Step one talks about teleportation in terms of being reconstructed with ambient organic materials. If comp were true though, no organic materials or reconstructions would be necessary. The scanning into a universal machine would be sufficient.
Taking this to the China Brain level, the universal machine could be a trillion people with notebooks, pencils, paper, and erasers, talking to each other over cell phones. This activity would have to collectively result in the teleported person now being conjured as if by incantation as a consequence of...what? The writing and erasing on paper? The calling and speaking on cell phones? Where does the experience of the now disembodied person come in?
Step one talks about annihilation as well, but it is not clear what role this actually plays in the process, except to make it seem more like teleportation and less like what it actually would be, which is duplication. If I scan an original document and email the scan, I have sent a duplicate, not teleported the original.
I have problems with all three of the comp assumptions:
yes, doctor: This is really the sleight of hand that props up the entire thought experiment. If you agree that you are nothing but your brain function and that your brain function can be replaced by the functioning of non-brain devices, then you have already agreed that human individuality is a universal commodity.
Church thesis: Views computation in isolation, irrespective of resources, supervenience on object-formed computing elements, etc. This is a theoretical theory of computation, completely divorced from realism from the start. What is it that does the computing? How and why does data enter or exit a computation?
Arithmetical Realism: The idea that truth values are self justifying independently of subjectivity or physics is literally a shot in the dark. Like yes, doctor, this is really swallowing the cow whole from the beginning and saying that the internal consistency of arithmetic constitutes universal supremacy without any real indication of that. Wouldn't computers tend to be self-correcting by virtue of the pull toward arithmetic truth within each logic circuit? Where do errors come from?
Craig
On Tue, Sep 04, 2012 at 06:48:58PM -0700, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> I have problems with all three of the comp assumptions:
>
> *yes, doctor*: This is really the sleight of hand that props up the entire
> thought experiment. If you agree that you are nothing but your brain
> function and that your brain function can be replaced by the functioning of
> non-brain devices, then you have already agreed that human individuality is
> a universal commodity.
Calling it a sleight of hand is a bit rough.
It is the meat of the
comp assumption, and spelling it out this way makes it very
explicit. Either you agree you can be copied (without feeling a
thing), or you don't. If you do, you must face up to the consequences
of the argument, if you don't, then you do not accept
computationalism, and the consequences of the UDA do not apply to your
worldview.
>
> *Church thesis*: Views computation in isolation, irrespective of resources,
> supervenience on object-formed computing elements, etc. This is a
> theoretical theory of computation, completely divorced from realism from
> the start. What is it that does the computing? How and why does data enter
> or exit a computation?
It is necessarily an abstract mathematical thesis. The latter two
questions simply are relevant.
>
> *Arithmetical Realism*: The idea that truth values are self justifying
> independently of subjectivity or physics is literally a shot in the dark.
> Like yes, doctor, this is really swallowing the cow whole from the
> beginning and saying that the internal consistency of arithmetic
> constitutes universal supremacy without any real indication of
> that.
AR is not just about internal consistency of mathematics, it is an
ontological commitment about the natural numbers. Whatever primitive
reality is, AR implies that the primitive reality models the natural
numbers.
In fact, for COMP, and the UDA, Turing completeness of primitive reality is
sufficient, but Bruno chose the natural numbers as his base reality
because it is more familiar to his correspondents.
> Wouldn't computers tend to be self-correcting by virtue of the pull toward
> arithmetic truth within each logic circuit? Where do errors come from?
>
Again, these two questions seem irrelevant.
Taking another look at Sane2004. This isn't so much as a challenge to Bruno, just sharing my notes of why I disagree. Not sure how far I will get this time, but here are my objections to the first step and the stipulated assumptions of comp. I understand that the point is to accept the given definition of comp, and in that respect, I have no reason to doubt that Bruno has accomplished what he sets out to as far as making a good theory within comp, and if he has not, I wouldn't be qualified to comment on it anyhow. From my perspective however, this is all beside the point, since the only point that matters is the actual truth of what consciousness actually is, and what is it's actual relation to physics and information. Given the fragile and precious nature of our own survival, I think that implications for teleportation and AI simulation/personhood which are derived from pure theory rather than thorough consideration of realism would be reckless to say the least.
Step one talks about teleportation in terms of being reconstructed with ambient organic materials. If comp were true though, no organic materials or reconstructions would be necessary. The scanning into a universal machine would be sufficient.
Taking this to the China Brain level, the universal machine could be a trillion people with notebooks, pencils, paper, and erasers, talking to each other over cell phones. This activity would have to collectively result in the teleported person now being conjured as if by incantation as a consequence of...what? The writing and erasing on paper? The calling and speaking on cell phones? Where does the experience of the now disembodied person come in?
Step one talks about annihilation as well, but it is not clear what role this actually plays in the process, except to make it seem more like teleportation and less like what it actually would be, which is duplication. If I scan an original document and email the scan, I have sent a duplicate, not teleported the original.
I have problems with all three of the comp assumptions:
yes, doctor: This is really the sleight of hand that props up the entire thought experiment. If you agree that you are nothing but your brain function and that your brain function can be replaced by the functioning of non-brain devices, then you have already agreed that human individuality is a universal commodity.
Church thesis: Views computation in isolation, irrespective of resources, supervenience on object-formed computing elements, etc. This is a theoretical theory of computation, completely divorced from realism from the start. What is it that does the computing? How and why does data enter or exit a computation?
Arithmetical Realism: The idea that truth values are self justifying independently of subjectivity or physics is literally a shot in the dark. Like yes, doctor, this is really swallowing the cow whole from the beginning and saying that the internal consistency of arithmetic constitutes universal supremacy without any real indication of that. Wouldn't computers tend to be self-correcting by virtue of the pull toward arithmetic truth within each logic circuit? Where do errors come from?
Craig
--
-- Onward! Stephen http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html
On Tue, Sep 04, 2012 at 06:48:58PM -0700, Craig Weinberg wrote:I have problems with all three of the comp assumptions: *yes, doctor*: This is really the sleight of hand that props up the entire thought experiment. If you agree that you are nothing but your brain function and that your brain function can be replaced by the functioning of non-brain devices, then you have already agreed that human individuality is a universal commodity.Calling it a sleight of hand is a bit rough. It is the meat of the comp assumption, and spelling it out this way makes it very explicit. Either you agree you can be copied (without feeling a thing), or you don't. If you do, you must face up to the consequences of the argument, if you don't, then you do not accept computationalism, and the consequences of the UDA do not apply to your worldview.
*Church thesis*: Views computation in isolation, irrespective of resources, supervenience on object-formed computing elements, etc. This is a theoretical theory of computation, completely divorced from realism from the start. What is it that does the computing? How and why does data enter or exit a computation?It is necessarily an abstract mathematical thesis. The latter two questions simply are relevant.
*Arithmetical Realism*: The idea that truth values are self justifying independently of subjectivity or physics is literally a shot in the dark. Like yes, doctor, this is really swallowing the cow whole from the beginning and saying that the internal consistency of arithmetic constitutes universal supremacy without any real indication of that.AR is not just about internal consistency of mathematics, it is an ontological commitment about the natural numbers. Whatever primitive reality is, AR implies that the primitive reality models the natural numbers.
In fact, for COMP, and the UDA, Turing completeness of primitive reality is sufficient, but Bruno chose the natural numbers as his base reality because it is more familiar to his correspondents.
Wouldn't computers tend to be self-correcting by virtue of the pull toward arithmetic truth within each logic circuit? Where do errors come from?Again, these two questions seem irrelevant.
Craig
Notice that both the duplication and the teleportation, as discussed, assume that the information content is exactly copyable.
This is not qubits that are involved... The point here is that this comp model assume that Reality is, at is ground level, classical.
On 9/4/2012 8:59 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:Notice that both the duplication and the teleportation, as discussed, assume that the information content is exactly copyable.
Not exactly. Only sufficiently accurately to maintain your consciousness.
This is not qubits that are involved... The point here is that this comp model assume that Reality is, at is ground level, classical.
It doesn't assume that. A fully quantum computation can be performed on a classical, i.e. Turing, computer. Bruno would just say it just takes a lower level of substitution.
Brent
On 9/5/2012 12:38 AM, meekerdb wrote:
On 9/4/2012 8:59 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:Notice that both the duplication and the teleportation, as discussed, assume that the information content is exactly copyable.
Not exactly. Only sufficiently accurately to maintain your consciousness.
If the copy is not exact then functional equivalence is not exact either and this is fatal for the model.
This is not qubits that are involved... The point here is that this comp model assume that Reality is, at is ground level, classical.
It doesn't assume that. A fully quantum computation can be performed on a classical, i.e. Turing, computer. Bruno would just say it just takes a lower level of substitution.
