Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation

[Craig Weinberg]

In a recent paper entitled
“Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation”:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1210.8447
Jan-Markus Schwindt has presented an impressive argument against the many-world interpretation of quantum mechanics.

The argument he presents is not new, but, in my opinion, nobody ever presented this argument so clearly.

In a nutshell, the argument is this:
To define separate worlds of MWI, one needs a preferred basis, which is an old well-known problem of MWI. In modern literature, one often finds the claim that the basis problem is solved by decoherence. What J-M Schwindt points out is that decoherence is not enough. Namely, decoherence solves the basis problem only if it is already known how to split the system into subsystems (typically, the measured system and the environment). But if the state in the Hilbert space is all what exists, then such a split is not unique. Therefore, MWI claiming that state in the Hilbert space is all what exists cannot resolve the basis problem, and thus cannot define separate worlds. Period! One needs some additional structure not present in the states of the Hilbert space themselves.

As reasonable possibilities for the additional structure, he mentions observers of the Copenhagen interpretation, particles of the Bohmian interpretation, and the possibility that quantum mechanics is not fundamental at all.

source

[Russell Standish]

> source <http://www.physicsforums.com/blog.php?b=4289>

Rather than Copenhagen observers, the many minds of Everett fits the
bill.

See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Many-minds_interpretation

As I see it - the argument is not new, and has been adequately
addressed within the Everett framework. What surprises me are people
like Deutsch sticking to their preferred bases...

Cheers
--

----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpc...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au
----------------------------------------------------------------------------

[Bruno Marchal]

Yes old argument keep getting copied and pasted, probably due to
"perish or publish".

> and has been adequately
> addressed within the Everett framework.

Absolutely so. Even in Everett original long version text (his thesis).

> What surprises me are people
> like Deutsch sticking to their preferred bases...

I agree, although I thought that David changed his mind on this.
People does not read the original work of Everett which shows clearly
the independence from the choice of a basis, even if the global
picture remains unclear. About this, with comp we know why (there are
no global physical picture a priori).

Best,

Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Craig Weinberg]

Can you explain, in the simplest layman terms, why this argument can be thrown out? The details are over my head, but it seems to me that the argument is simply that in order to make universes separate, you would need a whole other information architecture (which would also have to be information-theoretically multiplied) to create and preserve that separation. For each universe, you would need multiple universes of overhead outside of all universes. Or if that is not his argument in the paper, then consider it mine. Why does MWI not in itself require a second order MW to propagate and maintain the multiplicity? If it needs no resources, then why not use the same argument for the single universe?

Craig

[Russell Standish]

On Sun, Nov 18, 2012 at 08:12:51AM -0800, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> Can you explain, in the simplest layman terms, why this argument can be
> thrown out? The details are over my head, but it seems to me that the
> argument is simply that in order to make universes separate, you would need
> a whole other information architecture (which would also have to be
> information-theoretically multiplied) to create and preserve that
> separation. For each universe, you would need multiple universes of
> overhead outside of all universes. Or if that is not his argument in the
> paper, then consider it mine. Why does MWI not in itself require a second
> order MW to propagate and maintain the multiplicity? If it needs no
> resources, then why not use the same argument for the single universe?
>
> Craig

There is no external multiplicity - only a single multiverse (of which
there is a range of opinion as to what that is exactly), which has far
less complexity than any one of the contained universes. The
individual universes, or worlds, multiply within the heads of the
observers, and observers with it, so there is a 1-1 relationship
between world and observer.

There is no issue of preferred basis, as each observer has their own
chosen basis. Observers with incompatible bases can never communicate
with each other - they simply pass by each other unnoticed. Only
observers with compatible bases can share their realities - giving
rise to the "illusion" (as it were) of a single external classical
reality.

Hope that helps. I'd say go and read my book, but I'm not convinced I
found the perfect explanation of this in that book either
... :(. Others may have different suggestions.

[Stephen P. King]

Hi Russell,

I agree with this view, especially the part about the compatibility
of bases leading to a 'sharing of realities' that then gives rise to an
illusion of a single classical reality; I just phrase the concepts
differently. My question to you is how 'simple' can an observer be, as a
system? It seems to me that even particles could be considered as
observers. I buy Chalmers' argument for panpsychism.

--
Onward!

Stephen

[Russell Standish]

On Sun, Nov 18, 2012 at 07:48:57PM -0500, Stephen P. King wrote:
> Hi Russell,
>
> I agree with this view, especially the part about the
> compatibility of bases leading to a 'sharing of realities' that then
> gives rise to an illusion of a single classical reality; I just
> phrase the concepts differently. My question to you is how 'simple'
> can an observer be, as a system? It seems to me that even particles
> could be considered as observers. I buy Chalmers' argument for
> panpsychism.
>

I doubt that very much, as if true, then we should expect to find
ourselves as particles, which is the Occam's catastrophe redux I point
out in my book.

I suspect that as human beings, we rank amongst the simplest of all
possible observers.

Cheers

[Craig Weinberg]

On Sunday, November 18, 2012 8:01:20 PM UTC-5, Russell Standish wrote:

I suspect that as human beings, we rank amongst the simplest of all
possible observers.

why?

Craig
 

[Russell Standish]

Application of the Occam's razor theorem to Anthropic Selection. See
Section 5.1 of my book "Theory of Nothing".

Cheers

On Sun, Nov 18, 2012 at 06:59:52PM -0800, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> On Sunday, November 18, 2012 8:01:20 PM UTC-5, Russell Standish wrote:
> >
> >
> >
> > I suspect that as human beings, we rank amongst the simplest of all
> > possible observers.
> >
>
> why?
>
> Craig
>
>
> >
> >
> > ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
> >
> > Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
> > Principal, High Performance Coders

> > Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpc...@hpcoders.com.au<javascript:>

> > University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au
> > ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
> >
> >
>

> --
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[Stephen P. King]

On 11/18/2012 8:12 PM, Russell Standish wrote:

On Sun, Nov 18, 2012 at 07:48:57PM -0500, Stephen P. King wrote:

Hi Russell,

    I agree with this view, especially the part about the
compatibility of bases leading to a 'sharing of realities' that then
gives rise to an illusion of a single classical reality; I just
phrase the concepts differently. My question to you is how 'simple'
can an observer be, as a system? It seems to me that even particles
could be considered as observers. I buy Chalmers' argument for
panpsychism.

I doubt that very much, as if true, then we should expect to find
ourselves as particles, which is the Occam's catastrophe redux I point
out in my book.

Hi Russell,

    And how could we know that we are not particles dreaming that we are humans? Particles are, after all, just an artifact of a particular basis that some set of "observers with compatible bases can sharing their realities". Is a reality something that is 1p in your thinking? It isn't in my thinking but I'll put that aside for now.
    That is a very interesting point and I have long wondered about the distribution arguments (ala Bostrum) and Occam's catastrophe. It seems to me that there is something that is being assumed about consciousness in those reasonings, something that is being taken for granted. (For one thing, the Solomonoff-Levin distribution assumes a universal ensemble that is very much like Leibniz' pre-established harmony and thus problematic as it is not computable. Bruno's rejection of infinities seems to disallow for such priors to work for comp, IMHO.)
    I think that we can think of this cryptic idea that there is somehow a difference of the 'we' or, more correctly, the 'I' that is, as I claim, instantiated in a electron or an ant or a human or a giant Black Cloud and that this difference can somehow be remembered and passed along in continuations. It is the one complaint that I have with reincarnation theories, the idea that some memories that can only be defined with reference to physical bodies can be continued. I think that the 'I' is not much different from the center of mass of physics. The C.o.M. does not really exist at all as a substance or physical object and yet it has causal efficacy in some way...
    Could be that consciousness is being assumed to be some kind of substance that has persistent existence, like material substances in Parmenidean and Aristotelian science? What if this assumption is 'not even wrong'? What happens to the center of mass of an aggregate when the members of that aggregate are altered? What if consciousness is not a 'thing', but is a 'process' - something more like a 'stream'. Computer science has no problem with streams that I know of... I am trying to get Bruno to consider streams, as he does seem to be OK with Quine atoms (which are the canonical case of a stream!)
    Are you assuming that consciousness is somehow independent of bodies, ala Bruno's immaterialism of numbers? Isn't this just an obscure form of Cartesian dualism that just argues away the existence of the 'res extensa' as being, as per Bruno's argument, something that Occam's razor cuts out of ontology and thus are left with a 'arithmetic body problem' where the 'res extensa' used to be?

I suspect that as human beings, we rank amongst the simplest of all
possible observers.

    Is this because of your argument that self-awareness is necessary for consciousness? Maybe you are right but thinking of it backwards; could you consider that there is a difference between being able to 'know' that one is conscious and simply being conscious? I think that Craig is making the case that 'sense' or raw 'something that is like being in the world' is not separable from the 'being in the world'. What we have is the case where the 'simulation of the entity' is the entity itself; yet this wording does violence to the concept that I have been trying to explain.

    The best explanation that I have to point to is Kaufman and Zuckerman & Miranker's Russell operator idea and the Quine atom as a formal mathematical concept and its identification of the object with itself. It cannot be understood so long as one is embedded in the vision of the universe as being well founded and 'regular' - that there are a single set of 'irreducible' parts that make it up. It amazes me that the ideas of those Greek guys from 2000 years ago still carry so much influence over our thinking!

-- 
Onward!

Stephen

[Stephen P. King]

On 11/18/2012 11:03 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:

To Russell,

> Maybe you are right but thinking of it backwards

That I meant by this is that it is our ability to know that we are
conscious that allows us to think about that consciousness is and ask
questions like" could other entities be conscious?".

--
Onward!

Stephen

[Bruno Marchal]

On 19 Nov 2012, at 02:12, Russell Standish wrote:

> On Sun, Nov 18, 2012 at 07:48:57PM -0500, Stephen P. King wrote:
>> Hi Russell,
>>
>> I agree with this view, especially the part about the
>> compatibility of bases leading to a 'sharing of realities' that then
>> gives rise to an illusion of a single classical reality; I just
>> phrase the concepts differently. My question to you is how 'simple'
>> can an observer be, as a system? It seems to me that even particles
>> could be considered as observers. I buy Chalmers' argument for
>> panpsychism.
>>
>

> I doubt that very much, ...

Me too, as "pan" assumed some physical reality and thus contradict
comp, which is assumed also.



> ... as if true, then we should expect to find
> ourselves as particles,

That was my critics on the ASSA idea (Absolute self-sampling
assumption). But both in comp and in QM all probabilities are relative
to a "prepared state". They have the shape <aIb>, meaning: being in
the Ia> state, what is the probability to be in the Ib> state (or
finding some b eigenvalue).

> which is the Occam's catastrophe redux I point
> out in my book.
>
> I suspect that as human beings, we rank amongst the simplest of all
> possible observers.

Do you think that apes are not conscious?

Do you exclude that other beings, perhaps very similar to humans,
exist in the Mutliverse? or in arithmetic?

Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Bruno Marchal]

On 19 Nov 2012, at 05:03, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 11/18/2012 8:12 PM, Russell Standish wrote:

On Sun, Nov 18, 2012 at 07:48:57PM -0500, Stephen P. King wrote:

Hi Russell,

    I agree with this view, especially the part about the
compatibility of bases leading to a 'sharing of realities' that then
gives rise to an illusion of a single classical reality; I just
phrase the concepts differently. My question to you is how 'simple'
can an observer be, as a system? It seems to me that even particles
could be considered as observers. I buy Chalmers' argument for
panpsychism.

I doubt that very much, as if true, then we should expect to find
ourselves as particles, which is the Occam's catastrophe redux I point
out in my book.

Hi Russell,

    And how could we know that we are not particles dreaming that we are humans? Particles are, after all, just an artifact of a particular basis that some set of "observers with compatible bases can sharing their realities". Is a reality something that is 1p in your thinking? It isn't in my thinking but I'll put that aside for now.
    That is a very interesting point and I have long wondered about the distribution arguments (ala Bostrum) and Occam's catastrophe. It seems to me that there is something that is being assumed about consciousness in those reasonings, something that is being taken for granted. (For one thing, the Solomonoff-Levin distribution assumes a universal ensemble that is very much like Leibniz' pre-established harmony and thus problematic as it is not computable. Bruno's rejection of infinities seems to disallow for such priors to work for comp, IMHO.)

Partially OK. It is more complex as the probabilities, although "objective", concerned the 1p, which might contains actual infinities (at least in some sense).

    I think that we can think of this cryptic idea that there is somehow a difference of the 'we' or, more correctly, the 'I' that is, as I claim, instantiated in a electron or an ant or a human or a giant Black Cloud and that this difference can somehow be remembered and passed along in continuations. It is the one complaint that I have with reincarnation theories, the idea that some memories that can only be defined with reference to physical bodies can be continued. I think that the 'I' is not much different from the center of mass of physics. The C.o.M. does not really exist at all as a substance or physical object and yet it has causal efficacy in some way...
    Could be that consciousness is being assumed to be some kind of substance that has persistent existence, like material substances in Parmenidean and Aristotelian science? What if this assumption is 'not even wrong'? What happens to the center of mass of an aggregate when the members of that aggregate are altered? What if consciousness is not a 'thing', but is a 'process' - something more like a 'stream'. Computer science has no problem with streams that I know of... I am trying to get Bruno to consider streams, as he does seem to be OK with Quine atoms (which are the canonical case of a stream!)

Could explain the realtion between Quine atoms and streams?

Note that the UD dovetails on all programs, with all inputs including all streams.

    Are you assuming that consciousness is somehow independent of bodies, ala Bruno's immaterialism of numbers? Isn't this just an obscure form of Cartesian dualism that just argues away the existence of the 'res extensa' as being, as per Bruno's argument, something that Occam's razor cuts out of ontology and thus are left with a 'arithmetic body problem' where the 'res extensa' used to be?

But you need to postulate a small physical universe, and to speculate on a flaw in step 8, to get this. I thought for a long time on this list that the step 8 was not needed here, as the postulation of a small primitive physical universe cut the benefits of everything-like philosophy, which was the starting of this very list. 

Also, to be "left with the body problem" is what is intersting in comp, as it gives the realm, and the ways, matter can appear and be explained. All the other theories assumed matter at the start.

Bruno

I suspect that as human beings, we rank amongst the simplest of all
possible observers.

