This sentence does not speak English.
These words do not ‘refer’ to themselves.
sɹǝʇʇǝl uǝʌǝ ʇ,uǝɹɐ ǝsǝɥʇ
If you don't like Searle's example, perhaps the above can help illustrate that form is not inherently informative.
The implication here for me is that comp is a red herring as far as ascertaining the origin of awareness.
Either we view computation inherently having awareness as a meaningless epiphenomenal byproduct (yay, no free will), or we presume that computation can and does exist independently of all awareness but that a particular category of meta-computation is what we call awareness.
Even with the allowances that Bruno includes (or my understanding of what Bruno includes) in the form of first person indeterminacy and/or non comp contents, Platonic number dreams, etc - all of these can only negatively assert the completeness of arithmetic truth. My understanding is that Gödel (and others) are used to support this negative assertion, and I of course agree that indeed it is impossible for any arithmetic system to be complete, especially in the sense of defining itself completely. I suspect that Bruno assumes that I don't have a deep enough understanding of this, but I think that what understanding I do have is enough to persuade me that this entire line of investigation is a dead end as far as explaining consciousness. It only works if we assume consciousness as a possibility a priori and independently of any arithmetic logic.
Nowhere do I find in any AI/AGI theory any positive assertion of awareness. It is not enough to say *that* awareness fits into this or that category of programmatic interiority or logically necessary indeterminacy when the question of *what* awareness is in the first place and *why* is has not been addressed at all.
As I demonstrate in the three lines at the top, and Searle tried to demonstrate, awareness does not follow automatically from a negative assertion of computability. I bring up the example of cymatics on another thread. Scooping salt into a symmetrical-mandala pattern does not conjure up an acoustic vibration associated with that pattern. Qualia does not follow from quanta.
Quanta, however, could and I think does follow from qualia as a method of sequestering experiences to different degrees of privacy while retaining shared sense on more primitive 'public' levels. These methods would necessarily be construed as automatic to insulate crosstalk between channels of sense - to encourage the coherence of perceptual inertial frames to develop unique significance rather than to decohere into the entropy of the totality.
Does anyone have any positive assertion of consciousness derived from either physics or arithmetic? Any need for actual feelings and experiences, for direct participation?
Craig
----- Receiving the following content -----From: Craig WeinbergReceiver: everything-listTime: 2012-08-28, 12:19:50Subject: No Chinese Room Necessary
This sentence does not speak English.
These words do not 锟斤拷refer锟斤拷 to themselves.
s锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷l u锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷 锟斤拷,u锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷 锟斤拷s锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷
If you don't like Searle's example, perhaps the above can help illustrate that form is not inherently informative.
The implication here for me is that comp is a red herring as far as ascertaining the origin of awareness.
Either we view computation inherently having awareness as a meaningless epiphenomenal byproduct (yay, no free will), or we presume that computation can and does exist independently of all awareness but that a particular category of meta-computation is what we call awareness.
Even with the allowances that Bruno includes (or my understanding of what Bruno includes) in the form of first person indeterminacy and/or non comp contents, Platonic number dreams, etc - all of these can only negatively assert the completeness of arithmetic truth. My understanding is that G锟斤拷del (and others) are used to support this negative assertion, and I of course agree that indeed it is impossible for any arithmetic system to be complete, especially in the sense of defining itself completely. I suspect that Bruno assumes that I don't have a deep enough understanding of this, but I think that what understanding I do have is enough to persuade me that this entire line of investigation is a dead end as far as explaining consciousness. It only works if we assume consciousness as a possibility a priori and independently of any arithmetic logic.
Nowhere do I find in any AI/AGI theory any positive assertion of awareness. It is not enough to say *that* awareness fits into this or that category of programmatic interiority or logically necessary indeterminacy when the question of *what* awareness is in the first place and *why* is has not been addressed at all.
As I demonstrate in the three lines at the top, and Searle tried to demonstrate, awareness does not follow automatically from a negative assertion of computability. I bring up the example of cymatics on another thread. Scooping salt into a symmetrical-mandala pattern does not conjure up an acoustic vibration associated with that pattern. Qualia does not follow from quanta.
Quanta, however, could and I think does follow from qualia as a method of sequestering experiences to different degrees of privacy while retaining shared sense on more primitive 'public' levels. These methods would necessarily be construed as automatic to insulate crosstalk between channels of sense - to encourage the coherence of perceptual inertial frames to develop unique significance rather than to decohere into the entropy of the totality.
Does anyone have any positive assertion of consciousness derived from either physics or arithmetic? Any need for actual feelings and experiences, for direct participation?
Craig
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Hi Craig WeinbergI agree.Consciousness is not a monople, it is a dipole:Cs = subject + objectThe subject is always first person indeterminate.Being indeterminate, it is not computable.QEDRoger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net8/29/2012Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function."
----- Receiving the following content -----From: Craig WeinbergReceiver: everything-listTime: 2012-08-28, 12:19:50Subject: No Chinese Room Necessary
This sentence does not speak English.
These words do not ‘refer’ to themselves.
s l u ,u s
If you don't like Searle's example, perhaps the above can help illustrate that form is not inherently informative.
The implication here for me is that comp is a red herring as far as ascertaining the origin of awareness.
Either we view computation inherently having awareness as a meaningless epiphenomenal byproduct (yay, no free will), or we presume that computation can and does exist independently of all awareness but that a particular category of meta-computation is what we call awareness.
Even with the allowances that Bruno includes (or my understanding of what Bruno includes) in the form of first person indeterminacy and/or non comp contents, Platonic number dreams, etc - all of these can only negatively assert the completeness of arithmetic truth. My understanding is that G del (and others) are used to support this negative assertion, and I of course agree that indeed it is impossible for any arithmetic system to be complete, especially in the sense of defining itself completely. I suspect that Bruno assumes that I don't have a deep enough understanding of this, but I think that what understanding I do have is enough to persuade me that this entire line of investigation is a dead end as far as explaining consciousness. It only works if we assume consciousness as a possibility a priori and independently of any arithmetic logic.
Nowhere do I find in any AI/AGI theory any positive assertion of awareness. It is not enough to say *that* awareness fits into this or that category of programmatic interiority or logically necessary indeterminacy when the question of *what* awareness is in the first place and *why* is has not been addressed at all.
As I demonstrate in the three lines at the top, and Searle tried to demonstrate, awareness does not follow automatically from a negative assertion of computability. I bring up the example of cymatics on another thread. Scooping salt into a symmetrical-mandala pattern does not conjure up an acoustic vibration associated with that pattern. Qualia does not follow from quanta.
Quanta, however, could and I think does follow from qualia as a method of sequestering experiences to different degrees of privacy while retaining shared sense on more primitive 'public' levels. These methods would necessarily be construed as automatic to insulate crosstalk between channels of sense - to encourage the coherence of perceptual inertial frames to develop unique significance rather than to decohere into the entropy of the totality.
Does anyone have any positive assertion of consciousness derived from either physics or arithmetic? Any need for actual feelings and experiences, for direct participation?
Craig
--
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Hi Craig WeinbergI agree.Consciousness is not a monople, it is a dipole:Cs = subject + objectThe subject is always first person indeterminate.Being indeterminate, it is not computable.QED
Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net8/29/2012Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function."
----- Receiving the following content -----From: Craig WeinbergReceiver: everything-listTime: 2012-08-28, 12:19:50Subject: No Chinese Room Necessary
This sentence does not speak English.
These words do not ‘refer’ to themselves.
s l u ,u s
If you don't like Searle's example, perhaps the above can help illustrate that form is not inherently informative.
The implication here for me is that comp is a red herring as far as ascertaining the origin of awareness.
Either we view computation inherently having awareness as a meaningless epiphenomenal byproduct (yay, no free will), or we presume that computation can and does exist independently of all awareness but that a particular category of meta-computation is what we call awareness.
Even with the allowances that Bruno includes (or my understanding of what Bruno includes) in the form of first person indeterminacy and/or non comp contents, Platonic number dreams, etc - all of these can only negatively assert the completeness of arithmetic truth. My understanding is that G del (and others) are used to support this negative assertion, and I of course agree that indeed it is impossible for any arithmetic system to be complete, especially in the sense of defining itself completely. I suspect that Bruno assumes that I don't have a deep enough understanding of this, but I think that what understanding I do have is enough to persuade me that this entire line of investigation is a dead end as far as explaining consciousness. It only works if we assume consciousness as a possibility a priori and independently of any arithmetic logic.
Nowhere do I find in any AI/AGI theory any positive assertion of awareness. It is not enough to say *that* awareness fits into this or that category of programmatic interiority or logically necessary indeterminacy when the question of *what* awareness is in the first place and *why* is has not been addressed at all.
As I demonstrate in the three lines at the top, and Searle tried to demonstrate, awareness does not follow automatically from a negative assertion of computability. I bring up the example of cymatics on another thread. Scooping salt into a symmetrical-mandala pattern does not conjure up an acoustic vibration associated with that pattern. Qualia does not follow from quanta.
Quanta, however, could and I think does follow from qualia as a method of sequestering experiences to different degrees of privacy while retaining shared sense on more primitive 'public' levels. These methods would necessarily be construed as automatic to insulate crosstalk between channels of sense - to encourage the coherence of perceptual inertial frames to develop unique significance rather than to decohere into the entropy of the totality.
Does anyone have any positive assertion of consciousness derived from either physics or arithmetic? Any need for actual feelings and experiences, for direct participation?
Craig
--
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the subject is preceived as singular because it has memory. It has memory because it is intelligent and social. thereforre it is moral. therefore it needs memory to give and take account of its debts and merits with others.
This singularity is by definition because no other lived the same life of ourselves. But up to a point it is not essential. We can be made accustomed to other ourselves. Most twins consider each other another self. We could come to consider normal to say hello to our recently created clones. Although this probably will never happen.
To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/AQOANUvnFz4J.
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Alberto G. CoronaReceiver: everything-listTime: 2012-08-29, 08:21:27Subject: Re: No Chinese Room NecessaryHi:Awareness can 锟斤拷be functionally (we do not know if experientially) 锟斤拷computable. A program can run another program (a metaprogram) and do things depending on its results of the metaprogram (or his real time status). This is rutine in computer science and these programs are called "interpreters".锟斤拷The lack of 锟斤拷understanding, of this capability of metacomputation that any turing complete machine has, is IMHO the reason why 锟斤拷it is said that the brain-mind can do things that a computer can never do. 锟斤拷We humans can manage concepts in two ways : a direct way and a reflective way. The second is the result of an analysis of the first trough a metacomputation.For example we can not be aware of our use of category theory or our intuitions because they are hardwired programs, not interpreted programs. We can not know 锟斤拷our deep thinking structures because they are not exposed as metacomputations. When we use锟斤拷metaphorically锟斤拷the verb "to be fired" 锟斤拷to mean being redundant, we are using category theory but we can not be aware of it. 锟斤拷Only after research that assimilate mathematical facts with the observable psichology of humans, we can create an awareness of it by means of an adquired metacomputation.The same happens with the intuitions. We appreciate the beauty of a woman for adaptive reasons, but not the computation that produces this intuition. In the other side, we can appreciate the fact that the process 锟斤拷of diagonalization by G锟斤拷del 锟斤拷makes the Hilbert program impossible, That same conclusion can be reached by a program that metacomputes a constructive mathematical program. (see my post about the G锟斤拷del theorem).
Again, I do not see COMP a problem for the Existential problem of free will nor in any other existential question.
Consciousness is not a monople, it is a dipole:
锟斤拷
Cs = subject + object
锟斤拷
The subject is always first person indeterminate.
Being indeterminate,锟斤拷it is not computable.锟斤拷QED锟斤拷锟斤拷
Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net8/29/2012Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function."
----- Receiving the following content -----From: Craig WeinbergReceiver: everything-listTime: 2012-08-28, 12:19:50Subject: No Chinese Room Necessary
This sentence does not speak English.
These words do not 锟斤拷refer锟斤拷 to themselves.
s锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷l u锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷 锟斤拷,u锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷 锟斤拷s锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷
If you don't like Searle's example, perhaps the above can help illustrate that form is not inherently informative.
The implication here for me is that comp is a red herring as far as ascertaining the origin of awareness.
Either we view computation inherently having awareness as a meaningless epiphenomenal byproduct (yay, no free will), or we presume that computation can and does exist independently of all awareness but that a particular category of meta-computation is what we call awareness.
Even with the allowances that Bruno includes (or my understanding of what Bruno includes) in the form of first person indeterminacy and/or non comp contents, Platonic number dreams, etc - all of these can only negatively assert the completeness of arithmetic truth. My understanding is that G锟斤拷del (and others) are used to support this negative assertion, and I of course agree that indeed it is impossible for any arithmetic system to be complete, especially in the sense of defining itself completely. I suspect that Bruno assumes that I don't have a deep enough understanding of this, but I think that what understanding I do have is enough to persuade me that this entire line of investigation is a dead end as far as explaining consciousness. It only works if we assume consciousness as a possibility a priori and independently of any arithmetic logic.
Nowhere do I find in any AI/AGI theory any positive assertion of awareness. It is not enough to say *that* awareness fits into this or that category of programmatic interiority or logically necessary indeterminacy when the question of *what* awareness is in the first place and *why* is has not been addressed at all.
As I demonstrate in the three lines at the top, and Searle tried to demonstrate, awareness does not follow automatically from a negative assertion of computability. I bring up the example of cymatics on another thread. Scooping salt into a symmetrical-mandala pattern does not conjure up an acoustic vibration associated with that pattern. Qualia does not follow from quanta.
Quanta, however, could and I think does follow from qualia as a method of sequestering experiences to different degrees of privacy while retaining shared sense on more primitive 'public' levels. These methods would necessarily be construed as automatic to insulate crosstalk between channels of sense - to encourage the coherence of perceptual inertial frames to develop unique significance rather than to decohere into the entropy of the totality.
Does anyone have any positive assertion of consciousness derived from either physics or arithmetic? Any need for actual feelings and experiences, for direct participation?
Craig
--
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Hi Alberto G. Corona
What sort of an output would the computer give me ?It can't be experiential, 0or if it is, I know of noway to hook it to my brain.Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net8/29/2012Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function."
----- Receiving the following content -----From: Alberto G. CoronaReceiver: everything-listTime: 2012-08-29, 08:21:27Subject: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary
Hi:
Awareness can be functionally (we do not know if experientially) computable. A program can run another program (a metaprogram) and do things depending on its results of the metaprogram (or his real time status). This is rutine in computer science and these programs are called "interpreters".
The lack of understanding, of this capability of metacomputation that any turing complete machine has, is IMHO the reason why it is said that the brain-mind can do things that a computer can never do. We humans can manage concepts in two ways : a direct way and a reflective way. The second is the result of an analysis of the first trough a metacomputation.
For example we can not be aware of our use of category theory or our intuitions because they are hardwired programs, not interpreted programs. We can not know our deep thinking structures because they are not exposed as metacomputations. When we use metaphorically the verb "to be fired" to mean being redundant, we are using category theory but we can not be aware of it. Only after research that assimilate mathematical facts with the observable psichology of humans, we can create an awareness of it by means of an adquired metacomputation.The same happens with the intuitions. We appreciate the beauty of a woman for adaptive reasons, but not the computation that produces this intuition. In the other side, we can appreciate the fact that the process of diagonalization by G del makes the Hilbert program impossible, That same conclusion can be reached by a program that metacomputes a constructive mathematical program. (see my post about the G del theorem).
Again, I do not see COMP a problem for the Existential problem of free will nor in any other existential question.
Consciousness is not a monople, it is a dipole:
Cs = subject + object
The subject is always first person indeterminate.
Being indeterminate, it is not computable.QED
Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net8/29/2012Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function."
----- Receiving the following content -----From: Craig WeinbergReceiver: everything-listTime: 2012-08-28, 12:19:50Subject: No Chinese Room Necessary
This sentence does not speak English.
These words do not ‘refer’ to themselves.
s l u ,u s
If you don't like Searle's example, perhaps the above can help illustrate that form is not inherently informative.
The implication here for me is that comp is a red herring as far as ascertaining the origin of awareness.
Either we view computation inherently having awareness as a meaningless epiphenomenal byproduct (yay, no free will), or we presume that computation can and does exist independently of all awareness but that a particular category of meta-computation is what we call awareness.
Even with the allowances that Bruno includes (or my understanding of what Bruno includes) in the form of first person indeterminacy and/or non comp contents, Platonic number dreams, etc - all of these can only negatively assert the completeness of arithmetic truth. My understanding is that G del (and others) are used to support this negative assertion, and I of course agree that indeed it is impossible for any arithmetic system to be complete, especially in the sense of defining itself completely. I suspect that Bruno assumes that I don't have a deep enough understanding of this, but I think that what understanding I do have is enough to persuade me that this entire line of investigation is a dead end as far as explaining consciousness. It only works if we assume consciousness as a possibility a priori and independently of any arithmetic logic.
Hi Stephen,
Actually what you're saying makes me think of something new. Maybe the assumed singularity of the subject comes only through objectivity. Think of the dreamstate, or dementia, or infancy, where subjectivity is most directly exposed. The nature of the subject by itself is neither one nor many but orthogonal to quantity. It is a non-specific quasi-multiplicity/singularity of possible qualities and experiences.
It is the experience of objects that divides the self into a hypothetical 'one' as it internalizes its own place in the world of discrete objects.
Deprive it of sleep or give it a good movie to watch in a dark theater and the subject goes right back to (non-zero/non-infinity).
This affirms my sense of quantity on the outside, quality on the inside.
the subject is preceived as singular because it has memory. It has memory because it is intelligent and social. thereforre it is moral. therefore it needs memory to give and take account of its debts and merits with others.
This singularity is by definition because no other lived the same life of ourselves.
But up to a point it is not essential. We can be made accustomed to other ourselves. Most twins consider each other another self. We could come to consider normal to say hello to our recently created clones. Although this probably will never happen.
To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/gCCMCgPvNLIJ.
On 8/29/2012 8:44 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
the subject is preceived as singular because it has memory. It has memory because it is intelligent and social. thereforre it is moral. therefore it needs memory to give and take account of its debts and merits with others.
Hi Albert,
Memory is necessary but not sufficient. It the the content of memory and how it is sequentially ordered that matters. "I am what I remember myself to be."
No, because we could never know that for sure. It is singular in the sense of "only I can know what it is like to be me" is exactly true for each and every one of us. The result is that I cannot know what it is like to be you.
This singularity is by definition because no other lived the same life of ourselves.
Please elaborate! Try to speculate a situation where it might occur. There is something important to this!
But up to a point it is not essential. We can be made accustomed to other ourselves. Most twins consider each other another self. We could come to consider normal to say hello to our recently created clones. Although this probably will never happen.
--
the subject is preceived as singular because it has memory. It has memory because it is intelligent and social. thereforre it is moral. therefore it needs memory to give and take account of its debts and merits with others.
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Alberto G. CoronaReceiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-08-29, 08:44:19
Subject: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary
the subject 锟斤拷is preceived as singular because it has memory. It has memory because it is intelligent and social. thereforre it is moral. therefore it needs memory to give and take account of its debts and merits with others.锟斤拷This singularity is by definition because no other lived the same life of ourselves. But up to a point it is not essential. We can be made accustomed to other ourselves. 锟斤拷Most twins consider each other another self. We 锟斤拷could come to consider normal to say hello to our recently created clones. Although this锟斤拷probably锟斤拷will never happen.
2012/8/29 Stephen P. King <step...@charter.net>
On 8/29/2012 7:38 AM, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi Craig Weinberg锟斤拷I agree.锟斤拷
Consciousness is not a monople, it is a dipole:
锟斤拷
Cs = subject + object
锟斤拷
The subject is always first person indeterminate.