Yes, a classical computer can emulate a finite quantum computation given sufficient resources. This is not the same thing as the EPR effect that I am considering. The idea that I am considering is more like this:
Consider the visible physical universe. We know from observation that not only is it open on one end and that it's expansion is accelerating. People want to put this off on some "Dark Energy". I think that it is something else, driving it. Consider a classical computer that needs to emulate a quantum computation. It has to have even increasing resources to keep up with the QC if the QC is modeling an expanding universe. It we take Bruno's AR literally, where are these resources coming from?
Let's turn the tables and make Reality Quantum in its essence. The classical computation may just be something that the QC is running.
What is most interesting is that the QC can run an arbitrary number of classical computations, all at the same time. The CC can only barely compute the emulation of a single QC.
What if we have an infinite and eternal QC running infinitely many finite CCs and each of these CC's is trying to emulate a single QC. Map this idea out and look at the nice self-referential loop that this defines!
On 9/4/2012 9:48 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
Taking another look at Sane2004. This isn't so much as a challenge to Bruno, just sharing my notes of why I disagree. Not sure how far I will get this time, but here are my objections to the first step and the stipulated assumptions of comp. I understand that the point is to accept the given definition of comp, and in that respect, I have no reason to doubt that Bruno has accomplished what he sets out to as far as making a good theory within comp, and if he has not, I wouldn't be qualified to comment on it anyhow. From my perspective however, this is all beside the point, since the only point that matters is the actual truth of what consciousness actually is, and what is it's actual relation to physics and information. Given the fragile and precious nature of our own survival, I think that implications for teleportation and AI simulation/personhood which are derived from pure theory rather than thorough consideration of realism would be reckless to say the least.
Hi Craig,
Excellent post!
Yep, the assumption is that the function that gives rise to Sense is exactly representable as countable and recursively enumerable functions. The trick is finding the machine configuration that matches each of these. That's where the engineers come in and the theorists go out the door.
Step one talks about teleportation in terms of being reconstructed with ambient organic materials. If comp were true though, no organic materials or reconstructions would be necessary. The scanning into a universal machine would be sufficient.
Taking this to the China Brain level, the universal machine could be a trillion people with notebooks, pencils, paper, and erasers, talking to each other over cell phones. This activity would have to collectively result in the teleported person now being conjured as if by incantation as a consequence of...what? The writing and erasing on paper? The calling and speaking on cell phones? Where does the experience of the now disembodied person come in?
The "person" rides the computation, it is not "located" any particular place. But all this is predicated on the condition that consciousness is, at its more rubimentary level, nothing but countable and recursively enumerable functions. THe real question that we need to ask is: Might there be a point where we no longer are dealing with countable and recursively enumerable functions? What about countable and recursively enumerable functions that are coding for other countable and recursively enumerable functions? Are those still "computable"? So far the answer seems to be: Yes, they are. But what about the "truth" of the statements that those countable and recursively enumerable functions encode? Are they countable and recursively enumerable functions? Nope! Those are something else entirely!
Step one talks about annihilation as well, but it is not clear what role this actually plays in the process, except to make it seem more like teleportation and less like what it actually would be, which is duplication. If I scan an original document and email the scan, I have sent a duplicate, not teleported the original.
Notice that both the duplication and the teleportation, as discussed, assume that the information content is exactly copyable. This is not qubits that are involved... The point here is that this comp model assume that Reality is, at is ground level, classical. This is where my head starts spinning with Bruno's ideas....
I have problems with all three of the comp assumptions:
yes, doctor: This is really the sleight of hand that props up the entire thought experiment. If you agree that you are nothing but your brain function and that your brain function can be replaced by the functioning of non-brain devices, then you have already agreed that human individuality is a universal commodity.
Ummhummm, but it is! Why is that is so amazing?! Out notion of individuality is tied to the "autonomously moving and detecting and feeding and reproducing" machine that our minds inhabit! Why does its precise constitution matter?
All that matters is that it can "exactly" carry our the necessary functions. Individual minds are just different "versions" of one and the same mind! To steal an idea from Deutsch, Other histories are just different universes are just different minds... The hard question is: How the hell do they get synchronized with each other?
We know that the synchronization cannot exist "ahead of time", simply because that is a massive contradiction!
What if the synchronization is just "accidental" (like Bruno proposes)? Well, not sure about how that would solve the problem! Why? Because the chances of an "accidental" synchronization of an arbitrarily long sequence of matchings between arbitrarily many minds (each defined in terms of infinitely many computations intersecting) is vanishingly small. It is exactly zero! "Huston, We Have A Problem!"
Benjayk et al are posting about a related subject in the thread: RE: Two reasons why computers IMHO cannot exhibit intelligence It is all focused on the problem of the axiom of choice and constructability. I think the problem can be recast as a computational complexity problem, but I have been known to be not even wrong on occasion. My evidence is that the limitation that we see in the real world on computers is the scarcity of resources, which is why P does not equal NP IMHO. Without an eternally and exponentially expanding supply of resources (or tape), the UD simply cannot be run. Not even one step!
Might this be just a form of an imperative on the existence of an endless supply of universes with exponentially expanding resources? Isn't this exactly what we observe in the star filled heavens? Maybe we finitely exist because we must, or else existence would contradict itself and vanish (like that Penguin in the Bloom County cartoon). Resources must exist for the computations to occur. We are God's thoughts.
Church thesis: Views computation in isolation, irrespective of resources, supervenience on object-formed computing elements, etc. This is a theoretical theory of computation, completely divorced from realism from the start. What is it that does the computing? How and why does data enter or exit a computation?
It is an ontological theory that seeks to explain the appearance of "reality", thus it is meta-realism.
Arithmetical Realism: The idea that truth values are self justifying independently of subjectivity or physics is literally a shot in the dark. Like yes, doctor, this is really swallowing the cow whole from the beginning and saying that the internal consistency of arithmetic constitutes universal supremacy without any real indication of that. Wouldn't computers tend to be self-correcting by virtue of the pull toward arithmetic truth within each logic circuit? Where do errors come from?
That's the right question to be asking! Errors are sentences that are false in some code. Exactly how does this happen if one's beliefs are predicated on Bp & p(is true)?
Stathis Papaioannou
So you think somebody has to be looking at the Moon for it to exist?
On 9/4/2012 10:07 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:On 9/5/2012 12:38 AM, meekerdb wrote:
On 9/4/2012 8:59 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:Notice that both the duplication and the teleportation, as discussed, assume that the information content is exactly copyable.
Not exactly. Only sufficiently accurately to maintain your consciousness.
If the copy is not exact then functional equivalence is not exact either and this is fatal for the model.
Then you should mourn the Stephen P. King of and hour ago. He's been fatally changed.
This is not qubits that are involved... The point here is that this comp model assume that Reality is, at is ground level, classical.
It doesn't assume that. A fully quantum computation can be performed on a classical, i.e. Turing, computer. Bruno would just say it just takes a lower level of substitution.
Yes, a classical computer can emulate a finite quantum computation given sufficient resources. This is not the same thing as the EPR effect that I am considering. The idea that I am considering is more like this:
Consider the visible physical universe. We know from observation that not only is it open on one end and that it's expansion is accelerating. People want to put this off on some "Dark Energy". I think that it is something else, driving it. Consider a classical computer that needs to emulate a quantum computation. It has to have even increasing resources to keep up with the QC if the QC is modeling an expanding universe. It we take Bruno's AR literally, where are these resources coming from?
They are computations. They exist in Platonia. He's trying to explain matter, so he can't very well assume material resources. The world is made out of arithmetic, an infinite resource.
Let's turn the tables and make Reality Quantum in its essence. The classical computation may just be something that the QC is running.
There's not difference as computations.
What is most interesting is that the QC can run an arbitrary number of classical computations, all at the same time. The CC can only barely compute the emulation of a single QC.
You are talking about QC and CC as though they were material computers with finite resources. Once you've assumed material resources you've lost any non-circular possibility of explaining them.
What if we have an infinite and eternal QC running infinitely many finite CCs and each of these CC's is trying to emulate a single QC. Map this idea out and look at the nice self-referential loop that this defines!
You're confused.
Brent
--
All that matters is that it can "exactly" carry our the necessary functions. Individual minds are just different "versions" of one and the same mind! To steal an idea from Deutsch, Other histories are just different universes are just different minds... The hard question is: How the hell do they get synchronized with each other?
I think they are synchronization itself to begin with. The question to me is, how do they get de-synchronized, and I think it's by introducing latency on a borrowed-as-space basis.
That's the right question to be asking! Errors are sentences that are false in some code. Exactly how does this happen if one's beliefs are predicated on Bp & p(is true)?
