Technological (Machine) Thinking and Lived Being (Erlebnis)

[Roger Clough]

 

What is thinking ? Parmenides thought that thinking and being are one, which IMHO I agree with.

Thoughts come to us from the Platonic realm, which I personally, perhaps mistakenly, 

associate with what would be Penrose's incomputable realm.

Here is a brief discussion of technological or machine thinking vs lived experience.

http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/ref/10.1080/00201740310002398#tabModule

IMHO Because computers cannot have lived experience, they cannot think.

Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy

Volume 46, Issue 3, 2003

 

Thinking and Being: Heidegger and Wittgenstein on Machination and Lived-Experience

Version of record first published: 05 Nov 2010

Heidegger's treatment of 'machination' in the Beiträge zur Philosophie begins the critique of technological thinking that would centrally characterize his later work. Unlike later discussions of technology, the critique of machination in Beiträge connects its arising to the predominance of 'lived-experience' ( Erlebnis ) as the concealed basis for the possibility of a pre-delineated, rule-based metaphysical understanding of the world. In this essay I explore this connection. The unity of machination and lived-experience becomes intelligible when both are traced to their common root in the primordial Greek attitude of techne , originally a basic attitude of wondering knowledge of nature. But with this common root revealed, the basic connection between machination and lived-experience also emerges as an important development of one of the deepest guiding thoughts of the Western philosophical tradition: the Parmenidean assertion of the sameness of being and thinking. In the Beiträge 's analysis of machination and lived-experience, Heidegger hopes to discover a way of thinking that avoids the Western tradition's constant basic assumption of self-identity, an assumption which culminates in the modern picture of the autonomous, self-identical subject aggressively set over against a pre-delineated world of objects in a relationship of mutual confrontation. In the final section, I investigate an important and illuminating parallel to Heidegger's result: the consideration of the relationship between experience and technological ways of thinking that forms the basis of the late Wittgenstein's famous rule-following considerations.

everything-list

 

 

 

Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net

8/30/2012

Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function."

[Craig Weinberg]

I think that the Platonic realm is just time, and that time is nothing but experience.

Thought is the experience of generating hypothetical experience.

The mistake is presuming that because we perceive exterior realism as a topology of bodies that the ground of being must be defined in those terms. In fact, the very experience you are having right now - with your eyes closed or half asleep...this is a concretely and physically real part of the universe, it just isn't experienced as objects in space because you are the subject of the experience. If anything, the outside world is a Platonic realm of geometric perspectives and rational expectations. Interior realism is private time travel and eidetic fugues; metaphor, irony, anticipations, etc. Not only Platonic, but Chthonic. Thought doesn't come from a realm, realms come from thought.

Craig

[Stephen P. King]

On 8/30/2012 1:53 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> I think that the Platonic realm is just time, and that time is nothing
> but experience.

Hi Craig,

I would say that time is the sequencing order of experience. The
order of simultaneously givens within experience is physical space.

>
> Thought is the experience of generating hypothetical experience.

Agreed.

>
> The mistake is presuming that because we perceive exterior realism as
> a topology of bodies that the ground of being must be defined in those
> terms.

The mistake of subtracting the observer from observations.

> In fact, the very experience you are having right now - with your eyes
> closed or half asleep...this is a concretely and physically real part
> of the universe, it just isn't experienced as objects in space because
> you are the subject of the experience.

Exactly!

> If anything, the outside world is a Platonic realm of geometric
> perspectives and rational expectations. Interior realism is private
> time travel and eidetic fugues; metaphor, irony, anticipations, etc.
> Not only Platonic, but Chthonic. Thought doesn't come from a realm,
> realms come from thought.

Thoughts might be defined as the very act of n-th order categorization.

--
Onward!

Stephen

http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html

[Craig Weinberg]

On Thursday, August 30, 2012 2:00:49 PM UTC-4, Stephen Paul King wrote:

On 8/30/2012 1:53 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> I think that the Platonic realm is just time, and that time is nothing
> but experience.

  Hi Craig,

     I would say that time is the sequencing order of experience. The
order of simultaneously givens within experience is physical space.

