Here's another reductio ad absurdum illustration of comp.
If the version of comp we are discussing here is independent of physics, then shouldn't it be possible for us to program universal machines using only empty space? Length can be quantified, so why can't we just use millimeters or Planck lengths as the basis for our enumeration, addition, and multiplication and directly program from our mind to space?
Of course, it would be hard to know where it was because we would be constantly flying away from a space that was anchored to an absolute position independent of Earth, the solar system, Milky Way, etc, but that shouldn't matter anyhow since whatever method we use to directly program in empty space with our minds should also give us access to the results of the computations.
What do you think? Just as wafers of silicon glass could in theory be functionally identical to a living brain, wouldn't it be equally prejudiced to say that empty space isn't good enough to host the computations of silicon?
On Thu, Sep 20, 2012 at 10:02 AM, Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com> wrote:Here's another reductio ad absurdum illustration of comp.
If the version of comp we are discussing here is independent of physics, then shouldn't it be possible for us to program universal machines using only empty space? Length can be quantified, so why can't we just use millimeters or Planck lengths as the basis for our enumeration, addition, and multiplication and directly program from our mind to space?
Of course, it would be hard to know where it was because we would be constantly flying away from a space that was anchored to an absolute position independent of Earth, the solar system, Milky Way, etc, but that shouldn't matter anyhow since whatever method we use to directly program in empty space with our minds should also give us access to the results of the computations.
Right this is already the case. That we can use our minds to access the results.
What do you think? Just as wafers of silicon glass could in theory be functionally identical to a living brain, wouldn't it be equally prejudiced to say that empty space isn't good enough to host the computations of silicon?We don't even need empty space, we can use thought alone to figure out the future evolution of computers that already exist in Platonia and then get the result of any computation. The problem is we are slow at doing this,
so we build machines that can tell us what these platonic machines do with greater speed and accuracy than we ever could.
It's not doing the computations that is hard, the computations are already there. The problem is learning their results.
Jason
On 20 Sep 2012, at 17:02, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> Here's another reductio ad absurdum illustration of comp.
>
> If the version of comp we are discussing here is independent of
> physics, then shouldn't it be possible for us to program universal
> machines using only empty space?
You are quite quick here, but have a good insight, as comp makes space
non clonable, indeterministic in the details, and plausibly Turing
universal, as QM confirms. The 0-body problem (the quantum vacuum) is
already Turing universal (I think). For classical physics you need
three bodies at least).
> Length can be quantified, so why can't we just use millimeters or
> Planck lengths as the basis for our enumeration, addition, and
> multiplication and directly program from our mind to space?
Who we? In the universe nearby it costs a lot of energy/money/time to
handle matter already gigantic compared to the Planck length.
Or are you suggesting we are already simulated by the quantum vacuum.
Very plausible, but comp asks for justifying this in arithmetic.
>
> Of course, it would be hard to know where it was because we would be
> constantly flying away from a space that was anchored to an absolute
> position independent of Earth, the solar system, Milky Way, etc, but
> that shouldn't matter anyhow since whatever method we use to
> directly program in empty space with our minds should also give us
> access to the results of the computations.
?
>
> What do you think? Just as wafers of silicon glass could in theory
> be functionally identical to a living brain, wouldn't it be equally
> prejudiced to say that empty space isn't good enough to host the
> computations of silicon?
Empty space, in any turing universal theory, is equivalent with
universal dovetailing. It is a trivial theory, as when we assume comp,
the space and belief in spaces have to be justified through number
"dreams" statistics.
The advantage of comp is that we can use math and more easily reason
clearly. We can formulate key parts of the mind body problem
mathematically.
And computationalists are cool as they don't think twice before giving
the restaurant menu to the puppet who asks politely. They don't judge
people from their religion, skin color, clothes, or if made of wood,
or metal or flesh, as long as they behave respectfully of course.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
On Thursday, September 20, 2012 11:48:15 AM UTC-4, Jason wrote:
On Thu, Sep 20, 2012 at 10:02 AM, Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com> wrote:
Here's another reductio ad absurdum illustration of comp.
If the version of comp we are discussing here is independent of physics, then shouldn't it be possible for us to program universal machines using only empty space? Length can be quantified, so why can't we just use millimeters or Planck lengths as the basis for our enumeration, addition, and multiplication and directly program from our mind to space?
Of course, it would be hard to know where it was because we would be constantly flying away from a space that was anchored to an absolute position independent of Earth, the solar system, Milky Way, etc, but that shouldn't matter anyhow since whatever method we use to directly program in empty space with our minds should also give us access to the results of the computations.
Right this is already the case. That we can use our minds to access the results.
Why do you say this is the case? We aren't storing memories in space. When we lose our memory capacity it isn't because the universe is running out of space. We access experience through what we are, not through nothingness.
