[PATCH] x86/suspend: fix false positive KASAN warning on suspend/resume

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Josh Poimboeuf

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Nov 30, 2016, 6:10:15 PM11/30/16
to Rafael J. Wysocki, Len Brown, Pavel Machek, linu...@vger.kernel.org, linux-...@vger.kernel.org, pet...@infradead.org, mi...@kernel.org, lu...@amacapital.net, Scott Bauer, x...@kernel.org, Andrey Ryabinin, Alexander Potapenko, Dmitry Vyukov, kasa...@googlegroups.com
Resuming from a suspend operation is showing a KASAN false positive
warning:

BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in unwind_get_return_address+0x11d/0x130 at addr ffff8803867d7878
Read of size 8 by task pm-suspend/7774
page:ffffea000e19f5c0 count:0 mapcount:0 mapping: (null) index:0x0
flags: 0x2ffff0000000000()
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
CPU: 0 PID: 7774 Comm: pm-suspend Tainted: G B 4.9.0-rc7+ #8
Hardware name: Gigabyte Technology Co., Ltd. Z170X-UD5/Z170X-UD5-CF, BIOS F5 03/07/2016
ffff8803867d7468 ffffffffb4c0d051 ffff8803867d7500 ffff8803867d7878
ffff8803867d74f0 ffffffffb45cbe34 ffffffffb4e64136 ffffffffb4510d42
ffff8803828c3f4c 0000000000000097 0000000041b58ab3 ffffffffb6192731
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0x63/0x82
kasan_report_error+0x4b4/0x4e0
? acpi_hw_read_port+0xd0/0x1ea
? kfree_const+0x22/0x30
? acpi_hw_validate_io_request+0x1a6/0x1a6
__asan_report_load8_noabort+0x61/0x70
? unwind_get_return_address+0x11d/0x130
unwind_get_return_address+0x11d/0x130
? unwind_next_frame+0x97/0xf0
__save_stack_trace+0x92/0x100
save_stack_trace+0x1b/0x20
save_stack+0x46/0xd0
? save_stack_trace+0x1b/0x20
? save_stack+0x46/0xd0
? kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0
? kasan_slab_alloc+0x12/0x20
? acpi_hw_read+0x2b6/0x3aa
? acpi_hw_validate_register+0x20b/0x20b
? acpi_hw_write_port+0x72/0xc7
? acpi_hw_write+0x11f/0x15f
? acpi_hw_read_multiple+0x19f/0x19f
? memcpy+0x45/0x50
? acpi_hw_write_port+0x72/0xc7
? acpi_hw_write+0x11f/0x15f
? acpi_hw_read_multiple+0x19f/0x19f
? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x36/0x50
kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0
kasan_slab_alloc+0x12/0x20
kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0xbc/0x1e0
? acpi_get_sleep_type_data+0x9a/0x578
acpi_get_sleep_type_data+0x9a/0x578
acpi_hw_legacy_wake_prep+0x88/0x22c
? acpi_hw_legacy_sleep+0x3c7/0x3c7
? acpi_write_bit_register+0x28d/0x2d3
? acpi_read_bit_register+0x19b/0x19b
acpi_hw_sleep_dispatch+0xb5/0xba
acpi_leave_sleep_state_prep+0x17/0x19
acpi_suspend_enter+0x154/0x1e0
? trace_suspend_resume+0xe8/0xe8
suspend_devices_and_enter+0xb09/0xdb0
? printk+0xa8/0xd8
? arch_suspend_enable_irqs+0x20/0x20
? try_to_freeze_tasks+0x295/0x600
pm_suspend+0x6c9/0x780
? finish_wait+0x1f0/0x1f0
? suspend_devices_and_enter+0xdb0/0xdb0
state_store+0xa2/0x120
? kobj_attr_show+0x60/0x60
kobj_attr_store+0x36/0x70
sysfs_kf_write+0x131/0x200
kernfs_fop_write+0x295/0x3f0
__vfs_write+0xef/0x760
? handle_mm_fault+0x1346/0x35e0
? do_iter_readv_writev+0x660/0x660
? __pmd_alloc+0x310/0x310
? do_lock_file_wait+0x1e0/0x1e0
? apparmor_file_permission+0x18/0x20
? security_file_permission+0x73/0x1c0
? rw_verify_area+0xbd/0x2b0
vfs_write+0x149/0x4a0
SyS_write+0xd9/0x1c0
? SyS_read+0x1c0/0x1c0
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1e/0xad
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff8803867d7700: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
ffff8803867d7780: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
>ffff8803867d7800: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f4
^
ffff8803867d7880: f3 f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
ffff8803867d7900: 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 04 f4 f4 f4 f3 f3 f3 f3 00