Being indeterminate,锟斤拷it is not computable.锟斤拷QED
Hi Roger,
锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷 It is not a dipole in the normal sense, as the object is not restricted to being singular. The subject is always singular (necessity) while the object is possibly singular.
锟斤拷锟斤拷
Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net8/29/2012Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function."
----- Receiving the following content -----From: Craig WeinbergReceiver: everything-listTime: 2012-08-28, 12:19:50Subject: No Chinese Room Necessary
This sentence does not speak English.
These words do not 锟斤拷refer锟斤拷 to themselves.
s锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷l u锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷 锟斤拷,u锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷 锟斤拷s锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷
If you don't like Searle's example, perhaps the above can help illustrate that form is not inherently informative.
The implication here for me is that comp is a red herring as far as ascertaining the origin of awareness.
Either we view computation inherently having awareness as a meaningless epiphenomenal byproduct (yay, no free will), or we presume that computation can and does exist independently of all awareness but that a particular category of meta-computation is what we call awareness.
Even with the allowances that Bruno includes (or my understanding of what Bruno includes) in the form of first person indeterminacy and/or non comp contents, Platonic number dreams, etc - all of these can only negatively assert the completeness of arithmetic truth. My understanding is that G锟斤拷del (and others) are used to support this negative assertion, and I of course agree that indeed it is impossible for any arithmetic system to be complete, especially in the sense of defining itself completely. I suspect that Bruno assumes that I don't have a deep enough understanding of this, but I think that what understanding I do have is enough to persuade me that this entire line of investigation is a dead end as far as explaining consciousness. It only works if we assume consciousness as a possibility a priori and independently of any arithmetic logic.
Nowhere do I find in any AI/AGI theory any positive assertion of awareness. It is not enough to say *that* awareness fits into this or that category of programmatic interiority or logically necessary indeterminacy when the question of *what* awareness is in the first place and *why* is has not been addressed at all.
As I demonstrate in the three lines at the top, and Searle tried to demonstrate, awareness does not follow automatically from a negative assertion of computability. I bring up the example of cymatics on another thread. Scooping salt into a symmetrical-mandala pattern does not conjure up an acoustic vibration associated with that pattern. Qualia does not follow from quanta.
Quanta, however, could and I think does follow from qualia as a method of sequestering experiences to different degrees of privacy while retaining shared sense on more primitive 'public' levels. These methods would necessarily be construed as automatic to insulate crosstalk between channels of sense - to encourage the coherence of perceptual inertial frames to develop unique significance rather than to decohere into the entropy of the totality.
Does anyone have any positive assertion of consciousness derived from either physics or arithmetic? Any need for actual feelings and experiences, for direct participation?
Craig
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-- Onward! Stephen http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html
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----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Alberto G. CoronaReceiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-08-29, 09:08:43
Subject: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary
Craig:I just wanted to summarize the evolutionary reasons why idividuality exist, (no matter if individuality is a cause or an effect of phisical laws). 锟斤拷I did an extended account of this somewhere else in this list.I do not accept normative as distinct from objective. this is the fallacy of the naturalistic fallacy.锟斤拷Psychopathy锟斤拷(not in the abstract sense, but in the real sense with wich it appear in humans) 锟斤拷exist just because exist morality. It is an exploitation of morality for selfish purposes. Therefore it can be considered a morality effect. it would be non adaptive, and therefore unexistent, if there were no moral beings.
On Wednesday, August 29, 2012 8:44:40 AM UTC-4, Alberto G.Corona wrote:
the subject 锟斤拷is preceived as singular because it has memory. It has memory because it is intelligent and social. thereforre it is moral. therefore it needs memory to give and take account of its debts and merits with others.锟斤拷
What you are talking about is all a-posterior to objectivity. In a dream whole ensembles of 'memories' appear and disappear. It is possible to be intelligent and social and not be moral (sociopaths have memory). I think you are making some normative assumptions. When we generalize about consciousness we should not limit it to healthy-adult-human waking consciousness only.
锟斤拷This singularity is by definition because no other lived the same life of ourselves. But up to a point it is not essential. We can be made accustomed to other ourselves. 锟斤拷Most twins consider each other another self. We 锟斤拷could come to consider normal to say hello to our recently created clones. Although this锟斤拷probably锟斤拷will never happen.
In the story I read on brain conjoined twins, the sisters consider themselves both the same person in some contexts and different in others. They live the same life in one sense, different lives in another (life on the right side is not life on the left side...one girl's head is in a more awkward position than the other, etc).
锟斤拷
2012/8/29 Stephen P. King <step...@charter.net>
On 8/29/2012 7:38 AM, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi Craig Weinberg锟斤拷I agree.锟斤拷
Consciousness is not a monople, it is a dipole:
锟斤拷
Cs = subject + object
锟斤拷
The subject is always first person indeterminate.
Being indeterminate,锟斤拷it is not computable.锟斤拷QED
Hi Roger,
锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷 It is not a dipole in the normal sense, as the object is not restricted to being singular. The subject is always singular (necessity) while the object is possibly singular.锟斤拷锟斤拷
Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net8/29/2012Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function."
----- Receiving the following content -----From: Craig WeinbergReceiver: everything-listTime: 2012-08-28, 12:19:50Subject: No Chinese Room Necessary
This sentence does not speak English.
These words do not 锟斤拷refer锟斤拷 to themselves.
s锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷l u锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷 锟斤拷,u锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷 锟斤拷s锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷
If you don't like Searle's example, perhaps the above can help illustrate that form is not inherently informative.
The implication here for me is that comp is a red herring as far as ascertaining the origin of awareness.
Either we view computation inherently having awareness as a meaningless epiphenomenal byproduct (yay, no free will), or we presume that computation can and does exist independently of all awareness but that a particular category of meta-computation is what we call awareness.
Even with the allowances that Bruno includes (or my understanding of what Bruno includes) in the form of first person indeterminacy and/or non comp contents, Platonic number dreams, etc - all of these can only negatively assert the completeness of arithmetic truth. My understanding is that G锟斤拷del (and others) are used to support this negative assertion, and I of course agree that indeed it is impossible for any arithmetic system to be complete, especially in the sense of defining itself completely. I suspect that Bruno assumes that I don't have a deep enough understanding of this, but I think that what understanding I do have is enough to persuade me that this entire line of investigation is a dead end as far as explaining consciousness. It only works if we assume consciousness as a possibility a priori and independently of any arithmetic logic.
Right! That is how naming occurs.
----- Receiving the following content -----From: Alberto G. CoronaReceiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-08-29, 09:34:22Subject: Re: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary
Roger,I said that the awareness functionalty can be computable, that is that a inner computation can affect an external computation which is aware of the consequences of this inner computation.
锟斤拷锟斤拷like in the case of any relation of brain and mind,锟斤拷I do not say that this IS 锟斤拷the experience of awareness, but given the duality between mind and matter/brain, it is very plausible that the brain work that way when, in the paralell word of the mind, the mind experiences awareness2012/8/29 Roger Clough <rcl...@verizon.net>Hi Alberto G. Corona锟斤拷
What sort of an output would the computer give me ?It can't be experiential, 0or if it is, I know of noway to hook it to my brain.
锟斤拷锟斤拷
Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net8/29/2012Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function."
----- Receiving the following content -----From: Alberto G. CoronaReceiver: everything-listTime: 2012-08-29, 08:21:27Subject: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary
Hi:
Awareness can 锟斤拷be functionally (we do not know if experientially) 锟斤拷computable. A program can run another program (a metaprogram) and do things depending on its results of the metaprogram (or his real time status). This is rutine in computer science and these programs are called "interpreters".
锟斤拷The lack of 锟斤拷understanding, of this capability of metacomputation that any turing complete machine has, is IMHO the reason why 锟斤拷it is said that the brain-mind can do things that a computer can never do. 锟斤拷We humans can manage concepts in two ways : a direct way and a reflective way. The second is the result of an analysis of the first trough a metacomputation.For example we can not be aware of our use of category theory or our intuitions because they are hardwired programs, not interpreted programs. We can not know 锟斤拷our deep thinking structures because they are not exposed as metacomputations. When we use锟斤拷metaphorically锟斤拷the verb "to be fired" 锟斤拷to mean being redundant, we are using category theory but we can not be aware of it. 锟斤拷Only after research that assimilate mathematical facts with the observable psichology of humans, we can create an awareness of it by means of an adquired metacomputation.
The same happens with the intuitions. We appreciate the beauty of a woman for adaptive reasons, but not the computation that produces this intuition. In the other side, we can appreciate the fact that the process 锟斤拷of diagonalization by G锟斤拷del 锟斤拷makes the Hilbert program impossible, That same conclusion can be reached by a program that metacomputes a constructive mathematical program. (see my post about the G锟斤拷del theorem).
Again, I do not see COMP a problem for the Existential problem of free will nor in any other existential question.
Consciousness is not a monople, it is a dipole:
锟斤拷
Cs = subject + object
锟斤拷
The subject is always first person indeterminate.
Being indeterminate,锟斤拷it is not computable.锟斤拷QED锟斤拷锟斤拷
Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net8/29/2012Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function."
----- Receiving the following content -----From: Craig WeinbergReceiver: everything-listTime: 2012-08-28, 12:19:50Subject: No Chinese Room Necessary
This sentence does not speak English.
These words do not 锟斤拷refer锟斤拷 to themselves.
s锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷l u锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷 锟斤拷,u锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷 锟斤拷s锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷
If you don't like Searle's example, perhaps the above can help illustrate that form is not inherently informative.
The implication here for me is that comp is a red herring as far as ascertaining the origin of awareness.
Either we view computation inherently having awareness as a meaningless epiphenomenal byproduct (yay, no free will), or we presume that computation can and does exist independently of all awareness but that a particular category of meta-computation is what we call awareness.
Even with the allowances that Bruno includes (or my understanding of what Bruno includes) in the form of first person indeterminacy and/or non comp contents, Platonic number dreams, etc - all of these can only negatively assert the completeness of arithmetic truth. My understanding is that G锟斤拷del (and others) are used to support this negative assertion, and I of course agree that indeed it is impossible for any arithmetic system to be complete, especially in the sense of defining itself completely. I suspect that Bruno assumes that I don't have a deep enough understanding of this, but I think that what understanding I do have is enough to persuade me that this entire line of investigation is a dead end as far as explaining consciousness. It only works if we assume consciousness as a possibility a priori and independently of any arithmetic logic.
Craig,Is the universe expanding (at an accelerating rate)because it " excretes public entropy (space) as exhaust "?Richard
Awareness = I see X.or I am X.or some similar statement.There's no computer in that behavior or state of being.Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net8/29/2012Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function."
Time: 2012-08-29, 09:34:22Subject: Re: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary
Roger,I said that the awareness functionalty can be computable, that is that a inner computation can affect an external computation which is aware of the consequences of this inner computation.
like in the case of any relation of brain and mind, I do not say that this IS the experience of awareness, but given the duality between mind and matter/brain, it is very plausible that the brain work that way when, in the paralell word of the mind, the mind experiences awareness2012/8/29 Roger Clough <rcl...@verizon.net>Hi Alberto G. Corona
What sort of an output would the computer give me ?It can't be experiential, 0or if it is, I know of noway to hook it to my brain.
Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net8/29/2012Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function."
----- Receiving the following content -----From: Alberto G. CoronaReceiver: everything-listTime: 2012-08-29, 08:21:27Subject: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary
Hi:
Awareness can be functionally (we do not know if experientially) computable. A program can run another program (a metaprogram) and do things depending on its results of the metaprogram (or his real time status). This is rutine in computer science and these programs are called "interpreters".
The lack of understanding, of this capability of metacomputation that any turing complete machine has, is IMHO the reason why it is said that the brain-mind can do things that a computer can never do. We humans can manage concepts in two ways : a direct way and a reflective way. The second is the result of an analysis of the first trough a metacomputation.For example we can not be aware of our use of category theory or our intuitions because they are hardwired programs, not interpreted programs. We can not know our deep thinking structures because they are not exposed as metacomputations. When we use metaphorically the verb "to be fired" to mean being redundant, we are using category theory but we can not be aware of it. Only after research that assimilate mathematical facts with the observable psichology of humans, we can create an awareness of it by means of an adquired metacomputation.
The same happens with the intuitions. We appreciate the beauty of a woman for adaptive reasons, but not the computation that produces this intuition. In the other side, we can appreciate the fact that the process of diagonalization by G del makes the Hilbert program impossible, That same conclusion can be reached by a program that metacomputes a constructive mathematical program. (see my post about the G del theorem).
Again, I do not see COMP a problem for the Existential problem of free will nor in any other existential question.
Consciousness is not a monople, it is a dipole:
Cs = subject + object
The subject is always first person indeterminate.
Being indeterminate, it is not computable.QED
Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net8/29/2012Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function."
----- Receiving the following content -----From: Craig WeinbergReceiver: everything-listTime: 2012-08-28, 12:19:50Subject: No Chinese Room Necessary
This sentence does not speak English.
These words do not ‘refer’ to themselves.
s l u ,u s
If you don't like Searle's example, perhaps the above can help illustrate that form is not inherently informative.
The implication here for me is that comp is a red herring as far as ascertaining the origin of awareness.
Either we view computation inherently having awareness as a meaningless epiphenomenal byproduct (yay, no free will), or we presume that computation can and does exist independently of all awareness but that a particular category of meta-computation is what we call awareness.
Even with the allowances that Bruno includes (or my understanding of what Bruno includes) in the form of first person indeterminacy and/or non comp contents, Platonic number dreams, etc - all of these can only negatively assert the completeness of arithmetic truth. My understanding is that G del (and others) are used to support this negative assertion, and I of course agree that indeed it is impossible for any arithmetic system to be complete, especially in the sense of defining itself completely. I suspect that Bruno assumes that I don't have a deep enough understanding of this, but I think that what understanding I do have is enough to persuade me that this entire line of investigation is a dead end as far as explaining consciousness. It only works if we assume consciousness as a possibility a priori and independently of any arithmetic logic.
Hi Alberto G. CoronaSubjectivity has nothing to do with morality or evolution, it is simply the private of personal state of a perceiver (of some object), ie it is experience.Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net8/29/2012Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function."
----- Receiving the following content -----From: Alberto G. CoronaReceiver: everything-listTime: 2012-08-29, 09:08:43Subject: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary
Craig:I just wanted to summarize the evolutionary reasons why idividuality exist, (no matter if individuality is a cause or an effect of phisical laws). I did an extended account of this somewhere else in this list.
I do not accept normative as distinct from objective. this is the fallacy of the naturalistic fallacy.
Psychopathy (not in the abstract sense, but in the real sense with wich it appear in humans) exist just because exist morality. It is an exploitation of morality for selfish purposes. Therefore it can be considered a morality effect. it would be non adaptive, and therefore unexistent, if there were no moral beings.
On Wednesday, August 29, 2012 8:44:40 AM UTC-4, Alberto G.Corona wrote:
the subject is preceived as singular because it has memory. It has memory because it is intelligent and social. thereforre it is moral. therefore it needs memory to give and take account of its debts and merits with others.
What you are talking about is all a-posterior to objectivity. In a dream whole ensembles of 'memories' appear and disappear. It is possible to be intelligent and social and not be moral (sociopaths have memory). I think you are making some normative assumptions. When we generalize about consciousness we should not limit it to healthy-adult-human waking consciousness only.
This singularity is by definition because no other lived the same life of ourselves. But up to a point it is not essential. We can be made accustomed to other ourselves. Most twins consider each other another self. We could come to consider normal to say hello to our recently created clones. Although this probably will never happen.
In the story I read on brain conjoined twins, the sisters consider themselves both the same person in some contexts and different in others. They live the same life in one sense, different lives in another (life on the right side is not life on the left side...one girl's head is in a more awkward position than the other, etc).
2012/8/29 Stephen P. King <step...@charter.net>
On 8/29/2012 7:38 AM, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi Craig WeinbergI agree.
Consciousness is not a monople, it is a dipole:
Cs = subject + object
The subject is always first person indeterminate.
Being indeterminate, it is not computable.QED
Hi Roger,
It is not a dipole in the normal sense, as the object is not restricted to being singular. The subject is always singular (necessity) while the object is possibly singular.
Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net8/29/2012Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function."
----- Receiving the following content -----From: Craig WeinbergReceiver: everything-listTime: 2012-08-28, 12:19:50Subject: No Chinese Room Necessary
This sentence does not speak English.
These words do not ‘refer’ to themselves.
s l u ,u s
If you don't like Searle's example, perhaps the above can help illustrate that form is not inherently informative.
The implication here for me is that comp is a red herring as far as ascertaining the origin of awareness.
Either we view computation inherently having awareness as a meaningless epiphenomenal byproduct (yay, no free will), or we presume that computation can and does exist independently of all awareness but that a particular category of meta-computation is what we call awareness.
Even with the allowances that Bruno includes (or my understanding of what Bruno includes) in the form of first person indeterminacy and/or non comp contents, Platonic number dreams, etc - all of these can only negatively assert the completeness of arithmetic truth. My understanding is that G del (and others) are used to support this negative assertion, and I of course agree that indeed it is impossible for any arithmetic system to be complete, especially in the sense of defining itself completely. I suspect that Bruno assumes that I don't have a deep enough understanding of this, but I think that what understanding I do have is enough to persuade me that this entire line of investigation is a dead end as far as explaining consciousness. It only works if we assume consciousness as a possibility a priori and independently of any arithmetic logic.
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Alberto G. CoronaReceiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-08-29, 10:39:37
Subject: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary
2012/8/29 Stephen P. King <step...@charter.net>
On 8/29/2012 8:44 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
Hi Albert,the subject 锟斤拷is preceived as singular because it has memory. It has memory because it is intelligent and social. thereforre it is moral. therefore it needs memory to give and take account of its debts and merits with others.
锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷 Memory is necessary but not sufficient. It the the content of memory and how it is sequentially ordered锟斤拷 that matters. "I am what I remember myself to be."
in my own terms, this is a metacomputation (interpreted computation) operating over my own memory. The possibility of this metacomputation comes from evolutionary reasons: to reflect about the moral Albert that others see on me.
This singularity is by definition because no other lived the same life of ourselves.
锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷 No, because we could never know that for sure. It is singular in the sense of "only I can know what it is like to be me" is exactly true for each and every one of us. The result is that I cannot know what it is like to be you.That锟斤拷s why this uniqueness is not 锟斤拷essential锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷 Please elaborate! Try to speculate a situation where it might occur. There is something important to this!
But up to a point it is not essential. We can be made accustomed to other ourselves. 锟斤拷Most twins consider each other another self. We 锟斤拷could come to consider normal to say hello to our recently created clones. Although this锟斤拷probably锟斤拷will never happen.This is a logical possibility due to the nonessentiality of uniqueness of individuality. (Or in Bruno terms: the first person indeterminacy). 锟斤拷But probably the cloning machine would never exist. Sorry I can not ellaborate further....
2012/8/29 Stephen P. King <step...@charter.net>
On 8/29/2012 7:38 AM, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi Craig Weinberg锟斤拷I agree.锟斤拷
Consciousness is not a monople, it is a dipole:
锟斤拷
Cs = subject + object
锟斤拷
The subject is always first person indeterminate.
Being indeterminate,锟斤拷it is not computable.锟斤拷QED
Hi Roger,
锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷 It is not a dipole in the normal sense, as the object is not restricted to being singular. The subject is always singular (necessity) while the object is possibly singular.
锟斤拷锟斤拷
Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net8/29/2012Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function."
----- Receiving the following content -----From: Craig WeinbergReceiver: everything-listTime: 2012-08-28, 12:19:50Subject: No Chinese Room Necessary
This sentence does not speak English.
