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Is Starship on schedule and on cost?
Is Vulcan on schedule and on cost?
Has any other air force produced a superior air warfare capability?
Was the last home you had built built on schedule and on cost? 😊
Mike Snead
I worked at WPAFB for 37 years with much of that in the Deputy for Engineering which provides engineers to the System Program Offices (SPO). In the nearly 25 years that I worked in EN up through the mid-1990s, very, very few engineers left government service to work for a prime contractor. I can think of only a couple.
There were two primary reasons for this. The first was that government employees then were vested in the separate government retirement program that made leaving government employment very financially challenging once you had worked for the government for any substantial time. The second was that the experience and expertise of government engineers was different from those in private companies. Most government engineers—not all certainly—had broad experience in monitoring contractor efforts versus private company experience where an engineer would likely specialize in a particular area.
I once talked about this with my branch chief, himself a former engineer who came to work, like many, from private industry in the downsizing following the end of the Vietnam War and Apollo program. My branch chief told me that in structures work, the typical contractor engineer would “specialize” in a particular area, working that one area for much of their career absent promotion to management. For example, he told me that it was typical for a structures engineer to work only on the door frames surrounding passenger doors of a commercial airliner. In contrast in our branch, the engineers worked on many efforts, reviewing the efforts of contractors under contract to various SPOs. For major programs, such as the B-2, an engineer would be collocated full time to the SPO. (My experience ranged from ejection seats to the NASP and DC-X.)
The entire purpose of the B-2 program was to create a survivable strategic bomber that could, with high confidence, conduct offensive missions in highly contested airspace. The B-2 program was likely conceived in the late 1970s at a time when the Soviets had developed extensive and effective air defense capabilities. For the United States to maintain a true nuclear deterrent force based on the triad concept of land and sea-based missiles and strategic bombers, it was necessary to have the ability to make Soviet air defenses ineffective. (This was also a time with ballistic missile defense was emerging meaning that the missile-side of the triad could become vulnerable.)
I believe the original price noted for the B-2 reflected a fleet buy of 100 bombers meaning that the indirect costs of R&D would be spread over the 100 bombers. With a buy of only 20, along with early program termination costs, as well as the inevitable costs of the full R&D for an entirely new, almost entirely advanced composite aircraft of a novel design, while achieving a miniscule operational radar return signature, added to the per unit costs. Despite this, the B-2 has proven effective as a strategic deterrent while also providing the U.S. with a global covert conventional warfare capability—critical where limited but undefendable operations could prevent the need for a much larger and costly war operation.
The versatility of this design is now verified by the emergence of the B-21—what appears to be an updating to the now 40-year-old B-2 design.
Often now when government engineers reach the retirement age, they retire and become support contractors, often for the same program that they supported before retirement. This provides continuity of experience while preventing the government from needing to hire more full-time career engineers to meet immediate support needs. In other words, it keeps total costs down. I had a friend do this. He had a total of 50 years of service. I did not do this.
Mike Snead, PE
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Tim Cash
Bryan,
I do not dispute that there were cost overruns. There are almost always cost overruns in DOD programs because of the nature of the threat, the length of time involved in developing a new capability while the threat and mission are also evolving, and the inherent initial uncertainty in being able to fully “scope-out” what will be needed when bringing substantially new technological capabilities into operational service.
The federal government long ago decided to rely on contractors to design and build its weapon systems instead of generally relying on in-house weapons bureaus. With this decision came acceptance of “profitability” being a relentless political issue raised to oppose new military programs. It raises the question of what is a politically acceptable profit margin when the need for investment in a defense company must compete with investments in, say, Tesla? Or Apple? Or Microsoft?
You will need to further explain your comments on bomber survivability as they make no sense to me.
You will also need to explain your comments on collusion. One aspect of government defense contracting is to keep the industrial base “healthy” over decades. Look at Starship for example. How long has Starship been under development and it is still not “operational”. World-leading defense companies just don’t spring into action quickly. Starting one is not like selling an idea on Shark Tank. Take a look at Bezos and his 20 years trying to turn Blue Origin into a functioning aerospace company.
There is great animosity in the American public against the military and what many call the “military-industrial complex”. Often, people cite the “warning” by President Eisenhower about the threat of the growing military-industrial complex. Yet, as the Allied Supreme Commander, he made use of the product of this military-industrial complex to lead the U.S. and its allies to victory in Europe. As president for eight years, he made extensive use of this military-industrial complex, in total secrecy, to develop America’s substantial nuclear deterrent forces and substantial air and space reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities. Together, those two “needs” dominated his administration’s national security efforts. Yet, folks believe he opposed the military-industrial complex.
Mike Snead, PE
Good points, Mike.
Media and Hollywood have salivated over making MIC into boogeyman every chance they get, as easy villains. Sure they have been responsible for many cost overruns but then look at the cost increases in Healthcare in this country. NASA’s budget in the heyday of Apollo was smaller by a factor of 6. Now that factor is 165+. THESE ARE the huge numbers. But media does not take that on.
I wrote this in 2012 so some numbers have changed but you get the point:
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Dr. Ajay P. Kothari
President
Astrox Corporation
AIAA Associate Fellow
Member, AIAA Aerospace Power TC
Ph: 301-935-5868
Web: www.astrox.com
Email: a.p.k...@astrox.com
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From: jamesmsnead via Power Satellite Economics
Sent: Monday, August 05, 2024 10:14 AM
To: 'Bryan Zetlen' <br...@virtussolis.space>
Cc: 'Gary Barnhard' <barn...@barnhard.com>; 'Keith Henson' <hkeith...@gmail.com>; 'Keith Lofstrom' <kei...@keithl.com>; 'Power Satellite Economics' <power-satell...@googlegroups.com>; aro...@freelists.org
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The real “issue” that we are skirting around is how to avoid such cost overruns in spacefaring efforts.
