Tsirelson's theorem
Richard Gill
Justo Pastor Lambare
I belatedly heard that Boris Tsirelson has passed away (it was two months ago). Maybe we should discuss his theorem (you could call it: the quantum CHSH inequality)
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Алексей Никулов
Dear Richard,
I have read about quantum computer skepticism of Rolf Landauer in your link. Such skepticism is very rare, primarily because of censorship. We were able to publish the article The reasons for doubts about the reality of quantum computer (available on ResearchGate https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Alexey_Nikulov/research ) only in a little-known Russian journal. Now few scientists doubt the reality of the quantum computer, although this reality is doubtful already because of the contradiction of the EPR correlation with realism. No problem is in the idea of quantum computing from the point of view of mathematics, since mathematics is describing both real or unreal. But a real device can be created only on the base of a description of reality. The illusion of the reality of a quantum computer dominates because most people have never understood that quantum mechanics describes the observed ('observables') rather than the existing ('beables').
Alexey
To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/Bell_quantum_foundations/CAKAF9vWSH7z3NKgEAQhmLvr7yoOanvKV9ZvzH2dvP9RfMT8xdg%40mail.gmail.com.
Inge Svein Helland
I fully agree with you that quantum mechanics is about observables, not about beables.
This implies an epistemic interpretation of quantum theory. You may have some interest in the fact that my book 'Epistemic Processes' (Springer, 2018) hopefully will be revised sometimes during this year. Any comments that you or other members of this group might have to the first edition of the book, if you should have the time to look at it, will be of interest to me.
Inge
Geraldo A Barbosa
Inge Svein Helland
Hi Geraldo,
I don't know what you all have heard about observables and beables, but to the best of my own knowledge [sic! Russel's paradox?] an observable is connected to an agent's (or a group of communicating agents') knowledge about a physical system. Beable is a fairly unknown word to me, but it must be connected to an observable's ability to be something (reality?). I don't know if this is clarifying to you.
In my opinion, a quantum state specifies an agent's knowledge about one or several observables (associated with mutually commuting operators). At least in many cases such a knowledge can be obtained by asking a set of focused questions to nature, doing a measurement, and thus obtaining sharp answers to the questions.
Inge
Sent: 05 April 2020 13:19
To: Inge Svein Helland
Cc: Алексей Никулов; Bell inequalities and quantum foundations; jupalam; Chantal Roth; Ilja Schmelzer
Geraldo A Barbosa
Richard Gill
The word “be-able” was invented by John Bell. One should read his book “Speakable and Unspeakable in Quantum Mechanics”
Bell's paper, "The Theory of Local Beables" (beable, as opposed to observable, referring to something that exists independently of any observer), appeared in March 1976
It’s reproduced in the book.
Everyone who works on Bell inequalities and quantum foundations knows the term very well!
To view this discussion on the web visit
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Алексей Никулов
Dear Inge,
It was been knowing since 1925 that quantum mechanics is about observables, not about beables. Quantum mechanic was created on the base of the proposal made by Werner Heisenberg
in the article [1] to describe observables rather than beables. But only few experts, first of all the critics of quantum mechanics, understood the essence of Heisenberg's proposal. Most
people were sure that quantum mechanics describes beables. I draw your attention on the title of the famous EPR article [2]. The description of physical reality is equivalent to the
description of beables. Einstein, of course, understood that quantum mechanics does not describe physical reality. He repeatedly protested against the refusal of the creators of quantum mechanics to describe
physical reality. But most people did not understand this. Bell's inequalities could appear and become popular only because of this lack of understanding by most people what Einstein and
other critics of quantum mechanics understood. Qbism and other information interpretation of quantum mechanics could appear and become popular also only because of this
misunderstanding of the majority. There is nothing new in Qbism other than replacing the word 'observer' with the word 'agent'. QBists realized after many years the obvious logical fact that observables cannot be described without an observer in this description. But they can not understand that Heisenberg's
proposal misled several generations of physicists. I draw your attention once again how Einstein tried to convince young Heisenberg in 1926 that his proposal is wrong:
“But on principle, it is quite wrong to try founding a theory on observable magnitudes alone. In reality the very opposite happens. It is the theory which decides what we can observe. You must appreciate that observation is a very complicated process. The phenomenon under observation produces certain events in our measuring apparatus. As a result, further processes take place in the apparatus, which eventually and by complicated paths produce sense impressions and help us to fix the effects in our consciousness. Along this whole path-from the phenomenon to its fixation in our consciousness-we must be able to tell how nature functions, must know the natural laws at least in practical terms, before we can claim to have observed anything at all. Only theory, that is, knowledge of natural laws, enables us to deduce the underlying phenomena from our sense impressions” [3].
You and Qbists have to understand that what Einstein tried to explain to the young Heisenberg back in 1926.
Richard noted fairly that “The word “be-able” was invented by John Bell”. Bell, like Einstein understood that physical theory must describe beables rather than observables. Bell said, 63 years later after Einstein's unsuccessful attempt to convince young Heisenberg: ”Einstein said that it is theory which decides what is ’observable’. I think he was right - ’observation’ is a complicated and theory-laden business. Then that notion should not appear in the formulation of fundamental theory” [4].
Therefore Bell understood the essence of violation of Bell's inequalities in the opposite way as most modern authors understand this: ”For me then this is the real problem with quantum theory: the apparently essential conflict between any sharp formulation and fundamental relativity. That is to say, we have an apparent incompatibility, at the deepest level, between the two fundamental pillars of contemporary theory... and of our meeting”, see p. 172 in [5].
You and Qbists have to understand that what Einstein and Bell understood: quantum mechanics is trick rather than a scientific theory since, describing ’observables’, it cannot describe the process of observations.
You and Qbists have to understand also that quantum mechanics is not universal theory. It describes most quantum phenomena realistically without any agent or observer in this description, see the unpublished chapter The quantum mechanics is a non-universal theory. The realistic Schrodinger's and positivistic Born's interpretation of the wave function available on ResearchGate https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Alexey_Nikulov/research .
[1] W. Heisenberg, Uber quantentheoretische Umdeutung kinematischer und mechanischer Beziehungen. Zeitschrift fur Physik 33, 879-893 (1925). [2] A. Einstein, B. Podolsky, and N. Rosen, Can Quantum-Mechanical Description of Physical Reality Be Considered Complete? Phys. Rev. 47, 777 – 780 (1935).
[3] W. Heisenberg, Physics and Beyond. New York: Harper and Row, 1971.
[4] J.S. Bell, Against Measurement. Phys. World 3, 33-40 (1990).
[5] J.S. Bell, Speakable and Unspeakable in Quantum Mechanics: Collected Papers on Quantum Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge Universiy Press, 2004.
Alexey
Inge Svein Helland
Dear Alexey,
You have an impressive knowledge about the early history in the development of quantum mechanics. And you have very strong opinions on the basis of this knowledge.
My own feeling is that may be it is time for forgetting the history for a while and start to think completely anew. I have tried to do so in the paper that I posted to this group, but so far I have received no reactions from the group.
Concerning QBism, I have had some discussions with Chris Fuchs. We agree on some issues, but disagree strongly on other things.
I am sorry, but by this it seems to be necessary for me to end the discussion with you.
Inge
Sent: 06 April 2020 13:30
To: Inge Svein Helland
Cc: Bell inequalities and quantum foundations; Geraldo A Barbosa; Richard Gill; jupalam; Chantal Roth; Ilja Schmelzer
Алексей Никулов
Dear Inge,
I don't think that we can think completely anew and still think correctly. The reason for the methodological mistake of the creators of quantum mechanics, which misled several generations of physicists, was precisely that they decided that we can think completely anew. I draw attention in section 2 “Philosophical cradle of quantum mechanics” of the article” “Impartial History and Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics” (available on ResearchGate https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Alexey_Nikulov/research ) that the author of this mistake was a schoolboy Robert, who misunderstood philosophy of a philosopher of seventeenth century Nicolas Malebranche.
Robert was convincing Werner Heisenberg ”I should expect that atoms would, in any case, behave quite differently from the objects of everyday experience. I could imagine that attempts to divide matter even further might lead us to fluctuations and discontinuities from which it would be quite possible to conclude that matter has a grainy structure. But I also believe that the new structures will elude all our attempts to construct tangible images, that they will prove to be abstract expressions of natural laws rather than things” [1].
It's funny that Robert convinced Werner with the example of the atom and the cat: ”I can see a cat directly, for when I look at it, I can - indeed, I must - transform my sense impressions into a coherent idea. In the case of the cat we come face to face with two aspects: an objective and a subjective one - the cat as a thing and as a notion. But atoms are quite a different matter. Here notion and thing can no longer be separated, simply because the atom is neither the one nor the other” [1].
It is highly amusing that Schrodinger has shown logical inconsistency of the Robert statement using the same images - atoms and cat, although he could hardly know the memoirs of Heisenberg [1] published after Schrodinger’s paper [2]. Schrodinger has demonstrated with the help of his famous paradox that we can not think about the atomic world differently than about the world of our everyday experience if we think that the objects of the first world can influence on the objects of the second one. We can not think that a cat is thing and atoms are not things if we think that the state of the atoms can influence on the state of the cat, as it is assumed in the famous paradox with a cat proposed by Schrodinger [2].
Unfortunately, few modern authors understand this obvious essence of the Schrodinger paradox with the cat. I am not sure that Qbists understand this essence, although they have eliminated the logical contradiction of Robert with the help of the claim that notion and thing can no be separated in the case of the cat also, simply because the cat is neither the one nor the other.
[1] W. Heisenberg, Physics and Beyond. New York: Harper and Row, 1971.
[2] E. Schrodinger, Die gegenwartige Situation in der Quantenmechanik. Naturwissenschaften 23, 807-812, 823-828, 844-849 (1935).
Alexey
Inge Svein Helland
You are completely right, Alexey; one should not begin completely anew. But again the general question is: Whom should one listen to?
Sent: 07 April 2020 10:26
Алексей Никулов
Dear Inge,
One should first of all think and try to understand why Einstein, Schrodinger and other few critics were not accepting quantum mechanics despite the tremendous success of this theory. One should understand why Schrodinger was rejecting quantum jumps and Born’s proposal to consider his wave function as a description of the amplitude of the observation probability. One should answer the question, why most physicists, unlike Schrodinger, agreed with Born's proposal. The answer on this question enough obvious: “We cannot think that a real density can change instantly and no-locally due to the observation whereas we know from our everyday experience that a probability of observation changes at first observation”.
The majority agreed with Born's proposal since the wave-particle duality and some other paradoxical quantum phenomena cannot be described without the instant and non-local quantum jumps. Schrodinger was rejecting Born’s proposal since he understood that the probability of observation describes, first of all, our knowledge about a result of upcoming observation. Therefore he defined the EPR correlation as 'entanglement of our knowledge'.
Heisenberg, like Schrodinger, understood that the probability of observation describes our knowledge. He was justifying the postulate about the quantum jump by a discontinuous change in our knowledge: "Since through the observation our knowledge of the system has changed discontinuously, its mathematical representation also has undergone the discontinuous change and we speak of a ’quantum jump’" [1]. Heisenberg, unlike Schrodinger, agreed with Born’s proposal since Robert convinced he that notion (our knowledge about atom) and thing (atom) can no longer be separated, simply because the atom is neither the one nor the other.
The mass misconception about quantum mechanics arose because most physicists did not understand what Schrodinger and Heisenberg understood. They sincerely believed that quantum mechanics describes physical reality. The disputes about Bell's inequalities and the illusion of the reality of a quantum computer were made possible because of this misconception of the majority. Therefore one should not listen to the majority.
[1] W. Heisenberg, Physics and Philosophy. George Allen and Unwin Edition, 1959.
Alexey
Inge Svein Helland
Dear Alexey,
Again, my knowledge about the history of quantum mechanics is too limited to comment all your statements. But I want to emphasize the following:
Heisenberg, like Schrodinger, understood that the probability of observation describes our knowledge.
To the extent that physicists do not understand this, I will tend to agree with you that it is a scandal.
My book 'Epistemic Processes. A Basis for Statistics and Quantum Theory.' Springer 2018, was written from the point of departure that quantum theory, like statistical inference, is about the process of obtaining knowledge. The book is not perfect. As I now have said repeatedly, we are all limited. In particular, Chapter 4 of the book needs sorely a revision, and I am working towards this revision now.
Any comments that any of you might have to the first edition of the book, will be welcome.
Inge
Sent: 07 April 2020 19:00
Ilja Schmelzer
Am Dienstag, 7. April 2020 21:37:13 UTC+6:30 schrieb ingeh:
You are completely right, Alexey; one should not begin completely anew. But again the general question is: Whom should one listen to?
Inge Svein Helland
Yes, Ilja, we should listen to the arguments. But for an outsider like me, it is a little confusing with all the arguments in all direction. At present I am mostly attracted to Carlo Rovelli's Relational Quantum Mechanics. I am reading a paper by Smerlak and Rovelli, Foundation of Physics, 17,427 (2007): Relational EPR, which I think is quite enlightening. S&R abandon strict Einstein reality.
And it is important that we should learn from modern experiment. I think we should be able to understand the 2015 Bell experiments thoroughly both from the point of view of statisticians and from the point of view of physicists. Myself, I am struggling.
But tomorrow, Christ will die and suffer for the sins of all of us. To me, that is a relief. Others may look differently on this message.
Inge
Sent: 09 April 2020 12:59
To: Bell inequalities and quantum foundations
Subject: Re: [Bell_quantum_foundations] Tsirelson's theorem
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Алексей Никулов
Dear Ilja,
The doubts about the Born interpretation have never been associated with experiments. Moreover the Born interpretation was accepted by most people precisely because of the wave-particle duality experiments. Schrodinger and other critics of quantum mechanics were rejecting Born’s interpretation since the probability of observation describes our knowledge about a result of upcoming observation.
Inge is right that quantum mechanics is about the process of obtaining knowledge, according to Born’s interpretation. It is indeed a scandal, that most people could not understand during a long time that we can think of the quantum jump (instantaneous and non-local) only in our knowledge, but not in reality.
Born’s interpretation has misled several generations of physicists, even those like Richard Feynman. Feynman drew attention to the complexity of computing quantum systems and proposed to carry out such calculations using quantum systems. He did not take into account that the complexity of computing increases exponentially with the number of elements, not because the system is quantum, but because the probability of observation is calculated. Feynman, like the majority, did not understand also that the complexity increases exponentially only in the knowledge of the observer rather than in reality.
The mathematics of the probabilities of binary results of observation should not depend on the objects of observation. In this sense, there is no fundamental difference between spin 1/2 and Schrodinger's cat. Therefore particles with spin 1/2 can be replaced with cats in the quantum register as quantum bits. Alice's knowledge about observation of spin projections of the particles of the EPR pair and color (red or blue) of two balls is described the same expression (1), see the preprint “ Logical proof of the absurdity of the EPR correlation “ available on ResearchGate https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Alexey_Nikulov/research .
Unfortunately, creators of a quantum computer do not want to discuss a possibility to use Schrodinger's cat as quantum bit.
Alexey
To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/Bell_quantum_foundations/1586432145611.32190%40math.uio.no.
Inge Svein Helland
Dear Ilja, dear Alexey, dear all,
I know little about the Born interpretation, but I know much about the Born formula. I think it is crucial now the we try to understand as well as we can the possible reasons behind quantum probability.
In my book I have, what I perceive myself, an interesting proof of Born's formula from a set of quite reasonable assumptions. (Sections 5.5-5.6 in the book.) I will use some space in trying to explain this theorem.
The assumptions can be divided into 3 groups:
1) It is essential that the initial state is connected to what I call a maximally accessible variable X, that is, if X=f(Y) for a function f which is not one-to-one, the variable Y can not be accessed by the agent or communicating agents involved. In a quantummechanical setting this means the following: The initial state is a non-degenerate eigenvector of an operator corresponding to a variable X. X might well be a vector, then we have a set of mutually commuting operators.