These words do not 锟斤拷refer锟斤拷 to themselves.
s锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷l u锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷 锟斤拷,u锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷 锟斤拷s锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷
If you don't like Searle's example, perhaps the above can help illustrate that form is not inherently informative.
The implication here for me is that comp is a red herring as far as ascertaining the origin of awareness.
Either we view computation inherently having awareness as a meaningless epiphenomenal byproduct (yay, no free will), or we presume that computation can and does exist independently of all awareness but that a particular category of meta-computation is what we call awareness.
Even with the allowances that Bruno includes (or my understanding of what Bruno includes) in the form of first person indeterminacy and/or non comp contents, Platonic number dreams, etc - all of these can only negatively assert the completeness of arithmetic truth. My understanding is that G锟斤拷del (and others) are used to support this negative assertion, and I of course agree that indeed it is impossible for any arithmetic system to be complete, especially in the sense of defining itself completely. I suspect that Bruno assumes that I don't have a deep enough understanding of this, but I think that what understanding I do have is enough to persuade me that this entire line of investigation is a dead end as far as explaining consciousness. It only works if we assume consciousness as a possibility a priori and independently of any arithmetic logic.
Nowhere do I find in any AI/AGI theory any positive assertion of awareness. It is not enough to say *that* awareness fits into this or that category of programmatic interiority or logically necessary indeterminacy when the question of *what* awareness is in the first place and *why* is has not been addressed at all.
As I demonstrate in the three lines at the top, and Searle tried to demonstrate, awareness does not follow automatically from a negative assertion of computability. I bring up the example of cymatics on another thread. Scooping salt into a symmetrical-mandala pattern does not conjure up an acoustic vibration associated with that pattern. Qualia does not follow from quanta.
Quanta, however, could and I think does follow from qualia as a method of sequestering experiences to different degrees of privacy while retaining shared sense on more primitive 'public' levels. These methods would necessarily be construed as automatic to insulate crosstalk between channels of sense - to encourage the coherence of perceptual inertial frames to develop unique significance rather than to decohere into the entropy of the totality.
Does anyone have any positive assertion of consciousness derived from either physics or arithmetic? Any need for actual feelings and experiences, for direct participation?
Craig
--
-- Onward! Stephen http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html
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Craig:I just wanted to summarize the evolutionary reasons why idividuality exist, (no matter if individuality is a cause or an effect of phisical laws). I did an extended account of this somewhere else in this list.I do not accept normative as distinct from objective. this is the fallacy of the naturalistic fallacy.
Psychopathy (not in the abstract sense, but in the real sense with wich it appear in humans) exist just because exist morality. It is an exploitation of morality for selfish purposes. Therefore it can be considered a morality effect. it would be non adaptive, and therefore unexistent, if there were no moral beings.
Hi Alberto G. CoronaThe subject is the perceiver, not that which is perceived.For example, consider:"I see the cat." Here:I is the perceiving subject, cat is the object perceived.When the subject experiences seeing the cat, the experience is personal, as are all subjectivestates and all experiences.However, when he afterwards vocalizes "I see the cat", he has translated the experienceinto words, which means he has translated a subjective personal experience into apublicly accessible statement.All personal experiences are subjective, all experiences shared in words are objective.Any statement is then objective.Computers can only deal in words (computer code), which are objective,so computers cannot experience anything, since experience is wordless (codeless).Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net8/29/2012Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function."
----- Receiving the following content -----From: Alberto G. CoronaReceiver: everything-listTime: 2012-08-29, 10:39:37Subject: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary
2012/8/29 Stephen P. King <step...@charter.net>
On 8/29/2012 8:44 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
Hi Albert,the subject is preceived as singular because it has memory. It has memory because it is intelligent and social. thereforre it is moral. therefore it needs memory to give and take account of its debts and merits with others.
Memory is necessary but not sufficient. It the the content of memory and how it is sequentially ordered that matters. "I am what I remember myself to be."
in my own terms, this is a metacomputation (interpreted computation) operating over my own memory. The possibility of this metacomputation comes from evolutionary reasons: to reflect about the moral Albert that others see on me.
This singularity is by definition because no other lived the same life of ourselves.
No, because we could never know that for sure. It is singular in the sense of "only I can know what it is like to be me" is exactly true for each and every one of us. The result is that I cannot know what it is like to be you.
That′s why this uniqueness is not essential
But up to a point it is not essential. We can be made accustomed to other ourselves. Most twins consider each other another self. We could come to consider normal to say hello to our recently created clones. Although this probably will never happen.
Please elaborate! Try to speculate a situation where it might occur. There is something important to this!
This is a logical possibility due to the nonessentiality of uniqueness of individuality. (Or in Bruno terms: the first person indeterminacy). But probably the cloning machine would never exist. Sorry I can not ellaborate further....
2012/8/29 Stephen P. King <step...@charter.net>
On 8/29/2012 7:38 AM, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi Craig WeinbergI agree.
Consciousness is not a monople, it is a dipole:
Cs = subject + object
The subject is always first person indeterminate.
Being indeterminate, it is not computable.QED
Hi Roger,
It is not a dipole in the normal sense, as the object is not restricted to being singular. The subject is always singular (necessity) while the object is possibly singular.
Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net8/29/2012Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function."
----- Receiving the following content -----From: Craig WeinbergReceiver: everything-listTime: 2012-08-28, 12:19:50Subject: No Chinese Room Necessary
This sentence does not speak English.
These words do not ‘refer’ to themselves.
s l u ,u s
If you don't like Searle's example, perhaps the above can help illustrate that form is not inherently informative.
The implication here for me is that comp is a red herring as far as ascertaining the origin of awareness.
Either we view computation inherently having awareness as a meaningless epiphenomenal byproduct (yay, no free will), or we presume that computation can and does exist independently of all awareness but that a particular category of meta-computation is what we call awareness.
Even with the allowances that Bruno includes (or my understanding of what Bruno includes) in the form of first person indeterminacy and/or non comp contents, Platonic number dreams, etc - all of these can only negatively assert the completeness of arithmetic truth. My understanding is that G del (and others) are used to support this negative assertion, and I of course agree that indeed it is impossible for any arithmetic system to be complete, especially in the sense of defining itself completely. I suspect that Bruno assumes that I don't have a deep enough understanding of this, but I think that what understanding I do have is enough to persuade me that this entire line of investigation is a dead end as far as explaining consciousness. It only works if we assume consciousness as a possibility a priori and independently of any arithmetic logic.
--
----- Receiving the following content -----From: Alberto G. CoronaReceiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-08-29, 11:19:59Subject: Re: Re: Re: No Chinese Room NecessaryI say nothing opposed to that. What I say is that 锟斤拷it锟斤拷s functionality is computable: It is possible to make a robot with this functionality of awareness, but may be not with the capability of _being_ aware
Awareness = I see X.
锟斤拷or I am X.or some similar statement.锟斤拷There's no computer in that锟斤拷behavior or state of being.锟斤拷锟斤拷
Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net8/29/2012Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function."
Time: 2012-08-29, 09:34:22Subject: Re: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary
Roger,I said that the awareness functionalty can be computable, that is that a inner computation can affect an external computation which is aware of the consequences of this inner computation.
锟斤拷锟斤拷like in the case of any relation of brain and mind,锟斤拷I do not say that this IS 锟斤拷the experience of awareness, but given the duality between mind and matter/brain, it is very plausible that the brain work that way when, in the paralell word of the mind, the mind experiences awareness2012/8/29 Roger Clough <rcl...@verizon.net>Hi Alberto G. Corona锟斤拷
What sort of an output would the computer give me ?It can't be experiential, 0or if it is, I know of noway to hook it to my brain.
锟斤拷锟斤拷
Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net8/29/2012Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function."
----- Receiving the following content -----From: Alberto G. CoronaReceiver: everything-listTime: 2012-08-29, 08:21:27Subject: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary
Hi:
Awareness can 锟斤拷be functionally (we do not know if experientially) 锟斤拷computable. A program can run another program (a metaprogram) and do things depending on its results of the metaprogram (or his real time status). This is rutine in computer science and these programs are called "interpreters".
锟斤拷The lack of 锟斤拷understanding, of this capability of metacomputation that any turing complete machine has, is IMHO the reason why 锟斤拷it is said that the brain-mind can do things that a computer can never do. 锟斤拷We humans can manage concepts in two ways : a direct way and a reflective way. The second is the result of an analysis of the first trough a metacomputation.For example we can not be aware of our use of category theory or our intuitions because they are hardwired programs, not interpreted programs. We can not know 锟斤拷our deep thinking structures because they are not exposed as metacomputations. When we use锟斤拷metaphorically锟斤拷the verb "to be fired" 锟斤拷to mean being redundant, we are using category theory but we can not be aware of it. 锟斤拷Only after research that assimilate mathematical facts with the observable psichology of humans, we can create an awareness of it by means of an adquired metacomputation.
The same happens with the intuitions. We appreciate the beauty of a woman for adaptive reasons, but not the computation that produces this intuition. In the other side, we can appreciate the fact that the process 锟斤拷of diagonalization by G锟斤拷del 锟斤拷makes the Hilbert program impossible, That same conclusion can be reached by a program that metacomputes a constructive mathematical program. (see my post about the G锟斤拷del theorem).
Again, I do not see COMP a problem for the Existential problem of free will nor in any other existential question.
Consciousness is not a monople, it is a dipole:
锟斤拷
Cs = subject + object
锟斤拷
The subject is always first person indeterminate.
Being indeterminate,锟斤拷it is not computable.锟斤拷QED锟斤拷锟斤拷
Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net8/29/2012Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function."
----- Receiving the following content -----From: Craig WeinbergReceiver: everything-listTime: 2012-08-28, 12:19:50Subject: No Chinese Room Necessary
This sentence does not speak English.
These words do not 锟斤拷refer锟斤拷 to themselves.
s锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷l u锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷 锟斤拷,u锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷 锟斤拷s锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷
If you don't like Searle's example, perhaps the above can help illustrate that form is not inherently informative.
The implication here for me is that comp is a red herring as far as ascertaining the origin of awareness.
Either we view computation inherently having awareness as a meaningless epiphenomenal byproduct (yay, no free will), or we presume that computation can and does exist independently of all awareness but that a particular category of meta-computation is what we call awareness.
Even with the allowances that Bruno includes (or my understanding of what Bruno includes) in the form of first person indeterminacy and/or non comp contents, Platonic number dreams, etc - all of these can only negatively assert the completeness of arithmetic truth. My understanding is that G锟斤拷del (and others) are used to support this negative assertion, and I of course agree that indeed it is impossible for any arithmetic system to be complete, especially in the sense of defining itself completely. I suspect that Bruno assumes that I don't have a deep enough understanding of this, but I think that what understanding I do have is enough to persuade me that this entire line of investigation is a dead end as far as explaining consciousness. It only works if we assume consciousness as a possibility a priori and independently of any arithmetic logic.
----- Receiving the following content -----From: Alberto G. CoronaReceiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-08-29, 11:26:29Subject: Re: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary
It appears that subjectivity, has everithing to do with morality. This is not only evident for any religious person, but also for mathematics and game theory.
锟斤拷It appears that without 锟斤拷moral individuality, social collaboration is impossible, except for clones. I exposed the reasoning here.锟斤拷
Subjectivity has nothing to do with morality or evolution, it is simply the private of personal state of a perceiver (of some object), ie it is experience.
锟斤拷
Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net8/29/2012Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function."
----- Receiving the following content -----From: Alberto G. CoronaReceiver: everything-listTime: 2012-08-29, 09:08:43Subject: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary
Craig:I just wanted to summarize the evolutionary reasons why idividuality exist, (no matter if individuality is a cause or an effect of phisical laws). 锟斤拷I did an extended account of this somewhere else in this list.I do not accept normative as distinct from objective. this is the fallacy of the naturalistic fallacy.锟斤拷Psychopathy锟斤拷(not in the abstract sense, but in the real sense with wich it appear in humans) 锟斤拷exist just because exist morality. It is an exploitation of morality for selfish purposes. Therefore it can be considered a morality effect. it would be non adaptive, and therefore unexistent, if there were no moral beings.
On Wednesday, August 29, 2012 8:44:40 AM UTC-4, Alberto G.Corona wrote:
the subject 锟斤拷is preceived as singular because it has memory. It has memory because it is intelligent and social. thereforre it is moral. therefore it needs memory to give and take account of its debts and merits with others.锟斤拷
What you are talking about is all a-posterior to objectivity. In a dream whole ensembles of 'memories' appear and disappear. It is possible to be intelligent and social and not be moral (sociopaths have memory). I think you are making some normative assumptions. When we generalize about consciousness we should not limit it to healthy-adult-human waking consciousness only.
锟斤拷This singularity is by definition because no other lived the same life of ourselves. But up to a point it is not essential. We can be made accustomed to other ourselves. 锟斤拷Most twins consider each other another self. We 锟斤拷could come to consider normal to say hello to our recently created clones. Although this锟斤拷probably锟斤拷will never happen.
In the story I read on brain conjoined twins, the sisters consider themselves both the same person in some contexts and different in others. They live the same life in one sense, different lives in another (life on the right side is not life on the left side...one girl's head is in a more awkward position than the other, etc).
锟斤拷
2012/8/29 Stephen P. King <step...@charter.net>
On 8/29/2012 7:38 AM, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi Craig Weinberg锟斤拷I agree.锟斤拷
Consciousness is not a monople, it is a dipole:
锟斤拷
Cs = subject + object
锟斤拷
The subject is always first person indeterminate.
Being indeterminate,锟斤拷it is not computable.锟斤拷QED
Hi Roger,
锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷 It is not a dipole in the normal sense, as the object is not restricted to being singular. The subject is always singular (necessity) while the object is possibly singular.锟斤拷锟斤拷
Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net8/29/2012Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function."
----- Receiving the following content -----From: Craig WeinbergReceiver: everything-listTime: 2012-08-28, 12:19:50Subject: No Chinese Room Necessary
This sentence does not speak English.
These words do not 锟斤拷refer锟斤拷 to themselves.
s锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷l u锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷 锟斤拷,u锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷 锟斤拷s锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷
If you don't like Searle's example, perhaps the above can help illustrate that form is not inherently informative.
The implication here for me is that comp is a red herring as far as ascertaining the origin of awareness.
Either we view computation inherently having awareness as a meaningless epiphenomenal byproduct (yay, no free will), or we presume that computation can and does exist independently of all awareness but that a particular category of meta-computation is what we call awareness.
Even with the allowances that Bruno includes (or my understanding of what Bruno includes) in the form of first person indeterminacy and/or non comp contents, Platonic number dreams, etc - all of these can only negatively assert the completeness of arithmetic truth. My understanding is that G锟斤拷del (and others) are used to support this negative assertion, and I of course agree that indeed it is impossible for any arithmetic system to be complete, especially in the sense of defining itself completely. I suspect that Bruno assumes that I don't have a deep enough understanding of this, but I think that what understanding I do have is enough to persuade me that this entire line of investigation is a dead end as far as explaining consciousness. It only works if we assume consciousness as a possibility a priori and independently of any arithmetic logic.
Craig,
Is the universe expanding (at an accelerating rate)because it " excretes public entropy (space) as exhaust "?Richard
Even with the allowances that Bruno includes (or my understanding of what Bruno includes) in the form of first person indeterminacy and/or non comp contents, Platonic number dreams, etc - all of these can only negatively assert the completeness of arithmetic truth. My understanding is that G 锟斤拷del (and others) are used to support this negative assertion, and I of course agree that indeed it is impossible for any arithmetic system to be complete, especially in the sense of defining itself completely. I suspect that Bruno assumes that I don't have a deep enough understanding of this, but I think that what understanding I do have is enough to persuade me that this entire line of investigation is a dead end as far as explaining consciousness. It only works if we assume consciousness as a possibility a priori and independently of any arithmetic logic.
Nowhere do I find in any AI/AGI theory any positive assertion of awareness. It is not enough to say *that* awareness fits into this or that category of programmatic interiority or logically necessary indeterminacy when the question of *what* awareness is in the first place and *why* is has not been addressed at all.
As I demonstrate in the three lines at the top, and Searle tried to demonstrate, awareness does not follow automatically from a negative assertion of computability. I bring up the example of cymatics on another thread. Scooping salt into a symmetrical-mandala pattern does not conjure up an acoustic vibration associated with that pattern. Qualia does not follow from quanta.
Quanta, however, could and I think does follow from qualia as a method of sequestering experiences to different degrees of privacy while retaining shared sense on more primitive 'public' levels. These methods would necessarily be construed as automatic to insulate crosstalk between channels of sense - to encourage the coherence of perceptual inertial frames to develop unique significance rather than to decohere into the entropy of the totality.
Does anyone have any positive assertion of consciousness derived from either physics or arithmetic? Any need for actual feelings and experiences, for direct participation?
Craig
----- Receiving the following content -----From: Alberto G. CoronaReceiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-08-29, 11:40:43Subject: Re: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary
That you perceive is accesible to us by your words. You say that you perceive. With these worlds you transmit to us this information "craig says that he perceive"..
From my side, The belief tat you REALLY perceive is a matter of faith锟斤拷
What i said is that it is THEORETICALLY create a robot with the same functionality, and subject to the same statement of faith from my side.
The subject is the perceiver, not that which is perceived.
锟斤拷For example, consider:锟斤拷"I see the cat."锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷 Here:锟斤拷
I is the perceiving subject, cat is the object perceived.
锟斤拷
When the subject experiences seeing the cat, the experience is personal, as are all subjectivestates and all experiences.
锟斤拷
However, when he afterwards vocalizes "I see the cat", he has translated the experienceinto words, which means he has translated a subjective personal experience into apublicly accessible statement.
锟斤拷All personal experiences are subjective, all experiences shared in words are锟斤拷objective.
Any statement is then objective.
锟斤拷Computers can only deal in words (computer code),锟斤拷which are objective,so computers cannot experience anything, since experience is wordless (codeless).锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷
Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net8/29/2012Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function."
----- Receiving the following content -----From: Alberto G. CoronaReceiver: everything-listTime: 2012-08-29, 10:39:37Subject: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary
2012/8/29 Stephen P. King <step...@charter.net>
On 8/29/2012 8:44 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
Hi Albert,the subject 锟斤拷is preceived as singular because it has memory. It has memory because it is intelligent and social. thereforre it is moral. therefore it needs memory to give and take account of its debts and merits with others.
锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷 Memory is necessary but not sufficient. It the the content of memory and how it is sequentially ordered锟斤拷 that matters. "I am what I remember myself to be."
in my own terms, this is a metacomputation (interpreted computation) operating over my own memory. The possibility of this metacomputation comes from evolutionary reasons: to reflect about the moral Albert that others see on me.
This singularity is by definition because no other lived the same life of ourselves.
锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷 No, because we could never know that for sure. It is singular in the sense of "only I can know what it is like to be me" is exactly true for each and every one of us. The result is that I cannot know what it is like to be you.That锟斤拷s why this uniqueness is not 锟斤拷essential锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷 Please elaborate! Try to speculate a situation where it might occur. There is something important to this!
But up to a point it is not essential. We can be made accustomed to other ourselves. 锟斤拷Most twins consider each other another self. We 锟斤拷could come to consider normal to say hello to our recently created clones. Although this锟斤拷probably锟斤拷will never happen.This is a logical possibility due to the nonessentiality of uniqueness of individuality. (Or in Bruno terms: the first person indeterminacy). 锟斤拷But probably the cloning machine would never exist. Sorry I can not ellaborate further....
2012/8/29 Stephen P. King <step...@charter.net>
On 8/29/2012 7:38 AM, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi Craig Weinberg锟斤拷I agree.锟斤拷
Consciousness is not a monople, it is a dipole:
锟斤拷
Cs = subject + object
锟斤拷
The subject is always first person indeterminate.
