft IR photons that escape from the region. These photons are not recoverable, so once decoherence has progressed to reasonable degree, the situation is not reversible:  the IR photons can never be retrieved and put back into the interaction region, so once the possibilities have decohered, the process is irreversible in principle, not just FAPP. It is this irreversibility that precludes further interference or interaction between the worlds. So irreversibility is the defining characteristic of separate worlds, not just lack of interaction.

Given this, Alice and Bob separate into different branches/worlds only following an interaction -- only when they measure their part of the singlet state. It makes no sense to claim that this happens before such interaction with the state because before any measurement has been made, the situation is completely reversible and there is only one world.

Separate branches arise only from decohered quantum interactions.

Not in the MWI. If you decide to fix some base, you can consider that the branches are separated at the start. It is the differentiation view of Deutsch, which works also for the universal machine's "many-dreams" interpretation of arithmetic. The Y = ll rule.  IN QM it is just that
a(b + c) = ab + ac   if a is an observer, he does not need to look at the particle state b/c to be multiplied.

That is just playing with words, and Deutsch's approach reduces the concept of "separate worlds" to meaninglessness -- the concept becomes so fluid as to become useless. One is very much better advised to limit the idea of separate worlds to the irreversibility following a decohered interaction.

That does not exist. In principle quantum erasure is always possible.

I don't think that's true.  When part of the necessary information is carried away at the speed of light it's impossible (according to current theory) to erase it.

In practice that is quickly impossible, but reason of BIG numbers, but the wave, or the unitary evolution, is always reversible.

That's slightly different.  It assumes there is a "wave function of the multiverse" which is highly non-local (it includes other universes).  Since everything is inside it, there's no way to arrange its reversal.  To say it's reversible just means putting -t for t and -p for p is still a solution.

Brent

[Bruce Kellett]

I suppose it depends on what you want "reversibility" to do for you. If
your concern is with unitary evolution and the conservation of
information, the the evolution is "reversible" in that if you replace t
with -t in your equations, you will get another possible physical
process. But if your concern is with recovering the coherence of a
quantum state that has fully decohered (by unitary evolution) then you
face a different problem. There is no physical procedure that replaces t
with -t -- that is a purely mathematical operation that has no parallel
in the physical world. So the loss of IR photons at the speed of light
absolutely excludes the possibility of recovering the original coherent
state. Thus decohered separate worlds can never recombine or interact in
any way -- generic quantum processes are not reversible.

Bruce

[Brent Meeker]

And besides that, if you could actually reverse the evolution you and
everyone else would not even notice it. In fact maybe it is reversed.
Or more to the point t increases with entropy - it makes no sense to
"reverse" it, it's just a coordinate label in the equation. The t that
is measured by a clock only goes one way.

Brent

[Bruno Marchal]

See Saibal Mitra's answer.

In practice that is quickly impossible, but reason of BIG numbers, but the wave, or the unitary evolution, is always reversible.

That's slightly different.  It assumes there is a "wave function of the multiverse" which is highly non-local (it includes other universes). 

Then arithmetic is even more non-local. it includes all the dreams of all the dreamable universes. And if the number zero disappears, all numbers disappears at once. That makes non-locality into a metaphor.

The point was that some people, despite understanding that we cannot do quicker than light signaling with an EPR channel, still believe that the violation of Bell's inequality show that there is still a physical influence at a distance responsible for that violation. And that *must* be the case, if there is only one physical universe. The point is that in the MWI, the violation of Bell's inequality does no more bring any physical influence at a distance. They are phenomenologically explained by the "subjective probability" from the view from inside the many terms available in the universal wave.

Since everything is inside it, there's no way to arrange its reversal.  To say it's reversible just means putting -t for t and -p for p is still a solution.

OK.

Bruno

Brent

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[Bruno Marchal]

No problem with this. 

In "my" theory (which is the "physics of the average classical Löbian machine" and is extracted from pure arithmetic) we still don't know if there are photons. All we know is that there is a highly symmetrical core bottom which determines the measure on the observable and on the *many* relative accessible first person sharable histories, and that this obeys some quantum logic.

Bruno

Bruce

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[Bruno Marchal]

On 07 Jun 2016, at 13:46, Bruce Kellett wrote:

> On 7/06/2016 6:57 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> On 07 Jun 2016, at 04:24, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>>
>>> That sounds like you actually do accept the standard concept of
>>> non-locality in quantum mechanics! Spacelike separated particles
>>> can interfere probabilistically without any possible interactions
>>> (mechanistic force-field exchanges) between them: that is
>>> precisely what is meant by non-locality in this context.
>>>
>>> I think you have been too tied up with a mechanistic
>>> interpretation of non-locality -- you appear to think that it
>>> necessarily involves FTL exchange of some particle or other
>>> mechanistic influence. But this is not necessarily the case -- we
>>> don't actually postulate non-local hidden variables of this type
>>> because that would represent an attempt to give a "local" account
>>> of "non-locality". All that is involved is that the singlet state
>>> is a unity, even though the entangled particles might be widely
>>> separated. This is reflected in the fact that the wave function
>>> itself is intrinsically non-local -- it is local and deterministic
>>> only in configuration space, not in 3-dimensional physical space.
>>
>> You are the one who seem to accept that such a non-locality is not
>> physical, but due to the internal relative FPI. If you agree there
>> is no FTL action in any physical realities, I guess we agree, then.
>
> I have always been clear that no FTL mechanistic disturbance was
> involved in quantum non-locality.

Oh! Sorry for having miss that. But Bell's inequality violation + the
mono-universe assumption does lead to such FTL, like Bohm hidden
variable theory does lead to either FTL or super-conspiracies.

The point is that once we eliminate the wave packet reduction, there
are no more FTL. And no collapse = MWI, with most weak and abstract
notion of worlds. Without collapse, the linearity makes the
superposition contagious to anything interacting, and that generate
the world. But the differenciation of "worlds" are like bubbles
generated at each points of the cosmos, like Malpertuis described
front waves, making each of them local, almost by definition.

> We seems to agree on that. However, "the internal relative FPI" is
> just a sequence of words that has little meaning in this context.

?
You cannot avoid them to get the report by the Alices and Bobs about
the correlation and its violation of Bell's inequality. It is the
basic mechanism in Everett's paper. I found that independently in
arithmetic (instead of a Wave equation). Indeed, with
computationalism, we have to extracted the wave from the numbers, and
by doing its through self-reference, we can distinguish the provable
from the true but non provable by the observers, leading to the
distinction, for the intensional (and Theaetetical) variants of
provability, between quanta and qualia.

> Why not just accept that the observed results come from the standard
> evolution of the wave function, so the observed non-locality is just
> a property of the wave function -- no mystery or magical FPI about
> it at all.

As I said, and insist, you need it for Bob and Alice, and anyone,
actually, to just talk about results of measurement. Like you need the
Helsinki Man opening the door and saying "Oh! I am in Moscow this
times".

[Bruce Kellett]

You still get reduction to distinct worlds in each branch of the MWI.
You have to do some work to show that this is not equivalent (for each
observer) to a collapse.

>> We seems to agree on that. However, "the internal relative FPI" is
>> just a sequence of words that has little meaning in this context.
>
> ?
> You cannot avoid them to get the report by the Alices and Bobs about
> the correlation and its violation of Bell's inequality. It is the
> basic mechanism in Everett's paper. I found that independently in
> arithmetic (instead of a Wave equation). Indeed, with
> computationalism, we have to extracted the wave from the numbers, and
> by doing its through self-reference, we can distinguish the provable
> from the true but non provable by the observers, leading to the
> distinction, for the intensional (and Theaetetical) variants of
> provability, between quanta and qualia.
>
>> Why not just accept that the observed results come from the standard
>> evolution of the wave function, so the observed non-locality is just
>> a property of the wave function -- no mystery or magical FPI about it
>> at all.
>
> As I said, and insist, you need it for Bob and Alice, and anyone,
> actually, to just talk about results of measurement. Like you need the
> Helsinki Man opening the door and saying "Oh! I am in Moscow this times".

In other words, FPI is just the statement that Alice and Bob have to
look to find out which of the (+,+'), (+,-'), (-,+'), or (-,-') worlds
they are in. I don't think that actually adds anything significant to
the discussion.

Bruce

[Bruno Marchal]

By the FPI, that is a phenomenological collapse. The work is done by
Everett already. except that he did not realize that, by using
mechanism, there is no choice than to derive the universal wave or
universal matrix from elementary arithmetic. But then he was not
working on the mind-body problem and get the aristotelian prejudices
which are widespread (and dogmatic). But the FPI explains why there is
apparent collapse without collapse (Everett), and why there is an
apparent wave with only number.

>
>>> We seems to agree on that. However, "the internal relative FPI" is
>>> just a sequence of words that has little meaning in this context.
>>
>> ?
>> You cannot avoid them to get the report by the Alices and Bobs
>> about the correlation and its violation of Bell's inequality. It is
>> the basic mechanism in Everett's paper. I found that independently
>> in arithmetic (instead of a Wave equation). Indeed, with
>> computationalism, we have to extracted the wave from the numbers,
>> and by doing its through self-reference, we can distinguish the
>> provable from the true but non provable by the observers, leading
>> to the distinction, for the intensional (and Theaetetical) variants
>> of provability, between quanta and qualia.
>>
>>> Why not just accept that the observed results come from the
>>> standard evolution of the wave function, so the observed non-
>>> locality is just a property of the wave function -- no mystery or
>>> magical FPI about it at all.
>>
>> As I said, and insist, you need it for Bob and Alice, and anyone,
>> actually, to just talk about results of measurement. Like you need
>> the Helsinki Man opening the door and saying "Oh! I am in Moscow
>> this times".
>
> In other words, FPI is just the statement that Alice and Bob have to
> look to find out which of the (+,+'), (+,-'), (-,+'), or (-,-')
> worlds they are in. I don't think that actually adds anything
> significant to the discussion.

That eliminates the physical spooky action at a distance which are
necessarily there in QM+collapse.

That adds nothing, indeed. That shows only that the paradoxes came
only from the axioms some have added to fit their philosophical
prejudices.

[Bruce Kellett]

On 10/06/2016 1:41 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 09 Jun 2016, at 01:28, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>> In other words, FPI is just the statement that Alice and Bob have to
>> look to find out which of the (+,+'), (+,-'), (-,+'), or (-,-')
>> worlds they are in. I don't think that actually adds anything
>> significant to the discussion.
>
> That eliminates the physical spooky action at a distance which are
> necessarily there in QM+collapse.

You have yet to prove that -- assertion is not proof.

> That adds nothing, indeed. That shows only that the paradoxes came
> only from the axioms some have added to fit their philosophical
> prejudices.

So you add axioms to suit your philosophical prejudices just as others
do -- how does that make your position any better than that of others?

Bruce

[Bruno Marchal]

On 10 Jun 2016, at 03:02, Bruce Kellett wrote:

> On 10/06/2016 1:41 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> On 09 Jun 2016, at 01:28, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>>> In other words, FPI is just the statement that Alice and Bob have
>>> to look to find out which of the (+,+'), (+,-'), (-,+'), or (-,-')
>>> worlds they are in. I don't think that actually adds anything
>>> significant to the discussion.
>>
>> That eliminates the physical spooky action at a distance which are
>> necessarily there in QM+collapse.
>
> You have yet to prove that -- assertion is not proof.

By defining world by "closed for interaction", locality follows from
linearity. There are 1p statistical interference, but Bell's
inequality violation is accounted without FTL, which is not the case
with collapse, or Bohmian particules.
I gave the proof with others, and eventually you admitted that there
was no real action at a distance. But with one world, those are real
action at a distance. So I think the point has been made.

>
>> That adds nothing, indeed. That shows only that the paradoxes came
>> only from the axioms some have added to fit their philosophical
>> prejudices.
>
> So you add axioms to suit your philosophical prejudices just as
> others do -- how does that make your position any better than that
> of others?

No. I subtract axioms.

Bohr's axioms: SWE + COLLAPSE + number (add,mult) (+
unintelligible theory of mind)

Everett's axioms SWE + Number (add,mult). (+ mechanist theory of
mind)

Your servitor's axioms: Number(add,mult). (+ mechanist theory
of mind)

And I don't pretend that is true, only that digital mechanism makes
this necessary and testable (modulo the usual "malin génies").