2) The agent(s) make(s) their experiment under certain specified or unspecified ideals, which can be modeled by a superagent D, which is perfectly rational. In a quantummechanical setting I feel now that it can be useful to regard D as an objective Bayesian, a Bayesian whose prior is given by the right-invariant measure connected to a symmetry group G.
The choice of the group G may depend on the circumstances, but should describe some symmetry in the situation. This symmetry may be connected to what I call conceptual variables. John Bell has an interesting example from physics that can illustrate such a connection: In electomagnetism, the electric field E and the magnetic field H is what Bell calls beables, while the vector potential and the scaler potential is what I would call conceptual variables. These are subject to gauge transformations, connected to a gauge group G.
As a side-remark, an interesting observation can be made: Quantum models have also turned out to be useful in psychology and decision-theory. (Busemeyer and Bruza: Quantum Models of Cognition and Decision. Cambridge UP, 2013). In this connection the superagent D must be seen to be more unspecified.
What does it mean that D is perfectly rational? In my proof of the Born formula I model this by using the Dutch book principle.
3) I assume the likelihood principle from statistics: All information in the data from an experiment is contained in the likelihood function, the statistical model seen as a function of the actual parameter. In Section 5.4 I derive what I call the focused likelihood principle from this: When we have the choice between doing one out of several experiments, all connected to maximally accessible variables, all information, including the various experimental questions, is contained in what I call the likelihood effect, an effect in the physical sense, but defined in terms of model and data in the statistical sense.
As a limiting case, this concept of a likelihood effect also makes sense in perfect experiments where one disregards uncertainty in the measurement apparatus.
So far the assumptions. The proof is based on Peter Busch's elegant version of the Gleason theorem. The crucial point is that the posterior probability, seen as a function of the likelihood effect, should be additive over these effects.
So all this is a mixture of physics and statistics, and it is a straightforward, but a bit long proof. I know that there are other arguments for the Born formula, but one of my points is that some argument is needed. It is far from obvious that probabilities should be calculated as the squared modulus of some wave function. Born put this up as a postulate, got the Nobel price for this, and it is reproduced as a postulate in all textbooks, but it is one of the features of quantum theory which is very difficult to understand for outsiders.
A check of this proof in the book by somebody which should be motivated to do so, will obviously be of interest to me.
Inge
Sent: 09 April 2020 14:43
To: Ilja Schmelzer
Cc: Inge Svein Helland; Bell inequalities and quantum foundations; Richard Gill; jupalam; Chantal Roth; Geraldo A Barbosa
Алексей Никулов
Dear Inge,
The reason behind quantum probability is quite clear. And you understand it rightly when you say the probability of observation describes our knowledge. The creators of quantum mechanics failed to describe certain quantum phenomena as manifestations of reality. Therefore Heisenberg proposed to describe 'observables' rather than 'beables' and Born proposed to consider the Schrodinger wave function as a description of the amplitude of the observation probability.
There is important to understand the fundamental difference between quantum mechanics and a theory of hidden variables: quantum probability is a subjective probability which depends on the knowledge of an observer whereas the probability in a theory of hidden variables (like and in statistical physics) is objetive in the sence that a result of observation is determined by Nature rather than the mind of the observer. Therefore Einstein, Bell and other critics insisted that quantum mechanics must be replaced by a theory of hidden variables.
Quantum mechanics would belong to psychology rather than physics, if it described only our knowledge. But some paradoxical quantum phenomena cannot be explained if we describe only our knowledge. Therefore Dirac (in 1930) and von Neumann (in 1932) had to postulate an non-local influence of our knowledge on the state of quntum system. This influence of the subject on the object is known as the Dirac jump or wave function collapse. Thus, the creators entangled physics with psychology in quantum mechanics.
Unfortunately only the few understood this fact. I quote E.T. Jaynes [1] in the article” “Impartial History and Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics” (available on ResearchGate https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Alexey_Nikulov/research ):
”From this, it is pretty clear why present quantum theory not only does not use—it does not even dare to mention—the notion of a "real physical situation." Defenders of the theory say that this notion is philosophically naive, a throwback to outmoded ways of thinking, and that recognition of this constitutes deep new wisdom about the nature of human knowledge. I say that it constitutes a violent irrationality, that somewhere in this theory the distinction between reality and our knowledge of reality has become lost, and the result has more the character of medieval necromancy than science”, see p. 231 in [2].
[1] E.T. Jaynes, Quantum beats, in Foundations of Radiation Theory and Quantum Electrodynamics. A.O. Barut ed., New York: Plenum Press (1980).
[2] G. Greenstein and A. Zajonc, The Quantum Challenge. Modern Research on the Foundations of Quantum Mechanics. 2nd edn. Jones and Bartlett, Sudbury, 2006.
Alexey
Richard Gill
This is nonsense. We are all observers and each of our knowledge is in each of our minds.
Descartes was wrong. It's not "I think therefore I am" but "I feel therefore I am". https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Solipsism
Sorry, today I am a Qbist. Qbists can reason rationally.
From: Алексей Никулов <nikulo...@gmail.com>
Date: Friday, 10 April 2020 at 10:17
To: Inge Helland <in...@math.uio.no>
Inge Svein Helland
Richard Gill
The other for me, attractive, option is Ilja Schmelzer’s non-local realism. In fact I think that the two options are two sides to the same coin.
Алексей Никулов
Dear Richard,
It is very strange that mathematician feels rather than thinks. With what sense organs do you feel mathematical formulas?
Alexey
Richard Gill
Inge Svein Helland
A supplement to Richard's beautiful description: A crucial concept is that of decision. We all go through life making decision after decision, small decisions and large decisions, even existential decisions. When I write this, I am making decisions. Whoever should read it, has to make a decision on whether to read on or not.
Decisions can be based on belief, or knowledge, or both. In addition or feelings are deeply involved. QBism is based on belief, not knowledge. What we seem to need, is a theory of decisions, much more sophisticated than the decision theory used in statistics and economics. The book by Busemeyer and Bruza may give some clues.
Let us admit, Alexey, that in the contributions from both of us to this discussion, there is a lot of feeling involved.
Inge
Sent: 11 April 2020 07:00
To: Алексей Никулов
Cc: Inge Svein Helland; Ilja Schmelzer; Bell Inequalities and quantum foundations; jupalam; Chantal Roth; Geraldo A Barbosa
Subject: Re: [Bell_quantum_foundations] Tsirelson's theorem
On 10 Apr 2020, at 19:44, Алексей Никулов <nikulo...@gmail.com> wrote:
Dear Richard,It is very strange that mathematician feels rather than thinks. With what sense organs do you feel mathematical formulas?Alexey
пт, 10 апр. 2020 г. в 12:52, Richard Gill <gill...@gmail.com>:
The other for me, attractive, option is Ilja Schmelzer's non-local realism. In fact I think that the two options are two sides to the same coin.
From: Inge Helland <in...@math.uio.no>
Date: Friday, 10 April 2020 at 10:35
To: Richard Gill <gill...@gmail.com>
Cc: Алексей Никулов <nikulo...@gmail.com>, Ilja Schmelzer <ilja.sc...@gmail.com>, Bell inequalities and quantum foundations <Bell_quantum...@googlegroups.com>, jupalam <jup...@gmail.com>, Chantal Roth <cr...@nobilitas.com>, Geraldo A Barbosa <geraldo...@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [Bell_quantum_foundations] Tsirelson's theorem
I may be a QBist today, too. But tomorrow I might possibly begin to think again.
?
This is nonsense. We are all observers and each of our knowledge is in each of our minds.
Descartes was wrong. It's not "I think therefore I am" but "I feel therefore I am". https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Solipsism
Sorry, today I am a Qbist. Qbists can reason rationally.
From: Алексей Никулов <nikulo...@gmail.com>
Date: Friday, 10 April 2020 at 10:17
To: Inge Helland <in...@math.uio.no>
Cc: Ilja Schmelzer <ilja.sc...@gmail.com>, Bell inequalities and quantum foundations <bell_quantum...@googlegroups.com>, Richard Gill <gill...@gmail.com>, jupalam <jup...@gmail.com>, Chantal Roth <cr...@nobilitas.com>, Geraldo A Barbosa <geraldo...@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [Bell_quantum_foundations] Tsirelson's theorem
Dear Inge,
The reason behind quantum probability is quite clear. And you understand it rightly when you say the probability of observation describes our knowledge. The creators of quantum mechanics failed to describe certain quantum phenomena as manifestations of reality. Therefore Heisenberg proposed to describe 'observables' rather than 'beables' and Born proposed to consider the Schrodinger wave function as a description of the amplitude of the observation probability.
There is important to understand the fundamental difference between quantum mechanics and a theory of hidden variables: quantum probability is a subjective probability which depends on the knowledge of an observer whereas the probability in a theory of hidden variables (like and in statistical physics) is objetive in the sence that a result of observation is determined by Nature rather than the mind of the observer. Therefore Einstein, Bell and other critics insisted that quantum mechanics must be replaced by a theory of hidden variables.
Quantum mechanics would belong to psychology rather than physics, if it described only our knowledge. But some paradoxical quantum phenomena cannot be explained if we describe only our knowledge. Therefore Dirac (in 1930) and von Neumann (in 1932) had to postulate an non-local influence of our knowledge on the state of quntum system. This influence of the subject on the object is known as the Dirac jump or wave function collapse. Thus, the creators entangled physics with psychology in quantum mechanics.
Unfortunately only the few understood this fact. I quote E.T. Jaynes [1] in the article" "Impartial History and Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics" (available on ResearchGate https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Alexey_Nikulov/research ):
"From this, it is pretty clear why present quantum theory not only does not use-it does not even dare to mention-the notion of a "real physical situation." Defenders of the theory say that this notion is philosophically naive, a throwback to outmoded ways of thinking, and that recognition of this constitutes deep new wisdom about the nature of human knowledge. I say that it con-stitutes a violent irrationality, that somewhere in this theory the distinction between reality and our knowledge of reality has become lost, and the result has more the character of medieval necromancy than science", see p. 231 in [2].
Алексей Никулов
Dear Richard,
You have a materialistic worldview typical of many modern scientists, especially of the Soviet school. Modern scientists differ from the 'cultured men' about 1750 first of all because of this materialistic worldview. Then it is not clear how you can be refuting realism.
Realism, according to the 'cultured men' about 1750 and Einstein, states the objective existence of Nature independently of our consciousness. Of course, they were sure that our consciousness exists independently of objects of Nature, such as our brain. Your materialistic worldview claims that our consciousness depends on the objects of Nature. On the other hand, you refute realism, i.e. the existence of objects of Nature independently of our consciousness. So you state that nothing exists at all.
You think that Qbism and Ilja Schmelzer’s non-local realism are two sides to the same coin. Therefore you can toss this coin like a die and find out which of these theories is true. Before you look at a coin you know that it has fallen one of the two sides with probability 1/2. After your observation, the probability that Qbism (for example) is the true theory will become 1 or 0.
It is known from history that lots were sometimes cast to find out the truth. You can use particle with spin 1/2 in order to be more modern. You may take: spin-up means Qbism is true and spin-down Ilja Schmelzer’s theory is true. You will know before your observation, as with the coin, that both theories are true with probability 1/2, if you use the first particle of the EPR pair. But the probabilities will not be equal if you use the second particle of the EPR pair or any other non-entangled particle. In this case, the probability of each theory being true will depend on the direction in which you measure the spin projection.
The truth of each theory will depend on your will, if you know the eigenstate of the particle before your observation. For example, if the eigenstate is in the direction vertically up you can make with probability 1 the true theory Qbism by pointing the magnetic field gradient vertically up, and Ilja Schmelzer’s theory by pointing it vertically down. The problem of free will in quantum mechanics, which is discussed by Gerard 't Hooft [1] and others [2], appeared in quantum mechanics due to that “the observer is allowed to choose between sets of observables that are mutually non commuting” [1], for example, such sets of observables as spin projections in different directions, see the section “The problem of free will” the article The reasons for doubts about the reality of quantum computer available on ResearchGate https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Alexey_Nikulov/research .
Lots are casting when it is impossible to find out the truth in another way, for example, in a scientific way. To find out in a scientific way which of the theories is true, one should answer a number of questions, for example: "Can this theory explain why only discrete values of magnetic moment projections are observed in the Stern-Gerlach experiment?" or "Could a quantum computer be real according to this theory?". The second question is primarily of practical significance. Contrary to almost universal belief, a quantum computer cannot be real according to the orthodox quantum mechanics.
[1] G. ’t Hooft, The Free-Will Postulate in Quantum Mechanics. Herald of Russian Academy of Science 81, 907-911 (2011); arxiv: quant-ph/0701097
[2] J. Conway and S. Kochen, The Free Will Theorem. Found. Phys. 36, 1441-1473 (2006); arxiv: quant-ph/0604079
Alexey
Richard Gill
Geraldo A Barbosa
Justo Pastor Lambare
Алексей Никулов
Dear Richard,
I agree with you that this is really important that you are a Englishman, not a European, for example, not a German. Your statement "I feel therefore I am" is close to the empiristic philosophy such Englishmen as Locke, Berkeley and Hume and opposes the statement "I think therefore I am" of European philosophers Descartes, Kant and others. Would your disagreement with Karl Hess be the result of this difference between English and German philosophies?
You should know what the German, Heisenberg said about English empiristic philosophy:
“The three philosophers who can be taken as representatives for early empiristic philosophy are Locke, Berkeley and Hume. Locke holds, contrary to Descartes, that all knowledge is ultimately founded in experience. This experience may be sensation or perception of the operation of our own mind. Knowledge, so Locke states, is the perception of the agreement or disagreement of two ideas. The next step was taken by Berkeley. If actually all our knowledge is derived from perception, there is no meaning in the statement that the things really exist; because if the perception is given it cannot possibly make any difference whether the things exist or do not exist. Therefore, to be perceived is identical with existence. This line of argument then was extended to an extreme scepticism by Hume, who denied induction and causation and thereby arrived at a conclusion which if taken seriously would destroy the basis of all empirical science” [1].
I may add that empirical science was saved by the German, Kant, who agreed with Hume that the laws of induction and causation may be absente in Nature as thing-in-itself, but these laws are basis of our our notions about Nature.
Dear Geraldo,
The reality is in our notions about Nature rather than in our sense. The German, Einstein, who saturated himself with the Kant philosophy, defended realism in our notions as ”the presupposition of every kind of physical thinking”.
[1] W. Heisenberg, Physics and Philosophy. George Allenand Unwin Edition, 1959.
Alexey
To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/Bell_quantum_foundations/CAKAF9vUNsPbf-V2Cs8gyDp0gt%2BoNqxUgp4KbGRJOW03CUPG8Fw%40mail.gmail.com.
Richard Gill
Алексей Никулов
Dear Justo,
You are wrong. You, like all naive realists, confuse our notions about the universe with the universe. Realism is the regulative principle which defines the very possibility of consistent notions about the universe, or, as Einstein said, ”the presupposition of every kind of physical thinking”. Realism is the principle of our reason rather than the universe. Therefore it is absolute truth as all a priori knowledge. Finally, understand this!
Alexey
Justo Pastor Lambare
Алексей Никулов
Dear Justo,
You're wrong again. Absolute truth is possible for our human mind, but of course not about everything. For example, the equality 2 + 2 = 4 is absolute truth. Or do you doubt it? You, like many modern scientists, probably do not know that our knowledge is divided into a priori and empirical. A priori knowledge, to which all mathematics belongs, is absolutely true knowledge, while empirical knowledge can never be absolutely true. Modern scientists can are refuting a priori knowledge (realism), that is absolutely true, on the basis of empirical knowledge, that cannot be absolutely true, precisely because they do not understand what the 'cultured men' about 1750 and Einstein understood.
Alexey
To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/Bell_quantum_foundations/CAKAF9vWbdc4-Qr7g87D9KSvyQpLFOA-xg8On3EOGUZan0iS2zg%40mail.gmail.com.
Inge Svein Helland
In your last discussion contribution you stress again your notion of realism, define it as a priori knowledge, and contrast this to empirical knowledge. You say that a priori knowledge is true, a statement that I agree with you on, but I am not so sure that I will equate a priori knowledge with realism. You also say that empirical knowledge cannot be absolutely true. I do not know what you mean by absolutely here, but I see empirical knowledge as a very valuable source for guiding our decisions.