Yeah, it seems to me like we should have to be spraying cybercide all over the place to prevent supercomputers from springing up in the vacuum flux or the sewer systems of large cities.
On Wednesday, September 5, 2012 12:48:09 AM UTC-4, Brent wrote:
So you think somebody has to be looking at the Moon for it to exist?
What is existence other than the capacity to be detected in some way by some thing (itself if nothing else)?
What would be the difference between a moon that has no possibility of being detected in any way by any thing and nothingness?
----- Receiving the following content -----From: Craig WeinbergReceiver: everything-listTime: 2012-09-05, 02:20:22Subject: Re: Sane2004 Step One
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Taking another look at Sane2004. This isn't so much as a challenge to Bruno, just sharing my notes of why I disagree. Not sure how far I will get this time, but here are my objections to the first step and the stipulated assumptions of comp. I understand that the point is to accept the given definition of comp, and in that respect, I have no reason to doubt that Bruno has accomplished what he sets out to as far as making a good theory within comp, and if he has not, I wouldn't be qualified to comment on it anyhow. From my perspective however, this is all beside the point, since the only point that matters is the actual truth of what consciousness actually is, and what is it's actual relation to physics and information. Given the fragile and precious nature of our own survival, I think that implications for teleportation and AI simulation/personhood which are derived from pure theory rather than thorough consideration of realism would be reckless to say the least.
Step one talks about teleportation in terms of being reconstructed with ambient organic materials. If comp were true though, no organic materials or reconstructions would be necessary. The scanning into a universal machine would be sufficient.
Taking this to the China Brain level, the universal machine could be a trillion people with notebooks, pencils, paper, and erasers, talking to each other over cell phones. This activity would have to collectively result in the teleported person now being conjured as if by incantation as a consequence of...what? The writing and erasing on paper? The calling and speaking on cell phones? Where does the experience of the now disembodied person come in?
Step one talks about annihilation as well, but it is not clear what role this actually plays in the process, except to make it seem more like teleportation and less like what it actually would be, which is duplication. If I scan an original document and email the scan, I have sent a duplicate, not teleported the original.
I have problems with all three of the comp assumptions:
yes, doctor: This is really the sleight of hand that props up the entire thought experiment. If you agree that you are nothing but your brain function and that your brain function can be replaced by the functioning of non-brain devices, then you have already agreed that human individuality is a universal commodity.
Church thesis: Views computation in isolation, irrespective of resources, supervenience on object-formed computing elements, etc. This is a theoretical theory of computation, completely divorced from realism from the start. What is it that does the computing? How and why does data enter or exit a computation?
Arithmetical Realism: The idea that truth values are self justifying independently of subjectivity or physics is literally a shot in the dark. Like yes, doctor, this is really swallowing the cow whole from the beginning and saying that the internal consistency of arithmetic constitutes universal supremacy without any real indication of that. Wouldn't computers tend to be self-correcting by virtue of the pull toward arithmetic truth within each logic circuit? Where do errors come from?
Hi Craig WeinbergI don't like the word "existence" as it carriesso much baggage with it. What you describebelow is physical existence. That is a propertyof extended entities.
Inextended entities such as mind and 1p andthouights and feelings would be mentallyexistent.
On 05 Sep 2012, at 03:48, Craig Weinberg wrote:Taking another look at Sane2004. This isn't so much as a challenge to Bruno, just sharing my notes of why I disagree. Not sure how far I will get this time, but here are my objections to the first step and the stipulated assumptions of comp. I understand that the point is to accept the given definition of comp, and in that respect, I have no reason to doubt that Bruno has accomplished what he sets out to as far as making a good theory within comp, and if he has not, I wouldn't be qualified to comment on it anyhow. From my perspective however, this is all beside the point, since the only point that matters is the actual truth of what consciousness actually is, and what is it's actual relation to physics and information. Given the fragile and precious nature of our own survival, I think that implications for teleportation and AI simulation/personhood which are derived from pure theory rather than thorough consideration of realism would be reckless to say the least.Step one talks about teleportation in terms of being reconstructed with ambient organic materials. If comp were true though, no organic materials or reconstructions would be necessary. The scanning into a universal machine would be sufficient.
That is step 6.
Taking this to the China Brain level, the universal machine could be a trillion people with notebooks, pencils, paper, and erasers, talking to each other over cell phones. This activity would have to collectively result in the teleported person now being conjured as if by incantation as a consequence of...what? The writing and erasing on paper? The calling and speaking on cell phones? Where does the experience of the now disembodied person come in?
As you illustrate here, plausibly not on the physical means used by the brain. Step 8 shows that indeed the physical has nothing to do with consciousness, except as a content of consciousness. Keeping comp here, we associate consciousness with the logical abstract computations.
Step one talks about annihilation as well, but it is not clear what role this actually plays in the process, except to make it seem more like teleportation and less like what it actually would be, which is duplication. If I scan an original document and email the scan, I have sent a duplicate, not teleported the original.
Right. Classical teleportation = duplication + annihilation of the original. That's step 5, precisely.You understand the reasoning very well, but we know that the problem for you is in the assumption.
I have problems with all three of the comp assumptions:
yes, doctor: This is really the sleight of hand that props up the entire thought experiment. If you agree that you are nothing but your brain function and that your brain function can be replaced by the functioning of non-brain devices, then you have already agreed that human individuality is a universal commodity.
Why? A program or piece of information is not nothing. It asks works, can be paid for, can be precious and rare, etc.
Church thesis: Views computation in isolation, irrespective of resources, supervenience on object-formed computing elements, etc. This is a theoretical theory of computation, completely divorced from realism from the start. What is it that does the computing? How and why does data enter or exit a computation?
It is a discovery by mathematicians.
Arithmetical Realism: The idea that truth values are self justifying independently of subjectivity or physics is literally a shot in the dark. Like yes, doctor, this is really swallowing the cow whole from the beginning and saying that the internal consistency of arithmetic constitutes universal supremacy without any real indication of that. Wouldn't computers tend to be self-correcting by virtue of the pull toward arithmetic truth within each logic circuit? Where do errors come from?
They come from the inadequacy between belief and truth. Incompleteness makes this unavoidable at the root, and that is why the logic of Bp & p is different from the logic of Bp, despite G* proves Bp -> p. G does not prove it, so correct machine already knows that they might be incorrect "soon enough".Your last paragraph confirms you are still thinking of machines and numbers in a pre-Godelian or pre-Löbian way, I think.
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The test that I would use would be, as I have mentioned, to have someone be > walked off of their brain one hemisphere at a time, and then walked back on. > Ideally this process would be repeated several times for different > durations. That is the only test that could possibly work as far as I can > tell - of course it wouldn't prove success or failure beyond any theoretical > doubt, but it would be a pretty good indicator.
On 05 Sep 2012, at 14:01, Russell Standish wrote:
For certain choices of "this or that", the ultimate reality is
actually unknowable. For instance, the choice of a Turing complete
basis means that the hardware running the computations is completely
unknowable to the denizens of that computation.
Not really. With comp we know that the *physical* "bottom" is the result of the competition among all universal machines, (by UD-7 or 8) and this leads to (re)define physics by such a competition/measure on all computations. The initial base ontology is really irrelevant, and it makes no sense to choose one or another, except for technical commodities.
Put in another way: there is no ontological hardware. The hardware and wetware are emergent on the digital basic ontology (which can be described by numbers or combinators as they describe the same computations and the same object: you can prove the existence of combinators in arithmetic, and you can prove the existence of numbers from the combinator S and K. So the basic ontology is really the same and we can "know" it (betting on comp). It is really like the choice of a base in a linear space.
Brent
--
Stathis Papaioannou
--
Stathis Papaioannou
On Thu, Sep 6, 2012 at 2:34 PM, Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com> wrote:
>> But you couldn't realise you felt different if the part of your brain
>> responsible for realising were receiving exactly the same inputs from
>> the rest of the brain. So you could feel different, or feel nothing,
>> but maintain the delusional belief that nothing had changed.
>>
>>
>
> That's begging the question. You are assuming that the brain is a machine
> which produces consciousness. I think that the brain is the three
> dimensional shadow of many levels of experience and it produces nothing but
> neurochemistry and alterations in our ability to access an individual set of
> human experiences. The brain does not produce consciousness, it defines the
> form of many conscious relations.
But you believe that the neurochemicals do things contrary to what
chemists would predict, for example an ion channel opening or closing
without any cause such as a change in transmembrane potential or
ligand concentration.
We've talked about this before and it just isn't
consistent with any scientific evidence.
You interpret the existence
"spontaneous neural activity" as meaning that something magical like
this happens, but it doesn't mean that at all.