Being indeterminate,锟斤拷it is not computable.锟斤拷QED
Hi Roger,
锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷 It is not a dipole in the normal sense, as the object is not restricted to being singular. The subject is always singular (necessity) while the object is possibly singular.
锟斤拷锟斤拷
Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net8/29/2012Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function."
----- Receiving the following content -----From: Craig WeinbergReceiver: everything-listTime: 2012-08-28, 12:19:50Subject: No Chinese Room Necessary
This sentence does not speak English.
These words do not 锟斤拷refer锟斤拷 to themselves.
s锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷l u锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷 锟斤拷,u锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷 锟斤拷s锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷
If you don't like Searle's example, perhaps the above can help illustrate that form is not inherently informative.
The implication here for me is that comp is a red herring as far as ascertaining the origin of awareness.
Either we view computation inherently having awareness as a meaningless epiphenomenal byproduct (yay, no free will), or we presume that computation can and does exist independently of all awareness but that a particular category of meta-computation is what we call awareness.
Even with the allowances that Bruno includes (or my understanding of what Bruno includes) in the form of first person indeterminacy and/or non comp contents, Platonic number dreams, etc - all of these can only negatively assert the completeness of arithmetic truth. My understanding is that G锟斤拷del (and others) are used to support this negative assertion, and I of course agree that indeed it is impossible for any arithmetic system to be complete, especially in the sense of defining itself completely. I suspect that Bruno assumes that I don't have a deep enough understanding of this, but I think that what understanding I do have is enough to persuade me that this entire line of investigation is a dead end as far as explaining consciousness. It only works if we assume consciousness as a possibility a priori and independently of any arithmetic logic.
--
----- Receiving the following content -----From: Alberto G. CoronaReceiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-08-29, 11:41:42Subject: Re: Re: No Chinese Room Necessarysorry:
What i said is that it is THEORETICALLY POSSIBL to create a robot with the same functionality, and subject to the same statement of faith from my side.锟斤拷
2012/8/29 Alberto G. Corona <agoc...@gmail.com>
That you perceive is accesible to us by your words. You say that you perceive. With these worlds you transmit to us this information "craig says that he perceive"..
From my side, The belief tat you REALLY perceive is a matter of faith锟斤拷
What i said is that it is THEORETICALLY create a robot with the same functionality, and subject to the same statement of faith from my side.
The subject is the perceiver, not that which is perceived.
锟斤拷For example, consider:锟斤拷"I see the cat."锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷 Here:锟斤拷
I is the perceiving subject, cat is the object perceived.
锟斤拷
When the subject experiences seeing the cat, the experience is personal, as are all subjectivestates and all experiences.
锟斤拷
However, when he afterwards vocalizes "I see the cat", he has translated the experienceinto words, which means he has translated a subjective personal experience into apublicly accessible statement.
锟斤拷All personal experiences are subjective, all experiences shared in words are锟斤拷objective.
Any statement is then objective.
锟斤拷Computers can only deal in words (computer code),锟斤拷which are objective,so computers cannot experience anything, since experience is wordless (codeless).锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷
Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net8/29/2012Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function."
----- Receiving the following content -----From: Alberto G. CoronaReceiver: everything-listTime: 2012-08-29, 10:39:37Subject: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary
2012/8/29 Stephen P. King <step...@charter.net>
On 8/29/2012 8:44 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
Hi Albert,the subject 锟斤拷is preceived as singular because it has memory. It has memory because it is intelligent and social. thereforre it is moral. therefore it needs memory to give and take account of its debts and merits with others.
锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷 Memory is necessary but not sufficient. It the the content of memory and how it is sequentially ordered锟斤拷 that matters. "I am what I remember myself to be."
in my own terms, this is a metacomputation (interpreted computation) operating over my own memory. The possibility of this metacomputation comes from evolutionary reasons: to reflect about the moral Albert that others see on me.
This singularity is by definition because no other lived the same life of ourselves.
锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷 No, because we could never know that for sure. It is singular in the sense of "only I can know what it is like to be me" is exactly true for each and every one of us. The result is that I cannot know what it is like to be you.That锟斤拷s why this uniqueness is not 锟斤拷essential锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷 Please elaborate! Try to speculate a situation where it might occur. There is something important to this!
But up to a point it is not essential. We can be made accustomed to other ourselves. 锟斤拷Most twins consider each other another self. We 锟斤拷could come to consider normal to say hello to our recently created clones. Although this锟斤拷probably锟斤拷will never happen.This is a logical possibility due to the nonessentiality of uniqueness of individuality. (Or in Bruno terms: the first person indeterminacy). 锟斤拷But probably the cloning machine would never exist. Sorry I can not ellaborate further....
2012/8/29 Stephen P. King <step...@charter.net>
On 8/29/2012 7:38 AM, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi Craig Weinberg锟斤拷I agree.锟斤拷
Consciousness is not a monople, it is a dipole:
锟斤拷
Cs = subject + object
锟斤拷
The subject is always first person indeterminate.
Being indeterminate,锟斤拷it is not computable.锟斤拷QED
Hi Roger,
锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷 It is not a dipole in the normal sense, as the object is not restricted to being singular. The subject is always singular (necessity) while the object is possibly singular.
锟斤拷锟斤拷
Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net8/29/2012Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function."
----- Receiving the following content -----From: Craig WeinbergReceiver: everything-listTime: 2012-08-28, 12:19:50Subject: No Chinese Room Necessary
This sentence does not speak English.
These words do not 锟斤拷refer锟斤拷 to themselves.
s锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷l u锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷 锟斤拷,u锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷 锟斤拷s锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷
If you don't like Searle's example, perhaps the above can help illustrate that form is not inherently informative.
The implication here for me is that comp is a red herring as far as ascertaining the origin of awareness.
Either we view computation inherently having awareness as a meaningless epiphenomenal byproduct (yay, no free will), or we presume that computation can and does exist independently of all awareness but that a particular category of meta-computation is what we call awareness.
Even with the allowances that Bruno includes (or my understanding of what Bruno includes) in the form of first person indeterminacy and/or non comp contents, Platonic number dreams, etc - all of these can only negatively assert the completeness of arithmetic truth. My understanding is that G锟斤拷del (and others) are used to support this negative assertion, and I of course agree that indeed it is impossible for any arithmetic system to be complete, especially in the sense of defining itself completely. I suspect that Bruno assumes that I don't have a deep enough understanding of this, but I think that what understanding I do have is enough to persuade me that this entire line of investigation is a dead end as far as explaining consciousness. It only works if we assume consciousness as a possibility a priori and independently of any arithmetic logic.
--
----- Receiving the following content -----From: Alberto G. CoronaReceiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-08-29, 11:54:29
Subject: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary
Not only to lie. In order 锟斤拷to commerce and in general to interact, we need to know what to expect from whom. and the other need to know what the others expect form me. So I have to reflect on myself in order to act in the enviromnent of the moral and material expectations that others have about me. This is the origin of reflective individuality, that is moral from the beginning..锟斤拷
2012/8/29 meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net>
But Craig makes a point when he says computers only deal in words.锟斤拷 That's why something having human like intelligence and consciousness must be a robot, something that can act wordlessly in it's environment.锟斤拷 Evolutionarily speaking, conscious narrative is an add-on on top of subconscious thought which is responsible for almost everything we do.锟斤拷 Julian Jaynes theorized that humans did not become conscious in the modern sense until they engaged in inter-tribal commerce and it became important to learn to lie.
Brent
On 8/29/2012 8:40 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
That you perceive is accesible to us by your words. You say that you perceive. With these worlds you transmit to us this information "craig says that he perceive"..
From my side, The belief tat you REALLY perceive is a matter of faith锟斤拷
What i said is that it is THEORETICALLY create a robot with the same functionality, and subject to the same statement of faith from my side.
The subject is the perceiver, not that which is perceived.
锟斤拷For example, consider:锟斤拷"I see the cat."锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷 Here:锟斤拷
I is the perceiving subject, cat is the object perceived.
锟斤拷
When the subject experiences seeing the cat, the experience is personal, as are all subjectivestates and all experiences.
锟斤拷
However, when he afterwards vocalizes "I see the cat", he has translated the experienceinto words, which means he has translated a subjective personal experience into apublicly accessible statement.
锟斤拷All personal experiences are subjective, all experiences shared in words are锟斤拷objective.
Any statement is then objective.
锟斤拷Computers can only deal in words (computer code),锟斤拷which are objective,so computers cannot experience anything, since experience is wordless (codeless).锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷
Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net8/29/2012Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function."
----- Receiving the following content -----From: Alberto G. CoronaReceiver: everything-listTime: 2012-08-29, 10:39:37Subject: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary
2012/8/29 Stephen P. King <step...@charter.net>
On 8/29/2012 8:44 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
Hi Albert,the subject 锟斤拷is preceived as singular because it has memory. It has memory because it is intelligent and social. thereforre it is moral. therefore it needs memory to give and take account of its debts and merits with others.
锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷 Memory is necessary but not sufficient. It the the content of memory and how it is sequentially ordered锟斤拷 that matters. "I am what I remember myself to be."
in my own terms, this is a metacomputation (interpreted computation) operating over my own memory. The possibility of this metacomputation comes from evolutionary reasons: to reflect about the moral Albert that others see on me.
This singularity is by definition because no other lived the same life of ourselves.
锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷 No, because we could never know that for sure. It is singular in the sense of "only I can know what it is like to be me" is exactly true for each and every one of us. The result is that I cannot know what it is like to be you.That锟斤拷s why this uniqueness is not 锟斤拷essential锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷 Please elaborate! Try to speculate a situation where it might occur. There is something important to this!
But up to a point it is not essential. We can be made accustomed to other ourselves. 锟斤拷Most twins consider each other another self. We 锟斤拷could come to consider normal to say hello to our recently created clones. Although this锟斤拷probably锟斤拷will never happen.This is a logical possibility due to the nonessentiality of uniqueness of individuality. (Or in Bruno terms: the first person indeterminacy). 锟斤拷But probably the cloning machine would never exist. Sorry I can not ellaborate further....
2012/8/29 Stephen P. King <step...@charter.net>
On 8/29/2012 7:38 AM, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi Craig Weinberg锟斤拷I agree.锟斤拷
Consciousness is not a monople, it is a dipole:
锟斤拷
Cs = subject + object
锟斤拷
The subject is always first person indeterminate.
Being indeterminate,锟斤拷it is not computable.锟斤拷QED
Hi Roger,
锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷 It is not a dipole in the normal sense, as the object is not restricted to being singular. The subject is always singular (necessity) while the object is possibly singular.
锟斤拷锟斤拷
Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net8/29/2012Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function."
----- Receiving the following content -----From: Craig WeinbergReceiver: everything-listTime: 2012-08-28, 12:19:50Subject: No Chinese Room Necessary
This sentence does not speak English.
These words do not 锟斤拷refer锟斤拷 to themselves.
s锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷l u锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷 锟斤拷,u锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷 锟斤拷s锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷
If you don't like Searle's example, perhaps the above can help illustrate that form is not inherently informative.
The implication here for me is that comp is a red herring as far as ascertaining the origin of awareness.
Either we view computation inherently having awareness as a meaningless epiphenomenal byproduct (yay, no free will), or we presume that computation can and does exist independently of all awareness but that a particular category of meta-computation is what we call awareness.
Even with the allowances that Bruno includes (or my understanding of what Bruno includes) in the form of first person indeterminacy and/or non comp contents, Platonic number dreams, etc - all of these can only negatively assert the completeness of arithmetic truth. My understanding is that G锟斤拷 del (and others) are used to support this negative assertion, and I of course agree that indeed it is impossible for any arithmetic system to be complete, especially in the sense of defining itself completely. I suspect that Bruno assumes that I don't have a deep enough understanding of this, but I think that what understanding I do have is enough to persuade me that this entire line of investigation is a dead end as far as explaining consciousness. It only works if we assume consciousness as a possibility a priori and independently of any arithmetic logic.
--
A grizzly bear, which seemingly has no moral code (other than "when hungry, kill and eat"), can still perceiveperfectly well enough, or else he would starve.Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net8/29/2012Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function."
Time: 2012-08-29, 11:26:29Subject: Re: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary
It appears that subjectivity, has everithing to do with morality. This is not only evident for any religious person, but also for mathematics and game theory.
It appears that without moral individuality, social collaboration is impossible, except for clones. I exposed the reasoning here.
Subjectivity has nothing to do with morality or evolution, it is simply the private of personal state of a perceiver (of some object), ie it is experience.
Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net8/29/2012Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function."
----- Receiving the following content -----From: Alberto G. CoronaReceiver: everything-listTime: 2012-08-29, 09:08:43Subject: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary
Craig:I just wanted to summarize the evolutionary reasons why idividuality exist, (no matter if individuality is a cause or an effect of phisical laws). I did an extended account of this somewhere else in this list.
I do not accept normative as distinct from objective. this is the fallacy of the naturalistic fallacy.
Psychopathy (not in the abstract sense, but in the real sense with wich it appear in humans) exist just because exist morality. It is an exploitation of morality for selfish purposes. Therefore it can be considered a morality effect. it would be non adaptive, and therefore unexistent, if there were no moral beings.
On Wednesday, August 29, 2012 8:44:40 AM UTC-4, Alberto G.Corona wrote:
the subject is preceived as singular because it has memory. It has memory because it is intelligent and social. thereforre it is moral. therefore it needs memory to give and take account of its debts and merits with others.
What you are talking about is all a-posterior to objectivity. In a dream whole ensembles of 'memories' appear and disappear. It is possible to be intelligent and social and not be moral (sociopaths have memory). I think you are making some normative assumptions. When we generalize about consciousness we should not limit it to healthy-adult-human waking consciousness only.
This singularity is by definition because no other lived the same life of ourselves. But up to a point it is not essential. We can be made accustomed to other ourselves. Most twins consider each other another self. We could come to consider normal to say hello to our recently created clones. Although this probably will never happen.
In the story I read on brain conjoined twins, the sisters consider themselves both the same person in some contexts and different in others. They live the same life in one sense, different lives in another (life on the right side is not life on the left side...one girl's head is in a more awkward position than the other, etc).
2012/8/29 Stephen P. King <step...@charter.net>
On 8/29/2012 7:38 AM, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi Craig WeinbergI agree.
Consciousness is not a monople, it is a dipole:
Cs = subject + object
The subject is always first person indeterminate.
Being indeterminate, it is not computable.QED
Hi Roger,
It is not a dipole in the normal sense, as the object is not restricted to being singular. The subject is always singular (necessity) while the object is possibly singular.
Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net8/29/2012Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function."
----- Receiving the following content -----From: Craig WeinbergReceiver: everything-listTime: 2012-08-28, 12:19:50Subject: No Chinese Room Necessary
This sentence does not speak English.
These words do not ‘refer’ to themselves.
s l u ,u s
If you don't like Searle's example, perhaps the above can help illustrate that form is not inherently informative.
The implication here for me is that comp is a red herring as far as ascertaining the origin of awareness.
Either we view computation inherently having awareness as a meaningless epiphenomenal byproduct (yay, no free will), or we presume that computation can and does exist independently of all awareness but that a particular category of meta-computation is what we call awareness.
Even with the allowances that Bruno includes (or my understanding of what Bruno includes) in the form of first person indeterminacy and/or non comp contents, Platonic number dreams, etc - all of these can only negatively assert the completeness of arithmetic truth. My understanding is that G del (and others) are used to support this negative assertion, and I of course agree that indeed it is impossible for any arithmetic system to be complete, especially in the sense of defining itself completely. I suspect that Bruno assumes that I don't have a deep enough understanding of this, but I think that what understanding I do have is enough to persuade me that this entire line of investigation is a dead end as far as explaining consciousness. It only works if we assume consciousness as a possibility a priori and independently of any arithmetic logic.
2012/8/29 Stephen P. King <step...@charter.net>
Hi Albert,On 8/29/2012 8:44 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
the subject is preceived as singular because it has memory. It has memory because it is intelligent and social. thereforre it is moral. therefore it needs memory to give and take account of its debts and merits with others.
Memory is necessary but not sufficient. It the the content of memory and how it is sequentially ordered that matters. "I am what I remember myself to be."
in my own terms, this is a metacomputation (interpreted computation) operating over my own memory. The possibility of this metacomputation comes from evolutionary reasons: to reflect about the moral Albert that others see on me.
No, because we could never know that for sure. It is singular in the sense of "only I can know what it is like to be me" is exactly true for each and every one of us. The result is that I cannot know what it is like to be you.
This singularity is by definition because no other lived the same life of ourselves.
That´s why this uniqueness is not essential
Please elaborate! Try to speculate a situation where it might occur. There is something important to this!
But up to a point it is not essential. We can be made accustomed to other ourselves. Most twins consider each other another self. We could come to consider normal to say hello to our recently created clones. Although this probably will never happen.
This is a logical possibility due to the nonessentiality of uniqueness of individuality. (Or in Bruno terms: the first person indeterminacy). But probably the cloning machine would never exist. Sorry I can not ellaborate further....
----- Receiving the following content -----From: Alberto G. CoronaReceiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-08-29, 12:02:39Subject: Re: Re: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary
You said that you perceive. Now you mean that you reflect on yourself. And I must believe so.
It is theoretically possible to do a robot that do so as well in very sophisticated ways.锟斤拷I agree with you that robots are zombies, but 锟斤拷some day, like in the novels of Stanislav Lem, they may adquire political rights and perhaps they could demand you for saying so. ;)Note that all the time, like in any normal conversation we are obviating deep statements of faith:锟斤拷Are you a person? 锟斤拷a robot? an Lutheran robot? . An atheist robot that is trying to persuade us that intelligent robots don锟斤拷t exist?. A....The锟斤拷conclusions锟斤拷are very very different depending of which of these possible alternatives we choose.
2012/8/29 Roger Clough <rcl...@verizon.net>
Hi Alberto G. Corona锟斤拷A grizzly bear, which锟斤拷seemingly has no moral code (other than "when hungry, kill and eat"), can still perceive
perfectly well enough, or else he would starve.
锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷
Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net8/29/2012Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function."
Time: 2012-08-29, 11:26:29Subject: Re: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary
It appears that subjectivity, has everithing to do with morality. This is not only evident for any religious person, but also for mathematics and game theory.
锟斤拷It appears that without 锟斤拷moral individuality, social collaboration is impossible, except for clones. I exposed the reasoning here.锟斤拷
Subjectivity has nothing to do with morality or evolution, it is simply the private of personal state of a perceiver (of some object), ie it is experience.
锟斤拷
Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net8/29/2012Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function."
----- Receiving the following content -----From: Alberto G. CoronaReceiver: everything-listTime: 2012-08-29, 09:08:43Subject: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary
Craig:I just wanted to summarize the evolutionary reasons why idividuality exist, (no matter if individuality is a cause or an effect of phisical laws). 锟斤拷I did an extended account of this somewhere else in this list.I do not accept normative as distinct from objective. this is the fallacy of the naturalistic fallacy.锟斤拷Psychopathy锟斤拷(not in the abstract sense, but in the real sense with wich it appear in humans) 锟斤拷exist just because exist morality. It is an exploitation of morality for selfish purposes. Therefore it can be considered a morality effect. it would be non adaptive, and therefore unexistent, if there were no moral beings.
On Wednesday, August 29, 2012 8:44:40 AM UTC-4, Alberto G.Corona wrote:
the subject 锟斤拷is preceived as singular because it has memory. It has memory because it is intelligent and social. thereforre it is moral. therefore it needs memory to give and take account of its debts and merits with others.锟斤拷
What you are talking about is all a-posterior to objectivity. In a dream whole ensembles of 'memories' appear and disappear. It is possible to be intelligent and social and not be moral (sociopaths have memory). I think you are making some normative assumptions. When we generalize about consciousness we should not limit it to healthy-adult-human waking consciousness only.
