Open Individualism and Self Interest

[Dennis Ochei]

Under Daniel Kolak's open individualism there exists one numerically distinct person who is everyone at all times. What I want to explore is the implications of this theory for a self interested individual. For those unfamiliar with Open Individualism, you might instead imagine a demon appears to you, and informs you that after you die you will experience what it is like to be every person that ever lived.

The only rational course of action seems to be to maximize utility across lives. Meaning if $1 will buy you in your current life 1 unit of utility, but would afford another person 10 units, it would be rationally self interested to donate the money, if you expect to experience what they shall experience. This is essentially Singer's Effective Altruism at work. Are there any other rational courses of action if Open Individualism is true (or if the hypothetical demon appeared) and one is self interested?

[LizR]

I have often had these and similar thoughts myself. If reincarnation is true (and could be shown to be true beyond reasonable doubt) then the only rational course would be for people to be nice to one another, because they would only be being nice to themselves. (Especially if they have no way of knowing which lives they still have to lead... the $10 example would logically be equivalent to $5 in that you have a 50% chance of having lived that life already, in which case whatever happened has already happened... although in a multiverse scenario this gets (even more) complicated... plus once you've gone through everyone, you may have to start at the beginning again, so you should take that possibility into account - if this goes on forever, your $1 becomes $1 x infinity, and the difference between that and $10 x infinity is, well, nothing! But in any finite number N of iterations, you have $N becoming $10 x N, hence gain $9 x N)

This view also means that there is in fact only one consciousness in existence, as the mystics say.

(And of course the Beatles "I am he as you are he as you are me and we are all together.")

This is somewhat similar to the idea for creating a utopia - that everyone who will live in it is gathered together and magically made to forget who they are, and in particular, their position in society. They then have to decide on how the society should be run.

[Dennis Ochei]

I think you'll enjoy what I uploaded. I definitely had a "Hey! I thought of that" moment when I read it.

>  if this goes on forever, your $1 becomes $1 x infinity, and the difference between that and $10 x infinity is, well, nothing!

Would the number of iterations actually be infinite? Or would it merely approach infinity while remaining finite? If it's the second then the difference between the two choices grows without bound.

In the multiverse scenario, the redistribution always happens and always doesn't happen so it doesn't matter what choice any agent makes. However, it might effect the measure of the outcomes, if that matters.

> that everyone who will live in it is gathered together and magically made to forget who they are, and in particular, their position in society

This is John Stuart Mill's Veil of Ignorance :)

[meekerdb]

On 5/13/2014 9:39 PM, Dennis Ochei wrote:

I think you'll enjoy what I uploaded. I definitely had a "Hey! I thought of that" moment when I read it.

>  if this goes on forever, your $1 becomes $1 x infinity, and the difference between that and $10 x infinity is, well, nothing!

Would the number of iterations actually be infinite? Or would it merely approach infinity while remaining finite? If it's the second then the difference between the two choices grows without bound.

In the multiverse scenario, the redistribution always happens and always doesn't happen so it doesn't matter what choice any agent makes. However, it might effect the measure of the outcomes, if that matters.

> that everyone who will live in it is gathered together and magically made to forget who they are, and in particular, their position in society

This is John Stuart Mill's Veil of Ignorance :)

John Rawls Veil of Ignorance.  In Rawls ethical theory one agrees on how society will work without knowing what position one will have in that society.

Brent

[Dennis Ochei]

Whoops, thanks for the correction

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Wednesday, May 14, 2014, Dennis Ochei <do.inf...@gmail.com> wrote:

Under Daniel Kolak's open individualism there exists one numerically distinct person who is everyone at all times. What I want to explore is the implications of this theory for a self interested individual. For those unfamiliar with Open Individualism, you might instead imagine a demon appears to you, and informs you that after you die you will experience what it is like to be every person that ever lived.

The only rational course of action seems to be to maximize utility across lives. Meaning if $1 will buy you in your current life 1 unit of utility, but would afford another person 10 units, it would be rationally self interested to donate the money, if you expect to experience what they shall experience. This is essentially Singer's Effective Altruism at work. Are there any other rational courses of action if Open Individualism is true (or if the hypothetical demon appeared) and one is self interested?

If I tell you that this morning I woke up as you and you as me, but otherwise everything was exactly the same, how is this different to each of is waking up as ourselves? In other words, what possible evidence, either subjective or objective, could count either for or against this transformation having happened?

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[Dennis Ochei]

But that's exactly the point. Consciousness, if construed as the container of conscious experience (or the surface upon which experience is written) has no principle of individuation--all conscious experiencers abstracted from their experience are identical. For this reason a consciousness swap is as meaningless as swapping the location of two electrons or shifting the universe 6 feet to the left. This is not at all the route Kolak takes to his conclusion, but suffices as a quick exposition of why one would entertain the position. In short, patterns (complex organisms) emerge in the universe that allow the universe to be conscious of itself. All consciousness is one part of the universe experiencing another part of itself as other.

Course, one could also take the position that there is no experiencer independent of the experience. The experiencer and the experienced are one. In which case you are identical solely with yourself right this moment, and what will wake up in your bed tomorrow will not be you, but something that is merely like you in many ways. Under this view you now and you tomorrow are different persons. This is the view pushed by Parfit.

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[meekerdb]

If Dennis gave me a dollar...

Brent

[Dennis Ochei]

I would rather find a logically coherent reason to keep my dollars under open individualism, Brent. Something deep inside me recoils at the conclusion. But the only other coherent story of subjective expectation is the no-self theory,  which undermines so much of my value system that I'd rather not accept it. Rocks and hard places...

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[LizR]

Objective evidence could do it, but we'd need a whole well-evidenced theory of Cartesian dualism to back it up. But of course if the "transmigration of souls" required for this scenario to work is real, it could happen every night, or indeed every second. It's equivalent to the flashlight in Fred Hoyle's "pigeon holes" from "October the first is too late" (which isn't imho relevant to the theory of identity he proposes, which is essentially the "capsule theory").

[LizR]

"Speech is silver, silence is gold. Self is universe. Please excuse interruption, crossing in mist."

[Bruno Marchal]

On 14 May 2014, at 06:05, Dennis Ochei wrote:

Under Daniel Kolak's open individualism there exists one numerically distinct person who is everyone at all times. What I want to explore is the implications of this theory for a self interested individual. For those unfamiliar with Open Individualism, you might instead imagine a demon appears to you, and informs you that after you die you will experience what it is like to be every person that ever lived.

I think that is consitent, and perhaps true with comp, but perhaps not communicable, so, like many good religious idea, to present them can be too much, and prevent people to discover that by themselves.

It would be a proposition belonging to G* minus G. What can be justified, is that if comp is true then it follows.

The only rational course of action seems to be to maximize utility across lives. Meaning if $1 will buy you in your current life 1 unit of utility, but would afford another person 10 units, it would be rationally self interested to donate the money, if you expect to experience what they shall experience. This is essentially Singer's Effective Altruism at work. Are there any other rational courses of action if Open Individualism is true (or if the hypothetical demon appeared) and one is self interested?

When amoebas does that, it gives mold, mixomycete. 

I am not sure, because it depends what people do with the money, and with the short term, middle term, long term conflicts. 

Social amoebas lives a selfish life until they starve, and then they make sacrifice and assure the next generations:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5h8WOWEqP6o

"We are all the same person" is close to spoiling the end of the movie, somehow.

And which "we"? I assume you take all living creatures in arithmetic from the jumping spider to "divinities" (non computable sets, oracles).

But OK, the arithmetical hypostases describes an abstract ideally correct machines instanciated into its infinitely many variants or extensions. It is a universal person. But with different beliefs and experiences, and that has its role too.

It is a process of recognition. I recognize myself in PA and ZF, in some sense.

Bruno

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[Dennis Ochei]

G*, G, arithmetical hypostases, PA, ZF?

I must not know the lingo round here

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[LizR]

On 15 May 2014 14:26, Dennis Ochei <do.inf...@gmail.com> wrote:

G*, G, arithmetical hypostases, PA, ZF?

PA is Peano Arithmetic and ZF is Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory.

(Whatever they are!)

Just to prove I've managed to learn something while I've been here.

[Dennis Ochei]

I figured PA was either Peano or Presburger Arithmetic. I'm used to seeing ZFC but not ZF by itself. The other three are total mysteries to me

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[LizR]

Looks like you're already way ahead of me. Anyway, no doubt Bruno will explain.

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[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 15 May 2014 04:33, Dennis Ochei <do.inf...@gmail.com> wrote:

But that's exactly the point. Consciousness, if construed as the container of conscious experience (or the surface upon which experience is written) has no principle of individuation--all conscious experiencers abstracted from their experience are identical. For this reason a consciousness swap is as meaningless as swapping the location of two electrons or shifting the universe 6 feet to the left. This is not at all the route Kolak takes to his conclusion, but suffices as a quick exposition of why one would entertain the position. In short, patterns (complex organisms) emerge in the universe that allow the universe to be conscious of itself. All consciousness is one part of the universe experiencing another part of itself as other.

Course, one could also take the position that there is no experiencer independent of the experience. The experiencer and the experienced are one. In which case you are identical solely with yourself right this moment, and what will wake up in your bed tomorrow will not be you, but something that is merely like you in many ways. Under this view you now and you tomorrow are different persons. This is the view pushed by Parfit.

I am sympathetic to Parfit's view, but it doesn't change the way I feel about things. For example, to be consistent I shouldn't care if I die, since I die anyway even if my tomorrow self seems to persist; however, I do care if I die.

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[Stathis Papaioannou]

In other words, if the "transmigration of souls" occurs it is no different than if it didn't occur.

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[Dennis Ochei]

You can still care if you die normally but something like the swampman thought experiment is just as good as ordinary survival under Parfit's view, which a reductionist I feel is forced to accept. You care that you keep experiencing but there is no self to be found that persists. Destructive uploading or teletransportation preserve everything worth preserving. That you are what once was is purely an illusion. Naive closed individualism reveals itself as deeply flawed when subjected to thought experiments.Unless you subscribe to Kolak's view you can't redeem the idea that you are in any sense the same consciousness that you remember being

On Wednesday, May 14, 2014, Stathis Papaioannou <stat...@gmail.com> wrote:

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[LizR]

On 15 May 2014 15:43, Dennis Ochei <do.inf...@gmail.com> wrote:

You can still care if you die normally but something like the swampman thought experiment is just as good as ordinary survival under Parfit's view, which a reductionist I feel is forced to accept. You care that you keep experiencing but there is no self to be found that persists. Destructive uploading or teletransportation preserve everything worth preserving. That you are what once was is purely an illusion. Naive closed individualism reveals itself as deeply flawed when subjected to thought experiments.Unless you subscribe to Kolak's view you can't redeem the idea that you are in any sense the same consciousness that you remember being

I don't know about "in any sense". If you identify yourself as your current state of consciousness then undoubtedly you can't step into the same river twice, but if you identify yourself with your memories then there is some partial sameness between me now and myself this morning that doesn't exist between me and anyone else.

(Of course, Leonard Shelby would probably disagree...)

[Dennis Ochei]

But then the identity relationship is no longer transitive...

Suppose a brave officer to have been flogged when a boy at school, for robbing an orchard, to have taken a standard from the enemy in his first campaign, and to have been made a general in advanced life: Suppose also, which must be admitted to be possible, that when he took the standard, he was conscious of his having been flogged at school, and that when made a general he was conscious of his taking the standard, but had absolutely lost the consciousness of his flogging. 