    Is this because of your argument that self-awareness is necessary for consciousness? Maybe you are right but thinking of it backwards; could you consider that there is a difference between being able to 'know' that one is conscious and simply being conscious? I think that Craig is making the case that 'sense' or raw 'something that is like being in the world' is not separable from the 'being in the world'. What we have is the case where the 'simulation of the entity' is the entity itself; yet this wording does violence to the concept that I have been trying to explain.

    The best explanation that I have to point to is Kaufman and Zuckerman & Miranker's Russell operator idea and the Quine atom as a formal mathematical concept and its identification of the object with itself. It cannot be understood so long as one is embedded in the vision of the universe as being well founded and 'regular' - that there are a single set of 'irreducible' parts that make it up. It amazes me that the ideas of those Greek guys from 2000 years ago still carry so much influence over our thinking!

-- 
Onward!

Stephen

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Stephen P. King]

On 11/19/2012 9:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 19 Nov 2012, at 02:12, Russell Standish wrote:
>
>> On Sun, Nov 18, 2012 at 07:48:57PM -0500, Stephen P. King wrote:
>>> Hi Russell,
>>>
>>> I agree with this view, especially the part about the
>>> compatibility of bases leading to a 'sharing of realities' that then
>>> gives rise to an illusion of a single classical reality; I just
>>> phrase the concepts differently. My question to you is how 'simple'
>>> can an observer be, as a system? It seems to me that even particles
>>> could be considered as observers. I buy Chalmers' argument for
>>> panpsychism.
>>>
>>
>> I doubt that very much, ...
>
> Me too, as "pan" assumed some physical reality and thus contradict
> comp, which is assumed also.

Dear Bruno,

Why are you not considering the 'pan' to cover a plurality of 1p
that are observing or otherwise interacting and communicating with each
other as a 'physical reality"? I hope that we can agree that there is at
least an illusion of a physical world that 'we' - you, me, Russell, ....
can consider... Is it necessarily inconsistent with comp?

--
Onward!

Stephen

[Bruno Marchal]

On 19 Nov 2012, at 15:43, Stephen P. King wrote:

> On 11/19/2012 9:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> On 19 Nov 2012, at 02:12, Russell Standish wrote:
>>
>>> On Sun, Nov 18, 2012 at 07:48:57PM -0500, Stephen P. King wrote:
>>>> Hi Russell,
>>>>
>>>> I agree with this view, especially the part about the
>>>> compatibility of bases leading to a 'sharing of realities' that
>>>> then
>>>> gives rise to an illusion of a single classical reality; I just
>>>> phrase the concepts differently. My question to you is how 'simple'
>>>> can an observer be, as a system? It seems to me that even particles
>>>> could be considered as observers. I buy Chalmers' argument for
>>>> panpsychism.
>>>>
>>>
>>> I doubt that very much, ...
>>
>> Me too, as "pan" assumed some physical reality and thus contradict
>> comp, which is assumed also.
> Dear Bruno,
>
> Why are you not considering the 'pan' to cover a plurality of 1p
> that are observing or otherwise interacting and communicating with
> each other as a 'physical reality"?

There are two physical reality notions: the one which we infer from
observation and logic, like F = ma, F = km1m2/r^2, etc.
And the one explained by comp. We have to compare them to test comp.

> I hope that we can agree that there is at least an illusion of a
> physical world that 'we' - you, me, Russell, .... can consider... Is
> it necessarily inconsistent with comp?

? ? ?

Not at all. The whole point of UDA is in explaining why the physical
reality is unavoidable for the dreaming numbers, and how it emerges
from + and * (in the "number base"). It is indeed a first person
plural product, with the persons being all Löbian machines, etc.

Comp gives the complete algorithm to extract bodies and physical laws,
making comp testable, even if that is technically difficult, but up to
now, it fits remarkably, and that would not have been the case without
QM. That would not have the case if "p->[]<>p" was not a theorem of
the Z1* logics (matter).

Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Craig Weinberg]

On Sunday, November 18, 2012 4:23:14 PM UTC-5, Russell Standish wrote:

On Sun, Nov 18, 2012 at 08:12:51AM -0800, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> Can you explain, in the simplest layman terms, why this argument can be
> thrown out? The details are over my head, but it seems to me that the
> argument is simply that in order to make universes separate, you would need
> a whole other information architecture (which would also have to be
> information-theoretically multiplied) to create and preserve that
> separation. For each universe, you would need multiple universes of
> overhead outside of all universes. Or if that is not his argument in the
> paper, then consider it mine. Why does MWI not in itself require a second
> order MW to propagate and maintain the multiplicity? If it needs no
> resources, then why not use the same argument for the single universe?
>
> Craig

There is no external multiplicity - only a single multiverse

What I am asking is why would the single multiverse be any less dependent upon multiplicity to accomplish its infinities of preserved separations than a single universe does? If a universe needs a multiverse to justify superposition, then why doesn't a multiverse also need a meta-multiverse to keep track of all the possible ways of regulating the creation and preservation of universes? How is infinite regress avoided?

Craig
 

[Russell Standish]

On Mon, Nov 19, 2012 at 09:29:58AM -0800, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
> What I am asking is why would the single multiverse be any less dependent
> upon multiplicity to accomplish its infinities of preserved separations
> than a single universe does? If a universe needs a multiverse to justify
> superposition, then why doesn't a multiverse also need a meta-multiverse to
> keep track of all the possible ways of regulating the creation and
> preservation of universes? How is infinite regress avoided?
>

There is no regress in the picture. Please reread my text (or my book)
I have no clue as to why you are postulating one???? Can anyone else
explain Craig's concerns?

[Russell Standish]

On Mon, Nov 19, 2012 at 03:16:53PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 19 Nov 2012, at 02:12, Russell Standish wrote:
>
>
> >which is the Occam's catastrophe redux I point
> >out in my book.
> >
> >I suspect that as human beings, we rank amongst the simplest of all
> >possible observers.
>
> Do you think that apes are not conscious?

Not at all. (nonhuman-)Apes are not that much less complex mentally
than ourselves, at least according to our current crude notions of
complexity. I'm skeptical about your jumping spiders though ...

>
> Do you exclude that other beings, perhaps very similar to humans,
> exist in the Mutliverse? or in arithmetic?
>

Not at all. Of course in nearby universes, actual humans exist. But I
would also expect many beings of similar mental capacity and structure
to be spread throughout the universe. But very few super intelligent
beings (and they are probably hive minds anyway). And none that are
orders of magnitude less complex.

> Bruno
>
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

>
>
>
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[Craig Weinberg]

On Monday, November 19, 2012 4:37:44 PM UTC-5, Russell Standish wrote:

On Mon, Nov 19, 2012 at 09:29:58AM -0800, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
> What I am asking is why would the single multiverse be any less dependent
> upon multiplicity to accomplish its infinities of preserved separations
> than a single universe does? If a universe needs a multiverse to justify
> superposition, then why doesn't a multiverse also need a meta-multiverse to
> keep track of all the possible ways of regulating the creation and
> preservation of universes? How is infinite regress avoided?
>

There is no regress in the picture. Please reread my text (or my book)
I have no clue as to why you are postulating one???? Can anyone else
explain Craig's concerns?

I'm postulating infinite regress because the idea that universes are being created and preserved implies an meta-universal support which also must be made of some kind of information-theoretic functionality which would have its own meta-quantum reasoning for existing. How does having many worlds better explain the existence of any world or world-making condition? Mainly it buries the problem under a mountain of infinities.

Craig

[Russell Standish]

On Mon, Nov 19, 2012 at 02:12:33PM -0800, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
> On Monday, November 19, 2012 4:37:44 PM UTC-5, Russell Standish wrote:
> >
> > On Mon, Nov 19, 2012 at 09:29:58AM -0800, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> > >
> > >
> > > What I am asking is why would the single multiverse be any less
> > dependent
> > > upon multiplicity to accomplish its infinities of preserved separations
> > > than a single universe does? If a universe needs a multiverse to justify
> > > superposition, then why doesn't a multiverse also need a meta-multiverse
> > to
> > > keep track of all the possible ways of regulating the creation and
> > > preservation of universes? How is infinite regress avoided?
> > >
> >
> > There is no regress in the picture. Please reread my text (or my book)
> > I have no clue as to why you are postulating one???? Can anyone else
> > explain Craig's concerns?
> >
>
> I'm postulating infinite regress because the idea that universes are being
> created and preserved implies an meta-universal support which also must be
> made of some kind of information-theoretic functionality which would have
> its own meta-quantum reasoning for existing.

What does this even mean? Anyone else know?

> How does having many worlds
> better explain the existence of any world or world-making condition? Mainly
> it buries the problem under a mountain of infinities.
>
> Craig
>
>
> > --
> >
> > ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
> >
> > Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
> > Principal, High Performance Coders

> > Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpc...@hpcoders.com.au<javascript:>

> > University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au
> > ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
> >
> >
>

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[Craig Weinberg]

On Monday, November 19, 2012 5:41:22 PM UTC-5, Russell Standish wrote:

On Mon, Nov 19, 2012 at 02:12:33PM -0800, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
> On Monday, November 19, 2012 4:37:44 PM UTC-5, Russell Standish wrote:
> >
> > On Mon, Nov 19, 2012 at 09:29:58AM -0800, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> > >
> > >
> > > What I am asking is why would the single multiverse be any less
> > dependent
> > > upon multiplicity to accomplish its infinities of preserved separations
> > > than a single universe does? If a universe needs a multiverse to justify
> > > superposition, then why doesn't a multiverse also need a meta-multiverse
> > to
> > > keep track of all the possible ways of regulating the creation and
> > > preservation of universes? How is infinite regress avoided?
> > >
> >
> > There is no regress in the picture. Please reread my text (or my book)
> > I have no clue as to why you are postulating one???? Can anyone else
> > explain Craig's concerns?
> >
>
> I'm postulating infinite regress because the idea that universes are being
> created and preserved implies an meta-universal support which also must be
> made of some kind of information-theoretic functionality which would have
> its own meta-quantum reasoning for existing.

What does this even mean? Anyone else know?

What I am asking is why does the idea of a multiverse help explain why any one universe exists in the first place.

[meekerdb]

On 11/19/2012 4:52 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
> On Mon, Nov 19, 2012 at 02:12:33PM -0800, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>> I'm postulating infinite regress because the idea that universes are being
>> created and preserved implies an meta-universal support which also must be
>> made of some kind of information-theoretic functionality which would have
>> its own meta-quantum reasoning for existing.
> What does this even mean? Anyone else know?

It means Craig is a wordbot? :-)

Brent

[Russell Standish]

On Mon, Nov 19, 2012 at 02:45:43PM -0800, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> What I am asking is why does the idea of a multiverse help explain why any
> one universe exists in the first place.
>

This could be one of two different questions, both of which are
evrything-list 101:

1) Why a universe, given a multiverse. A universe is the internal (ie
1p) view of the multiverse.

2) Why a multiverse instead of a universe. The answer is the zero
information principle + Occams razor. Multiverses are actually much
simpler than universes.

I don't see that regressions, infinite or otherwise, have a role to
play in either question.

[Russell Standish]

:)

[Stephen P. King]

On 11/19/2012 9:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 19 Nov 2012, at 05:03, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 11/18/2012 8:12 PM, Russell Standish wrote:

On Sun, Nov 18, 2012 at 07:48:57PM -0500, Stephen P. King wrote:

Hi Russell,

    I agree with this view, especially the part about the
compatibility of bases leading to a 'sharing of realities' that then
gives rise to an illusion of a single classical reality; I just
phrase the concepts differently. My question to you is how 'simple'
can an observer be, as a system? It seems to me that even particles
could be considered as observers. I buy Chalmers' argument for
panpsychism.

I doubt that very much, as if true, then we should expect to find
ourselves as particles, which is the Occam's catastrophe redux I point
out in my book.

Hi Russell,

    And how could we know that we are not particles dreaming that we are humans? Particles are, after all, just an artifact of a particular basis that some set of "observers with compatible bases can sharing their realities". Is a reality something that is 1p in your thinking? It isn't in my thinking but I'll put that aside for now.
    That is a very interesting point and I have long wondered about the distribution arguments (ala Bostrum) and Occam's catastrophe. It seems to me that there is something that is being assumed about consciousness in those reasonings, something that is being taken for granted. (For one thing, the Solomonoff-Levin distribution assumes a universal ensemble that is very much like Leibniz' pre-established harmony and thus problematic as it is not computable. Bruno's rejection of infinities seems to disallow for such priors to work for comp, IMHO.)

Partially OK. It is more complex as the probabilities, although "objective", concerned the 1p, which might contains actual infinities (at least in some sense).

Dear Bruno,

    OK, I need to understand where actual infinities are permitted within comp's theoretical structure.

    I think that we can think of this cryptic idea that there is somehow a difference of the 'we' or, more correctly, the 'I' that is, as I claim, instantiated in a electron or an ant or a human or a giant Black Cloud and that this difference can somehow be remembered and passed along in continuations. It is the one complaint that I have with reincarnation theories, the idea that some memories that can only be defined with reference to physical bodies can be continued. I think that the 'I' is not much different from the center of mass of physics. The C.o.M. does not really exist at all as a substance or physical object and yet it has causal efficacy in some way...
    Could be that consciousness is being assumed to be some kind of substance that has persistent existence, like material substances in Parmenidean and Aristotelian science? What if this assumption is 'not even wrong'? What happens to the center of mass of an aggregate when the members of that aggregate are altered? What if consciousness is not a 'thing', but is a 'process' - something more like a 'stream'. Computer science has no problem with streams that I know of... I am trying to get Bruno to consider streams, as he does seem to be OK with Quine atoms (which are the canonical case of a stream!)

Could explain the realtion between Quine atoms and streams?

    I do not know how to explain this relation is words at this time. Please allow me to refer to some definitions and ask for some thought on your part.

From: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nonwellfounded-set-theory/#sectionstreams

"A stream of numbers is an ordered pair whose first coordinate is a number and whose second coordinate is again a stream of numbers. The first coordinate is called the head, and the second the tail. The tail of a given stream might be different from it, but again, it might be the very same stream. For example, consider the stream s whose head is 0 and whose tail is s again. Thus the tail of the tail of s is s itself. We have s = ⟨ 0, s⟩ , s = ⟨ 0, ⟨ 0, s⟩  ⟩ , etc. This stream s exhibits object circularity. It is natural to “unravel” its definition as:

(0,0,…,0,…)

It is natural to understand the unraveled form is as an infinite sequence; standardly, infinite sequences are taken to be functions whose domain is the set N of natural numbers. So we can take the unraveled form to be the constant function with value 0. Whether we want to take the stream s described above to be this function is an issue we want to explore in a general way in this entry. Notice that since we defined s to be an ordered pair, it follows from the way pairs are constructed in ordinary mathematics that s will not itself be the constant sequence 0."