Kant distinguished between analytic and synthetic a priori knowledge, but this distinction does not seem to be too important here, since he even looked at mathematical statements like 2+2=4 as synthetic.
One important thing is how all this is coupled to your general negative attitude towards quantum mechanics and to modern science. We may all feel that quantum theory is confusing, and at least I am confused by the many different interpretations of the theory, but I am far from willing to reject it completely.
Quite recently, some of my own confusion has bee removed by making myself familiar with Carlo Rovelli's Relational Quantum Mechanics. Like Einstein starts by removing the absolute notion of simultaneity, Rovelli starts by rejecting the notion of absolute, or observer-independent, state of a system [1]. States - and values of physical quantum systems - are relative to something, for instance an observer, and from this point of view he finds that quantum mechanics makes much more sense. In a later publication [2] he is even able to study the EPR-type correlations from this perspective. He concludes there: 'The abandonment of strict Einstein realism implied by the relational stance permits to reconcile quantum mechanics completeness, (operationally based) separability, and locality.' And: 'The question raised by EPR 'Can quantum-mechanical description of physical reality be considered complete?' has a positive answer. However, reality may be different for different observers.'
In a third publication [3], Rovelli uses a discussion related to time change invariance to give an argument against the realistic interpretation of the quantum state vector.
What does it mean to abandon strict Einstein realism? Take as a point of departure the famous EPR-statement: 'If, without in any way disturbing a system, we can predict the value of a physical quantity, then there exists an element of physical reality corresponding to this physical quantity.' In [4] a strict interpretation of this criterion is given: 'To ascribe reality to P, the measurement of an observable whose outcome would allow for P, must actually be performed.' By using this interpretation the authors argue that it is not necessarily true that any realistic theory consistent with quantum mechanics must be non-local. My point is that it does not seem necessary to reject the EPR-criterion completely; it can only be a question of interpreting it in a suitable way.
My conclusion: I agree with much of what you say, but I don't see realism - if it is interpreted in a proper way - as necessarily being the principle of our reasoning. And, even though modern scientist disagree much among themselves on questions related to quantum foundation, I am not in any way willing to replace them with 'cultured men' about 1750.
References.
[1] Rovelli, C. (1996). Relational Quantum Mechanics. Int. J. Theor. Phys. 35 (8), 1637.
[2] Smerlak, M. and Rovelli, C. (2007). Relational EPR. Found. Phys. 37 (3), 427.
[3] Rovelli, C. (2015). An argument against the realistic interpretation of the wave function. arXiv: 1508.05533v2 [quant-ph].
[4] Nisticò, G. and Sestito, A. (2011). Quantum mechanics, can it be consistent with reality? Found. Phys. 41, 1263.
Inge
Dear Alexei
Geraldo
Inge
Sendt fra min iPhone
From: Алексей Никулов <nikulo...@gmail.com>
Sent: 09 April 2020 14:43
To: Ilja Schmelzer
Cc: Inge Svein Helland; Bell inequalities and quantum foundations; Richard Gill; jupalam; Chantal Roth; Geraldo A Barbosa
Subject: Re: [Bell_quantum_foundations] Tsirelson's theorem
Dear Ilja,
The doubts about the Born interpretation have never been associated with experiments. Moreover the Born interpretation was accepted by most people precisely because of the wave-particle duality experiments. Schrodinger and other critics of quantum mechanics were rejecting Born’s interpretation since the probability of observation describes our knowledge about a result of upcoming observation.
Inge is right that quantum mechanics is about the process of obtaining knowledge, according to Born’s interpretation. It is indeed a scandal, that most people could not understand during a long time that we can think of the quantum jump (instantaneous and non-local) only in our knowledge, but not in reality.
Born’s interpretation has misled several generations of physicists, even those like Richard Feynman. Feynman drew attention to the complexity of computing quantum systems and proposed to carry out such calculations using quantum systems. He did not take into account that the complexity of computing increases exponentially with the number of elements, not because the system is quantum, but because the probability of observation is calculated. Feynman, like the majority, did not understand also that the complexity increases exponentially only in the knowledge of the observer rather than in reality.
The mathematics of the probabilities of binary results of observation should not depend on the objects of observation. In this sense, there is no fundamental difference between spin 1/2 and Schrodinger's cat. Therefore particles with spin 1/2 can be replaced with cats in the quantum register as quantum bits. Alice's knowledge about observation of spin projections of the particles of the EPR pair and color (red or blue) of two balls is described the same expression (1), see the preprint “ Logical proof of the absurdity of the EPR correlation “ available on ResearchGate https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Alexey_Nikulov/research .
Unfortunately, creators of a quantum computer do not want to discuss a possibility to use Schrodinger's cat as quantum bit.
Alexey
чт, 9 апр. 2020 г. в 14:35, Inge Svein Helland <in...@math.uio.no>:
Yes, Ilja, we should listen to the arguments. But for an outsider like me, it is a little confusing with all the arguments in all direction. At present I am mostly attracted to Carlo Rovelli's Relational Quantum Mechanics. I am reading a paper by Smerlak and Rovelli, Foundation of Physics, 17,427 (2007): Relational EPR, which I think is quite enlightening. S&R abandon strict Einstein reality.
And it is important that we should learn from modern experiment. I think we should be able to understand the 2015 Bell experiments thoroughly both from the point of view of statisticians and from the point of view of physicists. Myself, I am struggling.
But tomorrow, Christ will die and suffer for the sins of all of us. To me, that is a relief. Others may look differently on this message.
Inge
Justo Pastor Lambare
To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/Bell_quantum_foundations/1586704236334.84510%40math.uio.no.
Алексей Никулов
Dear Inge,
Modern scientists disagree much among themselves on questions related to quantum foundation precisely because they, in contrast 'cultured men' about 1750, do not think logically. It is
impossible to replace modern scientists with 'cultured men' about 1750. But if modern scientists will not understand what was understood by 'cultured men' about 1750 the modern chaos in
the understanding of quantum mechanics will not be overcome.
This chaos arose because modern scientists, instead of thinking logically, fantasize in various ways to maintain their faith in quantum mechanics and the illusion of its success in
describing quantum phenomena. The relational interpretation of quantum mechanics is one of the numerous fantasies. If different realisms are proposed, for example Einstein's realism,
Rovelli's realism, etc., then chaos is inevitable. There is only one realism that asserts the existence of things independent of our consciousness that are the cause of the phenomena we
observe. Or, in Einstein's words, realism states that the Moon exists when no one sees it. A reality which may be different for different observers it is nonsense by definition.
Of course, the only possible realism may be called Einstein's realism. But do not fantasize about any other realisms, since quantum mechanics contradicts this very realism and this
contradiction leads to the absurd. I demonstrate this obvious logical fact in the preprint Logical proof of the absurdity of the EPR correlation available on ResearchGate
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Alexey_Nikulov/research and also in the manuscript "Only the critics understood quantum mechanics". This manuscript was rejected by Editors of
six physical journals. It was submitted in the September of the last year to the journal “Foundations of Physics” the Editor-in-Chief of which is Carlo Rovelli.
I wrote in the Cover Letter: “I am sure that the logical proof must be refuted rather than banned. Therefore I am submitting the manuscript “Only the critics understood
quantum mechanics” in Foundation of Physics in the hope that Editors and Reviewers of this journal will not will not prohibit the publication of the logical proof the absurdity of
the EPR correlation without its refutation”.
The journal “Foundations of Physics” is distinguished by the fact that its editorial staff includes well-known experts on the foundation of quantum mechanics. I don't understand why
they decided to ban the logical proof instead of trying to disprove it. Perhaps the point is that the logical proof of the absurdity of the EPR correlation refutes, among other things, fantasies
of Carlo Rovelli.
The logical proof of the absurdity of the EPR correlation is trivial. I repeat it once again:
1) according to the postulate about the EPR correlation, any observer can create eigenstates of both particles of the EPR pair, measuring different dynamical variables of one of the particles,
regardless of the distance between the particles;
2) two observers can measure different dynamical variables of particles of the EPR pair;
3) thus, two observers will have created different eigenstates of the same particles (for example different spin states (3) and (4) in my manuscript), measuring different dynamical variables.
This logical proof allows to understand why realism is the regulative principle which defines the very possibility of the cognition of Nature. It is funny that Ilja and Justo tried to
disprove the third rather than the first statement. Although the absurdity of the first statement, which postulates the omnipotence of the mind of the observer, must be obvious. Ilja and Justo
claimed that quantum mechanics is not absurd since only the first observer has omnipotence, while the second observer cannot create eigenstate of the distant particle. The omnipotence of the
mind of the observer, comparable to the omnipotence of God the Creator, is logical consequence of the rejection of realism which states that eigenstates, as well as the Moon, must exist
indepedently on the mind of the observer.
I must say that Rovelli and you repeat the mistake of Heisenberg when you write that “Rovelli starts by rejecting the notion of absolute, or observer-independent, state of a system”
like Einstein starts by removing the absolute notion of simultaneity. You should read the conversation between Heisenberg and Einstein from Heisenberg's memoirs:
"We cannot observe electron orbits inside the atom," I must have replied, "but the radiation which an atom emits during discharges enables us to deduce the frequencies and corresponding
amplitudes of its electrons. After all, even in the older physics wave numbers and amplitudes could be considered substitutes for electron orbits. Now, since a good theory must be based on
directly observable magnitudes, I thought it more fitting to restrict myself to these, treating them, as it were, as representatives of the electron orbits."
"But you don't seriously believe," Einstein protested, "that none but observable magnitudes must go into a physical theory?"
"Isn't that precisely what you have done with relativity?" I asked in some surprise. "After all, you did stress the fact that it is impermissible to speak of absolute time, simply
because absolute time cannot be observed; that only clock readings, be it in the moving reference system or the system at rest, are relevant to the determina tion of time."
"Possibly I did use this kind of reasoning," Einstein admitted, "but it is nonsense all the same. Perhaps I could put it more diplomatically by saying that it may be heuristically
useful to keep in mind what one has actually observed. But on principle, it is quite wrong to try founding a theory on observable magnitudes alone. In reality the very opposite
happens. It is the theory which decides what we can observe. You must appreciate that observation is a very complicated process. The phenomenon under observation produces
certain events in our measuring apparatus. As a result, further processes take place in the apparatus, which eventually and by complicated paths produce sense impressions and
help us to fix the effects in our consciousness. Along this whole path-from the phenomenon to its fixation in our consciousness-we must be able to tell how nature functions, must
know the natural laws at least in practical terms, before we can claim to have observed anything at all. Only theory, that is, knowledge of natural laws, enables us to deduce the
underlying phenomena from our sense impressions. When we claim that we can observe something new, we ought really to be saying that, although we are about to formulate new
natural laws that do not agree with the old ones, we nevertheless assume that the existing laws-covering the whole path from the phenomenon to our consciousness-function in such
a way that we can rely upon them and hence speak of 'observations.”
You and Carlo Rovelli must understand that the process of observation, which cannot be described in any way, is absent in Einstein's theory of relativity, while quantum mechanics is
impossible without this process.
Alexey
To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/Bell_quantum_foundations/CAKAF9vVWvOd_ofH%3DmMY1R41FttpymuKB9T1LWkWMaxkQyNdtjA%40mail.gmail.com.
Inge Svein Helland
Dear Alexey,
I find it very difficult to discuss with somebody who is so deeply convinced that he is right and all modern scientists are wrong. I will try to be very brief, but I have no hope of convincing you.
You define realism as 'eigenstates, as well as the Moon, must exist independently of the mind of the mind of the observer.' I will claim that there is a huge difference between eigenstates and the moon. The moon of course exists when nobody looks. But the
state of the moon, what is that? In my opinion it can depend on what the observer focuses on, wants to observe. However, this idea with the moon is vague. One must in a way think of what is a maximally accessible variable.
But in the same way, a given particle will exist independent of the observer, but the spin component of the particle in some direction depends on the direction, chosen by the observer. And this variable is maximally accessible.
One thing that I find fascinating with Relational Quantum Mechanics is that it is a relatively open interpretation in the sense that it remains to become completely precise. I see my own paper, submitted to Foundations of Physics, as an attempt to make this idea precise. I do not claim in any way that I am absolutely right, but I am open for discussions.
For those who want to become acquainted with RQM without reading several papers, I can recommend https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qm-relational/ .
Inge
Sent: 13 April 2020 00:55
To: Inge Svein Helland
Cc: Bell inequalities and quantum foundations; jupalam; Richard Gill; Ilja Schmelzer; Geraldo A Barbosa; Chantal Roth
Richard Gill
Алексей Никулов
Dear Inge,
I am convinced of the correctness of logic rather than of my own rightness. No difference can be between eigenstates and the moon when we consider the relation of these objects to
the subject, according the logic rather than anyone opinion. Schrodinger, following logic, did not distinguish between eigenstates and the moon when he explained what was
fundamentally new in quantum mechanics. He noted in 1952 that ”···the mere contention that every observation depends on both the subject and the object, which are inextricably
interwoven this contention is hardly new, it is almost as old as science itself” [1]. But ”···in the present order of ideas the direct, causal, influence between the two is regarded as
mutual. It is said that there is also an unavoidable and uncontrollable impression from the side of the subject onto the object. This aspect is new ···” [1].
The influence from the side of the object onto the subject at any observation results to a change of our knowledge about the object. This influence may be non-local, when our
knowledge about to parts of the object is entangled, see the example with two balls in the preprint Logical proof of the absurdity of the EPR correlation available on ResearchGate
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Alexey_Nikulov/research . Accordingly, the influence from the side of the subject onto the object results to a change of the object under
influence of our knowledge. This influence from the side of the subject onto the object is known as the EPR correlation, although Einstein, Podolsky, Rosen did not admit the
possibility of such an absurdity.
Schrodinger defined in 1935 the EPR correlation as entanglement of our knowledge. He demonstrated also in the same publication, with his famous cat paradox, that
according to logic, no difference can be between objects, an atom and a cat, if we think that the state of the atom can affect the states of the cat. Unfortunately, only few modern
scientists understand the obvious essence of the Schrodinger paradox with the cat. This paradox demonstrates that, according to logic, the mind of the observer becomes the cause of a
phenomenon if the cause is denied in Nature, as the creators of quantum mechanics did.
You follow to the statement of the schoolboy Robert, when you claim that there is a huge difference between eigenstates and the moon. I wrote you April 7 that Robert
convinced Werner Heisenberg that “atoms would, in any case, behave quite differently from the objects of everyday experience“ on the example of atom and cat: ”I can see a cat directly,
for when I look at it, I can - indeed, I must - transform my sense impressions into a coherent idea. In the case of the cat we come face to face with two aspects: an objective and a
subjective one - the cat as a thing and as a notion. But atoms are quite a different matter. Here notion and thing can no longer be separated, simply because the atom is neither the one nor
the other” [2].
Robert, and Werner Heisenberg after him, did not take into account that the subjects, according to our experience, are many: you, I, Carlo Rovelli, Richard and all others. Not only
the subjective but also the objective aspects of atoms should depend on the opinion of each of us according to Robert's claim and quantum mechanics, which was created on the base of this
claim. Einstein, who in contrast to the majority understood this logic, has repeatedly argued that ”we cannot escape solipsism”, if we follow logically to the claims of the creators of
quantum mechanics.
The majority could not understand what Einstein understood, because of the belief that the the mind of the observer can be replaced by a soulless measuring apparatus in the
description of the act of observation. The creators of quantum mechanics constantly contradicted themselves on the question of what causes the quantum state to change during observation,
the mind of the observer or a soulless measuring apparatus. Relational Quantum Mechanics continues this tradition of logical contradictions and self-deception. The creators of the RQM
only confuse everything even more. According to the RQM: “Any system, irrespectively of its size, complexity or else, can play the role of the textbook’s quantum mechanical observer”.
Well! I ask the question: “How can any system (which is not the mind of the observer) provide certainty of the result of the second measurement of the same dynamic variable?” Can you
answer this question?