    These things being supposed, it follows, from Mr LOCKE’S doctrine, that he who was flogged at school is the same person who took the standard, and that he who took the standard is the same person who was made a general. Whence it follows, if there be any truth in logic, that the general is the same person with him who was flogged at school. But the general’s consciousness does not reach so far back as his flogging, therefore, according to Mr LOCKE’S doctrine, he is not the person who was flogged. There- fore the general is, and at the same time is not the same person with him who was flogged at a school.

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[Dennis Ochei]

Also would you bite the bullet that if i where to erase your personal memories then torture your body it wouldnt count as torturing you?

[Russell Standish]

On Tue, May 13, 2014 at 09:05:15PM -0700, Dennis Ochei wrote:
>
>
> Under Daniel Kolak's open individualism<http://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open_individualism> there

If you are going to be experiencing all possible experiences, anyway, then
what does it matter what you decide?

This is an indication of level confusion.

Possibly decision theory might work if future experiences are
discounted by how far in the future they are, but then how to work out
how far away the other person's experience is from you?

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[Dennis Ochei]

In this scenario you dont experience all possible experiences, only the experiences that actually arise during the course of history

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[Russell Standish]

Ah - that doesn't make sense if you take the ensemble everything idea
to be true.

Open Individualism doesn't seem very believable unless the ensemble
everything idea is true.

Cheers

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[Dennis Ochei]

Im not convinced you need it. In Kolak's dissertation "I am you," which you can google and find in its 700 page entirety he defends the idea rather well with no mention of the actuality of all possible things. He goes about arguing that the borders we take as individuating boundaries don't actually constitute those between different persons.

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[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 15 May 2014 13:43, Dennis Ochei <do.inf...@gmail.com> wrote:

You can still care if you die normally but something like the swampman thought experiment is just as good as ordinary survival under Parfit's view, which a reductionist I feel is forced to accept. You care that you keep experiencing but there is no self to be found that persists. Destructive uploading or teletransportation preserve everything worth preserving. That you are what once was is purely an illusion. Naive closed individualism reveals itself as deeply flawed when subjected to thought experiments.Unless you subscribe to Kolak's view you can't redeem the idea that you are in any sense the same consciousness that you remember being

I have thought about this a lot over the years and have come to the conclusion that it is an illusion that there is a self that persists over time. Nevertheless, it is an important illusion for me and I make efforts to ensure that the illusion continues.

 

On Wednesday, May 14, 2014, Stathis Papaioannou <stat...@gmail.com> wrote:

On 15 May 2014 04:33, Dennis Ochei <do.inf...@gmail.com> wrote:

But that's exactly the point. Consciousness, if construed as the container of conscious experience (or the surface upon which experience is written) has no principle of individuation--all conscious experiencers abstracted from their experience are identical. For this reason a consciousness swap is as meaningless as swapping the location of two electrons or shifting the universe 6 feet to the left. This is not at all the route Kolak takes to his conclusion, but suffices as a quick exposition of why one would entertain the position. In short, patterns (complex organisms) emerge in the universe that allow the universe to be conscious of itself. All consciousness is one part of the universe experiencing another part of itself as other.

Course, one could also take the position that there is no experiencer independent of the experience. The experiencer and the experienced are one. In which case you are identical solely with yourself right this moment, and what will wake up in your bed tomorrow will not be you, but something that is merely like you in many ways. Under this view you now and you tomorrow are different persons. This is the view pushed by Parfit.

I am sympathetic to Parfit's view, but it doesn't change the way I feel about things. For example, to be consistent I shouldn't care if I die, since I die anyway even if my tomorrow self seems to persist; however, I do care if I die.

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[meekerdb]

On 5/14/2014 9:51 PM, Dennis Ochei wrote:

But then the identity relationship is no longer transitive...

Suppose a brave officer to have been flogged when a boy at school, for robbing an orchard, to have taken a standard from the enemy in his first campaign, and to have been made a general in advanced life: Suppose also, which must be admitted to be possible, that when he took the standard, he was conscious of his having been flogged at school, and that when made a general he was conscious of his taking the standard, but had absolutely lost the consciousness of his flogging. 

    These things being supposed, it follows, from Mr LOCKE’S doctrine, that he who was flogged at school is the same person who took the standard, and that he who took the standard is the same person who was made a general. Whence it follows, if there be any truth in logic, that the general is the same person with him who was flogged at school. But the general’s consciousness does not reach so far back as his flogging, therefore, according to Mr LOCKE’S doctrine, he is not the person who was flogged. There- fore the general is, and at the same time is not the same person with him who was flogged at a school.

Hence the common sense theory that person's are defined by bodily continuity.

Brent

[Stathis Papaioannou]

It's only a common sense notion because we can't go around duplicating ourselves, meeting our duplicates, rewriting our memories and so on. 

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[Dennis Ochei]

I'm deeply conflicted. On one had I want the illusion but i also want to act in accordance with the truth. My reason for my self interest lies in my subjective expectation that I aill experience being my future self. I cant have the basis of all my actions be a lie. so much cognitive dissonance

[Dennis Ochei]

It doesn't handle the semiconservative replication case, where each resultant person retains half the material from the original, and you run into ship of theseus and sorites paradoxes

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[Bruno Marchal]

On 15 May 2014, at 04:26, Dennis Ochei wrote:

G*, G, arithmetical hypostases, PA, ZF?

I must not know the lingo round here

In your answer to Liz, you show that you know what ZF (and ZFC) are, and what PA is.

G and G* are the sound and complete modal logic describing the behavior of the provability predicate of PA (described in PA), or in ZF, or actually in any arithmetical sound machine.

G described the logic of provability that the machine can prove, and G* described the true logic of provability.

For example, take consistency (~[]f = non provable false). G* proves both ~[]f, and ~[]f -> ~[](~[]f) (Gödel second incompleteness theorem), but G proves only  ~[]f -> ~[](~[]f), as PA or ZF cannot prove their consistency.

To see the link with "open individualism" you might read my paper (or any more recent one):

 http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html 

I show that if we take seriously the idea that we are digitalizable machine, then eventually physics is a phenomenological reality emerging from the machine's dream in arithmetic (or any Turing universal theory). Then G and G* are used to find the coherence condition explaining the quantization of arithmetic, and where the quantum laws come from. You need to understand that your consciousness is not a product of your body, but more of the infinite relative bodies (self-representations) that you have in the arithmetical reality.

This eventually forces us to backtrack on Plato's and the mystics' conception of reality, instead of the current naturalism/materialism of Aristotle.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Bruno Marchal]

On 15 May 2014, at 06:51, Dennis Ochei wrote:

But then the identity relationship is no longer transitive...

Ypou mention Parfit, which put the identity on the person series, and that makes it non transitive. Take the step 3 of the UDA, in the paper I refer you too, and which is supposed to be sudtied on this list (I explain this since many years).

We have that from the first person point of view, the guy in M and the guy in W are the same guy as the original in Helsinki (say), yet they are not the same guy after the duplication. There is no paradox. The usual identity criterion is given by the personal memories and their structured integration.

Suppose a brave officer to have been flogged when a boy at school, for robbing an orchard, to have taken a standard from the enemy in his first campaign, and to have been made a general in advanced life: Suppose also, which must be admitted to be possible, that when he took the standard, he was conscious of his having been flogged at school, and that when made a general he was conscious of his taking the standard, but had absolutely lost the consciousness of his flogging. 

    These things being supposed, it follows, from Mr LOCKE’S doctrine, that he who was flogged at school is the same person who took the standard, and that he who took the standard is the same person who was made a general. Whence it follows, if there be any truth in logic, that the general is the same person with him who was flogged at school. But the general’s consciousness does not reach so far back as his flogging, therefore, according to Mr LOCKE’S doctrine, he is not the person who was flogged. There- fore the general is, and at the same time is not the same person with him who was flogged at a school.

No problem with this. It is the amnesia thought experiment, and it shows that we are the same person, once we assume computationalism. That is plausibly the universal person that the logic G and G* justify to be a notion or person canonically attached to any (universal) machine.

Bruno

On Wednesday, May 14, 2014, LizR <liz...@gmail.com> wrote:

On 15 May 2014 15:43, Dennis Ochei <do.inf...@gmail.com> wrote:

You can still care if you die normally but something like the swampman thought experiment is just as good as ordinary survival under Parfit's view, which a reductionist I feel is forced to accept. You care that you keep experiencing but there is no self to be found that persists. Destructive uploading or teletransportation preserve everything worth preserving. That you are what once was is purely an illusion. Naive closed individualism reveals itself as deeply flawed when subjected to thought experiments.Unless you subscribe to Kolak's view you can't redeem the idea that you are in any sense the same consciousness that you remember being

I don't know about "in any sense". If you identify yourself as your current state of consciousness then undoubtedly you can't step into the same river twice, but if you identify yourself with your memories then there is some partial sameness between me now and myself this morning that doesn't exist between me and anyone else.

(Of course, Leonard Shelby would probably disagree...)

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[Bruno Marchal]

On 15 May 2014, at 05:43, Dennis Ochei wrote:

You can still care if you die normally but something like the swampman thought experiment is just as good as ordinary survival under Parfit's view, which a reductionist I feel is forced to accept. You care that you keep experiencing but there is no self to be found that persists. Destructive uploading or teletransportation preserve everything worth preserving.

That is the computationalist assumption, which is the assumption from which I derive that physics is a branch of machine's psychology or theology.

That you are what once was is purely an illusion.

But a "real illusion", which obeys mathematical law, due to computer science.

Naive closed individualism reveals itself as deeply flawed when subjected to thought experiments.Unless you subscribe to Kolak's view you can't redeem the idea that you are in any sense the same consciousness that you remember being

Why. On the contrary, that is used to understand that we are all the same consciousness to begin with.

Bruno

On Wednesday, May 14, 2014, Stathis Papaioannou <stat...@gmail.com> wrote:

On 15 May 2014 04:33, Dennis Ochei <do.inf...@gmail.com> wrote:

But that's exactly the point. Consciousness, if construed as the container of conscious experience (or the surface upon which experience is written) has no principle of individuation--all conscious experiencers abstracted from their experience are identical. For this reason a consciousness swap is as meaningless as swapping the location of two electrons or shifting the universe 6 feet to the left. This is not at all the route Kolak takes to his conclusion, but suffices as a quick exposition of why one would entertain the position. In short, patterns (complex organisms) emerge in the universe that allow the universe to be conscious of itself. All consciousness is one part of the universe experiencing another part of itself as other.

Course, one could also take the position that there is no experiencer independent of the experience. The experiencer and the experienced are one. In which case you are identical solely with yourself right this moment, and what will wake up in your bed tomorrow will not be you, but something that is merely like you in many ways. Under this view you now and you tomorrow are different persons. This is the view pushed by Parfit.

I am sympathetic to Parfit's view, but it doesn't change the way I feel about things. For example, to be consistent I shouldn't care if I die, since I die anyway even if my tomorrow self seems to persist; however, I do care if I die.

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[meekerdb]

Another point in favor of the common sense idea.  But why would it matter if we could.  Duplicates would be new persons.

Brent

[meekerdb]

On 5/14/2014 11:32 PM, Dennis Ochei wrote:

I'm deeply conflicted. On one had I want the illusion but i also want to act in accordance with the truth.