KASAN instrumentation poisons the stack when entering a function and
unpoisons it when exiting the function. However, in the suspend path,
some functions never return, so their stack never gets unpoisoned,
resulting in stale KASAN shadow data which can cause false positive
warnings like the one above.

Reported-by: Scott Bauer <scott...@intel.com>
Tested-by: Scott Bauer <scott...@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoi...@redhat.com>
---
arch/x86/kernel/acpi/sleep.c | 3 +++
include/linux/kasan.h | 7 +++++++
2 files changed, 10 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/sleep.c b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/sleep.c
index 4858733..62bd046 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/sleep.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/sleep.c
@@ -115,6 +115,9 @@ int x86_acpi_suspend_lowlevel(void)
pause_graph_tracing();
do_suspend_lowlevel();
unpause_graph_tracing();
+
+ kasan_unpoison_stack_below_sp();
+
return 0;
}

diff --git a/include/linux/kasan.h b/include/linux/kasan.h
index 820c0ad..e0945d5 100644
--- a/include/linux/kasan.h
+++ b/include/linux/kasan.h
@@ -45,6 +45,12 @@ void kasan_unpoison_shadow(const void *address, size_t size);

void kasan_unpoison_task_stack(struct task_struct *task);
void kasan_unpoison_stack_above_sp_to(const void *watermark);
+asmlinkage void kasan_unpoison_task_stack_below(const void *watermark);
+
+static inline void kasan_unpoison_stack_below_sp(void)
+{
+ kasan_unpoison_task_stack_below(__builtin_frame_address(0));
+}

void kasan_alloc_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order);
void kasan_free_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order);
@@ -87,6 +93,7 @@ static inline void kasan_unpoison_shadow(const void *address, size_t size) {}

static inline void kasan_unpoison_task_stack(struct task_struct *task) {}
static inline void kasan_unpoison_stack_above_sp_to(const void *watermark) {}
+static inline void kasan_unpoison_stack_below_sp(void) {}

static inline void kasan_enable_current(void) {}
static inline void kasan_disable_current(void) {}
--
2.7.4

Andrey Ryabinin

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Dec 1, 2016, 4:05:13 AM12/1/16
to Josh Poimboeuf, Rafael J. Wysocki, Len Brown, Pavel Machek, linu...@vger.kernel.org, linux-...@vger.kernel.org, pet...@infradead.org, mi...@kernel.org, lu...@amacapital.net, Scott Bauer, x...@kernel.org, Alexander Potapenko, Dmitry Vyukov, kasa...@googlegroups.com


On 12/01/2016 02:10 AM, Josh Poimboeuf wrote:
> Resuming from a suspend operation is showing a KASAN false positive
> warning:
>

> KASAN instrumentation poisons the stack when entering a function and
> unpoisons it when exiting the function. However, in the suspend path,
> some functions never return, so their stack never gets unpoisoned,
> resulting in stale KASAN shadow data which can cause false positive
> warnings like the one above.
>
> Reported-by: Scott Bauer <scott...@intel.com>
> Tested-by: Scott Bauer <scott...@intel.com>
> Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoi...@redhat.com>
> ---
> arch/x86/kernel/acpi/sleep.c | 3 +++
> include/linux/kasan.h | 7 +++++++
> 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/sleep.c b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/sleep.c
> index 4858733..62bd046 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/sleep.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/sleep.c
> @@ -115,6 +115,9 @@ int x86_acpi_suspend_lowlevel(void)
> pause_graph_tracing();
> do_suspend_lowlevel();
> unpause_graph_tracing();
> +
> + kasan_unpoison_stack_below_sp();
> +

I think this might be too late. We may hit stale poison in the first C function called
after resume (restore_processor_state()). Thus the shadow must be unpoisoned prior such call,
i.e. somewhere in do_suspend_lowlevel() after .Lresume_point.

