Survey of Consciousness Models

Craig Weinberg

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Oct 10, 2012, 11:16:43 AM10/10/12

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Evgenii Rudnyi

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Oct 10, 2012, 3:27:35 PM10/10/12

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On 10.10.2012 17:16 Craig Weinberg said the following:

> http://s33light.org/post/33296583824
>
> Have a look. Objections? Suggestions?
>

I am not sure if vitalism is a model of consciousness.

Eliminativism is not Epiphenomenalism. The small difference is that
epiphenomenalism assumes mental phenomena and eliminativism not.
Epiphenomenalism acknowledge that mental phenomena do exist but they
just do not have causal power on human behavior.

Then there is Reductive Physicalisms: Mental states are identical to
physical states. It is not functionalism though, as everything goes
through physical states directly. The difference with eliminativism is
subtle.

There is Property Dualism and there is Externalism.

You will find nice podcasts about it at

A Romp Through the Philosophy of Mind
http://podcasts.ox.ac.uk/series/romp-through-philosophy-mind

Evgenii
--
http://blog.rudnyi.ru/2012/08/philosophy-of-mind.html

Craig Weinberg

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Oct 10, 2012, 3:45:10 PM10/10/12

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On Wednesday, October 10, 2012 3:27:52 PM UTC-4, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

On 10.10.2012 17:16 Craig Weinberg said the following:
> http://s33light.org/post/33296583824
>
> Have a look. Objections? Suggestions?
>

I am not sure if vitalism is a model of consciousness.

Yeah, this is more of an informal consideration of the breakpoints between awareness and matter. I bring in vitalism as a name for the breakpoint which is assigned to biology as far as being the difference between what can evolve awareness and what never can.

Eliminativism is not Epiphenomenalism. The small difference is that
epiphenomenalism assumes mental phenomena and eliminativism not.

I wasn't really talking about epiphenomenalism, I was saying that eliminativism treats consciousness as an epiphenomenon. Or are you saying that eliminativism eliminates even the concept of consciousness as an experience - which yeah, maybe it does, even though it really doesn't even make sense unless the inside of our brain looked like a Cartesian theater.

Epiphenomenalism acknowledge that mental phenomena do exist but they
just do not have causal power on human behavior.

Yeah, I see epiphenomenalism as a principle which could be attached to a lot of the ones that I listed. You could have epiphenomenal idealism if you believe that it is 'all God's Will', or whatever. It isn't really in the same category as what I was after here in looking at where the breakpoints are. Like substance dualism, it is just saying what consciousness is not but offers no explanation about what it is.

Then there is Reductive Physicalisms: Mental states are identical to
physical states. It is not functionalism though, as everything goes
through physical states directly. The difference with eliminativism is
subtle.

Too subtle for me maybe. What does one say that the other doesn't?

There is Property Dualism and there is Externalism.

Externalism is a good one that I should add maybe. It still doesn't point to who gets to be conscious and who doesn't though. Property dualism, like Substance dualism seems like it could be attached to several of the others. It doesn't really specify at what level the property of consciousness kicks in.

You will find nice podcasts about it at

A Romp Through the Philosophy of Mind
http://podcasts.ox.ac.uk/series/romp-through-philosophy-mind

Thanks! Will check em out when I can!

Craig

Evgenii
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http://blog.rudnyi.ru/2012/08/philosophy-of-mind.html

Evgenii Rudnyi

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Oct 11, 2012, 2:59:54 AM10/11/12

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On 10.10.2012 21:45 Craig Weinberg said the following:

>
> On Wednesday, October 10, 2012 3:27:52 PM UTC-4, Evgenii Rudnyi
> wrote:

...

>>
>> Then there is Reductive Physicalisms: Mental states are identical
>> to physical states. It is not functionalism though, as everything
>> goes through physical states directly. The difference with
>> eliminativism is subtle.
>>
>
> Too subtle for me maybe. What does one say that the other doesn't?
>

Reductive Physicalisms starts with a metaphysical assumptions that
mental states are identical to physical states. Hence it is a starting
point that consciousness is identical with some physical states.

Eliminativism on the other side plays induction. They say that the
history of science shows us that physics explains us more and more from
the area of consciousness. The conclude by induction that at some day
physics will explains everything of consciousness.

Evgenii

Richard Ruquist

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Oct 11, 2012, 7:55:27 AM10/11/12

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On Thu, Oct 11, 2012 at 2:59 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi <use...@rudnyi.ru> wrote:
> On 10.10.2012 21:45 Craig Weinberg said the following:
>>
>>
>> On Wednesday, October 10, 2012 3:27:52 PM UTC-4, Evgenii Rudnyi
>> wrote:
> ...
>
>>>
>>> Then there is Reductive Physicalisms: Mental states are identical
>>> to physical states. It is not functionalism though, as everything
>>> goes through physical states directly. The difference with
>>> eliminativism is subtle.
>>>
>>
>> Too subtle for me maybe. What does one say that the other doesn't?
>>
>
> Reductive Physicalisms starts with a metaphysical assumptions that mental
> states are identical to physical states. Hence it is a starting point that
> consciousness is identical with some physical states.
>
> Eliminativism on the other side plays induction. They say that the history
> of science shows us that physics explains us more and more from the area of
> consciousness. The conclude by induction that at some day physics will
> explains everything of consciousness.
>
> Evgenii
>

Evgenii, True if string theory is included in physics, Richard

>>> You will find nice podcasts about it at
>>>
>>> A Romp Through the Philosophy of Mind
>>> http://podcasts.ox.ac.uk/series/romp-through-philosophy-mind
>>>
>>
>> Thanks! Will check em out when I can!
>>
>> Craig
>>
>>
>>>
>>> Evgenii -- http://blog.rudnyi.ru/2012/08/philosophy-of-mind.html
>>>
>>
>

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Roger Clough

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Oct 11, 2012, 8:40:00 AM10/11/12

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Hi Craig Weinberg

Cool. I just signed up at tumblr previously.

Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net
10/11/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen

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Time: 2012-10-10, 11:16:43
Subject: Survey of Consciousness Models

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Roger Clough

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Oct 11, 2012, 9:37:19 AM10/11/12

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Hi Craig Weinberg

L speaking here:

Every corporeal body without parts in the
universe is also a monad. Bodies of more than
one part have a monad for each part.

Every monad is alive to various degrees, hence
various forms of vitalism, and to various degrees
have intellect (intelligence), feeling (sensory stuff)
and body (a meaty or material part) so the entire universe
is alive in various degrees. Rocks only have body monads
and are considered to be somewhat as in a coma.

These objects in monad form are all nonlocal, since monads are outside
of spacetime, so they share intellects, feeling, and
bodily feelings to a limited extent, always distorted
and always limited in their field of view. They can also
see a little into the future, acccording to their capabilities.

While that may sound magical, the actual corporeal
bodies are your everyday corporeal bodies, show
no more signs of life than nature shows you.
No magic involved. Bounce a ball, eat a cake, etc.

Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net
10/11/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen

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Time: 2012-10-10, 15:45:10
Subject: Re: Survey of Consciousness Models

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Richard Ruquist

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Oct 11, 2012, 10:16:43 AM10/11/12

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Roger,

Could you supply a link to where L said all that. Google is unable to
find any such place.
Richard

Roger Clough

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Oct 11, 2012, 10:45:50 AM10/11/12

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Hi Richard Ruquist

He didn't in so many words, you have to study his philosophy.

Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net
10/11/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen

----- Receiving the following content -----

From: Richard Ruquist
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-10-11, 10:16:43
Subject: Re: On monads and vitalism

Roger,

Could you supply a link to where L said all that. Google is unable to
find any such place.
Richard

Bruno Marchal

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Oct 11, 2012, 11:20:33 AM10/11/12

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On 10 Oct 2012, at 21:27, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

> On 10.10.2012 17:16 Craig Weinberg said the following:
>> http://s33light.org/post/33296583824
>>
>> Have a look. Objections? Suggestions?
>>
>
> I am not sure if vitalism is a model of consciousness.
>
> Eliminativism is not Epiphenomenalism. The small difference is that
> epiphenomenalism assumes mental phenomena and eliminativism not.
> Epiphenomenalism acknowledge that mental phenomena do exist but they
> just do not have causal power on human behavior.
>
> Then there is Reductive Physicalisms: Mental states are identical to
> physical states. It is not functionalism though, as everything goes
> through physical states directly. The difference with eliminativism
> is subtle.
>
> There is Property Dualism and there is Externalism.
>
> You will find nice podcasts about it at

Most assume, without knowing, more infinities in both matter and comp,
than the infinities Turing recoverable by the machines in her first
person perspective on arithmetic.

Still Aristotelian. Perhaps one of them is correct (certainly not
eliminativism, I think), but none are logically and epistemologically
compatible with the quite weak form of computationalism we can use in
cognitive science.

You have to come back to Plotinus and Pythagoras, or to listen to
mystic or to study computer science and arithmetic to see this. Such
view still take a primary universe for granted. Some don't believe in
a creator, but they still believe in a creation.

With comp it is more like an open problem. Even if a creation
eventually exists, it can only exists in virtue of gluing, in some
equivocal manner, all universal dreams. But QM already rise doubts on
such a possible universal equivocal selection.

Bruno

>
> A Romp Through the Philosophy of Mind
> http://podcasts.ox.ac.uk/series/romp-through-philosophy-mind
>
> Evgenii
> --
> http://blog.rudnyi.ru/2012/08/philosophy-of-mind.html
>

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

Evgenii Rudnyi

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Oct 11, 2012, 11:31:12 AM10/11/12

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On 11.10.2012 17:20 Bruno Marchal said the following:

>
> On 10 Oct 2012, at 21:27, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
>
>> On 10.10.2012 17:16 Craig Weinberg said the following:
>>> http://s33light.org/post/33296583824
>>>
>>> Have a look. Objections? Suggestions?
>>>
>>
>> I am not sure if vitalism is a model of consciousness.
>>
>> Eliminativism is not Epiphenomenalism. The small difference is that
>> epiphenomenalism assumes mental phenomena and eliminativism not.
>> Epiphenomenalism acknowledge that mental phenomena do exist but
>> they just do not have causal power on human behavior.
>>
>> Then there is Reductive Physicalisms: Mental states are identical
>> to physical states. It is not functionalism though, as everything
>> goes through physical states directly. The difference with
>> eliminativism is subtle.
>>
>> There is Property Dualism and there is Externalism.
>>
>> You will find nice podcasts about it at
>
>
>
> Most assume, without knowing, more infinities in both matter and
> comp, than the infinities Turing recoverable by the machines in her
> first person perspective on arithmetic.
>
> Still Aristotelian. Perhaps one of them is correct (certainly not
> eliminativism, I think), but none are logically and epistemologically
> compatible with the quite weak form of computationalism we can use
> in cognitive science.

This podcast reviews physicalism-based models of consciousness, hence
one could refer to it as Aristotelian models of consciousness indeed.

Evgenii

Bruno Marchal

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Oct 12, 2012, 6:59:42 AM10/12/12

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As long as you don't use comp (implicitly and explicitly), which is
often the case. The problem is that most physicalist believes in comp,
or can be shown to believe (perhaps unconsciously) in comp.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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