What do you think? Just as wafers of silicon glass could in theory be functionally identical to a living brain, wouldn't it be equally prejudiced to say that empty space isn't good enough to host the computations of silicon?
We don't even need empty space, we can use thought alone to figure out the future evolution of computers that already exist in Platonia and then get the result of any computation. The problem is we are slow at doing this,
Why is being 'slow' a problem? What's the rush? What time is it in Platonia? Why aren't we in Platonia now?
so we build machines that can tell us what these platonic machines do with greater speed and accuracy than we ever could.
Why would speed and accuracy matter, objectively? What is speed?
It's not doing the computations that is hard, the computations are already there. The problem is learning their results.
The problem is doing anything in the first place. Computations don't do anything at all. The reason that we do things is that we are not computations. We use computations. We can program things, but we can't thing programs without something to thing them with. This is a fatal flaw. If Platonia exists, it makes no sense for anything other than Platonia to exist. It would be redundant to go through the formality of executing any function is already executed non-locally. Why 'do' anything?
On Thursday, September 20, 2012 12:26:07 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 20 Sep 2012, at 17:02, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> Here's another reductio ad absurdum illustration of comp.
>
> If the version of comp we are discussing here is independent of
> physics, then shouldn't it be possible for us to program universal
> machines using only empty space?
You are quite quick here, but have a good insight, as comp makes space
non clonable, indeterministic in the details, and plausibly Turing
universal, as QM confirms. The 0-body problem (the quantum vacuum) is
already Turing universal (I think). For classical physics you need
three bodies at least).
What about an ideal vacuum? Just lengths multiplying and adding enumerated bundles of lengths. No quantum.
> Length can be quantified, so why can't we just use millimeters or
> Planck lengths as the basis for our enumeration, addition, and
> multiplication and directly program from our mind to space?
Who we? In the universe nearby it costs a lot of energy/money/time to
handle matter already gigantic compared to the Planck length.
Or are you suggesting we are already simulated by the quantum vacuum.
Very plausible, but comp asks for justifying this in arithmetic.
I'm saying that whatever program we access when we choose what we think about should be able to run just as easily in space as it does through the brain. I should be able to pick an area of my house and leave a bunch of memories there and then come back to them later just be occupying the same space. That's if we define space as relative to my house and not the rotating planet, revolving sun, etc.
So it sounds like you are not opposed to this idea of computation with no resources whatsoever besides space, provided that it could be justified arithmetically (which I don't understand why it wouldn't be. how does comp know if it's running on matter or space?)
>
> Of course, it would be hard to know where it was because we would be
> constantly flying away from a space that was anchored to an absolute
> position independent of Earth, the solar system, Milky Way, etc, but
> that shouldn't matter anyhow since whatever method we use to
> directly program in empty space with our minds should also give us
> access to the results of the computations.
?
I mean if I could stand completely still then the planet would fly off from under my feet and I would be left standing exactly where I was with the Earth revolving past me at 107,000 km/hr. I would occupy the same space while the Earth, Sun, and galaxy sweep away from me.
If instead of me, it was memories I had stashed away in space, then my body would be soon separated from the absolute position that I had placed them. It shouldn't matter though, since by the same method of thinking numbers into space, I should be able to retrieve them too, regardless of the distance between my body and the numbers.
>
> What do you think? Just as wafers of silicon glass could in theory
> be functionally identical to a living brain, wouldn't it be equally
> prejudiced to say that empty space isn't good enough to host the
> computations of silicon?
Empty space, in any turing universal theory, is equivalent with
universal dovetailing. It is a trivial theory, as when we assume comp,
the space and belief in spaces have to be justified through number
"dreams" statistics.
So you are saying yes to the space doctor?
The advantage of comp is that we can use math and more easily reason
clearly. We can formulate key parts of the mind body problem
mathematically.
I don't question that, and I think that it may ultimately be the only way of engineering mind body solutions - but I still think that if we really want to know the truth about mind body, we can only find that in the un-numbered, un-named meta-juxtapostions of experienced sense.
And computationalists are cool as they don't think twice before giving
the restaurant menu to the puppet who asks politely. They don't judge
people from their religion, skin color, clothes, or if made of wood,
or metal or flesh, as long as they behave respectfully of course.
I can behave respectfully to a puppet too, but I feel hypocritical because I wouldn't change places with them for any reason.
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
On Thursday, September 20, 2012 12:26:07 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 20 Sep 2012, at 17:02, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> Here's another reductio ad absurdum illustration of comp.
>
> If the version of comp we are discussing here is independent of
> physics, then shouldn't it be possible for us to program universal
> machines using only empty space?
You are quite quick here, but have a good insight, as comp makes space
non clonable, indeterministic in the details, and plausibly Turing
universal, as QM confirms. The 0-body problem (the quantum vacuum) is
already Turing universal (I think). For classical physics you need
three bodies at least).