Rafael J. Wysocki

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Dec 1, 2016, 9:04:24 AM12/1/16
to Josh Poimboeuf, Rafael J. Wysocki, Len Brown, Pavel Machek, Linux PM, Linux Kernel Mailing List, Peter Zijlstra, Ingo Molnar, Andy Lutomirski, Scott Bauer, the arch/x86 maintainers, Andrey Ryabinin, Alexander Potapenko, Dmitry Vyukov, kasa...@googlegroups.com
Looks OK to me.

Whom do you expect to apply this?

Thanks,
Rafael

Josh Poimboeuf

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Dec 1, 2016, 9:58:24 AM12/1/16
to Andrey Ryabinin, Rafael J. Wysocki, Len Brown, Pavel Machek, linu...@vger.kernel.org, linux-...@vger.kernel.org, pet...@infradead.org, mi...@kernel.org, lu...@amacapital.net, Scott Bauer, x...@kernel.org, Alexander Potapenko, Dmitry Vyukov, kasa...@googlegroups.com
Yeah, I think you're right. Will spin a v2.

--
Josh

Josh Poimboeuf

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Dec 1, 2016, 11:45:55 AM12/1/16
to Andrey Ryabinin, Rafael J. Wysocki, Len Brown, Pavel Machek, linu...@vger.kernel.org, linux-...@vger.kernel.org, pet...@infradead.org, mi...@kernel.org, lu...@amacapital.net, Scott Bauer, x...@kernel.org, Alexander Potapenko, Dmitry Vyukov, kasa...@googlegroups.com
So I tried calling kasan_unpoison_task_stack_below() from
do_suspend_lowlevel(), but it hung on the resume. Presumably because
restore_processor_state() does some important setup which would be
needed before calling into kasan_unpoison_task_stack_below(). For
example, setting up the gs register. So it's a bit of a catch-22.

It could probably be fixed properly by rewriting do_suspend_lowlevel()
to call restore_processor_state() with the temporary stack before
switching to the original stack and doing the unpoison.

(And there are some other issues with do_suspend_lowlevel() and I'd love
to try taking a scalpel to it. But I have too many knives in the air
already to want to try to attempt that right now...)

Unless somebody else wants to take a stab at it, my original patch is
probably good enough for now, since restore_processor_state() doesn't
seem to be triggering any KASAN warnings.

--
Josh

Dmitry Vyukov

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Dec 1, 2016, 11:52:13 AM12/1/16
to Josh Poimboeuf, Andrey Ryabinin, Rafael J. Wysocki, Len Brown, Pavel Machek, linu...@vger.kernel.org, LKML, Peter Zijlstra, Ingo Molnar, Andy Lutomirski, Scott Bauer, x...@kernel.org, Alexander Potapenko, kasan-dev
restore_processor_state/__restore_processor_state does not seem to
have any local variables, so KASAN does not do any stack checks there.
We could disable KASAN instrumentation of the file, or of particular
functions. Or we could call kasan_unpoison_shadow() on the stack range
before switching to it.

Josh Poimboeuf

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Dec 1, 2016, 11:53:07 AM12/1/16
to Rafael J. Wysocki, Rafael J. Wysocki, Len Brown, Pavel Machek, Linux PM, Linux Kernel Mailing List, Peter Zijlstra, Ingo Molnar, Andy Lutomirski, Scott Bauer, the arch/x86 maintainers, Andrey Ryabinin, Alexander Potapenko, Dmitry Vyukov, kasa...@googlegroups.com
Assuming it gets an ack from Andrey, can you take it? Or would the tip
tree be better?