Bruno

[Bruce Kellett]

On 11/06/2016 3:56 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 10 Jun 2016, at 03:02, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>> On 10/06/2016 1:41 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> On 09 Jun 2016, at 01:28, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>>>> In other words, FPI is just the statement that Alice and Bob have
>>>> to look to find out which of the (+,+'), (+,-'), (-,+'), or (-,-')
>>>> worlds they are in. I don't think that actually adds anything
>>>> significant to the discussion.
>>>
>>> That eliminates the physical spooky action at a distance which are
>>> necessarily there in QM+collapse.
>>
>> You have yet to prove that -- assertion is not proof.
>
> By defining world by "closed for interaction", locality follows from
> linearity.

Bruno, you specialize in these oracular pronouncements that mean
absolutely nothing. "locality follows from linearity" -- what a load of
total nonsense.

> There are 1p statistical interference, but Bell's inequality violation
> is accounted without FTL, which is not the case with collapse, or
> Bohmian particules.
> I gave the proof with others, and eventually you admitted that there
> was no real action at a distance. But with one world, those are real
> action at a distance. So I think the point has been made.

There is no FTL mechanism in action in one world or many: Bell
non-locality obeys the no-signalling theorem. You have to get over
thinking that non-locality means FTL action.

>>> That adds nothing, indeed. That shows only that the paradoxes came
>>> only from the axioms some have added to fit their philosophical
>>> prejudices.
>>
>> So you add axioms to suit your philosophical prejudices just as
>> others do -- how does that make your position any better than that of
>> others?
>
> No. I subtract axioms.
>
> Bohr's axioms: SWE + COLLAPSE + number (add,mult) (+
> unintelligible theory of mind)
>
> Everett's axioms SWE + Number (add,mult). (+ mechanist theory of
> mind)
>
> Your servitor's axioms: Number(add,mult). (+ mechanist theory
> of mind)
>
> And I don't pretend that is true, only that digital mechanism makes
> this necessary and testable (modulo the usual "malin génies").

All the above sets of axioms lead to non-local theories. You may claim
just to subtract axioms, but that is as much choosing your axioms as any
other procedure. And you have yet to show that you get the physics of
this world out of your theory --and demonstrate the necessary stability
of the physics. Just wishing evil genies away does not actually banish them.

Bruce

[Alan Grayson]

Here's an article of interest. FWIW, I don't believe the no-signalling theorem puts this issue

to rest. AG

 http://people.uleth.ca/~kent.peacock/FQXi_v2.pdf

[Bruno Marchal]

On 30 Aug 2016, at 18:23, Alan Grayson wrote:

On Friday, June 10, 2016 at 6:10:41 PM UTC-6, Bruce wrote:

On 11/06/2016 3:56 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 10 Jun 2016, at 03:02, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>> On 10/06/2016 1:41 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> On 09 Jun 2016, at 01:28, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>>>> In other words, FPI is just the statement that Alice and Bob have
>>>> to look to find out which of the (+,+'), (+,-'), (-,+'), or (-,-')
>>>> worlds they are in. I don't think that actually adds anything
>>>> significant to the discussion.
>>>
>>> That eliminates the physical spooky action at a distance which are
>>> necessarily there in QM+collapse.
>>
>> You have yet to prove that -- assertion is not proof.
>
> By defining world by "closed for interaction", locality follows from
> linearity.

Bruno, you specialize in these oracular pronouncements that mean
absolutely nothing.

This is just insulting, and add nothing but confusion.

Avoid ad hominem patronizing tone and focus on what you do not understand or disagree with.

"locality follows from linearity" -- what a load of
total nonsense.

OK, I was quick there, but I provided more details in *many* other posts. Please read most of a thread, not just a a sentence here and there and then adding to the prejudices.

To be slightly less short, and explain, I was talking in the frame of the non collapse formulation of QM, and I was just saying that without any collapse, the linearity of the tensor product with the linearity of the SWE ensure that at any time everything is local, even computable, in the global third person picture.

Basically, "physical non locality" needs to put some amount of 3p sense in the collapse of the wave, where in the MWI (and in arithmetic) the indeterminacies and the non local appearances are purely epistemic (first person or first person plural). 

> There are 1p statistical interference, but Bell's inequality violation
> is accounted without FTL, which is not the case with collapse, or
> Bohmian particules.
> I gave the proof with others, and eventually you admitted that there
> was no real action at a distance. But with one world, those are real
> action at a distance. So I think the point has been made.

There is no FTL mechanism in action in one world or many: Bell
non-locality obeys the no-signalling theorem. You have to get over
thinking that non-locality means FTL action.

Here's an article of interest. FWIW, I don't believe the no-signalling theorem puts this issue

to rest. AG

In all the thread we (me and Bruce) were agreeing with this.  

The question was specifically about some possible remnant of physical action at a distance in the MWI. We both know that the non signaling does not put light on this. Genuine physical action at a distance obviously exist in the QM-with-collapse, by Bell's inequality violation, but Bell's argument does not show action at a distance( in any unique branch if that exist), in the MWI. 

What we have is the contagion of superposition, and they never go quicker than interaction, that is at sub-speed of light.

And that is why we can define, or represent the "world" by set of space-time events closed for interaction.

 http://people.uleth.ca/~kent.peacock/FQXi_v2.pdf

Interesting (but out of  topic indeed).

Bruno

>>> That adds nothing, indeed. That shows only that the paradoxes came
>>> only from the axioms some have added to fit their philosophical
>>> prejudices.
>>
>> So you add axioms to suit your philosophical prejudices just as
>> others do -- how does that make your position any better than that of
>> others?
>
> No. I subtract axioms.
>
> Bohr's axioms: SWE + COLLAPSE + number (add,mult)      (+
> unintelligible theory of mind)
>
> Everett's axioms SWE + Number (add,mult).       (+ mechanist theory of
> mind)
>
> Your servitor's axioms: Number(add,mult).        (+ mechanist theory
> of mind)
>
> And I don't pretend that is true, only that digital mechanism makes
> this necessary and testable (modulo the usual "malin génies").

All the above sets of axioms lead to non-local theories. You may claim
just to subtract axioms, but that is as much choosing your axioms as any
other procedure. And you have yet to show that you get the physics of
this world out of your theory --and demonstrate the necessary stability
of the physics. Just wishing evil genies away does not actually banish them.

Bruce

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[agrays...@gmail.com]

In all the thread we (me and Bruce) were agreeing with this,   

I haven't read every post in this thread, but from Bruce's remark above, he apparently believes that you believe in FTL transmission of information, and that since the no-signal theorem denies that, your claim (or any claim of FTL transmission) is falsified.The article I posted denies that the apparent contradiction between relativity and non locality can be resolved simply by appealing to the non-signalling theorem, which Bruce seems to assert. I can only go by his words. So I don't see that the article I posted is irrelevant to the discussion. AG  

[agrays...@gmail.com]

Bruce insists there is no FTL phenomenon; that all we're dealing with is a property of the wf. Yet it seems that Alice and Bob have information that could only be transmitted FTL since they're space-like separated. I don't see how the no-signalling theorem resolves or denies this conclusion. But Bruce seems very sure. As for Bruno, I think he claims that there's no FTL phenomenon using the MWI, but there is for one-world with a collapse. Personally, I have always regarded the MWI as a cure that is worse than the disease. I have never heard any coherent account of how these other worlds come into existence, or even what exactly they contain and imply -- multiple copies of the observer, all with the same of the past? AG

[Bruno Marchal]

Guess what, you were completely wrong.

I was the one who denies the FTL. 

The article I posted denies that the apparent contradiction between relativity and non locality can be resolved simply by appealing to the non-signalling theorem, which Bruce seems to assert.

I was the one asserting that with the MWI, even the Bell's violation does not force FTL, even without signalling possible.

My point, shared by others in the thread,  was that with the MWI restores both 3p determinacy, and 3p locality. The point of Clark and Bruce is that even with the MWI, Bell's inequality violation proves that nature is 3p non local, and that action at a distance exists.

I can only go by his words. So I don't see that the article I posted is irrelevant to the discussion. AG  

It was Bruce who claims that Bell's inequality violation shows that FTL exists, even without possible signalling. I agree that FTL (fast than light influence which not necessarily exploitable for transmission of information) still exist, and I agree that it is logically possible, but people believing in that have the obligation to give evidence, and my point is that in the MWI, Bell's violation is no more an evidence, as Bell supposes definite outcomes in definite realties, which makes no sense in the MWI, nor in computationalism more generally.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[agrays...@gmail.com]

My text may have confused you. I thought you went to the MWI to deny FTL in this one-world. That's what I meant. But Bruce seems to deny FTL in this world, by saying the phenomenon is just a property of the wf, and in his appeal to the no-signalling theorem; as if to say, if you can't send information, there can't be FTL. But here "send information" in the context of no-signalling theorem just means you can't send a message of choice. AG 

What does FPI stand for? TIA, AG

The article I posted denies that the apparent contradiction between relativity and non locality can be resolved simply by appealing to the non-signalling theorem, which Bruce seems to assert.

I was the one asserting that with the MWI, even the Bell's violation does not force FTL, even without signalling possible.

My point, shared by others in the thread,  was that with the MWI restores both 3p determinacy, and 3p locality. The point of Clark and Bruce is that even with the MWI, Bell's inequality violation proves that nature is 3p non local, and that action at a distance exists.

I can only go by his words. So I don't see that the article I posted is irrelevant to the discussion. AG  

It was Bruce who claims that Bell's inequality violation shows that FTL exists, even without possible signalling.

Then why does he tell you to "get over it", it being FTL? AG

 

I agree that FTL (fast than light influence which not necessarily exploitable for transmission of information) still exist, and I agree that it is logically possible, but people believing in that have the obligation to give evidence, and my point is that in the MWI, Bell's violation is no more an evidence, as Bell supposes definite outcomes in definite realties, which makes no sense in the MWI, nor in computationalism more generally.

I tend to agree that Bell's results assume one world. AG 

[Alan Grayson]

Maybe he means that FTL exists in this world, so why resort to the MWI to deny it. But then why does he bring up the no-signalling theorem? AG 

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[agrays...@gmail.com]

Hope I didn't offend any true believers in the MWI, but in extensive discussions about this on another MB, none of the true believers could give a coherent account of these other worlds; for example, where the energy comes from, and whether an observer in this world is reproduced in other worlds, and if so, with what memories. The MWI seems like a desperate attempt to avoid non-locality and/or non-linearity of QM. AG 

[Bruno Marchal]

MWI is a theory. I have often explain, as a logician, that MWI is not an interpretation but a different theory than Copenhagen. MWI  = wave-function postulate. Copenhagen-QM = wave function postulate + collapse postulate. Of course both have some problem of interpretation (like all theories). I tend to not accept the notion of "physical world", and working in arithmetic I use only the notion of computation. Indeed, my result is that both the collapse of the wave and the wave itself are universal number's First Person phenomenologies, when we assume a form of Mechanist Hypothesis in cognitive science. Mechanism makes physicalism wrong.

but in extensive discussions about this on another MB, none of the true believers could give a coherent account of these other worlds; for example, where the energy comes from,

Energy is a "one-world" notion, but anyway, I don't believe in worlds, at least not until someone explains what they mean. For me, it is a convenient fiction. With Mechanism, a world is an extrapolation made by numbers sharing sheaves of computation verifying some measure weight, and such measure weighting must be explained through the logic of self-reference. You might take a look at my papers, like this one:

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html

Or this one, if you can access it:

 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.pbiomolbio.2013.03.014

and whether an observer in this world is reproduced in other worlds, and if so, with what memories. The MWI seems like a desperate attempt to avoid non-locality and/or non-linearity of QM. AG 

Well, it avois the non linearity of the collapse, and its dualism. OK.  But the "other worlds" are only a consequence of the contagion of the superposition of the particle (say) to the observer. If you look at a cat in the dead+alive state, you end yourself looking at a dead cat + looking at a alive cat. The given brain states are orthogonal and do not interact, but can still interfere statistically. This list is for people believing that "everything" is a simpler conceptual notion than any particular thing, and so welcome both the MWI in quantum physics, and the "many-computations" in arithmetic, that we get from Mechanism. I predicted the *appearance* of "many-worlds" before knowing about quantum physics measurement problem. 

About Bruce's points, maybe you should ask Bruce, as the cited post is a bit out of the context of the thread.

You asked in another post what is the FPI. 

It is an acronym for First Person Indeterminacy, and it is the subjective indeterminacy that you get in the (classical) self-duplication. Again, look at the paper sane04 cited above, where this is made precise and explained. The FPI is the building brick of the argument showing that Mechanism and Physicalism are incompatible, and that physics is conceptually reduced to arithmetic when we assume mechanism. I show that this leads to testable consequences, and some are tested retrospectively with QM.

