Step 3 - one step beyond?

[LizR]

In Bruno's "COMP 2013" paper he says

 

The notion of the first person, or the conscious knower, admits the simplest possible definition: it is provided by access to basic memories. Consciousness, despite its non-definability, facilitates the train of reasoning in humans; but we justifiably might have used digital machines instead.

Given this, in my opinion there is no problem with what is meant by step 3. Bruno makes no attempt to define personal identity beyond the contents of memories. Whether one "really" survives being teleported, or falling asleep and waking up the next day, isn't relevant. "Moscow man" is just the guy who remembers being Helsinki man, then finding himself in Moscow (for example). Hence Helsinki man can't predict any first person experience, only what will happen from a 3p view. Or if he didn't know duplication was involved, he would assume that he had a 50-50 chance of ending up in M or W.

[Bruce Kellett]

But this is a rather self-serving definition -- designed to fit in with
the conclusion he wants to draw. We are entering the realm of the
Humpty-Dumpty dictionary -- words no longer have their ordinary,
everyday meaning.

Bruce

[Bruno Marchal]

In science, all popular terms are redefined. This is just
clarification. You could attack Einstein and say that he refines terms
to suit his conclusion. You can pretend that those mad people who
pretend that the earth is round have just redefined the meaning of
earth. It is a universal critics bearing on the whole of science.

You must take the definition given, and study the proof, that's all.
if not, you are the one using argument of popularity which are
authoritative argument, and are non valid.

Bruno

>
> Bruce
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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[LizR]

In what way is it self-serving? It seems quite reasonable to say that a person is their memories, at least in a lot of important senses (Brent says it quite often, and he isn't a huge fan of comp).

As a side issue, I think it's the same - or similar - to the definition that was used by Everett? I haven't read his paper for a while but I seem to remember he used something like this, after all, what else can you really use apart from memory if you want to study how identity will persist over time within a given theory of physics? (For contrast, consider amnesia cases or the guy in "Memento").

[Bruce Kellett]

At some point you need to relate the terms of your theories to the real
everyday world. If your theory relies on some particular definition of
personal identity, then you have to show that this definition means that
your are talking about real, ordinary, everyday people. If your terms do
not relate, then your theory has no content.

Einstein, through his theories, changed our understanding of the nature
of space and time. But he did this in terms of common, well understood
concepts such as clocks and measuring rods. If he had redefined the
basic concept of measurement, then people would certainly have asked him
what he was talking about. Science does not work by definition.
Sometimes technical terms are required, and these need to be defined,
but unless such terms are ultimately related to standard concepts, then
there is no evidence that the theory has anything to do with the real
world. In science, of course, the ultimate test is always observation --
a successful theory has to accord with observation, when it is usually
the case that technical terms are of secondary importance. The abstract
theory of today is taught in high school in a few years time.

> You must take the definition given, and study the proof, that's all. if
> not, you are the one using argument of popularity which are
> authoritative argument, and are non valid.

No, it is not an argument from authority. That is an unreasonable
accusation. What I am requiring is that the terms you use, like the
concept of personal identity, are related to the meaning such terms have
in the real world. If you are not talking about real people, then it is
difficult to see any merit in the theory.

Bruce

[Bruno Marchal]

Sure. Can you tell me specifically where you have a problem with?

>
> Einstein, through his theories, changed our understanding of the
> nature of space and time. But he did this in terms of common, well
> understood concepts such as clocks and measuring rods. If he had
> redefined the basic concept of measurement, then people would
> certainly have asked him what he was talking about. Science does not
> work by definition. Sometimes technical terms are required, and
> these need to be defined, but unless such terms are ultimately
> related to standard concepts, then there is no evidence that the
> theory has anything to do with the real world. In science, of
> course, the ultimate test is always observation -- a successful
> theory has to accord with observation, when it is usually the case
> that technical terms are of secondary importance. The abstract
> theory of today is taught in high school in a few years time.

No problem. That is why I use diaries to axiomatize a part of the
meaining of the first and third person notion used in the reasoning. I
have never had any problem with this, except John Calrk, who shows
that he understand, but that he will not read step 4 anyway.

What is is that is unclear?

>
>
>> You must take the definition given, and study the proof, that's
>> all. if not, you are the one using argument of popularity which are
>> authoritative argument, and are non valid.
>
> No, it is not an argument from authority. That is an unreasonable
> accusation. What I am requiring is that the terms you use, like the
> concept of personal identity, are related to the meaning such terms
> have in the real world.

tell me specifically what you don't understand. Study the work, step
by step/ be careful with the post. In some post I talk to people
having already grasped UDA1-7, in other even with people having a good
idea of Step 8, etc.

Avoid patronizing and avoid ad hominem remark. Focus on the subject.

Also, it is better to avoid an ontological commitment, and use only
the assumption used in the reasoning.

> If you are not talking about real people, then it is difficult to
> see any merit in the theory.

That's a total obvious remark which insinuate that I might not do
that. Please, make specific remark. At which step of the UDA do you
have a problem? I have still no clue.

[John Clark]

On Wed, Apr 15, 2015 at 10:23 PM, Bruce Kellett <bhke...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:

> We are entering the realm of the Humpty-Dumpty dictionary -- words no longer have their ordinary, everyday meaning.

Yes. According to Bruno the words "atheist" and "Christian" mean almost the same thing with atheism being just a very minor variation of Christianity. And the word "God" means a unintelligent non-conscious amorphous impersonal blob that doesn't answer prayers and in fact doesn't do much of anything at all, nevertheless according to Bruno "God" exists and is very important for reasons never made clear. And "free will" means... well it means noise shaped air as near as I can tell. 

  John K Clark

[meekerdb]

That's an interesting question (although Bruno always says it's not relevant to his argument).  Having a coherent, narrative memory seems like an obvious desideratum.  But as you point out the guy in "Memento" stays the same person even though he can't form new long-term memories.  So another possibility is what we would call in AI "running the same program".  This seems to be what is captured by "counter-factual correctness".  Of course any human-level AI will learn and so there will be divergence; but in a sense one could say two instances a program instantiated the same "person" with different memories.  It would correspond to having the same character and predilections.  For example we might build several intelligent Mars Rovers that are landed in different places.  They would start with the same AI and memories (as installed at JPL) but as they learned and adapted they would diverge.

Brent

[Dennis Ochei]

One must revise the everyday concept of personal identity because it isn't even coherent. It's like youre getting mad at him for explaining combustion without reference to phlogiston. He can't use the everyday notion because it is a convenient fiction.

[Bruce Kellett]

Dennis Ochei wrote:
> One must revise the everyday concept of personal identity because it isn't even coherent. It's like youre getting mad at him for explaining combustion without reference to phlogiston. He can't use the everyday notion because it is a convenient fiction.

I don't think phlogiston is an everyday concept. The closest continuer
concept of personal identity is far from an unsophisticated everyday
notion, or a convenient fiction. If you want to revise it to some
alternative definition of personal identity that is better suited to
your purposes, then you have to do the necessary analytical work.

Bruce

[Dennis Ochei]

Closest continuer theory is itself a redefinition of the lay conception and is frankly absurd. Semiconservative replication doesn't kill me. And the lay understanding considers teletransportation as equivalent to death, contra closest continuer theory.

Combustion is the everyday concept and phlogiston was part of that concept's definition until someone "redefined" it. At least that's the analogy i was going for.

[Telmo Menezes]

On Mon, Apr 20, 2015 at 8:40 AM, Bruce Kellett <bhke...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:

Dennis Ochei wrote:

One must revise the everyday concept of personal identity because it isn't even coherent. It's like youre getting mad at him for explaining combustion without reference to phlogiston. He can't use the everyday notion because it is a convenient fiction.

I don't think phlogiston is an everyday concept.

Not anymore. It was made obsolete by a better theory, which was not required to take phlogiston into account, because phlogiston was just a made up explanation that happened to fit the observations available at the time.

 

The closest continuer concept of personal identity is far from an unsophisticated everyday notion, or a convenient fiction.

I wasn't familiar with the concept so I looked at several sources. I will summarize it in my own words, so that you can please correct me if I misunderstand something:

In case of branching (through something like duplication machines, body swaps, non-destructive teleportations, etc..), only one or zero branches will be the true continuation of the original. In some cases the true continuation is the one that more closely resembles the original psychologically, which can be determined by following causality chains. In the case of a tie, no branch is a true continuation of the original.

Again, please correct me if I am misrepresenting the theory or missing something important.

If what I said above is correct, this is just akin to a legal definition, not a serious scientific or philosophical theory. It makes a statement about a bunch of mushy concepts. What is a "true continuation"? How is the causality chain introduced by a train journey any different from the one introduced by a teleportation?

If Everett's MWI is correct, then this theory holds that there is no true continuation -- every single branching from one observer moment to the next introduces a tie in closeness. Which is fine by me, but then we can just ignore this entire "true continuation" business.

 

If you want to revise it to some alternative definition of personal identity that is better suited to your purposes, then you have to do the necessary analytical work.

There isn't a single reference to "personal identity" that I could find in the UDA paper. The work does lead to conclusions about personal identity (as does Everett's MWI) but it doesn't start from there. Please be specific about what you find incorrect in the reasoning.

Telmo.

[Bruce Kellett]

Telmo Menezes wrote:
> On Mon, Apr 20, 2015 at 8:40 AM, Bruce Kellett
> <bhke...@optusnet.com.au <mailto:bhke...@optusnet.com.au>> wrote:
>
> Dennis Ochei wrote:
>
> One must revise the everyday concept of personal identity
> because it isn't even coherent. It's like youre getting mad at
> him for explaining combustion without reference to phlogiston.
> He can't use the everyday notion because it is a convenient fiction.
>
> I don't think phlogiston is an everyday concept.
>
> Not anymore. It was made obsolete by a better theory, which was not
> required to take phlogiston into account, because phlogiston was just a
> made up explanation that happened to fit the observations available at
> the time.

No, phlogiston was a serious scientific theory. It required careful
experimentation to demonstrate that the theory did not really fit the
facts easily (you would require negative mass, for instance).

> The closest continuer concept of personal identity is far from an
> unsophisticated everyday notion, or a convenient fiction.
>
> I wasn't familiar with the concept so I looked at several sources. I
> will summarize it in my own words, so that you can please correct me if
> I misunderstand something:
>
> In case of branching (through something like duplication machines, body
> swaps, non-destructive teleportations, etc..), only one or zero branches
> will be the true continuation of the original. In some cases the true
> continuation is the one that more closely resembles the original
> psychologically, which can be determined by following causality chains.
> In the case of a tie, no branch is a true continuation of the original.

It involves a lot more than psychological resemblance. The point is that
personal identity is a multidimensional concept. It includes continuity
of the body, causality, continuity, access to memories, emotional
states, value systems, and everything else that goes to make up a unique
person. Although all of these things change with time in the natural
course of events, we say that there is a unique person in this history.
Closest continuer theory is a sophisticated attempt to capture this
multidimensionality, and acknowledges that the metric one might use, and
the relative weights placed on different dimensions, might be open to
discussion. But it is clear that in the case of ties (in whatever metric
you are using), new persons are created -- the person is not duplicated
in any operational sense.