--
Stathis Papaioannou
--
Stathis Papaioannou
On Thursday, September 6, 2012 1:32:21 AM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:On Thu, Sep 6, 2012 at 2:40 PM, Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com> wrote:
> I find that the least plausible explanation. It means that if a billion
> people talk to each other and give each other information, that some kind of
> consciousness must necessarily arise as a side-effect. You could say that it
> might arise, but the idea that such a side effect is somehow necessary as to
> accomplish certain kinds of information processing is laughably romantic to
> my mind. If I recruit people to recruit people to all do math together, then
> a magical genie will appear. Necessarily. Because of behavior modification.
> Mm. Yeah. No ghost in the machine, but machine that runs on ghost
> power...because...why?
No, it doesn't mean that at all. If the billion people interact so as
to mimic the behaviour of the neurons in a brain, resulting in the
ability to (for example) converse in natural language, then the idea
is that the billion-person brain would have consciousness. This
consciousness would have nothing to do with the consciousness of the
billion people producing it; I don't know what my neurons are doing
and my neurons individually certainly don't know what I am doing.
You are confirming what I have said. You are saying that a billion people doing the appropriate computations on paper with pencils and erasers and telephones to talk to each other would create a magical personality that nobody would know about but nonetheless would be born into the universe as a thinking, feeling, eating, crapping being.
Brent
Brent
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-- Onward! Stephen http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html
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From: Brian TennesonReceiver: everything-listTime: 2012-09-06, 10:28:51Subject: Re: Where do numbers and geometry come from ?
All numbers can be defined in terms of sets.� The question becomes this:
do sets have ontological primacy relative to mankind or are sets invented or created by mankind?
On Thu, Sep 6, 2012 at 5:11 AM, Roger Clough <rcl...@verizon.net> wrote:
Hi Stephen P. King��Yes, of course, but I wanted a more obvious, dramatic锟絜xample.
The philosophy of mathematics says something like the numbers
belong to a static or eternal world, change锟絠tself 锟絠s a property of geometry.
Numbers and geometry thus belong to the platonic world,which is forbidden or at least not consistent with the philosophyof materialism, IMHO.�
If numbers are platonic,锟絀 wonder what the� presumably materialist
Steven Hawkings has to say about their origin in his recentbook on numbers.���Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net9/6/2012Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent himso that everything could function."
----- Receiving the following content -----From: Stephen P. KingReceiver: everything-listTime: 2012-09-06, 07:53:18Subject: Re: Could we have invented the prime numbers ?
Dear Roger,
锟斤拷� Could the mere possibility of being a number (without the specificity of which one) be considered to be "there from the beginning"?
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Brian TennesonReceiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-09-06, 11:09:25
Subject: Re: Where do numbers and geometry come from ?
Correct me if I'm wrong but my understanding is that sets and membership cannot be defined in terms of a more primary mathematical concept.� Functions can be defined in terms of this primitive called sets.� Numbers are sets; natural numbers are defined directly in terms of sets (via the Von Neumann approach) and every more complicated number set can be defined in terms of the previous type of number set all the way up to real numbers, complex numbers, and nonstandard number sets.� The only type of number I am not sure how they can be seen as sets is that of surreal numbers described by Conway I believe.� I don't know much about surreal numbers.
Yes, this approach necessitates the existence of sets and membership.
There probably are other ways to define numbers but all properties that we want numbers to have can come from how they are defined in terms of sets.� In other words, the set theoretical description of various number sets is sufficient.
Kronecker said "God made the integers; all else is the work of man."� I would amend that to say God made sets (and membership); all else is the work of man.
On Thu, Sep 6, 2012 at 7:45 AM, Stephen P. King <step...@charter.net> wrote:
Dear Brian,
锟斤拷� "can be defined ..." implies the necessary existence of something or process or whatever that does the act of defining the set. Truth values do not do this, btw. Sets are collections defined in terms of functions, but numbers in-themselves are not those functions.. Unless you are considering some other ideas of what sets are... If we are going to think of set as having ontological primacy we have to have a notion of a set that does not need a membership function.
On 9/6/2012 10:28 AM, Brian Tenneson wrote:
All numbers can be defined in terms of sets.� The question becomes this:
do sets have ontological primacy relative to mankind or are sets invented or created by mankind?
On Thu, Sep 6, 2012 at 5:11 AM, Roger Clough <rcl...@verizon.net> wrote:
Hi Stephen P. King��Yes, of course, but I wanted a more obvious, dramatic锟絜xample.
The philosophy of mathematics says something like the numbers
belong to a static or eternal world, change锟絠tself 锟絠s a property of geometry.
Numbers and geometry thus belong to the platonic world,which is forbidden or at least not consistent with the philosophyof materialism, IMHO.�
If numbers are platonic,锟絀 wonder what the� presumably materialist
Steven Hawkings has to say about their origin in his recentbook on numbers.���Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net9/6/2012Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent himso that everything could function."
----- Receiving the following content -----From: Stephen P. KingReceiver: everything-listTime: 2012-09-06, 07:53:18Subject: Re: Could we have invented the prime numbers ?
Dear Roger,
锟斤拷� Could the mere possibility of being a number (without the specificity of which one) be considered to be "there from the beginning"?
-- Onward! Stephen http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html
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Correct me if I'm wrong but my understanding is that sets and membership cannot be defined in terms of a more primary mathematical concept. Functions can be defined in terms of this primitive called sets. Numbers are sets; natural numbers are defined directly in terms of sets (via the Von Neumann approach) and every more complicated number set can be defined in terms of the previous type of number set all the way up to real numbers, complex numbers, and nonstandard number sets. The only type of number I am not sure how they can be seen as sets is that of surreal numbers described by Conway I believe. I don't know much about surreal numbers.
Yes, this approach necessitates the existence of sets and membership.
There probably are other ways to define numbers but all properties that we want numbers to have can come from how they are defined in terms of sets. In other words, the set theoretical description of various number sets is sufficient.
Kronecker said "God made the integers; all else is the work of man." I would amend that to say God made sets (and membership); all else is the work of man.
Hi Brian TennesonI'm just to establish the fact that numbers are a prioriand so not created by man. Given that, it doesn't matter if sets area priori or not. Presumably (I am not a mathematician) you cannothave sets without numbers, so the numbers rule.Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net9/6/2012Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent himso that everything could function."
----- Receiving the following content -----From: Brian TennesonReceiver: everything-listTime: 2012-09-06, 10:28:51Subject: Re: Where do numbers and geometry come from ?
All numbers can be defined in terms of sets.� The question becomes this:
do sets have ontological primacy relative to mankind or are sets invented or created by mankind?
On Thu, Sep 6, 2012 at 5:11 AM, Roger Clough <rcl...@verizon.net> wrote:
Hi Stephen P. King��Yes, of course, but I wanted a more obvious, dramatic爀xample.
The philosophy of mathematics says something like the numbers
belong to a static or eternal world, change爄tself 爄s a property of geometry.
Numbers and geometry thus belong to the platonic world,which is forbidden or at least not consistent with the philosophyof materialism, IMHO.�
If numbers are platonic,營 wonder what the� presumably materialist
Steven Hawkings has to say about their origin in his recentbook on numbers.���Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net9/6/2012Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent himso that everything could function."
----- Receiving the following content -----From: Stephen P. KingReceiver: everything-listTime: 2012-09-06, 07:53:18Subject: Re: Could we have invented the prime numbers ?
Dear Roger,
牋� Could the mere possibility of being a number (without the specificity of which one) be considered to be "there from the beginning"?
Hi Brian TennesonI'm just to establish the fact that numbers are a prioriand so not created by man. Given that, it doesn't matter if sets area priori or not. Presumably (I am not a mathematician) you cannothave sets without numbers, so the numbers rule.Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net9/6/2012Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent himso that everything could function."
----- Receiving the following content -----From: Brian TennesonReceiver: everything-listTime: 2012-09-06, 10:28:51Subject: Re: Where do numbers and geometry come from ?
All numbers can be defined in terms of sets.� The question becomes this:
do sets have ontological primacy relative to mankind or are sets invented or created by mankind?
On Thu, Sep 6, 2012 at 5:11 AM, Roger Clough <rcl...@verizon.net> wrote:
Hi Stephen P. King��Yes, of course, but I wanted a more obvious, dramatic爀xample.
The philosophy of mathematics says something like the numbers
belong to a static or eternal world, change爄tself 爄s a property of geometry.
Numbers and geometry thus belong to the platonic world,which is forbidden or at least not consistent with the philosophyof materialism, IMHO.�
If numbers are platonic,營 wonder what the� presumably materialist
Steven Hawkings has to say about their origin in his recentbook on numbers.���Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net9/6/2012Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent himso that everything could function."