Ah, there's your problem.  "The truth" is likely unknowable.  "The illusion" is what's knowable - so why denigrate it?

Brent

[meekerdb]

On 5/14/2014 11:34 PM, Dennis Ochei wrote:

It doesn't handle the semiconservative replication case, where each resultant person retains half the material from the original, and you run into ship of theseus and sorites paradoxes

But there are no such cases.  They are stories based on a model of how the world works.

Brent

[Dennis Ochei]

Its pretty obvious that the naive notion cannot handle the split brain thought experiment or ship of theseus. Its also not obvious that a duplicate would be a new person. There is no such thing as the original particles, all like particles are indistinguishable. Furthermore, the replication can be done semiconservatively, where each of the resultant persons get half the particles of the original, rendering the question moot. Lastly, whether you are the original or the replica is a completely epiphenomenal distinction. It isnt physically meaningful.

So the illusion is persistent, but i can see the seams.

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[Dennis Ochei]

Parfit denies the existence of personal identity altogether, what is left merely psychological and biological relatedness relations.

Personal identity works if everyone is one person, but i dont want to be forced by my view of personal continuity to be an extreme altruist

Personal identity works if I am solely me right now but that is nearly as bad as the open case, as I have no real good reason to care more about my future self than others.

The memory criterion is a problem because the identity question cannot be graded. I will either wake up in my bed tomorrow or someone else will who is merely like me will. But memories can be gained or lost. If the loss or gain of a single memory destroys me, then we are right back to the empty view, if i can survive these kinds of transformations then we return to the open view


On Thursday, May 15, 2014, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

On 15 May 2014, at 06:51, Dennis Ochei wrote:

But then the identity relationship is no longer transitive...

Ypou mention Parfit, which put the identity on the person series, and that makes it non transitive. Take the step 3 of the UDA, in the paper I refer you too, and which is supposed to be sudtied on this list (I explain this since many years).

We have that from the first person point of view, the guy in M and the guy in W are the same guy as the original in Helsinki (say), yet they are not the same guy after the duplication. There is no paradox. The usual identity criterion is given by the personal memories and their structured integration.

Suppose a brave officer to have been flogged when a boy at school, for robbing an orchard, to have taken a standard from the enemy in his first campaign, and to have been made a general in advanced life: Suppose also, which must be admitted to be possible, that when he took the standard, he was conscious of his having been flogged at school, and that when made a general he was conscious of his taking the standard, but had absolutely lost the consciousness of his flogging. 

    These things being supposed, it follows, from Mr LOCKE’S doctrine, that he who was flogged at school is the same person who took the standard, and that he who took the standard is the same person who was made a general. Whence it follows, if there be any truth in logic, that the general is the same person with him who was flogged at school. But the general’s consciousness does not reach so far back as his flogging, therefore, according to Mr LOCKE’S doctrine, he is not the person who was flogged. There- fore the general is, and at the same time is not the same person with him who was flogged at a school.

No problem with this. It is the amnesia thought experiment, and it shows that we are the same person, once we assume computationalism. That is plausibly the universal person that the logic G and G* justify to be a notion or person canonically attached to any (universal) machine.

Bruno

On Wednesday, May 14, 2014, LizR <liz...@gmail.com> wrote:

On 15 May 2014 15:43, Dennis Ochei <do.inf...@gmail.com> wrote:

You can still care if you die normally but something like the swampman thought experiment is just as good as ordinary survival under Parfit's view, which a reductionist I feel is forced to accept. You care that you keep experiencing but there is no self to be found that persists. Destructive uploading or teletransportation preserve everything worth preserving. That you are what once was is purely an illusion. Naive closed individualism reveals itself as deeply flawed when subjected to thought experiments.Unless you subscribe to Kolak's view you can't redeem the idea that you are in any sense the same consciousness that you remember being

I don't know about "in any sense". If you identify yourself as your current state of consciousness then undoubtedly you can't step into the same river twice, but if you identify yourself with your memories then there is some partial sameness between me now and myself this morning that doesn't exist between me and anyone else.

(Of course, Leonard Shelby would probably disagree...)

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[Terren Suydam]

Hi Dennis,

I'm not familiar with Parfit and the other theoricians you guys have been talking about, but the concepts around self being bandied around seem so black and white. Dennis, you say self cannot be graded but why?  My self when I am drunk is different than my self when I am sober, but this is temporary. And if the idea of self is so brittle that it shatters from falling asleep, then why stop at sleep?  From one minute to the next, if I choose a precise enough notion of self, I am a different person. What is the principle that allows me to choose how precisely to define it?

In my view, self is not merely memory, or bounded by skin. It is an autopoietic construct, a living system that incorporates memories and is embodied in some "physical" form (where "physical" is general enough to include the virtual). Its defining characterization is that of persistent organization. It is a body, but in the memetic domain. Just as we don't go around saying that we have different bodies from one day to the next, so it is with the self. 

If there is a notion of self that is inclusive of all of us, a "global self", then we don't have access to that in the same way that my individual cells would not have access to my self. I see no reason to doubt that there is or could be a "global self" but if it exists, it has its own persistent organization and its own experience of reality. 

Terren

[Dennis Ochei]

The empty view doesn't stop at sleep, different psychophysical structures are different persons. From moment to moment there is no identity. Identity is abolished in all but the trivial case, there are just degrees of relatedness. Your relation to your future self is like your relationship with a sibling.

Identity cannot be had in degrees because it is concerned with the question, "What will I experience next?"

Let's say my memories and yours are gradually swapped in parallel, at the halfway point there are two personalities that are both half yours and half mine. It makes sense to say the are both not me if we take on the mereologically essential view of empty individualism. It doesnt make sense to say I am half experiencing being each of them. There is the experiencer on the left, and there is the one on the right but there is no experiencer that is half the person on the left and half the person on the right

On Thursday, May 15, 2014, Terren Suydam <terren...@gmail.com> wrote:

Hi Dennis,

I'm not familiar with Parfit and the other theoricians you guys have been talking about, but the concepts around self being bandied around seem so black and white. Dennis, you say self cannot be graded but why?  My self when I am drunk is different than my self when I am sober, but this is temporary. And if the idea of self is so brittle that it shatters from falling asleep, then why stop at sleep?  From one minute to the next, if I choose a precise enough notion of self, I am a different person. What is the principle that allows me to choose how precisely to define it?

In my view, self is not merely memory, or bounded by skin. It is an autopoietic construct, a living system that incorporates memories and is embodied in some "physical" form (where "physical" is general enough to include the virtual). Its defining characterization is that of persistent organization. It is a body, but in the memetic domain. Just as we don't go around saying that we have different bodies from one day to the next, so it is with the self. 

If there is a notion of self that is inclusive of all of us, a "global self", then we don't have access to that in the same way that my individual cells would not have access to my self. I see no reason to doubt that there is or could be a "global self" but if it exists, it has its own persistent organization and its own experience of reality. 

Terren

On Thu, May 15, 2014 at 12:27 PM, Dennis Ochei <do.inf...@gmail.com> wrote:

Parfit denies the existence of personal identity altogether, what is left merely psychological and biological relatedness relations.

Personal identity works if everyone is one person, but i dont want to be forced by my view of personal continuity to be an extreme altruist

Personal identity works if I am solely me right now but that is nearly as bad as the open case, as I have no real good reason to care more about my future self than others.

The memory criterion is a problem because the identity question cannot be graded. I will either wake up in my bed tomorrow or someone else will who is merely like me will. But memories can be gained or lost. If the loss or gain of a single memory destroys me, then we are right back to the empty view, if i can survive these kinds of transformations then we return to the open view


On Thursday, May 15, 2014, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

On 15 May 2014, at 06:51, Dennis Ochei wrote:

But then the identity relationship is no longer transitive...

Ypou mention Parfit, which put the identity on the person series, and that makes it non transitive. Take the step 3 of the UDA, in the paper I refer you too, and which is supposed to be sudtied on this list (I explain this since many years).

We have that from the first person point of view, the guy in M and the guy in W are the same guy as the original in Helsinki (say), yet they are not the same guy after the duplication. There is no paradox. The usual identity criterion is given by the personal memories and their structured integration.

Suppose a brave officer to have been flogged when a boy at school, for robbing an orchard, to have taken a standard from the enemy in his first campaign, and to have been made a general in advanced life: Suppose also, which must be admitted to be possible, that when he took the standard, he was conscious of his having been flogged at school, and that when made a general he was conscious of his taking the standard, but had absolutely lost the consciousness of his flogging. 

    These things being supposed, it follows, from Mr LOCKE’S doctrine, that he who was flogged at school is the same person who took the standard, and that he who took the standard is the same person who was made a general. Whence it follows, if there be any truth in logic, that the general is the same person with him who was flogged at school. But the general’s consciousness does not reach so far back as his flogging, therefore, according to Mr LOCKE’S doctrine, he is not the person who was flogged. There- fore the general is, and at the same time is not the same person with him who was flogged at a school.

No problem with this. It is the amnesia thought experiment, and it shows that we are the same person, once we assume computationalism. That is plausibly the universal person that the logic G and G* justify to be a notion or person canonically attached to any (universal) machine.

Bruno

On Wednesday, May 14, 2014, LizR <liz...@gmail.com> wrote:

On 15 May 2014 15:43, Dennis Ochei <do.inf...@gmail.com> wrote:

You can still care if you die normally but something like the swampman thought exp

[meekerdb]

On 5/15/2014 9:13 AM, Dennis Ochei wrote:

Its pretty obvious that the naive notion cannot handle the split brain thought experiment or ship of theseus.

But you don't know that those are possible.

Its also not obvious that a duplicate would be a new person.

It's just a semantic choice.

There is no such thing as the original particles, all like particles are indistinguishable. Furthermore, the replication can be done semiconservatively, where each of the resultant persons get half the particles of the original, rendering the question moot. Lastly, whether you are the original or the replica is a completely epiphenomenal distinction. It isnt physically meaningful.

Suppose someone made a duplicate of you.  The duplicate claims to own your house, and goes to court for possession.  Do you think the court should not consider it meaningful that one of you has physical continuity and the doesn't?  How do you decide what's "meaningful" and what isn't?

Brent

[meekerdb]

On 5/15/2014 9:27 AM, Dennis Ochei wrote:
> The memory criterion is a problem because the identity question cannot be graded. I will
> either wake up in my bed tomorrow or someone else will who is merely like me will.

Why "merely"? Why isn't "more like me than anything else in the universe" enough to "be" you?

> But memories can be gained or lost. If the loss or gain of a single memory destroys me,
> then we are right back to the empty view, if i can survive these kinds of
> transformations then we return to the open view

I don't see it? Why the all-or-nothing conclusion? You have more of your memories than I
do; so we are distinct.

Brent

[meekerdb]

On 5/15/2014 10:40 AM, Dennis Ochei wrote:

The empty view doesn't stop at sleep, different psychophysical structures are different persons. From moment to moment there is no identity. Identity is abolished in all but the trivial case, there are just degrees of relatedness. Your relation to your future self is like your relationship with a sibling.

Identity cannot be had in degrees because it is concerned with the question, "What will I experience next?"

Let's say my memories and yours are gradually swapped in parallel, at the halfway point there are two personalities that are both half yours and half mine. It makes sense to say the are both not me if we take on the mereologically essential view of empty individualism. It doesnt make sense to say I am half experiencing being each of them. There is the experiencer on the left, and there is the one on the right but there is no experiencer that is half the person on the left and half the person on the right

How do you know this?  Forget memories, suppose you an Terry had your brains wired together so that you shared each others perceptions.  What makes you think there would be two perceivers?  How do you know you aren't already two (or more) perceivers?  Have you read Dennett's multiple-drafts model of consciousness?