> Again, please correct me if I am misrepresenting the theory or missing
> something important.
>
> If what I said above is correct, this is just akin to a legal
> definition, not a serious scientific or philosophical theory. It makes a
> statement about a bunch of mushy concepts. What is a "true
> continuation"? How is the causality chain introduced by a train journey
> any different from the one introduced by a teleportation?
>
> If Everett's MWI is correct, then this theory holds that there is no
> true continuation -- every single branching from one observer moment to
> the next introduces a tie in closeness. Which is fine by me, but then we
> can just ignore this entire "true continuation" business.

MWI is in no way equivalent to Bruno's duplication situation. He
acknowledges this. The point about MWI is that the continuers are in
different worlds. There is no dimension connecting the worlds, so there
is no metric defining this difference. Each can then be counted as the
closest continuer /in that world/ -- with no possibility of conflicts.

> If you want to revise it to some alternative definition of personal
> identity that is better suited to your purposes, then you have to do
> the necessary analytical work.
>
> There isn't a single reference to "personal identity" that I could find
> in the UDA paper. The work does lead to conclusions about personal
> identity (as does Everett's MWI) but it doesn't start from there. Please
> be specific about what you find incorrect in the reasoning.

Read the COMP(2013) paper. There are many references to personal
identity in that, including the quote given by Liz: "The notion of the
first person, or /the conscious knower/, admits the simplest possible

definition: it is provided by access to basic memories."

In other words, Bruno is using only one dimension of personal identity
and basing his argument on that, to the exclusion of all the other
relevant dimensions. This is a serious limitation on the argument since
two quite different people can share a large proportion of their
memories, especially if they have lived closely together for many years.
And yet they suffer from no confusion of their separate identities.
Access to personal memories (as given in personal diaries) is not an
adequate criterion for personal identity.

Bruce

[spudb...@aol.com]

Closest continuer seems technically plausible, even in the John Hick way. But it does point out that identity, cannot, over long enough time, remain the same. Are we not closest continuers of the 5 year olds we used to be? Death should not be a big problem if the closest continuer is close to 100% accurate, to start off at least. Identity over time is the real issue.

 

 

-----Original Message-----
From: Dennis Ochei <do.inf...@gmail.com>
To: everything-list <everyth...@googlegroups.com>
Sent: Mon, Apr 20, 2015 5:11 am
Subject: Re: Step 3 - one step beyond?

Closest continuer theory is itself a redefinition of the lay conception and is
frankly absurd. Semiconservative replication doesn't kill me. And the lay
understanding considers teletransportation as equivalent to death, contra
closest continuer theory.

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[Bruno Marchal]

Are you saying that you believe that computationalism is false (in
which case you can believe in some closer continuer theory), or are
you saying that step 4 is not valid?

Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Bruno Marchal]

Certainly. That is why I insist in saying that the notion of personal
identity is out-of-topic.
We need only to use the amount needed to say "yes" to the doctor at
step zero.

But once you accept, for the sake of the argument, step zero, then the
multidimensional notion of personal identity is, by definition,
preserved at step zero, and easily shown preserved, in all remaining
steps of the argument.

Only the *difference* in the diaries contents needs to be used to get
the relative first person indeterminacy in the self-multiplication
experience.

That means that your argument is not relevant for invalidating the UDA
reasoning.

We need to take into account only what is relevant for the reasoning.

(That type of argument might perhaps been tried to invalidate comp
(step 0), but that remains to be proved. All attempts to falsify
computationalism or mechanism have failed, and been shown to either
beg the question (most of the times), or contain other errors).

Bruno




http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Dennis Ochei]

I think his problem is that you are using an "impoverished" definition of personal identity, the same way an incompatibilist would be annoyed at the compatibilist redefinition of free will. I have to admit that as an incompatibilist i am annoyed by this move, but in your case i am not bothered by it

[Dennis Ochei]

No, it's actually completely indeterminant whether I am the closest continuer or not. There might be a six year old somewhere who is more psychologically like my 5 year old self than I am and with a higher fraction of the molecules I was made of when I was 5.

Or suppose I get into a matter scanner at time t and it destructively scans me and then reconstitutes me. then at some unknown time t+x it creates a duplicate. Who is the closest continuer of the me that walked into the scanner at t? At all t+y where 0 < y < x the person who walked out of the scanner at t+epsilon is the closest continuer. Then at t+x the newly created duplicate becomes the closest continuer of me at t and the other person loses their personal identity due to something that potentially happened on the other side of the universe.

This is already silly without me opening the can of worms that is relativity. Which I will now quickly do: As observers in different reference frames will disagree to the ordering of events, they will disagree about whether the me who walked out of the scanner just after t is the closest continuer. CCT requires non-local instantaneous effects on personal identity which simply doesnt play nice with relativity.

[Bruce Kellett]

Dennis Ochei wrote:
> No, it's actually completely indeterminant whether I am the closest
> continuer or not. There might be a six year old somewhere who is more
> psychologically like my 5 year old self than I am and with a higher
> fraction of the molecules I was made of when I was 5.
>
> Or suppose I get into a matter scanner at time t and it destructively
> scans me and then reconstitutes me. then at some unknown time t+x it
> creates a duplicate. Who is the closest continuer of the me that
> walked into the scanner at t? At all t+y where 0 < y < x the person
> who walked out of the scanner at t+epsilon is the closest continuer.

Huh? The scan was destructive according to your account!

> Then at t+x the newly created duplicate becomes the closest continuer
> of me at t and the other person loses their personal identity due to
> something that potentially happened on the other side of the
> universe.
>
> This is already silly without me opening the can of worms that is
> relativity. Which I will now quickly do: As observers in different
> reference frames will disagree to the ordering of events, they will
> disagree about whether the me who walked out of the scanner just
> after t is the closest continuer. CCT requires non-local
> instantaneous effects on personal identity which simply doesnt play
> nice with relativity.

Time order along a time-like world line is invariant under Lorentz
transformations.I suggest that you don't know what you are talking about.

Bruce

[Bruce Kellett]

I am suggesting that computationalism is effectively false, in part
because of an inadequate account of personal identity. You substitute
part or all of the brain at some level with a Turing machine, but do not
take appropriate notice of the body bearing the brain. If we are not to
notice the substitution, we must still have a body that interacts with
the world in exactly the same way as the original. Under the
teleportation scenarios, some new body must be created or provided. I
think that in general the person might notice this.

If you woke up in the morning and looked in the mirror and saw Sophia
Loren looking back at you, or saw your next door neighbour in the
mirror, you might doubt your own identity. Memories are not everything
because memories can be lost, or be mistaken.

In total virtual reality scenarios, of course, this could be managed,
but then you have the problem of the identity of indiscernibles.
Creating copies that are identical to this level -- identical memories,
bodies, environments, and so on -- does not duplicate the person -- the
copies, being identical in all respects, are one person.

I am saying that a case could be made that all the destructive
teleportation scenarios create new persons -- the cut actually
terminates the original person. In step 3 you have a tie for closest
continuer so there is no continuing person -- the original is cut. If
the original is not cut (as in step 5), then that is the continuing
person, and the duplicate is a new person. Time delays as in steps 2 and
4 do not make a lot of difference, they just enhance the need for the
recognition of new persons.

In sum, your argument over these early steps is not an argument in
logic, but an argument of rhetoric. Because the tight definitions you
need for logical argument either are not provided, or when provided, do
not refer to anything in the real world, at best you are trying to
persuade rhetorically -- there is no logical compulsion. What you are
talking about has more to do with psychology and/or physics than
mathematics, so definitions can never be completely precise -- concepts
in the real world are always corrigible, so tightly constrained logical
arguments are not available as they are in mathematics.

Bruce

[Dennis Ochei]

> Huh? The scan was destructive according to your account!

That does not preclude me from having a closest continuer. CCT says that teletransportation perserves identity. This is just a teleportation to the same location. Or perhaps you missed the part were it reconstitutes me at t+epsilon and that's the confusion.

> Time order along a time-like world line is invariant under Lorentz

transformations.I suggest that you don't know what you are talking about.

https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=kGsbBw1I0Rg

You can start at 4 minutes. I'm resisting the urge to suggest that you don't know what you're talking about

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[LizR]

On 20 April 2015 at 21:44, Telmo Menezes <te...@telmomenezes.com> wrote:

On Mon, Apr 20, 2015 at 8:40 AM, Bruce Kellett <bhke...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:

Dennis Ochei wrote:

One must revise the everyday concept of personal identity because it isn't even coherent. It's like youre getting mad at him for explaining combustion without reference to phlogiston. He can't use the everyday notion because it is a convenient fiction.

I don't think phlogiston is an everyday concept.

Not anymore. It was made obsolete by a better theory, which was not required to take phlogiston into account, because phlogiston was just a made up explanation that happened to fit the observations available at the time.

Just the same as any other scientific theory, then!

 

[Dennis Ochei]

Do you have a coherent, non arbitrary theory of personal identity that claims 1) Teletransportation creates a new person, killing the original and 2) Ordinary survival does not create a new person, killing the original?

Let me remind you, although you probably know this, that all your atoms except some in your teeth are replaced throughout the course of a year.

On Monday, April 20, 2015, Bruce Kellett <bhke...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:

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[Bruce Kellett]

Dennis Ochei wrote:
> Do you have a coherent, non arbitrary theory of personal identity that
> claims 1) Teletransportation creates a new person, killing the original

It is a possible theory. See D Parfit, 'Reasons and Persons' (Oxford, 1984).

> and 2) Ordinary survival does not create a new person, killing the original?
>
> Let me remind you, although you probably know this, that all your atoms
> except some in your teeth are replaced throughout the course of a year.

When a cell in my arm dies and is replaced, I do not die. When my leg is
cut off, I do not die. Ordinary survival does not kill the original and
create a new person -- body replacement is a gradual, continuous process
which preserves bodily identity.

The teleportation process discussed involves actually destroying
(cutting or killing) the original and creating a new body at some
(remote) location. It is arguable whether this new body is sufficiently
close to the original to constitute a closest continuer -- hence
Parfit's idea that a new person is always created. If replacement of
memories in a new body counts as sufficient to constitute a suitable
closest continuer, that is your choice. But is is not a logical consequence.

Bruce

[Bruce Kellett]

Dennis Ochei wrote:
> > Huh? The scan was destructive according to your account!
>
> That does not preclude me from having a closest continuer. CCT says that
> teletransportation perserves identity. This is just a teleportation to
> the same location. Or perhaps you missed the part were it reconstitutes
> me at t+epsilon and that's the confusion.

Maybe you forgot to mention that part.

>> Time order along a time-like world line is invariant under Lorentz
> transformations.I suggest that you don't know what you are talking about.
>
> https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=kGsbBw1I0Rg
>
> You can start at 4 minutes. I'm resisting the urge to suggest that you
> don't know what you're talking about

I can't load the video. Tell me briefly what your argument against my
comment about time order along a time-like world line is.