Dirac was sure that ”after the first measurement has been made, there is no indeterminacy in the result of the second” [3] since otherwise we could see a single particle in several
places at once by looking twice in a row. Dirac, like other creators of quantum mechanics, often replaced the word “observation” with the word “measurement”. This spoof is particularly
obvious in this case, since the first measurement cannot eliminate the indeterminacy in the result of the second measurement if no one is observing the result of the measurements. We are
sure, in spite quantum mechanics, that the first observation eliminates the indeterminacy in the result of the second observation because of the change of our knowledge: we will know due
to the first observation where the object is located, for example.
But some quantum phenomena, such as the Stern-Gerlach effect, cannot be described if we assume that only our knowledge changes due to the first observation. Therefore Dirac had
to postulate ”that a measurement always causes the system to jump into an eigenstate of the dynamical variable that is being measured” [3] in order to provide determinacy in the result of
the second measurement. Thus, Dirac postulated the change of the quantum system under influence the knowledge of the observer. Just the Dirac jump is the new aspect of quantum
mechanics: “an unavoidable and uncontrollable impression from the side of the subject onto the object” about which Schrodinger wrote in [1]. I draw your attention that quantum
mechanics could predict the obvious absurd without the Dirac jump or wave function collapse, a possibility to see a single particle in several places at once.
Thus, the inconsistency of quantum mechanics was obvious for Einstein, Schrodinger, and other critics of quantum mechanics. But Carlo Rovelli and Editors of other physical journals
do not want to understand that "Only the critics understood quantum mechanics". Carlo Rovelli and others fantasize, obscuring obvious problems. For example, “In the relational
interpretation, any interaction counts as a measurement, to the extent one system affects the other and this influence depends on a variable of the first system”. It is enough to consider a
specific problem, such as the Stern-Gerlach effect, to understand that this interpretation, like many others, does not make sense. The authors of numerous interpretations invent more and
more new interpretations because they cannot describe specific quantum phenomena in a consistent way.
[1] E. Schrodinger, Science and Humanism. Physics in Our Time. Cambridge: University Press, 1952.
[2] W. Heisenberg, Physics and Beyond. New York: Harper and Row, 1971.
[3] A.M. Dirac, The Principles of Quantum Mechanics. Oxford University Press, 1930.
Alexey
Ilja Schmelzer
Am Sonntag, 12. April 2020 21:40:42 UTC+6:30 schrieb ingeh:
In your last discussion contribution you stress again your notion of realism, define it as a priori knowledge, and contrast this to empirical knowledge. You say that a priori knowledge is true, a statement that I agree with you on, but I am not so sure that I will equate a priori knowledge with realism. You also say that empirical knowledge cannot be absolutely true. I do not know what you mean by absolutely here, but I see empirical knowledge as a very valuable source for guiding our decisions.
From: Алексей Никулов <nikulo...@gmail.com>
The doubts about the Born interpretation have never been associated with experiments. Moreover the Born interpretation was accepted by most people precisely because of the wave-particle duality experiments.
Quite recently, some of my own confusion has bee removed by making myself familiar with Carlo Rovelli's Relational Quantum Mechanics. Like Einstein starts by removing the absolute notion of simultaneity, Rovelli starts by rejecting the notion of absolute, or observer-independent, state of a system [1]. States - and values of physical quantum systems - are relative to something, for instance an observer, and from this point of view he finds that quantum mechanics makes much more sense. In a later publication [2] he is even able to study the EPR-type correlations from this perspective. He concludes there: 'The abandonment of strict Einstein realism implied by the relational stance permits to reconcile quantum mechanics completeness, (operationally based) separability, and locality.' And: 'The question raised by EPR 'Can quantum-mechanical description of physical reality be considered complete?' has a positive answer. However, reality may be different for different observers.'
In a third publication [3], Rovelli uses a discussion related to time change invariance to give an argument against the realistic interpretation of the quantum state vector.
What does it mean to abandon strict Einstein realism? Take as a point of departure the famous EPR-statement: 'If, without in any way disturbing a system, we can predict the value of a physical quantity, then there exists an element of physical reality corresponding to this physical quantity.' In [4] a strict interpretation of this criterion is given: 'To ascribe reality to P, the measurement of an observable whose outcome would allow for P, must actually be performed.' By using this interpretation the authors argue that it is not necessarily true that any realistic theory consistent with quantum mechanics must be non-local. My point is that it does not seem necessary to reject the EPR-criterion completely; it can only be a question of interpreting it in a suitable way.
And, even though modern scientist disagree much among themselves on questions related to quantum foundation, I am not in any way willing to replace them with 'cultured men' about 1750.
Алексей Никулов
Dear Ilja,
I have to say that you don't quite understand the Kant philosophy correctly. It is wrong to say that “it is the failure of empiricism which has forced Kant to accept some a priori
things”. A priori knowledge according to the Kant philosophy is basis of our experience without which no empirical science could be possible. The assertions of our experience
contain both a priori and empirical knowledge. For example, in the assertion "The Sun revolves around the Earth in a circle", the circle refers to a priori knowledge, and the Sun
and Earth to empirical knowledge. We don't need to observe the circle to know that all the points of the circle are at the same distance from the same point in the center of the circle.
But we can learn about the Sun and the Earth from only observation.
A priori knowledge is more reliable than empirical knowledge, since it does not depend on how we interpret the results of observations. A circle remains a circle regardless of
whether the Sun rotates around the Earth or the Earth rotates.
You wrote: “So, it is clearly a priory truth, so that it should be classified as analytic rather than synthetic”. I must note that a priory truth can be both analytic and synthetic. All
mathematics knowledges are a priory and synthetic.
Realism belongs to a priori knowledge in the sense that it is a regulative principle that does not depend on our experience, but is a condition of the very possibility of the
experience. Realism states that the Moon exists when we don't see it. Therefore, the rejection of realism means that we must explain how our mind creates the Moon when we
observe it. The impossibility of such an explanation means the impossibility of any empirical cognition of the Moon.
Einstein's causality is the nonsense of modern scientists who do not understand what they are talking about. The causal law, like realism, is a regulative principle of our reason
which defines the very possibility of any empirical cognition. Try to understand what Greta Herman, German mathematics and philosopher, was trying to explain Heisenberg and Carl
von Weizsacker: "In Kant's philosophy, the causal law is not an empirical assertion which can be proved or disproved by experience, but the very basis of all experience-it is part of the categories of the understanding Kant calls 'a priori.' … The causal law is a mental tool with which we try to incorporate the raw material of our sense impressions into our experience, and only inasmuch as we manage to do so do we grasp the objects of natural science. That being the case, how can quantum mechanics possibly try to relax the causal law and yet hope to remain a branch of science?"
see the CONCLUSION of our article The reasons for doubts about the reality of quantum computer available on ResearchGate https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Alexey_Nikulov/research and
Heisenberg's memoirs.
You wrote: “But if we translate this into the language of Bell's theorem, this space is the space Lambda”. It it mistake to connect Bell's theorem with Lambda and any hidden variables
since Bell's inequalities can be deduced without any hidden variables.
The problem is not with the Born rule, but how a wave (a non-local object) can turn into a particle (a local object). It is obvious to me that most scientists, including Richard
Feynman, agreed with Born's proposal to consider the Schrodinger wave function as a description of the amplitude of the observation probability because we cannot think that a
real density can change due to the observation whereas we know from our everyday experience that a probability of observation changes at first observation. But they did not take
into account that the probability of observation changes in the mind of the observer first of all. I'm surprised it's not obvious to you. It is not about history. The contradiction of
quantum mechanics with realism and locality, the EPR correlation and violation of Bell's inequalities are logically deduced from Born's proposal.
You wrote: “The appropriate name for such "relative state realism" is "solipsism"”. I agree. Carlo Rovelli published the manuscript "Nonlocality Versus Modified Realism" by
Hervé Zwirn about Convivial solipsism despite my two negative reviews, see attached file.
Alexey
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Ilja Schmelzer
Am Dienstag, 14. April 2020 18:11:25 UTC+6:30 schrieb nikulovalexey:
I have to say that you don't quite understand the Kant philosophy correctly. It is wrong to say that “it is the failure of empiricism which has forced Kant to accept some a priori
things”.
You wrote: “So, it is clearly a priory truth, so that it should be classified as analytic rather than synthetic”. I must note that a priory truth can be both analytic and synthetic.
All mathematics knowledges are a priory and synthetic.
Einstein's causality is the nonsense of modern scientists who do not understand what they are talking about. The causal law, like realism, is a regulative principle of our reason
which defines the very possibility of any empirical cognition. Try to understand what Greta Herman, German mathematics and philosopher, was trying to explain Heisenberg and Carl
von Weizsacker:"In Kant's philosophy, the causal law is not an empirical assertion which can be proved or disproved by experience, but the very basis of all experience-it is part of the categories of the understanding Kant calls 'a priori.' … The causal law is a mental tool with which we try to incorporate the raw material of our sense impressions into our experience, and only inasmuch as we manage to do so do we grasp the objects of natural science. That being the case, how can quantum mechanics possibly try to relax the causal law and yet hope to remain a branch of science?"
You wrote: “But if we translate this into the language of Bell's theorem, this space is the space Lambda”. It it mistake to connect Bell's theorem with Lambda and any hidden variables
since Bell's inequalities can be deduced without any hidden variables.
The problem is not with the Born rule, but how a wave (a non-local object) can turn into a particle (a local object). It is obvious to me that most scientists, including Richard
Feynman, agreed with Born's proposal to consider the Schrodinger wave function as a description of the amplitude of the observation probability because we cannot think that a
real density can change due to the observation whereas we know from our everyday experience that a probability of observation changes at first observation. But they did not take
into account that the probability of observation changes in the mind of the observer first of all. I'm surprised it's not obvious to you. It is not about history. The contradiction ofquantum mechanics with realism and locality, the EPR correlation and violation of Bell's inequalities are logically deduced from Born's proposal.
Алексей Никулов
Dear Ilja,
It is correct that mathematics knowledges depend in no way on any observation. Therefore it is a priory knowledge. But it is not correct that mathematics knowledges are analytic.
An judgment is called analytic if it adds nothing to the concept of the object in question. For example, "All bodies are extended" is an analytic judgment since we cannot think about
non-extended bodies. Whereas, "All bodies have weight" is a synthetic judgment since we can think about weightless bodies. Analytical judgments clarify, and synthetic
judgments complement the concept of an object.
All empirical judgments are synthetic, but no all a priory judgments are analytic. Kant emphasized that mathematical judgments are a priory, but synthetic, not analytic. For
example, the judgment 7 + 5 = 12 is synthetic since the concept of twelve is not conceived in the combination of seven and five. The judgment "Everything that happens has its
cause" is also synthetic and a priory, but not empirical.
You claims that you know how one can describe realistically the transformation a wave (a non-local object) into a particle (a local object). Tell how!
Alexey
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Inge Svein Helland
I am not a philosopher, and I will not go into the discussions between you two on philosophy. But I want to defend my views on Relational Quantum Mechanics.
But first: I have suggested in a certain sense to reject realism in order to understand the conflict between Bell's theorem and recent experiments. You both seem to be very skeptical to this proposal.
What do I mean by rejecting realism? In the Bell theorem context, and using Richard's approach to this theorem, I simply mean the following: There may exist counterfactual variables X_1, X_2, Y_1 and Y_2 in the minds of several people, where X_i is the hypothetical outcome of Alice under setting i and Y_j is the hypothetical setting of Bob under setting j. And there may also exist in our mind joint probability models over these variables. But in reality, none of these models are able to describe all the observed facts. To describe real observations, we must in my opinion use models where we condition on at least some pairs of settings.
I think this may be translated into your language, Ilja. In your first equation you use rho(a,b,l), where a and b are the settings and l is a hidden variable. I will claim that in order to describe all aspects of reality, one cannot use a model with a joint distribution over pairs of settings and hidden variable(s). As a starting point one has to condition upon pairs of settings at least in some cases.
I hope you can understand, that by this technical way of rejecting realism, that is, by rejecting that certain probability models can describe all aspects of reality, I am in no way rejecting reality in itself.
Now to RQM. In your e-mail of Saturday, 21 March you write, Ilja: 'There is nothing fascinating in such relational interpretations. Once you have an absolute, realistic interpretation, you can always construct corresponding relational interpretations.' But for myself, I do not have an absolute, realistic interpretation. I do not believe that it is always possible to consider joint models of observers and the reality that they observe. To me, this is an absolute limitation.
Hence I do not throw away something to explain observations. What has to be thrown away, is already thrown away by Nature.
You also say: 'While different observers really see different things, the observations of different people should be, nonetheless, consistent with each other.' Yes, this is true when the observers can communicate. In the Bell experiment Alice and Bob cannot communicate at the time when the measurements are made.
It is sometimes claimed that RQM leads to solipsism. In my opinion, it is not so. The best I can do, is to cite from the Standford Encyclopedia article on RQM:
'Prima facie, RQM may seem to imply a form of perspective solipsism, as the values of variables realized in the perspective of some system S′ are not necessarily the same as those realized with respect to another system S″. This is however not the case, as follows directly from quantum theory itself. The key is to observe that any physical comparison is itself a quantum interaction. Suppose the variable A of S is measured by S′ and stored into the variable A′ of S′. This means that the interaction has created a correlation between A and A′. In turn, this means that a third system measuring A and A′ will certainly find consistent values. That is: the perspectives of S′ and S″ agree on this regard, and this can be checked in a physical interaction.
For instance: imagine experimenter S′ measures the spin of the electron S, and writes the value of this spin on a piece of paper. In principle, experimenter S″ can devise an experiment where she can detect an effect due to interference between the two branches where the spin of the electron (and the text) have one or the other value. But if S″ measures the spin and reads the piece of paper, she will find that experimenter S′ has seen the same spin as herself.
Why? Because quantum theory predicts so, as can be seen from the following: with respect to S″, the first interaction yields a quantum state of the form
|spin up⟩×|paper with text ‘spin up’⟩+|spin down⟩×|paper with text ‘spin down’⟩
Measuring the spin projects the state on one single branch of the two, and both branches lead to consistency. Therefore, as long as we do not chase subtle interference phenomena hidden behind decoherence, RQM implies that we all ‘see the same world’. '
All this needs some explanation. RQM is based upon 2 postulates: (a) Variables take values only at interactions. (b) The values they take are only relative to the (other) system affected by the interaction. In the citation above, S is the physical system under observation, and S' and S'' are observers. S'' observes both S and S'.
I hope that this is somewhat clarifying.
Inge
From: Алексей Никулов <nikulo...@gmail.com>
Sent: 14 April 2020 21:06
To: Ilja Schmelzer
Cc: Bell inequalities and quantum foundations; Richard Gill; jupalam; Inge Svein Helland; Chantal Roth; Geraldo A Barbosa
Subject: Re: [Bell_quantum_foundations] Tsirelson's theorem
Dear Ilja, It is correct that mathematics knowledges depend in no way on any observation. Therefore it is a priory knowledge. But it is not correct that mathematics knowledges are analytic.
Алексей Никулов
Dear Inge,
You write “I am not a philosopher” and immediately after that you start to philosophize. Unfortunately, many modern scientists do the same when they refute realism without even trying
to understand what realism is. Just therefore Jose Ortega y Gasset (the great Spanish philosopher according to Schrodinger’s opinion) stated that ”the barbarism of ’specialisation’”,
inherent contemporary scientists, is a danger to modern science. I explain in section 10 “The crisis of physics” of the manuscript "Only the critics understood quantum mechanics" that the
mass delusion about quantum mechanics is a consequence of ”the barbarism of ’specialisation’”, inherent contemporary scientists. Perhaps this is one of the reasons why Carlo Rovelli is
not willing to publish my manuscript.
Carlo Rovelli confirms an uncomplimentary opinion of Ortega y Gasset about contemporary scientists when he writes”Contrary to claims about the irrelevance of philosophy for
science, I argue that philosophy has had, and still has, far more influence on physics than is commonly assumed. I maintain that the current anti-philosophical ideology has had damaging
effects on the fertility of science” [1]. The understanding the importance of philosophy for science is important, but not enough without understanding philosophy.