Brent

[Terren Suydam]

On Thu, May 15, 2014 at 1:40 PM, Dennis Ochei <do.inf...@gmail.com> wrote:

The empty view doesn't stop at sleep, different psychophysical structures are different persons. From moment to moment there is no identity. Identity is abolished in all but the trivial case, there are just degrees of relatedness. Your relation to your future self is like your relationship with a sibling.

I think we throw the baby out with the bathwater if we reject common-sense notions of identity. This line of thought is like saying we should toss out Newtonian physics because it fails in the edge cases. Identity may be a construct, but so is just about everything else.

 

Identity cannot be had in degrees because it is concerned with the question, "What will I experience next?"

Again I return to the analogy to a physical body. My experience of my body from one day to the next is stable enough such that I never question whether it is the same as yesterday's, and that would be true even if I were to lose a limb while under anesthesia. Likewise for the object of my self-reflection. It is persistent through time and is flexible enough to return to its recognizable form even if altered by drugs, meditation, extreme emotions, and of course sleep. 

Let's say my memories and yours are gradually swapped in parallel, at the halfway point there are two personalities that are both half yours and half mine. It makes sense to say the are both not me if we take on the mereologically essential view of empty individualism. It doesnt make sense to say I am half experiencing being each of them. There is the experiencer on the left, and there is the one on the right but there is no experiencer that is half the person on the left and half the person on the right

There are ways in which bodies and selves can come to be seen as something that is "not me" in some sense, a subject Oliver Sacks gets deeply into. And those empirical examples I think are far more instructive about what constitutes self than thought experiments that make lots of assumptions about the nature of self and memory. To suggest that our memories could be swapped makes assumptions that may not bear out in the future given advances in our understanding about how memories are actualized.  I can't get past "let's say my memories and yours are gradually swapped in parallel" because I have too many questions about the details of that exchange - the answers to which would probably raise more questions.

Terren

 

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[Bruno Marchal]

What we do since we are amoebas. And before.

Bruno

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[meekerdb]

On 5/15/2014 11:31 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 15 May 2014, at 08:30, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On 15 May 2014 16:24, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:

On 5/14/2014 9:51 PM, Dennis Ochei wrote:

But then the identity relationship is no longer transitive...

Suppose a brave officer to have been flogged when a boy at school, for robbing an orchard, to have taken a standard from the enemy in his first campaign, and to have been made a general in advanced life: Suppose also, which must be admitted to be possible, that when he took the standard, he was conscious of his having been flogged at school, and that when made a general he was conscious of his taking the standard, but had absolutely lost the consciousness of his flogging. 

    These things being supposed, it follows, from Mr LOCKE’S doctrine, that he who was flogged at school is the same person who took the standard, and that he who took the standard is the same person who was made a general. Whence it follows, if there be any truth in logic, that the general is the same person with him who was flogged at school. But the general’s consciousness does not reach so far back as his flogging, therefore, according to Mr LOCKE’S doctrine, he is not the person who was flogged. There- fore the general is, and at the same time is not the same person with him who was flogged at a school.

Hence the common sense theory that person's are defined by bodily continuity.

It's only a common sense notion because we can't go around duplicating ourselves, meeting our duplicates, rewriting our memories and so on. 

What we do since we are amoebas. And before.

Amoebas divide - which is not the same as duplicate in the sense of the Helsinki man.

Brent

[Dennis Ochei]

split brain is possible and has been done, ship of theseus already happens at the physical and psychological level all the time. I dont think physical continuity should matter. If someone deconstructed and reconstructed me nothing is lost.

On Thursday, May 15, 2014, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:

On 5/15/2014 9:13 AM, Dennis Ochei wrote:

Its pretty obvious that the naive notion cannot handle the split brain thought experiment or ship of theseus.

But you don't know that those are possible.

Its also not obvious that a duplicate would be a new person.

It's just a semantic choice.

There is no such thing as the original particles, all like particles are indistinguishable. Furthermore, the replication can be done semiconservatively, where each of the resultant persons get half the particles of the original, rendering the question moot. Lastly, whether you are the original or the replica is a completely epiphenomenal distinction. It isnt physically meaningful.

Suppose someone made a duplicate of you.  The duplicate claims to own your house, and goes to court for possession.  Do you think the court should not consider it meaningful that one of you has physical continuity and the doesn't?  How do you decide what's "meaningful" and what isn't?

Brent

So the illusion is persistent, but i can see the seams.

On Thursday, May 15, 2014, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:

On 5/14/2014 11:32 PM, Dennis Ochei wrote:

I'm deeply conflicted. On one had I want the illusion but i also want to act in accordance with the truth.

Ah, there's your problem.  "The truth" is likely unknowable.  "The illusion" is what's knowable - so why denigrate it?

Brent

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[Dennis Ochei]

More like me than anything else in the universe is not sufficient for subjective expectation. Im not asking whether my appearance, personality, and memories are preserved (they are) I'm asking whether these properties are born by the same "I" of the present

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[meekerdb]

On 5/15/2014 12:57 PM, Dennis Ochei wrote:

More like me than anything else in the universe is not sufficient for subjective expectation. Im not asking whether my appearance, personality, and memories are preserved (they are) I'm asking whether these properties are born by the same "I" of the present

I don't understand "born by"?  Maybe you meant "borne"?  But that's reifying "I" over and above all its properties.  Why do that?  I'm just questioning the all-or-nothing.  Why can't "I" just consist of most of the properties "I" had yesterday?

Brent

[LizR]

On 16 May 2014 05:54, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:

On 5/15/2014 9:13 AM, Dennis Ochei wrote:

Its pretty obvious that the naive notion cannot handle the split brain thought experiment or ship of theseus.

But you don't know that those are possible.

Its also not obvious that a duplicate would be a new person.

It's just a semantic choice.

There is no such thing as the original particles, all like particles are indistinguishable. Furthermore, the replication can be done semiconservatively, where each of the resultant persons get half the particles of the original, rendering the question moot. Lastly, whether you are the original or the replica is a completely epiphenomenal distinction. It isnt physically meaningful.

Suppose someone made a duplicate of you.  The duplicate claims to own your house, and goes to court for possession.  Do you think the court should not consider it meaningful that one of you has physical continuity and the doesn't?  How do you decide what's "meaningful" and what isn't?

If anyone here hasn't seen the play "The Giftie" then my advice is, watch it immediately.

I, er, have a copy should anyone want one.

http://www.imdb.com/title/tt1086852/

PS maybe this should be in the movie recommendation thread, but it's particularly pertinent to this discussion.

[LizR]

Comp and the capsule theory of memory (and "Memento") suggest that a "person" is a series of person-moments, each of which is considered to last somewhere around 1/10th of a second (it could be longer or shorter and the idea would still hold) and assumed be the same person due to being linked by memories. Generally this is considered to be because of physical continuity, but comp-style thought experiments, at least, can deconstruct that idea. The question is whether physical continuity has some bearing on identity, or is just incidental (i.e. nature hasn't found any other way to do it). The usual argument against the importance of physical continuity is that we replace our cells - even our brain cells, apparently - every few hours/days/years/whatever. And more specifically, the atoms involved in a thought might go on to do something else - take part in a different thought, form a memory, pay a visit to the big toe... they're constantly being moved around, even without being lost from the system.

[Russell Standish]

On Thu, May 15, 2014 at 12:40:10PM -0500, Dennis Ochei wrote:
> The empty view doesn't stop at sleep, different psychophysical structures
> are different persons. From moment to moment there is no identity. Identity
> is abolished in all but the trivial case, there are just degrees of
> relatedness. Your relation to your future self is like your relationship
> with a sibling.
>
> Identity cannot be had in degrees because it is concerned with the
> question, "What will I experience next?"
>
> Let's say my memories and yours are gradually swapped in parallel, at the
> halfway point there are two personalities that are both half yours and half
> mine. It makes sense to say the are both not me if we take on the
> mereologically essential view of empty individualism. It doesnt make sense
> to say I am half experiencing being each of them. There is the experiencer
> on the left, and there is the one on the right but there is no experiencer
> that is half the person on the left and half the person on the right
>

I believe the premise of this thought experiment is wrong. By
something like 10%* of the way through, neither entity is consious, and
remains so until the 90% mark. The 50/50 brain is a non-person.

I have criticised Parfitt on this before, although I think he makes a
lot of sense elsewhere in his book.

Cheers

*Precise values could be determined by anaesthetisation experiments,
values quoted here are indicative.

--

----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpc...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au

Latest project: The Amoeba's Secret
(http://www.hpcoders.com.au/AmoebasSecret.html)
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[Dennis Ochei]

But someone can have global amnesia and still be a person, I dont think having memories originating from two people makes you a non-person

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[meekerdb]

On 5/15/2014 2:57 PM, LizR wrote:
> Comp and the capsule theory of memory (and "Memento") suggest that a "person" is a
> series of person-moments, each of which is considered to last somewhere around 1/10th of
> a second (it could be longer or shorter and the idea would still hold) and assumed be
> the same person due to being linked by memories.

I think there's an implicit assumption here that 'person-moments' refers only to conscious
thoughts. Subconscious thoughts, e.g. information processing, may take longer and overlap
and occur in different parts of the brain. Just because they are not conscious thoughts,
I don't think we can ignore them. After all, acting from habit, "without thinking", is
part of a person's character.

> Generally this is considered to be because of physical continuity, but comp-style
> thought experiments, at least, can deconstruct that idea. The question is whether
> physical continuity has some bearing on identity, or is just incidental (i.e. nature
> hasn't found any other way to do it). The usual argument against the importance of
> physical continuity is that we replace our cells - even our brain cells, apparently -
> every few hours/days/years/whatever.

I don't think we replace our brain cells, but even if we do, isn't the fact that they are
replaced and the replacements are functionally similar important to who we are?

> And more specifically, the atoms involved in a thought might go on to do something else
> - take part in a different thought, form a memory, pay a visit to the big toe... they're
> constantly being moved around, even without being lost from the system.

Replacing atoms is not problematic since we think any two of the same species are strictly
identical. The question is whether the brain could be implemented in some completely
different medium and still instantiate the same consciousness. I think it could only do
so approximately - so it might be close enough to fool your friends but still not be
exactly you. But does this imply, per Bruno's MGA, that no physical instantiation is
needed at all - just the existence in Platonia of those computations is enough? I think
the argument only proves that there could be another world, in which you are instantiated
in whatever is the physics of that world, e.g. Turing machine computations.

Brent

[meekerdb]

On 5/15/2014 3:17 PM, Dennis Ochei wrote:

But someone can have global amnesia and still be a person, I dont think having memories originating from two people makes you a non-person

They have to have short term memory though.

Brent

[Russell Standish]

On Thu, May 15, 2014 at 05:17:51PM -0500, Dennis Ochei wrote:
> But someone can have global amnesia and still be a person, I dont think
> having memories originating from two people makes you a non-person
>

No - but a 50/50 mix of brain structure will be non functional. And
you have to replace the brain structure as well in order to effectively
transfer the memories.