What about an ideal vacuum? Just lengths multiplying and adding enumerated bundles of lengths. No quantum.
> Length can be quantified, so why can't we just use millimeters or
> Planck lengths as the basis for our enumeration, addition, and
> multiplication and directly program from our mind to space?
Who we? In the universe nearby it costs a lot of energy/money/time to
handle matter already gigantic compared to the Planck length.
Or are you suggesting we are already simulated by the quantum vacuum.
Very plausible, but comp asks for justifying this in arithmetic.
I'm saying that whatever program we access when we choose what we think about should be able to run just as easily in space as it does through the brain.
I should be able to pick an area of my house and leave a bunch of memories there and then come back to them later just be occupying the same space.
That's if we define space as relative to my house and not the rotating planet, revolving sun, etc.
So it sounds like you are not opposed to this idea of computation with no resources whatsoever besides space,
provided that it could be justified arithmetically (which I don't understand why it wouldn't be. how does comp know if it's running on matter or space?)
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/BUBSbCUjtbgJ.
To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
----- Receiving the following content -----From: Jason ReschReceiver: everything-listTime: 2012-09-21, 01:19:04Subject: Re: Numbers in Space
On Thu, Sep 20, 2012 at 8:10 PM, Stephen P. King <step...@charter.net> wrote:
On 9/20/2012 11:48 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Thu, Sep 20, 2012 at 10:02 AM, Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com> wrote:
Here's another reductio ad absurdum illustration of comp.
If the version of comp we are discussing here is independent of physics, then shouldn't it be possible for us to program universal machines using only empty space? Length can be quantified, so why can't we just use millimeters or Planck lengths as the basis for our enumeration, addition, and multiplication and directly program from our mind to space?
Of course, it would be hard to know where it was because we would be constantly flying away from a space that was anchored to an absolute position independent of Earth, the solar system, Milky Way, etc, but that shouldn't matter anyhow since whatever method we use to directly program in empty space with our minds should also give us access to the results of the computations.
Right this is already the case. 锟絋hat we can use our minds to access the results.
�
What do you think? Just as wafers of silicon glass could in theory be functionally identical to a living brain, wouldn't it be equally prejudiced to say that empty space isn't good enough to host the computations of silicon?
锟斤拷� It takes the consumption of resources to "learn the results". This is what I have been yelling at Bruno about the entire time since I first read his beautiful papers. Understanding is never free.We don't even need empty space, we can use thought alone to figure out the future evolution of computers that already exist in Platonia and then get the result of any computation. 锟絋he problem is we are slow at doing this, so we build machines that can tell us what these platonic machines do with greater speed and accuracy than we ever could.It's not doing the computations that is hard, the computations are already there. 锟絋he problem is learning their results.JasonFor us (in this universe) to learn the results of a platonic computation may take resources, but if you happen to be that very platonic computation in question, then you don't need to do anything extra to get the result. 锟結ou are the result.Jason
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Stephen P. KingReceiver: everything-listTime: 2012-09-20, 20:50:22
Subject: Re: Numbers in Space
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsub...@googlegroups.com.
On 21 Sep 2012, at 03:28, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 9/20/2012 12:14 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Thursday, September 20, 2012 11:48:15 AM UTC-4, Jason wrote:
It's not doing the computations that is hard, the computations are already there. The problem is learning their results.
The problem is doing anything in the first place. Computations don't do anything at all. The reason that we do things is that we are not computations. We use computations. We can program things, but we can't thing programs without something to thing them with. This is a fatal flaw. If Platonia exists, it makes no sense for anything other than Platonia to exist. It would be redundant to go through the formality of executing any function is already executed non-locally. Why 'do' anything?
Bruno can 't answer that question. He is afraid that it will corrupt Olympia.
Not at all, the answer is easy here. In the big picture, that is arithmetic, nothing is done. The computations are already "done" in it. "doing things" is a relative internal notion coming from the first person perspectives.
Also, Platonia does not really exist, nor God, as existence is what belongs to Platonia. Comp follows Plotinus on this, both God and Matter does not belong to the category exist (ontologically). They are epistemological beings.
Bruno
On 20 Sep 2012, at 19:16, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Thursday, September 20, 2012 12:26:07 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 20 Sep 2012, at 17:02, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> Here's another reductio ad absurdum illustration of comp.
>
> If the version of comp we are discussing here is independent of
> physics, then shouldn't it be possible for us to program universal
> machines using only empty space?
You are quite quick here, but have a good insight, as comp makes space
non clonable, indeterministic in the details, and plausibly Turing
universal, as QM confirms. The 0-body problem (the quantum vacuum) is
already Turing universal (I think). For classical physics you need
three bodies at least).
What about an ideal vacuum? Just lengths multiplying and adding enumerated bundles of lengths. No quantum.
It would not be Turing universal.