Bruce

[Dennis Ochei]

sigh... Parfit does away with personal identity, replacing it with psychological connectedness relation R. Past and future selves are not identical to you, but are new persons that are like you to a high degree. Your relationship to your past and future selves are much like your relationship to your siblings. The illusion that you are the same observer riding through time is caused by memories and being destructively teleported is as good as ordinary survival because there is no further question of identity beyond relation R. Lastly, Parfit's Empty Individualism is not a CCT as it allows branching.

On Monday, April 20, 2015, Bruce Kellett <bhke...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:

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[Bruce Kellett]

Bruce Kellett wrote:
> Dennis Ochei wrote:
>> > Huh? The scan was destructive according to your account!
>>
>> That does not preclude me from having a closest continuer. CCT says
>> that teletransportation perserves identity. This is just a
>> teleportation to the same location. Or perhaps you missed the part
>> were it reconstitutes me at t+epsilon and that's the confusion.
>
> Maybe you forgot to mention that part.

OK, I see now that you reconstitute immediately. That, then is clearly
the closest continuer. A person reconstructed at some later time is not
a closest continuer if the original continued or was reconstructed
immediately -- the original person will have moved on and what he was x
ago is no longer relevant. The essential point is that time-order along
a time-like world line is invariant -- t is never before t+x (x>0) for
any observer.

Bruce

[Dennis Ochei]

http://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Relativity_of_simultaneity

I thought this was basic relativity 101? The video gives a concrete example with a train moving at relativistic speeds through a tunnel. The train lorentz contracts such that it is shorter than the tunnel. To an observer outside the tunnel, off the train, there will come a point in time when the train is completely within the tunnel. At this point two guillotines slam downwards simultaneously at the exit and the entrance of the tunnel and rise again barely missing the train.

From a frame on the train, the tunnel is lorentz contracted to be shorter than the train. The nose of the train is just barely missed by the guillotine at the exit while the back of the train portrudes from the tunnel. Some moments later the back of the train enters the tunnel  and the guillotine at the entrance slams down behind it with the front portruding.

On Monday, April 20, 2015, Bruce Kellett <bhke...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:

Dennis Ochei wrote:

 > Huh? The scan was destructive according to your account!

That does not preclude me from having a closest continuer. CCT says that teletransportation perserves identity. This is just a teleportation to the same location. Or perhaps you missed the part were it reconstitutes me at t+epsilon and that's the confusion.

Maybe you forgot to mention that part.

Time order along a time-like world line is invariant under Lorentz

transformations.I suggest that you don't know what you are talking about.

Relativity Paradox - Sixty Symbols

You can start at 4 minutes. I'm resisting the urge to suggest that you don't know what you're talking about

I can't load the video. Tell me briefly what your argument against my comment about time order along a time-like world line is.

Bruce

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[Bruce Kellett]

Dennis Ochei wrote:
> http://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Relativity_of_simultaneity
>
> I thought this was basic relativity 101? The video gives a concrete
> example with a train moving at relativistic speeds through a tunnel. The
> train lorentz contracts such that it is shorter than the tunnel. To an
> observer outside the tunnel, off the train, there will come a point in
> time when the train is completely within the tunnel. At this point two
> guillotines slam downwards simultaneously at the exit and the entrance
> of the tunnel and rise again barely missing the train.
>
> From a frame on the train, the tunnel is lorentz contracted to be
> shorter than the train. The nose of the train is just barely missed by
> the guillotine at the exit while the back of the train portrudes from
> the tunnel. Some moments later the back of the train enters the tunnel
> and the guillotine at the entrance slams down behind it with the front
> portruding.

The two ends of the train are separated by a space-like interval, not a
time-like interval.

Bruce

[meekerdb]

The information from the scan could be transmitted to spacelike separate reconstruction
events, in which case you couldn't label one copy as having time precedence over the
other. But I don't see what this has to do with anything of metaphysical significance.
It might present a legalistic problem, but that could be solved just by flipping a coin.

Brent

[Bruce Kellett]

True, but then there is no unique closest continuer, so two new persons
are created. Who inherits the farm? Well, that depends on the will of
the original, now deceased, person.

Bruce

[Dennis Ochei]

No one cares who inherits the farm. Subjective expectation is the crux of personal identity. You can't tell me that whether i wake up in Moscow depends on whether or not a reconstruction event happened at Helsinki faster than signals can travel between the two.

On Monday, April 20, 2015, Bruce Kellett <bhke...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:

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[Bruce Kellett]

Dennis Ochei wrote:
> Oh i see the issue. I didn't realize you'd assume the scanner is
> immobile. Immobilizing it relative to everything in the universe is
> uhhh... rather difficult.

The scanning event is taken as a single point in space-time. Mobility is
irrelevant. If you create duplicates, they can be sent to space-like
separated points, as Brent says. But if you simply reconstruct at some
later time at the same location, then the events are separated by a
time-like interval. This makes a difference to whether or not the time
order is unique -- it is for time-like separations.

Bruce

> On Monday, April 20, 2015, Bruce Kellett <bhke...@optusnet.com.au

[LizR]

I have to say that the point under discussion SHOULD be the nature of subjective experience, surely? That is, why do we feel as though we have continuity? (And does the answer to that preclude duplicators etc?)

[Dennis Ochei]

Right, mobility is irrelevant. I mispoke.

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[Russell Standish]

There is another way of looking at this. Assume a robust ontology, so
that the UD actually runs completely. Then the closest continuation
theory coupled with computationalism predicts the absence of any
discontinuities of experience, such as what I experience evry night
going to sleep. That is because in UD*, there will be always be a
closer continuation to one you're currently experiencing (for
essentially the same reason that there is always another real number
lying between any two real numbers you care to pick.

So either ontology is not robust (the Peter Jones move),
computationalism is false, or the CCT is false.

Not sure if Bruno needs to more explicit on this robust ontology bit,
as he deemphasises this until step 7.

Anyway, it does seem to me that CCT is attributing some sort of
identity role to physical continuity that is not there with
computational continuity.

--

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Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpc...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au
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[Dennis Ochei]

CCT doesn't have to entail physical continuity. The standard CCT seems to first use psychological similarty and in the case of ties physical continuity, but you could also imagine a purely paychological or purely physical CCT. My problem with CCT is that the rules for ties are ad hoc legal arbitration that violate locality and to quote Parfit: "A double survival can't equal death." My problem with similiarity measures is that you are no longer talking about subjective expectation. Similarity measures are fine if you throw out subjective expectation as a mere illusion. However, if you want to retain subjective expectation, then you have to have an all or none model of personal identity.

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[Bruce Kellett]

Russell Standish wrote:
>
> There is another way of looking at this. Assume a robust ontology, so
> that the UD actually runs completely. Then the closest continuation
> theory coupled with computationalism predicts the absence of any
> discontinuities of experience, such as what I experience evry night
> going to sleep. That is because in UD*, there will be always be a
> closer continuation to one you're currently experiencing (for
> essentially the same reason that there is always another real number
> lying between any two real numbers you care to pick.

That seems to be saying that there is always a continuer who never
sleeps. Gets to sound a bit like the quantum suicide scenario -- in MWI
there is always one branch in which the gun fails to fire.....

> So either ontology is not robust (the Peter Jones move),
> computationalism is false, or the CCT is false.
>
> Not sure if Bruno needs to more explicit on this robust ontology bit,
> as he deemphasises this until step 7.
>
> Anyway, it does seem to me that CCT is attributing some sort of
> identity role to physical continuity that is not there with
> computational continuity.

That seems to be the case. CCT does not specify a particular metric on
the multiple dimension of personal identity. SO I guess you could weight
physical continuity above everything else, or you could weight personal
memories infinitely highly. I do not think that either extreme captures
what we normally mean by physical identity over time.

I worry about memory loss cases -- whether through disease or trauma. My
particular concern is with Korsakoff's Syndrome, which was first
described in advanced alcoholics, but can occur after particular types
of brain injury. It is characterized by the fact that the person cannot
lay down new memories. They can't remember from one moment to the next
things that were said and done. To cover these gaps in memory they
confabulate all sorts of weird and fanciful stories. Nevertheless, such
a sufferer may have quite clear childhood memories -- there is just a
gap of twenty, thirty, or more years in their memory banks. Physically,
they are of essentially unaltered appearance, and frequently emotional
and other character traits are intact. When you speak to such a person,
you can be in no doubt that they are the same person as before the brain
injury, although the have lost most of their adult memories.

A satisfactory theory of personal identity has to account for such
cases, and variations thereon.

Bruce

[Stathis Papaioannou]

Of course destructive teleportation creates new persons, but the point
is that it doesn't matter, because ordinary life creates new persons
also, though gradually rather than all at once. If you discovered that
some otherwise perfectly normal people had a condition which caused
all of the matter in their body to be replaced overnight during sleep,
rather than gradually over the course of days, and that you were one
of these people, would it bother you? Or would you doubt that it was
so on the grounds that you were pretty sure you were "the same person"
and not a "new person"?

> In sum, your argument over these early steps is not an argument in logic,
> but an argument of rhetoric. Because the tight definitions you need for
> logical argument either are not provided, or when provided, do not refer to
> anything in the real world, at best you are trying to persuade rhetorically
> -- there is no logical compulsion. What you are talking about has more to do
> with psychology and/or physics than mathematics, so definitions can never be
> completely precise -- concepts in the real world are always corrigible, so
> tightly constrained logical arguments are not available as they are in
> mathematics.

All you have to agree is that it would make no difference to you if
you were perfectly (or close enough) copied. I guess you could
disagree with this but in that case you are deluded about being the
person you believe yourself to be.


--
Stathis Papaioannou

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 21 April 2015 at 09:25, Bruce Kellett <bhke...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
> Dennis Ochei wrote:
>>
>> Do you have a coherent, non arbitrary theory of personal identity that
>> claims 1) Teletransportation creates a new person, killing the original
>
>
> It is a possible theory. See D Parfit, 'Reasons and Persons' (Oxford, 1984).

Parfit's argument is that if identity is not preserved in these
thought experiments, then identity is not the thing that matters.

>> and 2) Ordinary survival does not create a new person, killing the
>> original?
>>
>> Let me remind you, although you probably know this, that all your atoms
>> except some in your teeth are replaced throughout the course of a year.
>
>
> When a cell in my arm dies and is replaced, I do not die. When my leg is cut
> off, I do not die. Ordinary survival does not kill the original and create a
> new person -- body replacement is a gradual, continuous process which
> preserves bodily identity.

What if the duplicating machine replaced first your head and then a
minute later the rest of your body?

> The teleportation process discussed involves actually destroying (cutting or
> killing) the original and creating a new body at some (remote) location. It
> is arguable whether this new body is sufficiently close to the original to
> constitute a closest continuer -- hence Parfit's idea that a new person is
> always created. If replacement of memories in a new body counts as
> sufficient to constitute a suitable closest continuer, that is your choice.
> But is is not a logical consequence.

There is a difference between natural and artificial replacement, but
in the end in both cases there is a new person and the matter in the
old person has disintegrated. It is not enough to show there is a
difference - you have to explain why it makes a difference to the
philosophical argument.