    A Quine atom is a set that only has itself as a member or "Quine Atom is a set Q that satisfies Q={Q}".

    see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quine_atom and http://math.eretrandre.org/mybb/showthread.php?tid=28

    It might be helpful to think of a Quine atom as a labeled transition system to understand my point about the relation between Quine atoms and streams.

Note that the UD dovetails on all programs, with all inputs including all streams.

    Yes. This is why I think that your UD idea is very important!

    Are you assuming that consciousness is somehow independent of bodies, ala Bruno's immaterialism of numbers? Isn't this just an obscure form of Cartesian dualism that just argues away the existence of the 'res extensa' as being, as per Bruno's argument, something that Occam's razor cuts out of ontology and thus are left with a 'arithmetic body problem' where the 'res extensa' used to be?

But you need to postulate a small physical universe, and to speculate on a flaw in step 8, to get this.

    Why? I am only taking comp seriously and considering that a finite but very large plurality of Löbian entities can form a defacto 'physical world' by their mutual agreements or truths. This 'physical world' is not to be considered as ontological primitive!

I thought for a long time on this list that the step 8 was not needed here, as the postulation of a small primitive physical universe cut the benefits of everything-like philosophy, which was the starting of this very list.

    Yes, so why is my idea so difficult for you to grok?

Also, to be "left with the body problem" is what is intersting in comp, as it gives the realm, and the ways, matter can appear and be explained. All the other theories assumed matter at the start.

    I know and this is what I wish to overcome, but I which for a model of interactions between Löbian entities.

[Craig Weinberg]

On Monday, November 19, 2012 6:27:56 PM UTC-5, Russell Standish wrote:

On Mon, Nov 19, 2012 at 02:45:43PM -0800, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> What I am asking is why does the idea of a multiverse help explain why any
> one universe exists in the first place.
>

This could be one of two different questions, both of which are
evrything-list 101:

1) Why a universe, given a multiverse. A universe is the internal (ie
1p) view of the multiverse.

Why does a multiverse need an internal view? Especially since our experience is that all participants in the universe already provide 1p internal views of the same universe.

2) Why a multiverse instead of a universe. The answer is the zero
information principle + Occams razor. Multiverses are actually much
simpler than universes.

Keeping with the simplicity theme, I'll just paste something I wrote this morning for a conversation on Facebook, and then for a post on my blog (this way I don't need to recreate the universe just to say the same thing I've already said... makes 'sense', right?):

To me, the problem with MWI is not that it’s exotic, or that it is too bold, or that it seems silly, or that it’s that it is unparsimonious, it is that it is radically hypocritical. It’s one thing to throw out Occam’s Razor in the service of explaining reality as it seems to us to actually be, but it’s another to throw it out for the purpose of preserving Occam’s Razor for mathematical purposes. MWI is like proposing that “The shortest distance between two lines is the creation of a fantastic number of universes.” This is only compelling if you are trying to squeeze something which is not arithmetic into an arithmetic framework.

What I see clearly is that the whole of arithmetic - algebra, topology, information, etc, is nothing compared to the richness of sensory coherence. Mathematics is a powerful tool because it is like a sterile skeleton of sense-making which can imitate anything that can be imitated (Church-Turing basically formalizes this). But my conjecture formalizes the understanding that awareness is defined specifically as *that which cannot be imitated or substituted*. Math is useful if you are trying to make sense of a lot of things, but sense isn’t useful to math in any conceivable way. Math is a way of making sense, but it has no possibility of participation, so it must be a character within the story of the universe rather than the universe being an idea within math. This is where MWI goes wrong. It puts an infinity of carts before each other so that we won’t notice there’s no horse.

I am saying, if we are going to make the creation of the universe infinitely easy, then why have a creation requirement at all? If every change to every molecule on every hair on a dust mite’s head needs its own Andromeda galaxy to help make that change…and really every *possible* change on every hair on every dust mite in the Andromeda galaxy also needs universes in which each of the first dust mite’s possible changes exist, then why have these changes at all? Why hop between a matrix of static possibilities if those possibilities are already realized?

[Bruno Marchal]

On 20 Nov 2012, at 03:52, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 11/19/2012 9:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 19 Nov 2012, at 05:03, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 11/18/2012 8:12 PM, Russell Standish wrote:

On Sun, Nov 18, 2012 at 07:48:57PM -0500, Stephen P. King wrote:

Hi Russell,

    I agree with this view, especially the part about the
compatibility of bases leading to a 'sharing of realities' that then
gives rise to an illusion of a single classical reality; I just
phrase the concepts differently. My question to you is how 'simple'
can an observer be, as a system? It seems to me that even particles
could be considered as observers. I buy Chalmers' argument for
panpsychism.

I doubt that very much, as if true, then we should expect to find
ourselves as particles, which is the Occam's catastrophe redux I point
out in my book.

Hi Russell,

    And how could we know that we are not particles dreaming that we are humans? Particles are, after all, just an artifact of a particular basis that some set of "observers with compatible bases can sharing their realities". Is a reality something that is 1p in your thinking? It isn't in my thinking but I'll put that aside for now.
    That is a very interesting point and I have long wondered about the distribution arguments (ala Bostrum) and Occam's catastrophe. It seems to me that there is something that is being assumed about consciousness in those reasonings, something that is being taken for granted. (For one thing, the Solomonoff-Levin distribution assumes a universal ensemble that is very much like Leibniz' pre-established harmony and thus problematic as it is not computable. Bruno's rejection of infinities seems to disallow for such priors to work for comp, IMHO.)

Partially OK. It is more complex as the probabilities, although "objective", concerned the 1p, which might contains actual infinities (at least in some sense).

Dear Bruno,

    OK, I need to understand where actual infinities are permitted within comp's theoretical structure.

You can see them as useful epistemological fictions to ease the reasoning of the Löbian machines (like PA) when emulated by the non Löbian reality (RA or the UD).

    I think that we can think of this cryptic idea that there is somehow a difference of the 'we' or, more correctly, the 'I' that is, as I claim, instantiated in a electron or an ant or a human or a giant Black Cloud and that this difference can somehow be remembered and passed along in continuations. It is the one complaint that I have with reincarnation theories, the idea that some memories that can only be defined with reference to physical bodies can be continued. I think that the 'I' is not much different from the center of mass of physics. The C.o.M. does not really exist at all as a substance or physical object and yet it has causal efficacy in some way...
    Could be that consciousness is being assumed to be some kind of substance that has persistent existence, like material substances in Parmenidean and Aristotelian science? What if this assumption is 'not even wrong'? What happens to the center of mass of an aggregate when the members of that aggregate are altered? What if consciousness is not a 'thing', but is a 'process' - something more like a 'stream'. Computer science has no problem with streams that I know of... I am trying to get Bruno to consider streams, as he does seem to be OK with Quine atoms (which are the canonical case of a stream!)

Could explain the realtion between Quine atoms and streams?

    I do not know how to explain this relation is words at this time. Please allow me to refer to some definitions and ask for some thought on your part.

From: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nonwellfounded-set-theory/#sectionstreams

"A stream of numbers is an ordered pair whose first coordinate is a number and whose second coordinate is again a stream of numbers. The first coordinate is called the head, and the second the tail. The tail of a given stream might be different from it, but again, it might be the very same stream. For example, consider the stream s whose head is 0 and whose tail is s again. Thus the tail of the tail of s is s itself. We have s = ⟨ 0, s⟩ , s = ⟨ 0, ⟨ 0, s⟩  ⟩ , etc. This stream s exhibits object circularity. It is natural to “unravel” its definition as:

(0,0,…,0,…)

It is natural to understand the unraveled form is as an infinite sequence; standardly, infinite sequences are taken to be functions whose domain is the set N of natural numbers. So we can take the unraveled form to be the constant function with value 0. Whether we want to take the stream s described above to be this function is an issue we want to explore in a general way in this entry. Notice that since we defined s to be an ordered pair, it follows from the way pairs are constructed in ordinary mathematics that s will not itself be the constant sequence 0."

    A Quine atom is a set that only has itself as a member or "Quine Atom is a set Q that satisfies Q={Q}".

    see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quine_atom and http://math.eretrandre.org/mybb/showthread.php?tid=28

    It might be helpful to think of a Quine atom as a labeled transition system to understand my point about the relation between Quine atoms and streams.

OK. All this is really a matter of implementation or representation. The second recursion theorem handles this well enough for computer science, but it is OK to choose any other system, if you prefer. But then you have to redo a big part of the work already done.

Note that the UD dovetails on all programs, with all inputs including all streams.

    Yes. This is why I think that your UD idea is very important!

And the UD, and all the finite section of its work exist in arithmetic. The gluing of those dreams is not, and belongs to the first person experience of the machines, which is independent of the UD-time-steps, so that it looks, and is mathematically described by the union of those finite pieces, and that lead to complex analytical structure of their stable realities.

    Are you assuming that consciousness is somehow independent of bodies, ala Bruno's immaterialism of numbers? Isn't this just an obscure form of Cartesian dualism that just argues away the existence of the 'res extensa' as being, as per Bruno's argument, something that Occam's razor cuts out of ontology and thus are left with a 'arithmetic body problem' where the 'res extensa' used to be?

But you need to postulate a small physical universe, and to speculate on a flaw in step 8, to get this.

    Why? I am only taking comp seriously and considering that a finite but very large plurality of Löbian entities can form a defacto 'physical world' by their mutual agreements or truths.

How will you select that finite set from the set of all Löbian machines, or Löbian machines experiences?

This 'physical world' is not to be considered as ontological primitive!

I still have no clue of what is your theory, by which I mean your primitive element. 

And I am at loss when you argue that the primitive elements have no properties, as I can't see how anything might emerge from that.

I thought for a long time on this list that the step 8 was not needed here, as the postulation of a small primitive physical universe cut the benefits of everything-like philosophy, which was the starting of this very list.

    Yes, so why is my idea so difficult for you to grok?

Well, because, now, you seem to invoke a finite set, when the everything idea suggests an infinite one.

I grok just when you say that something is not correct in my work or post, and fail to say something understandable about that. For most of your posts I thought that you are coherent with comp, but then you still invoke the physical reality to oppose comp immaterialism, and this despite you do agree that the physical reality is not primitive. This does not make a lot of sense.

Also, to be "left with the body problem" is what is intersting in comp, as it gives the realm, and the ways, matter can appear and be explained. All the other theories assumed matter at the start.

    I know and this is what I wish to overcome, but I which for a model of interactions between Löbian entities.

I wish for many things, I wish for deriving the whole of physics from arithmetic. My work shows only that the unique way to solve the mind-body problem, once assuming comp, and keeping qualia and quanta distinct, consists in defining knowledge and observation from the self-reference logics, and that the whole physics has to emerge from that, as I did completely illustrate already at the physical propositional level.

I know that such a work might seems frustrating for a philosopher, as it shows how with comp, the questions are translated into arithmetic, and that the solutions might take time to be found, despite somehow the main definitions and theorems already exist (cf Gödel, Löb, Solovay, Visser, G and G*).

I thought mathematicians and philosophers would be very pleased by such a bridge, but I have learned to be more realist about this, since. Many people in universities fight for defending the curriculum statu quo, instead of ideas and theories. 

This makes me think that the continental philosophy curriculum, and perhaps a part of the anglo-saxon one, might someday fall like Berlin wall, but it will take some time, to say the least. 

The fuzziness of the human science is too much an advantage for the politics and the manipulations. This strikes the eyes when you study the detail of the cannabis scandal, but is obviously clear in most religious or atheist institutions. 

Bruno

Bruno

I suspect that as human beings, we rank amongst the simplest of all
possible observers.

    Is this because of your argument that self-awareness is necessary for consciousness? Maybe you are right but thinking of it backwards; could you consider that there is a difference between being able to 'know' that one is conscious and simply being conscious? I think that Craig is making the case that 'sense' or raw 'something that is like being in the world' is not separable from the 'being in the world'. What we have is the case where the 'simulation of the entity' is the entity itself; yet this wording does violence to the concept that I have been trying to explain.

    The best explanation that I have to point to is Kaufman and Zuckerman & Miranker's Russell operator idea and the Quine atom as a formal mathematical concept and its identification of the object with itself. It cannot be understood so long as one is embedded in the vision of the universe as being well founded and 'regular' - that there are a single set of 'irreducible' parts that make it up. It amazes me that the ideas of those Greek guys from 2000 years ago still carry so much influence over our thinking!

-- 
Onward!

Stephen

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Russell Standish]

On Tue, Nov 20, 2012 at 07:39:02AM -0800, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
> On Monday, November 19, 2012 6:27:56 PM UTC-5, Russell Standish wrote:
> >
> >
> > 1) Why a universe, given a multiverse. A universe is the internal (ie
> > 1p) view of the multiverse.
> >
>
> Why does a multiverse need an internal view? Especially since our
> experience is that all participants in the universe already provide 1p
> internal views of the same universe.
>

The only way a multiverse could not have an internal view is if
observers are flatly impossible. That not only contradicts the facts,
it would make for a totally uninteresting entity, for which it is not
even wrong to say could exist.

>
> > 2) Why a multiverse instead of a universe. The answer is the zero
> > information principle + Occams razor. Multiverses are actually much
> > simpler than universes.
> >
>
> Keeping with the simplicity theme, I'll just paste something I wrote this
> morning for a conversation on Facebook, and then for a post on my blog
> (this way I don't need to recreate the universe just to say the same thing
> I've already said... makes 'sense', right?):
>
> To me, the problem with MWI is not that it’s exotic, or that it is too
> bold, or that it seems silly, or that it’s that it is unparsimonious, it is
> that it is radically hypocritical. It’s one thing to throw out Occam’s
> Razor in the service of explaining reality as it seems to us to actually
> be, but it’s another to throw it out for the purpose of preserving Occam’s
> Razor for mathematical purposes. MWI is like proposing that “The shortest
> distance between two lines is the creation of a fantastic number of
> universes.” This is only compelling if you are trying to squeeze something
> which is not arithmetic into an arithmetic framework.
>

You are already going off on a rant that makes it difficult to
interpret your objection. But to say that the multiverse fragrantly
violates Occam's razor as you seem to be is a well-rebutted furphy. To
see why does require a modicum of mathematical knowledge, but its not
rocket science. It is easily managed with the sort of mathematics
taught at high school.