I can go along with that. It's hard to know whether that sequencing arises as a function of space. It takes us years to develop a robust sense of time and it is hard to know how much of that is purely neurological maturation and how much has to do with the integration of external world events. For example, if you had a dream journal and I read you five dreams randomly from 1982 until now, I don't think you would be as successful in putting them in order as you would if I read you five journal entries of yours that were from your spacetime experience.

I think that time as you mean it, in the sense of sequence, is imported from our interactions in public space into conceptual availability as memory. The actual 'substance' of time, as in a universal cosmological force is nothing but experience itself. It is more the ground from which sequence can emerge than a fully realized sequential nature of experience. It's more like dreamtime. Memories can appear out of nowhere. Timelines can be uncertain and irrelevant.

>
> Thought is the experience of generating hypothetical experience.

     Agreed.

>
> The mistake is presuming that because we perceive exterior realism as
> a topology of bodies that the ground of being must be defined in those
> terms.

     The mistake of subtracting the observer from observations.

Exactly. The voyeur habit is the hardest to kick.
 

> In fact, the very experience you are having right now - with your eyes
> closed or half asleep...this is a concretely and physically real part
> of the universe, it just isn't experienced as objects in space because
> you are the subject of the experience.

     Exactly!

> If anything, the outside world is a Platonic realm of geometric
> perspectives and rational expectations. Interior realism is private
> time travel and eidetic fugues; metaphor, irony, anticipations, etc.
> Not only Platonic, but Chthonic. Thought doesn't come from a realm,
> realms come from thought.

     Thoughts might be defined as the very act of n-th order categorization.

Yeah, I like that. The 'in the sense of' sense of sense. In one way it is the closest to pure sense, in another way it is the most aloof and unreal. The paradox of surfaces and depth.

Craig

[Roger Clough]

Hi Craig Weinberg

 

You're on the right track, but everybody from Plato on

says that the Platonic world is timeless, eternal.

And nonextended or spaceless (nonlocal).

Leibniz's world of monads satisfies these requirements.

 

But there is more, there is the Supreme  Monad, which

experiences all. And IS the All.

 

 

Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net

8/31/2012

Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him

so that everything could function."

----- Receiving the following content -----

From: Craig Weinberg

Receiver: everything-list

Time: 2012-08-30, 13:53:09

Subject: Re: Technological (Machine) Thinking and Lived Being (Erlebnis)

I think that the Platonic realm is just time, and that time is nothing but experience.

Thought is the experience of generating hypothetical experience.

The mistake is presuming that because we perceive exterior realism as a topology of bodies that the ground of being must be defined in those terms. In fact, the very experience you are having right now - with your eyes closed or half asleep...this is a concretely and physically real part of the universe, it just isn't experienced as objects in space because you are the subject of the experience. If anything, the outside world is a Platonic realm of geometric perspectives and rational expectations. Interior realism is private time travel and eidetic fugues; metaphor, irony, anticipations, etc. Not only Platonic, but Chthonic. Thought doesn't come from a realm, realms come from thought.

Craig


On Thursday, August 30, 2012 11:54:32 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote:

 

What is thinking ? Parmenides thought that thinking and being are one, which IMHO I agree with.

Thoughts come to us from the Platonic realm, which I personally, perhaps mistakenly, 

associate with what would be Penrose's incomputable realm.

Here is a brief discussion of technological or machine thinking vs lived experience.

http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/ref/10.1080/00201740310002398#tabModule

IMHO Because computers cannot have lived experience, they cannot think.

Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy

Volume 46, Issue 3, 2003

 

Thinking and Being: Heidegger and Wittgenstein on Machination and Lived-Experience

Version of record first published: 05 Nov 2010

Heidegger's treatment of 'machination' in the Beitr锟絞e zur Philosophie begins the critique of technological thinking that would centrally characterize his later work. Unlike later discussions of technology, the critique of machination in Beitr锟絞e connects its arising to the predominance of 'lived-experience' ( Erlebnis ) as the concealed basis for the possibility of a pre-delineated, rule-based metaphysical understanding of the world. In this essay I explore this connection. The unity of machination and lived-experience becomes intelligible when both are traced to their common root in the primordial Greek attitude of techne , originally a basic attitude of wondering knowledge of nature. But with this common root revealed, the basic connection between machination and lived-experience also emerges as an important development of one of the deepest guiding thoughts of the Western philosophical tradition: the Parmenidean assertion of the sameness of being and thinking. In the Beitr锟絞e 's analysis of machination and lived-experience, Heidegger hopes to discover a way of thinking that avoids the Western tradition's constant basic assumption of self-identity, an assumption which culminates in the modern picture of the autonomous, self-identical subject aggressively set over against a pre-delineated world of objects in a relationship of mutual confrontation. In the final section, I investigate an important and illuminating parallel to Heidegger's result: the consideration of the relationship between experience and technological ways of thinking that forms the basis of the late Wittgenstein's famous rule-following considerations.