--
Josh

Rafael J. Wysocki

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Dec 1, 2016, 12:05:22 PM12/1/16
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I can take it unless anyone else wants to take care of it. :-)

Thanks,
Rafael

Josh Poimboeuf

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Dec 1, 2016, 12:13:11 PM12/1/16
to Dmitry Vyukov, Andrey Ryabinin, Rafael J. Wysocki, Len Brown, Pavel Machek, linu...@vger.kernel.org, LKML, Peter Zijlstra, Ingo Molnar, Andy Lutomirski, Scott Bauer, x...@kernel.org, Alexander Potapenko, kasan-dev
Actually, looking at the object code, it uses a lot of stack space and
has several calls to __asan_report_load*() functions. Probably due to
inlining of other functions which have stack variables.

> We could disable KASAN instrumentation of the file, or of particular
> functions.

I don't think that would be sufficient unless it were disabled for
__restore_processor_state() and all the functions it calls (and the
functions they call, etc), which wouldn't necessarily be
straightforward.

> Or we could call kasan_unpoison_shadow() on the stack range
> before switching to it.

I tried that already, but it hung because restore_processor_state()
hadn't been called yet (the catch-22 I mentioned aboved).

--
Josh

Dmitry Vyukov

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Dec 1, 2016, 12:27:52 PM12/1/16
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That can be loads of heap variables (or other non-stack data). KASAN
will emit these checks for lots of loads, but they don't necessary go
to stack.


>> We could disable KASAN instrumentation of the file, or of particular
>> functions.
>
> I don't think that would be sufficient unless it were disabled for
> __restore_processor_state() and all the functions it calls (and the
> functions they call, etc), which wouldn't necessarily be
> straightforward.
>
>> Or we could call kasan_unpoison_shadow() on the stack range
>> before switching to it.
>
> I tried that already, but it hung because restore_processor_state()
> hadn't been called yet (the catch-22 I mentioned aboved).

Ah, I see, we just can't execute normal C code at that point...

Josh Poimboeuf

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Dec 1, 2016, 12:34:41 PM12/1/16
to Dmitry Vyukov, Andrey Ryabinin, Rafael J. Wysocki, Len Brown, Pavel Machek, linu...@vger.kernel.org, LKML, Peter Zijlstra, Ingo Molnar, Andy Lutomirski, Scott Bauer, x...@kernel.org, Alexander Potapenko, kasan-dev
I also see the stack poisoning instructions:

54f: 49 c1 ee 03 shr $0x3,%r14
553: 4c 01 f0 add %r14,%rax
556: c7 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 movl $0xf1f1f1f1,(%rax)
55c: c7 40 04 00 00 f4 f4 movl $0xf4f40000,0x4(%rax)
563: c7 40 08 f3 f3 f3 f3 movl $0xf3f3f3f3,0x8(%rax)

> >> We could disable KASAN instrumentation of the file, or of particular
> >> functions.
> >
> > I don't think that would be sufficient unless it were disabled for
> > __restore_processor_state() and all the functions it calls (and the
> > functions they call, etc), which wouldn't necessarily be
> > straightforward.
> >
> >> Or we could call kasan_unpoison_shadow() on the stack range
> >> before switching to it.
> >
> > I tried that already, but it hung because restore_processor_state()
> > hadn't been called yet (the catch-22 I mentioned aboved).
>
> Ah, I see, we just can't execute normal C code at that point...

Right.

--
Josh

Dmitry Vyukov

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Dec 1, 2016, 12:47:28 PM12/1/16
to Josh Poimboeuf, Andrey Ryabinin, Rafael J. Wysocki, Len Brown, Pavel Machek, linu...@vger.kernel.org, LKML, Peter Zijlstra, Ingo Molnar, Andy Lutomirski, Scott Bauer, x...@kernel.org, Alexander Potapenko, kasan-dev
OK, then we are in trouble potentially.
It may work as long as as the stack region that is used for local vars
in restore_processor_state() does not contain any stale poisoning. But
it can break at any moment.