> What I see clearly is that the whole of arithmetic - algebra, topology,
> information, etc, is nothing compared to the richness of sensory coherence.
> Mathematics is a powerful tool because it is like a sterile skeleton of
> sense-making which can imitate anything that can be imitated (Church-Turing
> basically formalizes this). But my conjecture formalizes the understanding
> that awareness is defined specifically as *that which cannot be imitated or
> substituted*. Math is useful if you are trying to make sense of a lot of
> things, but sense isn’t useful to math in any conceivable way. Math is a
> way of making sense, but it has no possibility of participation, so it must
> be a character within the story of the universe rather than the universe

> being an idea within math. *This is where MWI goes wrong. It puts an

> infinity of carts before each other so that we won’t notice there’s no

> horse.*

I don't understand your objection. The observer has a critical role to
play in Multiverse theories (including the MWI), just not a physical
role (which is the problem with the Heisenberg/von Neumann version of
Copenhagen). The observer can be formalised to a certain extent,
providing useful insights (eg Bruno's AUDA), but nobody has completely
replaced the observer with mathematics, and quite possibly never will
(if you're to believe Chalmers and his "hard problem").

Cheers

[Craig Weinberg]

On Tuesday, November 20, 2012 5:58:15 PM UTC-5, Russell Standish wrote:

On Tue, Nov 20, 2012 at 07:39:02AM -0800, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
> On Monday, November 19, 2012 6:27:56 PM UTC-5, Russell Standish wrote:
> >
> >
> > 1) Why a universe, given a multiverse. A universe is the internal (ie
> > 1p) view of the multiverse.
> >
>
> Why does a multiverse need an internal view? Especially since our
> experience is that all participants in the universe already provide 1p
> internal views of the same universe.
>

The only way a multiverse could not have an internal view is if
observers are flatly impossible. That not only contradicts the facts,
it would make for a totally uninteresting entity, for which it is not
even wrong to say could exist.

What you're saying seems circular to me. 'A multiverse needs universes because we know that beings observe the universe.'

From my view, with a universe composed only of beings who not only observe but participate in the universe, the idea of a multiverse is superfluous.

>
> > 2) Why a multiverse instead of a universe. The answer is the zero
> > information principle + Occams razor. Multiverses are actually much
> > simpler than universes.
> >
>
> Keeping with the simplicity theme, I'll just paste something I wrote this
> morning for a conversation on Facebook, and then for a post on my blog
> (this way I don't need to recreate the universe just to say the same thing
> I've already said... makes 'sense', right?):
>
> To me, the problem with MWI is not that it’s exotic, or that it is too
> bold, or that it seems silly, or that it’s that it is unparsimonious, it is
> that it is radically hypocritical. It’s one thing to throw out Occam’s
> Razor in the service of explaining reality as it seems to us to actually
> be, but it’s another to throw it out for the purpose of preserving Occam’s
> Razor for mathematical purposes. MWI is like proposing that “The shortest
> distance between two lines is the creation of a fantastic number of
> universes.” This is only compelling if you are trying to squeeze something
> which is not arithmetic into an arithmetic framework.
>

You are already going off on a rant that makes it difficult to
interpret your objection. But to say that the multiverse fragrantly
violates Occam's razor as you seem to be is a well-rebutted furphy.

Your saying that something has been rebutted isn't really information that I can do anything with. I'm sure from your perspective that seems to be the case, but even though we live in the same universe, I am not persuaded by your assurance because I already know that you see the theory in a positive light.
 

To
see why does require a modicum of mathematical knowledge, but its not
rocket science. It is easily managed with the sort of mathematics
taught at high school.

Why does it require any knowledge? A theory that suggests that quintillions of universes must be generated by every mouse turd could not violate Occam's razor any more if it tried. The fact that the Emperor's Clothes require special glasses to see doesn't inspire any confidence in me. Again - my perspective is different from yours, yet we are talking about the same universe.
 

> What I see clearly is that the whole of arithmetic - algebra, topology,
> information, etc, is nothing compared to the richness of sensory coherence.
> Mathematics is a powerful tool because it is like a sterile skeleton of
> sense-making which can imitate anything that can be imitated (Church-Turing
> basically formalizes this). But my conjecture formalizes the understanding
> that awareness is defined specifically as *that which cannot be imitated or
> substituted*. Math is useful if you are trying to make sense of a lot of
> things, but sense isn’t useful to math in any conceivable way. Math is a
> way of making sense, but it has no possibility of participation, so it must
> be a character within the story of the universe rather than the universe
> being an idea within math. *This is where MWI goes wrong. It puts an
> infinity of carts before each other so that we won’t notice there’s no
> horse.*

I don't understand your objection.

My objection is that it is a hypocritical appeal to superfluous complication of concrete reality for the purpose of avoiding complication in abstract mathematical theory.
 

The observer has a critical role to
play in Multiverse theories (including the MWI), just not a physical
role (which is the problem with the Heisenberg/von Neumann version of
Copenhagen). The observer can be formalised to a certain extent,
providing useful insights (eg Bruno's AUDA), but nobody has completely
replaced the observer with mathematics, and quite possibly never will
(if you're to believe Chalmers and his "hard problem").

If you have a multiverse, what is the point of having beings who experience an illusion of choice? All choices would be inevitable.

Craig
 

[Russell Standish]

On Tue, Nov 20, 2012 at 03:23:55PM -0800, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
> On Tuesday, November 20, 2012 5:58:15 PM UTC-5, Russell Standish wrote:
> >
> > On Tue, Nov 20, 2012 at 07:39:02AM -0800, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> > >
> > > Why does a multiverse need an internal view? Especially since our
> > > experience is that all participants in the universe already provide 1p
> > > internal views of the same universe.
> > >
> >
> > The only way a multiverse could not have an internal view is if
> > observers are flatly impossible. That not only contradicts the facts,
> > it would make for a totally uninteresting entity, for which it is not
> > even wrong to say could exist.
> >
>
> What you're saying seems circular to me. 'A multiverse needs universes
> because we know that beings observe the universe.'
>

A multiverse that didn't have universes wouldn't be a multiverse. A
soccer team that didn't have soccer players wouldn't be a soccer
team. Sheesh!

> >
> > You are already going off on a rant that makes it difficult to
> > interpret your objection. But to say that the multiverse fragrantly
> > violates Occam's razor as you seem to be is a well-rebutted furphy.
>
>
> Your saying that something has been rebutted isn't really information that
> I can do anything with. I'm sure from your perspective that seems to be the
> case, but even though we live in the same universe, I am not persuaded by
> your assurance because I already know that you see the theory in a positive
> light.
>

You are showing your ignorance here. Read chapter 2 of my book,
understand it, _then_ come back with your objections. As I said, this
is everything list 101. If you just stick your fingers in your ears
and sing "la la la", you will not be persuaded of anything.

>
> > To
> > see why does require a modicum of mathematical knowledge, but its not
> > rocket science. It is easily managed with the sort of mathematics
> > taught at high school.
> >
>
> Why does it require any knowledge? A theory that suggests that quintillions
> of universes must be generated by every mouse turd could not violate
> Occam's razor any more if it tried.

Because, quite simply, it doesn't! This is a gross, gross
misunderstanding of Occam's razor. Just because it is commonly held,
does not make it any more right.

The fact that the Emperor's Clothes
> require special glasses to see doesn't inspire any confidence in me. Again
> - my perspective is different from yours, yet we are talking about the same
> universe.
>

This is not a question of perspective.

> >
> > I don't understand your objection.
>
>
> My objection is that it is a hypocritical appeal to superfluous
> complication of concrete reality for the purpose of avoiding complication
> in abstract mathematical theory.
>

This statement is based on (unfortunately widely held) misconception,
as mentioned above. As a consequence, it is a load of baloney.

>
> If you have a multiverse, what is the point of having beings who experience
> an illusion of choice? All choices would be inevitable.
>

An illusion seems to be good enough for some people. For me, the term is
misleading, as the "illusion" is just as real as the computer in front
of me, and the table it sits on. You pays your money and takes your choices.

[Roger Clough]

Hi Bruno Marchal

 

Isn't the Godel problem similar or related to saying that the

subject cannot be part of the predicate ? Then in any system

there will always be at least one subject, and that subject

cannot be part of the rest of the system ?

 

Which is the same as saying, along with Leibniz, that

in any system (of monads ) there must be at least one

supreme monad, whose subject or identity or soul

cannot be part of anything below it, because it is supreme.

 

 

 

 

[Roger Clough], [rcl...@verizon.net]

11/21/2012

"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen

 

----- Receiving the following content -----

From: Bruno Marchal

Receiver: everything-list

Time: 2012-11-20, 11:56:31

Subject: Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation

On 20 Nov 2012, at 03:52, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 11/19/2012 9:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 19 Nov 2012, at 05:03, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 11/18/2012 8:12 PM, Russell Standish wrote:

On Sun, Nov 18, 2012 at 07:48:57PM -0500, Stephen P. King wrote:

Hi Russell,

    I agree with this view, especially the part about the
compatibility of bases leading to a 'sharing of realities' that then
gives rise to an illusion of a single classical reality; I just
phrase the concepts differently. My question to you is how 'simple'
can an observer be, as a system? It seems to me that even particles
could be considered as observers. I buy Chalmers' argument for
panpsychism.

I doubt that very much, as if true, then we should expect to find
ourselves as particles, which is the Occam's catastrophe redux I point
out in my book.

Hi Russell,

    And how could we know that we are not particles dreaming that we are humans? Particles are, after all, just an artifact of a particular basis that some set of "observers with compatible bases can sharing their realities". Is a reality something that is 1p in your thinking? It isn't in my thinking but I'll put that aside for now.
    That is a very interesting point and I have long wondered about the distribution arguments (ala Bostrum) and Occam's catastrophe. It seems to me that there is something that is being assumed about consciousness in those reasonings, something that is being taken for granted. (For one thing, the Solomonoff-Levin distribution assumes a universal ensemble that is very much like Leibniz' pre-established harmony and thus problematic as it is not computable. Bruno's rejection of infinities seems to disallow for such priors to work for comp, IMHO.)

Partially OK. It is more complex as the probabilities, although "objective", concerned the 1p, which might contains actual infinities (at least in some sense).

Dear Bruno,

    OK, I need to understand where actual infinities are permitted within comp's theoretical structure.

You can see them as useful epistemological fictions to ease the reasoning of the L　bian machines (like PA) when emulated by the non L　bian reality (RA or the UD).

    I think that we can think of this cryptic idea that there is somehow a difference of the 'we' or, more correctly, the 'I' that is, as I claim, instantiated in a electron or an ant or a human or a giant Black Cloud and that this difference can somehow be remembered and passed along in continuations. It is the one complaint that I have with reincarnation theories, the idea that some memories that can only be defined with reference to physical bodies can be continued. I think that the 'I' is not much different from the center of mass of physics. The C.o.M. does not really exist at all as a substance or physical object and yet it has causal efficacy in some way...
    Could be that consciousness is being assumed to be some kind of substance that has persistent existence, like material substances in Parmenidean and Aristotelian science? What if this assumption is 'not even wrong'? What happens to the center of mass of an aggregate when the members of that aggregate are altered? What if consciousness is not a 'thing', but is a 'process' - something more like a 'stream'. Computer science has no problem with streams that I know of... I am trying to get Bruno to consider streams, as he does seem to be OK with Quine atoms (which are the canonical case of a stream!)

Could explain the realtion between Quine atoms and streams?

    I do not know how to explain this relation is words at this time. Please allow me to refer to some definitions and ask for some thought on your part.

From: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nonwellfounded-set-theory/#sectionstreams

"A stream of numbers is an ordered pair whose first coordinate is a number and whose second coordinate is again a stream of numbers. The first coordinate is called the head, and the second the tail. The tail of a given stream might be different from it, but again, it might be the very same stream. For example, consider the stream s whose head is 0 and whose tail is s again. Thus the tail of the tail of s is s itself. We have s = 　 0,　s　 , s = 　 0,　　 0,　s　 　　 , etc. This stream s exhibits object circularity. It is natural to “unravel” its definition as:

(0,0,…,0,…)

It is natural to understand the unraveled form is as an infinite sequence; standardly, infinite sequences are taken to be functions whose domain is the set N of natural numbers. So we can take the unraveled form to be the constant function with value 0. Whether we want to take the stream s described above to be this function is an issue we want to explore in a general way in this entry. Notice that since we defined s to be an ordered pair, it follows from the way pairs are constructed in ordinary mathematics that s will not itself be the constant sequence 0."

    A Quine atom is a set that only has itself as a member or "Quine Atom is a set Q that satisfies Q={Q}".

    see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quine_atom and http://math.eretrandre.org/mybb/showthread.php?tid=28

    It might be helpful to think of a Quine atom as a labeled transition system to understand my point about the relation between Quine atoms and streams.

OK. All this is really a matter of implementation or representation. The second recursion theorem handles this well enough for computer science, but it is OK to choose any other system, if you prefer. But then you have to redo a big part of the work already done.

Note that the UD dovetails on all programs, with all inputs including all streams.

    Yes. This is why I think that your UD idea is very important!

And the UD, and all the finite section of its work exist in arithmetic. The gluing of those dreams is not, and belongs to the first person experience of the machines, which is independent of the UD-time-steps, so that it looks, and is mathematically described by the union of those finite pieces, and that lead to complex analytical structure of their stable realities.

    Are you assuming that consciousness is somehow independent of bodies, ala Bruno's immaterialism of numbers? Isn't this just an obscure form of Cartesian dualism that just argues away the existence of the 'res extensa' as being, as per Bruno's argument, something that Occam's razor cuts out of ontology and thus are left with a 'arithmetic body problem' where the 'res extensa' used to be?

But you need to postulate a small physical universe, and to speculate on a flaw in step 8, to get this.

    Why? I am only taking comp seriously and considering that a finite but very large plurality of L　bian entities can form a defacto 'physical world' by their mutual agreements or truths.

How will you select that finite set from the set of all L　bian machines, or L　bian machines experiences?

This 'physical world' is not to be considered as ontological primitive!

I still have no clue of what is your theory, by which I mean your primitive element. 

And I am at loss when you argue that the primitive elements have no properties, as I can't see how anything might emerge from that.

I thought for a long time on this list that the step 8 was not needed here, as the postulation of a small primitive physical universe cut the benefits of everything-like philosophy, which was the starting of this very list.