everything-list

 

 

 

Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net

8/30/2012

Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function."

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[Roger Clough]

Hi Craig Weinberg

 

According to Einstein, space doesn't exist per se.

Remarkably, Leibniz also came this conclusion back in the 17th century.

 

 

Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net

8/31/2012

Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him

so that everything could function."

----- Receiving the following content -----

From: Craig Weinberg

Receiver: everything-list

Time: 2012-08-30, 18:16:32

Subject: Re: Technological (Machine) Thinking and Lived Being (Erlebnis)

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[Bruno Marchal]

On 31 Aug 2012, at 12:03, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Craig Weinberg

 

According to Einstein, space doesn't exist per se.

Remarkably, Leibniz also came this conclusion back in the 17th century.

I agree. And with comp nothing physical exists per se, as some platonists and mystics often asserts.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Roger Clough]

Hi Bruno Marchal

 

Perhaps I am misguided, but I thought that comp was moreorless

a mechanical model of brain and man activity.

 

I obviously need to peruse your main idea .

Do you have a link ?

 

 

Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net

8/31/2012

Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him

so that everything could function."

----- Receiving the following content -----

From: Bruno Marchal

Receiver: everything-list

Time: 2012-08-31, 09:56:27

[Bruno Marchal]

Hi Roger Clough,

Hi Bruno Marchal

 

Perhaps I am misguided, but I thought that comp was moreorless

a mechanical model of brain and man activity.

Not really. Comp is the hypothesis that there is a level of description of my brain or body such that I can be emulated by a computer simulating my brain (or body) at that level of description. Comp is neutral on the level. It might be a very low level like if we needed to simulate the entire solar system at the level of string theory, or very high, like if we were the result of the information processing done by the neurons in our skull.

Comp entails that NO machine can ever be sure about its substitution level (the level where we survive through the digital emulation), and so comp cannot be used normatively: if we are machine, we cannot know which machine we are, and thus "saying yes" to the digitalist doctor for an artificial brain demands some act of faith. It is a theological sort of belief in reincarnation, even if technological. It is theotechnology, if you want. No one can imposes this to some other.

Then I show that comp leads to Plato, and refute Aristotle metaphysics. There are no ontological physical universe. the physical universe emerges from a gluing property of machines or number's dream. The physical universe appears to be a tiny facet of reality.

The proof is constructive and show how to derive physics from machine's dream theory (itself belonging to arithmetic); but of course this leads to open problems in arithmetic. What has been solved so far explains already most of the quantum aspect of reality, qualitatively and quantitatively. The approach explains also why from the number's points of view, quanta and qualia differentiate.

The work is mainly a complete translation of a part of the 'mind-body problem' into a 'belief in matter problem' in pure arithmetic.

 

I obviously need to peruse your main idea .

Do you have a link ?

The more simple to read in english is probably the sane04:

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html

best,

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Craig Weinberg]

On Friday, August 31, 2012 5:53:24 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote:

Hi Craig Weinberg

 

You're on the right track, but everybody from Plato on

says that the Platonic world is timeless, eternal.

And nonextended or spaceless (nonlocal).

Leibniz's world of monads satisfies these requirements.

 

But there is more, there is the Supreme  Monad, which

experiences all. And IS the All.

 

Hegel and Spinoza have the Totality, Kabbala has Ein Sof, There's the Tao, Jung's collective unconscious, there's Om, Brahman, Logos, Urgrund, Urbild, first potency, ground of being, the Absolute, synthetic a prori, etc.

I call it the Totality-Singularity or just "Everythingness". It's what there is when we aren't existing as a spatiotemporally partitioned subset. It is by definition nonlocal and a-temporal as there is nothing to constrain its access to all experiences.