----- Receiving the following content -----From: Stephen P. KingReceiver: everything-listTime: 2012-09-06, 07:53:18Subject: Re: Could we have invented the prime numbers ?
Dear Roger,
牋� Could the mere possibility of being a number (without the specificity of which one) be considered to be "there from the beginning"?
Intention is not magic and doesn't need hypothetical permission to exist. If your words are random ricochets of quantum radioactive decay or thermodynamic anomalies, then they are meaningless noise. You can't account for them because any accounting you can produce with your fingertips is only the random twitchings of your nervous system. Your view that denies the very reality of intention that you employ to state your denial. The fact that you deny that it does shows me that you are only capable of framing the question in the one way that it can never be answered. Your view is to say, I choose to deny my ability to choose.
--
On 9/5/2012 2:03 AM, meekerdb wrote:
On 9/4/2012 10:07 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:On 9/5/2012 12:38 AM, meekerdb wrote:
On 9/4/2012 8:59 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:Notice that both the duplication and the teleportation, as discussed, assume that the information content is exactly copyable.
Not exactly. Only sufficiently accurately to maintain your consciousness.
If the copy is not exact then functional equivalence is not exact either and this is fatal for the model.
Then you should mourn the Stephen P. King of and hour ago. He's been fatally changed.
Never, I am not the impermanent image on the world stage. I am the fire that casts the images.
This is not qubits that are involved... The point here is that this comp model assume that Reality is, at is ground level, classical.
It doesn't assume that. A fully quantum computation can be performed on a classical, i.e. Turing, computer. Bruno would just say it just takes a lower level of substitution.
Yes, a classical computer can emulate a finite quantum computation given sufficient resources. This is not the same thing as the EPR effect that I am considering. The idea that I am considering is more like this:
Consider the visible physical universe. We know from observation that not only is it open on one end and that it's expansion is accelerating. People want to put this off on some "Dark Energy". I think that it is something else, driving it. Consider a classical computer that needs to emulate a quantum computation. It has to have even increasing resources to keep up with the QC if the QC is modeling an expanding universe. It we take Bruno's AR literally, where are these resources coming from?
They are computations. They exist in Platonia. He's trying to explain matter, so he can't very well assume material resources. The world is made out of arithmetic, an infinite resource.
Sure, but the explanation of the idea requires matter to be communicated. A slight oversight perhaps.
Let's turn the tables and make Reality Quantum in its essence. The classical computation may just be something that the QC is running.
There's not difference as computations.
You are correct but only in the absence of considerations of inputs and outputs and their concurrency. Abstract theory leaves out the obvious, but when it pretends to toss out the obvious, that is going to far.
What is most interesting is that the QC can run an arbitrary number of classical computations, all at the same time. The CC can only barely compute the emulation of a single QC.
You are talking about QC and CC as though they were material computers with finite resources. Once you've assumed material resources you've lost any non-circular possibility of explaining them.
No, I am pointing out that real computations require real resources. Only when we ignore this fact we can get away with floating castles in midair.
What if we have an infinite and eternal QC running infinitely many finite CCs and each of these CC's is trying to emulate a single QC. Map this idea out and look at the nice self-referential loop that this defines!
You're confused.
Maybe. I can handle being wrong. I learn from mistakes.
Brent
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On Wednesday, September 5, 2012 10:50:02 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:On 05 Sep 2012, at 03:48, Craig Weinberg wrote:Taking another look at Sane2004. This isn't so much as a challenge to Bruno, just sharing my notes of why I disagree. Not sure how far I will get this time, but here are my objections to the first step and the stipulated assumptions of comp. I understand that the point is to accept the given definition of comp, and in that respect, I have no reason to doubt that Bruno has accomplished what he sets out to as far as making a good theory within comp, and if he has not, I wouldn't be qualified to comment on it anyhow. From my perspective however, this is all beside the point, since the only point that matters is the actual truth of what consciousness actually is, and what is it's actual relation to physics and information. Given the fragile and precious nature of our own survival, I think that implications for teleportation and AI simulation/personhood which are derived from pure theory rather than thorough consideration of realism would be reckless to say the least.Step one talks about teleportation in terms of being reconstructed with ambient organic materials. If comp were true though, no organic materials or reconstructions would be necessary. The scanning into a universal machine would be sufficient.
That is step 6.
I haven't even gotten to step 2 yet. I'm reading "In the figure the teleported individual is represented by a black box. Its annihilation is
represented by a white box appearing at the left of the arrow" from 1.
Taking this to the China Brain level, the universal machine could be a trillion people with notebooks, pencils, paper, and erasers, talking to each other over cell phones. This activity would have to collectively result in the teleported person now being conjured as if by incantation as a consequence of...what? The writing and erasing on paper? The calling and speaking on cell phones? Where does the experience of the now disembodied person come in?
As you illustrate here, plausibly not on the physical means used by the brain. Step 8 shows that indeed the physical has nothing to do with consciousness, except as a content of consciousness. Keeping comp here, we associate consciousness with the logical abstract computations.
So the person's consciousness arises spontaneously through the overall effort-ness behind the writing, erasing, and calling, or does it gradually constellate from lesser fragments of disconnected effort-ness?
Step one talks about annihilation as well, but it is not clear what role this actually plays in the process, except to make it seem more like teleportation and less like what it actually would be, which is duplication. If I scan an original document and email the scan, I have sent a duplicate, not teleported the original.
Right. Classical teleportation = duplication + annihilation of the original. That's step 5, precisely.You understand the reasoning very well, but we know that the problem for you is in the assumption.
Yes, the assumption seems to presume physicality to disprove physicality
and presume consciousness to explain consciousness.
Computation seems to have nothing to do with either one of them in comp other than the fact of the plasticity and aloofness of comp can be seen as a sign that it is neither mind nor matter. It still doesn't answer the question of why have appearances of mind or matter at all?
If there is a reason, then that reason is the nature of the cosmos, not the filing and organizing system that indexes it's activities.
I have problems with all three of the comp assumptions:
yes, doctor: This is really the sleight of hand that props up the entire thought experiment. If you agree that you are nothing but your brain function and that your brain function can be replaced by the functioning of non-brain devices, then you have already agreed that human individuality is a universal commodity.
Why? A program or piece of information is not nothing. It asks works, can be paid for, can be precious and rare, etc.
It can't ask for anything by itself though.
We are the ones to whom the significance relates.
Information is nothing but an experience that can be remembered and transmitted to other experiencers through formation.
Church thesis: Views computation in isolation, irrespective of resources, supervenience on object-formed computing elements, etc. This is a theoretical theory of computation, completely divorced from realism from the start. What is it that does the computing? How and why does data enter or exit a computation?
It is a discovery by mathematicians.
And it is a valid discovery in the context of mathematical theory, but it doesn't translate to the realism of subjectivity and physics.
It assumes weightless computation that generates weight (for not particular reason).
Arithmetical Realism: The idea that truth values are self justifying independently of subjectivity or physics is literally a shot in the dark. Like yes, doctor, this is really swallowing the cow whole from the beginning and saying that the internal consistency of arithmetic constitutes universal supremacy without any real indication of that. Wouldn't computers tend to be self-correcting by virtue of the pull toward arithmetic truth within each logic circuit? Where do errors come from?
They come from the inadequacy between belief and truth. Incompleteness makes this unavoidable at the root, and that is why the logic of Bp & p is different from the logic of Bp, despite G* proves Bp -> p. G does not prove it, so correct machine already knows that they might be incorrect "soon enough".Your last paragraph confirms you are still thinking of machines and numbers in a pre-Godelian or pre-Löbian way, I think.
I admit that I have only a wisp of understanding about modal logic and Gödelian-Löbianian ideas, but I feel like even this surface understanding is enough to tell me that it is ultimately a red herring.
These concepts seem to just be about self-reference - maps of maps with no territory. Great for simulating some aspects of thought, because indeed, thinking has to do with copying copies and intellectual grammar, but feeling doesn't.
These are ways of mentioning how ideas are mentioned. In reality, this sentence does not refer to itself. There are only characters, or pixels, or optical phenomena here. The significance does not arise from the same level in which it is transmitted. This is the Chinese Room. Ceci n'est pas une pipe.
Craig
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I don't think that life or mind or intelligencecan be teleported. Especially since nobody knows whatthey are.I also don't believe that you can downloadthe contents of somebody's brain.
Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent himso that everything could function."