Have you tried kasan_unpoison_task_stack_below() or kasan_unpoison_shadow()?
I can see how kasan_unpoison_task_stack_below() can hang (it at least
uses current). But kasan_unpoison_shadow() is quite trivial, it
computes shadow address with simple math and writes zeroes there.


>> >> We could disable KASAN instrumentation of the file, or of particular
>> >> functions.
>> >
>> > I don't think that would be sufficient unless it were disabled for
>> > __restore_processor_state() and all the functions it calls (and the
>> > functions they call, etc), which wouldn't necessarily be
>> > straightforward.
>> >
>> >> Or we could call kasan_unpoison_shadow() on the stack range
>> >> before switching to it.
>> >
>> > I tried that already, but it hung because restore_processor_state()
>> > hadn't been called yet (the catch-22 I mentioned aboved).
>>
>> Ah, I see, we just can't execute normal C code at that point...
>
> Right.
>
> --
> Josh
>
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Josh Poimboeuf

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Dec 1, 2016, 12:56:14 PM12/1/16
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Good idea, I'll give kasan_unpoison_shadow() a shot.

--
Josh

Josh Poimboeuf

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Dec 1, 2016, 3:31:58 PM12/1/16
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Resuming from a suspend operation is showing a KASAN false positive
warning:

BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in unwind_get_return_address+0x11d/0x130 at addr ffff8803867d7878
Read of size 8 by task pm-suspend/7774
page:ffffea000e19f5c0 count:0 mapcount:0 mapping: (null) index:0x0
flags: 0x2ffff0000000000()
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
CPU: 0 PID: 7774 Comm: pm-suspend Tainted: G B 4.9.0-rc7+ #8
Hardware name: Gigabyte Technology Co., Ltd. Z170X-UD5/Z170X-UD5-CF, BIOS F5 03/07/2016
KASAN instrumentation poisons the stack when entering a function and
unpoisons it when exiting the function. However, in the suspend path,
some functions never return, so their stack never gets unpoisoned,
resulting in stale KASAN shadow data which can cause later false
positive warnings like the one above.

Reported-by: Scott Bauer <scott...@intel.com>
Suggested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvy...@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoi...@redhat.com>
---
arch/x86/kernel/acpi/wakeup_64.S | 16 ++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 16 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/wakeup_64.S b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/wakeup_64.S
index 169963f..1df9b75 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/wakeup_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/wakeup_64.S
@@ -109,6 +109,22 @@ ENTRY(do_suspend_lowlevel)
movq pt_regs_r14(%rax), %r14
movq pt_regs_r15(%rax), %r15

+#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN
+ /*
+ * The suspend path may have poisoned some areas deeper in the stack,
+ * which we now need to unpoison.
+ *
+ * We can't call kasan_unpoison_task_stack_below() because it uses %gs
+ * for 'current', which hasn't been set up yet. Instead, calculate the
+ * stack range manually and call kasan_unpoison_shadow().
+ */
+ movq %rsp, %rdi
+ andq $CURRENT_MASK, %rdi
+ movq %rsp, %rsi
+ xorq %rdi, %rsi
+ call kasan_unpoison_shadow
+#endif
+
xorl %eax, %eax
addq $8, %rsp
FRAME_END
--
2.7.4

Dmitry Vyukov

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Dec 2, 2016, 4:44:31 AM12/2/16
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Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvy...@google.com>

Thanks!

Ingo Molnar

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Dec 2, 2016, 5:15:56 AM12/2/16
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* Rafael J. Wysocki <raf...@kernel.org> wrote:

> >> Looks OK to me.
> >>
> >> Whom do you expect to apply this?
> >
> > Assuming it gets an ack from Andrey, can you take it? Or would the tip
> > tree be better?
>
> I can take it unless anyone else wants to take care of it. :-)

Please pick up the fixes in this thread.