Craig

 

Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net

8/31/2012

Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him

so that everything could function."

----- Receiving the following content -----

From: Craig Weinberg

Receiver: everything-list

Time: 2012-08-30, 13:53:09

Subject: Re: Technological (Machine) Thinking and Lived Being (Erlebnis)

I think that the Platonic realm is just time, and that time is nothing but experience.

Thought is the experience of generating hypothetical experience.

The mistake is presuming that because we perceive exterior realism as a topology of bodies that the ground of being must be defined in those terms. In fact, the very experience you are having right now - with your eyes closed or half asleep...this is a concretely and physically real part of the universe, it just isn't experienced as objects in space because you are the subject of the experience. If anything, the outside world is a Platonic realm of geometric perspectives and rational expectations. Interior realism is private time travel and eidetic fugues; metaphor, irony, anticipations, etc. Not only Platonic, but Chthonic. Thought doesn't come from a realm, realms come from thought.

Craig


On Thursday, August 30, 2012 11:54:32 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote:

 

What is thinking ? Parmenides thought that thinking and being are one, which IMHO I agree with.

Thoughts come to us from the Platonic realm, which I personally, perhaps mistakenly, 

associate with what would be Penrose's incomputable realm.

Here is a brief discussion of technological or machine thinking vs lived experience.

http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/ref/10.1080/00201740310002398#tabModule

IMHO Because computers cannot have lived experience, they cannot think.

Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy

Volume 46, Issue 3, 2003

 

Thinking and Being: Heidegger and Wittgenstein on Machination and Lived-Experience

Version of record first published: 05 Nov 2010

Heidegger's treatment of 'machination' in the Beitr锟�e zur Philosophie begins the critique of technological thinking that would centrally characterize his later work. Unlike later discussions of technology, the critique of machination in Beitr锟�e connects its arising to the predominance of 'lived-experience' ( Erlebnis ) as the concealed basis for the possibility of a pre-delineated, rule-based metaphysical understanding of the world. In this essay I explore this connection. The unity of machination and lived-experience becomes intelligible when both are traced to their common root in the primordial Greek attitude of techne , originally a basic attitude of wondering knowledge of nature. But with this common root revealed, the basic connection between machination and lived-experience also emerges as an important development of one of the deepest guiding thoughts of the Western philosophical tradition: the Parmenidean assertion of the sameness of being and thinking. In the Beitr锟�e 's analysis of machination and lived-experience, Heidegger hopes to discover a way of thinking that avoids the Western tradition's constant basic assumption of self-identity, an assumption which culminates in the modern picture of the autonomous, self-identical subject aggressively set over against a pre-delineated world of objects in a relationship of mutual confrontation. In the final section, I investigate an important and illuminating parallel to Heidegger's result: the consideration of the relationship between experience and technological ways of thinking that forms the basis of the late Wittgenstein's famous rule-following considerations.

everything-list

 

 

 

Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net

8/30/2012

Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function."

[Roger Clough]

Hi Craig Weinberg

 

Personally I call the Platonic realm "anything inextended".

Time necessarily drops out if space drops out.

 

Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net

9/3/2012

Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him

so that everything could function."

----- Receiving the following content -----

From: Craig Weinberg

Receiver: everything-list

Time: 2012-08-31, 16:32:54

Subject: Re: Re: Technological (Machine) Thinking and Lived Being (Erlebnis)

Heidegger's treatment of 'machination' in the Beitr� e zur Philosophie begins the critique of technological thinking that would centrally characterize his later work. Unlike later discussions of technology, the critique of machination in Beitr� e connects its arising to the predominance of 'lived-experience' ( Erlebnis ) as the concealed basis for the possibility of a pre-delineated, rule-based metaphysical understanding of the world. In this essay I explore this connection. The unity of machination and lived-experience becomes intelligible when both are traced to their common root in the primordial Greek attitude of techne , originally a basic attitude of wondering knowledge of nature. But with this common root revealed, the basic connection between machination and lived-experience also emerges as an important development of one of the deepest guiding thoughts of the Western philosophical tradition: the Parmenidean assertion of the sameness of being and thinking. In the Beitr� e 's analysis of machination and lived-experience, Heidegger hopes to discover a way of thinking that avoids the Western tradition's constant basic assumption of self-identity, an assumption which culminates in the modern picture of the autonomous, self-identical subject aggressively set over against a pre-delineated world of objects in a relationship of mutual confrontation. In the final section, I investigate an important and illuminating parallel to Heidegger's result: the consideration of the relationship between experience and technological ways of thinking that forms the basis of the late Wittgenstein's famous rule-following considerations.

everything-list

 

 

 

Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net

8/30/2012

Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function."