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Bruno MarchalReceiver: everything-listTime: 2012-09-05, 11:04:53
Subject: Re: Sane2004 Step One
On 05 Sep 2012, at 06:14, meekerdb wrote:
> On 9/4/2012 7:19 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
>> On Tue, Sep 04, 2012 at 06:48:58PM -0700, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>> I have problems with all three of the comp assumptions:
>>>
>>> *yes, doctor*: This is really the sleight of hand that props up
>>> the entire
>>> thought experiment. If you agree that you are nothing but your brain
>>> function and that your brain function can be replaced by the
>>> functioning of
>>> non-brain devices, then you have already agreed that human
>>> individuality is
>>> a universal commodity.
>> Calling it a sleight of hand is a bit rough. It is the meat of the
>> comp assumption, and spelling it out this way makes it very
>> explicit. Either you agree you can be copied (without feeling a
>> thing), or you don't. If you do, you must face up to the consequences
>> of the argument, if you don't, then you do not accept
>> computationalism, and the consequences of the UDA do not apply to
>> your
>> worldview.
>
> I suppose I can be copied. But does it follow that I am just the
> computations in my brain. It seems likely that I also require an
> outside environment/world with which I interact in order to remain
> conscious. Bruno passes this off by saying it's just a matter of
> the level of substitution, perhaps your local environment or even
> the whole galaxy must be replaced by a digital representation in
> order to maintain your consciousness unchanged. But this bothers
> me. Suppose it is the whole galaxy, or the whole observed
> universe. Does it really mean anything then to say your brain has
> been replaced ALONG WITH EVERYTHING ELSE? It's just the assertion
> that everything is computable.
That's a good argument for saying that the level of substitution is
not that low. But the reasoning would still go through, and we would
lead to a unique computable universe. That is the only way to make a
digital physics consistent (as I forget to say sometimes). Then you
get a more complex "other mind problem", and something like David
Nyman- Hoyle beam would be needed, and would need to be separate from
the physical reality, making the big physical whole incomplete, etc.
yes this bothers me too. Needless to say, I tend to believe that if
comp is true, the level is much higher.
>
>>
>>> *Church thesis*: Views computation in isolation, irrespective of
>>> resources,
>>> supervenience on object-formed computing elements, etc. This is a
>>> theoretical theory of computation, completely divorced from
>>> realism from
>>> the start. What is it that does the computing? How and why does
>>> data enter
>>> or exit a computation?
>> It is necessarily an abstract mathematical thesis. The latter two
>> questions simply are relevant.
>>
>>> *Arithmetical Realism*: The idea that truth values are self
>>> justifying
>>> independently of subjectivity or physics is literally a shot in
>>> the dark.
>>> Like yes, doctor, this is really swallowing the cow whole from the
>>> beginning and saying that the internal consistency of arithmetic
>>> constitutes universal supremacy without any real indication of
>>> that.
>> AR is not just about internal consistency of mathematics, it is an
>> ontological commitment about the natural numbers. Whatever primitive
>> reality is, AR implies that the primitive reality models the natural
>> numbers.
>
> ISTM that Bruno rejects any reality behind the natural numbers (or
> other system of computation). If often argues that the natural
> numbers exist, because they satisfy true propositions: There exists
> a prime number between 1 and 3, therefore 2 exists. This assumes a
> Platonist view of mathematical objects, which Peter D. Jones has
> argued against.
? I would say that the contrary is true. It is because natural numbers
exists, and seems to obeys laws like addition and multiplication that
true propositions can be made on them. 2 exists, and only 1 and 2
divides 2, so 2 is prime, and thus prime numbers exists. 2 itself
exists just because Ex(x = s(s(0))) is true. Indeed take x = s(s(0)),
and the proposition follows from s(s(0)) = s(s(0)).
Bruno
>
> Brent
>
>>
>> In fact, for COMP, and the UDA, Turing completeness of primitive
>> reality is
>> sufficient, but Bruno chose the natural numbers as his base reality
>> because it is more familiar to his correspondents.
>>
>>> Wouldn't computers tend to be self-correcting by virtue of the
>>> pull toward
>>> arithmetic truth within each logic circuit? Where do errors come
>>> from?
>>>
>> Again, these two questions seem irrelevant.
>>
>>> Craig
>>>
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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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On 9/5/2012 8:37 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:Put in another way: there is no ontological hardware. The hardware and wetware are emergent on the digital basic ontology (which can be described by numbers or combinators as they describe the same computations and the same object: you can prove the existence of combinators in arithmetic,
I don't think I understand that remark. Doesn't arithmetic *assume* combinators, i.e. + and * ?
Brentand you can prove the existence of numbers from the combinator S and K. So the basic ontology is really the same and we can "know" it (betting on comp). It is really like the choice of a base in a linear space.
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On 9/5/2012 11:37 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 05 Sep 2012, at 14:01, Russell Standish wrote:
For certain choices of "this or that", the ultimate reality is
actually unknowable. For instance, the choice of a Turing complete
basis means that the hardware running the computations is completely
unknowable to the denizens of that computation.
Not really. With comp we know that the *physical* "bottom" is the result of the competition among all universal machines, (by UD-7 or 8) and this leads to (re)define physics by such a competition/measure on all computations. The initial base ontology is really irrelevant, and it makes no sense to choose one or another, except for technical commodities.
Dear Bruno,
I am trying hard to be sure that I understand your ideas here. Could you specify the cardinality of "all universal machines"?
How many of them possibly exist?
Put in another way: there is no ontological hardware. The hardware and wetware are emergent on the digital basic ontology (which can be described by numbers or combinators as they describe the same computations and the same object: you can prove the existence of combinators in arithmetic, and you can prove the existence of numbers from the combinator S and K. So the basic ontology is really the same and we can "know" it (betting on comp). It is really like the choice of a base in a linear space.
So is there or is there not something that corresponds to "resources" (such as memory) for the Universal machines in your thought?
On 05 Sep 2012, at 17:27, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Wednesday, September 5, 2012 10:50:02 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:On 05 Sep 2012, at 03:48, Craig Weinberg wrote:Taking another look at Sane2004. This isn't so much as a challenge to Bruno, just sharing my notes of why I disagree. Not sure how far I will get this time, but here are my objections to the first step and the stipulated assumptions of comp. I understand that the point is to accept the given definition of comp, and in that respect, I have no reason to doubt that Bruno has accomplished what he sets out to as far as making a good theory within comp, and if he has not, I wouldn't be qualified to comment on it anyhow. From my perspective however, this is all beside the point, since the only point that matters is the actual truth of what consciousness actually is, and what is it's actual relation to physics and information. Given the fragile and precious nature of our own survival, I think that implications for teleportation and AI simulation/personhood which are derived from pure theory rather than thorough consideration of realism would be reckless to say the least.Step one talks about teleportation in terms of being reconstructed with ambient organic materials. If comp were true though, no organic materials or reconstructions would be necessary. The scanning into a universal machine would be sufficient.
That is step 6.
I haven't even gotten to step 2 yet. I'm reading "In the figure the teleported individual is represented by a black box. Its annihilation is
represented by a white box appearing at the left of the arrow" from 1.
Taking this to the China Brain level, the universal machine could be a trillion people with notebooks, pencils, paper, and erasers, talking to each other over cell phones. This activity would have to collectively result in the teleported person now being conjured as if by incantation as a consequence of...what? The writing and erasing on paper? The calling and speaking on cell phones? Where does the experience of the now disembodied person come in?
As you illustrate here, plausibly not on the physical means used by the brain. Step 8 shows that indeed the physical has nothing to do with consciousness, except as a content of consciousness. Keeping comp here, we associate consciousness with the logical abstract computations.
So the person's consciousness arises spontaneously through the overall effort-ness behind the writing, erasing, and calling, or does it gradually constellate from lesser fragments of disconnected effort-ness?Consciousness does not arise. It is not in space, nor in time. Its local content, obtained by differentiation, internally can refer to time and space, but that's particular content of an atemporal consciousness. I would say (no need of this in UDA).
Step one talks about annihilation as well, but it is not clear what role this actually plays in the process, except to make it seem more like teleportation and less like what it actually would be, which is duplication. If I scan an original document and email the scan, I have sent a duplicate, not teleported the original.
Right. Classical teleportation = duplication + annihilation of the original. That's step 5, precisely.You understand the reasoning very well, but we know that the problem for you is in the assumption.
Yes, the assumption seems to presume physicality to disprove physicalityAt some place, yes. In a reductio ad absurdum.and presume consciousness to explain consciousness.Yes. Like we presume (at some metalevel) anything we want to explain (from some other realm). It is not a lott, but science works that way. We don't know the public truth. We can only make clear our hypothesis and reason, and propose tests.
Computation seems to have nothing to do with either one of them in comp other than the fact of the plasticity and aloofness of comp can be seen as a sign that it is neither mind nor matter. It still doesn't answer the question of why have appearances of mind or matter at all?Comp is used to formulate the problem in math. Then we can see the general shape of the solution, which is a reduction of physics into arithmetic, with the advantage that we get a clear explanation of the difference of qualia and quanta. And we can test the quanta.