--
Stathis Papaioannou

[Dennis Ochei]

Right, this is one coherent non-arbitrary view. It's basically what Parfit put forward in Reason's and Persons. 

Kolak's is the other view. Property changes do not destroy identity ever.

Either view says teleportation is the same as ordinary survival.

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[LizR]

On 21 April 2015 at 14:15, Bruce Kellett <bhke...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:

Russell Standish wrote:

There is another way of looking at this. Assume a robust ontology, so
that the UD actually runs completely. Then the closest continuation
theory coupled with computationalism predicts the absence of any
discontinuities of experience, such as what I experience evry night
going to sleep. That is because in UD*, there will be always be a
closer continuation to one you're currently experiencing (for
essentially the same reason that there is always another real number
lying between any two real numbers you care to pick.

That seems to be saying that there is always a continuer who never sleeps.

Don't dreams count?

[Bruno Marchal]

On 21 Apr 2015, at 00:43, Bruce Kellett wrote:

> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> On 20 Apr 2015, at 09:40, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>>> Dennis Ochei wrote:
>>>> One must revise the everyday concept of personal identity because
>>>> it isn't even coherent. It's like youre getting mad at him for
>>>> explaining combustion without reference to phlogiston. He can't
>>>> use the everyday notion because it is a convenient fiction.
>>>
>>> I don't think phlogiston is an everyday concept. The closest
>>> continuer concept of personal identity is far from an
>>> unsophisticated everyday notion, or a convenient fiction. If you
>>> want to revise it to some alternative definition of personal
>>> identity that is better suited to your purposes, then you have to
>>> do the necessary analytical work.
>> Are you saying that you believe that computationalism is false (in
>> which case you can believe in some closer continuer theory), or are
>> you saying that step 4 is not valid?
>
> I am suggesting that computationalism is effectively false,

OK. But that is out of the topic.

> in part because of an inadequate account of personal identity.

Computationalism by definition makes simple teleportation, and
duplication, supporting the subjective feeling of personal identity.
So we don't need any account of personal identity, except the
acceptance of a an artificial brain, seen as a clinical operation like
another one. If not you should not even take an aspirin, as you would
need some adequate account of personal identity to be guarantied that
you will survive when you take that aspirin, or when you just drink
water, or even when you do nothing.

The situation would be different for someone claiming having the right
Turing program for the functioning of the brain, but comp just assumes
such program exists. Indeed, in the mathematical part, it is proven
than no machine can know for sure what is its own program, and that is
why the "it exists" in the definition is non constructive, even
necessarily non constructive (as Emil Post already saw) and the act of
saying "yes" ask for some an act of faith.

> You substitute part or all of the brain at some level with a Turing
> machine, but do not take appropriate notice of the body bearing the
> brain.

If the body is needed it is part of the 'generalized brain'. Even if
that is the entire universe (observable or not), the reasoning still
go through. This should be clear if you have grasped the argument up
to step 7.

> If we are not to notice the substitution, we must still have a body
> that interacts with the world in exactly the same way as the
> original. Under the teleportation scenarios, some new body must be
> created or provided. I think that in general the person might notice
> this.

You need a perceptual body, as in step 6. With computationalism you
cannot notice the difference introspectively, and that is all what
counts in the reasoning.

>
> If you woke up in the morning and looked in the mirror and saw
> Sophia Loren looking back at you, or saw your next door neighbour in
> the mirror, you might doubt your own identity. Memories are not
> everything because memories can be lost, or be mistaken.

Not in the protocol used in the reasoning. You distract yourself with
ideas which are perhaps interesting for some debate, but are not
relevant to understand that computationalism makes physics into a
branch of arithmetic.

>
> In total virtual reality scenarios, of course, this could be
> managed, but then you have the problem of the identity of
> indiscernibles. Creating copies that are identical to this level --
> identical memories, bodies, environments, and so on -- does not
> duplicate the person -- the copies, being identical in all respects,
> are one person.

That is correct.

Of course in step 6, the copies diverge because they are simulated in
simulation of Moscow and Washington. Like in step 7 they will diverge
on all ... diverging histories.

>
> I am saying that a case could be made that all the destructive
> teleportation scenarios create new persons -- the cut actually
> terminates the original person.

Then you can't accept a digital brain proposed by the doctor, and comp
is false (which is out of topic).

> In step 3 you have a tie for closest continuer so there is no
> continuing person -- the original is cut. If the original is not cut
> (as in step 5), then that is the continuing person, and the
> duplicate is a new person. Time delays as in steps 2 and 4 do not
> make a lot of difference, they just enhance the need for the
> recognition of new persons.

if comp is false, the reasoning just don't apply.

>
> In sum, your argument over these early steps is not an argument in
> logic,

?

An argument is valid, or is not valid.

> but an argument of rhetoric. Because the tight definitions you need
> for logical argument either are not provided, or when provided, do
> not refer to anything in the real world, at best you are trying to
> persuade rhetorically -- there is no logical compulsion.

Argument?

> What you are talking about has more to do with psychology and/or
> physics than mathematics,

I call that theology, and this can be justified using Plato's notion
of theology, as the lexicon Plotinus/arithmetic illustrates. The name
of the field is another topic.

Also, you are unclear. you argue that comp is false, but reason like
it makes sense, and that the reasoning is non valid, without saying
where is the error. It is hard to figure out what you mean.

> so definitions can never be completely precise

That never happens, even in arithmetic. That is why logic is used: to
reason in a valid way with incomplete and imprecise notions. You seem
to believe that something is non valid, but failed to say what. Adding
precisions when it is not needed only obscure your point.

> -- concepts in the real world are always corrigible, so tightly
> constrained logical arguments are not available as they are in
> mathematics.

Not if you use an hypothesis, like computationalism, which makes
possible to reason clearly, and eventually to get testable conclusion.
This is made mathematically possible thanks to Church's thesis (also
used in step 7, though).

If you have trouble with thought experiences, you might directly study
the mathematical theory, but you need to study some textbook in
mathematical logic and theoretical computer science. Personal 3p-self
is defined with the second recursion theorem of Kleene, and the first
person self is defined from the old idea by Theaetetus in Plato,
applied to the 3p-self.

Of course, if you have an alternate non-computationalist theory of
mind, you are free to expose it. But you cannot use it in a so direct
way to invalidate a reasoning made in a different theory. That simply
does not work.

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Bruno Marchal]

On 16 Apr 2015, at 19:48, John Clark wrote:

On Wed, Apr 15, 2015 at 10:23 PM, Bruce Kellett <bhke...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:

> We are entering the realm of the Humpty-Dumpty dictionary -- words no longer have their ordinary, everyday meaning.

Yes. According to Bruno the words "atheist" and "Christian" mean almost the same thing with atheism being just a very minor variation of Christianity.

They have the same notion of the creator, and the same notion of creation. And they have the same belief in creation.

And the word "God" means a unintelligent non-conscious amorphous impersonal blob

You attribute me things that I have never said.

that doesn't answer prayers and in fact doesn't do much of anything at all, nevertheless according to Bruno "God" exists and is very important for reasons never made clear.

I use God in the sense of Parmenides, Plato (who introduced the term "theology"), Plotinus, Proclus and many others, even the wiki. Only fundamentalist aristotelians have a problem with Plato's notion of God.

See the previous posts on this, by me and Jason Resch, and answer them instead, of making distracting rhetorics and false insinuations.

You would have mocked the greek sciences just by saying that they are ridiculous because they use the word "number" (= numerous) for one and two.

The advantage of defining God by the true reason of your consciousness here and now, is that it helps to see that physics is not a theology, and that a theory of truth is not a theology, but that physicalism is a theology, and that the theory God = (Arithmetical) Truth is a theology. 

It helps also to remind us that what most call God today has been imposed through violence, exil, torture, etc.

For the greeks, theology is the theory of everything, which seeks to justify and unify all branches of knowledge. 

Is God a blob or an intelligent person? Open problem with computationalism. Open problem too with Plotinus, actually.

Bruno

And "free will" means... well it means noise shaped air as near as I can tell. 

  John K Clark

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[John Clark]

On Tue, Apr 21, 2015  Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

On Wed, Apr 15, 2015  Bruce Kellett <bhke...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:

 

>>>  We are entering the realm of the Humpty-Dumpty dictionary -- words no longer have their ordinary, everyday meaning.

 

>> Yes. According to Bruno the words "atheist" and "Christian" mean almost the same thing with atheism being just a very minor variation of Christianity.

> They have the same notion of the creator, and the same notion of creation. And they have the same belief in creation.

Yep Bruce was correct, we are entering the realm of the Humpty-Dumpty dictionary.

 > Only fundamentalist aristotelians have a problem with Plato's notion of God

And according to your Humpty-Dumpty dictionary a fundamentalist aristotelian is somebody who thinks that Aristotle was by far the WORST physicist who ever lived and even in the field of philosophy was vastly overrated, just like all Greek philosophers

>> And the word "God" means a unintelligent non-conscious amorphous impersonal blob

> You attribute me things that I have never said.

OK you can clear this up right now right here by answering just one question: By the English word "God" do you mean a intelligent conscious being who created the universe and knows everything including what our prayers are or do you not? I think this question is very clear and does not require a paragraph of bafflegab to answer, a simple yes or no will do.  

  

> Is God a blob or an intelligent person? Open problem with computationalism.

No this has nothing to do with computationalism or mathematics or logic or science or even theology, this has to do with the meaning of a English word and nothing more. I already know what most people on this planet mean by the word "God" but I don't know what you mean, so all I need you to do is look up the word "God" in your Humpty-Dumpty dictionary and tell me what it says; I'd do it myself but I seem to have misplaced my copy.

 John K Clark

 

[LizR]

In order to participate in a forum like this you need to accept that certain shorthands are commonly used. For example "Aristotelian" just means anyone who assumes primary materialism, not someone who thinks everything Aristotle said was true - similarly a "Platonist" is someone who thinks the world is derived from underlying forms, nowadays considered mathematical. Bruno shouldn't need to have to constantly explain what he means by these terms..

[John Clark]

On Tue, Apr 21, 2015 , LizR <liz...@gmail.com> wrote:

> In order to participate in a forum like this you need to accept that certain shorthands are commonly used.

None of Bruno's shorthands or acronyms are commonly used, they are used on this list and nowhere else. And even here they are not used with any rational consistency. And then Bruno uses common words in very uncommon ways; I still don't know what the word "God" means in Brunospeak. And don't get me started on personal pronouns!

> For example "Aristotelian" just means anyone who assumes primary materialism

OK so now I know that in Bruno's Humpty-Dumpty dictionary a materialist is someone who doesn't even pretend to know if mathematics begat physics or physics begat mathematics. 

 

> Bruno shouldn't need to have to constantly explain what he means by these terms.

No, he needs to do exactly that. Bruno insists on using the Humpty-Dumpty dictionary and he has the only copy, so he needs to constantly explain what the hell he means; either that or throw away the Humpty-Dumpty dictionary. 