 

I agree that FTL (fast than light influence which not necessarily exploitable for transmission of information) still exist, and I agree that it is logically possible, but people believing in that have the obligation to give evidence, and my point is that in the MWI, Bell's violation is no more an evidence, as Bell supposes definite outcomes in definite realties, which makes no sense in the MWI, nor in computationalism more generally.

I tend to agree that Bell's results assume one world. AG 

Good. I think some people disagree with this on this list, but I will let them to defend their point again, or not.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[agrays...@gmail.com]

Bruno, thank you for a detailed response. Most of it is above my pay grade, but I will check some of your links and see what I can make of them. As for the MWI, I have a simple approach. If I went to LV and played a slot machine for a single trial or outcome, and someone asked me what happened to the other thousands of outcomes I didn't get, I'd think that would be a crazy question. But that's the question some physicists ask when they are confronted with the non-linearity of collapse in the Copenhagen Interpretation. Accepting non linearity and actual time irreversibility (not FAPP) is an easier concept to accept than the real or fictional other worlds necessary to support the MWI. BTW, the time irreversibility is not FAPP since the collapsed wf, when inserted back into the SWE, recovers only itself exactly at an earlier time, but not the original wf which collapsed. AG

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[scerir]

----Messaggio originale----
Da: "Alan Grayson" <agrays...@gmail.com>
Data: 30/08/2016 18.23
A: "Everything List"<everyth...@googlegroups.com>
Ogg: Re: Aaronson/Penrose

Here's an article of interest. FWIW, I don't believe the no-signalling theorem puts this issue to rest. AG

http://people.uleth.ca/~kent.peacock/FQXi_v2.pdf

### Hi Alan, read also

https://arxiv.org/abs/1210.7308

https://arxiv.org/abs/1110.3795

[agrays...@gmail.com]

On Sunday, September 4, 2016 at 3:11:49 PM UTC-6, scerir wrote:

----Messaggio originale----
Da: "Alan Grayson" <agrays...@gmail.com>
Data: 30/08/2016 18.23
A: "Everything List"<everyth...@googlegroups.com>
Ogg: Re: Aaronson/Penrose

Here's an article of interest. FWIW, I don't believe the no-signalling theorem puts this issue to rest. AG

http://people.uleth.ca/~kent.peacock/FQXi_v2.pdf

FWIW, I just meant that no possible signalling (due to the random nature of the measurements) does not, IMO, mean we don't have FTL transmission of information. I read Bruce's comment to imply otherwise, perhaps mistakenly. AG

[scerir]

----Messaggio originale----
Da: agrays...@gmail.com
Data: 05/09/2016 0.52
A: "Everything List"<everyth...@googlegroups.com>
Cc: <sce...@libero.it>
Ogg: Re: Re: Aaronson/Penrose

On Sunday, September 4, 2016 at 3:11:49 PM UTC-6, scerir wrote:

----Messaggio originale----
Da: "Alan Grayson" <agrays...@gmail.com>
Data: 30/08/2016 18.23
A: "Everything List"<everyth...@googlegroups.com>
Ogg: Re: Aaronson/Penrose

Here's an article of interest. FWIW, I don't believe the no-signalling theorem puts this issue to rest. AG

http://people.uleth.ca/~kent.peacock/FQXi_v2.pdf

FWIW, I just meant that no possible signalling (due to the random nature of the measurements) does not, IMO, mean we don't have FTL transmission of information. I read Bruce's comment to imply otherwise, perhaps mistakenly. AG

### I do not remember Bruce's comment. I think FTL information between two observers and FTL information (or "influences") between entangled pairs are different things. But there is another problem: is space-time independent of entanglement? 

### Hi Alan, read also

https://arxiv.org/abs/1210.7308

https://arxiv.org/abs/1110.3795

--

[Bruno Marchal]

On 05 Sep 2016, at 00:52, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:

On Sunday, September 4, 2016 at 3:11:49 PM UTC-6, scerir wrote:

----Messaggio originale----
Da: "Alan Grayson" <agrays...@gmail.com>
Data: 30/08/2016 18.23
A: "Everything List"<everyth...@googlegroups.com>
Ogg: Re: Aaronson/Penrose

Here's an article of interest. FWIW, I don't believe the no-signalling theorem puts this issue to rest. AG

http://people.uleth.ca/~kent.peacock/FQXi_v2.pdf

FWIW, I just meant that no possible signalling (due to the random nature of the measurements) does not, IMO, mean we don't have FTL transmission of information. I read Bruce's comment to imply otherwise, perhaps mistakenly. AG

I think that Bruce (and me) agreed on this.

My discussion with Bruce was only about the idea that the MWI restores locality (as I think), or if even with the MWI, and the non-signaling, we have still some non local influences (which Bruce seems to believe, but eventually that was not clear). A part of the difficulty is on trying to agree on some notion of physical non-locality in the MWI (what does that mean really?). Eventually it looks like our discussion (me and Bruce) was about definition, and not about some substantial conceptual differences.

Bruno

### Hi Alan, read also

https://arxiv.org/abs/1210.7308

https://arxiv.org/abs/1110.3795

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Bruno Marchal]

On 04 Sep 2016, at 20:27, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:

Bruno, thank you for a detailed response. Most of it is above my pay grade, but I will check some of your links and see what I can make of them.

OK.

As for the MWI, I have a simple approach. If I went to LV and played a slot machine for a single trial or outcome, and someone asked me what happened to the other thousands of outcomes I didn't get, I'd think that would be a crazy question.

I mainly agree, because there is no unanimity on which counterfactual or conditional non standard logic to use. 

But that's the question some physicists ask when they are confronted with the non-linearity of collapse in the Copenhagen Interpretation.

I tend to disagree here. The quantum situation is different because with quantum mechanics, different outcomes can interfere and thus have some physical underpinning which is hard to avoid, especially without assuming the collapse of the wave.

Accepting non linearity

There are work by Steinberg and Plaga which shows that if the QM wave is slightly non linear, then we get the WW with a revenge: interactions becomes possible in between terms of the wave. This makes wrong special relativity, but also thermodynamics, etc. 

So I guess you mean that there is a (non linear) collapse, and that, strictly speaking the SWR is false. You introduce a duality between observer and observed, or between macro and micro-physics. And, you assume non-mechanism in cognitive science. That is  lot of things for which we don't have evidence. Cosmologists applies QM on very big object, like black holes, if not the entire universe, and people trying to justify a physical collapse get a lot of problem, like non-locality, to cite the one Einstein disliked the most, and I share a bit that opinion.

and actual time irreversibility (not FAPP) is an easier concept to accept than the real or fictional other worlds necessary to support the MWI.

Well, with mechanism, in all case (with or without QM) we get the many histories/dreams/computations, and they exist like natural numbers. We don't have to take the "worlds" as primitive ontological reality. I tend to not really believe in *any* world. Those belongs to the imagination of the relative universal numbers, whose proof of existence can already be done in elementary arithmetic.

BTW, the time irreversibility is not FAPP since the collapsed wf, when inserted back into the SWE, recovers only itself exactly at an earlier time, but not the original wf which collapsed. AG

Yes, OK. If there is such a collapse, but I don't see evidence. I think it is human coquetry (grin). Nature loves to do things in many exemplars, and elementary arithmetic loves that to. Personal uniqueness is an illusion (provably so in the mechanist theory of mind). The evidences are more on the side of reversibility, and unitary evolution. But of course that might be false, and is still an open problem in the computationalist theory. But there too, we already got some evidence for linearity and a core symmetrical physical structure.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[agrays...@gmail.com]

On Monday, September 5, 2016 at 8:08:12 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 04 Sep 2016, at 20:27, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:

Bruno, thank you for a detailed response. Most of it is above my pay grade, but I will check some of your links and see what I can make of them.

OK.

As for the MWI, I have a simple approach. If I went to LV and played a slot machine for a single trial or outcome, and someone asked me what happened to the other thousands of outcomes I didn't get, I'd think that would be a crazy question.

I mainly agree, because there is no unanimity on which counterfactual or conditional non standard logic to use. 

Isn't it really much simpler? Just because something *could* exist, like those thousands of other outcomes of the slot machine, doesn't mean they *must* exist. The MWI insists all outcomes MUST exist. I see no necessity for that. AG 

But that's the question some physicists ask when they are confronted with the non-linearity of collapse in the Copenhagen Interpretation.

I tend to disagree here. The quantum situation is different because with quantum mechanics, different outcomes can interfere and thus have some physical underpinning which is hard to avoid, especially without assuming the collapse of the wave.

How can you disagree?  Many prominent physicists -- Greene, Deutsch, Carroll -- when confronted with the non-linearity of collapse, believe the MWI avoids or solves this problem. AG

Accepting non linearity

There are work by Steinberg and Plaga which shows that if the QM wave is slightly non linear, then we get the WW with a revenge: interactions becomes possible in between terms of the wave. This makes wrong special relativity, but also thermodynamics, etc. 

The wf before measurement is linear insofar as it satisfies a linear DE, and relativity is well tested. So I don't see any issue here. AG 

So I guess you mean that there is a (non linear) collapse, and that, strictly speaking the SWR is false.

SWR = ? 

Why does a non-linear collapse falsify SR? AG

 

You introduce a duality between observer and observed, or between macro and micro-physics. And, you assume non-mechanism in cognitive science.

 How can we test our models without the duality of observer and observed? You demand the impossible. What "non mechanism" have I assumed? QM just gives us probabilities. It's not a causal theory. AG

 

That is  lot of things for which we don't have evidence. Cosmologists applies QM on very big object, like black holes, if not the entire universe, and people trying to justify a physical collapse get a lot of problem, like non-locality, to cite the one Einstein disliked the most, and I share a bit that opinion.

and actual time irreversibility (not FAPP) is an easier concept to accept than the real or fictional other worlds necessary to support the MWI.

Well, with mechanism, in all case (with or without QM) we get the many histories/dreams/computations, and they exist like natural numbers. We don't have to take the "worlds" as primitive ontological reality. I tend to not really believe in *any* world. Those belongs to the imagination of the relative universal numbers, whose proof of existence can already be done in elementary arithmetic.

Physics is about constructing and testing models of physical reality, not about dreams. You can call the MWI a dream, but for me it's a nightmare. LOL. AG 

BTW, the time irreversibility is not FAPP since the collapsed wf, when inserted back into the SWE, recovers only itself exactly at an earlier time, but not the original wf which collapsed. AG

Yes, OK. If there is such a collapse, but I don't see evidence.

If you measure a system repeatedly, you get the same measurement. That's the evidence for collapse; that the system remains in the same eigenstate after measurement, not in the original superposition. AG

[Bruno Marchal]

On 05 Sep 2016, at 19:31, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:

On Monday, September 5, 2016 at 8:08:12 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 04 Sep 2016, at 20:27, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:

Bruno, thank you for a detailed response. Most of it is above my pay grade, but I will check some of your links and see what I can make of them.

OK.

As for the MWI, I have a simple approach. If I went to LV and played a slot machine for a single trial or outcome, and someone asked me what happened to the other thousands of outcomes I didn't get, I'd think that would be a crazy question.

I mainly agree, because there is no unanimity on which counterfactual or conditional non standard logic to use. 

Isn't it really much simpler? Just because something *could* exist, like those thousands of other outcomes of the slot machine, doesn't mean they *must* exist. The MWI insists all outcomes MUST exist. I see no necessity for that. AG 

You need it to get the interference between the terms of the wave. I agree with Deutsch: QM is the science of multiple interfering histories. The collapse is an addition to avoid that multiplication/differentiation consequence.

But that's the question some physicists ask when they are confronted with the non-linearity of collapse in the Copenhagen Interpretation.

I tend to disagree here. The quantum situation is different because with quantum mechanics, different outcomes can interfere and thus have some physical underpinning which is hard to avoid, especially without assuming the collapse of the wave.

How can you disagree?  Many prominent physicists -- Greene, Deutsch, Carroll -- when confronted with the non-linearity of collapse, believe the MWI avoids or solves this problem. AG

?

I agree with them. MWI entails no-collapse, and the evolution is purely linear. Just a "rotation" in the Hilbert space.

Accepting non linearity

There are work by Steinberg and Plaga which shows that if the QM wave is slightly non linear, then we get the WW with a revenge: interactions becomes possible in between terms of the wave. This makes wrong special relativity, but also thermodynamics, etc. 

The wf before measurement is linear insofar as it satisfies a linear DE, and relativity is well tested. So I don't see any issue here. AG 

OK, but then there is no collapse. We agree, then, only the collapse leads to non-linearity.