锟斤拷This singularity is by definition because no other lived the same life of ourselves. But up to a point it is not essential. We can be made accustomed to other ourselves. 锟斤拷Most twins consider each other another self. We 锟斤拷could come to consider normal to say hello to our recently created clones. Although this锟斤拷probably锟斤拷will never happen.
In the story I read on brain conjoined twins, the sisters consider themselves both the same person in some contexts and different in others. They live the same life in one sense, different lives in another (life on the right side is not life on the left side...one girl's head is in a more awkward position than the other, etc).
锟斤拷
2012/8/29 Stephen P. King <step...@charter.net>
On 8/29/2012 7:38 AM, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi Craig Weinberg锟斤拷I agree.锟斤拷
Consciousness is not a monople, it is a dipole:
锟斤拷
Cs = subject + object
锟斤拷
The subject is always first person indeterminate.
Being indeterminate,锟斤拷it is not computable.锟斤拷QED
Hi Roger,
锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷 It is not a dipole in the normal sense, as the object is not restricted to being singular. The subject is always singular (necessity) while the object is possibly singular.锟斤拷锟斤拷
Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net8/29/2012Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function."
----- Receiving the following content -----From: Craig WeinbergReceiver: everything-listTime: 2012-08-28, 12:19:50Subject: No Chinese Room Necessary
This sentence does not speak English.
These words do not 锟斤拷refer锟斤拷 to themselves.
s锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷l u锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷 锟斤拷,u锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷 锟斤拷s锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷
If you don't like Searle's example, perhaps the above can help illustrate that form is not inherently informative.
The implication here for me is that comp is a red herring as far as ascertaining the origin of awareness.
Either we view computation inherently having awareness as a meaningless epiphenomenal byproduct (yay, no free will), or we presume that computation can and does exist independently of all awareness but that a particular category of meta-computation is what we call awareness.
Even with the allowances that Bruno includes (or my understanding of what Bruno includes) in the form of first person indeterminacy and/or non comp contents, Platonic number dreams, etc - all of these can only negatively assert the completeness of arithmetic truth. My understanding is that G锟斤拷del (and others) are used to support this negative assertion, and I of course agree that indeed it is impossible for any arithmetic system to be complete, especially in the sense of defining itself completely. I suspect that Bruno assumes that I don't have a deep enough understanding of this, but I think that what understanding I do have is enough to persuade me that this entire line of investigation is a dead end as far as explaining consciousness. It only works if we assume consciousness as a possibility a priori and independently of any arithmetic logic.
Hi Alberto G. CoronaAwareness = I see X.or I am X.or some similar statement.There's no computer in that behavior or state of being.Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net8/29/2012Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function."
----- Receiving the following content -----From: Alberto G. CoronaReceiver: everything-listTime: 2012-08-29, 09:34:22Subject: Re: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary
Roger,I said that the awareness functionalty can be computable, that is that a inner computation can affect an external computation which is aware of the consequences of this inner computation.
like in the case of any relation of brain and mind, I do not say that this IS the experience of awareness, but given the duality between mind and matter/brain, it is very plausible that the brain work that way when, in the paralell word of the mind, the mind experiences awareness
2012/8/29 Roger Clough <rcl...@verizon.net>Hi Alberto G. Corona
What sort of an output would the computer give me ?It can't be experiential, 0or if it is, I know of noway to hook it to my brain.
Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net8/29/2012Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function."
----- Receiving the following content -----From: Alberto G. CoronaReceiver: everything-listTime: 2012-08-29, 08:21:27Subject: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary
Hi:
Awareness can be functionally (we do not know if experientially) computable. A program can run another program (a metaprogram) and do things depending on its results of the metaprogram (or his real time status). This is rutine in computer science and these programs are called "interpreters".
The lack of understanding, of this capability of metacomputation that any turing complete machine has, is IMHO the reason why it is said that the brain-mind can do things that a computer can never do. We humans can manage concepts in two ways : a direct way and a reflective way. The second is the result of an analysis of the first trough a metacomputation.
For example we can not be aware of our use of category theory or our intuitions because they are hardwired programs, not interpreted programs. We can not know our deep thinking structures because they are not exposed as metacomputations. When we use metaphorically the verb "to be fired" to mean being redundant, we are using category theory but we can not be aware of it. Only after research that assimilate mathematical facts with the observable psichology of humans, we can create an awareness of it by means of an adquired metacomputation.
The same happens with the intuitions. We appreciate the beauty of a woman for adaptive reasons, but not the computation that produces this intuition. In the other side, we can appreciate the fact that the process of diagonalization by G del makes the Hilbert program impossible, That same conclusion can be reached by a program that metacomputes a constructive mathematical program. (see my post about the G del theorem).
Again, I do not see COMP a problem for the Existential problem of free will nor in any other existential question.
Consciousness is not a monople, it is a dipole:
Cs = subject + object
The subject is always first person indeterminate.
Being indeterminate, it is not computable.QED
Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net8/29/2012Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function."
----- Receiving the following content -----From: Craig WeinbergReceiver: everything-listTime: 2012-08-28, 12:19:50Subject: No Chinese Room Necessary
This sentence does not speak English.
These words do not ‘refer’ to themselves.
s l u ,u s
If you don't like Searle's example, perhaps the above can help illustrate that form is not inherently informative.
The implication here for me is that comp is a red herring as far as ascertaining the origin of awareness.
Either we view computation inherently having awareness as a meaningless epiphenomenal byproduct (yay, no free will), or we presume that computation can and does exist independently of all awareness but that a particular category of meta-computation is what we call awareness.
Even with the allowances that Bruno includes (or my understanding of what Bruno includes) in the form of first person indeterminacy and/or non comp contents, Platonic number dreams, etc - all of these can only negatively assert the completeness of arithmetic truth. My understanding is that G del (and others) are used to support this negative assertion, and I of course agree that indeed it is impossible for any arithmetic system to be complete, especially in the sense of defining itself completely. I suspect that Bruno assumes that I don't have a deep enough understanding of this, but I think that what understanding I do have is enough to persuade me that this entire line of investigation is a dead end as far as explaining consciousness. It only works if we assume consciousness as a possibility a priori and independently of any arithmetic logic.
Nowhere do I find in any AI/AGI theory any positive assertion of awareness. It is not enough to say *that* awareness fits into this or that category of programmatic interiority or logically necessary indeterminacy when the question of *what* awareness is in the first place and *why* is has not been addressed at all.
As I demonstrate in the three lines at the top, and Searle tried to demonstrate, awareness does not follow automatically from a negative assertion of computability. I bring up the example of cymatics on another thread. Scooping salt into a symmetrical-mandala pattern does not conjure up an acoustic vibration associated with that pattern. Qualia does not follow from quanta.
Quanta, however, could and I think does follow from qualia as a method of sequestering experiences to different degrees of privacy while retaining shared sense on more primitive 'public' levels. These methods would necessarily be construed as automatic to insulate crosstalk between channels of sense - to encourage the coherence of perceptual inertial frames to develop unique significance rather than to decohere into the entropy of the totality.
Does anyone have any positive assertion of consciousness derived from either physics or arithmetic? Any need for actual feelings and experiences, for direct participation?
Craig
Hi Craig,
Nice idea but it would wreck the fungibility requirement that modern economies require. The fact that the physical object Mars Bar is equivalent to any other Mars Bar is how quality is maintained for a brand. The same goes for the value of a Dollar bill. It the value where history dependent then it would make all physical object unique and thus not fungible. The cost of tracking the differences of commodities would be HUGE and swamp everything else. We see a toy model of the case where fungibility vanishes (ideally as copies are forgeries!) in the art market.
Hi Craig,
What is the difference between the two? Ultimately, what we are talking about is just that set of fact that is incontrovertible among us.
Psychopathy (not in the abstract sense, but in the real sense with wich it appear in humans) exist just because exist morality. It is an exploitation of morality for selfish purposes. Therefore it can be considered a morality effect. it would be non adaptive, and therefore unexistent, if there were no moral beings.
You don't need to be immoral or unintelligent to be a psychopath. I agree with Roger that consciousness does not depend on morality (however I think that morality is an extension of significance, which is analogous to density or gravity but in the temporal-figurative sense).
Craig
Hi Craig,
I think that the defining feature of a psychopath is an inability to accurately model the internal reactions of and by others within one's own thoughts. It is a form of autism.
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: meekerdbReceiver: everything-listTime: 2012-08-29, 11:47:46
Subject: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary
But Craig makes a point when he says computers only deal in words.锟斤拷 That's why something having human like intelligence and consciousness must be a robot, something that can act wordlessly in it's environment.锟斤拷 Evolutionarily speaking, conscious narrative is an add-on on top of subconscious thought which is responsible for almost everything we do.锟斤拷 Julian Jaynes theorized that humans did not become conscious in the modern sense until they engaged in inter-tribal commerce and it became important to learn to lie.
Brent
On 8/29/2012 8:40 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
That you perceive is accesible to us by your words. You say that you perceive. With these worlds you transmit to us this information "craig says that he perceive"..
From my side, The belief tat you REALLY perceive is a matter of faith锟斤拷
What i said is that it is THEORETICALLY create a robot with the same functionality, and subject to the same statement of faith from my side.
The subject is the perceiver, not that which is perceived.
锟斤拷For example, consider:锟斤拷"I see the cat."锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷 Here:锟斤拷
I is the perceiving subject, cat is the object perceived.
锟斤拷
When the subject experiences seeing the cat, the experience is personal, as are all subjectivestates and all experiences.
锟斤拷
However, when he afterwards vocalizes "I see the cat", he has translated the experienceinto words, which means he has translated a subjective personal experience into apublicly accessible statement.
锟斤拷All personal experiences are subjective, all experiences shared in words are锟斤拷objective.
Any statement is then objective.
锟斤拷Computers can only deal in words (computer code),锟斤拷which are objective,so computers cannot experience anything, since experience is wordless (codeless).锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷
Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net8/29/2012Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function."
----- Receiving the following content -----From: Alberto G. CoronaReceiver: everything-listTime: 2012-08-29, 10:39:37Subject: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary
2012/8/29 Stephen P. King <step...@charter.net>
On 8/29/2012 8:44 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
Hi Albert,the subject 锟斤拷is preceived as singular because it has memory. It has memory because it is intelligent and social. thereforre it is moral. therefore it needs memory to give and take account of its debts and merits with others.
锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷 Memory is necessary but not sufficient. It the the content of memory and how it is sequentially ordered锟斤拷 that matters. "I am what I remember myself to be."
in my own terms, this is a metacomputation (interpreted computation) operating over my own memory. The possibility of this metacomputation comes from evolutionary reasons: to reflect about the moral Albert that others see on me.
This singularity is by definition because no other lived the same life of ourselves.
锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷 No, because we could never know that for sure. It is singular in the sense of "only I can know what it is like to be me" is exactly true for each and every one of us. The result is that I cannot know what it is like to be you.That锟斤拷s why this uniqueness is not 锟斤拷essential锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷 Please elaborate! Try to speculate a situation where it might occur. There is something important to this!
But up to a point it is not essential. We can be made accustomed to other ourselves. 锟斤拷Most twins consider each other another self. We 锟斤拷could come to consider normal to say hello to our recently created clones. Although this锟斤拷probably锟斤拷will never happen.This is a logical possibility due to the nonessentiality of uniqueness of individuality. (Or in Bruno terms: the first person indeterminacy). 锟斤拷But probably the cloning machine would never exist. Sorry I can not ellaborate further....
2012/8/29 Stephen P. King <step...@charter.net>
On 8/29/2012 7:38 AM, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi Craig Weinberg锟斤拷I agree.锟斤拷
Consciousness is not a monople, it is a dipole:
锟斤拷
Cs = subject + object
锟斤拷
The subject is always first person indeterminate.
Being indeterminate,锟斤拷it is not computable.锟斤拷QED
Hi Roger,
锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷 It is not a dipole in the normal sense, as the object is not restricted to being singular. The subject is always singular (necessity) while the object is possibly singular.
锟斤拷锟斤拷
Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net8/29/2012Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function."
----- Receiving the following content -----From: Craig WeinbergReceiver: everything-listTime: 2012-08-28, 12:19:50Subject: No Chinese Room Necessary
This sentence does not speak English.
These words do not 锟斤拷refer锟斤拷 to themselves.
s锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷l u锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷 锟斤拷,u锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷 锟斤拷s锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷
If you don't like Searle's example, perhaps the above can help illustrate that form is not inherently informative.
The implication here for me is that comp is a red herring as far as ascertaining the origin of awareness.
Either we view computation inherently having awareness as a meaningless epiphenomenal byproduct (yay, no free will), or we presume that computation can and does exist independently of all awareness but that a particular category of meta-computation is what we call awareness.
Even with the allowances that Bruno includes (or my understanding of what Bruno includes) in the form of first person indeterminacy and/or non comp contents, Platonic number dreams, etc - all of these can only negatively assert the completeness of arithmetic truth. My understanding is that G锟斤拷 del (and others) are used to support this negative assertion, and I of course agree that indeed it is impossible for any arithmetic system to be complete, especially in the sense of defining itself completely. I suspect that Bruno assumes that I don't have a deep enough understanding of this, but I think that what understanding I do have is enough to persuade me that this entire line of investigation is a dead end as far as explaining consciousness. It only works if we assume consciousness as a possibility a priori and independently of any arithmetic logic.
--
Please excuse the word, but comp can only create zombies,which seem to be alive but are not actually so.
Hi Craig
But what you are saying here is true for each and every individual observer; it is a 1p duality, along the lines of a figure/frame relation. We have to consider multiple observers, each with this property and see how components , in the entanglement frame, in one observer, A maps onto a component in the spatial frame of observer B and vise versa.
On Wednesday, August 29, 2012 2:24:45 PM UTC-4, Stephen Paul King wrote:Hi Craig
But what you are saying here is true for each and every individual observer; it is a 1p duality, along the lines of a figure/frame relation. We have to consider multiple observers, each with this property and see how components , in the entanglement frame, in one observer, A maps onto a component in the spatial frame of observer B and vise versa.
Hi Stephen,
I am thinking that it's like this. As an outsider to the Chinese language, I can't recognize the significance of the difference between one character or word and another. As an outsider to the world of modern kids, I can't recognize the difference between one brand of toy and another or one style of shoe and another. The information entropy is high. It seems like I could substitute any new shoe and it should serve the same purpose - but of course, that's because I'm not young and cool so I don't know what is cool. I have to take the kids word for it.
This same principle is what we are dealing with in our conception of matter and space. We have to rely on the reports of our body to us about its world. We are getting a consensus of organs, tissues, cells, molecules and coming up with an anthropologically-appropriate sense of scale and space. Now we have extended those body reports to include other instruments which give us a prosthetic enhancement to our sense of scale and space into the microcosm and macro-universe.
This extension has given us a peek behind our direct range of space and scale and into realms of unexpected unities (quantum entanglement for example, particle/wave duality, vacuum flux, etc) so that we are getting more of an insider's view of the universe that we are not directly inside of.
As for mapping components onto each other's frames, the frames are already the manifestation of all components separation from unity with each other.
Like tickling yourself doesn't work because on some level you know exactly when you are going to try to tickle yourself. It isn't that you have a model of a tickler of people and a tickled person and they interfere with each other when you try to tickle yourself - there isn't any model at all. When someone tickles you it is precisely because you can't anticipate their action that the sensation of being tickled becomes possible.
Space is like that. It is matter being tickled by matter that is not itself.
It might experience it as some sound or feeling or something we can't understand, but whatever it is that atoms experience on that level, or bodies of atoms experience on another level, is what we see, feel, and understand on our level as space or place relations.
It's like that example of the parking lot full of shiny cars. Each chrome edge and corner shining is not a separate simulation of the sun, it is a single presentation of the sense that arises out of your relation to the sun and the cars. It is a specular sharing of sense, not a mechanical instantiation.
Craig
Hi Craig,
You are on fire today! Nice! I like this real world example, but I am a bit fuzzy on how you are seeing it. Let me do my interpretation/reaction and see where it takes us. The "lack of recognition" is something important as it can show us how bisimulations are almost never a single step process. More often than not we have to go through several steps to, for this instance, knowing what the cool shoe is. This implies that more resources are required for strange objects to be recognized as opposed to fewer resources to recognize the familiar ones.
Sure.
This same principle is what we are dealing with in our conception of matter and space. We have to rely on the reports of our body to us about its world. We are getting a consensus of organs, tissues, cells, molecules and coming up with an anthropologically-appropriate sense of scale and space. Now we have extended those body reports to include other instruments which give us a prosthetic enhancement to our sense of scale and space into the microcosm and macro-universe.
Umm, this is wandering off topic a little. The pointed question is how does the duality on each individual maps between many such individuals? This is how interaction, IMHO, is to be represented.
This extension has given us a peek behind our direct range of space and scale and into realms of unexpected unities (quantum entanglement for example, particle/wave duality, vacuum flux, etc) so that we are getting more of an insider's view of the universe that we are not directly inside of.
The point about QM is important because the mutual commutativity rule is very important! For a given set of interacting/measuring/observing entities, their set of incontrovertible facts is strictly limited to observables in mutually commuting bases. For example, I cannot measure position data of a set of electrons and you measure momentum data on the "same set of electrons" if there is the possibility that we can share data. Mutual commutativity acts as a filter on what is "the same" 3p object. It is interesting to note that classical physics assumes that all observable bases commute... Newton et al never considered saw the need to consider the non-commutative case.
I think that the whole standard model is, in an absolute sense, inside-out. Electrons are not particles but sensitivity modes which seem particulate to our instruments because we are using their exteriors specifically to externalize/objectify the events. QM measures that objectification of matter interacting with itself from the outside.
Yes, that's true, but there is more detail to how the separation goes. There is something like a path and a "distance" between them and unity that can be exploited. My thought is that the path might be defined on the graph of all of the components relative to each other. From my research these graphs are ultrametric and non-archimedean in the absolute sense, so the usual graph ideas don't quite apply. This article explains the critical difference: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Non-Archimedean_time The trick is the inclusion of event horizons that act to hide the infinitely distance parts. This shows up as limited "forgetfulness" of residuation in Pratt's dualism idea.
As for mapping components onto each other's frames, the frames are already the manifestation of all components separation from unity with each other.
Right, but consider the schizophrenic that is operating out of synch between his hand movements and his perceptions of the sensations. He would be able to convincingly "tickle himself" but not recognize that those are his hands that are doing the tickling.
Like tickling yourself doesn't work because on some level you know exactly when you are going to try to tickle yourself. It isn't that you have a model of a tickler of people and a tickled person and they interfere with each other when you try to tickle yourself - there isn't any model at all. When someone tickles you it is precisely because you can't anticipate their action that the sensation of being tickled becomes possible.
No, its just a lag effect! The key is the definition of "itself" and "not-itself". For matter the determining factor is the speed of light. Things with in the light cone are "self" and outside the light cone are "not self".
Space is like that. It is matter being tickled by matter that is not itself.
Right.
It might experience it as some sound or feeling or something we can't understand, but whatever it is that atoms experience on that level, or bodies of atoms experience on another level, is what we see, feel, and understand on our level as space or place relations.
I disagree. Each shiny fragment entails a simulation on its own (as its photons have their own paths to traverse which get summed ala Feynman integrals), that is how they are recognized as seperate, but your point is right about your total relationship between the sun and cars. But this is a 1p vs. 3p situation.
It's like that example of the parking lot full of shiny cars. Each chrome edge and corner shining is not a separate simulation of the sun, it is a single presentation of the sense that arises out of your relation to the sun and the cars. It is a specular sharing of sense, not a mechanical instantiation.