  John K Clark

[Dennis Ochei]

I'm not gonna lie, i find this exchange rather entertaining. I dont know what side I'd pick, but I will say I've never been 100% clear on what Bruno meant by Aristotelian or Platonist before now. What does Bruno do with personal pronouns? I have to agree that at least some of Bruno's written correspondence is hard to follow, but esotericism is par for the course in philosophy anyway...

God always means something just shy of disproven and always fills the gaps of understanding

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[LizR]

On 22 April 2015 at 08:43, John Clark <johnk...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Tue, Apr 21, 2015 , LizR <liz...@gmail.com> wrote:

> In order to participate in a forum like this you need to accept that certain shorthands are commonly used.

None of Bruno's shorthands or acronyms are commonly used, they are used on this list and nowhere else.

That's what I meant. Most specialised discussions have their own shorthand. (Bruno's shorthand is also used on FOR and similar forums, as well as in papers on the subject of comp).

 

And even here they are not used with any rational consistency.

I disagree, at least concerning the ones I mentioned. And I have no problem with personal pronouns - this seems to me to be a side issue. That is to say, the issue of pronouns WOULD cut to the heart of the argument, except that Bruno has already tackled the matter of personal identity in the "yes doctor" assumption (and yes, "yes doctor" is indeed convenient shorthand for a specific well defined concept that is only used on this list and a few other places).

I'm not so sure about "God" but I'm willing to let that one slide, at least for a while, in the hope that all will become clear eventually - as it has with the other concepts.

 

> For example "Aristotelian" just means anyone who assumes primary materialism

OK so now I know that in Bruno's Humpty-Dumpty dictionary a materialist is someone who doesn't even pretend to know if mathematics begat physics or physics begat mathematics. 

That isn't quite correct. A primary materialist is someone who considers physics (and specifically materialism) to be, at least in principle, at the bottom end of any chain of explanation. (As a result, they have the task of either filling the explanatory gap introduced by Eugene Wigner's "Unreasonable effectiveness" paper, or explaining why there is no gap. This can only be done, from a Primary Materialist perspective, by considering maths secondary to physics. So they do "pretend to know" - and almost certainly consider that they do, in fact, know).

 

> Bruno shouldn't need to have to constantly explain what he means by these terms.

No, he needs to do exactly that. Bruno insists on using the Humpty-Dumpty dictionary and he has the only copy, so he needs to constantly explain what the hell he means; either that or throw away the Humpty-Dumpty dictionary. 

Maybe he will, if you throw away your Playground Bully's Insult Dictionary.

[Dennis Ochei]

FOR?

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[LizR]

Sorry. More specialised jargon! That's the Fabric of Reality discussion list. In fact I think it's now the Fabric of Alternative Reality...!

https://groups.google.com/forum/#!forum/foar

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[Dennis Ochei]

What are the other forums that people on everything list go to? How deep does the rabbit hole go?

[LizR]

I don't mind, as long as there's a nice soft pile of leaves at the bottom.

[Dennis Ochei]

Lol, don't make me write a webcrawler that looks for LizR

[LizR]

On 22 April 2015 at 14:35, Dennis Ochei <do.inf...@gmail.com> wrote:

Lol, don't make me write a webcrawler that looks for LizR

I wouldn't dream of making you do anything (although my ninja assassins remain on standby at all times....but, no pressure)

But if you do, you may get some surprising results.

[John Clark]

On Tue, Apr 21, 2015 Dennis Ochei <do.inf...@gmail.com> wrote:

> What are the other forums that people on everything list go to? How deep does the rabbit hole go?

I've been posting to the Extropian List since the mid 1990s, at one time it was more active than this list, it's not as active as it once was but it's still my favorite because it still has a high signal to noise ratio. Over the years I've learned a lot there from some very smart people. 

http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat 

  John K Clark

 

[Dennis Ochei]

Awesome! Thanks!

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[Bruce Kellett]

Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 21 Apr 2015, at 00:43, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>
>> What you are talking about has more to do with psychology and/or
>> physics than mathematics,
>
> I call that theology, and this can be justified using Plato's notion of
> theology, as the lexicon Plotinus/arithmetic illustrates. The name of
> the field is another topic.
>
> Also, you are unclear. you argue that comp is false, but reason like it
> makes sense, and that the reasoning is non valid, without saying where
> is the error. It is hard to figure out what you mean.

I think we are coming from entirely different starting points. From my
(physicist's) point of view, what you are doing is proposing a model and
reasoning about what happens in that model. Because it is your model,
you are free to choose the starting point and the ancillary assumptions
as you wish. All that matters for the model is that the logic of the
development of the model is correct.

What is happening in our exchanges is that I am examining what goes into
your model and seeing whether it makes sense in the light of other
knowledge. The actual logic of the development of your model is then of
secondary importance. If your assumptions are unrealistic or too
restrictive, then no matter how good your logic, the end result will not
be of any great value. These wider issues cannot be simply dismissed as
"off topic".

In summary, my objections start with step 0, the "yes doctor" argument.
I do not think that it is physically possible to examine a living brain
in sufficient detail to reproduce its conscious life in a Turing machine
without actually destroying the brain before the process is complete. I
would say "No" to the doctor. So even though I believe that AI is
possible, in other words, that a computer-based intelligence that can
function in all relevant respects like a normal human being is in
principle possible, I do not believe that I can be replaced by such an
AI. The necessary starting data are unobtainable in principle.

Consequently, I think the reasoning in the first steps of your model
could only apply to mature AIs, not to humans. The internal logic of the
model is then not an issue -- but the relevance to human experience is.

Bruce

[Dennis Ochei]

Certainly we could scan a nematode, don't you think? 302 neurons. Nematodes should say yes doctor. If I had a brain tumor, rescinsion of which would involve damaging the 1000 neurons and there was a brain prothesis that would simulate a their function I should say yes doctor. Since modelling 1000 neurons at sufficient detail is possible, I leave it as an excercise for the reader to demonstrate that simulating a whole brain is possible.

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[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Wednesday, April 22, 2015, Bruce Kellett <bhke...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:

I don't see why you think it is impossible to scan a brain sufficiently to reproduce it. For example, you could fix a the brain, slice it up with a microtome and with microscopy establish all the synaptic connections. That is the crudest proposal for so-called mind uploading, but it may be necessary to go further to the molecular level and determine the types and numbers of membrane proteins in each neuron. The next step would be the at the level of small molecules and atoms, such as neurotransmitters and ions, but this may be able to be deduced from information about the type of neuron and macromolecules. It seems unlikely that you would need to determine things like ionic concentrations at a given moment, since ionic gradients collapse all the time and the person survives. In any case, with the "yes doctor" test you would not be the first volunteer. It is assumed that it will be well established, through a series of engineering refinements, that with the brain replacement the copies seem to behave normally and claim that they feel normal. The leap of faith (which, as I've said previously, I don't think is such a leap) is that not only will the copies say they feel the same, they will in fact feel the same.

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Stathis Papaioannou

[Bruno Marchal]

On 22 Apr 2015, at 09:05, Bruce Kellett wrote:

> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> On 21 Apr 2015, at 00:43, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>>> What you are talking about has more to do with psychology and/or
>>> physics than mathematics,
>> I call that theology, and this can be justified using Plato's
>> notion of theology, as the lexicon Plotinus/arithmetic illustrates.
>> The name of the field is another topic.
>> Also, you are unclear. you argue that comp is false, but reason
>> like it makes sense, and that the reasoning is non valid, without
>> saying where is the error. It is hard to figure out what you mean.
>
> I think we are coming from entirely different starting points. From my
> (physicist's) point of view, what you are doing is proposing a model
> and
> reasoning about what happens in that model. Because it is your model,
> you are free to choose the starting point and the ancillary
> assumptions
> as you wish. All that matters for the model is that the logic of the
> development of the model is correct.

OK. What you call "model" is what logician call "theory". Logician use
"model" for a mathematical object playing basically the role of a
"reality" satisfying the axioms and theorems of the theory. (let us
keep in mind this to avoid deaf dialog).

Hmm, step seven shows that the practilcaness of the duplication is not
relevant. I come back on this below.

Another point, given that you seem to accept the weaker thesis of
strong AI (machine can be conscious), then the UDA works for them,
they can understand it, and get the same conclusion. So such machine
would prove correctly that either physics is a branch of arithmetic,
or they are not machine. But we know that such AI are machine (in the
comp sense), so that would be an even better proof than UDA, and
indeed it is actually a good sketch of the mathematical translation of
UDA in arithmetic.

But we don't need to go in UDA. You are right that the first steps of
the UDA might not be realist, (although I doubt that too: see Ochei's
post), but normally you should understand that at step seven, that
absence of realism is no more a trouble, as the UD generates all
computations, even the simulation of the whole Milky at the level of
strings and branes.

The only thing which might perhaps prevent the reasoning to go through
is if matter plays some non Turing emulable role for the presence of
consciousness. But then we are no more postulating computationalism.

A rather long time ago, I thought that "UDA" and alike could be used
to show that computationalism lead to a contradiction. But I got only
"weirdness", and to test comp we need to compare the the comp
weirdness and the empirical weirdness. And that is the point. I am not
a defender of comp, or of any idea. I am a logician saying that IF we
have such belief, and if we are rational enough, then we have to
accept this or that consequence.

And, to be sure, I do find comp elegant, as it leads to a simple
theory of arithmetic: elementary arithmetic.

I will try, (cf my promise to the Platonist Guitar Boy (PGC)) to make
a summary of the math part (AUDA,, the machine interview), you might
better appreciate, as it shows how complex the extraction of physics
is, but how incompleteness leads already rather quickly to MWI and
some quantum logic that we can compare to the empirical quantum logic.
In fact we can already "implement" in the comp extracted physics some
quantum gates, but may be some other could not, and once realized in
nature that might lead to a refutation of comp or the classical theory
of knowledge (or we are in a perverse simulation, to be complete). The
main things is that the approach explains also 99,9% (say) of
consciousness, and even of the neoplatonist theology.

But are you able to doubt weak materialism? Once you understand that
the arithmetical reality (the model, (n the logician sense, (N, +, *))
does emulate (in the computer science sense) all computations, you
don't need UDA to just doubt the existence of a primitively
ontological physical reality.

Bruno








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[Bruno Marchal]

On 22 Apr 2015, at 09:26, Dennis Ochei wrote:

Certainly we could scan a nematode, don't you think? 302 neurons. Nematodes should say yes doctor. If I had a brain tumor, rescinsion of which would involve damaging the 1000 neurons and there was a brain prothesis that would simulate a their function I should say yes doctor. Since modelling 1000 neurons at sufficient detail is possible, I leave it as an excercise for the reader to demonstrate that simulating a whole brain is possible.

I don't think that this is relevant to grasp the consequence of computationalism, but I agree with you: emulating the brain might be technologically possible. But it is also quite complex, and the pioneers of digital, but physical, brain will probably feel quite "stoned".  In particular, we get more and more evidences that the glial cells plays important regulating roles in the brain, and even that they transmit information. They have no axons, but they communicate between themselves trough waves of chemical reactions, passing from membranes to membranes, and seems to be able to activate or inhibit the action of some neurons. So I would say yes to a doctor who emulates the neuron and the glial cells at the level of the concentration of the metabolites in the cells. That is not for tomorrow, but perhaps for after tomorrow.