Thanks!

Ingo

Pavel Machek

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Dec 2, 2016, 7:54:33 AM12/2/16
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Hi!

> Resuming from a suspend operation is showing a KASAN false positive
> warning:

> KASAN instrumentation poisons the stack when entering a function and
> unpoisons it when exiting the function. However, in the suspend path,
> some functions never return, so their stack never gets unpoisoned,
> resulting in stale KASAN shadow data which can cause later false
> positive warnings like the one above.
>
> Reported-by: Scott Bauer <scott...@intel.com>
> Suggested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvy...@google.com>
> Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoi...@redhat.com>

Acked-by: Pavel Machek <pa...@ucw.cz>
Well... you may want to add note to kasan_unpoison_shadow()

/*
* This is called by early resume code, with cpu not yer properly
* resumed. In particular, %gs may not be set up, and thus current
* is not available.
*/

Thanks,
Pavel
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Andrey Ryabinin

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Dec 2, 2016, 8:40:49 AM12/2/16
to Josh Poimboeuf, Dmitry Vyukov, Rafael J. Wysocki, Len Brown, Pavel Machek, linu...@vger.kernel.org, LKML, Peter Zijlstra, Ingo Molnar, Andy Lutomirski, Scott Bauer, x...@kernel.org, Alexander Potapenko, kasan-dev
Looks good, but in fact we can use kasan_unpoison_task_stack_below(). We just need to change it a little:

diff --git a/mm/kasan/kasan.c b/mm/kasan/kasan.c
index 70c0097..e779236 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/kasan.c
+++ b/mm/kasan/kasan.c
@@ -80,7 +80,9 @@ void kasan_unpoison_task_stack(struct task_struct *task)
/* Unpoison the stack for the current task beyond a watermark sp value. */
asmlinkage void kasan_unpoison_task_stack_below(const void *watermark)
{
- __kasan_unpoison_stack(current, watermark);
+ void *base = (void *)((unsigned long)watermark & ~(THREAD_SIZE - 1));
+
+ kasan_unpoison_shadow(base, watermark - base);
}


With this we don't have to calculate stack range in assembly.


Josh Poimboeuf

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Dec 2, 2016, 9:01:51 AM12/2/16
to Andrey Ryabinin, Dmitry Vyukov, Rafael J. Wysocki, Len Brown, Pavel Machek, linu...@vger.kernel.org, LKML, Peter Zijlstra, Ingo Molnar, Andy Lutomirski, Scott Bauer, x...@kernel.org, Alexander Potapenko, kasan-dev
That is better indeed, will do a v3.

--
Josh

Dmitry Vyukov

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Dec 2, 2016, 9:03:07 AM12/2/16
to Josh Poimboeuf, Andrey Ryabinin, Rafael J. Wysocki, Len Brown, Pavel Machek, linu...@vger.kernel.org, LKML, Peter Zijlstra, Ingo Molnar, Andy Lutomirski, Scott Bauer, x...@kernel.org, Alexander Potapenko, kasan-dev
agree

Josh Poimboeuf

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Dec 2, 2016, 9:42:43 AM12/2/16
to Andrey Ryabinin, Dmitry Vyukov, Rafael J. Wysocki, Len Brown, Pavel Machek, linu...@vger.kernel.org, LKML, Peter Zijlstra, Ingo Molnar, Andy Lutomirski, Scott Bauer, x...@kernel.org, Alexander Potapenko, kasan-dev
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoi...@redhat.com>
---
arch/x86/kernel/acpi/wakeup_64.S | 9 +++++++++
mm/kasan/kasan.c | 9 ++++++++-
2 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/wakeup_64.S b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/wakeup_64.S
index 169963f..50b8ed0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/wakeup_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/wakeup_64.S
@@ -109,6 +109,15 @@ ENTRY(do_suspend_lowlevel)
movq pt_regs_r14(%rax), %r14
movq pt_regs_r15(%rax), %r15