[meekerdb]

On 5/15/2014 3:05 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
> On Thu, May 15, 2014 at 12:40:10PM -0500, Dennis Ochei wrote:
>> The empty view doesn't stop at sleep, different psychophysical structures
>> are different persons. From moment to moment there is no identity. Identity
>> is abolished in all but the trivial case, there are just degrees of
>> relatedness. Your relation to your future self is like your relationship
>> with a sibling.
>>
>> Identity cannot be had in degrees because it is concerned with the
>> question, "What will I experience next?"
>>
>> Let's say my memories and yours are gradually swapped in parallel, at the
>> halfway point there are two personalities that are both half yours and half
>> mine. It makes sense to say the are both not me if we take on the
>> mereologically essential view of empty individualism. It doesnt make sense
>> to say I am half experiencing being each of them. There is the experiencer
>> on the left, and there is the one on the right but there is no experiencer
>> that is half the person on the left and half the person on the right
>>
> I believe the premise of this thought experiment is wrong. By
> something like 10%* of the way through, neither entity is consious, and
> remains so until the 90% mark. The 50/50 brain is a non-person.

Or a crazy person.

Brent

[Dennis Ochei]

Right Liz, the question is, does the memory link actually signify the presence of the same local I? Or does each moment have its own I? Or do all moments everywhere share a single global I? If there are local I's, then how are their boundaries drawn?

All of these questions are epiphenomenal from the point of view of physics so I fear there is no way for me to decide. All my observations and brain processes will be identical no matter which hypothesis is true.

On Thursday, May 15, 2014, LizR <liz...@gmail.com> wrote:

Comp and the capsule theory of memory (and "Memento") suggest that a "person" is a series of person-moments, each of which is considered to last somewhere around 1/10th of a second (it could be longer or shorter and the idea would still hold) and assumed be the same person due to being linked by memories. Generally this is considered to be because of physical continuity, but comp-style thought experiments, at least, can deconstruct that idea. The question is whether physical continuity has some bearing on identity, or is just incidental (i.e. nature hasn't found any other way to do it). The usual argument against the importance of physical continuity is that we replace our cells - even our brain cells, apparently - every few hours/days/years/whatever. And more specifically, the atoms involved in a thought might go on to do something else - take part in a different thought, form a memory, pay a visit to the big toe... they're constantly being moved around, even without being lost from the system.

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[Dennis Ochei]

I meant borne. Subjective expectation is the problem. It's not clear that you can "partially" partake in an experience. An experience is either yours or it is someone elses.

On Thursday, May 15, 2014, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:

On 5/15/2014 12:57 PM, Dennis Ochei wrote:

More like me than anything else in the universe is not sufficient for subjective expectation. Im not asking whether my appearance, personality, and memories are preserved (they are) I'm asking whether these properties are born by the same "I" of the present

I don't understand "born by"?  Maybe you meant "borne"?  But that's reifying "I" over and above all its properties.  Why do that?  I'm just questioning the all-or-nothing.  Why can't "I" just consist of most of the properties "I" had yesterday?

Brent

On Thursday, May 15, 2014, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:

On 5/15/2014 9:27 AM, Dennis Ochei wrote:

The memory criterion is a problem because the identity question cannot be graded. I will either wake up in my bed tomorrow or someone else will who is merely like me will.

Why "merely"?  Why isn't "more like me than anything else in the universe" enough to "be" you?

But memories can be gained or lost. If the loss or gain of a single memory destroys me, then we are right back to the empty view, if i can survive these kinds of transformations then we return to the open view

I don't see it?  Why the all-or-nothing conclusion?  You have more of your memories than I do; so we are distinct.

Brent

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[meekerdb]

But I think a lot of what your brain does is integrate perceptions from different places (right eye, left eye, inner ear,...) into a coherent story that appears as conscious thought.  So I expect that if you were sharing inputs with Terren or sharing brain parts, each brain would continue to create coherent stories - even if it had to ignore some inputs or confabulate some.  This is essentially what happens in split-brain experiments.  It also suggests to me that conscious thought is just a kind of story the brain makes up, mainly for the purpose of remembering what's important and forgetting the rest.

Brent

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[LizR]

On 16 May 2014 10:25, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:

On 5/15/2014 2:57 PM, LizR wrote:

Comp and the capsule theory of memory (and "Memento") suggest that a "person" is a series of person-moments, each of which is considered to last somewhere around 1/10th of a second (it could be longer or shorter and the idea would still hold) and assumed be the same person due to being linked by memories.

I think there's an implicit assumption here that 'person-moments' refers only to conscious thoughts.  Subconscious thoughts, e.g. information processing, may take longer and overlap and occur in different parts of the brain.  Just because they are not conscious thoughts, I don't think we can ignore them.  After all, acting from habit, "without thinking", is part of a person's character.

There isn't particularly an implicit assumption, because at some point the subconscious thoughts have conscious consequences, and those are part of the "person moment". The rest is like memory retrieval, for example - at some point the memory becomes conscious, and contributes to a PM.

The implicit assumptions are that there is something important about consciousness (i.e. eliminative materialism is wrong), plus the idea that a PM (or OM) is a well defined notion. (Personally I'm agnostic on these points.)

Generally this is considered to be because of physical continuity, but comp-style thought experiments, at least, can deconstruct that idea. The question is whether physical continuity has some bearing on identity, or is just incidental (i.e. nature hasn't found any other way to do it). The usual argument against the importance of physical continuity is that we replace our cells - even our brain cells, apparently - every few hours/days/years/whatever.

I don't think we replace our brain cells, but even if we do, isn't the fact that they are replaced and the replacements are functionally similar important to who we are?

We do, apparently. http://www.theguardian.com/science/neurophilosophy/2012/feb/23/brain-new-cells-adult-neurogenesis

(I know I could do with some new ones ... or do I mean "neurones" ?)

I'm not sure why you asked that question, however. What would make you think that this ISN'T important to who we are? Obviously the capsule theory of identity says that functional similarity is important to who we are and that it's important on a far shorter timescale than brain cell replacement. (Or is this just another of those "buts" you like to throw in occasionally when not actually disagreeing? :)

And more specifically, the atoms involved in a thought might go on to do something else - take part in a different thought, form a memory, pay a visit to the big toe... they're constantly being moved around, even without being lost from the system.

Replacing atoms is not problematic since we think any two of the same species are strictly identical.  The question is whether the brain could be implemented in some completely different medium and still instantiate the same consciousness.  I think it could only do so approximately - so it might be close enough to fool your friends but still not be exactly you.  But does this imply, per Bruno's MGA, that no physical instantiation is needed at all - just the existence in Platonia of those computations is enough?  I think the argument only proves that there could be another world, in which you are instantiated in whatever is the physics of that world, e.g. Turing machine computations.

Imho this depends on whether comp and the capsule theory are correct - i.e. whether "yes doctor" is a good bet. It can only be a good bet if there is nothing supernatural involved, if physical continuity isn't important (which requires that eliminativism is wrong, I think), and if there aren't any infinities getting in the way of perfect duplication (e.g. if space-time is a continuum then exact duplication is unlikely, even in an infinite universe).

If exact duplication of a conscious person is possible at any level, then it should be possible to instantiate the same person in other parts of an infinite universe, in other parts of the multiverse, in computer simulations, and in Platonia (the last one assuming Bruno knows what he is talking about and computations exist in some useful sense in Platonia).

[LizR]

On 16 May 2014 10:36, Dennis Ochei <do.inf...@gmail.com> wrote:

Right Liz, the question is, does the memory link actually signify the presence of the same local I? Or does each moment have its own I? Or do all moments everywhere share a single global I? If there are local I's, then how are their boundaries drawn?

Yes, those are indeed the questions. Especially the last one. I don't think we're in a position to answer them (or if we ever will be...)

All of these questions are epiphenomenal from the point of view of physics so I fear there is no way for me to decide. All my observations and brain processes will be identical no matter which hypothesis is true.

Only from physics which isn't derivable from psychology via comp, I suspect, so Bruno may have something to say about this.

[LizR]

On 16 May 2014 11:40, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:

But I think a lot of what your brain does is integrate perceptions from different places (right eye, left eye, inner ear,...) into a coherent story that appears as conscious thought.  So I expect that if you were sharing inputs with Terren or sharing brain parts, each brain would continue to create coherent stories - even if it had to ignore some inputs or confabulate some.  This is essentially what happens in split-brain experiments.  It also suggests to me that conscious thought is just a kind of story the brain makes up, mainly for the purpose of remembering what's important and forgetting the rest.

I agree with you here, although obviously the story is somewhat constrained by sensory input. (The modern term is vritual reality, but story will do.)

"Who is the Master who makes the grass green?" indeed.

[Russell Standish]

On Fri, May 16, 2014 at 12:10:20PM +1200, LizR wrote:
>
> I don't think we replace our brain cells, but even if we do, isn't the fact
> > that they are replaced and the replacements are functionally similar
> > important to who we are?
> >
> > We do, apparently.
> http://www.theguardian.com/science/neurophilosophy/2012/feb/23/brain-new-cells-adult-neurogenesis
>
> (I know I could do with some new ones ... or do I mean "neurones" ?)
>

I think that is more about brain repair, than material replacement in
cells, and only involves a few percent of neurons.

It turns out the carbon atoms in the DNA of neural cells is remarkable
long lived, as chronicled via the radiation spike due to atmospheric
nuclear weapons testing in 50s & 60s. I don't have a cite on hand,
but the result is that your neuronal DNA is on average about two years
younger than your own age. For most other cell types, the average age
is around 7 years, or something like that.

The conclusion is that the body does not materially recycle neurons,
as presumably to do so loses important learnt information. The other
interesting conclusion is that our brains are dramatically rewired
when we're about 2. We're not the same people as when we're infants.

Cheers

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 16 May 2014 01:59, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:

On 5/14/2014 11:30 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On 15 May 2014 16:24, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:

On 5/14/2014 9:51 PM, Dennis Ochei wrote:

But then the identity relationship is no longer transitive...

Suppose a brave officer to have been flogged when a boy at school, for robbing an orchard, to have taken a standard from the enemy in his first campaign, and to have been made a general in advanced life: Suppose also, which must be admitted to be possible, that when he took the standard, he was conscious of his having been flogged at school, and that when made a general he was conscious of his taking the standard, but had absolutely lost the consciousness of his flogging. 

    These things being supposed, it follows, from Mr LOCKE’S doctrine, that he who was flogged at school is the same person who took the standard, and that he who took the standard is the same person who was made a general. Whence it follows, if there be any truth in logic, that the general is the same person with him who was flogged at school. But the general’s consciousness does not reach so far back as his flogging, therefore, according to Mr LOCKE’S doctrine, he is not the person who was flogged. There- fore the general is, and at the same time is not the same person with him who was flogged at a school.

Hence the common sense theory that person's are defined by bodily continuity.

It's only a common sense notion because we can't go around duplicating ourselves, meeting our duplicates, rewriting our memories and so on.

Another point in favor of the common sense idea.  But why would it matter if we could.  Duplicates would be new persons.

What would happen to the common sense theory of bodily continuity if teleportation, with or without destruction of the original, were possible and commonplace? 

--
Stathis Papaioannou

[LizR]

On 16 May 2014 13:02, Russell Standish <li...@hpcoders.com.au> wrote:

On Fri, May 16, 2014 at 12:10:20PM +1200, LizR wrote:
>
> I don't think we replace our brain cells, but even if we do, isn't the fact
> > that they are replaced and the replacements are functionally similar
> > important to who we are?
> >
> > We do, apparently.
> http://www.theguardian.com/science/neurophilosophy/2012/feb/23/brain-new-cells-adult-neurogenesis
>
> (I know I could do with some new ones ... or do I mean "neurones" ?)
>

I think that is more about brain repair, than material replacement in
cells, and only involves a few percent of neurons.