    Yes, so why is my idea so difficult for you to grok?

Well, because, now, you seem to invoke a finite set, when the everything idea suggests an infinite one.

I grok just when you say that something is not correct in my work or post, and fail to say something understandable about that. For most of your posts I thought that you are coherent with comp, but then you still invoke the physical reality to oppose comp immaterialism, and this despite you do agree that the physical reality is not primitive. This does not make a lot of sense.

Also, to be "left with the body problem" is what is intersting in comp, as it gives the realm, and the ways, matter can appear and be explained. All the other theories assumed matter at the start.

    I know and this is what I wish to overcome, but I which for a model of interactions between L　bian entities.

I wish for many things, I wish for deriving the whole of physics from arithmetic. My work shows only that the unique way to solve the mind-body problem, once assuming comp, and keeping qualia and quanta distinct, consists in defining knowledge and observation from the self-reference logics, and that the whole physics has to emerge from that, as I did completely illustrate already at the physical propositional level.

I know that such a work might seems frustrating for a philosopher, as it shows how with comp, the questions are translated into arithmetic, and that the solutions might take time to be found, despite somehow the main definitions and theorems already exist (cf G　del, L　b, Solovay, Visser, G and G*).

I thought mathematicians and philosophers would be very pleased by such a bridge, but I have learned to be more realist about this, since. Many people in universities fight for defending the curriculum statu quo, instead of ideas and theories. 

This makes me think that the continental philosophy curriculum, and perhaps a part of the anglo-saxon one, might someday fall like Berlin wall, but it will take some time, to say the least. 

The fuzziness of the human science is too much an advantage for the politics and the manipulations. This strikes the eyes when you study the detail of the cannabis scandal, but is obviously clear in most religious or atheist institutions. 

Bruno

Bruno

I suspect that as human beings, we rank amongst the simplest of all
possible observers.

    Is this because of your argument that self-awareness is necessary for consciousness? Maybe you are right but thinking of it backwards; could you consider that there is a difference between being able to 'know' that one is conscious and simply being conscious? I think that Craig is making the case that 'sense' or raw 'something that is like being in the world' is not separable from the 'being in the world'. What we have is the case where the 'simulation of the entity' is the entity itself; yet this wording does violence to the concept that I have been trying to explain.

    The best explanation that I have to point to is Kaufman and Zuckerman & Miranker's Russell operator idea and the Quine atom as a formal mathematical concept and its identification of the object with itself. It cannot be understood so long as one is embedded in the vision of the universe as being well founded and 'regular' - that there are a single set of 'irreducible' parts that make it up. It amazes me that the ideas of those Greek guys from 2000 years ago still carry so much influence over our thinking!

-- 
Onward!

Stephen

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Bruno Marchal]

On 21 Nov 2012, at 14:10, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Bruno Marchal

 

Isn't the Godel problem similar or related to saying that the

subject cannot be part of the predicate ?

Yes. the subject (1p) can't. But the machine can still refer to itself.

Then in any system

there will always be at least one subject, and that subject

cannot be part of the rest of the system ?

Eve,ntually the "system" belongs only to the imagination of the subject.

 

Which is the same as saying, along with Leibniz, that

in any system (of monads ) there must be at least one

supreme monad, whose subject or identity or soul

cannot be part of anything below it, because it is supreme.

Possible. the universal knower in ourself might then be the "supreme monad". But it is not the outer God, it more the universal soul, the third greek god.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Stephen P. King]

On 11/19/2012 10:06 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 19 Nov 2012, at 15:43, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 11/19/2012 9:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 19 Nov 2012, at 02:12, Russell Standish wrote:

On Sun, Nov 18, 2012 at 07:48:57PM -0500, Stephen P. King wrote:

Hi Russell,

  I agree with this view, especially the part about the
compatibility of bases leading to a 'sharing of realities' that then
gives rise to an illusion of a single classical reality; I just
phrase the concepts differently. My question to you is how 'simple'
can an observer be, as a system? It seems to me that even particles
could be considered as observers. I buy Chalmers' argument for
panpsychism.

I doubt that very much, ...

Me too, as "pan" assumed some physical reality and thus contradict comp, which is assumed also.

Dear Bruno,

   Why are you not considering the 'pan' to cover a plurality of 1p that are observing or otherwise interacting and communicating with each other as a 'physical reality"?

There are two physical reality notions: the one which we infer from observation and logic, like F = ma, F = km1m2/r^2, etc.
And the one explained by comp. We have to compare them to test comp.

Dear Bruno,

    How exactly does the comparison occur? Comp seems to necessitate all possible physical worlds in an equiprobable way. There is a deep problem with notions of priors as it seems that we cannot escape from the problem of subjectivity as we see in the (so-called) anthropic principle: each observer will necessarily find itself in a world what has laws compatible with its existence. It seems to me that the observational act itself is a breaking of the perfect symmetry of equiprobability of possible worlds. But this claim implies violence to the idea of a 3p.
    I found at http://higgo.com/qti/Mallah.htm an exchange between Mallah and Standish that seems to illustrate this problem:

"Russell Standish: The predictions can easily depend of the 'picture' but must be consistent with each other. Let me give a simple example: In one picture, observer A decides to measure the spin of an electron in the x direction. In the other, observer B decides to measure the spin of the electron in the y direction. Observer A will see the spin of the electron aligned with x axis, and Observer B will see it aligned with the y axis. Both observations are correct in the first person picture of that observer. A "person" with the third person perspective, sees observers A and B as inhabiting separate `worlds' of a multiverse, each with appropriate measure that can be computed from Quantum Mechanics.

Jacques Mallah: On the contrary, this is a textbook example of the way I said it works. The theory predicts some measure distribution of observers; an individual observer sees an observation drawn from that distribution. There are no different sets of predictions for different pictures, just the measure distribution and the sample from it.

Russell Standish: It sounds to me like you don't think the prediction changes according to what the observer chooses to observe? An electron cannot have its spin aligned with the x axis and the y axis at the same time. Once the experimenter has chosen which direction to measure the spin, the history of that particular is observer is constrained by that fact, and the predictions of QM altered accordingly. This is true both in MWI and the Copenhagen interpretation, and is the "spooky" nature of QM. I used to think that QM gave predictions in terms of distributions, and that because one didn't see isolated particles, rather ensembles of such particles, I didn't see a problem. The properties of an ensemble are well defined. However, the ability of experimenters to isolate a single particle, such as a photon, or an atom, means we have to take this "spookiness" seriously."

    The idea of a 3p cannot be applied consistently to the notion of a 'person' or observer if one is considering the 1p of observers in separate 'worlds' of a multiverse unless, for example, A and B have observables that mutually commute and thus have some chance of being mutually consistent and capable of being integrated into a single narrative. I think that this problem is being overlooked because the problem of Satisfiability is being ignored.

I hope that we can agree that there is at least an illusion of a physical world that 'we' - you, me, Russell, .... can consider... Is it necessarily inconsistent with comp?

? ? ?

Not at all. The whole point of UDA is in explaining why the physical reality is unavoidable for the dreaming numbers, and how it emerges from + and * (in the "number base"). It is indeed a first person plural product, with the persons being all Löbian machines, etc.

    I am coming at the idea of a 'physical reality' as an emergent structure and not some pre-defined ordering.

Comp gives the complete algorithm to extract bodies and physical laws, making comp testable, even if that is technically difficult,

    I claim that it is not even technically difficult; it is impossible for the simple reason that there does not exist a unique Boolean algebra for all possible 1p. Why? Because it cannot be proven to be satisfiable(aka globally self-consistent) by any finite sequence of algorithms. Completeness and consistency for such cannot be assumed a priori.

but up to now, it fits remarkably, and that would not have been the case without QM. That would not have the case if "p->[]<>p" was not a theorem of the Z1* logics (matter).

    Your reasoning is correct only because you are assuming the impossible to be true a priori: that there exists a solution to the Satisfiability problem *and* that it is accessible for any finitely expressible logical structure.

-- 
Onward!

Stephen

[Bruno Marchal]

On 22 Nov 2012, at 00:20, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 11/19/2012 10:06 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 19 Nov 2012, at 15:43, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 11/19/2012 9:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 19 Nov 2012, at 02:12, Russell Standish wrote:

On Sun, Nov 18, 2012 at 07:48:57PM -0500, Stephen P. King wrote:

Hi Russell,

  I agree with this view, especially the part about the
compatibility of bases leading to a 'sharing of realities' that then
gives rise to an illusion of a single classical reality; I just
phrase the concepts differently. My question to you is how 'simple'
can an observer be, as a system? It seems to me that even particles
could be considered as observers. I buy Chalmers' argument for
panpsychism.

I doubt that very much, ...

Me too, as "pan" assumed some physical reality and thus contradict comp, which is assumed also.

Dear Bruno,

   Why are you not considering the 'pan' to cover a plurality of 1p that are observing or otherwise interacting and communicating with each other as a 'physical reality"?

There are two physical reality notions: the one which we infer from observation and logic, like F = ma, F = km1m2/r^2, etc.
And the one explained by comp. We have to compare them to test comp.

Dear Bruno,

    How exactly does the comparison occur?

By comparing the logic of the observable inferred from observation (the quantum logic based on the algebra of the observable/linear positive operators) and the logic obtained from the arithmetical quantization, which exists already. 

Comp seems to necessitate all possible physical worlds in an equiprobable way.

?

There is a deep problem with notions of priors as it seems that we cannot escape from the problem of subjectivity as we see in the (so-called) anthropic principle: each observer will necessarily find itself in a world what has laws compatible with its existence. It seems to me that the observational act itself is a breaking of the perfect symmetry of equiprobability of possible worlds.

? 

But this claim implies violence to the idea of a 3p.
    I found at http://higgo.com/qti/Mallah.htm an exchange between Mallah and Standish that seems to illustrate this problem:

"Russell Standish: The predictions can easily depend of the 'picture' but must be consistent with each other. Let me give a simple example: In one picture, observer A decides to measure the spin of an electron in the x direction. In the other, observer B decides to measure the spin of the electron in the y direction. Observer A will see the spin of the electron aligned with x axis, and Observer B will see it aligned with the y axis. Both observations are correct in the first person picture of that observer. A "person" with the third person perspective, sees observers A and B as inhabiting separate `worlds' of a multiverse, each with appropriate measure that can be computed from Quantum Mechanics.

Jacques Mallah: On the contrary, this is a textbook example of the way I said it works. The theory predicts some measure distribution of observers; an individual observer sees an observation drawn from that distribution. There are no different sets of predictions for different pictures, just the measure distribution and the sample from it.

Russell Standish: It sounds to me like you don't think the prediction changes according to what the observer chooses to observe? An electron cannot have its spin aligned with the x axis and the y axis at the same time. Once the experimenter has chosen which direction to measure the spin, the history of that particular is observer is constrained by that fact, and the predictions of QM altered accordingly. This is true both in MWI and the Copenhagen interpretation, and is the "spooky" nature of QM. I used to think that QM gave predictions in terms of distributions, and that because one didn't see isolated particles, rather ensembles of such particles, I didn't see a problem. The properties of an ensemble are well defined. However, the ability of experimenters to isolate a single particle, such as a photon, or an atom, means we have to take this "spookiness" seriously."

    The idea of a 3p cannot be applied consistently to the notion of a 'person' or observer if one is considering the 1p of observers in separate 'worlds' of a multiverse unless, for example, A and B have observables that mutually commute and thus have some chance of being mutually consistent and capable of being integrated into a single narrative. I think that this problem is being overlooked because the problem of Satisfiability is being ignored.

?

I hope that we can agree that there is at least an illusion of a physical world that 'we' - you, me, Russell, .... can consider... Is it necessarily inconsistent with comp?

? ? ?

Not at all. The whole point of UDA is in explaining why the physical reality is unavoidable for the dreaming numbers, and how it emerges from + and * (in the "number base"). It is indeed a first person plural product, with the persons being all Löbian machines, etc.

    I am coming at the idea of a 'physical reality' as an emergent structure and not some pre-defined ordering.

Good.

Comp gives the complete algorithm to extract bodies and physical laws, making comp testable, even if that is technically difficult,

    I claim that it is not even technically difficult; it is impossible for the simple reason that there does not exist a unique Boolean algebra for all possible 1p.

? (I agree such BA does not exist, but this is exactly what we need to find a measure theorem à-la Gleason). We need a sufficiently good quantum logic, and up to now the comp quantum logic fits rather well.

Why? Because it cannot be proven to be satisfiable(aka globally self-consistent) by any finite sequence of algorithms. Completeness and consistency for such cannot be assumed a priori.

?

but up to now, it fits remarkably, and that would not have been the case without QM. That would not have the case if "p->[]<>p" was not a theorem of the Z1* logics (matter).

    Your reasoning is correct only because you are assuming the impossible to be true a priori: that there exists a solution to the Satisfiability problem

It exists. "Satisfability" is non tractable, not insoluble. The first persons don't care "waiting exponential time" by the invariance of first person experience on delays.

*and* that it is accessible for any finitely expressible logical structure.

It is accessible, but then I don't see at all the relevance of this.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Stephen P. King]

On 11/22/2012 9:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 22 Nov 2012, at 00:20, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 11/19/2012 10:06 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 19 Nov 2012, at 15:43, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 11/19/2012 9:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 19 Nov 2012, at 02:12, Russell Standish wrote:

On Sun, Nov 18, 2012 at 07:48:57PM -0500, Stephen P. King wrote:

Hi Russell,

  I agree with this view, especially the part about the
compatibility of bases leading to a 'sharing of realities' that then
gives rise to an illusion of a single classical reality; I just
phrase the concepts differently. My question to you is how 'simple'
can an observer be, as a system? It seems to me that even particles
could be considered as observers. I buy Chalmers' argument for
panpsychism.

I doubt that very much, ...

Me too, as "pan" assumed some physical reality and thus contradict comp, which is assumed also.

Dear Bruno,

   Why are you not considering the 'pan' to cover a plurality of 1p that are observing or otherwise interacting and communicating with each other as a 'physical reality"?

There are two physical reality notions: the one which we infer from observation and logic, like F = ma, F = km1m2/r^2, etc.
And the one explained by comp. We have to compare them to test comp.

Dear Bruno,

    How exactly does the comparison occur?

By comparing the logic of the observable inferred from observation (the quantum logic based on the algebra of the observable/linear positive operators) and the logic obtained from the arithmetical quantization, which exists already. 