+#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN
+ /*
+ * The suspend path may have poisoned some areas deeper in the stack,
+ * which we now need to unpoison.
+ */
+ movq %rsp, %rdi
+ call kasan_unpoison_task_stack_below
+#endif
+
xorl %eax, %eax
addq $8, %rsp
FRAME_END
diff --git a/mm/kasan/kasan.c b/mm/kasan/kasan.c
index 0e9505f..e9d8ba0 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/kasan.c
+++ b/mm/kasan/kasan.c
@@ -80,7 +80,14 @@ void kasan_unpoison_task_stack(struct task_struct *task)
/* Unpoison the stack for the current task beyond a watermark sp value. */
asmlinkage void kasan_unpoison_task_stack_below(const void *watermark)
{
- __kasan_unpoison_stack(current, watermark);
+ /*
+ * Calculate the task stack base address. Avoid using 'current'
+ * because this function is called by early resume code which hasn't
+ * yet set up the percpu register (%gs).
+ */
+ void *base = (void *)((unsigned long)watermark & CURRENT_MASK);
+
+ kasan_unpoison_shadow(base, watermark - base);
}

/*
--
2.7.4

Andrey Ryabinin

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Dec 2, 2016, 9:44:56 AM12/2/16
to Josh Poimboeuf, Dmitry Vyukov, Rafael J. Wysocki, Len Brown, Pavel Machek, linu...@vger.kernel.org, LKML, Peter Zijlstra, Ingo Molnar, Andy Lutomirski, Scott Bauer, x...@kernel.org, Alexander Potapenko, kasan-dev


On 12/02/2016 05:42 PM, Josh Poimboeuf wrote:


> diff --git a/mm/kasan/kasan.c b/mm/kasan/kasan.c
> index 0e9505f..e9d8ba0 100644
> --- a/mm/kasan/kasan.c
> +++ b/mm/kasan/kasan.c
> @@ -80,7 +80,14 @@ void kasan_unpoison_task_stack(struct task_struct *task)
> /* Unpoison the stack for the current task beyond a watermark sp value. */
> asmlinkage void kasan_unpoison_task_stack_below(const void *watermark)
> {
> - __kasan_unpoison_stack(current, watermark);
> + /*
> + * Calculate the task stack base address. Avoid using 'current'
> + * because this function is called by early resume code which hasn't
> + * yet set up the percpu register (%gs).
> + */
> + void *base = (void *)((unsigned long)watermark & CURRENT_MASK);

CURRENT_MASK is defined only on x86...

Josh Poimboeuf

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Dec 2, 2016, 10:08:22 AM12/2/16
to Andrey Ryabinin, Dmitry Vyukov, Rafael J. Wysocki, Len Brown, Pavel Machek, linu...@vger.kernel.org, LKML, Peter Zijlstra, Ingo Molnar, Andy Lutomirski, Scott Bauer, x...@kernel.org, Alexander Potapenko, kasan-dev
Oops. I guess I should have taken your suggested patch verbatim...

Will do a proper multi-arch compile before submitting v4.

--
Josh

Josh Poimboeuf

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Dec 2, 2016, 12:42:25 PM12/2/16
to Andrey Ryabinin, Dmitry Vyukov, Rafael J. Wysocki, Len Brown, Pavel Machek, linu...@vger.kernel.org, LKML, Peter Zijlstra, Ingo Molnar, Andy Lutomirski, Scott Bauer, x...@kernel.org, Alexander Potapenko, kasan-dev
diff --git a/mm/kasan/kasan.c b/mm/kasan/kasan.c
index 0e9505f..b2a0cff 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/kasan.c
+++ b/mm/kasan/kasan.c
@@ -80,7 +80,14 @@ void kasan_unpoison_task_stack(struct task_struct *task)
/* Unpoison the stack for the current task beyond a watermark sp value. */
asmlinkage void kasan_unpoison_task_stack_below(const void *watermark)
{
- __kasan_unpoison_stack(current, watermark);
+ /*
+ * Calculate the task stack base address. Avoid using 'current'
+ * because this function is called by early resume code which hasn't
+ * yet set up the percpu register (%gs).
+ */
+ void *base = (void *)((unsigned long)watermark & ~(THREAD_SIZE - 1));
+
+ kasan_unpoison_shadow(base, watermark - base);
}