I think we should always expect some measure of cost overrun simply because of unpredictability in material and labor costs, often because of factors well beyond the control of the contractor or SPO—such as seen in the last several years.
Having said this, what we can control is the uncertainty in the design that leads to design-driven cost escalation. I cite four examples:
1. The first point in cost avoidance is to exclude technical political maneuvering from the consideration of the design of the system.
Example: The National Aerospace Plane effort got its start with a proposal by Tony DuPont to build an X-15-style X-aircraft to demonstrate his version of an injector-rocket hybrid “jet” engine. After many rejections within the Federal Government, he caught the interest of DARPA. DARPA assembled a small team, “loosely managed” led by the TAV Project Office at WPAFB where I had recently joined as the TAV Project Engineer. (The project office was a small group of about 6 people.) The DARPA effort was called “Copper Canyon” and was separate from the TAV efforts. I “went along” on the Copper Canyon meetings to keep abreast of the discussions—primarily focused on the feasibility of scramjet propulsion. This was in 1984-85. They were looking as a 100K GTOW vehicle to test the engine concept. By mid-1985, the effort had caught the attention of the White House and grew into a primary part of a new presidential effort at advancing America’s aerospace capabilities. This made it a “national” program. Soon it came to be jointly “owned” by the Air Force, NASA, Navy, SDIO, and DARPA. As part of the national effort, achieving SSTO became a program objective. In part, this program “killed” the WPAFB TSTO TAV effort.
The F-35 appears to be another good example of a national program failure—a good idea 25 years ago grew into a must-have tri-service “silver bullet”. We tried this before with the F-111.
Lesson-learned: Don’t do “joint” programs. Pick an organizational leader and hold them accountable for their failures.
2. The second point is to not put scientists in charge of how money is to be spent.
Example : Once started, NASP became a high-technology “money bank” for the hypersonic R&D community in the government labs. Many NASP-funded efforts were simply unfunded efforts from previous years.
I was the first engineer assigned to the NASP Joint Program Office. We had a very small engineering cadre of about 10 or so people in the JPO. A couple of years into the program, we were working on the next year’s R&D budget. (There was a separate group in the JPO handling the R&D efforts as this was where most of the money was being spent.)
At that time, we had five prime airframe contractors and three prime engine contractors. This was a presidential/national program and no major aerospace company wanted to be left out and Congress wanted the “fame dollars” spent in their states and districts.
These airframe and engine contractors were working on their particular version of conceptual design of the NASP—meaning we had multiple different concepts in the works. Meanwhile, the R&D community was working on their particular areas of funded research. When the time came to provide engineering inputs into the next year’s R&D budget, this task fell to me as the Chief Engineer was away on TDY as I recall. I decided to ask each of the prime contractors for their inputs as to what proposed work would benefit their conceptual design efforts. They “bravely” responded and indicated that only about 15-20 percent of the proposed funds would be spent on areas that would be of help in maturing their design. I forwarded these results and later got “taken behind the woodshed” for doing so as this cast doubt on the wisdom of the R&D community “knowing” that their efforts had value to the program. By that time, the program was primarily a collection of disparate R&D efforts under the guise of an X-aircraft program. Over a billion $$ were being spent on R&D each year.
Lesson-learned: The role of the R&D community is to assist, not to lead in determining the “Third best” solution to achieve the overall operational capability. Here I refer to Sir Robert Watson-Watt’s “Law of the Third Best”. “Give them the third best to go on with; the second best comes too late, the best never comes." The R&D community vied to propose “first best” solutions while the contractors sought “third best” solutions. Third best is TRL 6+.
Example 3: SpaceX’s Starship. For this discussion, my primary criticism is that the design is far from settled. Essentially, we are watching a conceptual design process being undertaken through building hardware. I don’t fault this being done. I fault the PR that portrays this as a “settled” design on which key national spacefaring planning has been prematurely founded.
Lesson-learned: Don’t “buy-in” based on the hype. The presidential hype of NASP largely contributed to not beginning the WPAFB TAV effort that was based on TRL 6+ technology. (The three-star Aeronautical Systems Division commander recommended starting a TAV program. He was then also managing the F-22, B-2, C-17, B-1B, and F-117 programs—meaning he/ASD understood what it took to develop such new capabilities.) The manned Air Force TAV would have been operational around 2000 with a commercial variant soon after.
Example 4: Hoover Dam. Initially for flood control and irrigation water use, the Hoover Dam was proposed in the 1920s. Government engineers identified the site and developed a detailed description of what was to be built. (See attached.) The specification was reasonably detailed with 100 pages and 76 drawings. This means that considerable in-house effort went into the design of an “integrated” solution. This design/specs were then put out for bid. Due to the scale of the effort, a joint company was formed to submit a bid—Six Companies. One of these companies employed Frank Crowe, one of the leading dam builder. He was put in charge. The effort came in under budget and was completed quicker than the schedule.
Other examples where competent engineering leadership made a difference are the first Transcontinental Railroad, Panama Canal, and the Saturn V.
Lesson-Learned: What are primarily engineering efforts should be led by competent engineers.
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The United States has an immense “store” of untapped aerospace “mastery” that is currently not being used or used wisely. This is leading to “wrong-headed” approaches that are failing, in my opinion, in making America a true human spacefaring nation. As a nation, we have forgotten that competent engineering leadership is needed to be successful in achieving substantial operational goals.
Mike Snead, PE