Dear Bruno,

    How does the comparison occur? I will not ask what or who is involved, only how. What means exists to compare and contrast a pair of logics?

Comp seems to necessitate all possible physical worlds in an equiprobable way.

?

    Does not comp require all possible 1p to exist?

There is a deep problem with notions of priors as it seems that we cannot escape from the problem of subjectivity as we see in the (so-called) anthropic principle: each observer will necessarily find itself in a world what has laws compatible with its existence. It seems to me that the observational act itself is a breaking of the perfect symmetry of equiprobability of possible worlds.

? 

But this claim implies violence to the idea of a 3p.
    I found at http://higgo.com/qti/Mallah.htm an exchange between Mallah and Standish that seems to illustrate this problem:

"Russell Standish: The predictions can easily depend of the 'picture' but must be consistent with each other. Let me give a simple example: In one picture, observer A decides to measure the spin of an electron in the x direction. In the other, observer B decides to measure the spin of the electron in the y direction. Observer A will see the spin of the electron aligned with x axis, and Observer B will see it aligned with the y axis. Both observations are correct in the first person picture of that observer. A "person" with the third person perspective, sees observers A and B as inhabiting separate `worlds' of a multiverse, each with appropriate measure that can be computed from Quantum Mechanics.

Jacques Mallah: On the contrary, this is a textbook example of the way I said it works. The theory predicts some measure distribution of observers; an individual observer sees an observation drawn from that distribution. There are no different sets of predictions for different pictures, just the measure distribution and the sample from it.

Russell Standish: It sounds to me like you don't think the prediction changes according to what the observer chooses to observe? An electron cannot have its spin aligned with the x axis and the y axis at the same time. Once the experimenter has chosen which direction to measure the spin, the history of that particular is observer is constrained by that fact, and the predictions of QM altered accordingly. This is true both in MWI and the Copenhagen interpretation, and is the "spooky" nature of QM. I used to think that QM gave predictions in terms of distributions, and that because one didn't see isolated particles, rather ensembles of such particles, I didn't see a problem. The properties of an ensemble are well defined. However, the ability of experimenters to isolate a single particle, such as a photon, or an atom, means we have to take this "spookiness" seriously."

    The idea of a 3p cannot be applied consistently to the notion of a 'person' or observer if one is considering the 1p of observers in separate 'worlds' of a multiverse unless, for example, A and B have observables that mutually commute and thus have some chance of being mutually consistent and capable of being integrated into a single narrative. I think that this problem is being overlooked because the problem of Satisfiability is being ignored.

?

I hope that we can agree that there is at least an illusion of a physical world that 'we' - you, me, Russell, .... can consider... Is it necessarily inconsistent with comp?

? ? ?

Not at all. The whole point of UDA is in explaining why the physical reality is unavoidable for the dreaming numbers, and how it emerges from + and * (in the "number base"). It is indeed a first person plural product, with the persons being all Löbian machines, etc.

    I am coming at the idea of a 'physical reality' as an emergent structure and not some pre-defined ordering.

Good.

Comp gives the complete algorithm to extract bodies and physical laws, making comp testable, even if that is technically difficult,

    I claim that it is not even technically difficult; it is impossible for the simple reason that there does not exist a unique Boolean algebra for all possible 1p.

? (I agree such BA does not exist, but this is exactly what we need to find a measure theorem à-la Gleason). We need a sufficiently good quantum logic, and up to now the comp quantum logic fits rather well.

    Gleason's theorem is interesting: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gleason%27s_theorem

"For a Hilbert space of dimension 3 or greater, the only possible measure of the probability of the state associated with a particular linear subspace a of the Hilbert space will have the form Tr(μ(a) W), the trace of the operator product of the projection operator μ(a) and the density matrix W for the system."

    We sidestep the problem of how we define the transition from pure states to density matrices. Andrew's discussion might be seen as addressing this...

Why? Because it cannot be proven to be satisfiable(aka globally self-consistent) by any finite sequence of algorithms. Completeness and consistency for such cannot be assumed a priori.

?

    Do you ever address the question of satisfyability?

but up to now, it fits remarkably, and that would not have been the case without QM. That would not have the case if "p->[]<>p" was not a theorem of the Z1* logics (matter).

    Your reasoning is correct only because you are assuming the impossible to be true a priori: that there exists a solution to the Satisfiability problem

It exists. "Satisfability" is non tractable, not insoluble. The first persons don't care "waiting exponential time" by the invariance of first person experience on delays.

    Of course, but an infinite BA requires eternity (infinitely many steps) to solve its satisfiability problem. I am not claiming non-solubility; I am pointing out that the computation of satisfiability must run to obtain a solution, otherwise it is false to claim that the solution is accessible. It is a profound mistake to claim that the existence of the largest prime number defines the exact sequence of numerals that would enumerate that prime number. Similarly, the mere possibility of satisfiability of a BA cannot be used to argue about the particular distribution of propositions of the BA.
    You are considering first persons in the eternal and ideal case, but that does not connect omniscient machines to finite human brains. This is the challenge to Plato and Parmenides, how do we bridge between the Realm of Truth and the world of appearances? We could make claims forever but showing a proof requires physical effort. There are no shortcuts to knowledge. You seem to be OK with the idea that knowledge can obtain 'for free'. Perhaps I am mistaken, but it seems that you are assuming the impossible to be real.

   

*and* that it is accessible for any finitely expressible logical structure.

It is accessible, but then I don't see at all the relevance of this.

    Please explain how it is accessible.

-- 
Onward!

Stephen

[Roger Clough]

Hi Bruno Marchal

 

1) I suspect that when you refer to imagination, it is the

same as what I call intuition.  They're related, but I don't

think they're exactly the same. I see intuition as coming

from Platonia and spreading wider than the individual to

all possible solutions. In essence, you do not imagine these

solutions, they become evident to you.

 

2) Maybe I misundertand you, but I especially don't see how the machine,  

has any advantage over the person with regard to 1p. As I see it,

1p is a blind spot, machine or person. Godel holds for both a

person and a machine.

 

 

 

[Roger Clough], [rcl...@verizon.net]

11/23/2012

"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen

 

----- Receiving the following content -----

From: Bruno Marchal

Receiver: everything-list

Time: 2012-11-21, 12:26:21

[Craig Weinberg]

On Friday, November 23, 2012 4:23:49 AM UTC-5, rclough wrote:

Hi Bruno Marchal

 

1) I suspect that when you refer to imagination, it is the

same as what I call intuition.  They're related, but I don't

think they're exactly the same. I see intuition as coming

from Platonia and spreading wider than the individual to

all possible solutions. In essence, you do not imagine these

solutions, they become evident to you.

Imagination and intuition are different.

Imagine a blue chair. Works right?

Have an intuition that someone is going to ring your doorbell. Didn't work, did it? You can't make yourself have an intuition, intuition comes to you unbidden from beyond your conscious attention. Imagination produces results in the form of images and other ideal gestalts, both voluntarily and involuntarily, just as we can choose to control our breathing to some extent or allow it to happen outside of our conscious attention.

 

2) Maybe I misundertand you, but I especially don't see how the machine,  

has any advantage over the person with regard to 1p. As I see it,

1p is a blind spot, machine or person. Godel holds for both a

person and a machine.

 

1p is only a blind spot from a 3p perspective. Everything that has every been experienced is only 1p as far as we know. This is actually one of the main points where my model improves the conventional understanding. Neither 1p nor 3p can be proved against the other. The more relevant dichotomy is between spatially extended public exterior sense and temporally intended private interior sense. Both are really 1p, but the former faces a 3p which may or may not be primitively 'real'.

Craig
 

[Roger Clough]

Hi Craig Weinberg

 

Yes,intuition comes from Platonia, whereas 

a dream might come from a bad choice of food,

or a nasty comment somebody made.

 

Intuition brings in something new and presumably

good and rational, but with a dream you are often only

forced into a fruitless search for a solution

to your discomfort, grasping at irrational

straws. At least that's my experience.

 

 

[Roger Clough], [rcl...@verizon.net]

11/23/2012

"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen

 

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Time: 2012-11-23, 08:11:42

Subject: Re: imagination

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[Craig Weinberg]

On Friday, November 23, 2012 7:35:09 AM UTC-5, rclough wrote:

Hi Craig Weinberg

 

Yes,intuition comes from Platonia, whereas 

a dream might come from a bad choice of food,

or a nasty comment somebody made.

 

Intuition brings in something new and presumably

good and rational, but with a dream you are often only

forced into a fruitless search for a solution

to your discomfort, grasping at irrational

straws. At least that's my experience.

I think this is too simplistic of a view of what is really going on. Within a dream you can have intuition also. You can arguably have every kind of experience in a dream that you can have while you are awake (though some categories of experience are uncommon). Indeed only actually waking up provides a vantage point from which the unreality of a dream can be clearly seen.

We were talking about imagination though, which implies the capacity to consciously direct inner experience while intuition is decidedly undirected by the conscious mind. Your distinction makes some sense on the surface, as far as there is a notion of truthfulness to the contents of intuition which is not necessarily present in imagination, however there is no question in my mind that while great evil has been done in the service of dreams and false promises, they are generally served by intuition just as well, with brutal dictators and psychotic killers often guided by an extraordinarily intuitive gift for military and political strategy. The logic of a sociopath is a form of intuition, whereas intuition is not a form of logic.

[Roger Clough]

Hi Craig Weinberg

 

 

I can't disagree.

 

[Roger Clough], [rcl...@verizon.net]

11/23/2012

"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen

 

----- Receiving the following content -----

From: Craig Weinberg

Receiver: everything-list

Time: 2012-11-23, 10:40:39

Subject: Re: Re: imagination

To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/4tlDkQaxkIoJ.

[Bruno Marchal]

Hi Roger,

On 23 Nov 2012, at 10:23, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Bruno Marchal

 

1) I suspect that when you refer to imagination, it is the

same as what I call intuition.  They're related, but I don't

think they're exactly the same. I see intuition as coming

from Platonia and spreading wider than the individual to

all possible solutions. In essence, you do not imagine these

solutions, they become evident to you.

OK. "intuition" and imagination" are fuzzy word capable of having different meaning according to the context. 

I would say that I agree with you here, but this does not mean much.

 

2) Maybe I misundertand you, but I especially don't see how the machine,  

has any advantage over the person with regard to 1p. As I see it,

1p is a blind spot, machine or person. 

Usually the 1p is rather transparent, from the 1p point of view (pov). 

Not sure to get what you mean here.

Godel holds for both a

person and a machine.

That's the point. So you agree with me that Penrose and Lucas are wrong on this, as they believe that Gödel applies to machines, but not to humans, making us superior or at least different from machines. On the contrary I consider Gödel's theorem as the first non trivial exact proposition for the ideally sound human. The first theorem in "exact psychology", or "theology". This makes sense with the comp hypothesis.

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Roger Clough]

Hi Bruno Marchal

 

Of course intuition and imagination are fuzzy words.

For they have no logical basis, and are closer

to hunger for food than coming across the right way to get it.

 

No problem such as homicide is immediately solved

by logic, at least initially, for you know not where to look, and

you don't have an infinite amount of time.

 

A champion chess player does not use logic or very much of

it to win a game. I think that computers that beat them have

to go through every possible move and even look ahead a few moves.

 

I suppose one could say that in the long run, any

problem could be solved by logic.  But in the long run  

we are all dead.

 

[Roger Clough], [rcl...@verizon.net]

11/24/2012

"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen

 

----- Receiving the following content -----

From: Bruno Marchal

Receiver: everything-list

Time: 2012-11-23, 12:29:41

Subject: Re: imagination

Hi Roger,

On 23 Nov 2012, at 10:23, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Bruno Marchal

 

1) I suspect that when you refer to imagination, it is the

same as what I call intuition.  They're related, but I don't

think they're exactly the same. I see intuition as coming

from Platonia and spreading wider than the individual to

all possible solutions. In essence, you do not imagine these

solutions, they become evident to you.

OK. "intuition" and imagination" are fuzzy word capable of having different meaning according to the context. 

I would say that I agree with you here, but this does not mean much.

 

2) Maybe I misundertand you, but I especially don't see how the machine,  

has any advantage over the person with regard to 1p. As I see it,

1p is a blind spot, machine or person. 

Usually the 1p is rather transparent, from the 1p point of view (pov). 

Not sure to get what you mean here.

Godel holds for both a

person and a machine.

That's the point. So you agree with me that Penrose and Lucas are wrong on this, as they believe that G　del applies to machines, but not to humans, making us superior or at least different from machines. On the contrary I consider G　del's theorem as the first non trivial exact proposition for the ideally sound human. The first theorem in "exact psychology", or "theology". This makes sense with the comp hypothesis.

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Bruno Marchal]

On 24 Nov 2012, at 11:35, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Bruno Marchal

 

Of course intuition and imagination are fuzzy words.

For they have no logical basis, and are closer

to hunger for food than coming across the right way to get it.

 

No problem such as homicide is immediately solved

by logic, at least initially, for you know not where to look, and

you don't have an infinite amount of time.

 

A champion chess player does not use logic or very much of

it to win a game. I think that computers that beat them have

to go through every possible move and even look ahead a few moves.

 

I suppose one could say that in the long run, any

problem could be solved by logic. 

On the contrary, since we have discovered the universal machine, we know that logic can't help to solve most problems, that we have to change the logics like clothes according to the context and problems.

You keep talking like logicians before Gödel. Gödel refute them. 

Today we have universal machines, and this made us more ignorant than ever. At least we can know why. Universal machine does not solve problems, they are problems. Exactly like life. Universal machines can only escape forward and they only bring more complexity. 

But in the long run  

we are all dead.

We don't know that, and I don't see why you do that remark right now.

I have to go, now.

Best,

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Roger Clough]

Hi Bruno Marchal

 

Poincare had a lot to say on intuition vs logic in mathematics.

For one thing, the idea of continuity is an intuition.

 

http://www-history.mcs.st-and.ac.uk/Extras/Poincare_Intuition.html

 

 

 

[Roger Clough], [rcl...@verizon.net]

11/24/2012

"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen

 

----- Receiving the following content -----

From: Bruno Marchal

Receiver: everything-list

Time: 2012-11-24, 08:30:11

Subject: Re: imagination

On 24 Nov 2012, at 11:35, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Bruno Marchal

 

Of course intuition and imagination are fuzzy words.

For they have no logical basis, and are closer

to hunger for food than coming across the right way to get it.

 

No problem such as homicide is immediately solved

by logic, at least initially, for you know not where to look, and

you don't have an infinite amount of time.