Most modern scientists did not understand for a long time that quantum mechanics contradicts realism. Bell's inequalities could become so popular only because of this lack of
understanding. Most scientists did not want to understand why Einstein insisted that rejecting realism is a methodological error, since they, unlike Einstein, did not saturate himself with
the Kant philosophy. Therefore when many modern scientists finally learned that quantum mechanics contradicts realism, they decided to abandon realism rather than quantum mechanics.
The barbarism of ’specialisation’ has manifested itself in this case in the lack of understanding of what realism is and the confidence that experimental results are the absolute criterion
of the truth. Realism is rejected on the grounds of the impossibility to describe realistically certain quantum phenomena. We cannot realistically describe not only violation of Bell's
inequalities but also the wave-particle duality experiments and the Stern-Gerlach experiment. We cannot realistically describe the Stern-Gerlach experiment since 1922. But only very few
scientists questioned realism, before Bell's inequalities have become popular. Most scientists had no doubt before this that quantum mechanics describes reality.
Ortega y Gasset stated: ”And now it turns out that the actual scientific man is the prototype of the mass-man”. This fact manifests itself most clearly in the belief of most modern
scientists in the reality of a quantum computer, despite the fact that its idea contradicts realism. This ridiculous belief is a consequence of a vague understanding of the essence of realism
and the contradiction quantum mechanics with realism. Already the creators of quantum mechanics obscured the problem by false substitution of the mind of the observer with a soulless
measuring apparatus. The problem was further obscured by numerous interpretations of quantum mechanics.
The 'cultured men' about 1750 sought to avoid the scandalous conflict of our reason with itself. Authors of numerous interpretations of quantum mechanics do not care about this
conflict at all. They reject realism and at the same time continue to view quantum mechanics as descriptions of reality. Only because of this conflict of reason with itself the ridiculous
belief in the reality of a quantum computer has become possible.
You “have suggested in a certain sense to reject realism in order to understand the conflict between Bell's theorem and recent experiments”. You must know that long before you, the
creators of quantum mechanics had suggested to reject realism to describe paradoxical quantum phenomena. So you have nothing to reject. You only need to understand that quantum
mechanics predicts the violation of Bell's inequalities precisely because of the rejection of realism by its creators. You must also understand that the rejection of realism by the creators of
quantum mechanics led not only to the conflict of reason with itself, but also to the obvious absurdity. The Relational Quantum Mechanics and other interpretations only obscure this
obvious fact without in any way solving the problem.
Those who refute realism must understand that our inability to describe realistically some quantum phenomena indicates only about our inability rather than about our ability to refute
realism.
[1] Carlo Rovelli, Physics Needs Philosophy. Philosophy Needs Physics. Found. Phys. 48, 481-491, (2018); arXiv: 1805.10602
Alexey
Ilja Schmelzer
Am Mittwoch, 15. April 2020 01:36:35 UTC+6:30 schrieb nikulovalexey:
It is correct that mathematics knowledges depend in no way on any observation. Therefore it is a priory knowledge. But it is not correct that mathematics knowledges are analytic.
An judgment is called analytic if it adds nothing to the concept of the object in question.
For example, the judgment 7 + 5 = 12 is synthetic since the concept of twelve is not conceived in the combination of seven and five.
You claims that you know how one can describe realistically the transformation a wave (a non-local object) into a particle (a local object). Tell how!
Richard Gill
Алексей Никулов
Dear Richard,
Thank you! I can't understand out why this glitch happened. I changed some settings and am trying once again.
AlexeyInge Svein Helland
Dear Alexey,
Of course I have nothing against philosophy, but I will not classify what I wrote in my previous email as philosophy. I had a very simple proposal in the following situation: Recent experiments together with Bell's theorem has shown that Nature rejects either realism or locality (or freedom in Richard's formulation). I am not willing to reject locality for the very reason that I believe strongly in the special theory of relativity. So I ask myself: Can the strictest possible concept of realism be modified in some way so that both experiments and Bell's theorem can be saved?
I understand that you react strongly on this very idea. You will save realism in all possible interpretations, even at the cost of rejecting quantum mechanics completely, even at the cost of being in conflict with nearly all modern scientist, at least those interested in quantum phenomena.
I am sorry, I cannot take that stance. I have respect for many scientists, even the creators of quantum mechinics. I am confused by the many different interpretations, but I try to navigate in this landscape.
So I am willing to discuss my proposal with anyone, but not on the premises that you sketch in your long answer.
So what is my proposal? Simply to state that the joint probability of 4 counterfactual variables cannot give an adequate description of reality. I indicate that one instead should use a conditional model, conditioned on the settings of both Alice and Bob.
This is a technical solution, but it does have consequences. As I said, I am willing to discuss the solution with anybody, but not on the premises that one should reject modern science.
Inge
Sent: 16 April 2020 19:31
To: Richard Gill
Cc: Inge Svein Helland; Ilja Schmelzer; Bell Inequalities and quantum foundations; jupalam; Chantal Roth; Geraldo A Barbosa
Алексей Никулов
The concept of realism must not be modified in any way. If everyone will changes the concept of realism at their whim to
fit his theory to experimental results, then science will become a complete chaos. The concept of realism is unambiguous:
realism states that the things we observe exist independently of our consciousness. Many modern scientists did not want
and still do not want to understand that quantum mechanics contradicts realism exactly in this sense.
You wrote: “I had a very simple proposal in the following situation: Recent experiments together with Bell's theorem has
shown that Nature rejects either realism or locality (or freedom in Richard's formulation)”. I must here repeat the
Ortega y Gasset statement: ”And now it turns out that the actual scientific man is the prototype of the mass-man”. The
mass-man follows the opinion of the masses. A mass misconception of modern scientists is the illusion that experiments
or even Nature can reject realism. It is particularly absurd to say that Nature rejects realism because Nature is reality
by definition. Only a theory and its creators can reject realism. A theory rejects realism if it claims that our
consciousness rather than Nature is the cause of observed phenomena.
Quantum mechanics claims that our consciousness rather than Nature is the cause of observed phenomena due to Born's
proposal to consider the Schrodinger wave function as a description of the amplitude of the observation probability.
Before you will begin to solve the problem of Bell's inequalities, you must understand that Bell's inequality would not
be possible if most scientists did not accept Born's proposal without realizing that this proposal contradicts realism.
You must also understand that Bell's inequalities would also be impossible without the Stern-Gerlach experiment and the
illusion of most scientists that quantum mechanics could explain the results of this experiment. This illusion prevails
up to now. You should understand that the original unsolved problem is not in violation of Bell's inequalities, but in
the fact that only discrete values of the projections of the vector - the magnetic moment-are observed. One of the main
misconceptions of almost all authors of publications about Bell's inequalities is that they take the observation of only
two values of spin projections for granted. They do not understand that just the Stern-Gerlach effect is original unsolved
problem, without a solution of which it is pointless to try to solve the problem of violation of Bell's inequalities.
I understand realism rather than I try to save it. I understand that a theory that contradicts realism, i.e., claims that
the cause of the phenomena we observe is our consciousness rather than Nature, cannot be considered a scientific theory.
At the same time, I do not reject quantum mechanics completely, since quantum mechanics describes most quantum phenomena
realistically, even without hidden variables, see the unpublished chapter
The quantum mechanics is a non-universal theory. The realistic Schrodinger's and positivistic Born's interpretation of the wave function https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Alexey_Nikulov/researchI belong to those who are interested in quantum phenomena and have been engaged in them for a long time. I have been
studying macroscopic quantum phenomena for a long time and I know that there is no contradiction with realism in their
description, because, as Richard Feynman noted fairely, this description uses the realistic interpretation of the wave
function originally proposed by Schrodinger. I must say that Anthony Leggett invented the contradiction between quantum
mechanics and macroscopic realism for no pretext in macroscopic quantum phenomena.
I have respect for the creators of quantum mechanics and admire they, especially Heisenberg. But I also admire the
critics of quantum mechanics, especially Einstein, Schrodinger, Bell, and Greta Herman. I, in contrast to the most
scientists, understand that the critics rather than creators were right.
Alexey
Ilja Schmelzer
I had a very simple proposal in the following situation: Recent experiments together with Bell's theorem has shown that Nature rejects either realism or locality (or freedom in Richard's formulation). I am not willing to reject locality for the very reason that I believe strongly in the special theory of relativity. So I ask myself: Can the strictest possible concept of realism be modified in some way so that both experiments and Bell's theorem can be saved?
I understand that you react strongly on this very idea. You will save realism in all possible interpretations, even at the cost of rejecting quantum mechanics completely, even at the cost of being in conflict with nearly all modern scientist, at least those interested in quantum phenomena.
I am sorry, I cannot take that stance. I have respect for many scientists, even the creators of quantum mech[a]nics. I am confused by the many different interpretations, but I try to navigate in this landscape.
So I am willing to discuss my proposal with anyone, but not on the premises that you sketch in your long answer.
So what is my proposal? Simply to state that the joint probability of 4 counterfactual variables cannot give an adequate description of reality. I indicate that one instead should use a conditional model, conditioned on the settings of both Alice and Bob.
Inge Svein Helland
Dear Alexey,
I should perhaps have given up any attempt to convince you, but I will give it a last trial.
You base your standing upon 3 statements.
1) Realism states that the things we observe exist independently of our conciousness.
2) Quantum mechanics contradicts realism exactly in this sense.
3) If somebody tries to change the concept of realism, then science will become a complete chaos.
I disagree with all 3 statements. Let me first introduce:
Realism2 states that the states of the things we observe exist independently of our conciousness.
To me it is very important to add the words 'state of'. If we do this, I will agree with a modified version of your statement 2: Quantum mechanics contradicts realism2. And, importantly: She can do this without creating complete chaos.
So in a quantummechanical context, what do I mean by state? I have posted a note here earlier which may illustrate my view on this: To me, a quantum state (more generally an eigenvector space corresponding to some observable) can be associated with a focused question (or a set of questions corresponding to commuting observables) posed by an agent together with a sharp answer to this question (these questions). In this way, the state is connected to the conciousness of the agent. He makes a decision to ask a question to Nature. Quantum theory is connected to the knowledge of an agent about Nature in this sense.
You seem to reject very many aspects of quantum mechanics, aspects that have been verified by experience many times, the Born formula, the Stern Gerlach effect and so on. To save your standing you even seem to reject results of experiments. I feel a little helpless when I try to argue against this, and I wish that other members of the group might help me here.
You also seem to say that the Bell theorem has no interest. But this theorem has given name to the group, so I suppose that you are quite alone here. I repeat that the purpose of my proposal has been to try to understand the Bell theorem and at the same time understand recent experiment. I can summarize my proposal in a general principle:
Any objective, realistic model in a situation where two parties do not communicate for some reason, should be conditioned on the choices made by both parties.
Of course, this is a principle that one can disagree with, but if it is accepted, the very simple argument behind the CHSH inequality ceases to hold.
And, very tentatively, the principle can be carried over to other situations.
A journalist who wants to cover a deep conflict/war in a fairly objective way, should have a mental model where she tries to understand and take into account the choices made by both parties.
Perhaps even more tentatively, it may seem to apply to my own current mission. I have tried to understand both the foundation of quantum mechanics and the foundation of statistical inference under parts of the same umbrella. In fact that was the purpose
of my book 'Epistemic Processes', which now sorely needs a revision. One difficulty is that there currently is very little communication between the relevant disciplines. So, according to my principle I should try as best as I can to understand and appreciate
the scientific choices made by members of both societies. Or perhaps one should seek for a language which may help to improve the communication between the two societies. Of course, that is very ambitious, but I have made a suggestion in the paper that I have
posted here earlier.
Well, you might feel that the last topic is a little farfetched. But what I do mean, is that I would appreciate it if other members of the group could join in this debate, on all levels. And if anybody could help me with anything in my process of finding the best revision of my book (and eventually of my standpoints), I would be very grateful for that.
And, but that may be a hope in vain, I hope that you also might be open to revise slightly some of your standpoints.
Inge
Sent: 17 April 2020 01:47
To: Inge Svein Helland
Cc: Richard Gill; Ilja Schmelzer; Bell Inequalities and quantum foundations; jupalam; Chantal Roth; Geraldo A Barbosa
Inge Svein Helland
Dear Ilja,
I posted my answer to Alexey before I saw your response. But I will try to answer you, too.
For my view on realism, see my concept 'realism2' in my answer to Alexey.
I am not willing to, and I do not see the necessity of rejecting the spacetime interpretation of relativity.
In my answer to Alexey, I formulated my proposal as a general principle, a principle which I feel can be the basis for understanding the Bell theorem and much else. Following this principle, I will not accept the hidden variable model with omega=(a,b,l) as a basis for understanding the recent experiments. Instead, I will base my attempts to understand it all on a set of conditional models, in your notation
E(AB|a,b)=int A(a,b,l) B(a,b,l) rho(l|a,b) dl.
I guess this is to relect realism in some sense, but then I am willing to do so. It seems to be a possible way to understand quantum mechanics.
Inge
To: Bell inequalities and quantum foundations
Subject: Re: [Bell_quantum_foundations] Tsirelson's theorem
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Ilja Schmelzer
1) Realism states that the things we observe exist independently of our conciousness.
2) Quantum mechanics contradicts realism exactly in this sense.
3) If somebody tries to change the concept of realism, then science will become a complete chaos.
Following this principle, I will not accept the hidden variable model with omega=(a,b,l) as a basis for understanding the recent experiments.
E(AB|a,b)=int A(a,b,l) B(a,b,l) rho(l|a,b) dl.
Inge Svein Helland
Dear Ilja,
I have to make myself more precise. Concerning realism, I allow myself to consider two versions:
- Realism1 states that the things we observe exist independently of our conciousness.
- Realism2 states that the states og things we observe exist independently of our conciousness.
I believe in realism1, but not necessarily in realism2. I believe that quantum mechanics contradict realism2, but not realism1. I agree that if realism1 is rejected, then science become a complete chaos. But by just rejecting realism2, I think that even logic may survive.
Concerning the Bell theorem and experiment, I agree that many models exist, also 'hidden variable models'. But the models always exist only in our minds. And I want to cite the great statistician George Box: 'All models are wrong, but some are useful.'
To be able to explain the violation of the CHSH inequality by experiments, I find it useful to use the conditional model given by rho(l|a,b). Whether or not rho(l|a,b) should reduce to rho(l) in some cases, is a question that I don't want to consider. I just say that a model with just rho(l) in this case is too simple to explain the experimental facts. By taking this stand, I find it unnecessary to reject Einstein causality.
It may perhaps be somewhat illimunating to see the whole thing from the point of view of counterfactuals, as Richard does. In the Bell experiment, there are two settings a=1 or 2, and corresponding counterfactual outcomes A1 and A2, similarly, on Bob's side, there are settings b=1 or 2 and counterfactual oucomes B1 and B2. If you choose a probability model over all the counterfactuals A1, A2, B1 and B2, then by a simple argument the CHSH inequality follows. Hence, to explain facts, I will not choose this model. If I were to analyze the data available after the experiment, I would use a conditional model, conditioning on both a and b.
Tentatively, I have also tried to extend this to a general principle: In situations where two parties are not able to communicate for some reason, it might be useful to choose a mental model where you take into account, condition on, the choices made by both parties.
In such situations, a model with just rho(l) may simply be too simple.
I have read through the Wikipedia article on superdeterminism, but for myself, I don't find this concept very relevant. To me, it is a question of which model is useful in order to explain facts, not which model is 'correct'.
Inge
To: Bell inequalities and quantum foundations
Subject: Re: [Bell_quantum_foundations] Tsirelson's theorem
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Richard Gill
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Inge Svein Helland
19. apr. 2020 kl. 08:40 skrev Richard Gill <gill...@gmail.com>:
I think it is very important here to agree that certain macroscopic things are real. Clicks of buttons. Whether a switch is set “up” or “down”.
To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/Bell_quantum_foundations/781B099E-6046-4710-87D8-E36DA6BEE974%40gmail.com.
Алексей Никулов
If you believe in realism 1, but not necessarily in realism 2 then exactly logic cannot survive. How can a thing exist in no state?