Craig
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From experience I know people tend not to adopt it, but let me recommend a distinction. Moral is what I expect of myself. Ethics is what I do and what I hope other people will do in their interactions with other people. They of course tend to overlap since I will be ashamed of myself if I cheat someone, so it's both immoral and unethical. But they are not the same. If I spent my time smoking pot and not working I'd be disappointed in myself, but it wouldn't be unethical.
On 8/29/2012 8:54 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote:Not only to lie. In order to commerce and in general to interact, we need to know what to expect from whom. and the other need to know what the others expect form me. So I have to reflect on myself in order to act in the enviromnent of the moral and material expectations that others have about me. This is the origin of reflective individuality, that is moral from the beginning..
2012/8/29 meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net>
But Craig makes a point when he says computers only deal in words. That's why something having human like intelligence and consciousness must be a robot, something that can act wordlessly in it's environment. Evolutionarily speaking, conscious narrative is an add-on on top of subconscious thought which is responsible for almost everything we do. Julian Jaynes theorized that humans did not become conscious in the modern sense until they engaged in inter-tribal commerce and it became important to learn to lie.
Brent
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On 29 Aug 2012, at 22:30, meekerdb wrote:
From experience I know people tend not to adopt it, but let me recommend a distinction. Moral is what I expect of myself. Ethics is what I do and what I hope other people will do in their interactions with other people. They of course tend to overlap since I will be ashamed of myself if I cheat someone, so it's both immoral and unethical. But they are not the same. If I spent my time smoking pot and not working I'd be disappointed in myself, but it wouldn't be unethical.
I'm not sure I understand. "not working" wouldn't be immoral either. Disappointing, yes, but immoral?
BTW:I would not relate pot with not working. Some people don't work and smoke pot, and then blame pot for their non working, but some people smokes pot and work very well. The only researcher I knew smoking pot from early morning to evening, everyday, since hies early childhood, was the one who published the most, and get the most prestigious post in the US.
As a math teacher, since I told students that blaming pot will not been allowed for justifying exam problems, some students realize that they were using pot to lie to themselves on their motivation for study. It is so easy.
Likewise, if we were allowed to drive while being drunk, after a while the number of car accidents due to alcohol would probably diminish a lot, because the real culprit is not this product or that behavior, but irresponsibility, which is encouraged by treating adults like children. I think.
I think that there are many tries to separate moral from ethics: indiividual versus social, innate versus cultural, emotional versus rational etc. The whole point is to obviate the m*** world as much as we can, under the impression that moral is subjective and not objetive, or more precisely that there is no moral that can be objective. An there is such crap as the separation of facts and values (as if values (and in particular universal values) where not social facts).Well, this is a more effect of positivism which is deeply flawed in theoretical and practical terms. It is a consequence also of modern gnosticism, called progressivism of which positivism is one of the phases, that believes possible in a certain future a society with a perfect harmony of individual desires and social needs, making moral unnecessary.
I think that there are many tries to separate moral from ethics: indiividual versus social, innate versus cultural, emotional versus rational etc. The whole point is to obviate the m*** world as much as we can, under the impression that moral is subjective and not objetive, or more precisely that there is no moral that can be objective. An there is such crap as the separation of facts and values (as if values (and in particular universal values) where not social facts).
Well, this is a more effect of positivism which is deeply flawed in theoretical and practical terms. It is a consequence also of modern gnosticism, called progressivism of which positivism is one of the phases, that believes possible in a certain future a society with a perfect harmony of individual desires and social needs, making moral unnecessary. They also believe that the current social reality is a demiurgic creation of repressive social forces that hinder an era of Wisdom and Peace....
But this is impossible. Not only it is against judeochristian traditions, but against the theorical basis of the progressive ideology: the theory of evolution (natural selection). Men are social individuals and therefore moral is deep in his hardwired (instintive) nature, as multilevel selection theory can demonstrate.
Not only to lie. In order to commerce and in general to interact, we need to know what to expect from whom. and the other need to know what the others expect form me. So I have to reflect on myself in order to act in the enviromnent of the moral and material expectations that others have about me. This is the origin of reflective individuality, that is moral from the beginning..
But Craig makes a point when he says computers only deal in words. That's why something having human like intelligence and consciousness must be a robot, something that can act wordlessly in it's environment. Evolutionarily speaking, conscious narrative is an add-on on top of subconscious thought which is responsible for almost everything we do. Julian Jaynes theorized that humans did not become conscious in the modern sense until they engaged in inter-tribal commerce and it became important to learn to lie.
Brent
On 8/29/2012 8:40 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
That you perceive is accesible to us by your words. You say that you perceive. With these worlds you transmit to us this information "craig says that he perceive"..
From my side, The belief tat you REALLY perceive is a matter of faith
What i said is that it is THEORETICALLY create a robot with the same functionality, and subject to the same statement of faith from my side.
The subject is the perceiver, not that which is perceived.
For example, consider:"I see the cat." Here:
I is the perceiving subject, cat is the object perceived.
When the subject experiences seeing the cat, the experience is personal, as are all subjectivestates and all experiences.
However, when he afterwards vocalizes "I see the cat", he has translated the experienceinto words, which means he has translated a subjective personal experience into apublicly accessible statement.
All personal experiences are subjective, all experiences shared in words are objective.
Any statement is then objective.
Computers can only deal in words (computer code), which are objective,
so computers cannot experience anything, since experience is wordless (codeless).
Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net8/29/2012Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function."
----- Receiving the following content -----From: Alberto G. CoronaReceiver: everything-listTime: 2012-08-29, 10:39:37Subject: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary
2012/8/29 Stephen P. King <step...@charter.net>
Hi Albert,On 8/29/2012 8:44 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
the subject is preceived as singular because it has memory. It has memory because it is intelligent and social. thereforre it is moral. therefore it needs memory to give and take account of its debts and merits with others.
Memory is necessary but not sufficient. It the the content of memory and how it is sequentially ordered that matters. "I am what I remember myself to be."
in my own terms, this is a metacomputation (interpreted computation) operating over my own memory. The possibility of this metacomputation comes from evolutionary reasons: to reflect about the moral Albert that others see on me.
This singularity is by definition because no other lived the same life of ourselves.
No, because we could never know that for sure. It is singular in the sense of "only I can know what it is like to be me" is exactly true for each and every one of us. The result is that I cannot know what it is like to be you.
That′s why this uniqueness is not essential
But up to a point it is not essential. We can be made accustomed to other ourselves. Most twins consider each other another self. We could come to consider normal to say hello to our recently created clones. Although this probably will never happen.
Please elaborate! Try to speculate a situation where it might occur. There is something important to this!
This is a logical possibility due to the nonessentiality of uniqueness of individuality. (Or in Bruno terms: the first person indeterminacy). But probably the cloning machine would never exist. Sorry I can not ellaborate further....
2012/8/29 Stephen P. King <step...@charter.net>
On 8/29/2012 7:38 AM, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi Craig WeinbergI agree.
Consciousness is not a monople, it is a dipole:
Cs = subject + object
The subject is always first person indeterminate.
Being indeterminate, it is not computable.QED
Hi Roger,
It is not a dipole in the normal sense, as the object is not restricted to being singular. The subject is always singular (necessity) while the object is possibly singular.
Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net8/29/2012Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function."
----- Receiving the following content -----From: Craig WeinbergReceiver: everything-listTime: 2012-08-28, 12:19:50Subject: No Chinese Room Necessary
This sentence does not speak English.
These words do not ‘refer’ to themselves.
s l u ,u s
If you don't like Searle's example, perhaps the above can help illustrate that form is not inherently informative.
The implication here for me is that comp is a red herring as far as ascertaining the origin of awareness.
Either we view computation inherently having awareness as a meaningless epiphenomenal byproduct (yay, no free will), or we presume that computation can and does exist independently of all awareness but that a particular category of meta-computation is what we call awareness.
Even with the allowances that Bruno includes (or my understanding of what Bruno includes) in the form of first person indeterminacy and/or non comp contents, Platonic number dreams, etc - all of these can only negatively assert the completeness of arithmetic truth. My understanding is that G del (and others) are used to support this negative assertion, and I of course agree that indeed it is impossible for any arithmetic system to be complete, especially in the sense of defining itself completely. I suspect that Bruno assumes that I don't have a deep enough understanding of this, but I think that what understanding I do have is enough to persuade me that this entire line of investigation is a dead end as far as explaining consciousness. It only works if we assume consciousness as a possibility a priori and independently of any arithmetic logic.
Nowhere do I find in any AI/AGI theory any positive assertion of awareness. It is not enough to say *that* awareness fits into this or that category of programmatic interiority or logically necessary indeterminacy when the question of *what* awareness is in the first place and *why* is has not been addressed at all.
As I demonstrate in the three lines at the top, and Searle tried to demonstrate, awareness does not follow automatically from a negative assertion of computability. I bring up the example of cymatics on another thread. Scooping salt into a symmetrical-mandala pattern does not conjure up an acoustic vibration associated with that pattern. Qualia does not follow from quanta.
Quanta, however, could and I think does follow from qualia as a method of sequestering experiences to different degrees of privacy while retaining shared sense on more primitive 'public' levels. These methods would necessarily be construed as automatic to insulate crosstalk between channels of sense - to encourage the coherence of perceptual inertial frames to develop unique significance rather than to decohere into the entropy of the totality.
Does anyone have any positive assertion of consciousness derived from either physics or arithmetic? Any need for actual feelings and experiences, for direct participation?
Craig
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Hi Alberto G. CoronaSeeming to be aware is not the same as actually being aware,just as seeming to be alive is not the same as actually being alive.And my view is that comp, since it must operate in (objective) code,can only create entities that might seem to be alive, not actually be alive.
Please excuse the word, but comp can only create zombies,which seem to be alive but are not actually so.
Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net8/29/2012Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function."
----- Receiving the following content -----From: Alberto G. CoronaReceiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-08-29, 11:19:59Subject: Re: Re: Re: No Chinese Room NecessaryI say nothing opposed to that. What I say is that it′s functionality is computable: It is possible to make a robot with this functionality of awareness, but may be not with the capability of _being_ aware
Awareness = I see X.or I am X.or some similar statement.There's no computer in that behavior or state of being.
Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net8/29/2012Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function."
Time: 2012-08-29, 09:34:22Subject: Re: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary
Roger,I said that the awareness functionalty can be computable, that is that a inner computation can affect an external computation which is aware of the consequences of this inner computation.like in the case of any relation of brain and mind, I do not say that this IS the experience of awareness, but given the duality between mind and matter/brain, it is very plausible that the brain work that way when, in the paralell word of the mind, the mind experiences awareness
2012/8/29 Roger Clough <rcl...@verizon.net>Hi Alberto G. Corona
What sort of an output would the computer give me ?It can't be experiential, 0or if it is, I know of noway to hook it to my brain.
Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net8/29/2012Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function."
----- Receiving the following content -----From: Alberto G. CoronaReceiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-08-29, 08:21:27
Subject: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary
Hi:Awareness can be functionally (we do not know if experientially) computable. A program can run another program (a metaprogram) and do things depending on its results of the metaprogram (or his real time status). This is rutine in computer science and these programs are called "interpreters".
The lack of understanding, of this capability of metacomputation that any turing complete machine has, is IMHO the reason why it is said that the brain-mind can do things that a computer can never do. We humans can manage concepts in two ways : a direct way and a reflective way. The second is the result of an analysis of the first trough a metacomputation.For example we can not be aware of our use of category theory or our intuitions because they are hardwired programs, not interpreted programs. We can not know our deep thinking structures because they are not exposed as metacomputations. When we use metaphorically the verb "to be fired" to mean being redundant, we are using category theory but we can not be aware of it. Only after research that assimilate mathematical facts with the observable psichology of humans, we can create an awareness of it by means of an adquired metacomputation.
The same happens with the intuitions. We appreciate the beauty of a woman for adaptive reasons, but not the computation that produces this intuition. In the other side, we can appreciate the fact that the process of diagonalization by G del makes the Hilbert program impossible, That same conclusion can be reached by a program that metacomputes a constructive mathematical program. (see my post about the G del theorem).
Again, I do not see COMP a problem for the Existential problem of free will nor in any other existential question.
I agree.Consciousness is not a monople, it is a dipole:Cs = subject + objectThe subject is always first person indeterminate.Being indeterminate, it is not computable.QED
Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net8/29/2012Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function."
----- Receiving the following content -----From: Craig WeinbergReceiver: everything-listTime: 2012-08-28, 12:19:50Subject: No Chinese Room Necessary
This sentence does not speak English.
These words do not ‘refer’ to themselves.
s l u ,u s
If you don't like Searle's example, perhaps the above can help illustrate that form is not inherently informative.
The implication here for me is that comp is a red herring as far as ascertaining the origin of awareness.
Either we view computation inherently having awareness as a meaningless epiphenomenal byproduct (yay, no free will), or we presume that computation can and does exist independently of all awareness but that a particular category of meta-computation is what we call awareness.
Even with the allowances that Bruno includes (or my understanding of what Bruno includes) in the form of first person indeterminacy and/or non comp contents, Platonic number dreams, etc - all of these can only negatively assert the completeness of arithmetic truth. My understanding is that G del (and others) are used to support this negative assertion, and I of course agree that indeed it is impossible for any arithmetic system to be complete, especially in the sense of defining itself completely. I suspect that Bruno assumes that I don't have a deep enough understanding of this, but I think that what understanding I do have is enough to persuade me that this entire line of investigation is a dead end as far as explaining consciousness. It only works if we assume consciousness as a possibility a priori and independently of any arithmetic logic.
Nowhere do I find in any AI/AGI theory any positive assertion of awareness. It is not enough to say *that* awareness fits into this or that category of programmatic interiority or logically necessary indeterminacy when the question of *what* awareness is in the first place and *why* is has not been addressed at all.
As I demonstrate in the three lines at the top, and Searle tried to demonstrate, awareness does not follow automatically from a negative assertion of computability. I bring up the example of cymatics on another thread. Scooping salt into a symmetrical-mandala pattern does not conjure up an acoustic vibration associated with that pattern. Qualia does not follow from quanta.
Quanta, however, could and I think does follow from qualia as a method of sequestering experiences to different degrees of privacy while retaining shared sense on more primitive 'public' levels. These methods would necessarily be construed as automatic to insulate crosstalk between channels of sense - to encourage the coherence of perceptual inertial frames to develop unique significance rather than to decohere into the entropy of the totality.
Does anyone have any positive assertion of consciousness derived from either physics or arithmetic? Any need for actual feelings and experiences, for direct participation?
Craig
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Please excuse the word, but comp can only create zombies,which seem to be alive but are not actually so.The problem is that you cannot know that.
In case of doubt it is ethically better to attribute consciousness to something non conscious, than attributing non consciousness to something conscious, as that can generate suffering.
There is japanese engineer who is building androids, that is robot looking very much like humans.An european journalist asked him if he was not worrying about naive people who might believe that such machine is alive.He answered that in Japan they believe that everything is alive, so that they have no problem with such question.As I said often, the "real" question is not "can machine think", but "can your daughter marry a machine" (like a man who did undergone a digital brain transplant).When will machine get the right to vote?
When the Lutherans will baptize machines?
Etc.Universal machines are sort of universal babies, or universal dynamical mirror. If you can't develop respect for them, they won't develop respect for you.
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There is a human nature, and therefore a social nature with invariants.in computational terms, the human mind is a collection or hardwired programs.
codified by a developmental program, codified itself by a genetic program, which incidentally is a 90% identical in all humans (this is an amazing homogeneity for a single specie).These hardwired programs create behaviours in humans, that interact in a social environment. By game theory, you can verify that there are Nash equilibriums among these human players. These optimums of well being for all withing the constraints of human nature called nash equilibriums are the moral code.These equilibriums are no sharp maximums, but vary slightly according with the social coordinates. They are lines of surface maximums. These maximums are know by our intuition because we have suffered social selection, so a knowledge of them are intuitive. That we have suffered social selection means that the groups of hominids or the individual hominids whose conducts were away from the nash equilibriums dissapeared. To be near these equilibriums was an advantage so we have these hardwired intuitions, that the greeks called Nous and the chistians call soul.What happens a broad variety of moral behaviours are really the expression of the same moral code operating in different circunstances where the optimum has been displaced. There are very interesting studies, for example in foundational book of evolutionary psychology "The adapted mind"about in which circunstances a mother may abandon his newborn child in extreme cases (In the study about pregnancy sickness). This would be at the extreme of the social spectrum: In the contrary in a affluent society close to ours, the rules are quite "normal". Both the normal behaviour or the extreme behaviour is created by the same basic algoritm of individual/social optimization. No matter if we see this from a dynamic way (contemplating the variations and extremes) or a static one contemplating a "normal" society, the moral is a unique, universal rule system. Thanks to the research on evolution applied to huumans, computer science and game theory, It is a rediscovered fact of human nature and his society, that await a development of evolutionary morals
Hi Craig,
Umm, ever hear of the concept of "Heaven"? It sounds very much like a "a future society with a perfect anything or that morals were unnecessary".
On Thursday, August 30, 2012 6:16:14 PM UTC-4, Stephen Paul King wrote:Hi Craig,
Umm, ever hear of the concept of "Heaven"? It sounds very much like a "a future society with a perfect anything or that morals were unnecessary".
Sure, but when does the Left Wing ever talk about Heaven?
Craig
On Thursday, August 30, 2012 4:47:19 PM UTC-4, Alberto G.Corona wrote:There is a human nature, and therefore a social nature with invariants.
in computational terms, the human mind is a collection or hardwired programs.
codified by a developmental program, codified itself by a genetic program, which incidentally is a 90% identical in all humans (this is an amazing homogeneity for a single specie).
These hardwired programs create behaviours in humans, that interact in a social environment. By game theory, you can verify that there are Nash equilibriums among these human players. These optimums of well being for all withing the constraints of human nature called nash equilibriums are the moral code.
These equilibriums are no sharp maximums, but vary slightly according with the social coordinates. They are lines of surface maximums. These maximums are know by our intuition because we have suffered social selection, so a knowledge of them are intuitive. That we have suffered social selection means that the groups of hominids or the individual hominids whose conducts were away from the nash equilibriums dissapeared. To be near these equilibriums was an advantage so we have these hardwired intuitions, that the greeks called Nous and the chistians call soul.
What happens a broad variety of moral behaviours are really the expression of the same moral code operating in different circunstances where the optimum has been displaced. There are very interesting studies, for example in foundational book of evolutionary psychology "The adapted mind"
about in which circunstances a mother may abandon his newborn child in extreme cases (In the study about pregnancy sickness). This would be at the extreme of the social spectrum: In the contrary in a affluent society close to ours, the rules are quite "normal". Both the normal behaviour or the extreme behaviour is created by the same basic algoritm of individual/social optimization. No matter if we see this from a dynamic way (contemplating the variations and extremes) or a static one contemplating a "normal" society, the moral is a unique, universal rule system. Thanks to the research on evolution applied to huumans, computer science and game theory, It is a rediscovered fact of human nature and his society, that await a development of evolutionary morals
Computational analogies can only provide us with a toy model of morality. Should I eat my children, or should I order a pizza? It depends on the anticipation of statistical probabilities, etc...no different than how the equilibrium of oxygen and CO2 in my blood determines whether I inhale or exhale.
This kind of modeling may indeed offer some predictive strategies and instrumental knowledge of morality, but if we had to build a person or a universe based on this description, what would we get? Where is the revulsion, disgust, and blame - the stigma and shaming...the deep and violent prejudices? Surely they are not found in the banal evils of game theory.
On 8/30/2012 6:35 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Thursday, August 30, 2012 6:16:14 PM UTC-4, Stephen Paul King wrote:Hi Craig,
Umm, ever hear of the concept of "Heaven"? It sounds very much like a "a future society with a perfect anything or that morals were unnecessary".