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[Craig Weinberg]

On Monday, September 3, 2012 8:33:34 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote:

Hi Craig Weinberg

 

Personally I call the Platonic realm "anything inextended".

Time necessarily drops out if space drops out.

I see the opposite. If space drops out, all you have is time. I can count to 10 in my mind without invoking any experience of space. I can listen to music for hours without conjuring any spatial dimensionality. I think that space is the orthogonal reflection of experience, and that time, is that reflection (space) reflected again back into experience a spatially conditioned a posteriori reification of experience.

Craig
 

Heidegger's treatment of 'machination' in the Beitr锟�e zur Philosophie begins the critique of technological thinking that would centrally characterize his later work. Unlike later discussions of technology, the critique of machination in Beitr锟�e connects its arising to the predominance of 'lived-experience' ( Erlebnis ) as the concealed basis for the possibility of a pre-delineated, rule-based metaphysical understanding of the world. In this essay I explore this connection. The unity of machination and lived-experience becomes intelligible when both are traced to their common root in the primordial Greek attitude of techne , originally a basic attitude of wondering knowledge of nature. But with this common root revealed, the basic connection between machination and lived-experience also emerges as an important development of one of the deepest guiding thoughts of the Western philosophical tradition: the Parmenidean assertion of the sameness of being and thinking. In the Beitr锟�e 's analysis of machination and lived-experience, Heidegger hopes to discover a way of thinking that avoids the Western tradition's constant basic assumption of self-identity, an assumption which culminates in the modern picture of the autonomous, self-identical subject aggressively set over against a pre-delineated world of objects in a relationship of mutual confrontation. In the final section, I investigate an important and illuminating parallel to Heidegger's result: the consideration of the relationship between experience and technological ways of thinking that forms the basis of the late Wittgenstein's famous rule-following considerations.

everything-list

 

 

 

Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net

8/30/2012

Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function."

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[Roger Clough]

Hi Craig Weinberg

 

The experience of time is called consciousness, the simplest kind.

 

 

Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net

9/4/2012

Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him

so that everything could function."

----- Receiving the following content -----

From: Craig Weinberg

Receiver: everything-list

Time: 2012-09-04, 00:48:59

Subject: Re: Personally I call the Platonic realm "anything inextended".Anything outside of spacetime.

Heidegger's treatment of 'machination' in the Beitr� e zur Philosophie begins the critique of technological thinking that would centrally characterize his later work. Unlike later discussions of technology, the critique of machination in Beitr� e connects its arising to the predominance of 'lived-experience' ( Erlebnis ) as the concealed basis for the possibility of a pre-delineated, rule-based metaphysical understanding of the world. In this essay I explore this connection. The unity of machination and lived-experience becomes intelligible when both are traced to their common root in the primordial Greek attitude of techne , originally a basic attitude of wondering knowledge of nature. But with this common root revealed, the basic connection between machination and lived-experience also emerges as an important development of one of the deepest guiding thoughts of the Western philosophical tradition: the Parmenidean assertion of the sameness of being and thinking. In the Beitr� e 's analysis of machination and lived-experience, Heidegger hopes to discover a way of thinking that avoids the Western tradition's constant basic assumption of self-identity, an assumption which culminates in the modern picture of the autonomous, self-identical subject aggressively set over against a pre-delineated world of objects in a relationship of mutual confrontation. In the final section, I investigate an important and illuminating parallel to Heidegger's result: the consideration of the relationship between experience and technological ways of thinking that forms the basis of the late Wittgenstein's famous rule-following considerations.

everything-list

 

 

 

Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net

8/30/2012

Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function."

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[Craig Weinberg]

That's what I'm saying. You can have ideal consciousness without space.