> Length can be quantified, so why can't we just use millimeters or
> Planck lengths as the basis for our enumeration, addition, and
> multiplication and directly program from our mind to space?
Who we? In the universe nearby it costs a lot of energy/money/time to
handle matter already gigantic compared to the Planck length.
Or are you suggesting we are already simulated by the quantum vacuum.
Very plausible, but comp asks for justifying this in arithmetic.
I'm saying that whatever program we access when we choose what we think about should be able to run just as easily in space as it does through the brain.
Or just arithmetic. You don't need space. Only addition and multiplication of integers. Or justapplication and abstraction on lambda terms, etc.
I should be able to pick an area of my house and leave a bunch of memories there and then come back to them later just be occupying the same space.
Not at all. You are distributed in the whole UD*. You can go back to your memory only if the measure on computations makes such a persistence possible. This needs to be justified with the self-reference logics, and that is what is done with S4Grz1, Z1* and X1*.
That's if we define space as relative to my house and not the rotating planet, revolving sun, etc.
So it sounds like you are not opposed to this idea of computation with no resources whatsoever besides space,
No need for spaces. To invoke it is already too much physicalist for comp.
provided that it could be justified arithmetically (which I don't understand why it wouldn't be. how does comp know if it's running on matter or space?)
By UDA. Anything physical must be justified with the "material hypostases". Up to now, this works, even by giving the shadows of the reason why destructive interference of the computations occurs below our substitution level.
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com.
On 9/20/2012 9:49 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
Physical computers are assembled substances which exhibit exceptionally
normative, controllable, and observable behaviors.
Craig
To understand a thing is to control a thing.
On 20 Sep 2012, at 19:16, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Thursday, September 20, 2012 12:26:07 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 20 Sep 2012, at 17:02, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> Here's another reductio ad absurdum illustration of comp.
>
> If the version of comp we are discussing here is independent of
> physics, then shouldn't it be possible for us to program universal
> machines using only empty space?
You are quite quick here, but have a good insight, as comp makes space
non clonable, indeterministic in the details, and plausibly Turing
universal, as QM confirms. The 0-body problem (the quantum vacuum) is
already Turing universal (I think). For classical physics you need
three bodies at least).
What about an ideal vacuum? Just lengths multiplying and adding enumerated bundles of lengths. No quantum.It would not be Turing universal.
> Length can be quantified, so why can't we just use millimeters or
> Planck lengths as the basis for our enumeration, addition, and
> multiplication and directly program from our mind to space?
Who we? In the universe nearby it costs a lot of energy/money/time to
handle matter already gigantic compared to the Planck length.
Or are you suggesting we are already simulated by the quantum vacuum.
Very plausible, but comp asks for justifying this in arithmetic.
I'm saying that whatever program we access when we choose what we think about should be able to run just as easily in space as it does through the brain.Or just arithmetic. You don't need space. Only addition and multiplication of integers. Or justapplication and abstraction on lambda terms, etc.
I should be able to pick an area of my house and leave a bunch of memories there and then come back to them later just be occupying the same space.Not at all. You are distributed in the whole UD*. You can go back to your memory only if the measure on computations makes such a persistence possible. This needs to be justified with the self-reference logics, and that is what is done with S4Grz1, Z1* and X1*.
That's if we define space as relative to my house and not the rotating planet, revolving sun, etc.
So it sounds like you are not opposed to this idea of computation with no resources whatsoever besides space,No need for spaces. To invoke it is already too much physicalist for comp.
provided that it could be justified arithmetically (which I don't understand why it wouldn't be. how does comp know if it's running on matter or space?)By UDA. Anything physical must be justified with the "material hypostases". Up to now, this works, even by giving the shadows of the reason why destructive interference of the computations occurs below our substitution level.
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Craig WeinbergReceiver: everything-listTime: 2012-09-21, 11:27:56
Subject: Re: Numbers in Space
To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/X2XXBwCB-ycJ.
On 9/21/2012 4:10 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Dear Bruno,
On 21 Sep 2012, at 03:28, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 9/20/2012 12:14 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Thursday, September 20, 2012 11:48:15 AM UTC-4, Jason wrote:
It's not doing the computations that is hard, the computations are already there. The problem is learning their results.
The problem is doing anything in the first place. Computations don't do anything at all. The reason that we do things is that we are not computations. We use computations. We can program things, but we can't thing programs without something to thing them with. This is a fatal flaw. If Platonia exists, it makes no sense for anything other than Platonia to exist. It would be redundant to go through the formality of executing any function is already executed non-locally. Why 'do' anything?
Bruno can 't answer that question. He is afraid that it will corrupt Olympia.
Not at all, the answer is easy here. In the big picture, that is arithmetic, nothing is done. The computations are already "done" in it. "doing things" is a relative internal notion coming from the first person perspectives.