So I guess you mean that there is a (non linear) collapse, and that, strictly speaking the SWR is false.

SWR = ? 

Why does a non-linear collapse falsify SR? AG

By Bell's violation, if there is a collapse, it affects elements which are space-separated. Einstein explained this already at the Solvay congress.

 

You introduce a duality between observer and observed, or between macro and micro-physics. And, you assume non-mechanism in cognitive science.

 How can we test our models without the duality of observer and observed? You demand the impossible.

Read the book by Hans Primas on the foundation of chemistery. It explains well why Everett restores monism in the philosophy of mind (but he missed this happens directly with Mechanism).

What "non mechanism" have I assumed? QM just gives us probabilities. It's not a causal theory. AG

With the collapse.

 

That is  lot of things for which we don't have evidence. Cosmologists applies QM on very big object, like black holes, if not the entire universe, and people trying to justify a physical collapse get a lot of problem, like non-locality, to cite the one Einstein disliked the most, and I share a bit that opinion.

and actual time irreversibility (not FAPP) is an easier concept to accept than the real or fictional other worlds necessary to support the MWI.

Well, with mechanism, in all case (with or without QM) we get the many histories/dreams/computations, and they exist like natural numbers. We don't have to take the "worlds" as primitive ontological reality. I tend to not really believe in *any* world. Those belongs to the imagination of the relative universal numbers, whose proof of existence can already be done in elementary arithmetic.

Physics is about constructing and testing models of physical reality, not about dreams.

Assuming there is a physical reality per se, but with Mechanism, the physical reality is "only" a persistent statisticl illusion emerging from all computational histories.

You can call the MWI a dream, but for me it's a nightmare. LOL. AG 

BTW, the time irreversibility is not FAPP since the collapsed wf, when inserted back into the SWE, recovers only itself exactly at an earlier time, but not the original wf which collapsed. AG

Yes, OK. If there is such a collapse, but I don't see evidence.

If you measure a system repeatedly, you get the same measurement. That's the evidence for collapse;

Not at all. That is what Everett explains in all details. You don't need the collapse to explain, using only the SWE that in each branch the observer feel like there has been a collapse, using only a notion similar to the First Person Indeterminacy that we have anyway in arithmetic.

that the system remains in the same eigenstate after measurement, not in the original superposition. AG

Yes, with a collapse which is not explained, nor even well defined, and which contradicts the SWE.

Computationalism and QM without collapse leads to immaterial monism, which is nice as we don't have any evidence for primary matter.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[agrays...@gmail.com]

I understand your pov. It has but one problem. You ignore the elephant in the room; namely, those other worlds or universes necessary for the outcomes not measured in this world to be realized. But you have an out, stated in another posts. They form part of your imagination. Not good enough from my pov. AG

[agrays...@gmail.com]

On Tuesday, September 6, 2016 at 4:38:53 AM UTC-6, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:

I understand your pov. It has but one problem. You ignore the elephant in the room; namely, those other worlds or universes necessary for the outcomes not measured in this world to be realized. But you have an out, stated in another post. They form part of your imagination. Not good enough from my pov. AG

I should also add that the MWI sheds no light, AFAICT, on the measurement problem; that is, why we get the outcome we get. As far as collapse contradicting SR via the result of Bell experiments, I am not sure about that conclusion. If FTL occurs, it may be the case that in some frames Alice's measurement occurs first, in other frames Bob's measurement occurs first. I tend to think this muddies the waters on the issue of FLT transmission and contradictions with relativity. AG

For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout</

[agrays...@gmail.com]

On Tuesday, September 6, 2016 at 9:42:36 AM UTC-6, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:

On Tuesday, September 6, 2016 at 4:38:53 AM UTC-6, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:

I understand your pov. It has but one problem. You ignore the elephant in the room; namely, those other worlds or universes necessary for the outcomes not measured in this world to be realized. But you have an out, stated in another post. They form part of your imagination. Not good enough from my pov. AG

I should also add that the MWI sheds no light, AFAICT, on the measurement problem; that is, why we get the outcome we get. As far as collapse contradicting SR via the result of Bell experiments, I am not sure about that conclusion. If FTL occurs, it may be the case that in some frames Alice's measurement occurs first, in other frames Bob's measurement occurs first. I tend to think this muddies the waters on the issue of FLT transmission and contradictions with relativity. AG

Possible correction: my remark about relativity might apply to how events are seen from a frame moving FTL -- that is, a breakdown in causality -- and might not apply to Alice/Bob situation. AG 

[Bruno Marchal]

On 06 Sep 2016, at 12:38, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:

I understand your pov. It has but one problem. You ignore the elephant in the room; namely, those other worlds or universes necessary for the outcomes not measured in this world to be realized. But you have an out, stated in another posts. They form part of your imagination. Not good enough from my pov. AG

I guess you misunderstood something, as eventually I show that with computationalism, we cannot assume more than elementary arithmetic. Even the induction axioms are already phenomenological.

There is just no other worlds, nor even one world, only number dreams with relative and varied degrees of consistency and coherence (seen as multiple-consistency).

The reasoning is deductive. I show mechanism and computationalism to be logically incompatible up to possible (consistent) use of magic (which remains always possible to save basically any theory).

I explain how to extract physics, and I extracted the logic of the observable (the sigma_1 sentences being simultaneously provable and consistent, that is motivated by the informal Universal Dovetailer Argument) and all this is shown meaningful thanks to Gödel's and Löb incompleteness theorem). That leads the the logic of the "measure one" propositions, and it happens that is related to a quantum logic similar, up to now, to most quantum logics suggested by the empirical quantum mechanics.

Now, those who see how Everett makes much more sense than Copenhagen, can appreciate that what I did (and what all Löbian (inductive) universal number does) is just the generalization from Everett (all quantum computations) to *all* computations (which lives in a tiny part of Arithmetic).

Both the Universal Wave and the Collapse are phenomenological. Plato is right if mechanism is true. It's all in the head of the universal machine/number. My point is that this is testable, and thanks to QM-Everett, partially tested already.

You seem to still believe in the second God of Aristotle (Primary Matter/Universe). I am agnostic, but I do not see evidence for it, and even think there are many evidences against it.

I am not the one coming up with more ontology. I am the one skeptical about the ontology taken granted by many.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Bruno Marchal]

On 06 Sep 2016, at 17:42, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:

On Tuesday, September 6, 2016 at 4:38:53 AM UTC-6, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:

I understand your pov. It has but one problem. You ignore the elephant in the room; namely, those other worlds or universes necessary for the outcomes not measured in this world to be realized. But you have an out, stated in another post. They form part of your imagination. Not good enough from my pov. AG

I should also add that the MWI sheds no light, AFAICT, on the measurement problem; that is, why we get the outcome we get. As far as collapse contradicting SR via the result of Bell experiments, I am not sure about that conclusion. If FTL occurs, it may be the case that in some frames Alice's measurement occurs first, in other frames Bob's measurement occurs first. I tend to think this muddies the waters on the issue of FLT transmission and contradictions with relativity. AG

The "MWI" explains already a part of the mind-body problem when formulated in the Digital Mechanist Frame. You don't need to even know QM to understand the high plausibility of the "many-computations".

If FTL occurs, and you keep both QM and SR, then an action in the future can change the past, and physical causility becomes meaningless. With mechanism, physical causality is not yet guarantied, to be sure, but I would throw digital mechanism if it could lead to future -> past physical action (it does not make sense).

Ah, you wrote:

Possible correction: my remark about relativity might apply to how events are seen from a frame moving FTL -- that is, a breakdown in causality -- and might not apply to Alice/Bob situation. AG

Well, OK, then. But it would apply if there were a collapse (in one universe), even if Alice needs to send two bits of information to transformed the effect (and send or get one qubit). 

The "collapse" does not even refer to anything I can make sense of. It looks like a continuous invocation of God. As an explanation, it looks like a continuum of blasphemes (in the theology of the universal machine).

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[agrays...@gmail.com]

On Wednesday, September 7, 2016 at 11:16:38 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 06 Sep 2016, at 17:42, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:

On Tuesday, September 6, 2016 at 4:38:53 AM UTC-6, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:

I understand your pov. It has but one problem. You ignore the elephant in the room; namely, those other worlds or universes necessary for the outcomes not measured in this world to be realized. But you have an out, stated in another post. They form part of your imagination. Not good enough from my pov. AG

I should also add that the MWI sheds no light, AFAICT, on the measurement problem; that is, why we get the outcome we get. As far as collapse contradicting SR via the result of Bell experiments, I am not sure about that conclusion. If FTL occurs, it may be the case that in some frames Alice's measurement occurs first, in other frames Bob's measurement occurs first. I tend to think this muddies the waters on the issue of FLT transmission and contradictions with relativity. AG

The "MWI" explains already a part of the mind-body problem when formulated in the Digital Mechanist Frame. You don't need to even know QM to understand the high plausibility of the "many-computations".

If FTL occurs, and you keep both QM and SR, then an action in the future can change the past, and physical causility becomes meaningless. With mechanism, physical causality is not yet guarantied, to be sure, but I would throw digital mechanism if it could lead to future -> past physical action (it does not make sense).

Ah, you wrote:

Possible correction: my remark about relativity might apply to how events are seen from a frame moving FTL -- that is, a breakdown in causality -- and might not apply to Alice/Bob situation. AG

Well, OK, then. But it would apply if there were a collapse (in one universe), even if Alice needs to send two bits of information to transformed the effect (and send or get one qubit). 

The "collapse" does not even refer to anything I can make sense of. It looks like a continuous invocation of God. As an explanation, it looks like a continuum of blasphemes (in the theology of the universal machine).

Here's what collapse means to me; the wf evolves from a solution of SWE, namely a superposition, to a delta function centered at the measurement value. No one knows, or has a model how this transformation occurs.It's in the category of a TBD, possibly unknowable. It seems empirically based since repeated measurements of the same system result in the same outcomes. I don't necessarily believe in primary matter's existence. But its statistical persistence seems undeniable, whereas the many worlds has yet to manifest any persistence except in the minds of its advocates. AG

Bruno

<a href="http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/" rel="nofollow"

[agrays...@gmail.com]

On Wednesday, September 7, 2016 at 11:00:03 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 06 Sep 2016, at 12:38, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:

I understand your pov. It has but one problem. You ignore the elephant in the room; namely, those other worlds or universes necessary for the outcomes not measured in this world to be realized. But you have an out, stated in another posts. They form part of your imagination. Not good enough from my pov. AG

I guess you misunderstood something, as eventually I show that with computationalism, we cannot assume more than elementary arithmetic. Even the induction axioms are already phenomenological.

There is just no other worlds, nor even one world, only number dreams with relative and varied degrees of consistency and coherence (seen as multiple-consistency).

The reasoning is deductive. I show mechanism and computationalism to be logically incompatible up to possible (consistent) use of magic (which remains always possible to save basically any theory).

I explain how to extract physics, and I extracted the logic of the observable (the sigma_1 sentences being simultaneously provable and consistent, that is motivated by the informal Universal Dovetailer Argument) and all this is shown meaningful thanks to Gödel's and Löb incompleteness theorem). That leads the the logic of the "measure one" propositions, and it happens that is related to a quantum logic similar, up to now, to most quantum logics suggested by the empirical quantum mechanics.

Now, those who see how Everett makes much more sense than Copenhagen, can appreciate that what I did (and what all Löbian (inductive) universal number does) is just the generalization from Everett (all quantum computations) to *all* computations (which lives in a tiny part of Arithmetic).

Both the Universal Wave and the Collapse are phenomenological. Plato is right if mechanism is true. It's all in the head of the universal machine/number. My point is that this is testable, and thanks to QM-Everett, partially tested already.

What's been tested? I never encountered an advocate of the MWI make that claim. OTOH, I have shown that collapse can be interpreted as tested by virtue of the fact that repeated measurements of the same system yield identical outcomes; implying that after the first measurement, the system remains in the eigenstate of the eigenvalue measured. AG 

<div style="word-w

[Bruno Marchal]

On 07 Sep 2016, at 20:06, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:

On Wednesday, September 7, 2016 at 11:16:38 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 06 Sep 2016, at 17:42, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:

On Tuesday, September 6, 2016 at 4:38:53 AM UTC-6, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:

I understand your pov. It has but one problem. You ignore the elephant in the room; namely, those other worlds or universes necessary for the outcomes not measured in this world to be realized. But you have an out, stated in another post. They form part of your imagination. Not good enough from my pov. AG

I should also add that the MWI sheds no light, AFAICT, on the measurement problem; that is, why we get the outcome we get. As far as collapse contradicting SR via the result of Bell experiments, I am not sure about that conclusion. If FTL occurs, it may be the case that in some frames Alice's measurement occurs first, in other frames Bob's measurement occurs first. I tend to think this muddies the waters on the issue of FLT transmission and contradictions with relativity. AG

The "MWI" explains already a part of the mind-body problem when formulated in the Digital Mechanist Frame. You don't need to even know QM to understand the high plausibility of the "many-computations".