Sure, but when does the Left Wing ever talk about Heaven?
Craig
Hi Craig,
Umm, the Marxists have an analogue... " classless, moneyless, and stateless social order structured upon common ownership of the means of production, as well as a social, political and economic ideology that aims at the establishment of this social order".
On 8/30/2012 2:19 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
Computational analogies can only provide us with a toy model of morality. Should I eat my children, or should I order a pizza? It depends on the anticipation of statistical probabilities, etc...no different than how the equilibrium of oxygen and CO2 in my blood determines whether I inhale or exhale.
It also depends on what you want. No decision problem can be solved with values. The values that evolved biologically are common and don't change very fast; so it's a good bet you love your children more than yourself.
This kind of modeling may indeed offer some predictive strategies and instrumental knowledge of morality, but if we had to build a person or a universe based on this description, what would we get? Where is the revulsion, disgust, and blame - the stigma and shaming...the deep and violent prejudices? Surely they are not found in the banal evils of game theory.
They're found in your the banal neurons of your brain,
so they could be part of the morals of a robot if we chose to build it that way. From our perspective as citizens in a very diverse and interconnected world of billions of people, we can see ways in which we might give a robot better, more adaptive, values than biology has given us.
Brent
If morals didn't exist, why would we choose to invent them? What possible purpose could be served by some additional qualitative layer of experience on top of the perfectly efficient and simple execution of neurochemical scripts? Don't you see that the proposed usefulness of such a thing is only conceivable in hindsight - after the fact of its existence?
We didn't invent them. They evolved. Evolution has no foresight, it's random.
It takes advantage of what is available. Feeling sick at your stomach after eating rotten food is a good adaptation to teach you not eat stuff like that again.
So what feeling would work to guide you not harm a child? - how about that 'sick at your stomach' feeling.
On Thursday, August 30, 2012 8:19:32 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote:
If morals didn't exist, why would we choose to invent them? What possible purpose could be served by some additional qualitative layer of experience on top of the perfectly efficient and simple execution of neurochemical scripts? Don't you see that the proposed usefulness of such a thing is only conceivable in hindsight - after the fact of its existence?
We didn't invent them. They evolved. Evolution has no foresight, it's random.
Randomness is not omnipotence. It doesn't matter how many words I write here, they will never evolve into something that writes by itself.
It takes advantage of what is available. Feeling sick at your stomach after eating rotten food is a good adaptation to teach you not eat stuff like that again.
No, it isn't a possible adaptation at all. There would not be any such thing as 'feeling' or 'sick' - only memory locations and branching tree algorithms. This is what I am saying, feeling makes no sense as a possibility unless you are looking back on it in hindsight after the fact. Sure, to you it seems like nausea is a good adaptation, but that's naive realism. You assume nausea is possible because you have experienced it.
You would have to use evolution to explain the possibility of feeling in the first place, and it cannot.
So what feeling would work to guide you not harm a child? - how about that 'sick at your stomach' feeling.
That implies that T-cells need a feeling to guide them not to kill friendly cells.
That H2O needs a feeling to guide it not to dissolve non-polar molecules. If you believe in functionalism, then all feeling is a metaphysical epiphenomenon. I think the opposite makes more sense - everything is feeling, function is the result of sense, not the other way around. T-cells do feel. Molecules do feel. How could it be any other way?
On 8/30/2012 5:39 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Thursday, August 30, 2012 8:19:32 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote:
If morals didn't exist, why would we choose to invent them? What possible purpose could be served by some additional qualitative layer of experience on top of the perfectly efficient and simple execution of neurochemical scripts? Don't you see that the proposed usefulness of such a thing is only conceivable in hindsight - after the fact of its existence?
We didn't invent them. They evolved. Evolution has no foresight, it's random.
Randomness is not omnipotence. It doesn't matter how many words I write here, they will never evolve into something that writes by itself.
Exactly. Randomness is more likely to kludge up an adaptation than create an efficient design from scratch. Your words don't evolve because they don't move around and recombine randomly - except in your head.
Are you an Intelligent Design creationist?
It takes advantage of what is available. Feeling sick at your stomach after eating rotten food is a good adaptation to teach you not eat stuff like that again.
No, it isn't a possible adaptation at all. There would not be any such thing as 'feeling' or 'sick' - only memory locations and branching tree algorithms. This is what I am saying, feeling makes no sense as a possibility unless you are looking back on it in hindsight after the fact. Sure, to you it seems like nausea is a good adaptation, but that's naive realism. You assume nausea is possible because you have experienced it.
That's not an assumption - that's empiricism. An assumption would be that a brain can't instantiate feelings.
You would have to use evolution to explain the possibility of feeling in the first place, and it cannot.
So what feeling would work to guide you not harm a child? - how about that 'sick at your stomach' feeling.
That implies that T-cells need a feeling to guide them not to kill friendly cells.
No it doesn't. T-cells are not social animals who need to care for their young.
That H2O needs a feeling to guide it not to dissolve non-polar molecules. If you believe in functionalism, then all feeling is a metaphysical epiphenomenon. I think the opposite makes more sense - everything is feeling, function is the result of sense, not the other way around. T-cells do feel. Molecules do feel. How could it be any other way?
But then you have no way to explain why they feel this instead of that.
Brent
On Thursday, August 30, 2012 9:00:12 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote:On 8/30/2012 5:39 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Thursday, August 30, 2012 8:19:32 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote:
If morals didn't exist, why would we choose to invent them? What possible purpose could be served by some additional qualitative layer of experience on top of the perfectly efficient and simple execution of neurochemical scripts? Don't you see that the proposed usefulness of such a thing is only conceivable in hindsight - after the fact of its existence?
We didn't invent them. They evolved. Evolution has no foresight, it's random.
Randomness is not omnipotence. It doesn't matter how many words I write here, they will never evolve into something that writes by itself.
Exactly. Randomness is more likely to kludge up an adaptation than create an efficient design from scratch. Your words don't evolve because they don't move around and recombine randomly - except in your head.
Are you suggesting that if I add a randomizer that the words being spit out will eventually learn to become an author?
Are you an Intelligent Design creationist?
Of course not.
It takes advantage of what is available. Feeling sick at your stomach after eating rotten food is a good adaptation to teach you not eat stuff like that again.
No, it isn't a possible adaptation at all. There would not be any such thing as 'feeling' or 'sick' - only memory locations and branching tree algorithms. This is what I am saying, feeling makes no sense as a possibility unless you are looking back on it in hindsight after the fact. Sure, to you it seems like nausea is a good adaptation, but that's naive realism. You assume nausea is possible because you have experienced it.
That's not an assumption - that's empiricism. An assumption would be that a brain can't instantiate feelings.
Ok, then you know nausea is possible because you have experienced it. That doesn't change the fact that nausea has no business being possible in a universe driven only by bottom up evolution.
You would have to use evolution to explain the possibility of feeling in the first place, and it cannot.
So what feeling would work to guide you not harm a child? - how about that 'sick at your stomach' feeling.
That implies that T-cells need a feeling to guide them not to kill friendly cells.
No it doesn't. T-cells are not social animals who need to care for their young.
T-cells are social organisms who need to care for the other cells of the body. What's the difference?
On 8/30/2012 6:23 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Thursday, August 30, 2012 9:00:12 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote:On 8/30/2012 5:39 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Thursday, August 30, 2012 8:19:32 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote:
If morals didn't exist, why would we choose to invent them? What possible purpose could be served by some additional qualitative layer of experience on top of the perfectly efficient and simple execution of neurochemical scripts? Don't you see that the proposed usefulness of such a thing is only conceivable in hindsight - after the fact of its existence?
We didn't invent them. They evolved. Evolution has no foresight, it's random.
Randomness is not omnipotence. It doesn't matter how many words I write here, they will never evolve into something that writes by itself.
Exactly. Randomness is more likely to kludge up an adaptation than create an efficient design from scratch. Your words don't evolve because they don't move around and recombine randomly - except in your head.
Are you suggesting that if I add a randomizer that the words being spit out will eventually learn to become an author?
That would be necessary but not sufficient. You'd need an editor (or natural selection) to find something coherent.
Are you an Intelligent Design creationist?
Of course not.
Then why can't you accept that living systems are not designed, don't 'need' be they way they are, are just formed by random variation and natural selection.
It takes advantage of what is available. Feeling sick at your stomach after eating rotten food is a good adaptation to teach you not eat stuff like that again.
No, it isn't a possible adaptation at all. There would not be any such thing as 'feeling' or 'sick' - only memory locations and branching tree algorithms. This is what I am saying, feeling makes no sense as a possibility unless you are looking back on it in hindsight after the fact. Sure, to you it seems like nausea is a good adaptation, but that's naive realism. You assume nausea is possible because you have experienced it.
That's not an assumption - that's empiricism. An assumption would be that a brain can't instantiate feelings.
Ok, then you know nausea is possible because you have experienced it. That doesn't change the fact that nausea has no business being possible in a universe driven only by bottom up evolution.
IT'S RANDOM! Having business assumes a goal, foresight.
You would have to use evolution to explain the possibility of feeling in the first place, and it cannot.
So what feeling would work to guide you not harm a child? - how about that 'sick at your stomach' feeling.
That implies that T-cells need a feeling to guide them not to kill friendly cells.
No it doesn't. T-cells are not social animals who need to care for their young.
T-cells are social organisms who need to care for the other cells of the body. What's the difference?
For one the T-cells don't have young.
Their 'feelings' are simple and don't need to rise to level of being expressible or to be resolved with conflicting feelings.
You are again asking why some biological system 'needs' to be the way it is, as though there is a designer who can explain his choice.
Brent
Craig
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----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Bruno MarchalReceiver: everything-listTime: 2012-08-30, 13:03:32
Subject: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary
On 29 Aug 2012, at 22:30, meekerdb wrote:
From experience I know people tend not to adopt it, but let me recommend a distinction. Moral is what I expect of myself. Ethics is what I do and what I hope other people will do in their interactions with other people. They of course tend to overlap since I will be ashamed of myself if I cheat someone, so it's both immoral and unethical. But they are not the same. If I spent my time smoking pot and not working I'd be disappointed in myself, but it wouldn't be unethical.I'm not sure I understand. "not working" wouldn't be immoral either. Disappointing, yes, but immoral?
BTW:I would not relate pot with not working. Some people don't work and smoke pot, and then blame pot for their non working, but some people smokes pot and work very well. The only researcher I knew smoking pot from early morning to evening, everyday, since hies early childhood, was the one who published the most, and get the most prestigious post in the US.
As a math teacher, since I told students that blaming pot will not been allowed for justifying exam problems, some students realize that they were using pot to lie to themselves on their motivation for study. It is so easy.Likewise, if we were allowed to drive while being drunk, after a while the number of car accidents due to alcohol would probably diminish a lot, because the real culprit is not this product or that behavior, but irresponsibility, which is encouraged by treating adults like children. I think.
Bruno
On 8/29/2012 8:54 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote:Not only to lie. In order to commerce and in general to interact, we need to know what to expect from whom. and the other need to know what the others expect form me. So I have to reflect on myself in order to act in the enviromnent of the moral and material expectations that others have about me. This is the origin of reflective individuality, that is moral from the beginning..
2012/8/29 meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net>
But Craig makes a point when he says computers only deal in words. That's why something having human like intelligence and consciousness must be a robot, something that can act wordlessly in it's environment. Evolutionarily speaking, conscious narrative is an add-on on top of subconscious thought which is responsible for almost everything we do. Julian Jaynes theorized that humans did not become conscious in the modern sense until they engaged in inter-tribal commerce and it became important to learn to lie.
Brent
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----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Bruno MarchalReceiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-08-30, 15:03:20
Subject: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary
Hi Roger
I say nothing opposed to that. What I say is that 锟斤拷it锟斤拷s functionality is computable: It is possible to make a robot with this functionality of awareness, but may be not with the capability of _being_ aware
Awareness = I see X.
锟斤拷or I am X.or some similar statement.锟斤拷There's no computer in that锟斤拷behavior or state of being.锟斤拷锟斤拷
Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net8/29/2012Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function."
Time: 2012-08-29, 09:34:22Subject: Re: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary
Roger,I said that the awareness functionalty can be computable, that is that a inner computation can affect an external computation which is aware of the consequences of this inner computation.
锟斤拷锟斤拷like in the case of any relation of brain and mind,锟斤拷I do not say that this IS 锟斤拷the experience of awareness, but given the duality between mind and matter/brain, it is very plausible that the brain work that way when, in the paralell word of the mind, the mind experiences awareness2012/8/29 Roger Clough <rcl...@verizon.net>Hi Alberto G. Corona锟斤拷
What sort of an output would the computer give me ?It can't be experiential, 0or if it is, I know of noway to hook it to my brain.
锟斤拷锟斤拷
Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net8/29/2012Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function."
----- Receiving the following content -----From: Alberto G. CoronaReceiver: everything-listTime: 2012-08-29, 08:21:27Subject: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary
Hi:Awareness can 锟斤拷be functionally (we do not know if experientially) 锟斤拷computable. A program can run another program (a metaprogram) and do things depending on its results of the metaprogram (or his real time status). This is rutine in computer science and these programs are called "interpreters".锟斤拷The lack of 锟斤拷understanding, of this capability of metacomputation that any turing complete machine has, is IMHO the reason why 锟斤拷it is said that the brain-mind can do things that a computer can never do. 锟斤拷We humans can manage concepts in two ways : a direct way and a reflective way. The second is the result of an analysis of the first trough a metacomputation.For example we can not be aware of our use of category theory or our intuitions because they are hardwired programs, not interpreted programs. We can not know 锟斤拷our deep thinking structures because they are not exposed as metacomputations. When we use锟斤拷metaphorically锟斤拷the verb "to be fired" 锟斤拷to mean being redundant, we are using category theory but we can not be aware of it. 锟斤拷Only after research that assimilate mathematical facts with the observable psichology of humans, we can create an awareness of it by means of an adquired metacomputation.The same happens with the intuitions. We appreciate the beauty of a woman for adaptive reasons, but not the computation that produces this intuition. In the other side, we can appreciate the fact that the process 锟斤拷of diagonalization by G锟斤拷del 锟斤拷makes the Hilbert program impossible, That same conclusion can be reached by a program that metacomputes a constructive mathematical program. (see my post about the G锟斤拷del theorem).
Again, I do not see COMP a problem for the Existential problem of free will nor in any other existential question.
Consciousness is not a monople, it is a dipole:
锟斤拷
Cs = subject + object
锟斤拷
The subject is always first person indeterminate.
Being indeterminate,锟斤拷it is not computable.锟斤拷QED锟斤拷锟斤拷
Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net8/29/2012Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function."
----- Receiving the following content -----From: Craig WeinbergReceiver: everything-listTime: 2012-08-28, 12:19:50Subject: No Chinese Room Necessary
This sentence does not speak English.
These words do not 锟斤拷refer锟斤拷 to themselves.
s锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷l u锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷 锟斤拷,u锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷 锟斤拷s锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷
If you don't like Searle's example, perhaps the above can help illustrate that form is not inherently informative.
The implication here for me is that comp is a red herring as far as ascertaining the origin of awareness.
Either we view computation inherently having awareness as a meaningless epiphenomenal byproduct (yay, no free will), or we presume that computation can and does exist independently of all awareness but that a particular category of meta-computation is what we call awareness.
Even with the allowances that Bruno includes (or my understanding of what Bruno includes) in the form of first person indeterminacy and/or non comp contents, Platonic number dreams, etc - all of these can only negatively assert the completeness of arithmetic truth. My understanding is that G锟斤拷del (and others) are used to support this negative assertion, and I of course agree that indeed it is impossible for any arithmetic system to be complete, especially in the sense of defining itself completely. I suspect that Bruno assumes that I don't have a deep enough understanding of this, but I think that what understanding I do have is enough to persuade me that this entire line of investigation is a dead end as far as explaining consciousness. It only works if we assume consciousness as a possibility a priori and independently of any arithmetic logic.
On Thursday, August 30, 2012 3:03:32 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:Please excuse the word, but comp can only create zombies,which seem to be alive but are not actually so.The problem is that you cannot know that.
Then you can't know that he can't know that either. Maybe he does know it? Maybe he can tell in his bones that this is true? You are arbitrarily being conservative in your attribution of the veracity of human sense and liberal in your attribution of machine sense.
In case of doubt it is ethically better to attribute consciousness to something non conscious, than attributing non consciousness to something conscious, as that can generate suffering.
It could generate suffering either way. If an android tells you that you can sing and you believe it, you could be brainwashed by an advertisement. You could choose to save a machine programmed to yell in a fire while other real people burn alive.
There is japanese engineer who is building androids, that is robot looking very much like humans.An european journalist asked him if he was not worrying about naive people who might believe that such machine is alive.He answered that in Japan they believe that everything is alive, so that they have no problem with such question.As I said often, the "real" question is not "can machine think", but "can your daughter marry a machine" (like a man who did undergone a digital brain transplant).When will machine get the right to vote?
When will the machine demand the right to vote?
When the Lutherans will baptize machines?
When will they demand to be baptized?
Etc.Universal machines are sort of universal babies, or universal dynamical mirror. If you can't develop respect for them, they won't develop respect for you.
Not even remotely persuasive to me. Sorry Bruno, but It sounds like you are selling me a pet rock. It's not scientific - has there ever been a case where a universal machine has developed respect for someone? Can a machine tell the difference between respect and disrespect? Nah.
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On Thursday, August 30, 2012 4:47:19 PM UTC-4, Alberto G.Corona wrote:There is a human nature, and therefore a social nature with invariants.in computational terms, the human mind is a collection or hardwired programs.codified by a developmental program, codified itself by a genetic program, which incidentally is a 90% identical in all humans (this is an amazing homogeneity for a single specie).These hardwired programs create behaviours in humans, that interact in a social environment. By game theory, you can verify that there are Nash equilibriums among these human players. These optimums of well being for all withing the constraints of human nature called nash equilibriums are the moral code.These equilibriums are no sharp maximums, but vary slightly according with the social coordinates. They are lines of surface maximums. These maximums are know by our intuition because we have suffered social selection, so a knowledge of them are intuitive. That we have suffered social selection means that the groups of hominids or the individual hominids whose conducts were away from the nash equilibriums dissapeared. To be near these equilibriums was an advantage so we have these hardwired intuitions, that the greeks called Nous and the chistians call soul.What happens a broad variety of moral behaviours are really the expression of the same moral code operating in different circunstances where the optimum has been displaced. There are very interesting studies, for example in foundational book of evolutionary psychology "The adapted mind"about in which circunstances a mother may abandon his newborn child in extreme cases (In the study about pregnancy sickness). This would be at the extreme of the social spectrum: In the contrary in a affluent society close to ours, the rules are quite "normal". Both the normal behaviour or the extreme behaviour is created by the same basic algoritm of individual/social optimization. No matter if we see this from a dynamic way (contemplating the variations and extremes) or a static one contemplating a "normal" society, the moral is a unique, universal rule system. Thanks to the research on evolution applied to huumans, computer science and game theory, It is a rediscovered fact of human nature and his society, that await a development of evolutionary moralsComputational analogies can only provide us with a toy model of morality.
Should I eat my children, or should I order a pizza? It depends on the anticipation of statistical probabilities, etc...no different than how the equilibrium of oxygen and CO2 in my blood determines whether I inhale or exhale.
This kind of modeling may indeed offer some predictive strategies and instrumental knowledge of morality, but if we had to build a person or a universe based on this description, what would we get? Where is the revulsion, disgust, and blame - the stigma and shaming...the deep and violent prejudices? Surely they are not found in the banal evils of game theory.