If there is a reason, then that reason is the nature of the cosmos, not the filing and organizing system that indexes it's activities.
I have problems with all three of the comp assumptions:
yes, doctor: This is really the sleight of hand that props up the entire thought experiment. If you agree that you are nothing but your brain function and that your brain function can be replaced by the functioning of non-brain devices, then you have already agreed that human individuality is a universal commodity.
Why? A program or piece of information is not nothing. It asks works, can be paid for, can be precious and rare, etc.
It can't ask for anything by itself though.Proof.
We are the ones to whom the significance relates.Actually God told me yesterday that we are wrong on this. Only the jumping spider can do that.
Information is nothing but an experience that can be remembered and transmitted to other experiencers through formation.
Church thesis: Views computation in isolation, irrespective of resources, supervenience on object-formed computing elements, etc. This is a theoretical theory of computation, completely divorced from realism from the start. What is it that does the computing? How and why does data enter or exit a computation?
It is a discovery by mathematicians.
And it is a valid discovery in the context of mathematical theory, but it doesn't translate to the realism of subjectivity and physics.Physics, or not physics are not among the hypothesis. More in the questioning.It assumes weightless computation that generates weight (for not particular reason).We search the reason. You say "for no particular reason" without providing a reason.
Arithmetical Realism: The idea that truth values are self justifying independently of subjectivity or physics is literally a shot in the dark. Like yes, doctor, this is really swallowing the cow whole from the beginning and saying that the internal consistency of arithmetic constitutes universal supremacy without any real indication of that. Wouldn't computers tend to be self-correcting by virtue of the pull toward arithmetic truth within each logic circuit? Where do errors come from?
They come from the inadequacy between belief and truth. Incompleteness makes this unavoidable at the root, and that is why the logic of Bp & p is different from the logic of Bp, despite G* proves Bp -> p. G does not prove it, so correct machine already knows that they might be incorrect "soon enough".Your last paragraph confirms you are still thinking of machines and numbers in a pre-Godelian or pre-Löbian way, I think.
I admit that I have only a wisp of understanding about modal logic and Gödelian-Löbianian ideas, but I feel like even this surface understanding is enough to tell me that it is ultimately a red herring.This is self-defeating.
These concepts seem to just be about self-reference - maps of maps with no territory. Great for simulating some aspects of thought, because indeed, thinking has to do with copying copies and intellectual grammar, but feeling doesn't.The machine knows that, already. Feeling and first person notion have no 3p representation at all. For logical reason, explainable with the math above.
These are ways of mentioning how ideas are mentioned. In reality, this sentence does not refer to itself. There are only characters, or pixels, or optical phenomena here. The significance does not arise from the same level in which it is transmitted. This is the Chinese Room. Ceci n'est pas une pipe.This has already been commented. You confuse the 3p self-reference and the 1p self-reference. I think.
On 05 Sep 2012, at 08:38, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 9/5/2012 2:03 AM, meekerdb wrote:
On 9/4/2012 10:07 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:On 9/5/2012 12:38 AM, meekerdb wrote:
On 9/4/2012 8:59 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
snip
What is most interesting is that the QC can run an arbitrary number of classical computations, all at the same time. The CC can only barely compute the emulation of a single QC.
You are talking about QC and CC as though they were material computers with finite resources. Once you've assumed material resources you've lost any non-circular possibility of explaining them.
No, I am pointing out that real computations require real resources. Only when we ignore this fact we can get away with floating castles in midair.
Brent just point out that arithmetic contains infinite resource.What do you mean by "real computations"? Do you mean "physical computations"? Why would they lack resources?
Bruno
Dear Bruno,
On Thursday, September 6, 2012 2:02:02 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:On 05 Sep 2012, at 17:27, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Wednesday, September 5, 2012 10:50:02 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:On 05 Sep 2012, at 03:48, Craig Weinberg wrote:Taking another look at Sane2004. This isn't so much as a challenge to Bruno, just sharing my notes of why I disagree. Not sure how far I will get this time, but here are my objections to the first step and the stipulated assumptions of comp. I understand that the point is to accept the given definition of comp, and in that respect, I have no reason to doubt that Bruno has accomplished what he sets out to as far as making a good theory within comp, and if he has not, I wouldn't be qualified to comment on it anyhow. From my perspective however, this is all beside the point, since the only point that matters is the actual truth of what consciousness actually is, and what is it's actual relation to physics and information. Given the fragile and precious nature of our own survival, I think that implications for teleportation and AI simulation/personhood which are derived from pure theory rather than thorough consideration of realism would be reckless to say the least.Step one talks about teleportation in terms of being reconstructed with ambient organic materials. If comp were true though, no organic materials or reconstructions would be necessary. The scanning into a universal machine would be sufficient.
That is step 6.
I haven't even gotten to step 2 yet. I'm reading "In the figure the teleported individual is represented by a black box. Its annihilation is
represented by a white box appearing at the left of the arrow" from 1.
Taking this to the China Brain level, the universal machine could be a trillion people with notebooks, pencils, paper, and erasers, talking to each other over cell phones. This activity would have to collectively result in the teleported person now being conjured as if by incantation as a consequence of...what? The writing and erasing on paper? The calling and speaking on cell phones? Where does the experience of the now disembodied person come in?
As you illustrate here, plausibly not on the physical means used by the brain. Step 8 shows that indeed the physical has nothing to do with consciousness, except as a content of consciousness. Keeping comp here, we associate consciousness with the logical abstract computations.
So the person's consciousness arises spontaneously through the overall effort-ness behind the writing, erasing, and calling, or does it gradually constellate from lesser fragments of disconnected effort-ness?Consciousness does not arise. It is not in space, nor in time. Its local content, obtained by differentiation, internally can refer to time and space, but that's particular content of an atemporal consciousness. I would say (no need of this in UDA).
If you exclude space and time, what kind of locality do you refer to?
In my example, a quintillion people call each other on the phone and write down numbers that they get from each other and perform arithmetic functions on them (which in turn may inform them on how to process subsequent arithmetic instructions, etc). Ok. So where does the interpretation of these trillion events per second come in? What knows what all of the computations add up to be? At what point does the 'local content' begin to itch and turn blue? Even if it could, why should it do such a thing?
Step one talks about annihilation as well, but it is not clear what role this actually plays in the process, except to make it seem more like teleportation and less like what it actually would be, which is duplication. If I scan an original document and email the scan, I have sent a duplicate, not teleported the original.
Right. Classical teleportation = duplication + annihilation of the original. That's step 5, precisely.You understand the reasoning very well, but we know that the problem for you is in the assumption.
Yes, the assumption seems to presume physicality to disprove physicalityAt some place, yes. In a reductio ad absurdum.and presume consciousness to explain consciousness.Yes. Like we presume (at some metalevel) anything we want to explain (from some other realm). It is not a lott, but science works that way. We don't know the public truth. We can only make clear our hypothesis and reason, and propose tests.
Why not just recognize it formally and say that consciousness doesn't need any explanation other than the experience of "this" and "that".
.Computation seems to have nothing to do with either one of them in comp other than the fact of the plasticity and aloofness of comp can be seen as a sign that it is neither mind nor matter. It still doesn't answer the question of why have appearances of mind or matter at all?Comp is used to formulate the problem in math. Then we can see the general shape of the solution, which is a reduction of physics into arithmetic, with the advantage that we get a clear explanation of the difference of qualia and quanta. And we can test the quanta.
I'm ok with reducing physics to math or math to physics, but neither have any link back to experience.
If there is a reason, then that reason is the nature of the cosmos, not the filing and organizing system that indexes it's activities.
I have problems with all three of the comp assumptions:
yes, doctor: This is really the sleight of hand that props up the entire thought experiment. If you agree that you are nothing but your brain function and that your brain function can be replaced by the functioning of non-brain devices, then you have already agreed that human individuality is a universal commodity.
Why? A program or piece of information is not nothing. It asks works, can be paid for, can be precious and rare, etc.
It can't ask for anything by itself though.Proof.
We can't coerce data into keeping secrets. All forms of secrecy require some kind of social control of information. Data will always talk to strangers. (see my post today: https://groups.google.com/forum/?fromgroups=#!topic/everything-list/L9LbbtQAN9U)
We are the ones to whom the significance relates.Actually God told me yesterday that we are wrong on this. Only the jumping spider can do that.
Jumping spiders and God are us too.
Information is nothing but an experience that can be remembered and transmitted to other experiencers through formation.
Church thesis: Views computation in isolation, irrespective of resources, supervenience on object-formed computing elements, etc. This is a theoretical theory of computation, completely divorced from realism from the start. What is it that does the computing? How and why does data enter or exit a computation?