It turns out the carbon atoms in the DNA of neural cells is remarkable
long lived, as chronicled via the radiation spike due to atmospheric
nuclear weapons testing in 50s & 60s. I don't have a cite on hand,
but the result is that your neuronal DNA is on average about two years
younger than your own age. For most other cell types, the average age
is around 7 years, or something like that.

So physical continuity may be important, in which case it's possible "yes doctor" is a bad bet.

[LizR]

On 16 May 2014 12:55, Stathis Papaioannou <stat...@gmail.com> wrote:

What would happen to the common sense theory of bodily continuity if teleportation, with or without destruction of the original, were possible and commonplace? 

Anyone who's watched "Star Trek" can answer that one!

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 16 May 2014 11:02, Russell Standish <li...@hpcoders.com.au> wrote:

On Fri, May 16, 2014 at 12:10:20PM +1200, LizR wrote:
>
> I don't think we replace our brain cells, but even if we do, isn't the fact
> > that they are replaced and the replacements are functionally similar
> > important to who we are?
> >
> > We do, apparently.
> http://www.theguardian.com/science/neurophilosophy/2012/feb/23/brain-new-cells-adult-neurogenesis
>
> (I know I could do with some new ones ... or do I mean "neurones" ?)
>

I think that is more about brain repair, than material replacement in
cells, and only involves a few percent of neurons.

It turns out the carbon atoms in the DNA of neural cells is remarkable
long lived, as chronicled via the radiation spike due to atmospheric
nuclear weapons testing in 50s & 60s. I don't have a cite on hand,
but the result is that your neuronal DNA is on average about two years
younger than your own age. For most other cell types, the average age
is around 7 years, or something like that.

The conclusion is that the body does not materially recycle neurons,
as presumably to do so loses important learnt information. The other
interesting conclusion is that our brains are dramatically rewired
when we're about 2. We're not the same people as when we're infants.

Cheers

I think this might be the paper you are thinking of:

http://scholar.google.com.au/scholar_url?hl=en&q=http://yadda.icm.edu.pl/yadda/element/bwmeta1.element.elsevier-b6ed2137-3083-37b7-9901-46f88551da73/c/main.pdf&sa=X&scisig=AAGBfm12RhfzMR6yIzFstjT4BrLeu8PfyQ&oi=scholarr&ei=B2V1U7eNHI_ZkQXQ0YEI&ved=0CCwQgAMoADAA

 

(Going to the above URL gives the entire paper rather than an abstract)

But while the atoms in the neuronal DNA are relatively stable over time, the rest of the matter in a neuron turns over continuously.

--
Stathis Papaioannou

[meekerdb]

And the doctor chooses the right level of substitution.  Certainly we don't need exact substitution; we're not exactly the same from day to day, much less year to year.  But I think we need to be embedded in a physical environment with which we interact.

If exact duplication of a conscious person is possible at any level, then it should be possible to instantiate the same person in other parts of an infinite universe, in other parts of the multiverse, in computer simulations,

I agree, assuming that there is enough "world" also instantiated around him - which I suspect is A LOT.

and in Platonia (the last one assuming Bruno knows what he is talking about and computations exist in some useful sense in Platonia).

I think that's technically true, but misleading because in the Platonia instantiation there will have to be a "world" instantiated there to.  I don't think a consciousness can exist in isolation (at least not without falling into do-loop) and so then we will have a simulated world with the instantiated consciousness in Platonia.  But how is that different from a world outside Platonia?  How is it different from this world?  "Simulated" doesn't really denote any distinction when it refers to a whole world (ever read Stanilaw Lem's "The Cyberiad"?).

Brent

--

[meekerdb]

We'd adopt some rule as to who was who.  Without destruction it would be the original.  With destruction we might say they are equal heirs.

Brent

[meekerdb]

It's all relative.  If the alternative is dying of liver cancer it might still be a good bet.

Brent

[LizR]

On 16 May 2014 15:23, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:

Imho this depends on whether comp and the capsule theory are correct - i.e. whether "yes doctor" is a good bet. It can only be a good bet if there is nothing supernatural involved, if physical continuity isn't important (which requires that eliminativism is wrong, I think), and if there aren't any infinities getting in the way of perfect duplication (e.g. if space-time is a continuum then exact duplication is unlikely, even in an infinite universe).

And the doctor chooses the right level of substitution.  Certainly we don't need exact substitution; we're not exactly the same from day to day, much less year to year.  But I think we need to be embedded in a physical environment with which we interact.

Yes, an environment as well, of course. What Max Tegmark calls the level 1 and level 3 multiverse duplications include the entire universe, I think. He is assuming everything is quantised (of course).

If exact duplication of a conscious person is possible at any level, then it should be possible to instantiate the same person in other parts of an infinite universe, in other parts of the multiverse, in computer simulations,

I agree, assuming that there is enough "world" also instantiated around him - which I suspect is A LOT.

Yes. Max Tegmark talks about duplicating Hubble spheres, which I'd say can reasonably be called a lot.

and in Platonia (the last one assuming Bruno knows what he is talking about and computations exist in some useful sense in Platonia).

I think that's technically true, but misleading because in the Platonia instantiation there will have to be a "world" instantiated there too.  I don't think a consciousness can exist in isolation (at least not without falling into do-loop) and so then we will have a simulated world with the instantiated consciousness in Platonia.  But how is that different from a world outside Platonia?  How is it different from this world?

According to comp it isn't.

 

  "Simulated" doesn't really denote any distinction when it refers to a whole world (ever read Stanilaw Lem's "The Cyberiad"?).

Yes, I've read The Cyberiad many times, as well as lots of other things by Mr Lem.

[LizR]

If physical continuity is important, these aren't alternatives.

[Dennis Ochei]

The more I think about the subjective expectation question the more meaningless it becomes. I'm not asking if a future person is physically or psychologically like me, I know the answer to that. In fact, even if I knew every physical fact about a body and had a complete knowledge of the neural correlates of consciousness I still wouldn't know if it was realizing my consciousness or a consciousness that is merely precisely like mine. This question of whether a past or future experience did or will belong to me is distinctly extraphysical.

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[meekerdb]

I think you're taking an all-or-nothing view.  Originally it was stated that physical continuity could make no difference - in support of the theory that everybody is the same person.  I argued that commons sense says that it does make a difference, and law and society agree.  But making a difference and "being important" may be poles apart.  Suppose saying yes to the doctor would cause you to lose all recent memories (which is certainly a plausible effect) because of lack of physical continuity of part of your brain.  It would be "important", but it would still be a better bet than dying of liver cancer.

Brent

[meekerdb]

On 5/15/2014 9:28 PM, LizR wrote:

  "Simulated" doesn't really denote any distinction when it refers to a whole world (ever read Stanilaw Lem's "The Cyberiad"?).

Yes, I've read The Cyberiad many times, as well as lots of other things by Mr Lem.

My favorite scifi author.

Brent
"A mathematician is like a mad tailor: he is making "all possible clothes" and hopes to make also something suitable for dressing"
   --- Stanislaw Lem, Summa Techologiae

[Terren Suydam]

On Fri, May 16, 2014 at 12:41 AM, Dennis Ochei <do.inf...@gmail.com> wrote:

The more I think about the subjective expectation question the more meaningless it becomes. I'm not asking if a future person is physically or psychologically like me, I know the answer to that. In fact, even if I knew every physical fact about a body and had a complete knowledge of the neural correlates of consciousness I still wouldn't know if it was realizing my consciousness or a consciousness that is merely precisely like mine. This question of whether a past or future experience did or will belong to me is distinctly extraphysical.

It is extraphysical, but that doesn't mean nothing can be said about it. There are tools for understanding systems regardless of their domain of instantiation, such as cybernetics. If the self can be characterized without reference to the physical per se, then there may be answers to those questions.

[Bruno Marchal]

On 15 May 2014, at 18:13, Dennis Ochei wrote:

Its pretty obvious that the naive notion cannot handle the split brain thought experiment or ship of theseus. Its also not obvious that a duplicate would be a new person. There is no such thing as the original particles, all like particles are indistinguishable. Furthermore, the replication can be done semiconservatively, where each of the resultant persons get half the particles of the original, rendering the question moot. Lastly, whether you are the original or the replica is a completely epiphenomenal distinction. It isnt physically meaningful.

So the illusion is persistent, but i can see the seams.

I would not say it is an illusion. It is based on your local connectedness of your body and memory. It is the motor of what will make sense in your life, and it makes possible long term project. It is immaterial, but real, like a number.

Physically meaningful? But a physical reality  is also an illusion if you accept teleportation (see my paper). Your small ego and your higher self is as much real, even if the little ego identity is relative. if you suffer from toothache, you will take the medication. You don't need to see the seams to act for your own better.

Bruno

On Thursday, May 15, 2014, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:

On 5/14/2014 11:32 PM, Dennis Ochei wrote:

I'm deeply conflicted. On one had I want the illusion but i also want to act in accordance with the truth.

Ah, there's your problem.  "The truth" is likely unknowable.  "The illusion" is what's knowable - so why denigrate it?

Brent

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[Bruno Marchal]

On 15 May 2014, at 18:27, Dennis Ochei wrote:

Parfit denies the existence of personal identity altogether, what is left merely psychological and biological relatedness relations.

Personal identity works if everyone is one person, but i dont want to be forced by my view of personal continuity to be an extreme altruist

Personal identity works if I am solely me right now but that is nearly as bad as the open case, as I have no real good reason to care more about my future self than others.

But then you want not only care about your own future, and at the same time care about the others caring about their own future. If not, everyone lose.

The memory criterion is a problem because the identity question cannot be graded. I will either wake up in my bed tomorrow or someone else will who is merely like me will. But memories can be gained or lost. If the loss or gain of a single memory destroys me, then we are right back to the empty view, if i can survive these kinds of transformations then we return to the open view

In theory, and that can have practical consequences. We are all the universal person, but the reasons to become a many is in the self-recognition, despite the differences. But those differences are important to give the sense of saying hello to oneself. If not you talk like if you were enlightened and confirms you say stuff from G* minus G. You fall in the theological trap, and you will eliminate first person and their lives. It is like losing motivation for life because you get a glimpse of the afterlife.

Bruno

On Thursday, May 15, 2014, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

On 15 May 2014, at 06:51, Dennis Ochei wrote:

But then the identity relationship is no longer transitive...

Ypou mention Parfit, which put the identity on the person series, and that makes it non transitive. Take the step 3 of the UDA, in the paper I refer you too, and which is supposed to be sudtied on this list (I explain this since many years).

We have that from the first person point of view, the guy in M and the guy in W are the same guy as the original in Helsinki (say), yet they are not the same guy after the duplication. There is no paradox. The usual identity criterion is given by the personal memories and their structured integration.

Suppose a brave officer to have been flogged when a boy at school, for robbing an orchard, to have taken a standard from the enemy in his first campaign, and to have been made a general in advanced life: Suppose also, which must be admitted to be possible, that when he took the standard, he was conscious of his having been flogged at school, and that when made a general he was conscious of his taking the standard, but had absolutely lost the consciousness of his flogging. 