/*
--
2.7.4

Andrey Ryabinin

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Dec 2, 2016, 4:02:05 PM12/2/16
to Josh Poimboeuf, Dmitry Vyukov, Rafael J. Wysocki, Len Brown, Pavel Machek, linu...@vger.kernel.org, LKML, Peter Zijlstra, Ingo Molnar, Andy Lutomirski, Scott Bauer, x...@kernel.org, Alexander Potapenko, kasan-dev
Acked-by: Andrey Ryabinin <arya...@virtuozzo.com>

Pavel Machek

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Dec 2, 2016, 4:09:04 PM12/2/16
to Josh Poimboeuf, Andrey Ryabinin, Dmitry Vyukov, Rafael J. Wysocki, Len Brown, linu...@vger.kernel.org, LKML, Peter Zijlstra, Ingo Molnar, Andy Lutomirski, Scott Bauer, x...@kernel.org, Alexander Potapenko, kasan-dev
On Fri 2016-12-02 11:42:21, Josh Poimboeuf wrote:
> Resuming from a suspend operation is showing a KASAN false positive
> warning:
>
>
> Reported-by: Scott Bauer <scott...@intel.com>
> Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoi...@redhat.com>

Acked-by: Pavel Machek <pa...@ucw.cz>

> diff --git a/mm/kasan/kasan.c b/mm/kasan/kasan.c
> index 0e9505f..b2a0cff 100644
> --- a/mm/kasan/kasan.c
> +++ b/mm/kasan/kasan.c
> @@ -80,7 +80,14 @@ void kasan_unpoison_task_stack(struct task_struct *task)
> /* Unpoison the stack for the current task beyond a watermark sp value. */
> asmlinkage void kasan_unpoison_task_stack_below(const void *watermark)
> {
> - __kasan_unpoison_stack(current, watermark);
> + /*
> + * Calculate the task stack base address. Avoid using 'current'
> + * because this function is called by early resume code which hasn't
> + * yet set up the percpu register (%gs).
> + */
> + void *base = (void *)((unsigned long)watermark & ~(THREAD_SIZE - 1));
> +
> + kasan_unpoison_shadow(base, watermark - base);
> }
>

I know you modified this code to be arch-independend... but is it
really? I guess it is portable enough across architectures that run
kasan today..
signature.asc

Josh Poimboeuf

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Dec 2, 2016, 4:57:41 PM12/2/16
to Pavel Machek, Andrey Ryabinin, Dmitry Vyukov, Rafael J. Wysocki, Len Brown, linu...@vger.kernel.org, LKML, Peter Zijlstra, Ingo Molnar, Andy Lutomirski, Scott Bauer, x...@kernel.org, Alexander Potapenko, kasan-dev
Yes, it's arch-independent as far as I know.

All the implementations of alloc_thread_stack_node() in kernel/fork.c
create THREAD_SIZE sized/aligned stacks.

ia64 has its own implementation of alloc_thread_stack_node(), which also
has a THREAD_SIZE sized/aligned stack, with task_struct stored at the
beginning.

For those architectures for which stack grows up, they would need to
call a different helper which unpoisons the stack above the watermark,
but that was also the case before my patch.

--
Josh

Rafael J. Wysocki

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Dec 7, 2016, 7:14:06 PM12/7/16
to Josh Poimboeuf, Andrey Ryabinin, Dmitry Vyukov, Len Brown, Pavel Machek, linu...@vger.kernel.org, LKML, Peter Zijlstra, Ingo Molnar, Andy Lutomirski, Scott Bauer, x...@kernel.org, Alexander Potapenko, kasan-dev
Applied.

Thanks,
Rafael

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