To understand morals we must look at sense and motive, and how the association of transgressive motives (criminality) is associated fairly and unfairly with transgressive sense (images, characters worthy of disgust, shame, etc). We must understand how super-signifying images are telegraphed socially through and second-hand exaggeration and dramatization, of story-telling and parenting, demagoguery, religious authority, etc. Morality is politics. It is the subjective topology which elevates and lowers events, objects, people, places, behaviors, etc so that we enforce our own behavioral control before outside authorities need to. It isn't only a mathematical system of rules, it is a visceral drama. Consciousness computes, but consciousness itself has almost nothing to do with computation. It is experience. That is all there is.
One can experience the computation of other experiences, but without experience, there is no access to computation.
Craig
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----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Alberto G. CoronaReceiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-08-31, 05:23:23Subject: Re: Is evolution moral ?Take for example the most primitive form of competition: the fight in a tribe for a leader. You defeat your opponent using politics or a form of ritualized violence (sorry for the redundancy). Then if you are the best fit for the task and the competition is adequate, the overall fitness of the group is enhanced. Therefore, if there is group selection, and our ancestor had it, this kind of moral competition, 锟絙ecomes a part of our moral psichology. As a result this, in fact, is an integral part of the inherent collaborative-competitive idiosincrasy of maleness. And it is highly moral, that is, there is profound perceived feeling in these activities of acting for the good of the group.
Not only to lie. In order 锟絫o commerce and in general to interact, we need to know what to expect from whom. and the other need to know what the others expect form me. So I have to reflect on myself in order to act in the enviromnent of the moral and material expectations that others have about me. This is the origin of reflective individuality, that is moral from the beginning..�
2012/8/29 meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net>
But Craig makes a point when he says computers only deal in words.� That's why something having human like intelligence and consciousness must be a robot, something that can act wordlessly in it's environment.� Evolutionarily speaking, conscious narrative is an add-on on top of subconscious thought which is responsible for almost everything we do.� Julian Jaynes theorized that humans did not become conscious in the modern sense until they engaged in inter-tribal commerce and it became important to learn to lie.
Brent
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Adam Smith showed that "enlightened self-interest",contrary to what a liberal might think, benefitsall. The buyer gains goods, the seller gains capital. Societyis eventually enriched as well. Man would never havesurvived with such all-enriching market trading.Ayn Rand went overboard on the self-interest aspect,advocating selfishness and self-esteem as goals to strive for.I don't think that greed and egotism enhance life, though.On the other hand, Rand's conservative economics was top rate.Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net8/31/2012Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent himso that everything could function."
----- Receiving the following content -----From: Alberto G. CoronaReceiver: everything-listTime: 2012-08-31, 05:23:23Subject: Re: Is evolution moral ?
Take for example the most primitive form of competition: the fight in a tribe for a leader. You defeat your opponent using politics or a form of ritualized violence (sorry for the redundancy). Then if you are the best fit for the task and the competition is adequate, the overall fitness of the group is enhanced. Therefore, if there is group selection, and our ancestor had it, this kind of moral competition, 燽ecomes a part of our moral psichology. As a result this, in fact, is an integral part of the inherent collaborative-competitive idiosincrasy of maleness. And it is highly moral, that is, there is profound perceived feeling in these activities of acting for the good of the group.
Not only to lie. In order 爐o commerce and in general to interact, we need to know what to expect from whom. and the other need to know what the others expect form me. So I have to reflect on myself in order to act in the enviromnent of the moral and material expectations that others have about me. This is the origin of reflective individuality, that is moral from the beginning..�
2012/8/29 meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net>
But Craig makes a point when he says computers only deal in words.� That's why something having human like intelligence and consciousness must be a robot, something that can act wordlessly in it's environment.� Evolutionarily speaking, conscious narrative is an add-on on top of subconscious thought which is responsible for almost everything we do.� Julian Jaynes theorized that humans did not become conscious in the modern sense until they engaged in inter-tribal commerce and it became important to learn to lie.
Brent
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From: Craig WeinbergReceiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-08-30, 14:23:33
Subject: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary
On Thursday, August 30, 2012 2:01:45 PM UTC-4, Alberto G.Corona wrote:I think that there are many tries to separate moral from ethics: indiividual versus social, innate versus cultural, emotional versus rational etc. The whole point is to obviate the m*** world as much as we can, under the impression that moral is subjective and not objetive, or more precisely that there is no moral that can be objective. An there is such crap as the separation of facts and values (as if values (and in particular universal values) where not social facts).Well, this is a more effect of positivism which is deeply flawed in theoretical and practical terms. It is a consequence also of modern gnosticism, called progressivism of which positivism is one of the phases, that believes possible in a certain future a society with a perfect harmony of individual desires and social needs, making moral unnecessary.
Craig
I have never heard anyone who expresses progressive, liberal, or left wing opinions state that they believe in a future society with a perfect anything or that morals were unnecessary.
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Hi Bruno MarchalIf IMHO the moral is that which enhances life,then not working tends to be immoral.
It is interesting to try to combine this definitionwith evolution. You might enhance your own life(and chance of generating more humans) bydefeating a competitor, but the overall outcomewould be a wash (be amoral). Not sure.I think that in dealing with morality, thewhole group should be considered -- atleast from the viewpoint of a god.
Hi Bruno MarchalI would answer by saying that even unconscious entities, such asan immune system, can enhance life, and so IMHO are good(moral) while cancer, which tends to deminish life, is bad or evil.
Hi Roger
I say nothing opposed to that. What I say is that it′s functionality is computable: It is possible to make a robot with this functionality of awareness, but may be not with the capability of _being_ aware
Awareness = I see X.
or I am X.or some similar statement.
There's no computer in that behavior or state of being.
Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net8/29/2012Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function."
Time: 2012-08-29, 09:34:22Subject: Re: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary
Roger,I said that the awareness functionalty can be computable, that is that a inner computation can affect an external computation which is aware of the consequences of this inner computation.
like in the case of any relation of brain and mind, I do not say that this IS the experience of awareness, but given the duality between mind and matter/brain, it is very plausible that the brain work that way when, in the paralell word of the mind, the mind experiences awareness2012/8/29 Roger Clough <rcl...@verizon.net>Hi Alberto G. Corona
What sort of an output would the computer give me ?It can't be experiential, 0or if it is, I know of noway to hook it to my brain.
Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net8/29/2012Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function."
----- Receiving the following content -----From: Alberto G. CoronaReceiver: everything-listTime: 2012-08-29, 08:21:27Subject: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary
Hi:
Awareness can be functionally (we do not know if experientially) computable. A program can run another program (a metaprogram) and do things depending on its results of the metaprogram (or his real time status). This is rutine in computer science and these programs are called "interpreters".
The lack of understanding, of this capability of metacomputation that any turing complete machine has, is IMHO the reason why it is said that the brain-mind can do things that a computer can never do. We humans can manage concepts in two ways : a direct way and a reflective way. The second is the result of an analysis of the first trough a metacomputation.For example we can not be aware of our use of category theory or our intuitions because they are hardwired programs, not interpreted programs. We can not know our deep thinking structures because they are not exposed as metacomputations. When we use metaphorically the verb "to be fired" to mean being redundant, we are using category theory but we can not be aware of it. Only after research that assimilate mathematical facts with the observable psichology of humans, we can create an awareness of it by means of an adquired metacomputation.
The same happens with the intuitions. We appreciate the beauty of a woman for adaptive reasons, but not the computation that produces this intuition. In the other side, we can appreciate the fact that the process of diagonalization by G del makes the Hilbert program impossible, That same conclusion can be reached by a program that metacomputes a constructive mathematical program. (see my post about the G del theorem).
Again, I do not see COMP a problem for the Existential problem of free will nor in any other existential question.
Consciousness is not a monople, it is a dipole:
Cs = subject + object
The subject is always first person indeterminate.
Being indeterminate, it is not computable.QED
Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net8/29/2012Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function."
----- Receiving the following content -----From: Craig WeinbergReceiver: everything-listTime: 2012-08-28, 12:19:50Subject: No Chinese Room Necessary
This sentence does not speak English.
These words do not ‘refer’ to themselves.
s l u ,u s
If you don't like Searle's example, perhaps the above can help illustrate that form is not inherently informative.
The implication here for me is that comp is a red herring as far as ascertaining the origin of awareness.
Either we view computation inherently having awareness as a meaningless epiphenomenal byproduct (yay, no free will), or we presume that computation can and does exist independently of all awareness but that a particular category of meta-computation is what we call awareness.
Even with the allowances that Bruno includes (or my understanding of what Bruno includes) in the form of first person indeterminacy and/or non comp contents, Platonic number dreams, etc - all of these can only negatively assert the completeness of arithmetic truth. My understanding is that G del (and others) are used to support this negative assertion, and I of course agree that indeed it is impossible for any arithmetic system to be complete, especially in the sense of defining itself completely. I suspect that Bruno assumes that I don't have a deep enough understanding of this, but I think that what understanding I do have is enough to persuade me that this entire line of investigation is a dead end as far as explaining consciousness. It only works if we assume consciousness as a possibility a priori and independently of any arithmetic logic.
----- Receiving the following content -----From: Alberto G. CoronaReceiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-08-31, 05:53:23Subject: Re: Re: Is evolution moral ?Totally in agreement.The problem is that the market has not good cognitive/moral support in human psichology, because it is very recent. For one side, men acting in markets feels themselves as selfish and the winner is envied. This has锟斤拷nt to be so, because engaging in the market is very good 锟斤拷for the group.锟斤拷In the contrary, in sports and politics both things don锟斤拷t happens in general:. the participants has a sense of participation in a almost religious activity, and the winners are admired. the losers are appreciated too. 锟斤拷As a consequence, free market advocates, like Ayn Rand intelectualize their point of view by positivizing bare selfishness, which is an error, because not all kinds of selfishness are good overall. These simplifications are a result of 锟斤拷the absence of a science of moral.
Adam Smith showed that "enlightened self-interest",contrary to what a liberal might think, benefits
all.锟斤拷 The buyer gains goods, the seller gains capital. Society
is eventually enriched as well. Man would never havesurvived with such all-enriching market trading.
锟斤拷
Ayn Rand went overboard on the self-interest aspect,advocating selfishness and self-esteem as goals to strive for.I don't think that greed and egotism enhance life, though.
锟斤拷
On the other hand, Rand's conservative economics was top rate.
锟斤拷锟斤拷
Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net8/31/2012Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent himso that everything could function."
----- Receiving the following content -----From: Alberto G. CoronaReceiver: everything-listTime: 2012-08-31, 05:23:23Subject: Re: Is evolution moral ?
Take for example the most primitive form of competition: the fight in a tribe for a leader. You defeat your opponent using politics or a form of ritualized violence (sorry for the redundancy). Then if you are the best fit for the task and the competition is adequate, the overall fitness of the group is enhanced. Therefore, if there is group selection, and our ancestor had it, this kind of moral competition, 锟絙ecomes a part of our moral psichology. As a result this, in fact, is an integral part of the inherent collaborative-competitive idiosincrasy of maleness. And it is highly moral, that is, there is profound perceived feeling in these activities of acting for the good of the group.
Not only to lie. In order 锟絫o commerce and in general to interact, we need to know what to expect from whom. and the other need to know what the others expect form me. So I have to reflect on myself in order to act in the enviromnent of the moral and material expectations that others have about me. This is the origin of reflective individuality, that is moral from the beginning..
----- Receiving the following content -----From: Bruno MarchalReceiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-08-31, 06:03:20
Subject: Re: Is evolution moral ?
Competition incites a desire to win (incentive) ,which is very healthy(ie good), at least to a degree. This is contrary to liberal thought,which holds that if we are all equal, there should be no winners or losers.For a little greed is what causes people to buy stocks,so a little greed is good.Greed is necessary due to the fear of taking such a risk.And to sell when things look too risky.Economics is in fact a psychological science.Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net8/31/2012Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent himso that everything could function."
----- Receiving the following content -----From: Alberto G. CoronaReceiver: everything-listTime: 2012-08-31, 05:53:23Subject: Re: Re: Is evolution moral ?
Totally in agreement.The problem is that the market has not good cognitive/moral support in human psichology, because it is very recent. For one side, men acting in markets feels themselves as selfish and the winner is envied. This has′nt to be so, because engaging in the market is very good for the group.In the contrary, in sports and politics both things don′t happens in general:. the participants has a sense of participation in a almost religious activity, and the winners are admired. the losers are appreciated too.As a consequence, free market advocates, like Ayn Rand intelectualize their point of view by positivizing bare selfishness, which is an error, because not all kinds of selfishness are good overall. These simplifications are a result of the absence of a science of moral.
Adam Smith showed that "enlightened self-interest",contrary to what a liberal might think, benefits
all. The buyer gains goods, the seller gains capital. Society
is eventually enriched as well. Man would never havesurvived with such all-enriching market trading.
Ayn Rand went overboard on the self-interest aspect,advocating selfishness and self-esteem as goals to strive for.I don't think that greed and egotism enhance life, though.
On the other hand, Rand's conservative economics was top rate.
Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net8/31/2012Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent himso that everything could function."
----- Receiving the following content -----From: Alberto G. CoronaReceiver: everything-listTime: 2012-08-31, 05:23:23Subject: Re: Is evolution moral ?
Take for example the most primitive form of competition: the fight in a tribe for a leader. You defeat your opponent using politics or a form of ritualized violence (sorry for the redundancy). Then if you are the best fit for the task and the competition is adequate, the overall fitness of the group is enhanced. Therefore, if there is group selection, and our ancestor had it, this kind of moral competition, 燽ecomes a part of our moral psichology. As a result this, in fact, is an integral part of the inherent collaborative-competitive idiosincrasy of maleness. And it is highly moral, that is, there is profound perceived feeling in these activities of acting for the good of the group.
Not only to lie. In order 爐o commerce and in general to interact, we need to know what to expect from whom. and the other need to know what the others expect form me. So I have to reflect on myself in order to act in the enviromnent of the moral and material expectations that others have about me. This is the origin of reflective individuality, that is moral from the beginning..
Hi Craig,
They never state it explicitly, but it is the logical implication of their arguments. "We should pay teachers more and useless businessmen less" implies all are paid the same regardless of skill, no? "We should stop paying private contractors so much to imprison more and more people on meaningless drug charges" implies? Most people simply don't try to explain their ideologies to themselves or others, whether libertarian, republican, progressive or whatever, they are simply not curious to know.
2012/8/31 Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com>
On Thursday, August 30, 2012 6:55:35 PM UTC-4, Stephen Paul King wrote:On 8/30/2012 6:35 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Thursday, August 30, 2012 6:16:14 PM UTC-4, Stephen Paul King wrote:Hi Craig,
Umm, ever hear of the concept of "Heaven"? It sounds very much like a "a future society with a perfect anything or that morals were unnecessary".
Sure, but when does the Left Wing ever talk about Heaven?
Craig
Hi Craig,
Umm, the Marxists have an analogue... " classless, moneyless, and stateless social order structured upon common ownership of the means of production, as well as a social, political and economic ideology that aims at the establishment of this social order".
When does the Left Wing ever talk about Marxism? Does Dennis Kucinich talk about a stateless social order? Even self described socialists like Bernie Sanders or activists like Michael Moore don't say "we must get rid of money and class!". All I have ever heard from progressives is "We should pay teachers more and useless businessmen less." and "We should stop paying private contractors so much to imprison more and more people on meaningless drug charges". I have hung out with many anarchists, feminists, hippies, and rabid left wing ideologues socially throughout my life and have never - ever - heard anyone mention communism or Marxism in any kind of political context at all. Most of what I know about Marxism has come from Libertarians and Republicans holding up its ghost in effigy.
Well you're not living in the right country then... And an anarchist who would not talk about about a classless goal... well cannot be an "anarchist" which means "without hierarchy/authority" not without rules, that is anomie.
On Friday, August 31, 2012 4:14:37 AM UTC-4, Quentin Anciaux wrote:2012/8/31 Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com>
On Thursday, August 30, 2012 6:55:35 PM UTC-4, Stephen Paul King wrote:On 8/30/2012 6:35 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Thursday, August 30, 2012 6:16:14 PM UTC-4, Stephen Paul King wrote:Hi Craig,
Umm, ever hear of the concept of "Heaven"? It sounds very much like a "a future society with a perfect anything or that morals were unnecessary".
Sure, but when does the Left Wing ever talk about Heaven?
Craig
Hi Craig,
Umm, the Marxists have an analogue... " classless, moneyless, and stateless social order structured upon common ownership of the means of production, as well as a social, political and economic ideology that aims at the establishment of this social order".
When does the Left Wing ever talk about Marxism? Does Dennis Kucinich talk about a stateless social order? Even self described socialists like Bernie Sanders or activists like Michael Moore don't say "we must get rid of money and class!". All I have ever heard from progressives is "We should pay teachers more and useless businessmen less." and "We should stop paying private contractors so much to imprison more and more people on meaningless drug charges". I have hung out with many anarchists, feminists, hippies, and rabid left wing ideologues socially throughout my life and have never - ever - heard anyone mention communism or Marxism in any kind of political context at all. Most of what I know about Marxism has come from Libertarians and Republicans holding up its ghost in effigy.
Well you're not living in the right country then... And an anarchist who would not talk about about a classless goal... well cannot be an "anarchist" which means "without hierarchy/authority" not without rules, that is anomie.
What does where I live have to do with anything?
Are you saying that only people who want to see the US paved over and sold to WalMart are real Americans? When I say that people I have known are anarchists I mean that they have anarchic sympathies - not that they advocate a permanent realization of total anarchy.
Craig
Quentin
CraigTo view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/-We2MSfPkrkJ.---- Onward! Stephen http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html
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On 30 Aug 2012, at 21:23, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Thursday, August 30, 2012 3:03:32 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:Please excuse the word, but comp can only create zombies,which seem to be alive but are not actually so.The problem is that you cannot know that.
Then you can't know that he can't know that either. Maybe he does know it? Maybe he can tell in his bones that this is true? You are arbitrarily being conservative in your attribution of the veracity of human sense and liberal in your attribution of machine sense.Oh? may be Hitler knew in his bones that Jewish were a problem. You have weird argument.
In case of doubt it is ethically better to attribute consciousness to something non conscious, than attributing non consciousness to something conscious, as that can generate suffering.
It could generate suffering either way. If an android tells you that you can sing and you believe it, you could be brainwashed by an advertisement. You could choose to save a machine programmed to yell in a fire while other real people burn alive.I don't see why saving a machine from fire would prevents me to save children and woman first, as I feel closer to them. But then if I can, after, save a machine, why not. You are the one talking like if you knew that machines are forever zombies/puppets.
There is japanese engineer who is building androids, that is robot looking very much like humans.An european journalist asked him if he was not worrying about naive people who might believe that such machine is alive.He answered that in Japan they believe that everything is alive, so that they have no problem with such question.As I said often, the "real" question is not "can machine think", but "can your daughter marry a machine" (like a man who did undergone a digital brain transplant).When will machine get the right to vote?
When will the machine demand the right to vote??In the year 4024. Perhaps. Or in the year 40000024. I don't care. It is not relevant for the issue. With the comp theory, some machines, us, have already the right to vote.
When the Lutherans will baptize machines?
When will they demand to be baptized?When Lutherans will listen to them, and become sensible to their delicate souls.
Etc.Universal machines are sort of universal babies, or universal dynamical mirror. If you can't develop respect for them, they won't develop respect for you.
Not even remotely persuasive to me. Sorry Bruno, but It sounds like you are selling me a pet rock. It's not scientific - has there ever been a case where a universal machine has developed respect for someone? Can a machine tell the difference between respect and disrespect? Nah.In the comp theory we are machines, so all this already happened. You just reiterate your non-comp assumption, presenting it as a truth, but in science we never do that.