Then with comp, we survive anyway in the arithmetical reality, but here, the problem is that there is still an inflation of possibilities, going from backtracking in our life, to becoming a sort of god. Only the progress in mathematical theology can give more clues. Plato's proof of the immortality of the soul remains intact in the arithmetical theology, but in that case, the soul can become amnesic, and the survival can have a strong "salvia divinorum experience" look. (You can see the report of such experiences on Erowid).The little ego might not survive, in that case, but before vanishing, you can realize internally that you are not the little ego. That form of personal identity might be an illusion, which can be consciously stopped. Note that some dream can lead to similar experience. It impose you a form of selfish altruism, as you realize that the suffering of the others are yours, in some concrete sense.

Bruno

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[Bruno Marchal]

On 21 Apr 2015, at 19:39, John Clark wrote:

On Tue, Apr 21, 2015  Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

On Wed, Apr 15, 2015  Bruce Kellett <bhke...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:

 

>>>  We are entering the realm of the Humpty-Dumpty dictionary -- words no longer have their ordinary, everyday meaning.

 

>> Yes. According to Bruno the words "atheist" and "Christian" mean almost the same thing with atheism being just a very minor variation of Christianity.

> They have the same notion of the creator, and the same notion of creation. And they have the same belief in creation.

Yep Bruce was correct, we are entering the realm of the Humpty-Dumpty dictionary.

 > Only fundamentalist aristotelians have a problem with Plato's notion of God

And according to your Humpty-Dumpty dictionary a fundamentalist aristotelian is somebody who thinks that Aristotle was by far the WORST physicist who ever lived and even in the field of philosophy was vastly overrated, just like all Greek philosophers

So why do you defend implicitly all the time his theology, and seems to deny or even not being aware of the theology of the Platonist.

Jason Resh shows you that my definition of God is the same as the Chinese, Indian, Greeks, and it is even in the wiki. It is widespread, and it is used even by most jewish, christian, and even muslims (but they have regressed since some century on that). Only creationist and fundamentalist use the literal notion of God, as a person intelligent and with a will, having done literally the world.

Please buy the book by Proclus: element of theology. It sums well the whole Plato theology, with the "correction" mae by Plotinus and other neo-platonist. Or read my paper on Plotinus, to see the lexicon "Plato-Arithmetic", foreviewed by Plotinus in his chapter "on Numbers".

>> And the word "God" means a unintelligent non-conscious amorphous impersonal blob

> You attribute me things that I have never said.

OK you can clear this up right now right here by answering just one question: By the English word "God" do you mean a intelligent conscious being who created the universe and knows everything including what our prayers are or do you not?

I don't mean that. I mean the original greek-indian notion (accepted by many jewishes, muslims, and more marginally by many christians). Some masons accepted it too, with the label "grand architect, although they add more from the timaeus, and less from the Parmenides.

Only people calling hemselves atheists seems to forget that the christian God theory might be a bit naive for that notion.

I think this question is very clear and does not require a paragraph of bafflegab to answer, a simple yes or no will do.  

So it is NO. But of course, the math might show that this is less false than what we might think. We just don't know, Mathematical theology is in its infancy.

  

> Is God a blob or an intelligent person? Open problem with computationalism.

No this has nothing to do with computationalism or mathematics or logic or science or even theology, this has to do with the meaning of a English word and nothing more.

In science, it is never a question of vocabulary, but on agreeing with definition. Only integrists hides conceptual problems into vocabulary quarrel. 

I already know what most people on this planet mean by the word "God"

No, you don't. Reread jason detailed post of last year please. 

but I don't know what you mean,

Then it means that you have not read the posts, as I gave the very simple definition more that fifty times. See Jason resh post, which was excellent on that definition.

so all I need you to do is look up the word "God" in your Humpty-Dumpty dictionary and tell me what it says; I'd do it myself but I seem to have misplaced my copy.

You suffer from opportunistic lack of memory, all of the time. Why should I answer, given that I have already answered more than fifty times. Just look in the wiki, the last time I look, it contained my definition. Google on "God", or on "plato God" or "Proclus God", or "Plotinus One", etc. 

Bruno

 John K Clark

 

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[Alberto G. Corona]

Bruno,

I´m convinced that you are a larouchist:

http://laroucheplanet.info/pmwiki/pmwiki.php?n=Cult.PlatoAristotle

I agree in that there are two sides depending on if they value the mind or the matter as the primary thing. I also line up with the mind side, but Aristotle has little to do in this battle. Really the battle was initiated in the XII century with the nominalists.

Larouche says that nominalism is a extreme Aristotelism. It is not. It is the negation of platonism and aristotelism both of them. And I agree that it is the methaphisics behind the modern science and the modern world in general.

--

Alberto.

[Bruno Marchal]

Hi Alberto,

On 22 Apr 2015, at 11:36, Alberto G. Corona wrote:

Bruno,

I´m convinced that you are a larouchist:

http://laroucheplanet.info/pmwiki/pmwiki.php?n=Cult.PlatoAristotle

I agree in that there are two sides depending on if they value the mind or the matter as the primary thing. I also line up with the mind side, but Aristotle has little to do in this battle. Really the battle was initiated in the XII century with the nominalists.

It is not so important, but I think the battle was already present in Athene academy. Your link seems to agree. It was renewed with the nominalist in the XII century, or the eleventh I think.

That opposition is present in both Chinese and Indian schools. It is an important opposition.

To be clear, I am more on a neutral side, à-la-Spinoza, somehow. I am OK that mind is more fundamental than matter, but mind is not yet fundamental, as it relies on the numbers, a position which is not so far from the neoplatonists, and of course Pythagorus, who influenced a lot Plato.

Larouche says that nominalism is a extreme Aristotelism. It is not.

Hmm... I might side with Larouche, if you take "aristotelian" in the sense of the followers of Aristotle. Aristotle himself is still quite Platonists, but the bad tongues said that this was only to not make Plato (his master) too much angry.

It is the negation of platonism and aristotelism both of them. And I agree that it is the methaphisics behind the modern science and the modern world in general.

OK.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[John Clark]

On Wed, Apr 22, 2015  Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

 >>>  Only fundamentalist aristotelians have a problem with Plato's notion of God

 

>> And according to your Humpty-Dumpty dictionary a fundamentalist aristotelian is somebody who thinks that Aristotle was by far the WORST physicist who ever lived and even in the field of philosophy was vastly overrated, just like all Greek philosophers

> So why do you defend implicitly all the time his theology, and seems to deny or even not being aware of the theology of the Platonist.

I'm not denying anything and I'm not talking about science or philosophy or theology, I just want to know the meaning of a particular word in your strange non-standard vocabulary. It would be silly of me to argue over definitions so I'll accept any meaning of the word "God" you give me as long as it's clear and you use it consistently. 

> Please buy the book by Proclus: element of theology.

Buy a book written by somebody almost as ignorant of modern science as a Republican presidential candidate? I don't think so.  

>> OK you can clear this up right now right here by answering just one question: By the English word "God" do you mean a intelligent conscious being who created the universe and knows everything including what our prayers are or do you not?

> So it is NO.

Thank you, that was clear. So when I previously said that for you "the word "God" means a unintelligent non-conscious amorphous impersonal blob" and you responded with "You attribute me things that I have never said" you now admit that your response was incorrect and for you the word "God" really does mean a unintelligent non-conscious amorphous impersonal blob. 

> In science, it is never a question of vocabulary

I agree, but in philosophic and theologic debates it usually is just a question of vocabulary. Definitions of words are arbitrary but both parties in a debate must agree on those meanings or they literally don't know what they're arguing about.  A debate on if "God" exists would be pretty silly if nobody can agree on what the word means, but on this day you've cleared that up so I can now unequivocally and boldly shout to the world "I BELIEVE GOD EXISTS"  because I believe that unintelligent non-conscious amorphous impersonal blobs that didn't create the universe exist.

  John K Clark

 

 

[Bruno Marchal]

On 22 Apr 2015, at 18:30, John Clark wrote:

On Wed, Apr 22, 2015  Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

 >>>  Only fundamentalist aristotelians have a problem with Plato's notion of God

 

>> And according to your Humpty-Dumpty dictionary a fundamentalist aristotelian is somebody who thinks that Aristotle was by far the WORST physicist who ever lived and even in the field of philosophy was vastly overrated, just like all Greek philosophers

> So why do you defend implicitly all the time his theology, and seems to deny or even not being aware of the theology of the Platonist.

I'm not denying anything and I'm not talking about science or philosophy or theology, I just want to know the meaning of a particular word in your strange non-standard vocabulary. It would be silly of me to argue over definitions so I'll accept any meaning of the word "God" you give me as long as it's clear and you use it consistently. 

God is by definition the ultimate reality or the ultimate truth which explains why you are here and now, and conscious,.

> Please buy the book by Proclus: element of theology.

Buy a book written by somebody almost as ignorant of modern science as a Republican presidential candidate? I don't think so.  

Modern science hides theology under the rug.

The debate God or Not God hides the real question asked by the platonists: (primitive) Universe or not (primitive) Universe?

Is the physical reality the ontological reality, or is the physical reality the shadow of the fundamental reality?

>> OK you can clear this up right now right here by answering just one question: By the English word "God" do you mean a intelligent conscious being who created the universe and knows everything including what our prayers are or do you not?

> So it is NO.

Thank you, that was clear. So when I previously said that for you "the word "God" means a unintelligent non-conscious amorphous impersonal blob" and you responded with "You attribute me things that I have never said" you now admit that your response was incorrect and for you the word "God" really does mean a unintelligent non-conscious amorphous impersonal blob. 

You confuse ~[]A with [] ~A.

I do not believe that god is an unintelligent blob, nor do I believe it is not an unintelligent blob. 

As I said it is an open problem with computationalism. We just don't know yet if the reason of your existence is an intelligent blob or not. 

With computationalism, God is approximated by the concept of arithmetical truth, and it is an open problem for us if that arithmetical truth/reality can be see as a knower itself. There are very subtle difficulties on that point, and the neoplatonist where aware of them.

> In science, it is never a question of vocabulary

I agree, but in philosophic and theologic debates it usually is just a question of vocabulary.

That is why I do science, and not debate, which are infinite, in that domain. You should read my paper on Plotinus, which gives a lexicon of the machine's theology, or phenomenological theology, and its translation in arithmetic, and why that is possible and necessary. 

Even for neoplatonist, god is not part of the being, but is a simple first principle at the origin of the beings or the appearance of beings.

Definitions of words are arbitrary but both parties in a debate must agree on those meanings or they literally don't know what they're arguing about. 

You talk like if some person have problem with all this. Only fundamentalist believers have problems here, not scientists (as far as I know).