    These things being supposed, it follows, from Mr LOCKE’S doctrine, that he who was flogged at school is the same person who took the standard, and that he who took the standard is the same person who was made a general. Whence it follows, if there be any truth in logic, that the general is the same person with him who was flogged at school. But the general’s consciousness does not reach so far back as his flogging, therefore, according to Mr LOCKE’S doctrine, he is not the person who was flogged. There- fore the general is, and at the same time is not the same person with him who was flogged at a school.

No problem with this. It is the amnesia thought experiment, and it shows that we are the same person, once we assume computationalism. That is plausibly the universal person that the logic G and G* justify to be a notion or person canonically attached to any (universal) machine.

Bruno

On Wednesday, May 14, 2014, LizR <liz...@gmail.com> wrote:

On 15 May 2014 15:43, Dennis Ochei <do.inf...@gmail.com> wrote:

You can still care if you die normally but something like the swampman thought experiment is just as good as ordinary survival under Parfit's view, which a reductionist I feel is forced to accept. You care that you keep experiencing but there is no self to be found that persists. Destructive uploading or teletransportation preserve everything worth preserving. That you are what once was is purely an illusion. Naive closed individualism reveals itself as deeply flawed when subjected to thought experiments.Unless you subscribe to Kolak's view you can't redeem the idea that you are in any sense the same consciousness that you remember being

I don't know about "in any sense". If you identify yourself as your current state of consciousness then undoubtedly you can't step into the same river twice, but if you identify yourself with your memories then there is some partial sameness between me now and myself this morning that doesn't exist between me and anyone else.

(Of course, Leonard Shelby would probably disagree...)

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Bruno Marchal]

On 15 May 2014, at 21:05, meekerdb wrote:

On 5/15/2014 11:31 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 15 May 2014, at 08:30, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On 15 May 2014 16:24, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:

On 5/14/2014 9:51 PM, Dennis Ochei wrote:

But then the identity relationship is no longer transitive...

Suppose a brave officer to have been flogged when a boy at school, for robbing an orchard, to have taken a standard from the enemy in his first campaign, and to have been made a general in advanced life: Suppose also, which must be admitted to be possible, that when he took the standard, he was conscious of his having been flogged at school, and that when made a general he was conscious of his taking the standard, but had absolutely lost the consciousness of his flogging. 

    These things being supposed, it follows, from Mr LOCKE’S doctrine, that he who was flogged at school is the same person who took the standard, and that he who took the standard is the same person who was made a general. Whence it follows, if there be any truth in logic, that the general is the same person with him who was flogged at school. But the general’s consciousness does not reach so far back as his flogging, therefore, according to Mr LOCKE’S doctrine, he is not the person who was flogged. There- fore the general is, and at the same time is not the same person with him who was flogged at a school.

Hence the common sense theory that person's are defined by bodily continuity.

It's only a common sense notion because we can't go around duplicating ourselves, meeting our duplicates, rewriting our memories and so on. 

What we do since we are amoebas. And before.

Amoebas divide - which is not the same as duplicate in the sense of the Helsinki man.

Well amoeba are their own brain, and the duplication conserves the connections. They are the same at the molecular in their asexual division. They do change when sexual-like transactions occur, but we can argue the difference is very small in most case. I was just illustrating that biological evolution seems to have already bet (not necessarily consciously) on self-duplication. In particular is you agree that the M-man and M-man are the same as the H-guys, then the two amoebas are duplicate in the sense of the multiple instantiation of the Helsinki man.

Bruno

Brent

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[Bruno Marchal]

On 16 May 2014, at 00:36, Dennis Ochei wrote:

Right Liz, the question is, does the memory link actually signify the presence of the same local I? Or does each moment have its own I? Or do all moments everywhere share a single global I? If there are local I's, then how are their boundaries drawn?

They are recovered by linking the representative brain ([]p) with the truth it refers too. In that case, you can prove that they have no boundaries---entailing what you seem to call the open theory, which is true in Heaven, not on Earth. On Earth you need consistent long term memories, efficacious short term memories, etc.

All of these questions are epiphenomenal from the point of view of physics so I fear there is no way for me to decide.

If comp is true, physics is "phenomenal". You need magic in matter to introduce a subjective immediately knowable difference between a computation in arithmetic and a computation is a primitive physical reality. 

If we are machine, then the physical reality is an emerging pattern in machine's consciousness/knowledge, in arithmetic.

Bruno

All my observations and brain processes will be identical no matter which hypothesis is true.

On Thursday, May 15, 2014, LizR <liz...@gmail.com> wrote:

Comp and the capsule theory of memory (and "Memento") suggest that a "person" is a series of person-moments, each of which is considered to last somewhere around 1/10th of a second (it could be longer or shorter and the idea would still hold) and assumed be the same person due to being linked by memories. Generally this is considered to be because of physical continuity, but comp-style thought experiments, at least, can deconstruct that idea. The question is whether physical continuity has some bearing on identity, or is just incidental (i.e. nature hasn't found any other way to do it). The usual argument against the importance of physical continuity is that we replace our cells - even our brain cells, apparently - every few hours/days/years/whatever. And more specifically, the atoms involved in a thought might go on to do something else - take part in a different thought, form a memory, pay a visit to the big toe... they're constantly being moved around, even without being lost from the system.

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[Bruno Marchal]

On 16 May 2014, at 00:50, Dennis Ochei wrote:

I meant borne. Subjective expectation is the problem. It's not clear that you can "partially" partake in an experience. An experience is either yours or it is someone elses.

Yes. thanks to brain connectedness. That is why the probability is 1/2 in the Washington-Moscow duplication experience.

But that's a point of a notion of identity conservation for some self-transformation.

Bruno

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[Bruno Marchal]

Not sure Dennis use seriously physicalism though, but in principle you are right, and I already said something.

Dennis Ochei seems to believe in primary physics (like all aristotelians), and comp, but they does not work well together, and leads to person and consciousness elimination (which I take as total nonsense).

Bruno

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[Dennis Ochei]

I'd be very grateful if you could elaborate. What precisely is comp? That the universe is computable? I take physicalism pretty seriously, but of course it could be wrong or incomplete, but i think it places a limit on what is knowable.

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[Dennis Ochei]

Reading paper now, im clear on comp

[Bruno Marchal]

On 16 May 2014, at 03:02, Russell Standish wrote:

> On Fri, May 16, 2014 at 12:10:20PM +1200, LizR wrote:
>>
>> I don't think we replace our brain cells, but even if we do, isn't
>> the fact
>>> that they are replaced and the replacements are functionally similar
>>> important to who we are?
>>>
>>> We do, apparently.
>> http://www.theguardian.com/science/neurophilosophy/2012/feb/23/brain-new-cells-adult-neurogenesis
>>
>> (I know I could do with some new ones ... or do I mean "neurones" ?)
>>
>
> I think that is more about brain repair, than material replacement in
> cells, and only involves a few percent of neurons.
>
> It turns out the carbon atoms in the DNA of neural cells is remarkable
> long lived, as chronicled via the radiation spike due to atmospheric
> nuclear weapons testing in 50s & 60s. I don't have a cite on hand,
> but the result is that your neuronal DNA is on average about two years
> younger than your own age. For most other cell types, the average age
> is around 7 years, or something like that.

That looks like the age of the cell, but all piece of DNA are changed
many times, so the age of a DNA does not seem to me to be necessarily
the age of the atoms making the structure. brain is the place where
the metabolic activity is the highest, so I am not sure our neurons
are so stable at the constitutive level.

>
> The conclusion is that the body does not materially recycle neurons,

I am not convinced. Our neurons live long, but that does not mean they
are not continually rebuild.

Bruno

> as presumably to do so loses important learnt information. The other
> interesting conclusion is that our brains are dramatically rewired
> when we're about 2. We're not the same people as when we're infants.
>
> Cheers
> --
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
> Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
> Principal, High Performance Coders
> Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpc...@hpcoders.com.au
> University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au
>
> Latest project: The Amoeba's Secret
> (http://www.hpcoders.com.au/AmoebasSecret.html)
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
>

[Bruno Marchal]

OK. I need to read that paper, and perhaps change my mind. I doubt this can be used seriously to put a doubt on comp. The atom of my computer are quite stable also ...

Bruno

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[Bruno Marchal]

On 16 May 2014, at 05:23, meekerdb wrote:

On 5/15/2014 5:10 PM, LizR wrote:

On 16 May 2014 10:25, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:

On 5/15/2014 2:57 PM, LizR wrote:

Comp and the capsule theory of memory (and "Memento") suggest that a "person" is a series of person-moments, each of which is considered to last somewhere around 1/10th of a second (it could be longer or shorter and the idea would still hold) and assumed be the same person due to being linked by memories.

I think there's an implicit assumption here that 'person-moments' refers only to conscious thoughts.  Subconscious thoughts, e.g. information processing, may take longer and overlap and occur in different parts of the brain.  Just because they are not conscious thoughts, I don't think we can ignore them.  After all, acting from habit, "without thinking", is part of a person's character.

There isn't particularly an implicit assumption, because at some point the subconscious thoughts have conscious consequences, and those are part of the "person moment". The rest is like memory retrieval, for example - at some point the memory becomes conscious, and contributes to a PM.

The implicit assumptions are that there is something important about consciousness (i.e. eliminative materialism is wrong), plus the idea that a PM (or OM) is a well defined notion. (Personally I'm agnostic on these points.)

Generally this is considered to be because of physical continuity, but comp-style thought experiments, at least, can deconstruct that idea. The question is whether physical continuity has some bearing on identity, or is just incidental (i.e. nature hasn't found any other way to do it). The usual argument against the importance of physical continuity is that we replace our cells - even our brain cells, apparently - every few hours/days/years/whatever.

I don't think we replace our brain cells, but even if we do, isn't the fact that they are replaced and the replacements are functionally similar important to who we are?

We do, apparently. http://www.theguardian.com/science/neurophilosophy/2012/feb/23/brain-new-cells-adult-neurogenesis

(I know I could do with some new ones ... or do I mean "neurones" ?)

I'm not sure why you asked that question, however. What would make you think that this ISN'T important to who we are? Obviously the capsule theory of identity says that functional similarity is important to who we are and that it's important on a far shorter timescale than brain cell replacement. (Or is this just another of those "buts" you like to throw in occasionally when not actually disagreeing? :)

And more specifically, the atoms involved in a thought might go on to do something else - take part in a different thought, form a memory, pay a visit to the big toe... they're constantly being moved around, even without being lost from the system.

Replacing atoms is not problematic since we think any two of the same species are strictly identical.  The question is whether the brain could be implemented in some completely different medium and still instantiate the same consciousness.  I think it could only do so approximately - so it might be close enough to fool your friends but still not be exactly you.  But does this imply, per Bruno's MGA, that no physical instantiation is needed at all - just the existence in Platonia of those computations is enough?  I think the argument only proves that there could be another world, in which you are instantiated in whatever is the physics of that world, e.g. Turing machine computations.

Imho this depends on whether comp and the capsule theory are correct - i.e. whether "yes doctor" is a good bet. It can only be a good bet if there is nothing supernatural involved, if physical continuity isn't important (which requires that eliminativism is wrong, I think), and if there aren't any infinities getting in the way of perfect duplication (e.g. if space-time is a continuum then exact duplication is unlikely, even in an infinite universe).