Also, Platonia does not really exist, nor God, as existence is what belongs to Platonia. Comp follows Plotinus on this, both God and Matter does not belong to the category exist (ontologically). They are epistemological beings.
Bruno
OK, but you are ignoring my question: How does the existence become decomposed such that there are "epistemological beings"?
So far your explanation is focused on the representation in terms of arithmetics and I accept your reasonings: In the big picture, that is arithmetic, nothing is done." There is no "action", no change, all that exists "just is". But then what do we make of time?
We can dismiss it as an illusion?
But that would be just an evasion of the obvious question: Why does the illusion occur?
I am interested in explanation that at least try to answer this question: How does the illusion persist?
What might "cause" it? Why do "special purpose" computations occur such that we can identify physical systems with them? My proposal is to weaken the concept of Computational Universality a tiny bit and thus allow room for the possibility of an answer to the questions that I have.
Consider this: What happens is there does not exist any physical system that can implement a particular computation X?
Is it possible for us, humans, or any other sentient physical being to "know" anything about X, such that we might have some model of X that is faithfully representative?
On 9/21/2012 1:19 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
Jason,
On Thu, Sep 20, 2012 at 8:10 PM, Stephen P. King <step...@charter.net> wrote:
It takes the consumption of resources to "learn the results". This is what I have been yelling at Bruno about the entire time since I first read his beautiful papers. Understanding is never free.On 9/20/2012 11:48 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Thu, Sep 20, 2012 at 10:02 AM, Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com> wrote:
Here's another reductio ad absurdum illustration of comp.
If the version of comp we are discussing here is independent of physics, then shouldn't it be possible for us to program universal machines using only empty space? Length can be quantified, so why can't we just use millimeters or Planck lengths as the basis for our enumeration, addition, and multiplication and directly program from our mind to space?
Of course, it would be hard to know where it was because we would be constantly flying away from a space that was anchored to an absolute position independent of Earth, the solar system, Milky Way, etc, but that shouldn't matter anyhow since whatever method we use to directly program in empty space with our minds should also give us access to the results of the computations.
Right this is already the case. That we can use our minds to access the results.
What do you think? Just as wafers of silicon glass could in theory be functionally identical to a living brain, wouldn't it be equally prejudiced to say that empty space isn't good enough to host the computations of silicon?
We don't even need empty space, we can use thought alone to figure out the future evolution of computers that already exist in Platonia and then get the result of any computation. The problem is we are slow at doing this, so we build machines that can tell us what these platonic machines do with greater speed and accuracy than we ever could.
It's not doing the computations that is hard, the computations are already there. The problem is learning their results.
Jason
For us (in this universe) to learn the results of a platonic computation may take resources, but if you happen to be that very platonic computation in question, then you don't need to do anything extra to get the result. You are the result.
Jason
That is not the point! I think we all agree on what you remark upon! It is how everything gets partitioned up so that we have the kind of world we observe. We observe a classical world where things don't work with infinite resources or infinite speed or infinite connectivity. We are asking for the fact that we observe an illusion to be explained!
Does 38 have any factors?
Does program xyz stop in fewer than 10^100 steps?
Both of these are mathematical questions with only one possible answer. Their truth is established whether or not we test it, ask it, implement it or think it. They would be either true or false even if nothing existed for us to have any hope of answering it.
If you mathematically defined what programs are conscious you could even say the question "Does program xyz contain conscious entities?" is a mathematical question. If it is true, then there exist conscious entities.
Your requirement that there be some "real" implementation for computation leads to an infinite regress. What "real" computer is our universe running on?
Hi Bruno Marchal
I think we should only use the word "exists" only when we are
referring to physical existence.
Thus I can truthfully say,
for example, that God does not exist.
Wikipedia says, "In common usage, it [existence]
is the world we are aware of through our senses,
and that persists independently without them."
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Existence
On the other hand, Platonia, Plotinus, Plato, Kant and Leibniz,
take the opposite view or what is real and what exists. To them ideas
and other nonphysical items such as numbers or anything not extended in space,
anything outside of spacetime are what exist, the physical world out
there is merely an appearance, a phenomenon. Following Leibniz,
I would say of such things that they live, since life has
such attributes.
So when we say that a man exists, we are speaking of the physical man.
But when we say that he lives, we are speaking of man as a mental or
living being.
Hi Craig WeinbergThwe ideal vacuum is still in spacetime.
Hi Stephen P. King and all
The problems imagined by materialists in invoking dualism
are just that - imaginary-- as long as mind is unextended
and brain is extended. And the so-called "hard problem" of consciousness
and the cartesian problem of interfacing or superimposing
mind and brain simply vanish. They're apples and oranges.
They exist in different universes, which can superimpose,
the extended or physical "floating" in a sea of inextended
or nonphysical mind, or to use a better word, life.
We have to be able to communicate...
If you mathematically defined what programs are conscious you could even say the question "Does program xyz contain conscious entities?" is a mathematical question. If it is true, then there exist conscious entities.