If FTL occurs, and you keep both QM and SR, then an action in the future can change the past, and physical causility becomes meaningless. With mechanism, physical causality is not yet guarantied, to be sure, but I would throw digital mechanism if it could lead to future -> past physical action (it does not make sense).

Ah, you wrote:

Possible correction: my remark about relativity might apply to how events are seen from a frame moving FTL -- that is, a breakdown in causality -- and might not apply to Alice/Bob situation. AG

Well, OK, then. But it would apply if there were a collapse (in one universe), even if Alice needs to send two bits of information to transformed the effect (and send or get one qubit). 

The "collapse" does not even refer to anything I can make sense of. It looks like a continuous invocation of God. As an explanation, it looks like a continuum of blasphemes (in the theology of the universal machine).

Here's what collapse means to me; the wf evolves from a solution of SWE, namely a superposition, to a delta function centered at the measurement value. No one knows, or has a model how this transformation occurs.It's in the category of a TBD, possibly unknowable. It seems empirically based since repeated measurements of the same system result in the same outcomes. I don't necessarily believe in primary matter's existence. But its statistical persistence seems undeniable, whereas the many worlds has yet to manifest any persistence except in the minds of its advocates. AG

The MWI is only the SWE taken literally. If an observer O observes a cat in the superposition d + a (dead + alive), we know that, before interaction, the physical state is well described by the expression O(a + d), with the tensor product noted multiplicatively, and that it is equivalent with Oa + Od. So even at this stage the "O" can be considered being in a superposition state. That is what I called the linearity of the tensor product. Now, by the linearity of the wave evolution we get O-a a + O-b b, that is each branch behaves classically (P-i = O with i in its memory. And both 0-a and O-b can repeat their measurement, and the linearity of the wave evolution implies that they will always find the same measurement result. So the MWI explains the persistence as much well as classical physics, or QM+collapse (if that means something precise).

My point is that at this stage, QM (without collapse) is compatible with Mechanism (used implicitly above) only insofar as the persistence is explained from a statistics on *all* computations (which exist once you agree that 2+2=4 independently of you and me). 

My technical point is that this work in the sense that we can derive quantum logic (and normally physics) from the logical structure that the computations inherit from the logic of (machine) self-reference.

That is elegant because at this stage the "theory of everything" needs no less and no more than very elementary axioms (and mechanism in the meta-background). 

The only axiom that I use are the following:

0 ≠ (x + 1)

((x + 1) = (y + 1))  -> x = y

x = 0 v Ey(x = y + 1)

x + 0 = x

x + (y + 1) = (x + y) + 1

x * 0 = 0

x * (y + 1) = (x * y) + x

Actually I could even just use the two combinators axioms:

Kxy = x

Sxyz = xz(yz)

Such axioms are Turing complete, and you can prove the existence of the UD from them (and *in* them if you add some induction axioms, but I prefer to put them in the epistemology of the observers).

The Turing-Church thesis rehabilit the neopythagorean theology, and we get physics exactly when we use the antic definition of knowledge and matter provided by them (notably by Moderatus of Gades).

On the contrary, if primary matter or if physicalism would be true, we remain with the task of explaining what is their role for consciousness (or just first person experience). 

Aristotle idea of naturalism or (weak) materialism (the existence of a physical primary reality) has only been a tool for letting the mind-body problem sleep a bit, and that has been a very fertile simplifying hypothesis, but now, with mechanism, and plausibly with only quantum mechanics, we get the (predicted by the Platonist) problem of justifying the relation between first person discourse and third person discourse. We can't use the simple mind-brain identity theory, because we have an infinity of quasi identical brains in arithmetic, and we can't use a selection principle based on a substance without damaging the mechanist hypothesis.

Keep in mind that my origianl goal is to solve the mind-body problem, and with mechanism, we have no choice other than justifying the appearance of physicalness from a statistic based on the mix of "*all* computations + machine self-reference when distributed in those computations. It works (till now). Non-mechanism does not work, and it is well known that the mind-body problem has been put under the rug since Aristotle (except by the Platonists, who were just banned from our civilisation 1500 years ago).

In Soccer terms: Plato 1, Aristotle 0. I don't pretend it is the last match.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Bruno Marchal]

On 07 Sep 2016, at 21:27, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:

On Wednesday, September 7, 2016 at 11:00:03 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 06 Sep 2016, at 12:38, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:

I understand your pov. It has but one problem. You ignore the elephant in the room; namely, those other worlds or universes necessary for the outcomes not measured in this world to be realized. But you have an out, stated in another posts. They form part of your imagination. Not good enough from my pov. AG

I guess you misunderstood something, as eventually I show that with computationalism, we cannot assume more than elementary arithmetic. Even the induction axioms are already phenomenological.

There is just no other worlds, nor even one world, only number dreams with relative and varied degrees of consistency and coherence (seen as multiple-consistency).

The reasoning is deductive. I show mechanism and computationalism to be logically incompatible up to possible (consistent) use of magic (which remains always possible to save basically any theory).

I explain how to extract physics, and I extracted the logic of the observable (the sigma_1 sentences being simultaneously provable and consistent, that is motivated by the informal Universal Dovetailer Argument) and all this is shown meaningful thanks to Gödel's and Löb incompleteness theorem). That leads the the logic of the "measure one" propositions, and it happens that is related to a quantum logic similar, up to now, to most quantum logics suggested by the empirical quantum mechanics.

Now, those who see how Everett makes much more sense than Copenhagen, can appreciate that what I did (and what all Löbian (inductive) universal number does) is just the generalization from Everett (all quantum computations) to *all* computations (which lives in a tiny part of Arithmetic).

Both the Universal Wave and the Collapse are phenomenological. Plato is right if mechanism is true. It's all in the head of the universal machine/number. My point is that this is testable, and thanks to QM-Everett, partially tested already.

What's been tested? I never encountered an advocate of the MWI make that claim.

I was not talking of the MWI, which is tested by all QM experiences. I was talking about the "many-dream interpretation of Arithmetic". In my work I do not assume *any* physical *theory*. UDA shows that physics is entirely reduced to machine psychology/theology, itself derived entirely from the elementary arithmetical axioms that I just posted.

What has been tested, in the retrospective way, is the theology/psychology of machine, as it gives the right physics, up to now.

OTOH, I have shown that collapse can be interpreted as tested by virtue of the fact that repeated measurements of the same system yield identical outcomes; implying that after the first measurement, the system remains in the eigenstate of the eigenvalue measured. AG 

That statement is already refuted by Everett who explains well why we get the same results for repeated measurements, and this for different observers. That follows from the SWE + some amount of Mechanism (in cognitive science, where it is often the default hypothesis). I sketched the argument in my preceding post.

But the collapse has never been tested (despite the "Schroedinger kittens"), nor even well defined. The collapse axiom is just a statement saying that QM is false when ... what? Consciousness is involved? Measuring apparatus are involved, macro-physics is involved. It is unclear, and virtually never used. It makes no sense in all macro-use of quantum mechanics, like in quantum cosmology or quantum computation. The collapse is a form of cosmic solipsist coquetry I'm afraid.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[agrays...@gmail.com]

On Thursday, September 8, 2016 at 7:53:23 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 07 Sep 2016, at 20:06, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:

On Wednesday, September 7, 2016 at 11:16:38 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 06 Sep 2016, at 17:42, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:

On Tuesday, September 6, 2016 at 4:38:53 AM UTC-6, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:

I understand your pov. It has but one problem. You ignore the elephant in the room; namely, those other worlds or universes necessary for the outcomes not measured in this world to be realized. But you have an out, stated in another post. They form part of your imagination. Not good enough from my pov. AG

I should also add that the MWI sheds no light, AFAICT, on the measurement problem; that is, why we get the outcome we get. As far as collapse contradicting SR via the result of Bell experiments, I am not sure about that conclusion. If FTL occurs, it may be the case that in some frames Alice's measurement occurs first, in other frames Bob's measurement occurs first. I tend to think this muddies the waters on the issue of FLT transmission and contradictions with relativity. AG

The "MWI" explains already a part of the mind-body problem when formulated in the Digital Mechanist Frame. You don't need to even know QM to understand the high plausibility of the "many-computations".

If FTL occurs, and you keep both QM and SR, then an action in the future can change the past, and physical causility becomes meaningless. With mechanism, physical causality is not yet guarantied, to be sure, but I would throw digital mechanism if it could lead to future -> past physical action (it does not make sense).

Ah, you wrote:

Possible correction: my remark about relativity might apply to how events are seen from a frame moving FTL -- that is, a breakdown in causality -- and might not apply to Alice/Bob situation. AG

Well, OK, then. But it would apply if there were a collapse (in one universe), even if Alice needs to send two bits of information to transformed the effect (and send or get one qubit). 

The "collapse" does not even refer to anything I can make sense of. It looks like a continuous invocation of God. As an explanation, it looks like a continuum of blasphemes (in the theology of the universal machine).

Here's what collapse means to me; the wf evolves from a solution of SWE, namely a superposition, to a delta function centered at the measurement value. No one knows, or has a model how this transformation occurs.It's in the category of a TBD, possibly unknowable. It seems empirically based since repeated measurements of the same system result in the same outcomes. I don't necessarily believe in primary matter's existence. But its statistical persistence seems undeniable, whereas the many worlds has yet to manifest any persistence except in the minds of its advocates. AG

The MWI is only the SWE taken literally.

Maybe that's the problem; taking a calculational tool too seriously. AG

 

If an observer O observes a cat in the superposition d + a (dead + alive),

But that never happens. The state of superposition exists, if it does, when the box is closed, and ceases when the box is opened. Maybe you have a fundamental misunderstanding of Schrodinger's Cat. AG

[agrays...@gmail.com]

On Thursday, September 8, 2016 at 10:22:04 AM UTC-6, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:

On Thursday, September 8, 2016 at 7:53:23 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 07 Sep 2016, at 20:06, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:

On Wednesday, September 7, 2016 at 11:16:38 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 06 Sep 2016, at 17:42, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:

On Tuesday, September 6, 2016 at 4:38:53 AM UTC-6, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:

I understand your pov. It has but one problem. You ignore the elephant in the room; namely, those other worlds or universes necessary for the outcomes not measured in this world to be realized. But you have an out, stated in another post. They form part of your imagination. Not good enough from my pov. AG

I should also add that the MWI sheds no light, AFAICT, on the measurement problem; that is, why we get the outcome we get. As far as collapse contradicting SR via the result of Bell experiments, I am not sure about that conclusion. If FTL occurs, it may be the case that in some frames Alice's measurement occurs first, in other frames Bob's measurement occurs first. I tend to think this muddies the waters on the issue of FLT transmission and contradictions with relativity. AG

The "MWI" explains already a part of the mind-body problem when formulated in the Digital Mechanist Frame. You don't need to even know QM to understand the high plausibility of the "many-computations".

If FTL occurs, and you keep both QM and SR, then an action in the future can change the past, and physical causility becomes meaningless. With mechanism, physical causality is not yet guarantied, to be sure, but I would throw digital mechanism if it could lead to future -> past physical action (it does not make sense).

Ah, you wrote:

Possible correction: my remark about relativity might apply to how events are seen from a frame moving FTL -- that is, a breakdown in causality -- and might not apply to Alice/Bob situation. AG

Well, OK, then. But it would apply if there were a collapse (in one universe), even if Alice needs to send two bits of information to transformed the effect (and send or get one qubit). 

The "collapse" does not even refer to anything I can make sense of. It looks like a continuous invocation of God. As an explanation, it looks like a continuum of blasphemes (in the theology of the universal machine).

Here's what collapse means to me; the wf evolves from a solution of SWE, namely a superposition, to a delta function centered at the measurement value. No one knows, or has a model how this transformation occurs.It's in the category of a TBD, possibly unknowable. It seems empirically based since repeated measurements of the same system result in the same outcomes. I don't necessarily believe in primary matter's existence. But its statistical persistence seems undeniable, whereas the many worlds has yet to manifest any persistence except in the minds of its advocates. AG

The MWI is only the SWE taken literally.