And the doctor chooses the right level of substitution.  Certainly we don't need exact substitution; we're not exactly the same from day to day, much less year to year.  But I think we need to be embedded in a physical environment with which we interact.

I think you need some reference to truth (p) or to some reality (<>t), but that is what is given in the nuance []p & p and []p & <>p. And if comp is true, that will provide your (probable) environment. If not, you are using "physical" as a kind of magic.

If exact duplication of a conscious person is possible at any level, then it should be possible to instantiate the same person in other parts of an infinite universe, in other parts of the multiverse, in computer simulations,

I agree, assuming that there is enough "world" also instantiated around him - which I suspect is A LOT.

Even enough worldS!

and in Platonia (the last one assuming Bruno knows what he is talking about and computations exist in some useful sense in Platonia).

I think that's technically true, but misleading because in the Platonia instantiation there will have to be a "world" instantiated there to. 

In the good proportion, we can hope. But in Platonia, you have also the brains in the vat, the dreams, etc. We must do the math to justify the "stable worlds" are winning the measure conficts..

I don't think a consciousness can exist in isolation (at least not without falling into do-loop) and so then we will have a simulated world with the instantiated consciousness in Platonia.  But how is that different from a world outside Platonia?  How is it different from this world?  "Simulated" doesn't really denote any distinction when it refers to a whole world (ever read Stanilaw Lem's "The Cyberiad"?).

Good point, and that is why we can start of arithmetic or of the UD*. But we must still justify the "worlds" and their stability. It works, as we get quickly non trivial proposition physical law of the observable.

I realize that you argument for environment is quite similar to the move from []p to p or <>p.

Bruno

Brent

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[Dennis Ochei]

What are these boxes  [] supposed to mean?

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Neuroscience/Computer Science, Music 3♭

[Dennis Ochei]

And <> ?

[Bruno Marchal]

On 16 May 2014, at 06:41, Dennis Ochei wrote:

The more I think about the subjective expectation question the more meaningless it becomes. I'm not asking if a future person is physically or psychologically like me, I know the answer to that. In fact, even if I knew every physical fact about a body and had a complete knowledge of the neural correlates of consciousness I still wouldn't know if it was realizing my consciousness or a consciousness that is merely precisely like mine. This question of whether a past or future experience did or will belong to me is distinctly extraphysical.

This is so true that if you push the reasoning you will understand that the primitive character of physics is an illusion, even if a particular important one that no machines can avoid (statistically).

Are you OK that the probability to find yourself in Moscow is 1/2, when you are read and cut in Helsinki, and build again in Moscow and Washington?

This is used implicitly in Everett Quantum mechanics, but with computationalism, that you accept, this extends to the space of all subjective experience realized in elementary arithmetic.

It is an easy exercise to show that the iteration of such duplication leads to non compressible white noise for most of the 2^n persons obtained when the duplication experiment is repeated n times.

Bruno

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[Bruno Marchal]

On 16 May 2014, at 07:04, meekerdb wrote:

On 5/15/2014 9:28 PM, LizR wrote:

  "Simulated" doesn't really denote any distinction when it refers to a whole world (ever read Stanilaw Lem's "The Cyberiad"?).

Yes, I've read The Cyberiad many times, as well as lots of other things by Mr Lem.

My favorite scifi author.

Mine too, with Galouye.

Bruno

Brent
"A mathematician is like a mad tailor: he is making "all possible clothes" and hopes to make also something suitable for dressing"
   --- Stanislaw Lem, Summa Techologiae

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Dennis Ochei]

> This is so true that if you push the reasoning you will understand that the primitive character of physics is an illusion, even if a particular important one that no machines can avoid (statistically).

 

I want to grok this statement can you give me more? Why is physics an illusion

 

> Are you OK that the probability to find yourself in Moscow is 1/2, when you are read and cut in Helsinki, and build again in Moscow and Washington?

 

I'm down with that

 

> It is an easy exercise to show that the iteration of such duplication leads to non compressible white noise for most of the 2^n persons obtained when the duplication experiment is repeated n times.

 

Don't get this either, but I haven't finished the paper, so maybe that will illuminate things

[Dennis Ochei]

For anyone who hasn't yet enjoyed the Cyberiad

[Dennis Ochei]

Bruno, I get everything until you bring in the UD and then I only understand pieces of what you are saying.

>  if we want build a universal machine, which is 

not only able to emulate all machines, but which actually does the emulation of each machine, 

we will be obliged to dovetail on each execution

What does it mean to dovetail on each execution?

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Friday, May 16, 2014, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

The brain is very metabolically active, and the matter at the synapses on particular turns over rapidly.  But even if this were not the case, it would be no argument against comp.

--
Stathis Papaioannou

[Bruno Marchal]

On 16 May 2014, at 09:48, Dennis Ochei wrote:

I'd be very grateful if you could elaborate. What precisely is comp? That the universe is computable?

It is more that my brain is computable, or that my "generalized brain" is computable, where the generalized brain is anything that if it is turing emulated at some relevant level, I will survive in the usual clinical sense.

It is not the assumption that the universe (physical, or mathematical) is computable, and actually, computationalism (comp) makes the appearance of the universe not entirely computable. It makes also (well, I argue) the physical universe into a sort of border of the reality of mind, which is itself defined by computer science or arithmetic, so that leads to testable consequences in physics, notably a sort of "many reality" structure, and somehow, quantum mechanics confirms this (if you have read Everett).

I take physicalism pretty seriously, but of course it could be wrong or incomplete, but i think it places a limit on what is knowable.

Eventually it is the theory of machine beliefs, knowledge and observation which will put some limit of what a physical reality can be.

I don't expect this to be obvious. It is slightly less difficult for people open to the "many-worlds" view of QM (Everett), and/or for those who reminds dreams and have experienced different sort of consciousness state. Such experiences are not necessary, but can open the mind of people stuck in the aristotelian conception of reality, that is with a primitive ontological physical reality.

Reading paper now, im clear on comp

OK. Nice. 

What are these boxes  [] supposed to mean? And <> ?

In what I propose, most of the time, "[]p" is for Gödel "beweisbar" (provable) predicate written in the language of arithmetic, and handled by a "sufficiently rich" (called here "Löbian") machine, like PA (Peano Arithmetic).

<>p can be seen as an abbreviation of ~[] ~p, and is read "consistent p" (as indeed if PA cannot prove ~p, p is consistant with PA.

Solovay discovered that the modal logic G axiomatized the behavoir of Gödel's beweisbar.

G is a so called normal modal logic. It means classical propositional logic + one symbol "[]", and the axioms [](A -> B) -> ([]A -> []B) and  []([]A -> A) -> []A, and with the modus ponens rule of inference (from A and A-> B you can deduce B), and necessitation, from A you can deduce B. He found also the important (non normal) modal logic G*, which axiomatizes the true logic of provability, as opposed to the part that the machine can prove.

Just to explain G and G*, I talk on many different modal logic, and in that case the box and diamond have a more general meaning. I also study different type of modal logics derived from G and G*.

The classical theory of knowledge, which I mention often is the modal logic T, or S4, with the axioms []A -> A, and sometimes also []A -> [][]A (introspection, self-awareness).

> This is so true that if you push the reasoning you will understand that the primitive character of physics is an illusion, even if a particular important one that no machines can avoid (statistically).

 

I want to grok this statement can you give me more? Why is physics an illusion

Well, that's a long story. Normally the paper explain. The idea is that a tiny part of the arithmetical reality emulate all computation, and that a machine has no means to distinguish, *quickly* a computation done in arithmetic from a computation done by any other universal system, so that to really predicts any experience you do (or any future first person account you can do for an experience), you need to look at all the computation going through your state, and evaluate the proportion going in some other states. But then physics is reduced to a statistics on computations in arithmetic. At first sight there will be too many computations (the white rabbit problem) but using an idea of Theaetetus, and variants, we can recover enough constraints to recover a quantum like reality, and perhaps some destructive interference on the "white rabbits". 

> Are you OK that the probability to find yourself in Moscow is 1/2, when you are read and cut in Helsinki, and build again in Moscow and Washington?

 

I'm down with that

OK. I might come back on this, as I have to go soon.  You will have to keep in mind the difference between the first person discourse of the experiencer(s), which are simply the sequence of result of experiments written in the diary, with the third person description, which is deterministic, with a person which is multiplied. The key is that the "first person experiment diary" is taken with the experiencers, and so is also multiplied, unlike a third person diary. 

If your reiterated the WM duplication, each diary will contain a sequence like 

WWWMWMMMWWMMMMMWMWMMW

And combinatorial calculus can show that most are algorithmically incompressible. So if you bet money, you have more chance to win if you predict a random sequence than the binary digits of PI (say). OK?

Of course, with a naive use of the "open mind" theory, you might say that you are in both W and M, (as you are everyone!), but the guy in M will still to have to write M in his diary, and the guy in W will write W, and both have to distinguish their immediate feeling (oh I am definitely in this city), with the intellectual knowledge that their body is in both city (the third person view). OK?

> It is an easy exercise to show that the iteration of such duplication leads to non compressible white noise for most of the 2^n persons obtained when the duplication experiment is repeated n times.

 

Don't get this either, but I haven't finished the paper, so maybe that will illuminate things

OK. Please let us know if you have a problem with that. 

Bruno

On Friday, May 16, 2014, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

On 16 May 2014, at 02:13, LizR wrote:

On 16 May 2014 10:36, Dennis Ochei <do.inf...@gmail.com> wrote:

Right Liz, the question is, does the memory link actually signify the presence of the same local I? Or does each moment have its own I? Or do all moments everywhere share a single global I? If there are local I's, then how are their boundaries drawn?

Yes, those are indeed the questions. Especially the last one. I don't think we're in a position to answer them (or if we ever will be...)

All of these questions are epiphenomenal from the point of view of physics so I fear there is no way for me to decide. All my observations and brain processes will be identical no matter which hypothesis is true.

Only from physics which isn't derivable from psychology via comp, I suspect, so Bruno may have something to say about this.

Not sure Dennis use seriously physicalism though, but in principle you are right, and I already said something.

Dennis Ochei seems to believe in primary physics (like all aristotelians), and comp, but they does not work well together, and leads to person and consciousness elimination (which I take as total nonsense).

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Dennis Ochei]

I'm gathering that dovetailing means alternating through the programs, essentially multithreading, so that the UD doesn't get stuck on an unhalting computation.

[meekerdb]

On 5/16/2014 12:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>> It turns out the carbon atoms in the DNA of neural cells is remarkable
>> long lived, as chronicled via the radiation spike due to atmospheric
>> nuclear weapons testing in 50s & 60s. I don't have a cite on hand,
>> but the result is that your neuronal DNA is on average about two years
>> younger than your own age. For most other cell types, the average age
>> is around 7 years, or something like that.
>
> That looks like the age of the cell, but all piece of DNA are changed many times,

Do you mean replaced by a copy as part of cell metabolism (which I think happens on cell
division? Or do you mean each DNA molecule suffers random changes during the life of a
cell - due to radiation, etc.

> so the age of a DNA does not seem to me to be necessarily the age of the atoms making
> the structure.

Of course the carbon atoms were produce in a super nova and are likely millions of years old.

> brain is the place where the metabolic activity is the highest, so I am not sure our
> neurons are so stable at the constitutive level.

The common theory is that long term memories are encoded by growth and change in neuronal
axons and synaptic connections, which would take metabolic activity. But it wouldn't
require changes in neuron cell DNA.

Brent