The underlying Quantum's unitary transformation.
Your requirement that there be some "real" implementation for computation leads to an infinite regress. What "real" computer is our universe running on?
--
On 9/21/2012 1:19 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
Jason,
On Thu, Sep 20, 2012 at 8:10 PM, Stephen P. King <step...@charter.net> wrote:
It takes the consumption of resources to "learn the results". This is what I have been yelling at Bruno about the entire time since I first read his beautiful papers. Understanding is never free.On 9/20/2012 11:48 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Thu, Sep 20, 2012 at 10:02 AM, Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com> wrote:
Here's another reductio ad absurdum illustration of comp.
If the version of comp we are discussing here is independent of physics, then shouldn't it be possible for us to program universal machines using only empty space? Length can be quantified, so why can't we just use millimeters or Planck lengths as the basis for our enumeration, addition, and multiplication and directly program from our mind to space?
Of course, it would be hard to know where it was because we would be constantly flying away from a space that was anchored to an absolute position independent of Earth, the solar system, Milky Way, etc, but that shouldn't matter anyhow since whatever method we use to directly program in empty space with our minds should also give us access to the results of the computations.
Right this is already the case. That we can use our minds to access the results.
What do you think? Just as wafers of silicon glass could in theory be functionally identical to a living brain, wouldn't it be equally prejudiced to say that empty space isn't good enough to host the computations of silicon?
We don't even need empty space, we can use thought alone to figure out the future evolution of computers that already exist in Platonia and then get the result of any computation. The problem is we are slow at doing this, so we build machines that can tell us what these platonic machines do with greater speed and accuracy than we ever could.
It's not doing the computations that is hard, the computations are already there. The problem is learning their results.
Jason
For us (in this universe) to learn the results of a platonic computation may take resources, but if you happen to be that very platonic computation in question, then you don't need to do anything extra to get the result. You are the result.
Jason
That is not the point! I think we all agree on what you remark upon! It is how everything gets partitioned up so that we have the kind of world we observe. We observe a classical world where things don't work with infinite resources or infinite speed or infinite connectivity. We are asking for the fact that we observe an illusion to be explained!
Does 38 have any factors?
Does program xyz stop in fewer than 10^100 steps?
Both of these are mathematical questions with only one possible answer. Their truth is established whether or not we test it, ask it, implement it or think it. They would be either true or false even if nothing existed for us to have any hope of answering it.
If you mathematically defined what programs are conscious you could even say the question "Does program xyz contain conscious entities?" is a mathematical question. If it is true, then there exist conscious entities.
ROGER: Hi Bruno Marchal
I think we should only use the word "exists" only when we are
referring to physical existence.
BRUNO: Hmm.... That might aggravate the naturalist or materialist human penchant.
ROGER: Why ? Naturalist and materialist entities are extended and so physically exist.
What I say here is how I think Leibniz would respond.
Thus I can truthfully say,
for example, that God does not exist.
Wikipedia says, "In common usage, it [existence]
is the world we are aware of through our senses,
and that persists independently without them."
BRUNO: But that points on the whole problem. With comp and QM, even when you observe the moon, it is not "really" there.
ROGER: Yes it is. Although I observe the moon phenomenologically, it still has physical existence in spacetime
because it is extended.
At least that's Leibniz' position, namely that phenomena, although illusions,
still have physical presence. Leibniz refers to these as "well-founded phenomena." You can still stub your toe on
phenomenological rocks.
On the other hand, Platonia, Plotinus, Plato, Kant and Leibniz,
take the opposite view or what is real and what exists. To them ideas
and other nonphysical items such as numbers or anything not extended in space,
anything outside of spacetime are what exist, the physical world out
there is merely an appearance, a phenomenon. Following Leibniz,
I would say of such things that they live, since life has
such attributes.
BRUNO: Hmm... Then numbers lives, but with comp, only universal or Lobian numbers can be said reasonably enough to be living.
You might go to far. Even in Plato, the No? content (all the ideas) is richer that its living part. I doubt Plato would have said that
a circle is living. Life will need the soul to enact life in the intelligible.
Plato's One is a special case, since it is a monad of monads,
And more esoteric thinking treats numbers more as beings:
http://supertarot.co.uk/westcott/monad.htm
BRUNO: The person and its body. OK. For the term "exist" I think we should allow all reading, and just ask people to remind us of the sense before the use.
With comp, all the exists comes from the "ExP(x)" use in arithmetic, and their arithmetical epistemological version, like []Ex[]P(x), or []<>Ex[]<>P(x), etc.
That gives a testable toy theology (testable as such a theology contains the physics as a subpart).
BrunoROGER: You lost me, except I believe that a main part of confusion and disagreement on this listcomes because of multiple meanings of the word "exists",which brings me back to where I started:
I think we should only use the word "exists" only when we are
referring to physical (extended) existence.