Maybe that's the problem; taking a calculational tool too seriously. AG

 

If an observer O observes a cat in the superposition d + a (dead + alive),

But that never happens. The state of superposition exists, if it does, when the box is closed, and ceases when the box is opened. Maybe you have a fundamental misunderstanding of Schrodinger's Cat. AG

More specifically, the superposition comes into existence when the poison gas apparatus and radioactive source are connected to the cat's enclosure, making a dead cat possible if there is a radioactive decay. There is no observer of this superposition since it occurs, if it occurs, when the box is closed. AG 

 

 

Bruno

Bruno

<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0;margin-left:0.8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex

[Bruno Marchal]

On 08 Sep 2016, at 18:22, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:

On Thursday, September 8, 2016 at 7:53:23 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 07 Sep 2016, at 20:06, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:

On Wednesday, September 7, 2016 at 11:16:38 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 06 Sep 2016, at 17:42, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:

On Tuesday, September 6, 2016 at 4:38:53 AM UTC-6, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:

I understand your pov. It has but one problem. You ignore the elephant in the room; namely, those other worlds or universes necessary for the outcomes not measured in this world to be realized. But you have an out, stated in another post. They form part of your imagination. Not good enough from my pov. AG

I should also add that the MWI sheds no light, AFAICT, on the measurement problem; that is, why we get the outcome we get. As far as collapse contradicting SR via the result of Bell experiments, I am not sure about that conclusion. If FTL occurs, it may be the case that in some frames Alice's measurement occurs first, in other frames Bob's measurement occurs first. I tend to think this muddies the waters on the issue of FLT transmission and contradictions with relativity. AG

The "MWI" explains already a part of the mind-body problem when formulated in the Digital Mechanist Frame. You don't need to even know QM to understand the high plausibility of the "many-computations".

If FTL occurs, and you keep both QM and SR, then an action in the future can change the past, and physical causility becomes meaningless. With mechanism, physical causality is not yet guarantied, to be sure, but I would throw digital mechanism if it could lead to future -> past physical action (it does not make sense).

Ah, you wrote:

Possible correction: my remark about relativity might apply to how events are seen from a frame moving FTL -- that is, a breakdown in causality -- and might not apply to Alice/Bob situation. AG

Well, OK, then. But it would apply if there were a collapse (in one universe), even if Alice needs to send two bits of information to transformed the effect (and send or get one qubit). 

The "collapse" does not even refer to anything I can make sense of. It looks like a continuous invocation of God. As an explanation, it looks like a continuum of blasphemes (in the theology of the universal machine).

Here's what collapse means to me; the wf evolves from a solution of SWE, namely a superposition, to a delta function centered at the measurement value. No one knows, or has a model how this transformation occurs.It's in the category of a TBD, possibly unknowable. It seems empirically based since repeated measurements of the same system result in the same outcomes. I don't necessarily believe in primary matter's existence. But its statistical persistence seems undeniable, whereas the many worlds has yet to manifest any persistence except in the minds of its advocates. AG

The MWI is only the SWE taken literally.

Maybe that's the problem; taking a calculational tool too seriously. AG

 

If an observer O observes a cat in the superposition d + a (dead + alive),

But that never happens. The state of superposition exists, if it does, when the box is closed, and ceases when the box is opened.

Then the SWE is wrong. 

You beg the question by postulating that QM is wrong outside the box, but there are no evidence for that, given that Everett showed the consistency of QM-without-collapse with the facts, using the simplest known antic theory of mind (mechanism).

Maybe you have a fundamental misunderstanding of Schrodinger's Cat. AG

It is the measurement problem, and you talk like if the collapse solves it, but then tell me precisely the range of QM.

I read de Broglie who suggested that entanglement would no more operate at the distance of an atom diameter. People give criteria for the collapse, but the experience refutes them. I share Feynman's idea that the collapse is a collective hallucination, and the math shows that if comp is true then that hallucination is somehow necessary.

With computationalism we have to generalize Everett's embedding of the physicist in the physical reality to the embedding of the mathematician in arithmetic (which is actually what Gödel begun).

Mechanism explains both the origin of consciousness and the origin of the appearance of matter, and this in a way enough precise so that we can test it, and thanks to QM, mechanism is not (yet) refuted, and is, I think, the only theory explaining consciousness, including why it cannot be completely explained in any first person convincing way (the so called hard problem, which is only the antic mind-body problem after mechanism solved the "easy part" (AI)).

I do not defend any theory. You should not been able to guess what I might believe true or not. Computationalism has an advantage in philosophy, which is that it can rely on theoretical computer science which is a branch of both mathematical logic and number theory. It is a good lantern to search the key around, not more.

My main point is that we can study the highly non trivial relation between machines' belief and diverse notion of truth they can discover and guess. They got a theology closer to Plotinus (300 after C., neoplatonism) and Moderatus of Gades (neopythagoreanism, 2 centuries before Plotinus) than the materialist Aristotelians.

I say this being aware that some scientists still take the Aristotelian metaphysics for granted, but of course science is just beginning to be able to formulate the problem (which of Plato or Aristotle is closer to reality). The discovery of the universal machine/number is still a very recent event and few get really the Church-Turing idea and their relation with Gödel's completeness and incompleteness fundamental results. 

I can suggest you some good books if you are interested. But if you dislike Everett, it might take some work before liking the consequences of the digital mechanist hypothesis. The bible is Martin Davis "Undecidability", and its own introduction to computability and logic (both published by Dover) is excellent if you are enough mathematically minded.

Bruno

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[agrays...@gmail.com]

On Thursday, September 8, 2016 at 1:15:15 PM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 08 Sep 2016, at 18:22, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:

On Thursday, September 8, 2016 at 7:53:23 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 07 Sep 2016, at 20:06, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:

On Wednesday, September 7, 2016 at 11:16:38 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 06 Sep 2016, at 17:42, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:

On Tuesday, September 6, 2016 at 4:38:53 AM UTC-6, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:

I understand your pov. It has but one problem. You ignore the elephant in the room; namely, those other worlds or universes necessary for the outcomes not measured in this world to be realized. But you have an out, stated in another post. They form part of your imagination. Not good enough from my pov. AG

I should also add that the MWI sheds no light, AFAICT, on the measurement problem; that is, why we get the outcome we get. As far as collapse contradicting SR via the result of Bell experiments, I am not sure about that conclusion. If FTL occurs, it may be the case that in some frames Alice's measurement occurs first, in other frames Bob's measurement occurs first. I tend to think this muddies the waters on the issue of FLT transmission and contradictions with relativity. AG

The "MWI" explains already a part of the mind-body problem when formulated in the Digital Mechanist Frame. You don't need to even know QM to understand the high plausibility of the "many-computations".

If FTL occurs, and you keep both QM and SR, then an action in the future can change the past, and physical causility becomes meaningless. With mechanism, physical causality is not yet guarantied, to be sure, but I would throw digital mechanism if it could lead to future -> past physical action (it does not make sense).

Ah, you wrote:

Possible correction: my remark about relativity might apply to how events are seen from a frame moving FTL -- that is, a breakdown in causality -- and might not apply to Alice/Bob situation. AG

Well, OK, then. But it would apply if there were a collapse (in one universe), even if Alice needs to send two bits of information to transformed the effect (and send or get one qubit). 

The "collapse" does not even refer to anything I can make sense of. It looks like a continuous invocation of God. As an explanation, it looks like a continuum of blasphemes (in the theology of the universal machine).

Here's what collapse means to me; the wf evolves from a solution of SWE, namely a superposition, to a delta function centered at the measurement value. No one knows, or has a model how this transformation occurs.It's in the category of a TBD, possibly unknowable. It seems empirically based since repeated measurements of the same system result in the same outcomes. I don't necessarily believe in primary matter's existence. But its statistical persistence seems undeniable, whereas the many worlds has yet to manifest any persistence except in the minds of its advocates. AG

The MWI is only the SWE taken literally.

Maybe that's the problem; taking a calculational tool too seriously. AG

 

If an observer O observes a cat in the superposition d + a (dead + alive),

But that never happens. The state of superposition exists, if it does, when the box is closed, and ceases when the box is opened.

Then the SWE is wrong. 

You beg the question by postulating that QM is wrong outside the box, but there are no evidence for that, given that Everett showed the consistency of QM-without-collapse with the facts, using the simplest known antic theory of mind (mechanism)

The fact is the cat is dead OR alive when the box is opened, and presumably alive before the box is closed. So all I am doing is refuting your claim that any observer observes a superposition of states. AG  

Bruno

 

<div style="word

[Bruno Marchal]

On 08 Sep 2016, at 21:43, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:

On Thursday, September 8, 2016 at 1:15:15 PM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 08 Sep 2016, at 18:22, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:

On Thursday, September 8, 2016 at 7:53:23 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 07 Sep 2016, at 20:06, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:

On Wednesday, September 7, 2016 at 11:16:38 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 06 Sep 2016, at 17:42, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:

On Tuesday, September 6, 2016 at 4:38:53 AM UTC-6, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:

I understand your pov. It has but one problem. You ignore the elephant in the room; namely, those other worlds or universes necessary for the outcomes not measured in this world to be realized. But you have an out, stated in another post. They form part of your imagination. Not good enough from my pov. AG

I should also add that the MWI sheds no light, AFAICT, on the measurement problem; that is, why we get the outcome we get. As far as collapse contradicting SR via the result of Bell experiments, I am not sure about that conclusion. If FTL occurs, it may be the case that in some frames Alice's measurement occurs first, in other frames Bob's measurement occurs first. I tend to think this muddies the waters on the issue of FLT transmission and contradictions with relativity. AG

The "MWI" explains already a part of the mind-body problem when formulated in the Digital Mechanist Frame. You don't need to even know QM to understand the high plausibility of the "many-computations".

If FTL occurs, and you keep both QM and SR, then an action in the future can change the past, and physical causility becomes meaningless. With mechanism, physical causality is not yet guarantied, to be sure, but I would throw digital mechanism if it could lead to future -> past physical action (it does not make sense).

Ah, you wrote:

Possible correction: my remark about relativity might apply to how events are seen from a frame moving FTL -- that is, a breakdown in causality -- and might not apply to Alice/Bob situation. AG

Well, OK, then. But it would apply if there were a collapse (in one universe), even if Alice needs to send two bits of information to transformed the effect (and send or get one qubit). 

The "collapse" does not even refer to anything I can make sense of. It looks like a continuous invocation of God. As an explanation, it looks like a continuum of blasphemes (in the theology of the universal machine).

Here's what collapse means to me; the wf evolves from a solution of SWE, namely a superposition, to a delta function centered at the measurement value. No one knows, or has a model how this transformation occurs.It's in the category of a TBD, possibly unknowable. It seems empirically based since repeated measurements of the same system result in the same outcomes. I don't necessarily believe in primary matter's existence. But its statistical persistence seems undeniable, whereas the many worlds has yet to manifest any persistence except in the minds of its advocates. AG

The MWI is only the SWE taken literally.

Maybe that's the problem; taking a calculational tool too seriously. AG

 

If an observer O observes a cat in the superposition d + a (dead + alive),

But that never happens. The state of superposition exists, if it does, when the box is closed, and ceases when the box is opened.

Then the SWE is wrong. 

You beg the question by postulating that QM is wrong outside the box, but there are no evidence for that, given that Everett showed the consistency of QM-without-collapse with the facts, using the simplest known antic theory of mind (mechanism)

The fact is the cat is dead OR alive when the box is opened, and presumably alive before the box is closed. So all I am doing is refuting your claim that any observer observes a superposition of states. AG  

In QM+collapse, which assumes that QM is wrong somewhere (but where? No unanimity of collapse-defenders agree on this).

Without collapse, the cat is in the superposition state (dead+alive), and when an observer look at the cat, he entangles itself with the cat state, and the final state is O-a alive + O-d dead (linearity of tensor product). Then by linearity of the SWE, O-a lives a *phenomenological collapse" like if the cat was reduced to "alive", and O-b lives a phenomenological like if the cat was reduced to "dead", but in the 3p picture, no reduction ever occurred.