I have to say that one of the consequences of ”the barbarism of ’specialisation’” is the inability of many contemporary scientists to
think logically. They differ from 'cultured men' about 1750 and Einstein precisely in this inability, without which it is impossible
to explain their lack of understanding of Einstein's desire to think that the Moon exists when he does not see it.
Einstein understood that from the point of view of logic, it does not matter what does not exist before observation and appears after
observation: the Moon, elementary particles, or their states. Therefore he was talking about the Moon, although of course he
understood that quantum mechanics does not describe the Moon. According to logic, if something does not exist before observation and
appears during observation, then the mind of observer creates this something.
Unfortunately, many contemporary scientists, unlike 'cultured men' about 1750, do not know that realism was postulated by the
Cartesian polarity between ’res cogitans’ (a thinking entity) and ’res extensa’ (an extended entity). The Cartesian polarity
provides the very possibility of the natural sciences (about ’res extensa’) by stating that "res cogitans" (God, angels, and human
consciousness ) do not influence directly on "res extensa". Many modern scientists do not know even that the creator of quantum
mechanics, Heisenberg, emphasized that quantum mechanics rejected the Cartesian polarity and that Einstein rejected quantum
mechanics because of this very reason.
I have to say that the numerous and varied fantasies about quantum mechanics and, in particular, about Bell's inequalities became
possible because many modern scientists do not understand what 'cultured men' about 1750 understood. And they do not know how to
think logically. In particular, they don't ask obvious questions. I am surprised that you and everyone else who uses the term
"hidden variables" do not answer the question: "Why can variables be hidden?" Can you answer this question?
Alexey
Dear Alexei,
I see that we don't agree on everything. The ground theme for the second law of thermodynamics is the impossibility to builda perpetuum mobile of the second kind. So our challenge to you is: earn a fortune by turning heat into useful energy. Whateverexcuse you would bring forward why that won't work, would be a reestablishment of the second law.Rephrasing what exactly the second law is, would be an interesting challenge, and that, I would expect, would not generatemuch resistance; I believe people will then be interested.
Greetings,
G. 't H
On 19 Apr 2020, at 00:49, Алексей Никулов <nikulo...@gmail.com> wrote:
Dear Prof. Hooft,
many thanks for your letter. Excuse me that I was sending you my emails to the members of the Bell inequalities and quantum foundations group.
I was doing this because you are one of the few experts in quantum fundamentals whounderstand that the renouncement of realistic laws of nature and causality by many modern scientists is misconception.
The confidence in a possibility to refute realism dominates now. The Bell inequalities and quantum foundations group
is one of the few opportunities where it is still possible to express a point of view that contradicts the point of
view of the majority. Most scientific journals are censored by those who believe that Bell's inequalities and experimental
results disprove local realism.
I think that numerous publications the authors of which refute realism indicate about the crisis of physics. Even such
scientists as Anthony Leggett find it possible to be refuting realism. The contradiction of quantum mechanics with
macroscopic realism is pet idea of Anthony Leggett. He is willing to sacrifice even the laws of conservation for this
idea. The author of the publication in Nature Physics [1], following Anthony Leggett, claims that not only particles,
but also the Moon don't really exist. And it is impossible to publish a manuscript not only in tNature Physics, but in
almost all other journals, which would refute the claim that the Moon does not exist independently of our consciousness.
Unfortunately, the censorship of the majority exists not only in relation to the problem of the renouncement of
realistic laws. I was glad to learn from your Editorial [2] that you, unlike most scientists, do not consider doubts
about the absolute status of the second law of thermodynamics an unscientific problem. You wrote in this short article:
“We were surprised to see that Dr. Sheehan himself came with the most daring proposal, that of “thermosynthetic life”,
speculating the existence of life forms that can violate the Second Law”.
Dr. Sheehan has for many years questioned the absolute status of the second law of thermodynamics. I, like most
scientist, was sure twenty-three years ago that the second law could not be questioned. I began to doubt in the second
law when my colleague I.N. Zhilyaev told me in the end of 1997 year that he observed a dc voltage on segment of an Al
mesoscopic loop without any external current. This dc voltage V was observed only in a narrow temperature region near
the superconducting transition and its value and sign depend in a periodic way on the magnetic flux within the loop with
the period equal the flux quantum. Long before this, it was known that a circular persistent current I is observed in
such superconducting loops. Thus, my colleague observed a dc power VI source.
I concluded that the dc power VI of the persistent current can be induced by thermal fluctuations which switch the loop
segments between superconducting and normal state. I have created a theory of this effect. The theory is enough obvious
but contradicts to the second law of thermodynamics. The theory could be published [3] only without a direct statement
about this contradiction. Only the theory was published in [3]. The experimental result, which provoked this theory,
remained unpublished since theorists have convinced Zhilyaev that according to modern knowledge he cannot observed the
dc voltage which he observed. I had to repeat his experimental result with other colleagues [4].
I told this story at the First International Conference on Quantum Limits to the Second Law that Dr. Sheehan organized
in San Diego in 2002 [5]. Unfortunately, the experimental result [4] could not be published in scientific journals
because of its contradiction to the second law of thermodynamics.
The censorship of the believers in the second law of thermodynamics comes to ridiculous. My theoretical article [6],
explaining why the persistent current does not decay, was published. But the Comment to this publication, written by
Dr. Sheehan in order to draw the attention of readers that my article [6] contradicts to the second law of
thermodynamics, was rejected. Editors were considering it more than a year. Three Referees were sympathetic to the
Comment the author of which, in their opinion, exposed that my paper [6] is wrong. But all these Referees recommended
to do not publish this correct Comment and my Reply [7]. It is funny!
I have written recently about this funny story in a letter to the Editors of the journal “Superconductor Science and
Technology”, see attached file. The Editors did not want to publish our experimental work "The dc power observed on the
half of asymmetric superconducting ring in which current flows against electric field". They had not published this
manuscript, despite that I told them about the stupidity of the editors of another journal. I had to hide that the
experimental result contradicted the second law in order it can be published [8], see attached file.
I believe that the censorship of the majority predominated in scientific journals is very harmful to science and
indicates the crisis in physics. Therefore I told you this story, about the inability to publish even experimental
results that contradict the faith of most people.
I understand why most scientists believe in the second law of thermodynamics. But I also understand that there is no
scientific basis for this belief. Most scientists in the late 19th and even early 20th century negatively related to the
Maxwell-Boltzmann statistical theory, because of the obvious contradiction between the reversibility of the laws of
mechanics and the postulated irreversibility of thermodynamics. Smoluchowski wrote in 1914: "By virtue of trusting in
the great achievements of thermodynamics, this principle [the Carnot principle] was elevated to the rank of the absolute,
exact dogma unaware exclusion. And since at that time molecular kinetics under interpretation of this beginning faced the
known difficulties connected with irreversibility of processes, it together with atomistics was condemned as untenable"
[9].
But in the 20th century the Boltzmann theory, which in the 19th century was considered to be contrary to thermodynamics,
became the basis of the second law of thermodynamics. Most scientists believe that Boltzmann's H - theorem overcame the
contradiction between the reversibility of mechanics and the irreversibility of thermodynamics. Only few modern
scientists know that the great scientist Max Planck questioned the H – theorem more than a hundred years ago. He noted
in his Scientific Autobiography that "Boltzmann omitted in his deduction every mention of the indispensable
presupposition of the validity of his theorem – namely, the assumption of molecular disorder" [10]. Planck wrote, "He
[i.e. Boltzmann] must have simply taken it for granted" [10]. All physics following the Boltzmann considered the
assumption of molecular disorder than for granted. But the persistent current is an experimental evidence of violation
of the assumption of molecular disorder. This experimental fact means that Planck's pedantry appeared ingenious.
To convince scientists that the violation of the second law of thermodynamics is a scientific problem, I offered the
editors of the journal Entropy the Special Issue "The Law of Entropy Increase and Boltzmann’s H-Theorem"
https://www.mdpi.com/journal/entropy/special_issues/law_Entropy . They accepted my offer, since Dr. Sheehan and I edited
a Special Issue "Quantum Limits to the Second Law of Thermodynamics" in 2004, see
https://www.mdpi.com/journal/entropy/special_issues/quantum_limits , when the journal Entropy was not as well known as
it is now.
Many thanks for the link to your book. I looked it partly. It is very interesting. I hope that your efforts will be
crowned with the creation of a realistic theory of quantum phenomena. This is now one of the most important tasks. An
equally important task, in my opinion, is to overcome the censorship of the majority.
I agree with you completely that “One needs the right state of mind to understand the situation”.
[1] J.E. Mooij, Quantum mechanics: No moon there. Nature Phys. 6, 401–402 (2010).
[2] Gerard ’t Hooft, Editorial. Found. Phys. 37, 1659 (2007)
[3] A.V. Nikulov and I.N. Zhilyaev, The Little-Parks effect in an inhomogeneous superconducting ring. J. Low Temp. Phys.
112, 227-236 (1998).
[4] S.V. Dubonos, Kuznetsov,V.I. and Nikulov,A.V., "Segment of an Inhomogeneous Mesoscopic Loop as a DC Power Source"
in Proceedings of 10th International Symposium "NANOSTRUCTURES: Physicsand Technology" StPetersburg: loffe Institute,
2002, pp. 350-353; https://arxiv.org/abs/physics/0105059
[5] Alexey Nikulov, About Perpetuum Mobile without Emotions. AIP Conference Proceedings 643, 207 (2002); https://doi.org/10.1063/1.1523805 ;
https://aip.scitation.org/toc/apc/643/1?expanded=643
[6] A.V. Nikulov, Quantum Force in a Superconductor. Phys. Rev. B 64, 012505 (2001).
[7] A.V. Nikulov, Reply to Comment on "Quantum Force in a Superconductor" arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/cond-mat/0304313
[8] V.L. Gurtovoia, V.N. Antonov, M.Exarchos, A.I. Il’ina, and A.V.Nikulov, The dc power observed on the half of asymmetric superconducting
ring in which current flows against electric field. Physica C 559, 14-20 (2019)
[9] M.Smoluchowski, "Gultigkeitsgrenzen des zweiten Hauptsatzes der Warmetheorie", in Vortrage uber kinetische Theorie
der Materie und der Elektrizitat (Mathematische Vorlesungen an der Universitat Gottingen, VI). Leipzig und Berlin,
B.G.Teubner, 1914, p.87.
[10] M. Planck, Scientific Autobiography and Other Papers. Williams and Norgate LTD. London 1950.
With best wishes,
Alexey Nikulov
пт, 17 апр. 2020 г. в 15:06, Hooft, G. 't (Gerard) <G.tH...@uu.nl>:
Dear Mr Nikulov,
You don't need to send all these cc's of your correspondences. You sound like all those other nitwits that frequently send metheir concoctions. But it so happens that lots of what you say about reality is true. I am one of the very few quantumscientists who proclaim that there is a completely "real" universe of particles and perhaps other objects, obeying completelyrealistic laws. Many philosophers follow Bell in his conclusions that his inequalities prove the non-reality of qm. But hisassumptions were too narrow, and people should realise that there are much larger sets of completely realistic laws ofnature, for which the theory we now call quantum mechanics manages to disclose statistical consequences without revealingwhat is "really" going on. Contrary to almost completely established wisdom, one does not have to give up locality or causalityto understand this. We do need something that looks like "superdeterminism", the fact that also "observers" obey locallyrealistic laws of nature, which, in a very formal sense, deprives them from their "free will". Of course there is no such thingas "free will". if this should be interpreted as disobeying the laws of nature with your mind. No, sorry, you can't. I find it verystrange, perhaps the influence of religion(s), that so many people hang on to having "free will".
But I think I also understand how, in spite of the directness and real existence of completely deterministic laws,nevertheless the thing we call quantum mechanics describes their statistical implications. This is very straightforward mathematics,no need for "consciousness', `Wigner's friend', a cat that's half dead, half alive, and all these things. Paradoxes come aboutbecause people don't understand that even realistic objects can span a Hilbert space. The source of the `quantum uncertainties'is the fundamental impossibility to determine with certainty the exact configuration of the initial state, whenever we performan experiment: uncertainty out = uncertainty in. It's that simple. There's also no mystery when the 'wave function collapses'.It does this automatically, but we almost never know the wave function precisely enough to see why it does.
I am working on a manuscript that should elucidate the underlying math. It's very straightforward. One needs the right state ofmind to understand the situation.
Fundamental Theories of Physics, Vol. 185, Springer International Publishing, 2016.
eBook ISBN 978-3-319-41285-6, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-41285-6
Hardcover ISBN 978-3-319-41284-9, Series ISSN 0168-1222, Edition Number 1
It's freely available on the net.
Greetings,Gerard 't Hooft
Ilja Schmelzer
Am Sonntag, 19. April 2020 12:36:45 UTC+6:30 schrieb ingeh:
To be able to explain the violation of the CHSH inequality by experiments, I find it useful to use the conditional model given by rho(l|a,b). Whether or not rho(l|a,b) should reduce to rho(l) in some cases, is a question that I don't want to consider.
I just say that a model with just rho(l) in this case is too simple to explain the experimental facts. By taking this stand, I find it unnecessary to reject Einstein causality.
In such situations, a model with just rho(l) may simply be too simple.
I have read through the Wikipedia article on superdeterminism, but for myself, I don't find this concept very relevant. To me, it is a question of which model is useful in order to explain facts, not which model is 'correct'.
Inge Svein Helland
Am Sonntag, 19. April 2020 13:12:45 UTC+6:30 schrieb ilja:
As a statistician, I have not been used to all physical terms, in particular the concept of superdeterminism. Now I have read through Hossenfelder and Palmer (2019). Rethinking Superdeterminism. arXiv: 1912.06462v2 [quant-ph], and I will read it more thoroughly later. But I have read enough to say, yes I accept superdeterminism, unfortunately, what you can nonsense and a stupid theory. A citation from the abstract of H&P: 'The existing objections to Superdeterminism are based on experience with classical physics and linear systems, but this experience misleads us.'
Inge Svein Helland
Dear Alexey,
'If you believe in realism 1, but not necessarily in realism 2 then exactly logic cannot survive. How can a thing exist in no state? '
'I am surprised that you and everyone else who uses the term
"hidden variables" do not answer the question: "Why can variables be hidden?" Can you answer this question?'
Richard Gill
Алексей Никулов
Your opinion, that all depends on the knowledge of an actor, means logically that there is nothing that does not depend on the
knowledge of the actor. Then I ask you: "How many do actors exist according to your opinion?" and "What is the relationship between the knowledge
of different actors if there is more than one actor?"
I have to say that it is impossible to escape solipsism following to your opinion. Your opinion is absurd although it follows the
statement of the creators of quantum mechanics. Einstein was repeatedly arguing that ”we cannot escape solipsism” if we follow
logically the statements of quantum mechanics. I demonstrate that Einstein was right on the particular example of the EPR
correlation in the preprint Logical proof of the absurdity of the EPR correlation available on ResearchGate
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Alexey_Nikulov/research .
Quantum mechanics would not be absurd if it described only someone's knowledge. Quantum mechanics would belong to psichology rather
than physics in this case. Quantum mechanics is absurd because of its postulate about an influence from the side of the subject onto
the object. I wrote you already that I quote E.T. Jaynes [1] in the article” “ Impartial History and Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics ”
(available on ResearchGate https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Alexey_Nikulov/research):
”From this, it is pretty clear why present quantum theory not only does not use—it does not even dare to mention—the notion of a
"real physical situation." Defenders of the theory say that this notion is philosophically naive, a throwback to outmoded ways of
thinking, and that recognition of this constitutes deep new wisdom about the nature of human knowledge. I say that it constitutes a
violent irrationality, that somewhere in this theory the distinction between reality and our knowledge of reality has become lost,
and the result has more the character of medieval necromancy than science”, see p. 231 in [2].