Heidegger's treatment of 'machination' in the Beitr锟� e zur Philosophie begins the critique of technological thinking that would centrally characterize his later work. Unlike later discussions of technology, the critique of machination in Beitr锟�e connects its arising to the predominance of 'lived-experience' ( Erlebnis ) as the concealed basis for the possibility of a pre-delineated, rule-based metaphysical understanding of the world. In this essay I explore this connection. The unity of machination and lived-experience becomes intelligible when both are traced to their common root in the primordial Greek attitude of techne , originally a basic attitude of wondering knowledge of nature. But with this common root revealed, the basic connection between machination and lived-experience also emerges as an important development of one of the deepest guiding thoughts of the Western philosophical tradition: the Parmenidean assertion of the sameness of being and thinking. In the Beitr锟�e 's analysis of machination and lived-experience, Heidegger hopes to discover a way of thinking that avoids the Western tradition's constant basic assumption of self-identity, an assumption which culminates in the modern picture of the autonomous, self-identical subject aggressively set over against a pre-delineated world of objects in a relationship of mutual confrontation. In the final section, I investigate an important and illuminating parallel to Heidegger's result: the consideration of the relationship between experience and technological ways of thinking that forms the basis of the late Wittgenstein's famous rule-following considerations.

everything-list

 

 

 

Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net

8/30/2012

Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function."

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[Roger Clough]

Hi Craig Weinberg

 

Exactly.  There may a problem with this, but its seems

that if mind is everywhere (is inextended, so space is irrelevant),

I am always part of the mind of God. So saying that-  when I look out

of my eyes, that is actually God looking out- which sounds

of course weird. Or that there is only one perceiver, that being

the Supreme Monad, is not illogical.

 

 

 

 

Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net

9/5/2012

Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him

so that everything could function."

----- Receiving the following content -----

From: Craig Weinberg

Receiver: everything-list

Time: 2012-09-04, 20:50:39

Subject: Re: consciousness as the experiencre of time

Heidegger's treatment of 'machination' in the Beitr� e zur Philosophie begins the critique of technological thinking that would centrally characterize his later work. Unlike later discussions of technology, the critique of machination in Beitr� e connects its arising to the predominance of 'lived-experience' ( Erlebnis ) as the concealed basis for the possibility of a pre-delineated, rule-based metaphysical understanding of the world. In this essay I explore this connection. The unity of machination and lived-experience becomes intelligible when both are traced to their common root in the primordial Greek attitude of techne , originally a basic attitude of wondering knowledge of nature. But with this common root revealed, the basic connection between machination and lived-experience also emerges as an important development of one of the deepest guiding thoughts of the Western philosophical tradition: the Parmenidean assertion of the sameness of being and thinking. In the Beitr� e 's analysis of machination and lived-experience, Heidegger hopes to discover a way of thinking that avoids the Western tradition's constant basic assumption of self-identity, an assumption which culminates in the modern picture of the autonomous, self-identical subject aggressively set over against a pre-delineated world of objects in a relationship of mutual confrontation. In the final section, I investigate an important and illuminating parallel to Heidegger's result: the consideration of the relationship between experience and technological ways of thinking that forms the basis of the late Wittgenstein's famous rule-following considerations.

everything-list

 

 

 

Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net

8/30/2012

Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function."

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[Craig Weinberg]

On Wednesday, September 5, 2012 8:11:39 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote:

Hi Craig Weinberg

 

Exactly.  There may a problem with this, but its seems

that if mind is everywhere (is inextended, so space is irrelevant),

I am always part of the mind of God. So saying that-  when I look out

of my eyes, that is actually God looking out- which sounds

of course weird. Or that there is only one perceiver, that being

the Supreme Monad, is not illogical.

 

I don't think that it sounds any weirder to say that then to say that when we look out of our eyes, we can see is the dust from the Big Bang. We are the totality-singularity (Supreme Monad or everythingness, etc) subdivided as reflected capacities to experience. The universe is nothing but a capacity to experience and to juxtapose that capacity with itself (which is what experience actually is).