Bruno

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[Alan Grayson]

Sorry, but what you write makes no sense. When you look at the cat, presumably after box is opened, the cat is either alive or dead. You may be entangled with it, but at that point in time there is no superposition of alive and dead.  AG

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[agrays...@gmail.com]

I don't see how you can apply the SWE to this problem. It's a function of space and time and its solutions have nothing to do with alive or dead. And if you can't do so, your analysis makes no sense. AG

[agrays...@gmail.com]

Please ignore my first response, but I stand by my second response. I see no way to apply the SWE to this problem. It's not a function of Alive and Dead. Thus, the idea of Alive and Dead interfering with other makes no sense in this context. AG 

[Jason Resch]

There is, but you are now part of the superposition. You have differentiated into two non-interacting brain states. One of which is part of the history:

A) Atom decayed, Geiger Counter Detected it, Poison Release, Cat Died, You saw a dead cat, Your brain remembers seeing a dead cat

B) Atom did not decay, Geiger Counter Never Detected Anything, Poison still contained, Cat still alive, You saw a live cat, Your brain remembers seeing a live cat 

The system remains in the superposition of (A+B). The super position of the atoms state has led to all the other superpositions regarding the cats state, and now your state, and can spread at up to the speed of light as the multi-state particles carry forward their interactions with the environment.

Jason

[Alan Grayson]

In the context of the MWI, an observer in this world see one of the alternatives, say the first. So we can say the cat in this world has won the lottery. Why must there be a cat in some other world -- a world that comes into existence when the cat in this world has survived  -- and lose the lottery? Oh, the wf is a superposition and continues to evolve. But look at the wf. It's a solution in terms of space and time. I see no Alive or Dead state as a solution of the SWE. So your mentor, Bruno, speaks foolishly despite his sophistication. I think it's called a category error. AG 

The system remains in the superposition of (A+B). The super position of the atoms state has led to all the other superpositions regarding the cats state, and now your state, and can spread at up to the speed of light as the multi-state particles carry forward their interactions with the environment.

But the superposition of the radioactive states can NOT be interpreted to mean the atoms are simultaneously in both states, Decayed and Undecayed. I explained why recently. Hence, the cat, which can be imagined as sharing that superposition of the radioactive states, is not simultaneously in both Alive and Dead states. AG 

Jason

[Alan Grayson]

To summarize; you have two fatal problems; you can't explain the emergence of the other world when an experiment is done in this world -- its infrastructure and energy, including its additional observer -- and you misinterpret the meaning of the wf for the radioactive states. AG

Jason

[Bruno Marchal]

We usually judged if an animal is dead or alive by a (rough and macro) analysis of the position of the atoms of its body. 

If the cat lies down: it is dead. If the cat walks: it is alive. No need to go beyond the space and time descriptions.

The quality dead and alive are sort of biophysical macro (in the computer science sense). 

The superposition of the decaying atom contaminates all particles around and that contagion of superposition propagates to the whole box, and beyond if the box leaked or is opened.

The propagation speed is subliminal  (interaction-time).

With Everett theory, which is just Copenhagen theory minus a postulate (collapse), we get back determinacy, locality, realism (although not at the usual mundane level, which I admit can seem shocking).

My point, or result, is that IF we postulate Mechanism, an assumption in the cognitive science, or in philosophy of mind, or in psychology, or in theology, THEN we get Everett minus, yet again, a postulate: the SWE itself. It *has to*became explained as providing the unique measure for the first person plural emerging view on all computations in elementary arithmetic, or combinator algebra (etc.). And this works, in the sense that the modal, intensional, variant of self-reference available to any "sufficiently rich" (Löbian, or Gödelian) machine provides a quantum logic and a quantization on the states accessible by a Universal Dovetailer (the sigma_1 arithmetical reality, in logician's terms) relatively to itself.

That provides an utterly clear arithmetic  interpretation of a theory due to a neopythagorean of the first century of the C. era: Moderatus of Gades, but also of the main Enneads of Plotinus.

And this 'machine's theology' contains physics, and so is testable. The conception of matter becomes weird and quite counter-intuitive, and without quantum mechanics, I would have judged it highly unplausible. But both the theology of the universal machine, and the verifiable measurable facts points toward a Platonist like theology. 

The Enlightenment Period will be transformed when theology, the modest and humble, and highly skeptical, science, will return at the faculty of science where it was born. Until then we are still in the middle-age like we can see by looking around us.

Bruno

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[agrays...@gmail.com]

It 's easier just to claim the cat shares the wf of the radioactive source. But you still have the 800+  pound gorilla in the room you can't account for; namely, by your CHOICE to do the cat experiment, you're claiming the creation of another world with another cat and another observer. Calling it a branch or whatever doesn't solve your fatal problem. There's a simpler solution to your problem; instead of conceiving of the collapse as meaning irreducible randomness, why not assume it's a continuous process whereby the wf evolves into a delta function centered at the value measured? IOW, just assume there's an as yet unknown, continuous, non linear evolution of the state prior to measurement, which is time reversible. After all, your objection to collapse is its standard interpretation as irreducible randomness. AG

 

Bruno

</blockquot

[Bruno Marchal]

Where did I claim something like that? The terms of the branches does not depend on my choice, and the results of the measurement do not depend on the base chosen. It is just the supposition terms of the wave (in any base). There are no worlds, only relative states. My choice change only the way the multiverse is locally and relatively to me partitionned.

Calling it a branch or whatever doesn't solve your fatal problem. There's a simpler solution to your problem; instead of conceiving of the collapse as meaning irreducible randomness,

The point is that the randomness becomes only a case of Mechanist first person indeterminacy, which exist even without quantum mechanics.

why not assume it's a continuous process whereby the wf evolves into a delta function centered at the value measured? IOW, just assume there's an as yet unknown, continuous, non linear evolution of the state prior to measurement, which is time reversible. After all, your objection to collapse is its standard interpretation as irreducible randomness. AG

That is a Bohm-De Broglie type of move. It assumes QM false, and leads to many difficulties often discussed here (see Weinberg argument that non linearity leads to the refutation of thermodynamics, GR, etc.), including irreducibly-hidden variables/initial-conditions, with non local effects. Anyway, I work with computationalism, and show we have to derive the wave and its equation, so we will see if there is a non linearity in that case, but the results so far go in the direction that the physics is reversible and linear, etc.

Let us no do "philosophy" and just be clear on what theory we assume. Once we assume digital mechanism, there is no more choice left (that *is* the point).

Bruno

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[agrays...@gmail.com]

It seems that they do. If you do a cat experiment, you get two branches. If you don't, you don't. They don't exist apriori, unless you want to deny free will. They come into existence when an experiment is done, or possibly when there's some sort of decision tree, such as playing a slot machine at LV. AG

 

and the results of the measurement do not depend on the base chosen.

It seems that they do. Measurements of energy, momentum or spin for example, result in different bases. AG

It is just the supposition terms of the wave (in any base). There are no worlds, only relative states. My choice change only the way the multiverse is locally and relatively to me partitionned.

These relative states seem to require observers and a measuring infrastructure. You create them by virtue of what you DO, say in an experiment. Or do you back off from the apparent requirement of the MWI that all possible outcomes are measured somewhere, somehow? Just having a branch evolving is not tantamount to a measurement and observation. AG

Calling it a branch or whatever doesn't solve your fatal problem. There's a simpler solution to your problem; instead of conceiving of the collapse as meaning irreducible randomness,

The point is that the randomness becomes only a case of Mechanist first person indeterminacy, which exist even without quantum mechanics.

why not assume it's a continuous process whereby the wf evolves into a delta function centered at the value measured? IOW, just assume there's an as yet unknown, continuous, non linear evolution of the state prior to measurement, which is time reversible. After all, your objection to collapse is its standard interpretation as irreducible randomness. AG

That is a Bohm-De Broglie type of move. It assumes QM false, and leads to many difficulties often discussed here (see Weinberg argument that non linearity leads to the refutation of thermodynamics, GR,

Do you have a link for this, particularly about his comments on thermodynamics? TIA, AG

 

etc.), including irreducibly-hidden variables/initial-conditions, with non local effects. Anyway, I work with computationalism, and show we have to derive the wave and its equation, so we will see if there is a non linearity in that case, but the results so far go in the direction that the physics is reversible and linear, etc.

Let us no do "philosophy" and just be clear on what theory we assume. Once we assume digital mechanism, there is no more choice left (that *is* the point).

Succinctly, what is digital mechanism? I don't see how arithmetic and possibly a computer can reproduce any physical theory. It's real stretch IMO. AG

[agrays...@gmail.com]

Maybe you mean like a monkey typing randomly could eventually reproduce Shakespeare. But how could QM be tested if you only had a digital summary of its postulates, or how would the world we live in be simulated? How do you go from digits on a computer (not to mention where the computer comes from) to matter even if the matter is just a feature of statistical stability? Is all this supposed to be simpler than a quantum collapse? Still seems like a huge stretch. AG 

[agrays...@gmail.com]

Sounds like a variation on solipsism; awfully subjective. Because I can imagine the unrealized (in my world) outcome, it must exist in some other world or branch? Does the same apply for an outcome of a slot machine or a roll of the dice? Can you demonstrate any necessity for this, or is just something you want to believe? AG  

[Bruno Marchal]

Well, there are explanation why our type of brain favors the position base, but when you choose to do an experiment, you don't create branches, you differentiate on the alternative you are interested in.

They don't exist apriori, unless you want to deny free will. They come into existence when an experiment is done, or possibly when there's some sort of decision tree, such as playing a slot machine at LV. AG

We don't know. We need a coherent quantum theory of gravitation to figure out. No problem with free-will, as it is not related to quantum of computationalist indeterminacy at all---but that is quite a different topic (already discussed here).

 

and the results of the measurement do not depend on the base chosen.

It seems that they do. Measurements of energy, momentum or spin for example, result in different bases. AG

They correspond to different base, but the numerical result are not dependent of the base chosen to describe the wave evolution. This is well explained in Everett long paper.

It is just the supposition terms of the wave (in any base). There are no worlds, only relative states. My choice change only the way the multiverse is locally and relatively to me partitionned.

These relative states seem to require observers and a measuring infrastructure.

No problem. Everett theory is just that it obeys to QM too.

You create them by virtue of what you DO, say in an experiment. Or do you back off from the apparent requirement of the MWI that all possible outcomes are measured somewhere, somehow?

You don't create them at all, no more than you create the moon by looking at it. You just localize yourslef relatively to the more probable (numerous, weighted) relative branche(s).

Just having a branch evolving is not tantamount to a measurement and observation. AG

Calling it a branch or whatever doesn't solve your fatal problem. There's a simpler solution to your problem; instead of conceiving of the collapse as meaning irreducible randomness,

The point is that the randomness becomes only a case of Mechanist first person indeterminacy, which exist even without quantum mechanics.

why not assume it's a continuous process whereby the wf evolves into a delta function centered at the value measured? IOW, just assume there's an as yet unknown, continuous, non linear evolution of the state prior to measurement, which is time reversible. After all, your objection to collapse is its standard interpretation as irreducible randomness. AG

That is a Bohm-De Broglie type of move. It assumes QM false, and leads to many difficulties often discussed here (see Weinberg argument that non linearity leads to the refutation of thermodynamics, GR,

Do you have a link for this, particularly about his comments on thermodynamics? TIA, AG

Google on "Weinberg non linear quantum mechanics".

 

etc.), including irreducibly-hidden variables/initial-conditions, with non local effects. Anyway, I work with computationalism, and show we have to derive the wave and its equation, so we will see if there is a non linearity in that case, but the results so far go in the direction that the physics is reversible and linear, etc.

Let us no do "philosophy" and just be clear on what theory we assume. Once we assume digital mechanism, there is no more choice left (that *is* the point).

Succinctly, what is digital mechanism? I don't see how arithmetic and possibly a computer can reproduce any physical theory. It's real stretch IMO. AG

It has too, see my paper already referred, or ask for more.

You are right, a computer cannot emulate the physical reality, nor consciousness. 

Digital mechanism, alias computationalism, is a very weak hypothesis in cognitive science: it is the hypothesis that we could survive with a digital artificial brain or body? It is a modern version of Descartes-Milinda Mechanism. It generalize and weaken many versions like Putnam's functionalism, which assumes the description level is high.

Some sum up it by "no magic", a bit like Dideort defined rationalism by Descarte's mechanism.

Then it is a theorem that elementary arithmetic reality (model) realize the universal dovetailing, and that both consciusness and matter are emergent pattern on a self-referential structure which exist in arithmetic (or Turing equivalent) and the math confirms this by showing that the (antic) definition of matter when translated in arithmetic gives a quantum logic. 

Bruno

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[Bruno Marchal]

Not at all. That process is typically not Turing Universal. A counter in base 2 would be enough. It is more sutli than that and requires the understanding of the arithmetization of meta-arithmetic (Gödel's work).

You need to understand that elementary arithmetic is Turing universal, and that all universal system emulates all universal system. But the physical universe and consciousness are not emulated by *any* universal system in particular, but, below our substitution, by a special sum on all of them.