You and other modern dreamers about realism should finally understand what E.T. Jaynes understood forty years ago, if you can't
understand the meaning of Bell's inequalities. I have to say that you and Richard do not know why variables can be hidden. Bell
stated that “The proof of von Neumann is not merely false but foolish!” since von Neumann did not take into account that variables
must be hidden according to the Bohr quantum postulate which states “the impossibility of any sharp distinction between the behaviour
of atomic objects and the interaction with the measuring instruments which serve to define the conditions under which the phenomena
appear”.
The von Neumann no-go theorem is false according to Bell since the interaction of atomic objects with the measuring instruments
(which does not contradict realism) cannot be distinguished from the interaction with the mind of the observer (which contradicts
realism) without the requirement of locality. The Bell no-go theorem differs from the von Neumann no-go theorem only because of the
requirement of locality. The meaningless term "local realism" has become popular among modern authors precisely because they don't
know why variables can be hidden.
[1] E.T. Jaynes, Quantum beats, in Foundations of Radiation Theory and Quantum Electrodynamics. A.O. Barut ed., New York: Plenum
Press (1980).
[2] G. Greenstein and A. Zajonc, The Quantum Challenge. Modern Research on the Foundations of Quantum Mechanics. 2nd edn. Jones and
Bartlett, Sudbury, 2006.
Alexey
Inge Svein Helland
Dear Alexey,
'Your opinion, that all depends on the knowledge of an actor, means logically that there is nothing that does not depend on the
knowledge of the actor.'
of different actors if there is more than one actor?" '
'I have to say that it is impossible to escape solipsism following to your opinion. '
violent irrationality, that somewhere in this theory the distinction between reality and our knowledge of reality has become lost,'
'I asked the question "Why can variables be hidden?" because without an answer to this question it is impossible to correctly
understand the meaning of Bell's inequalities. I have to say that you and Richard do not know why variables can be hidden.'
'The aim of science is to gain knowledge about the external world; this is what we mean by an epistemic process. In its most primitive form, the process of achieving knowledge can be
described by what Brody [2] called an epistemic cycle: "Act, and see what happens". Experiments in laboratories and observational studies done by scientists are usually much more
sophisticated than this; they often require several epistemic cycles and also higher order epistemic cycles acting upon the first order cycles. An experiment or an observational study
is always focused on some concrete system, it involves concrete experimental/observational questions and it is always done in a context, which might depend on conceptual formulations;
in addition the context may be partly historical and partly chosen by the scientist himself, or depending upon the scientist.'
For the rest, I refer to my book.
[1] Helland, I.S. (2018) Epistemic Processes. Springer, Berlin.
[2] Brody, T. (1993) In L. de la Pera and P. Hedgson (Eds.) The Philosophy behind Physics. Springer, Berlin.
Inge
Алексей Никулов
My experience is that I can't convince almost no experimenter that quantum mechanics can't describe certain quantum phenomena without
the mind of the observer in this description. The experimenters usually object that the experiment can be performed without an observer
and the results of the experiment can be recorded by a computer. This objection is one of the manifestations of 'the barbarism of
specialisation’ and naive realism inherent contemporary scientists. The experimenters make no distinction between their notions
about measurement and the ability of the quantum mechanics to describe paradoxical quantum phenomena using the measurement process
in this description.
You are not an experimenter, but you also make no distinction between your notions and what quantum mechanics claims. Your opinion
that quantum mechanics depends on the knowledge of an actor is obviously right if we mean that an actor is our reason. Quantum
mechanics not only depends but also belongs to our reason since it, as well as any theory, is created by our (humans) reason. This
should be obvious to everyone and there is no problem with that any theory is subjective. The problem is that quantum mechanics
postulates, as Schrodinger wrote, “an unavoidable and uncontrollable impression from the side of the subject onto the object” [1],
i.e. an influence from the side of our knowledge onto the state of the quantum system.
You wrote: “In a given physical situation there can be a number of communicating actors; they all can be said to act collectively as
knowledge about two balls, red and blue, whereas the 'quantum' entanglement relates to the knowledge about two particles with spin
1/2 of the EPR pair.
Only knowledge of the observer changes due to the observation in the case 'classical' entanglement, since we can think that a color
of each ball existed before the observation whereas no spin state of the two particles of the EPR pair can exist before the first
observation in the case of the 'quantum' entanglement. Quantum mechanics postulates that the mind of the first observer creates spin states of
the both particles regardless of the distance between these particles. The absurdity is that two observers, Alice and Bob, can
create different states of the same particles. Your statements lead to absurdity precisely because you don't make a distinction
between your notions and the statements of a theory.
I have to say that you contradict yourself, like the creators of quantum mechanics. On the one hand you quote your book “The aim of
science is to gain knowledge about the external world; this is what we mean by an epistemic process”. But on the other hand you
write: “If quantum mechanics is about our knowledge, it is about something in our minds. And our minds influence our actions, and our
actions the external world”.
Here you confuse the influence of our body with the direct influence of our mind on the world which is external to our mind. It
would not be absurd if quantum mechanics postulated the influence of our body on the external world since our body is "res extensa"
which is external to our mind - "res cogitans". But quantum mechanics would not contradict realism and locality, and could not
predict violation of Bell's inequalities in this case since any influence of our body, like of any measuring apparatus, is real and
local.
You cannot understand why variables can be hidden and, as a consequence, you cannot understand the meaning of Bell's inequalities
precisely because you confuse the impact of our body with the direct impact of our mind on the external world.
[1] E. Schrodinger, Science and Humanism. Physics in Our Time. Cambridge: University Press, 1952.
Alexey
Richard Gill
Ilja Schmelzer
I have to say that in the final analysis nobody can escape solipsism.
Am Donnerstag, 23. April 2020 17:31:47 UTC+6:30 schrieb nikulovalexey:
My experience is that I can't convince almost no experimenter that quantum mechanics can't describe certain quantum phenomena without
the mind of the observer in this description.
This objection is one of the manifestations of 'the barbarism of
specialisation’ and naive realism inherent contemporary scientists. The experimenters make no distinction between their notions
about measurement and the ability of the quantum mechanics to describe paradoxical quantum phenomena using the measurement process
in this description.
You are not an experimenter, but you also make no distinction between your notions and what quantum mechanics claims. Your opinion
that quantum mechanics depends on the knowledge of an actor is obviously right if we mean that an actor is our reason. Quantum
mechanics not only depends but also belongs to our reason since it, as well as any theory, is created by our (humans) reason.
This should be obvious to everyone and there is no problem with that any theory is subjective. The problem is that quantum mechanics
postulates, as Schrodinger wrote, “an unavoidable and uncontrollable impression from the side of the subject onto the object” [1],
i.e. an influence from the side of our knowledge onto the state of the quantum system.
Only knowledge of the observer changes due to the observation in the case 'classical' entanglement, since we can think that a color
of each ball existed before the observation whereas no spin state of the two particles of the EPR pair can exist before the first
observation in the case of the 'quantum' entanglement. Quantum mechanics postulates that the mind of the first observer creates spin states of
the both particles regardless of the distance between these particles.
The absurdity is that two observers, Alice and Bob, can
create different states of the same particles. Your statements lead to absurdity precisely because you don't make a distinction
between your notions and the statements of a theory.
I have to say that you contradict yourself, like the creators of quantum mechanics. On the one hand you quote your book “The aim of
science is to gain knowledge about the external world; this is what we mean by an epistemic process”. But on the other hand you
write: “If quantum mechanics is about our knowledge, it is about something in our minds. And our minds influence our actions, and our
actions the external world”.
Here you confuse the influence of our body with the direct influence of our mind on the world which is external to our mind. It
would not be absurd if quantum mechanics postulated the influence of our body on the external world since our body is "res extensa"
which is external to our mind - "res cogitans". But quantum mechanics would not contradict realism and locality, and could not
predict violation of Bell's inequalities in this case since any influence of our body, like of any measuring apparatus, is real and
local.
You cannot understand why variables can be hidden and, as a consequence, you cannot understand the meaning of Bell's inequalities
precisely because you confuse the impact of our body with the direct impact of our mind on the external world.
Jan-Åke Larsson
As my example above shows, it is not our mind which makes any difference. And quantum theory does not contradict realism. It is in contradiction only with Einstein causality.
Professor, Head of Department
|
|
Department of Electrical Engineering SE-581 83 Linköping Phone: +46 (0)13-28 14 68 Mobile: +46 (0)13-28 14 68 Visiting address: Campus Valla, House B, Entr 27, 3A:482 Please visit us at www.liu.se |
Ilja Schmelzer
I like what Ilja wrote, and I agree to almost all of it.On tor, 2020-04-23 at 21:27 -0700, Ilja Schmelzer wrote:As my example above shows, it is not our mind which makes any difference. And quantum theory does not contradict realism. It is in contradiction only with Einstein causality.Not only. If you subscribe to realism, every physical system must have infinite memory. Or produce heat, in a specific measurement setup.Perhaps I could interest you in https://arxiv.org/abs/1509.03641
Inge Svein Helland
Thank you, Ilja, for giving a thorough answer to Alexey before I got the time to do so, myself. I agree with almost everything you say. An exception is the issue of superdeterminism versus Einstein causality, which we have discussed before.
I may have been somewhat inaccurate in what I said on the connection between mind and knowledge. On the other hand, there do in fact exist interesting interesting psychological theories based on quantum theory, see [1]. Maybe the mind plays a role, after
all?
[1] Busemeyer, J.R. and Bruza, P.D. (2012) Quantum Models of Cognition and Decision. Cambridge University Press.
Inge
To: Bell inequalities and quantum foundations
Subject: Re: [Bell_quantum_foundations] Tsirelson's theorem
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Jan-Åke Larsson
--
Ilja Schmelzer
Am Freitag, 24. April 2020 12:58:35 UTC+6:30 schrieb ingeh:
On the other hand, there do in fact exist interesting interesting psychological theories based on quantum theory, see [1]. Maybe the mind plays a role, after all?
[1] Busemeyer, J.R. and Bruza, P.D. (2012) Quantum Models of Cognition and Decision. Cambridge University Press.
Алексей Никулов
Solipsism has the disadvantage that the sole observer can create a device, such as a quantum computer, only in their imagination.
Therefore the numerous creators of a quantum computer should not ignore Einstein's repeated warnings that the rejection of the
concept of “the real state of a physical system” by the creators of quantum mechanics inevitably leads to solipsism. They should
also not ignore the only correct definition of the EPR correlation as entanglement of our knowledge, given by Schrodinger in 1935.
Alain Aspect claims in his Viewpoint: ”Closing the Door on Einstein and Bohr’s Quantum Debate” [1]: ”By closing two loopholes at
once, three experimental tests of Bell’s inequalities remove the last doubts that we should renounce local realism. They also open
the door to new quantum information technologies”. Alain Aspect is an outstanding experimenter, but he does not understand that it
is nonsense to propose to create a new technology based on the renouncement of realism, even local. Any real device and any real
technology can be created on the base of a consistent description of reality rather than of our knowledge or of results of observations.
The lack of understanding of this "philosophy" is one of the most surprising consequences of 'the barbarism of specialisation’,
inherent contemporary scientists.
[1] A. Aspect, Viewpoint: Closing the Door on Einstein and Bohr’s Quantum Debate. Physics 8, 123 (2015)
Alexey
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Richard Gill
Alexei, everyone lives in their own imagined universe. It’s what our brains do. Only when there is too large a dissonance between the predictions and the actually received sensory impressions, does our world collapse, and we become mentally ill. The operating system cannot cope with so many error messages (pain, stress) and disturbances and everything grinds to a halt. Sometimes, after a period of inertia, the system reboots, and this gives an opportunity to actually change the order in which modules are loaded and whether or not all modules are loaded. This is called “plasticity”. The brain can rebuild its own operating system using just the BIOS, the most basic and ancient components. Of course some or all of the memory may have been wiped during such re-starts.
From: Алексей Никулов <nikulo...@gmail.com>
Date: Friday, 24 April 2020 at 10:32
To: Richard Gill <gill...@gmail.com>
Cc: Bell inequalities and quantum foundations <Bell_quantum...@googlegroups.com>, Ilja Schmelzer <ilja.sc...@gmail.com>, Inge Helland <in...@math.uio.no>, jupalam <jup...@gmail.com>, Geraldo A Barbosa <geraldo...@gmail.com>, Chantal
Roth <cr...@nobilitas.com>
Subject: Re: [Bell_quantum_foundations] Tsirelson's theorem
Dear Richard,
Алексей Никулов
You and Jan-Åke Larsson agree with Ilja although your opinions are opposite. It is typical for all believers in quantum mechanics.
Quantum mechanics is believed by both realists who are sure that quantum mechanics describes reality, and numerous authors who
refute realism because of its contradiction with quantum mechanics.
Ilya claims that quantum mechanics does not contradict realism with the help of a trick. He claims that theories alternative to
quantum mechanics are interpretations. Then he argues that quantum mechanics does not contradict realism, since realistic
interpretations of quantum mechanics were proposed. His logic is a very strange, since realistic interpretations (more precisely
realistic theories alternative to quantum mechanics) have been proposed precisely because quantum mechanics contradicts realism. For
example, Hugh Everett proposed his theory of of numerous parallel universes since he, in contrast to the majority, understood as far
back as 1957 that the process of observation (Process 1 in von Neumann's terminology) can be descriebed only as lying in the domain
of psychology [1].
Jan-Åke Larsson connected the problems considered in our group with thermodynamics. It is stated in his paper that some problems of
quantum mechanics can be decidable using thermodynamics. Ilja wrote also about the Brownian motion and entropy. Therefore I, as
Guest Editor, would like to annouce the new Special Issue "The Law of Entropy Increase and Boltzmann’s H-Theorem"
https://www.mdpi.com/journal/entropy/special_issues/law_Entropy . This Special Issue is a continuation of the Special Issue on
“Quantum Limits to the Second Law of Thermodynamics” of Entropy, Volume 6, Issue 1 which I edited with Daniel Sheehan sixteen years
ago, see https://www.mdpi.com/1099-4300/6/1 .
The attitude of most scientists to the second law of thermodynamics, like to quantum mechanics, confirms the opinion of Jose Ortega
y Gasset whu stated that ”now it turns out that the actual scientific man is the prototype of the mass-man”. The mass-man believes
what the masses believe without hesitation or questioning the validity of the belief.
The law of entropy increase or the second law of thermodynamics holds the unique position among the laws of Nature. The authors of
the review article [2] wrote:
“The second law of thermodynamics is, without a doubt, one of the most perfect laws in physics. Any reproducible violation of it,
however small, would bring the discoverer great riches as well as a trip to Stockholm. The world's energy problems would be solved
at one stroke. It is not possible to find any other law (except, perhaps, for super selection rules such as charge conservation) for
which a proposed violation would bring more skepticism than this one. Not even Maxwell's laws of electricity or Newton's law of
gravitation are so sacrosanct, for each has measurable corrections coming from quantum effects or general relativity. The law has
caught the attention of poets and philosophers and has been called the greatest scientific achievement of the nineteenth century.
Engels disliked it, for it supported opposition to dialectical materialism, while Pope Pius XII regarded it as proving the existence
of a higher being”.
The second law of thermodynamics or the law of entropy increase has a dramatic history. It was postulated as the Carnot principle.
In his brilliant work of 1824 [3] Sadi Carnot postulated maximum efficiency any heat engine on the basis that otherwise "it would be
not only an perpetual motion, but also an unlimited creation of the driving force without the cost of phlogiston or any other agents".
Smoluchowski wrote in 1914: "We call the Carnot principle as the second law of thermodynamics since Clausius’s time" [4]. The
genius of Carnot is that using the notion of phlogiston, he determined the relationship between the maximum efficiency of the heat
engine and the impossibility of the perpetuum mobile, which is valid in all notions. It became clear that Carnot postulated
irreversibility in physics when the heat began to consider as a form of energy.
Most scientists in the late 19th and even early 20th century negatively related to the Maxwell-Boltzmann statistical theory, because
of the obvious contradiction between the reversibility of the laws of mechanics and the postulated irreversibility of thermodynamics.
Smoluchowski wrote in 1914: "By virtue of trusting in the great achievements of thermodynamics, this principle [the Carnot principle]
was elevated to the rank of the absolute, exact dogma unaware exclusion. And since at that time molecular kinetics under
interpretation of this beginning faced the known difficulties connected with irreversibility of processes, it together with
such outstanding and even great scientists as Henri Poincare and Max Planck.