A debate on if "God" exists would be pretty silly if nobody can agree on what the word means, but on this day you've cleared that up so I can now unequivocally and boldly shout to the world "I BELIEVE GOD EXISTS"  because I believe that unintelligent non-conscious amorphous impersonal blobs that didn't create the universe exist.

See above. I never said that I believe that God is such a blob.

Bruno

  John K Clark

 

 

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[meekerdb]

On 4/22/2015 12:26 AM, Dennis Ochei wrote:

Certainly we could scan a nematode, don't you think? 302 neurons. Nematodes should say yes doctor. If I had a brain tumor, rescinsion of which would involve damaging the 1000 neurons and there was a brain prothesis that would simulate a their function I should say yes doctor. Since modelling 1000 neurons at sufficient detail is possible, I leave it as an excercise for the reader to demonstrate that simulating a whole brain is possible.

The complete neural structure of planaria has been mapped.  But that doesn't capture the "consciounsness" of the individual planaria.  You can't tell from the wiring diagram whether a particular planaria has learned to take the illuminated fork in the test maze.  So you might determine the generic brain structure of homo sapiens, but you would not thereby capture the consciousness of some particular person.  For that, presumably you would need to know the relative strength of all the synapses at a particular moment.

Brent

[Dennis Ochei]

Yes, I know it hasn't been done, but i think most people would agree that c elegans could be scanned or that a small neuroprothesis is possible, which is enough of a foothold to say uploading thought experiments are relevant to human experience.

Of course none of this is deeply relevant to comp.

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[John Mikes]

Dennis: 

"God always means something just shy of disproven and always fills the gaps of understanding ..."

I don't need to "disprove" something that has not been "proven" - or at least described as possible. BTW: nothing can be 'proven' except for ignorance. 

To keep pace with the unfathomable Everything (not the restricted physical topic-content of this list) the flexibility of the human (ignorant) mind requires a 'creator', a 'sustainer' a "BOSS" like a king for a country. That is called 'GOD'. 

You may believe (in) it. Know you cannot. So there is no way to disprove. 

Sometimes 'God' fills the gaps of misunderstanding (ignorance) as well.

I don't believe that going back to more primitive times (less facts included into our worldview) even the smartest(?) minds could LEAD our ignorance to better wisdom. Aristotle's 'total' (in my pun: the "Aris - Total") was MORE than the sum of HIS counted ingredients, which included only the listable material parts. Then we have learned about functions, attributes, connections, variants, variations etc. and added lots of includable 'parts' to the total. 

Plato did not even pretend to visualize the 'world': he imagined a SHADOW of it on the wall as our percept of reality(?), situated BEHIND us (=invisibly). 

I esteem Bruno's ideas - am no mathematician - can rarely follow them, yet I never got a reply to my question about "what are the NUMBERS" from him. 

I consider 'computation' as (Lat) com (cum) - putare (thinking), mind's work, to add 2 and 2 together, definitely not restricted to the numberical terms. It may be also to add an animal, or plant to an environment. Real, or fake. 

Since the early 90s I participated on more than a dozen discussion lists, this one has exciting and lesser exciting posts and posters. 

Best regards

John Mikes

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[spudb...@aol.com]

I was booted off when Natasha did her purge and went to Kurzweilai. I was almost booted from there for outing Nancy More as the list moderator who did the booting back in the day. I usually was not a troller and if people zinged me, I ignored it because I was there for Tipler - affirmative, stuff, not arguments. Kind of like here, except now if I fear that people will ally themselves with the elites, who now lean into some sort of neocommunism, that I do bitch back. Of God, it is less important to me if He functions as promised, more, I am concerned is how we sapiens are doing? When we disintegrate, can we get put back together, faster, better, smarter? That kind of thing. But that is my neurosis.

 

 

[meekerdb]

On 4/22/2015 2:26 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 21 Apr 2015, at 19:39, John Clark wrote:

On Tue, Apr 21, 2015  Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

On Wed, Apr 15, 2015  Bruce Kellett <bhke...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:

 

>>>  We are entering the realm of the Humpty-Dumpty dictionary -- words no longer have their ordinary, everyday meaning.

 

>> Yes. According to Bruno the words "atheist" and "Christian" mean almost the same thing with atheism being just a very minor variation of Christianity.

> They have the same notion of the creator, and the same notion of creation. And they have the same belief in creation.

Yep Bruce was correct, we are entering the realm of the Humpty-Dumpty dictionary.

 > Only fundamentalist aristotelians have a problem with Plato's notion of God

And according to your Humpty-Dumpty dictionary a fundamentalist aristotelian is somebody who thinks that Aristotle was by far the WORST physicist who ever lived and even in the field of philosophy was vastly overrated, just like all Greek philosophers

So why do you defend implicitly all the time his theology, and seems to deny or even not being aware of the theology of the Platonist.

Jason Resh shows you that my definition of God is the same as the Chinese, Indian, Greeks,

Are you claiming that all Chinese, Indians, and Greeks agree on a canonical definition for "God"?  That would certainly be remarkable (especially as "god" is an English word).

and it is even in the wiki.

From: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/God

God is conceived as the Supreme Being and principal object of faith.[1] The concept of God as described by theologians commonly includes the attributes of omniscience (infinite knowledge), omnipotence (unlimited power), omnipresence (present everywhere), omnibenevolence (perfect goodness), divine simplicity, and eternal and necessary existence. In theism, God is the creator and sustainer of the universe, while in deism, God is the creator, but not the sustainer, of the universe. Monotheism is the belief in the existence of one God or in the oneness of God. In pantheism, God is the universe itself. In atheism, God is purported not to exist, while God is deemed unknown or unknowable within the context of agnosticism. God has also been conceived as being incorporeal (immaterial), a personal being, the source of all moral obligation, and the "greatest conceivable existent".[1]

It is widespread, and it is used even by most jewish, christian, and even muslims (but they have regressed since some century on that). Only creationist and fundamentalist use the literal notion of God, as a person intelligent and with a will, having done literally the world.

So the Pope is a fundamentalist and creationist?  I think your "literal notion of God" is a straw man.  All jews, christians, and muslims believe in a god who is a person (or three) and is extremely powerful, knowledgeable, and morally perfect.  Since they use the word to designate what they believe in who are you to tell them their word means something entirely different?

Brent

Please buy the book by Proclus: element of theology. It sums well the whole Plato theology, with the "correction" mae by Plotinus and other neo-platonist. Or read my paper on Plotinus, to see the lexicon "Plato-Arithmetic", foreviewed by Plotinus in his chapter "on Numbers".

>> And the word "God" means a unintelligent non-conscious amorphous impersonal blob

> You attribute me things that I have never said.

OK you can clear this up right now right here by answering just one question: By the English word "God" do you mean a intelligent conscious being who created the universe and knows everything including what our prayers are or do you not?

I don't mean that. I mean the original greek-indian notion (accepted by many jewishes, muslims, and more marginally by many christians). Some masons accepted it too, with the label "grand architect, although they add more from the timaeus, and less from the Parmenides.

Only people calling hemselves atheists seems to forget that the christian God theory might be a bit naive for that notion.

On the contrary, atheists remember that the theory is so naive that it's silly to believe it.

I think this question is very clear and does not require a paragraph of bafflegab to answer, a simple yes or no will do.  

So it is NO. But of course, the math might show that this is less false than what we might think. We just don't know, Mathematical theology is in its infancy.

Then it shouldn't presume to provide meaning to ancient terms that already have a common meaning.

  

> Is God a blob or an intelligent person? Open problem with computationalism.

No this has nothing to do with computationalism or mathematics or logic or science or even theology, this has to do with the meaning of a English word and nothing more.

In science, it is never a question of vocabulary, but on agreeing with definition. Only integrists hides conceptual problems into vocabulary quarrel.

Really?  Suppose I define "Bruno" to refer to John Clark and "John Clark" to refer to Bruno Marchal.  Should we just accept this as mere hypothetical vocabulary and proceed from there?

I already know what most people on this planet mean by the word "God"

No, you don't. Reread jason detailed post of last year please.

Who elected Jason to speak for most people on the planet?  Did he take a survey?

Brent

[Dennis Ochei]

I think you interpretted my words in a different way than I intended. My point was merely that theists use motte and bailey tactics, modifying their definition of God as soon as you start tightening the screws. If you cut off one head the theist will confabulate a new one for their religious belief. People say science cannot kill religion. But I say that science has killed religion countless times, and continues to do so. But religion rises again from its ashes, generally more benign than before.

Once we have dispelled illusions, the religion that emerges then will be beautiful. But until that time most instances of religion are things that reason and empiricism must put down to perfect.

[Alberto G. Corona]

Poor nominalists... 

Ever what you call "science" and "reason" has claimed prevalence over religion has been to produce massacres, since 1789 and even before. the religion of the ones that wave the flags of "science" and "reason", that is, thae ones that claim knowledge without conscience that what they have is some kind of faith based on a particular metaphysics. are the most dangerous ones.

These people like you are the ones that the world must fear

Alberto.

[LizR]

On 23 April 2015 at 08:06, John Mikes <jam...@gmail.com> wrote:

Dennis: 

"God always means something just shy of disproven and always fills the gaps of understanding ..."

I don't need to "disprove" something that has not been "proven" - or at least described as possible. BTW: nothing can be 'proven' except for ignorance. 

Yes, this makes God a Russell's teapot, and the burden of proof is with the theists (well, except if "God" is intended in Bruno's sense - as whatever is the fundamental cause of existence - but that's another matter, or possibly another equation). Mind you some things can be proven, at least beyond reasonable doubt. For example the falisty of a load of previously accepted scientific theories - aether and phlogiston, humours and alchemy.... raindrops on roses and whiskers on kittens....

[LizR]

On 23 April 2015 at 08:19, spudboy100 via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:

I was booted off when Natasha did her purge and went to Kurzweilai. I was almost booted from there for outing Nancy More as the list moderator who did the booting back in the day. I usually was not a troller and if people zinged me, I ignored it because I was there for Tipler - affirmative, stuff, not arguments. Kind of like here, except now if I fear that people will ally themselves with the elites, who now lean into some sort of neocommunism, that I do bitch back.

I hope not! I mean about there being any of that so-called moderation that destroys forums (and stops them being "forums" too, of course, in the proper meaning of the word) - not about you bitching. Long may you bitch! (And me too, of course).

[LizR]

On 23 April 2015 at 08:50, Dennis Ochei <do.inf...@gmail.com> wrote:

I think you interpretted my words in a different way than I intended. My point was merely that theists use motte and bailey tactics, modifying their definition of God as soon as you start tightening the screws. If you cut off one head the theist will confabulate a new one for their religious belief. People say science cannot kill religion. But I say that science has killed religion countless times, and continues to do so. But religion rises again from its ashes, generally more benign than before.

It's an almost exact parallel with how viruses that once killed their hosts gradually become less dangerous :-)

(Richard Dawkins would agree that religion is a mind-virus, especially since he invented the word meme.)

Once we have dispelled illusions, the religion that emerges then will be beautiful. But until that time most instances of religion are things that reason and empiricism must put down to perfect.

Nice thought! 

[Stathis Papaioannou]

Yes, and you could possibly do that using a technique resolving detail down to the size of macromolecules.