It is a discovery by mathematicians.
And it is a valid discovery in the context of mathematical theory, but it doesn't translate to the realism of subjectivity and physics.Physics, or not physics are not among the hypothesis. More in the questioning.It assumes weightless computation that generates weight (for not particular reason).We search the reason. You say "for no particular reason" without providing a reason.
The realism of physical weight in the universe is what I am saying is one of the things that is not derived from pure computation.
There seems to be no anchoring in mass (despite info-theoretic confusions about entropy). To comp, it makes no difference whether a program operates on a galactic scale or microscopic scale - the code is weightless. That is not our experience of galaxies and atoms though.
Arithmetical Realism: The idea that truth values are self justifying independently of subjectivity or physics is literally a shot in the dark. Like yes, doctor, this is really swallowing the cow whole from the beginning and saying that the internal consistency of arithmetic constitutes universal supremacy without any real indication of that. Wouldn't computers tend to be self-correcting by virtue of the pull toward arithmetic truth within each logic circuit? Where do errors come from?
They come from the inadequacy between belief and truth. Incompleteness makes this unavoidable at the root, and that is why the logic of Bp & p is different from the logic of Bp, despite G* proves Bp -> p. G does not prove it, so correct machine already knows that they might be incorrect "soon enough".Your last paragraph confirms you are still thinking of machines and numbers in a pre-Godelian or pre-Löbian way, I think.
I admit that I have only a wisp of understanding about modal logic and Gödelian-Löbianian ideas, but I feel like even this surface understanding is enough to tell me that it is ultimately a red herring.This is self-defeating.
Why, do you feel yourself to be defeated ;) ?
These concepts seem to just be about self-reference - maps of maps with no territory. Great for simulating some aspects of thought, because indeed, thinking has to do with copying copies and intellectual grammar, but feeling doesn't.The machine knows that, already. Feeling and first person notion have no 3p representation at all. For logical reason, explainable with the math above.
I agree. Why does 1p machine theory propose the existence of feeling though?
These are ways of mentioning how ideas are mentioned. In reality, this sentence does not refer to itself. There are only characters, or pixels, or optical phenomena here. The significance does not arise from the same level in which it is transmitted. This is the Chinese Room. Ceci n'est pas une pipe.This has already been commented. You confuse the 3p self-reference and the 1p self-reference. I think.
I don't think that I do (nor does Searle or Korzybski, Magritte...)
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All numbers can be defined in terms of sets. The question becomes this:
do sets have ontological primacy relative to mankind or are sets invented or created by mankind?
----- Receiving the following content -----From: Brian TennesonReceiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-09-06, 11:31:35Subject: Re: Re: Where do numbers and geometry come from ?
Sure you can have sets without numbers.
The popular set theory's development known as ZFC is not based on numbers.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zermelo%E2%80%93Fraenkel_set_theory
Numbers are defined in terms of sets.锟斤拷 What that means is that all numbers are sets but not all sets are numbers.
I do agree that numbers are not created by man but neither are sets.
On Thu, Sep 6, 2012 at 8:19 AM, Roger Clough <rcl...@verizon.net> wrote:
Hi Brian Tenneson锟斤拷
I'm just to establish the fact that numbers are a prioriand so not created by man. Given that, it doesn't matter if sets are
a priori or not. Presumably (I am not a mathematician) 锟斤拷you cannot
have sets without numbers, so the numbers rule.
锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷
Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net9/6/2012Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent himso that everything could function."
----- Receiving the following content -----From: Brian TennesonReceiver: everything-listTime: 2012-09-06, 10:28:51Subject: Re: Where do numbers and geometry come from ?
All numbers can be defined in terms of sets. The question becomes this:
do sets have ontological primacy relative to mankind or are sets invented or created by mankind?
On Thu, Sep 6, 2012 at 5:11 AM, Roger Clough <rcl...@verizon.net> wrote:
Hi Stephen P. KingYes, of course, but I wanted a more obvious, dramatic锟絜xample.
The philosophy of mathematics says something like the numbers
belong to a static or eternal world, change锟絠tself 锟絠s a property of geometry.
Numbers and geometry thus belong to the platonic world,which is forbidden or at least not consistent with the philosophyof materialism, IMHO.
If numbers are platonic,锟絀 wonder what the presumably materialist
Steven Hawkings has to say about their origin in his recentbook on numbers.Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net9/6/2012Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent himso that everything could function."
----- Receiving the following content -----From: Stephen P. KingReceiver: everything-listTime: 2012-09-06, 07:53:18Subject: Re: Could we have invented the prime numbers ?
Dear Roger,
锟斤拷 Could the mere possibility of being a number (without the specificity of which one) be considered to be "there from the beginning"?
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Bruno MarchalReceiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-09-06, 13:44:55
Subject: Re: Sane2004 Step One
----- Receiving the following content -----From: Stephen P. KingReceiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-09-06, 11:35:56
Subject: Re: Where do numbers and geometry come from ?
Dear Roger,
锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷 Why is it that people persist in even suggesting that numbers are "created by man"? Why the anthropocentric bias? Pink Ponies might have actually crated them, or Polka-dotted Unicorns! The idea is just silly! The point is that properties do not occur at the whim of any one thing, never have and never will.
On 9/6/2012 11:19 AM, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi Brian Tenneson锟斤拷
I'm just to establish the fact that numbers are a prioriand so not created by man. Given that, it doesn't matter if sets are
a priori or not. Presumably (I am not a mathematician) 锟斤拷you cannot
have sets without numbers, so the numbers rule.
锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷
Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net9/6/2012Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent himso that everything could function."
----- Receiving the following content -----From: Brian TennesonReceiver: everything-listTime: 2012-09-06, 10:28:51Subject: Re: Where do numbers and geometry come from ?
All numbers can be defined in terms of sets. The question becomes this:
do sets have ontological primacy relative to mankind or are sets invented or created by mankind?
On Thu, Sep 6, 2012 at 5:11 AM, Roger Clough <rcl...@verizon.net> wrote:
Hi Stephen P. KingYes, of course, but I wanted a more obvious, dramatic锟絜xample.
The philosophy of mathematics says something like the numbers
belong to a static or eternal world, change锟絠tself 锟絠s a property of geometry.
Numbers and geometry thus belong to the platonic world,which is forbidden or at least not consistent with the philosophyof materialism, IMHO.
If numbers are platonic,锟絀 wonder what the presumably materialist
Steven Hawkings has to say about their origin in his recentbook on numbers.Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net9/6/2012Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent himso that everything could function."
----- Receiving the following content -----From: Stephen P. KingReceiver: everything-listTime: 2012-09-06, 07:53:18Subject: Re: Could we have invented the prime numbers ?
Dear Roger,
锟斤拷 Could the mere possibility of being a number (without the specificity of which one) be considered to be "there from the beginning"?
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: meekerdbReceiver: everything-listTime: 2012-09-06, 11:38:19
Subject: Re: Sane2004 Step One
On 07 Sep 2012, at 04:20, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 9/6/2012 1:44 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Dear Bruno,
On 05 Sep 2012, at 08:38, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 9/5/2012 2:03 AM, meekerdb wrote:
On 9/4/2012 10:07 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:snipOn 9/5/2012 12:38 AM, meekerdb wrote:
On 9/4/2012 8:59 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
What is most interesting is that the QC can run an arbitrary number of classical computations, all at the same time. The CC can only barely compute the emulation of a single QC.
You are talking about QC and CC as though they were material computers with finite resources. Once you've assumed material resources you've lost any non-circular possibility of explaining them.
No, I am pointing out that real computations require real resources. Only when we ignore this fact we can get away with floating castles in midair.
Brent just point out that arithmetic contains infinite resource.What do you mean by "real computations"? Do you mean "physical computations"? Why would they lack resources?
Bruno
I am talking about physical systems that have the capacity of carrying out in their dynamics the functions that implement the abstract computations that you are considering. The very thing that you claim is unnecessary.
But you claim that too, as matter is not primitive. or you lost me again.I need matter to communicate with you, but that matter is explained in comp as a a persistent relational entity, so I don't see the problem. It is necessary in the sense that it is implied by the comp hypothesis, even constructively (making comp testable). It is even more stable and "solid" than anything we might extrapolate from observation, as we might be dreaming. Indeed it comes from the atemporal ultra-stable relations between numbers, that you recently mention as not created by man (I am very glad :).
Bruno
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Roger CloughReceiver: everything-listTime: 2012-09-07, 06:51:10Subject: A leibnizian argument that necessary truths would seem to be a priori
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: meekerdbReceiver: everything-listTime: 2012-09-06, 14:44:11
Subject: Re: Sane2004 Step One
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