 

A champion chess player does not use logic or very much of

it to win a game. I think that computers that beat them have

to go through every possible move and even look ahead a few moves.

 

I suppose one could say that in the long run, any

problem could be solved by logic. 

On the contrary, since we have discovered the universal machine, we know that logic can't help to solve most problems, that we have to change the logics like clothes according to the context and problems.

You keep talking like logicians before G　del. G　del refute them. 

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Bruno Marchal]

On 24 Nov 2012, at 14:00, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Bruno Marchal

 

Poincare had a lot to say on intuition vs logic in mathematics.

For one thing, the idea of continuity is an intuition.

 

http://www-history.mcs.st-and.ac.uk/Extras/Poincare_Intuition.html

Poincaré, like Kronecker were intuitionist before and after Brouwer (the founder of intuitionism). 

It is the philosophy of the first person of the machine, but it is an error to extrapolate it to reality (at least in the comp theory).

It is epistemologically correct, but ontologically disastrous, as it leads to different form of solipsism.

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Stephen P. King]

On 11/25/2012 9:22 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 24 Nov 2012, at 14:00, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Bruno Marchal

 

Poincare had a lot to say on intuition vs logic in mathematics.

For one thing, the idea of continuity is an intuition.

 

http://www-history.mcs.st-and.ac.uk/Extras/Poincare_Intuition.html

Poincaré, like Kronecker were intuitionist before and after Brouwer (the founder of intuitionism). 

It is the philosophy of the first person of the machine, but it is an error to extrapolate it to reality (at least in the comp theory).

It is epistemologically correct, but ontologically disastrous, as it leads to different form of solipsism.

Bruno

Dear Bruno,

    Please elaborate in these remarks as to how intuitionism is, among other things, 'ontologically disastrous'. It seems to me that intuitionism is a more general logical framework that can, if constructed carefully, allow us to make correct predictions when we are considering finite approximations to the 'perfect' Platonic notions. It is one thing to have ontological theories that are based on 'ideal' conditions and it is another thing to have the means to make local calculations and approximations. Let us never make Perfection the enemy of the effective.

-- 
Onward!

Stephen

[Bruno Marchal]

On 23 Nov 2012, at 16:40, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Friday, November 23, 2012 7:35:09 AM UTC-5, rclough wrote:

Hi Craig Weinberg

 

Yes,intuition comes from Platonia, whereas 

a dream might come from a bad choice of food,

or a nasty comment somebody made.

 

Intuition brings in something new and presumably

good and rational, but with a dream you are often only

forced into a fruitless search for a solution

to your discomfort, grasping at irrational

straws. At least that's my experience.

I think this is too simplistic of a view of what is really going on. Within a dream you can have intuition also. You can arguably have every kind of experience in a dream that you can have while you are awake (though some categories of experience are uncommon). Indeed only actually waking up provides a vantage point from which the unreality of a dream can be clearly seen.

With comp we can know that we are (relatively) dreaming, but we can never know that we are awaken.

We were talking about imagination though, which implies the capacity to consciously direct inner experience while intuition is decidedly undirected by the conscious mind. Your distinction makes some sense on the surface, as far as there is a notion of truthfulness to the contents of intuition which is not necessarily present in imagination, however there is no question in my mind that while great evil has been done in the service of dreams and false promises, they are generally served by intuition just as well, with brutal dictators and psychotic killers often guided by an extraordinarily intuitive gift for military and political strategy. The logic of a sociopath is a form of intuition, whereas intuition is not a form of logic.

What about intuitionist logic? I do think it capture some important feature of what many call intuition.

Classical mathematics can be described as intuitionist mathematics + (P v ~P) 

Without (P v ~P), the so-called excluded middle principle, you get the logic of a self-extending self. Basically a solipsist who take as real only its mental constructions. Like women and engineers perhaps. It is the heart, the yin, the knower, the first person. It is also what we get with the Bp & p definition of knowledge (the corresponding modal logic S4Grz1 can be seen as a logic of the epistemology of an intuitionist knower).

With (P v ~P), you get the non-constructive proof of existence, and thus Platonia, and with comp, that is where the self-extending selfs extend themselves.

So I agree with a part of your disagreement with Roger Clough. In fine, intuition is rooted in the earth, and the counter-intuitive Platonia is what makes earth and self possible, but no selfs can really believe in this, still less construct Platonia.

Bruno

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[Bruno Marchal]

On 22 Nov 2012, at 18:38, Stephen P. King wrote:

    How exactly does the comparison occur?

By comparing the logic of the observable inferred from observation (the quantum logic based on the algebra of the observable/linear positive operators) and the logic obtained from the arithmetical quantization, which exists already. 

    How does the comparison occur? I will not ask what or who is involved, only how. What means exists to compare and contrast a pair of logics?

The logic exists, because, by UDA, when translated in arithmetic, makes a relative physical certainty into a true Sigma_1 sentence, which has to be provable, and consistent. So the observability with measure one is given by []p = Bp & Dt & p, with p arithmetical sigma_1 (this is coherent with the way the physical reality has to be redefined through UDA). Then the quantum logic is given by the quantization []<>p, thanks to the law p -> []<>p, and this makes possible to reverse the Goldblatt modal translation of quantum logic into arithmetic. 

Comparison is used in the everyday sense. Just look if we get the quantum propositions, new one, different one, etc.

Comp seems to necessitate all possible physical worlds in an equiprobable way.

?

    Does not comp require all possible 1p to exist?

Comp makes all possible 1p existing in arithmetic, from the possible arithmetical pov. 

There is a deep problem with notions of priors as it seems that we cannot escape from the problem of subjectivity as we see in the (so-called) anthropic principle: each observer will necessarily find itself in a world what has laws compatible with its existence. It seems to me that the observational act itself is a breaking of the perfect symmetry of equiprobability of possible worlds.

? 

But this claim implies violence to the idea of a 3p.
    I found at http://higgo.com/qti/Mallah.htm an exchange between Mallah and Standish that seems to illustrate this problem:

"Russell Standish: The predictions can easily depend of the 'picture' but must be consistent with each other. Let me give a simple example: In one picture, observer A decides to measure the spin of an electron in the x direction. In the other, observer B decides to measure the spin of the electron in the y direction. Observer A will see the spin of the electron aligned with x axis, and Observer B will see it aligned with the y axis. Both observations are correct in the first person picture of that observer. A "person" with the third person perspective, sees observers A and B as inhabiting separate `worlds' of a multiverse, each with appropriate measure that can be computed from Quantum Mechanics.

Jacques Mallah: On the contrary, this is a textbook example of the way I said it works. The theory predicts some measure distribution of observers; an individual observer sees an observation drawn from that distribution. There are no different sets of predictions for different pictures, just the measure distribution and the sample from it.

Russell Standish: It sounds to me like you don't think the prediction changes according to what the observer chooses to observe? An electron cannot have its spin aligned with the x axis and the y axis at the same time. Once the experimenter has chosen which direction to measure the spin, the history of that particular is observer is constrained by that fact, and the predictions of QM altered accordingly. This is true both in MWI and the Copenhagen interpretation, and is the "spooky" nature of QM. I used to think that QM gave predictions in terms of distributions, and that because one didn't see isolated particles, rather ensembles of such particles, I didn't see a problem. The properties of an ensemble are well defined. However, the ability of experimenters to isolate a single particle, such as a photon, or an atom, means we have to take this "spookiness" seriously."

    The idea of a 3p cannot be applied consistently to the notion of a 'person' or observer if one is considering the 1p of observers in separate 'worlds' of a multiverse unless, for example, A and B have observables that mutually commute and thus have some chance of being mutually consistent and capable of being integrated into a single narrative. I think that this problem is being overlooked because the problem of Satisfiability is being ignored.

?

I hope that we can agree that there is at least an illusion of a physical world that 'we' - you, me, Russell, .... can consider... Is it necessarily inconsistent with comp?

? ? ?

Not at all. The whole point of UDA is in explaining why the physical reality is unavoidable for the dreaming numbers, and how it emerges from + and * (in the "number base"). It is indeed a first person plural product, with the persons being all Löbian machines, etc.

    I am coming at the idea of a 'physical reality' as an emergent structure and not some pre-defined ordering.

Good.

Comp gives the complete algorithm to extract bodies and physical laws, making comp testable, even if that is technically difficult,

    I claim that it is not even technically difficult; it is impossible for the simple reason that there does not exist a unique Boolean algebra for all possible 1p.

? (I agree such BA does not exist, but this is exactly what we need to find a measure theorem à-la Gleason). We need a sufficiently good quantum logic, and up to now the comp quantum logic fits rather well.

    Gleason's theorem is interesting: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gleason%27s_theorem

"For a Hilbert space of dimension 3 or greater, the only possible measure of the probability of the state associated with a particular linear subspace a of the Hilbert space will have the form Tr(μ(a) W), the trace of the operator product of the projection operator μ(a) and the density matrix W for the system."

    We sidestep the problem of how we define the transition from pure states to density matrices. Andrew's discussion might be seen as addressing this...

OK.

Why? Because it cannot be proven to be satisfiable(aka globally self-consistent) by any finite sequence of algorithms. Completeness and consistency for such cannot be assumed a priori.

?

    Do you ever address the question of satisfiability?

Which satisfiability? I use it all the time. p->p is satisfiable by all interpretation, and this is used all the time. I do not use the complexity of satisfiability, as if this needed to be used, it has to be justified by the modal logic extracted from self-reference.

but up to now, it fits remarkably, and that would not have been the case without QM. That would not have the case if "p->[]<>p" was not a theorem of the Z1* logics (matter).

    Your reasoning is correct only because you are assuming the impossible to be true a priori: that there exists a solution to the Satisfiability problem

It exists. "Satisfability" is non tractable, not insoluble. The first persons don't care "waiting exponential time" by the invariance of first person experience on delays.

    Of course, but an infinite BA requires eternity (infinitely many steps) to solve its satisfiability problem.

But no machine ever need to do that (and can't). The BA might be infinite, but not the proposition, unless you are using infinitary logic, which does not play a big role in comp up to now. 

I am not claiming non-solubility; I am pointing out that the computation of satisfiability must run to obtain a solution,

The 1p depends on truth, not on proof.

otherwise it is false to claim that the solution is accessible.

The UD does "prove", or arithemtic proves, all the true sigma_1 sentences, which is enough for the computations to be emulated. then the 1p are distirubuted non constructively on that, independently of the complexity of the proofs. Without this, no measure problem.

And with no measure problem, you lost the reduction of physics to computer science.

It is a profound mistake to claim that the existence of the largest prime number defines the exact sequence of numerals that would enumerate that prime number.

You need to decide in which base you write it, and then it is defined. But we don't need this. 

Similarly, the mere possibility of satisfiability of a BA

Satisfiability concerns sentences, not BA.

cannot be used to argue about the particular distribution of propositions of the BA.
    You are considering first persons in the eternal and ideal case, but that does not connect omniscient machines to finite human brains.

The connection is explained by the UDA.

This is the challenge to Plato and Parmenides, how do we bridge between the Realm of Truth and the world of appearances?

By the realtion between machines' belief and reality. With comp, today, we can use the work of Tarski and others.

We could make claims forever but showing a proof requires physical effort.

And time, money, if not a sense of public relation. But that is relevant at some meta-meta-level.

There are no shortcuts to knowledge. You seem to be OK with the idea that knowledge can obtain 'for free'.

Free of physics, yes. Free of math? No. You need to postulate enough to get Turing universality.

Perhaps I am mistaken, but it seems that you are assuming the impossible to be real.

I don't. Unless you come back with the idea that 1+1=2 requires a physical world, or thing like that.

   

*and* that it is accessible for any finitely expressible logical structure.

It is accessible, but then I don't see at all the relevance of this.

    Please explain how it is accessible.

You were using the term. I am the one asking the question here.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Craig Weinberg]

On Friday, November 23, 2012 11:54:57 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 22 Nov 2012, at 18:38, Stephen P. King wrote:

    How exactly does the comparison occur?

By comparing the logic of the observable inferred from observation (the quantum logic based on the algebra of the observable/linear positive operators) and the logic obtained from the arithmetical quantization, which exists already. 

    How does the comparison occur? I will not ask what or who is involved, only how. What means exists to compare and contrast a pair of logics?

The logic exists, because, by UDA, when translated in arithmetic, makes a relative physical certainty into a true Sigma_1 sentence, which has to be provable, and consistent. So the observability with measure one is given by []p = Bp & Dt & p, with p arithmetical sigma_1 (this is coherent with the way the physical reality has to be redefined through UDA). Then the quantum logic is given by the quantization []<>p, thanks to the law p -> []<>p, and this makes possible to reverse the Goldblatt modal translation of quantum logic into arithmetic. 

Comparison is used in the everyday sense. Just look if we get the quantum propositions, new one, different one, etc.

The question is straightforward to me - what makes logical comparison happen? Let me try to tease out what you answer is here, because it is not obvious.

The logic exists, because,

so far so good.

by UDA,

Isn't UDA a logical construct already? Is your answer to 'what makes logic happen?' rooted in the presumption of logic? That's ok with me, but you don't need any smoke or mirrors after that, you are pretty much committed to 'because maths' as the alpha and omega answer to all possible questions.

when translated in arithmetic, makes a relative physical certainty into a true Sigma_1 sentence, which has to be provable, and consistent.

Proof and consistency, again, are already features of logic. What makes things true? How does it actually happen?

So the observability with measure one is given by []p = Bp & Dt & p, with p arithmetical sigma_1 (this is coherent with the way the physical reality has to be redefined through UDA). Then the quantum logic is given by the quantization []<>p, thanks to the law p -> []<>p, and this makes possible to reverse the Goldblatt modal translation of quantum logic into arithmetic. 

Way over my head, but it sounds like logic proving logic again.

Comparison is used in the everyday sense.

Yes! Now that I understand. What's wrong with the 'everyday sense' being the reality and the specialized logic being one category of specialized mechanisms within that?
 
Craig

[Roger Clough]

Hi Bruno Marchal

 

Perhaps the comparison does not go all the way, but

it seems to me that comp is Leibnizian in behavior.

Changes in comp simply emulate (rather than directly cause)

changes in the brain (and hence changes in the mind). 

And vice versa. 

 

Simply emulating each other (at least from a Leibniz

viewpoint) is not actually causal, although it may appear to be,

thus the mind acts "as if" it is controlled by or controls

the brain, which is what comp models.