============================================================================================
ROGER: Hi Bruno Marchal
I think we should only use the word "exists" only when we are
referring to physical existence.
BRUNO: Hmm.... That might aggravate the naturalist or materialist human penchant.
ROGER: Why ? Naturalist and materialist entities are extended and so physically exist.
What I say here is how I think Leibniz would respond.
Thus I can truthfully say,
for example, that God does not exist.
Wikipedia says, "In common usage, it [existence]
is the world we are aware of through our senses,
and that persists independently without them."
BRUNO: But that points on the whole problem. With comp and QM, even when you observe the moon, it is not "really" there.
ROGER: Yes it is. Although I observe the moon phenomenologically, it still has physical existence in spacetime
because it is extended.
At least that's Leibniz' position, namely that phenomena, although illusions,
still have physical presence.
Leibniz refers to these as "well-founded phenomena." You can still stub your toe on
phenomenological rocks.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Existence
On the other hand, Platonia, Plotinus, Plato, Kant and Leibniz,
take the opposite view or what is real and what exists. To them ideas
and other nonphysical items such as numbers or anything not extended in space,
anything outside of spacetime are what exist, the physical world out
there is merely an appearance, a phenomenon. Following Leibniz,
I would say of such things that they live, since life has
such attributes.
BRUNO: Hmm... Then numbers lives, but with comp, only universal or Lobian numbers can be said reasonably enough to be living.
You might go to far. Even in Plato, the No? content (all the ideas) is richer that its living part. I doubt Plato would have said that
a circle is living. Life will need the soul to enact life in the intelligible.
Plato's One is a special case, saince it is a monad of monads,
And more esoteric thinking treats numbers more as beings:
http://supertarot.co.uk/westcott/monad.htm
BRUNO: The person and its body. OK. For the term "exist" I think we should allow all reading, and just ask people to remind us of the sense before the use.
With comp, all the exists comes from the "ExP(x)" use in arithmetic, and their arithmetical epistemological version, like []Ex[]P(x), or []<>Ex[]<>P(x), etc.
That gives a testable toy theology (testable as such a theology contains the physics as a subpart).
BrunoROGER: You lost me, except I believe that a main part of confusion and disagreement on this listcomes because of multiple meanings of the word "exists",which brings me back to where I started:
I think we should only use the word "exists" only when we are
referring to physical (extended) existence.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com.
On 22 Sep 2012, at 11:25, Roger Clough wrote:
t: Hi Bruno Marchal
Dear Stephen and Bruno:(BRUNO: Hmm... Then numbers lives, but with comp, only universal or Lobian numbers can be said reasonably enough to be living.
You might go to far. Even in Plato, the No? content (all the ideas) is richer that its living part. I doubt Plato would have said that a circle is living. Life will need the soul to enact life in the intelligible. )
I find it hard to believe that 'exist(ence?)' is depending on human thought/measurement/comprehension. If something fails to 'materialize'(?) into physical(?) existence it still can exist - in our thinking, or beyond that: in the part of the unlimited (complexity?) we never heard of.To restrict existence to our knowledge - especially quoting ancient thinkers who experienced so much less to think of-(e.g. Leibnitz, whom I respect no end, but over the more than 3 centuries humanity has learned SOMETHING??)is counterscientific -there are less polite words - and Bruno's justification depends how we define that 'circle' - OOPS: life-living. And IF we aggrevate naturalists and materialists? so be it. (Spelling var: SOB-it).(Bruno again: Life will need the soul to enact life in the intelligible.Looks like Bruno's stance on the mind-body bases. I am not with that, I consider Descartes' dualism a defence against the danger to be burnt at the stake. I consider him smarter than dualistic.Stephen, I think(?) you waste your time arguing in such length against a differen belief system. It is like a political campaign in the US: everybody talks ONLY to their OWN constituents, the others do not even listen. All those billion $s (there) are wasted just as all those zillion posts here.Look at the double-meaning of your Wiki-quote. ((- I am one of those "others"-.))Sorry I could not resist to reply.John M
With comp, all the exists comes from the "ExP(x)" use in arithmetic, and their arithmetical epistemological version, like []Ex[]P(x), or []<>Ex[]<>P(x), etc.
Can not you see, Bruno, that this stipulation makes existence contingent upon the ability to be defined by a symbol and thus on human whim? It is the tool-maker and user that is talking through you here.
That gives a testable toy theology (testable as such a theology contains the physics as a subpart).
Testable, sure, but theology should never be contingent. It must flow from pure necessity and our finite models are simply insufficient for this task.
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com.
This is my schema.
Can you complete/ammend it?