--
Stathis Papaioannou

[Dennis Ochei]

Yes, ignorance and fanaticism under any banner, including that of science and reason, will leave a trail of bodies in their wake. But unless you have an alternative to using reason and science to understand the world around and within us (divine revelation?) i don't see your point.

Religion gives people bad reasons to be good, when good reasons abound.

Also, im not a nominalist.

> These people like you are the ones that the world must fear

Yes! Tremble! Mwhahahahaha!

haha, there is nothing fear from me. My hands are tied, since I know harming others is equivalent to harming myself

On Wednesday, April 22, 2015, Alberto G. Corona <agoc...@gmail.com> wrote:

Poor nominalists... 

Ever what you call "science" and "reason" has claimed prevalence over religion has been to produce massacres, since 1789 and even before. the religion of the ones that wave the flags of "science" and "reason", that is, thae ones that claim knowledge without conscience that what they have is some kind of faith based on a particular metaphysics. are the most dangerous ones.

These people like you are the ones that the world must fear

2015-04-22 22:50 GMT+02:00 Dennis Ochei <do.inf...@gmail.com>:

I think you interpretted my words in a different way than I intended. My point was merely that theists use motte and bailey tactics, modifying their definition of God as soon as you start tightening the screws. If you cut off one head the theist will confabulate a new one for their religious belief. People say science cannot kill religion. But I say that science has killed religion countless times, and continues to do so. But religion rises again from its ashes, generally more benign than before.

Once we have dispelled illusions, the religion that emerges then will be beautiful. But until that time most instances of religion are things that reason and empiricism must put down to perfect.

--

Alberto.

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[meekerdb]

But not without destroying the brain and producing a gap in consciousness (assuming you could produce a working replica).  I don't see that a gap is particularly significant; a concussion also causes a gap.

Brent

[spudb...@aol.com]

I have noted this before regarding Lord Russell's Teapot orbiting Jupiter. For the last 40 years or so we have had the science to orbit a teapot, as well as two probes around Jupiter--this should tell us something! We could insert a teapot in orbit nowadays, making word, flesh, and secondly, we need to view religion, cosmology, through a computationalist/digitalist' eyes. Because old man universe is appearing more as a great program than a great stopwatch, at its core. So sayeth, Tegmark, Lloydd, and Schmidhuber, amen! It also indicates that H. sapiens are a part of this all. 

Sent from AOL Mobile Mail

[John Clark]

On Wed, Apr 22, 2015  Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

>>  I just want to know the meaning of a particular word in your strange non-standard vocabulary. It would be silly of me to argue over definitions so I'll accept any meaning of the word "God" you give me as long as it's clear and you use it consistently. 

 

 > God is by definition the ultimate reality or the ultimate truth which explains why you are here and now, and conscious,.

That is 100% inconsistent with what you said in your post just a few hours ago, you said your definition of God was NOT a intelligent conscious being who created the universe and knows everything including what our prayers are. Make up your mind! How can I say if I believe in "God" or not if you keep changing the definition of the word every few hours?

> I do not believe that god is an unintelligent blob, nor do I believe it is not an unintelligent blob. 

Yes that's what I thought. Or to say the same thing with different words, what you believe is neither true nor false, what you believe is so worthless it's not even wrong, what you believe is gibberish.    

> Definitions of words are arbitrary but both parties in a debate must agree on those meanings or they literally don't know what they're arguing about. 

> You talk like if some person have problem with all this. Only fundamentalist believers have problems here, not scientists (as far as I know).

So in your Humpty Dumpty dictionary a "fundamentalist believer" is somebody who believes that in having a debate maybe just maybe it might be a good idea to know what the hell the argument is about. 

And this should not be confused with a "fundamentalist aristotelian" which  is somebody who thinks that Aristotle was by far the WORST physicist who ever lived and even in the field of philosophy was vastly overrated.

  John K Clark

[LizR]

On 23 April 2015 at 12:54, spudboy100 via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:

I have noted this before regarding Lord Russell's Teapot orbiting Jupiter. For the last 40 years or so we have had the science to orbit a teapot, as well as two probes around Jupiter--this should tell us something!

Not sure what. Russell's teapot was posited before those things were possible, so the logic stands - at least until we invent time travel. And in any case, once the universe is full of orbiting teapots we can still just come up with something else very unlikely to make the same point.

 

We could insert a teapot in orbit nowadays, making word, flesh, and secondly, we need to view religion, cosmology, through a computationalist/digitalist' eyes. Because old man universe is appearing more as a great program than a great stopwatch, at its core. So sayeth, Tegmark, Lloydd, and Schmidhuber, amen! It also indicates that H. sapiens are a part of this all. 

Yeah, maybe.

[LizR]

On 23 April 2015 at 13:04, John Clark <johnk...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Wed, Apr 22, 2015  Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

>>  I just want to know the meaning of a particular word in your strange non-standard vocabulary. It would be silly of me to argue over definitions so I'll accept any meaning of the word "God" you give me as long as it's clear and you use it consistently. 

 

 > God is by definition the ultimate reality or the ultimate truth which explains why you are here and now, and conscious,.

That is 100% inconsistent with what you said in your post just a few hours ago, you said your definition of God was NOT a intelligent conscious being who created the universe and knows everything including what our prayers are.

I think you've mis-parsed what Bruno is saying. He isn't saying that God is conscious, he's saying God is whatever explains why we're conscious.

[John Clark]

On Wed, Apr 22, 2015 spudboy100 via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:

> I was booted off when Natasha did her purge and went to Kurzweilai.

I've been on the Extropian lost longer than you and I don't recall a purge by Natasha or by anybody else. And I know who Ray Kurzweil is but I don't know what "went to Kurzweilai" means.

 

> I was there for Tipler

I though Tipler had some very interesting ideas, but unfortunately they were later proven to be dead wrong.   

  John K Clark

[meekerdb]

Well I have at least a partial chain of explanation which is not very controversial:

conscious<-language<-social<-evolution<-biology<-chemistry<-physics

Now if Bruno can show:

physics<-arithmetic

I'd be glad to also add:

arithmetic<-consciousness

Brent

[LizR]

On 23 April 2015 at 11:36, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:

But not without destroying the brain and producing a gap in consciousness (assuming you could produce a working replica).  I don't see that a gap is particularly significant; a concussion also causes a gap.

If comp is correct, gaps make no difference. (That would also be Frank Tipler's argument for immortality, in the absence of cosmic acceleration.)

[John Clark]

On Wed, Apr 22, 2015 LizR <liz...@gmail.com> wrote:

 

> I think you've mis-parsed what Bruno is saying. He isn't saying that God is conscious, he's saying God is whatever explains why we're conscious.

Bruno also says that mathematics begat our physical world and he might or might not be right about that, but even assuming that he is do you really think that "God" would be the best name for the Peano Postulates? Call me old fashioned but I think something called "God" should be more intelligent than I am, or at least be more intelligent and more conscious than a sack full of doorknobs.

  John K Clark

 

[LizR]

On 23 April 2015 at 13:30, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:

Well I have at least a partial chain of explanation which is not very controversial:

conscious<-language<-social<-evolution<-biology<-chemistry<-physics

The last 6 items are fairly uncontroversial, although I'm not 100% sure about the language<-social one. Still, that seems quite likely. What I'm less sure about is the first item: consciousness as - I assume - a linguistic construct. If I had to guess, I'd go for the explanatory chain making consciousness derive from evolution. My guess is that consciousness isn't uniquely human (as the linguistic case presumably argues, unless you're suggesting a few warning cries and suchlike can give rise to consciousness?)

Now if Bruno can show:

physics<-arithmetic

I'd be glad to also add:

arithmetic<-consciousness

I'm sure you would, and I'm certainly keen to see the proof - an explanation of why something we've invented is so "unreasonable effective" will be fascinating.

[LizR]

I didn't argue for or against Bruno's usage. I just pointed out that I think you've misunderstood what Bruno claimed in the post you were replying to.

[meekerdb]

On 4/22/2015 7:32 PM, LizR wrote:

On 23 April 2015 at 13:30, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:

Well I have at least a partial chain of explanation which is not very controversial:

conscious<-language<-social<-evolution<-biology<-chemistry<-physics

The last 6 items are fairly uncontroversial, although I'm not 100% sure about the language<-social one. Still, that seems quite likely. What I'm less sure about is the first item: consciousness as - I assume - a linguistic construct. If I had to guess, I'd go for the explanatory chain making consciousness derive from evolution. My guess is that consciousness isn't uniquely human (as the linguistic case presumably argues, unless you're suggesting a few warning cries and suchlike can give rise to consciousness?)

I agree that animals, without language, also have awareness and perception.  I just left out a lot of steps in the above chain.  I was thinking of consciousness as the inner narrative of humans which does depend on language (c.f. Julian Jaynes).

Now if Bruno can show:

physics<-arithmetic

I'd be glad to also add:

arithmetic<-consciousness

I'm sure you would, and I'm certainly keen to see the proof - an explanation of why something we've invented is so "unreasonable effective" will be fascinating.

I don't see why that should be so fascinating.  If we invent it, it's not surprising that it's useful.  Are you surprised at the unreasonable effectiveness of knives?...or writing?...or airplanes?  And has anybody found an unreasonable effectiveness for octonions?...or Cantor's infinite cardinals?  It seems to me that mathematics has just about the effectiveness that you would expect from human invention much of which is motivated by solving problems but some of which is just inventing games.

Brent

[Stathis Papaioannou]

Even if comp is incorrect gaps make no difference, since they occur in
the course of normal life.


--
Stathis Papaioannou

[Bruce Kellett]

Gaps in consciousness, perhaps. But are there gaps in the ebb and flow
of brain chemicals, hormones, cell deaths and divisions, ...? Or gaps in
the flow of the unconscious?

Bruce

[meekerdb]

I'm pretty sure there are gaps in all biological processes that correspond to any kind of
thought/perception/awareness in the case of people who are cooled down for heart surgery.

Brent

[LizR]

But they do have to be explained differently (For example by physical continuity). We're discussing whether scanning a brain and making a (hypothetically "exact enough") duplicate later would affect the consciousness of the person involved. Comp says not, obviously in this case for other reasons than physical continuity.

 

[Bruce Kellett]

I doubt that. Is the point susceptible of proof either way? Not all
brain processes stop under anaesthesia.

Bruce

[meekerdb]

Of course as Stathis says, "How would you know if your consciousness changed?"  You could ask friends and look at documents and check your memories, but it's hard to say what it would mean to notice your consciousness changed.  Even if you thought that, maybe it's not your consciousness that's different rather it's your memory of how your consciousness used to be.  Motorcycle racers have a saying, "The older I get, the faster I was."

Brent

[Stathis Papaioannou]

As I understand it, comp requires simulation of the brain on a digital
computer. It could be that there are processes in the brain that are
not Turing emulable, and therefore it would be impossible to make an
artificial brain using a computer. However, it might still be possible
to make a copy through some other means, such as making an exact
biological copy using different matter.


--
Stathis Papaioannou