But how could QM be tested if you only had a digital summary of its postulates, or how would the world we live in be simulated?

That never happen. We cannot simulate the arithmetical reality, and consciousness and matter emerges from that, in a way which predicts quantum mechanics (without collapse) a priori, both intuitively and formally. This makes a precise version of computationalism testable.

How do you go from digits on a computer (not to mention where the computer comes from)

The existence of computer, in the original sense of Post, Turing, Church, is a theorem of (Peano) Arithmetic. But the ontology does not need the induction axiom. Peano can prove that Robinson arithmetic realize all computations (without being able to prove this by itself). 

to matter even if the matter is just a feature of statistical stability? Is all this supposed to be simpler than a quantum collapse? Still seems like a huge stretch. AG 

My point is that this *follows* logically from Digital Mechanism (the idea that we are machine in the weak sense of above, used in evolution, biology, etc.). Concept like Primary Matter, or any Aristotelian God, become like adding magic to make impossible to solve a problem (the mind-body problem, the quanta/qualia problem). 

And the collapse does not make physical sense, only phenomenogical (1p) sense, even without digital mechanism.  It is not usable in quantum filed theory, in GR. 

But I am not here to defend Everett's theory, except it helps to understand that Digital Mechanism is not refuted.

Of course, if someone shows how to test the collapse, and get an example, then digital mechanism can be said to be refuted or quasi-refuted, but meanwhile it is just adding a magic-type of complexity only.

Bruno

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[agrays...@gmail.com]

I think we do know. See comment below. AG  

and the results of the measurement do not depend on the base chosen.

It seems that they do. Measurements of energy, momentum or spin for example, result in different bases. AG

They correspond to different base, but the numerical result are not dependent of the base chosen to describe the wave evolution. This is well explained in Everett long paper.

 

I don't see how you reach this conclusion. If I measure spin, I surely get a different numerical result than if I measure energy, AG 

It is just the supposition terms of the wave (in any base). There are no worlds, only relative states. My choice change only the way the multiverse is locally and relatively to me partitionned.

These relative states seem to require observers and a measuring infrastructure.

No problem. Everett theory is just that it obeys to QM too.

Please; no appeals to authority. Do you need observers or not on the other worlds, or branches, or whatever, and their measuring infrastructures? AG   

You create them by virtue of what you DO, say in an experiment. Or do you back off from the apparent requirement of the MWI that all possible outcomes are measured somewhere, somehow?

You don't create them at all, no more than you create the moon by looking at it. You just localize yourslef relatively to the more probable (numerous, weighted) relative branche(s).th

What if the probability is 50-50 as in a spin experiment? How is the choice made?. But more important, since I've never done one, will the alternative histories pre-exist if I decide one day to do such an experiment? AG

Just having a branch evolving is not tantamount to a measurement and observation. AG

Calling it a branch or whatever doesn't solve your fatal problem. There's a simpler solution to your problem; instead of conceiving of the collapse as meaning irreducible randomness,

The point is that the randomness becomes only a case of Mechanist first person indeterminacy, which exist even without quantum mechanics.

why not assume it's a continuous process whereby the wf evolves into a delta function centered at the value measured? IOW, just assume there's an as yet unknown, continuous, non linear evolution of the state prior to measurement, which is time reversible. After all, your objection to collapse is its standard interpretation as irreducible randomness. AG

That is a Bohm-De Broglie type of move. It assumes QM false, and leads to many difficulties often discussed here (see Weinberg argument that non linearity leads to the refutation of thermodynamics, GR,

Do you have a link for this, particularly about his comments on thermodynamics? TIA, AG

Google on "Weinberg non linear quantum mechanics".

 

etc.), including irreducibly-hidden variables/initial-conditions, with non local effects. Anyway, I work with computationalism, and show we have to derive the wave and its equation, so we will see if there is a non linearity in that case, but the results so far go in the direction that the physics is reversible and linear, etc.

Let us no do "philosophy" and just be clear on what theory we assume. Once we assume digital mechanism, there is no more choice left (that *is* the point).

Succinctly, what is digital mechanism? I don't see how arithmetic and possibly a computer can reproduce any physical theory. It's real stretch IMO. AG

It has too, see my paper already referred, or ask for more.

You are right, a computer cannot emulate the physical reality, nor consciousness. 

Digital mechanism, alias computationalism, is a very weak hypothesis in cognitive science: it is the hypothesis that we could survive with a digital artificial brain or body? It is a modern version of Descartes-Milinda Mechanism. It generalize and weaken many versions like Putnam's functionalism, which assumes the description level is high.

Are you referring to Peter Putnam who used to teach at Colombia University in the late 1950's? Do you have a link? AG 

[Bruno Marchal]

Of course. The point is that if we measure whatever we want, the result does not depend of the base used. Many are wrong on this when discussing Everett's theory.

It is just the supposition terms of the wave (in any base). There are no worlds, only relative states. My choice change only the way the multiverse is locally and relatively to me partitionned.

These relative states seem to require observers and a measuring infrastructure.

No problem. Everett theory is just that it obeys to QM too.

Please; no appeals to authority.

mentionning a theory is not an argument of authority, it is called honesty. Nobody claims that this or that theory is true or false. We avoid "philosophy", or make special thread, which I avoid to prevent confusion.

Do you need observers or not on the other worlds, or branches, or whatever, and their measuring infrastructures? AG   

Everett assume the Universal Wave, but ignores (like most) the consequence of digital mechanism.

I assume only elementary arithmetic and computationalism, in the UDA, and only elementary arithmetic in the actual beginning of the derivation of physics and of the wave from the interview of the universal machine.

You create them by virtue of what you DO, say in an experiment. Or do you back off from the apparent requirement of the MWI that all possible outcomes are measured somewhere, somehow?

You don't create them at all, no more than you create the moon by looking at it. You just localize yourslef relatively to the more probable (numerous, weighted) relative branche(s).th

What if the probability is 50-50 as in a spin experiment? How is the choice made?. But more important, since I've never done one, will the alternative histories pre-exist if I decide one day to do such an experiment? AG

Have you read the sane04 paper?

Just having a branch evolving is not tantamount to a measurement and observation. AG

Calling it a branch or whatever doesn't solve your fatal problem. There's a simpler solution to your problem; instead of conceiving of the collapse as meaning irreducible randomness,

The point is that the randomness becomes only a case of Mechanist first person indeterminacy, which exist even without quantum mechanics.

why not assume it's a continuous process whereby the wf evolves into a delta function centered at the value measured? IOW, just assume there's an as yet unknown, continuous, non linear evolution of the state prior to measurement, which is time reversible. After all, your objection to collapse is its standard interpretation as irreducible randomness. AG

That is a Bohm-De Broglie type of move. It assumes QM false, and leads to many difficulties often discussed here (see Weinberg argument that non linearity leads to the refutation of thermodynamics, GR,

Do you have a link for this, particularly about his comments on thermodynamics? TIA, AG

Google on "Weinberg non linear quantum mechanics".

 

etc.), including irreducibly-hidden variables/initial-conditions, with non local effects. Anyway, I work with computationalism, and show we have to derive the wave and its equation, so we will see if there is a non linearity in that case, but the results so far go in the direction that the physics is reversible and linear, etc.

Let us no do "philosophy" and just be clear on what theory we assume. Once we assume digital mechanism, there is no more choice left (that *is* the point).

Succinctly, what is digital mechanism? I don't see how arithmetic and possibly a computer can reproduce any physical theory. It's real stretch IMO. AG

It has too, see my paper already referred, or ask for more.

You are right, a computer cannot emulate the physical reality, nor consciousness. 

Digital mechanism, alias computationalism, is a very weak hypothesis in cognitive science: it is the hypothesis that we could survive with a digital artificial brain or body? It is a modern version of Descartes-Milinda Mechanism. It generalize and weaken many versions like Putnam's functionalism, which assumes the description level is high.

Are you referring to Peter Putnam who used to teach at Colombia University in the late 1950's? Do you have a link? AG 

PUTNAM H., 1960, Minds and Machines, Dimensions of Mind : A Symposium, Sidney

Hook (Ed.), New-York University Press, New-York. also in Anderson A. R. (Ed.),1964.

ANDERSON A.R. (ed.), 1964, Minds and Machine, Prentice Hall inc. New Jersey. 

(Trad. Française : Pensée et machine, Editions du Champ Vallon, 1983).

Bruno

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[agrays...@gmail.com]

No. I wouldn't know where to find it, but more important the theory doesn't appeal to me. I could be wrong, but it apparently relies on human memories and seems solipsistic. I think, without appealing to any theory or paper, you could answer the question directly about the preexistence of alternative states or histories. If I do a cat experiment, do I create the alternative states or histories, or are they preexisting? AG 

[Bruno Marchal]

On 13 Sep 2016, at 00:46, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:

[SNIP]

On Monday, September 12, 2016 at 2:14:18 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 11 Sep 2016, at 20:48, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:

You create them by virtue of what you DO, say in an experiment. Or do you back off from the apparent requirement of the MWI that all possible outcomes are measured somewhere, somehow?

You don't create them at all, no more than you create the moon by looking at it. You just localize yourslef relatively to the more probable (numerous, weighted) relative branche(s).th

What if the probability is 50-50 as in a spin experiment? How is the choice made?. But more important, since I've never done one, will the alternative histories pre-exist if I decide one day to do such an experiment? AG

Have you read the sane04 paper?

No. I wouldn't know where to find it,

I gave you the link: 

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html

Click on the paper, and on the slide. The slide reminds a decomposition of the reasoning in eight simple (but not all that simple) steps.

Don't stay too long in the catalog of people criticizing a work before studying it. You might end in the category of people who get the point but lies to save their face.

but more important the theory doesn't appeal to me.

?

Non-computationalism relies on actual infinities, or magical souls, or naïve fairy tales. Like Diderot understood, with many atheists, Mechanism is the default assumption of the rationalist. 

Mechanism makes eventually all notion of primary matter into phlogiston-like concept. The point is that if Mechanism is true, the appearance of matter has a testable explanation, not relying on assumed substance or materiality, or physical concepts. Mechanism is not compatible with physicalism, nor even entirely with mathematicalism, there are some subtleties here, depending on the bet on digitalism, which belongs to theology, and only to math in "God's eye" (some relations are true, but only without saying them)..

I could be wrong, but it apparently relies on human memories

?

and seems solipsistic.

Some modalities of self-reference are machine-solispistic, like the modalities related to the subject (for the others: S4Grz, S4Grz1, X, X*, X1, X1*). But numbers, computation and the core of matter should have a first person plural reality (G, G*, G1, G1*, Z, Z1, Z*, Z1*), and the whole thing is a many mind structure, hardly solipsistic. 

The passage from S4Grz (or X) to G (or Z) is when the machine can discover "not-me" and can bet on the existence of the others, and when histories can be shared among classes of multiple observers. 

I think, without appealing to any theory or paper, you could answer the question directly about the preexistence of alternative states or histories.

Yes, everything preexist(s) in some sense, as everything (objective and subjective) is derived from addition and multiplication of numbers. 

The crazy thing here (that addition and multiplication are, taken together with a bit of logic, already Turing universal) is not mine, although this is not well known and I am often considered as crazy on a point which is very basic for mathematical logicians.

If I do a cat experiment, do I create the alternative states or histories, or are they preexisting? AG 

There is only true (and false) relation between numbers, but the computable one direct a differentiating flux of consciousness, with a very complex mathematical structure (the modal logics give only the "simple" propositional level, but we can explore the quantified version: it is a matter of work). 

So when you do the cat experiment, you, relatively to here-and-now, let the (1p) consciousness flux differentiates in (not two, it is always aleph_0 at the least) "preexisting" (yet in an epistemological sense: they are derived notion/experience) computational histories (defined in term of self-referential number relations). 

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[agrays...@gmail.com]

FWIW, I think you've solved the mind-body problem by eliminating the body. AG 

 

Bruno

 

Bruno

 

<blockquote class="

[Bruno Marchal]

On 15 Sep 2016, at 17:38, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:

snip

FWIW, I think you've solved the mind-body problem by eliminating the body. AG 

Exactly. The body/matter loss its ontology, and the mind-body problem is reduced into the problem of justifying the laws of physics from some special and precise arithmetical statistics. 

UDA proves that we have to do that once we assume computationalism, and the translation of AUDA in arithmetic, through the logics of self-reference (Gödel, Löb, ...) provides the solution at the propositional level, and it fits with quantum logic(s).

Bruno

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