Things in themselves (noumena) -> - Have a computational nature (Bruno) : few components: numbers, + *- Is just a mathematical manyfold(Me), few components: equations- Are Monadic (Roger). many components- Are phisical: includes the "phisical world" with: space, time persons, cars. (physicalists)
Things perceived (phenomena) -> - Relies on the architecture of the mind, the activity of the brain (a local arangement thatkeep entropy constant along a direction in space-time, the product of natural selectionTherefore, existence is selected (Me)- The mind is a robust computation -and therefore implies a certain selection- (Bruno)- Are created by the activity of the supreme monad (Roger)- Does not matter (physicalists)
2012/9/23 Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be>
On 22 Sep 2012, at 20:05, Stephen P. King wrote:
With comp, all the exists comes from the "ExP(x)" use in arithmetic, and their arithmetical epistemological version, like []Ex[]P(x), or []<>Ex[]<>P(x), etc.
Can not you see, Bruno, that this stipulation makes existence contingent upon the ability to be defined by a symbol and thus on human whim? It is the tool-maker and user that is talking through you here.
Confusion of level. The stipulation used to described such existence does not makes such existence contingent at all. Only the stipulation is contingent, not its content, which can be considered as absolute, as we work in the standard model (by the very definition of comp: we work with standard comp (we would not say "yes" to a doctor if he propose a non standard cording of our brain).
That gives a testable toy theology (testable as such a theology contains the physics as a subpart).
Testable, sure, but theology should never be contingent. It must flow from pure necessity and our finite models are simply insufficient for this task.
First our model is not finite, only our theories and machines are. And the AUDA illustrates clearly that theology's shape (the hypostases) follows pure necessity, even if all machine will define a particular arithmetical content for each theology, but this is natural, as it concerns the private life of individual machine (it is the same for us by default in all religion).
Bruno
This is my schema.Can you complete/ammend it?Things in themselves (noumena) -> - Have a computational nature (Bruno) : few components: numbers, + *
- Is just a mathematical manyfold(Me), few components: equations- Are Monadic (Roger). many components- Are phisical: includes the "phisical world" with: space, time persons, cars. (physicalists)Things perceived (phenomena) -> - Relies on the architecture of the mind, the activity of the brain (a local arangement thatkeep entropy constant along a direction in space-time, the product of natural selectionTherefore, existence is selected (Me)
- The mind is a robust computation -and therefore implies a certain selection- (Bruno)
- Are created by the activity of the supreme monad (Roger)- Does not matter (physicalists)
2012/9/23 Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be>On 22 Sep 2012, at 20:05, Stephen P. King wrote:
With comp, all the exists comes from the "ExP(x)" use in arithmetic, and their arithmetical epistemological version, like []Ex[]P(x), or []<>Ex[]<>P(x), etc.
Can not you see, Bruno, that this stipulation makes existence contingent upon the ability to be defined by a symbol and thus on human whim? It is the tool-maker and user that is talking through you here.
Confusion of level. The stipulation used to described such existence does not makes such existence contingent at all. Only the stipulation is contingent, not its content, which can be considered as absolute, as we work in the standard model (by the very definition of comp: we work with standard comp (we would not say "yes" to a doctor if he propose a non standard cording of our brain).
That gives a testable toy theology (testable as such a theology contains the physics as a subpart).
Testable, sure, but theology should never be contingent. It must flow from pure necessity and our finite models are simply insufficient for this task.First our model is not finite, only our theories and machines are. And the AUDA illustrates clearly that theology's shape (the hypostases) follows pure necessity, even if all machine will define a particular arithmetical content for each theology, but this is natural, as it concerns the private life of individual machine (it is the same for us by default in all religion).Bruno--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
--
Alberto.
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
----- Receiving the following content -----From: Stephen P. KingReceiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-09-22, 16:03:48Subject: Re: On Causation with Mind and brain as apples and oranges
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsub...@googlegroups.com.
Hi Stephen P. KingI have trouble conceiving an isomorphism (or anything comparative) betweensomething that is there and something that is not. The somethingthat is not there is not the absence of the thing that was,since it has no shape, no location, and cannot be found by a physicalsearch.
For any Boolean algebra B, S(B) is a compact totally disconnected Hausdorff space; such spaces are
called Stone spaces (also profinite spaces).
Conversely, given any topological space X, the collection
of subsets of X that are clopen (both closed and open) is
a Boolean algebra."
----- Receiving the following content -----From: Bruno MarchalReceiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-09-24, 08:58:12Subject: Re: Potential definitions--Re: Re: What is 'Existence'?
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsub...@googlegroups.com.
Hi Bruno,With components I mean a neutral enumeration of entities. perhaps lebnitzian monads would be more appropriate.Besides numbers + and * I think that is necessary machines or any kind of instruction set + an execution unit? . It isn't?
Hi Bruno Marchal
Being a pragmatist (and an engineer), I believe what works or makes the best sense.I am basically trying to understand the relationship betweenPlatonism and modern science. So it's not either/or, its both/and.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.