Craig

Heidegger's treatment of 'machination' in the Beitr锟�e zur Philosophie begins the critique of technological thinking that would centrally characterize his later work. Unlike later discussions of technology, the critique of machination in Beitr锟�e connects its arising to the predominance of 'lived-experience' ( Erlebnis ) as the concealed basis for the possibility of a pre-delineated, rule-based metaphysical understanding of the world. In this essay I explore this connection. The unity of machination and lived-experience becomes intelligible when both are traced to their common root in the primordial Greek attitude of techne , originally a basic attitude of wondering knowledge of nature. But with this common root revealed, the basic connection between machination and lived-experience also emerges as an important development of one of the deepest guiding thoughts of the Western philosophical tradition: the Parmenidean assertion of the sameness of being and thinking. In the Beitr锟�e 's analysis of machination and lived-experience, Heidegger hopes to discover a way of thinking that avoids the Western tradition's constant basic assumption of self-identity, an assumption which culminates in the modern picture of the autonomous, self-identical subject aggressively set over against a pre-delineated world of objects in a relationship of mutual confrontation. In the final section, I investigate an important and illuminating parallel to Heidegger's result: the consideration of the relationship between experience and technological ways of thinking that forms the basis of the late Wittgenstein's famous rule-following considerations.

everything-list

[Stephen P. King]

On 9/5/2012 11:37 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Wednesday, September 5, 2012 8:11:39 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote:

Hi Craig Weinberg

 

Exactly.  There may a problem with this, but its seems

that if mind is everywhere (is inextended, so space is irrelevant),

I am always part of the mind of God. So saying that-  when I look out

of my eyes, that is actually God looking out- which sounds

of course weird. Or that there is only one perceiver, that being

the Supreme Monad, is not illogical.

 

I don't think that it sounds any weirder to say that then to say that when we look out of our eyes, we can see is the dust from the Big Bang. We are the totality-singularity (Supreme Monad or everythingness, etc) subdivided as reflected capacities to experience. The universe is nothing but a capacity to experience and to juxtapose that capacity with itself (which is what experience actually is).

Craig

Dear Craig,

    I would only add to your illuminating remark that this "capacity" is to both self-observe and other-observe. Observation, IMHO, is nothing more that the ability to generate a simulation. Only when there is a match between the simulations of multiple "reflected capacities to experience" that truth obtains.

[Craig Weinberg]

On Thursday, September 6, 2012 7:31:25 PM UTC-4, Stephen Paul King wrote:

On 9/5/2012 11:37 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Wednesday, September 5, 2012 8:11:39 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote:

Hi Craig Weinberg

 

Exactly.  There may a problem with this, but its seems

that if mind is everywhere (is inextended, so space is irrelevant),

I am always part of the mind of God. So saying that-  when I look out

of my eyes, that is actually God looking out- which sounds

of course weird. Or that there is only one perceiver, that being

the Supreme Monad, is not illogical.

 

I don't think that it sounds any weirder to say that then to say that when we look out of our eyes, we can see is the dust from the Big Bang. We are the totality-singularity (Supreme Monad or everythingness, etc) subdivided as reflected capacities to experience. The universe is nothing but a capacity to experience and to juxtapose that capacity with itself (which is what experience actually is).

Craig

Dear Craig,

    I would only add to your illuminating remark that this "capacity" is to both self-observe and other-observe.

Agreed!
 

Observation, IMHO, is nothing more that the ability to generate a simulation. Only when there is a match between the simulations of multiple "reflected capacities to experience" that truth obtains.

I wouldn't call it a simulation as much as a perspective-defined access. We actually see things directly, but what we can see is defined by what we are and in our case, what we are is very complex with many opportunities for contention between levels and self-other symmetries.

I think it is relativity. Just as proximity of a black hole changes actual temporal participation rather than simulates a change, our experience of our life actually changes through direct participation with it. Instead of simulation I would call it local identity or local realism, since there is no non-local identity or global realism.

Craig

[Stephen P. King]

Hi Craig,

    The simulation idea is using an abstraction, it is not the thing itself. The simulation model is a start on a mathematical model of the *content* of Sense. It is not Sense itself.

    I think the elephant in the Everything list room is the lack of a clear cut definition of the differences and relations between things and their representations, between the abstract and the concrete, a sign and its referent. Our ideas of  Realism needs to be updated. This YouTube video (in 5 parts) is a nice dramatic reading that explains the ideas involved: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AxV3ompeJ-Y