But in the 20th century the Boltzmann theory, which in the 19th century was considered to be contrary to thermodynamics, became the
basis of the second law of thermodynamics. Most scientists believe that Boltzmann's H - theorem overcame the contradiction between
his deduction every mention of the indispensable presupposition of the validity of his theorem – namely, the assumption of molecular
Almost all physicists, following the Boltzmann, considered the assumption of molecular disorder than for granted. But this
assumption is not based on anything, since molecular disorder is understood as disorder of the thermal motion of any particles:
molecules, Brownian particles, atoms, electrons, ions, etc. Planck questioned the H – theorem of Boltzmann in the late nineteenth
century, before the creation by he of quantum theory in 1900. Almost no one has considered the validity of the assumption of
molecular disorder for quantum systems.
The assumption of molecular disorder implies in particular the impossibility of a directed motion under thermodynamic equilibrium.
But such quantum phenomenon as the persistent current observed in the normal metal and superconducting rings at a non-zero resistance
refutes this impossibility [6]. The persistent current is the experimental evidence of violation of the assumption of molecular
disorder. Therefore it is necessary to recognize that Planck's pedantry appeared ingenious. The observations of the persistent
current refute the H – theorem of Boltzmann and as a consequence of the absolute status of the second law of thermodynamics.
A violation of the second law of thermodynamics means a possibility to build a perpetuum mobile, i.e. the possibility to obtaine
useful work from heat without the necessity to spend a fuel in order to create a temperature difference. Therefore even physicists
who understand physics very well stop to understand when it comes to a violation of the second law of thermodynamics. The attitude
of scientists to this problem is too emotional. We proposed the the Special Issue on “The law of entropy increase and Boltzmann's
H – theorem” in order to descusse the problem of possible violation of the second law of thermodynamics without emotion, on the base
of scientific arguments pros and cons.
We cannot be sure that any violation of the second law of thermodynamics will solve the world's energy problems at one stroke,
contrary to the statement of the authors [2], since the power of a perpetuum mobile may be very weak. For example, the power of
the persistent current observed in [7] equal approximately 10^{-12} W on one ring. The power increases proportional to the number
of the identical asymmetric rings connected in series [7]. But one needs to create a system of 10^{12} = 1000000000000 rings to get
power of just 1 W. On the other hand, we should not exclude the possibility of other examples of violations of the second law of
thermodynamics, which will allow to solve the world's energy problems at one stroke. Scientists must treat the problem of perpetuum
mobile without emotion in order such examples could be found. In any case I state that a perpetuum mobile is much more real than a
quantum computer.
[1] H. Everett ’Relative State’ Formulation of Quantum Mechanics. Rev. Mod. Phys. 29, 454-462 (1957)
[2] Elliott H. Lieb and Jakob Yngvason, The physics and mathematics of the second law of thermodynamics. Physics Reports 310, 1-96 (1999).
[3] S. Carnot, Reflections on the Motive Power of Heat and on Machines Fitted to Develop that Power. New York: J. Wiley and Sons 1897.
[4] M.Smoluchowski, "Gultigkeitsgrenzen des zweiten Hauptsatzes der Warmetheorie", in Vortrage uber kinetische Theorie der Materie und
[6] Alexey Nikulov, Observations of Persistent Current at Non-Zero Resistance: Challenge to the Second Law of Thermodynamics. AIP
Conference Proceedings 1411 “The Second Law of Thermodynamics: Status and Challenges”, 122 – 144 (2011).
[7] V.L. Gurtovoia, V.N. Antonov, M. Exarchos, A.I. Il’in, A.V. Nikulov, The dc power observed on the half of asymmetric superconducting
ring in which current flows against electric field. Physica C 559, 14–20 (2019).
Alexey
Ilja Schmelzer
Ilya claims that quantum mechanics does not contradict realism with the help of a trick. He claims that theories alternative to
quantum mechanics are interpretations. Then he argues that quantum mechanics does not contradict realism, since realistic
interpretations of quantum mechanics were proposed. His logic is a very strange, since realistic interpretations (more precisely
realistic theories alternative to quantum mechanics) have been proposed precisely because quantum mechanics contradicts realism.
Inge Svein Helland
Dear Alexey,
You say that the opinions of Jan-Åke Larsson and me are opposite. Please read the Abstract of the paper that Jan-Åke refers to. The authors distinguish between Type I and Type II interpretations of quantum theory. According to Type I quantum probabilities are seen as determined by intrinsic properties of the observed system. Type II see them as relational experiences between an observer and the system. Using concepts from thermodynamics the authors prove that Type I interpretations are incompatible with certain reasonable assumptions.
Partly by stressing an epistemic interpretation of quantum states, and partly referring to Relational Quantum Mechanics, I have strongly argued for a Type II viewpoint. Jan-Åke and I could not have agreeed more.
Inge
Sent: 24 April 2020 15:14
To: Inge Svein Helland
Cc: Bell inequalities and quantum foundations; Richard Gill; Ilja Schmelzer; jupalam; Geraldo A Barbosa; Chantal Roth
Justo Pastor Lambare
Inge Svein Helland
Dear Justo,
Not quite, but nearly so. I guess Type II is slightly wider than the epistemic interpretation.
Inge
Sent: 24 April 2020 17:23
To: Bell inequalities and quantum foundations
Justo Pastor Lambare
Inge Svein Helland
Or rather, the assumptions of the PBR theorem are not satisfied for them.
Алексей Никулов
Dear Inge,
I meant that you and Jan-Åke Larsson agree with Ilya, although your opinion and Larsson's opinion are the opposite of Ilya's opinion.
Alexey
To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/Bell_quantum_foundations/1587743880334.94612%40math.uio.no.
Inge Svein Helland
I disagree with Ilja on some specific points, but agree with much of what he has written in his last e-mails.
Sent: 24 April 2020 19:21
To: Inge Svein Helland
Cc: Bell inequalities and quantum foundations; Justo Pastor Lambare; Richard Gill; Geraldo A Barbosa; Ilja Schmelzer; Chantal Roth
Jan-Åke Larsson
Алексей Никулов
Dear Inge,
I meant that you disagree with Ilya on the main question: "What does quantum mechanics describe?" The following answers are offered
to this question:
1) Quantum mechanics describes reality;
2) Quantum mechanics describes the knowledge of an observer (called an agent, an actor, and etc.);
3) Quantum mechanics describes both the knowledge of the observer and the reality on which the mind of the observer can influence.
As I understand it, Ilya defends the first answer, you the second. What can you agree with Ilya about if you and Ilya are defending
opposite answers to the main question? Or do you, like many believers in quantum mechanics, not consider significant the question
"What does quantum mechanics describe?"?
Alexey
Ilja Schmelzer
does that mean that Type I are realistic interpretations whale type II epistemic ones?
Richard Gill
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Richard Gill
On 25 Apr 2020, at 06:53, Richard Gill <gill...@gmail.com> wrote:
Inge Svein Helland
Very briefly: Yes, I support 2). But I do not find any clear statement on this issue in Ilja's lateste e-mails. Inge
Sent: 24 April 2020 22:54
To: Jan-Åke Larsson
Cc: Inge Svein Helland; Bell inequalities and quantum foundations; Justo Pastor Lambare; Richard Gill; Geraldo A Barbosa; Ilja Schmelzer; Chantal Roth
Ilja Schmelzer
Am Samstag, 25. April 2020 03:24:23 UTC+6:30 schrieb nikulovalexey:
I meant that you disagree with Ilya on the main question: "What does quantum mechanics describe?" The following answers are offered
to this question:
1) Quantum mechanics describes reality;
2) Quantum mechanics describes the knowledge of an observer (called an agent, an actor, and etc.);
3) Quantum mechanics describes both the knowledge of the observer and the reality on which the mind of the observer can influence.
As I understand it, Ilya defends the first answer, you the second.
Ilja Schmelzer
Ilja, what do you mean by "overlap"?
I find the terminology very confusing. I hate long foreign words like epistemological and ontological. Can't we come up with some plain English terms? I guess Bell's neologism "be-able" is "ontological"
In a mathematical model there are things which one may consider to correspond to things in reality. For instance: if I make a mathematical model of my office then the middle point of my (rectangular) desk is I suppose real, since I think of my desk as being real. What about a point 1 meter straight above the middle point of my desk? I think of it is a real location in space. Is it an element of reality?
Seems to me that all this philosophical talk has a hidden background of coordinate systems, a kind of ether, which must be as real as the things which are supposed to be real too can only be defined relative to them.
Алексей Никулов
You wrote: “I don't use any tricks, I simply use standard established names”. I agree that you use the trick which has become
standard established names for the mass-man. The mass-man became to consider the theories alternative to quantum mechanics as
interpretations first of all because of the censorship of believers in quantum mechanics. Bohm and Everett would not be able to
publish their alternative theories if they did not name these theories as Interpretation of the Quantum Theory or Formulation of
Quantum Mechanics. The authors of other numerous “interpretations” were following willingly or unwittingly Bohm and Everett.
I know from my experience that the censorship of the mass-man can be circumvented if I did not write directly that the result
presented in the manuscript contradicts, for example, the second law of thermodynamics. But I could not publish the manuscript in
any scientific journal if I directly wrote about this contradiction.
You “see no point in fighting about names”. But the point is not in names, but in the fact that a scientific theory should not have
interpretations, since any scientific theory must clearly define what it describes and how. If the creators of a theory do not
clearly define even what this theory describes, then this is not a theory, but a trick.
It is obvious enough that the trick of quantum mechanics is Born’s proposal to consider the Schrodinger wave function as a
description of the amplitude of the observation probability. Anyone, who has not lost the ability to think logically, should
conclude that quantum mechanics, according to Born’s proposal, describes observer's knowledge about results of an upcoming
observation, since the probability of observation describes just this.
But none of the physicists, except a few critics, made this logical conclusion because of the success of quantum mechanics and the
belief in the false substitution of the mind of the observer with a soulless measuring apparatus. Numerous interpretations arose
precisely because the creators of quantum mechanics were obscuring about the subject of the describtion of this theory. Only for
this reason could the nonsense fact have become possible when alternative theories with a different subject of description are
considered interpretations.
You wrote: “Feel free to criticize the Copenhagen interpretation naming it Copenhagen theory, but don't name it quantum theory, this
creates only confusion”.
It is you who create confusion by calling quantum mechanics the Copenhagen interpretation. No Copenhagen interpretation exists. It is
myth created by the mass-man. Can you tell what the Copenhagen interpretation is? Does Born’s proposal belong to this interpretation?
Alexey
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Justo Pastor Lambare
Richard Gill
On 25 Apr 2020, at 13:02, Алексей Никулов <nikulo...@gmail.com> wrote:
Алексей Никулов
To understand quantum mechanics, in particular the essence of Bell's inequalities, it is necessary to understand the meaning of the
probability of observation rather than the meaning of the word “probability”.
You wrote “I'm glad I'm not a philosopher” since you take for philosophers those who think obscurely, often using words that they
themselves do not quite understand. True philosophers think clearly and logically. You think as a true philosopher when you “guess
Bell's neologism "be-able" is 'ontological'”. Accordingly, 'observables' are 'epistemological'.
Your final analysis “it’s all in my own head” is right in the sense that we can know only our notions about Nature, but not Nature
as thing-in-itself. But reality is not relative precisely because it belongs to our notions about Nature. Reality in our notions is
Nature as thing-in-itself, which exists independently of our notions and is the cause of all phenomena which we observe.
Alexey
To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/Bell_quantum_foundations/173F5F51-4E80-4443-8D11-EFEF7797AC8C%40gmail.com.
Алексей Никулов
My discussion belongs to logic and, consequently, to physics, since no science is possible without logic. I have to say that you,
like many modern scientists, cannot think logically. You cannot understand even what Einstein was pointing out back in 1927: Born’s
proposal logically leads to an absurdity without the collapse of the wave function. Although this is quite obvious: quantum
mechanics would predict the possibility to see a single particle in many places at once, i.e. obvious absurd, without the postulate
about the Dirac jump or the collapse of the wave function at the first observation. Therefore, it is absurd to claim that Born’s
proposal does not belong to the interpretation whereas the collapse of the wave function is an interpretation.
If you consider your delusions and the inability to think logically to be a scientific method, then I reject this scientific method.
Excuse me,
Alexey
Justo Pastor Lambare
Алексей Никулов
is the prototype of the mass-man. Not by chance, not through the individual failings of each particular man of science, but because
science itself - the root of our civilisation - automatically converts him into mass-man, makes of him a primitive, a modern
barbarian”.
The mass-man believes what the masses believe and does not know how to think critically and logically. Your opinion about Einstein's
attitude to quantum mechanics is the opinion of the masses rather than the true attitude of Einstein. The true attitude can be
learned by reading Einstein himself, not by the publications of modern authors.
You can't (or don't want to) understand when I explained to you quite clearly that Born’s proposal is unthinkable without the
collapse of the wave function. I did not claim that quantum mechanics predicts that a particle can be detected in two places at the
same time. I wrote that quantum mechanics does not predict this absurd only thanks to the postulate about the Dirac jump or the
collapse of the wave function. Anyone, who can think logically at all, should easily understand that quantum mechanics would
predict that a particle can be detected in two places at the same time without this postulate about an instantaneous and non-local
change in the probability of observing a particle from a non-zero value to zero in all space except the area where the particle was
observed at the first observation.
The believers in quantum mechanics, like you, usually don't know the history of what they believe. I send a text that describes
shortly the history of Born's rule and the clear explanation made by Einstein in 1927 of why this rule "leads to a contradiction with
the postulate of relativity", see attachhed file.
I must say that you follow the misconceptions of the modern masses (the entire community of physicists and scientists) in almost
everything. You belive in 'falsification' as a criterion of the scientific method, since the modern masses, following Popper,
believe in this criterion. You, like the modern masses, do not want to understand that no 'falsification' and no experimental
results can save quantum mechanics from the obvious absurd. The Dirac jump relieved quantum mechanics of one absurdity, but
postulated another absurdity - the omnipotence of the mind of the observer, which can create states of a quantum system at any
distance.
The creators quantum mechanics, following to a schoolboy Robert, who misunderstood philosophy of a philosopher of seventeenth century
Nicolas Malebranche, have impressed you and the modern masses that intuition can be macroscopic. Therefore you and the modern masses
cannot understand the essence of the Schrodinger paradox with the cat which demonstrate that our intuition cannot be macroscopic or
microscopic.
Excuse me,
Alexey
To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/Bell_quantum_foundations/CAKAF9vUU7_0e5CuD%3DwcEEE2ek6eJo1eUfSihd1vpKsHPFQbJLg%40mail.gmail.com.
Ilja Schmelzer
You wrote: “I don't use any tricks, I simply use standard established names”. I agree that you use the trick which has become
standard established names for the mass-man. The mass-man became to consider the theories alternative to quantum mechanics as
interpretations first of all because of the censorship of believers in quantum mechanics. Bohm and Everett would not be able to
publish their alternative theories if they did not name these theories as Interpretation of the Quantum Theory or Formulation of
Quantum Mechanics. The authors of other numerous “interpretations” were following willingly or unwittingly Bohm and Everett.
You “see no point in fighting about names”. But the point is not in names, but in the fact that a scientific theory should not have
interpretations, since any scientific theory must clearly define what it describes and how. If the creators of a theory do not
clearly define even what this theory describes, then this is not a theory, but a trick.
It is obvious enough that the trick of quantum mechanics is Born’s proposal to consider the Schrodinger wave function as a
description of the amplitude of the observation probability. Anyone, who has not lost the ability to think logically, should
conclude that quantum mechanics, according to Born’s proposal, describes observer's knowledge about results of an upcoming
observation, since the probability of observation describes just this.
It is you who create confusion by calling quantum mechanics the Copenhagen interpretation. No Copenhagen interpretation exists. It is
myth created by the mass-man. Can you tell what the Copenhagen interpretation is? Does Born’s proposal belong to this interpretation?