 

 

 

[Roger Clough], [rcl...@verizon.net]

11/26/2012

"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen

 

----- Receiving the following content -----

From: Bruno Marchal

Receiver: everything-list

Time: 2012-11-23, 12:29:41

Subject: Re: imagination

Hi Roger,

On 23 Nov 2012, at 10:23, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Bruno Marchal

 

1) I suspect that when you refer to imagination, it is the

same as what I call intuition.  They're related, but I don't

think they're exactly the same. I see intuition as coming

from Platonia and spreading wider than the individual to

all possible solutions. In essence, you do not imagine these

solutions, they become evident to you.

OK. "intuition" and imagination" are fuzzy word capable of having different meaning according to the context. 

I would say that I agree with you here, but this does not mean much.

 

2) Maybe I misundertand you, but I especially don't see how the machine,  

has any advantage over the person with regard to 1p. As I see it,

1p is a blind spot, machine or person. 

Usually the 1p is rather transparent, from the 1p point of view (pov). 

Not sure to get what you mean here.

Godel holds for both a

person and a machine.

That's the point. So you agree with me that Penrose and Lucas are wrong on this, as they believe that G　del applies to machines, but not to humans, making us superior or at least different from machines. On the contrary I consider G　del's theorem as the first non trivial exact proposition for the ideally sound human. The first theorem in "exact psychology", or "theology". This makes sense with the comp hypothesis.

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Bruno Marchal]

On 25 Nov 2012, at 20:53, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 11/25/2012 9:22 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 24 Nov 2012, at 14:00, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Bruno Marchal

 

Poincare had a lot to say on intuition vs logic in mathematics.

For one thing, the idea of continuity is an intuition.

 

http://www-history.mcs.st-and.ac.uk/Extras/Poincare_Intuition.html

Poincaré, like Kronecker were intuitionist before and after Brouwer (the founder of intuitionism). 

It is the philosophy of the first person of the machine, but it is an error to extrapolate it to reality (at least in the comp theory).

It is epistemologically correct, but ontologically disastrous, as it leads to different form of solipsism.

Bruno

Dear Bruno,

    Please elaborate in these remarks as to how intuitionism is, among other things, 'ontologically disastrous'.

It is the logical-mathematical version of solipsism. What exist is what you can construct. It forbid the proof by absurdum of existence and negation.

But with comp, we need only arithmetic, and the intuitionist double negation ◊p = ~~p, (not not p), can be used to recover the notion of non constructive proof, and so are technically equivalent. It is in Analysis that intuitionism and classical logic differ substantially.

It seems to me that intuitionism is a more general logical framework that can, if constructed carefully, allow us to make correct predictions when we are considering finite approximations to the 'perfect' Platonic notions.

There is just no Platonia for an intuitionist. It makes no sense. In comp intuitionism is really the logic of the constructive self-extending self, and it plays the role of the first person, which is coherent with the fact that the 1p is solipsist de facto, even if he has been civilized and believe in the other people, but that belief is not intuitionnistic.

It is one thing to have ontological theories that are based on 'ideal' conditions and it is another thing to have the means to make local calculations and approximations.

I can be OK with this. Such differences arguably appears in the comp theories too.

Let us never make Perfection the enemy of the effective.

God and arithmetical truth can be said to be perfect. A lot of imperfections exists and that is part of what we have to explained. And comp leads to an explanation close to the neoplatonist "fall of the soul".

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[meekerdb]

On 11/23/2012 8:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

    How does the comparison occur? I will not ask what or who is involved, only how. What means exists to compare and contrast a pair of logics?

The logic exists, because, by UDA, when translated in arithmetic, makes a relative physical certainty into a true Sigma_1 sentence, which has to be provable, and consistent. So the observability with measure one is given by []p = Bp & Dt & p, with p arithmetical sigma_1 (this is coherent with the way the physical reality has to be redefined through UDA). Then the quantum logic is given by the quantization []<>p, thanks to the law p -> []<>p, and this makes possible to reverse the Goldblatt modal translation of quantum logic into arithmetic. 

Comparison is used in the everyday sense. Just look if we get the quantum propositions, new one, different one, etc.

The question is why is the sentence about anything.  It's easy to write down axioms and prove theorems from them, but that doesn't make them true of anything.

Brent

[Bruno Marchal]

On 26 Nov 2012, at 13:42, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Friday, November 23, 2012 11:54:57 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 22 Nov 2012, at 18:38, Stephen P. King wrote:

    How exactly does the comparison occur?

By comparing the logic of the observable inferred from observation (the quantum logic based on the algebra of the observable/linear positive operators) and the logic obtained from the arithmetical quantization, which exists already. 

    How does the comparison occur? I will not ask what or who is involved, only how. What means exists to compare and contrast a pair of logics?

The logic exists, because, by UDA, when translated in arithmetic, makes a relative physical certainty into a true Sigma_1 sentence, which has to be provable, and consistent. So the observability with measure one is given by []p = Bp & Dt & p, with p arithmetical sigma_1 (this is coherent with the way the physical reality has to be redefined through UDA). Then the quantum logic is given by the quantization []<>p, thanks to the law p -> []<>p, and this makes possible to reverse the Goldblatt modal translation of quantum logic into arithmetic. 

Comparison is used in the everyday sense. Just look if we get the quantum propositions, new one, different one, etc.

The question is straightforward to me - what makes logical comparison happen? Let me try to tease out what you answer is here, because it is not obvious.

The logic exists, because,

so far so good.

by UDA,

Isn't UDA a logical construct already?

UDA refers to an argument. It is the argument showing that if we are machine (even physical machine) then in fine physics has to be justified by the arithmetical relations, and some internal views related to it.

Is your answer to 'what makes logic happen?' rooted in the presumption of logic?

At the basic ontological level, I can limit the assumption in logic quite a lot. Actually we don't need logic at the base ontological level, only simple substitution rules and the +, * equality axioms. Only later we candefine an observer, in that ontology, as a machine/number  having bigger set of logical beliefs. But the existence of such machine does not require the belief or assumptions in that logic.

That's ok with me, but you don't need any smoke or mirrors after that, you are pretty much committed to 'because maths' as the alpha and omega answer to all possible questions.

On the contrary. The math is used to be precise, and then to realize that we don't have the answers at all, but we do have tools to make the questions clearer, and sometimes this can give already some shape of the answer, like seeing that comp bactracks to Plato's conception of reality (even Pythagorus).

This is not much. Just a remind that science has not decided between Plato and Aristotle in theology.

when translated in arithmetic, makes a relative physical certainty into a true Sigma_1 sentence, which has to be provable, and consistent.

Proof and consistency, again, are already features of logic. What makes things true? How does it actually happen?

We assume some notion of arithmetical truth. I hope you can agree with proposition like "44 is a prime number or 44 is not a prime number". Not much is assumed, except for UDA, where you are asked if you are willing to accept a computer in place of your brain. The computer is supposed to be reconfigured at some level of course. We assume also Church thesis, although it is easy to avoid it, technically (but not so much "philosophically").

So the observability with measure one is given by []p = Bp & Dt & p, with p arithmetical sigma_1 (this is coherent with the way the physical reality has to be redefined through UDA). Then the quantum logic is given by the quantization []<>p, thanks to the law p -> []<>p, and this makes possible to reverse the Goldblatt modal translation of quantum logic into arithmetic. 

Way over my head, but it sounds like logic proving logic again.

It is not your fault. Nobody knows logic, except the professional logicians, who are not really aware of this. 

I talk about logic, the branch of math, not logic the adjective for all simple rational behavior that we all know. UDA does not use logic-branch-math, but of course it use the logic that you are necessarily using when sending a post to a list (implicitly). 

AUDA needs logic-the branch of math, due to the link between computer science and mathematical logic. 

Comparison is used in the everyday sense.

Yes! Now that I understand. What's wrong with the 'everyday sense' being the reality

That would cut all the funding in fundamental sciences, as this answer everything. It is a bit like "why do you waste your time trying to understanding the thermo-kinetics of car motor and how car moves? Why not just accept that car moves when we press on the pedal?"

The everyday sense is a part of reality, and I would understand it in term of the simplest assumption possible. Then my point is only that if comp is true (that is, roughly, if we are machine) then we can already refute the lasting current idea that there is a primitive physical universe. It gives at least another rational conception of reality, which gives the hope to get the origin of the physical laws, and the material patterns.

and the specialized logic being one category of specialized mechanisms within that?

Logic is not fundamental at all, for UDA, you need only the everyday logic that you need to be able to do a pizza. Arithmetic is far more important, if only to understand how a computer functions. 

Yet more advanced logic can help for two things, when doing reasoning:

-showing that a proposition follows from other propositions (deduction)

-showing that a proposition does not follow from other propositions (independence).

Then, concerning the relation between mind, thinking, feeling, truth, etc. many result in logic put some light, and that is not astonishing once you bet on comp, even if temporarily for the sake of the argument.

In logic, the branch of math, the beginning is the most difficult, because you have to understand what you have to not understand, like formal expressions. 

Logic is just like algebra, and those things imposes themselves once we tackle precise theories, and relations between theories. It helps for refuting them, or representing a theory in another, etc.

I know that comp invites to math, and that this seems to be a problem for many.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Bruno Marchal]

On 26 Nov 2012, at 13:07, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Bruno Marchal

 

Perhaps the comparison does not go all the way, but

it seems to me that comp is Leibnizian in behavior.

Changes in comp simply emulate (rather than directly cause)

changes in the brain (and hence changes in the mind). 

And vice versa. 

 

Simply emulating each other (at least from a Leibniz

viewpoint) is not actually causal, although it may appear to be,

thus the mind acts "as if" it is controlled by or controls

the brain, which is what comp models.

You might try to be clearer. I can relate, but in too many ways, and I am not sure if it relates with your understanding.

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Craig Weinberg]

On Monday, November 26, 2012 1:46:53 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 26 Nov 2012, at 13:42, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Friday, November 23, 2012 11:54:57 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 22 Nov 2012, at 18:38, Stephen P. King wrote:

    How exactly does the comparison occur?

By comparing the logic of the observable inferred from observation (the quantum logic based on the algebra of the observable/linear positive operators) and the logic obtained from the arithmetical quantization, which exists already. 

    How does the comparison occur? I will not ask what or who is involved, only how. What means exists to compare and contrast a pair of logics?

The logic exists, because, by UDA, when translated in arithmetic, makes a relative physical certainty into a true Sigma_1 sentence, which has to be provable, and consistent. So the observability with measure one is given by []p = Bp & Dt & p, with p arithmetical sigma_1 (this is coherent with the way the physical reality has to be redefined through UDA). Then the quantum logic is given by the quantization []<>p, thanks to the law p -> []<>p, and this makes possible to reverse the Goldblatt modal translation of quantum logic into arithmetic. 

Comparison is used in the everyday sense. Just look if we get the quantum propositions, new one, different one, etc.

The question is straightforward to me - what makes logical comparison happen? Let me try to tease out what you answer is here, because it is not obvious.

The logic exists, because,

so far so good.

by UDA,

Isn't UDA a logical construct already?

UDA refers to an argument. It is the argument showing that if we are machine (even physical machine) then in fine physics has to be justified by the arithmetical relations, and some internal views related to it.

Isn't an argument a logical construct though? I can't argue a piece of iron into being magnetized. There has to be a plausible interface between pure logic and anything tangible, doesn't there? It doesn't have to be matter, even subjective experience is not conjured by logic alone. Can we use logic to alone to deny that we see what we see or feel what we feel?

Is your answer to 'what makes logic happen?' rooted in the presumption of logic?

At the basic ontological level, I can limit the assumption in logic quite a lot.

I'm not sure why that changes anything at all. I think it makes it even worse, because if you have a basic ontological level with very limited logical assumptions, and everything is reducible to that, then what is it that you are reducing it from?
 

Actually we don't need logic at the base ontological level, only simple substitution rules and the +, * equality axioms.

Aren't rules and axioms the defining structures of logic? It sounds like this:

C: "How can you justify the existence of logic with logic alone?"

B: "Well, you don't need much logic. In fact you don't need any logic. All you really need is logic."
 

Only later we candefine an observer, in that ontology, as a machine/number  having bigger set of logical beliefs. But the existence of such machine does not require the belief or assumptions in that logic.

I'm not even bringing observers into it. I'm not talking about awareness of participants, I'm talking about the emergence of the possibility of logic at all.

That's ok with me, but you don't need any smoke or mirrors after that, you are pretty much committed to 'because maths' as the alpha and omega answer to all possible questions.

On the contrary. The math is used to be precise, and then to realize that we don't have the answers at all, but we do have tools to make the questions clearer, and sometimes this can give already some shape of the answer, like seeing that comp bactracks to Plato's conception of reality (even Pythagorus).

This is not much. Just a remind that science has not decided between Plato and Aristotle in theology.

How do we know that we aren't making the questions clearer by amputating everything that doesn't fit our axioms?

when translated in arithmetic, makes a relative physical certainty into a true Sigma_1 sentence, which has to be provable, and consistent.

Proof and consistency, again, are already features of logic. What makes things true? How does it actually happen?

We assume some notion of arithmetical truth. I hope you can agree with proposition like "44 is a prime number or 44 is not a prime number".

What are the mechanics of that assumption though? The details of the propositions are not interesting to me, rather it is the ontology of proposition itself. What is it? Who proposes? How do they do it exactly? That is the only magic that consciousness contains. Beyond that, it's just mind-numbing patterns playing themselves out forever. Participation is everything and no amount of interrogating functions can conceivably synthesize that from logic. Logic does not participate, it constrains and guides that which is participating as an inert codex of blind axioms.
 

Not much is assumed, except for UDA, where you are asked if you are willing to accept a computer in place of your brain. The computer is supposed to be reconfigured at some level of course. We assume also Church thesis, although it is easy to avoid it, technically (but not so much "philosophically").

Church thesis is similarly reflexive logic. There is no reason to presume that because anything that can be put into a Boolean box has other logical commonalities that this (unquestionably important and worthwhile) commonality extends to causally efficacious presence. An air conditioner doesn't create air. Church assumes the air of sense making from the start and then shows how all manner of air conditioners can be assembled from the same fundamental blueprint. I'm not falling for it though. It's a sleight of hand maneuver. While functionalism does card tricks with logic, the power and reality of sense supplies the table, tablecloth, stage, lights, audience, and girl to saw in half. Yes, I see, you pulled my card, King of Diamonds, very impressive - truly, but how does it taste like chocolate and dance Gangnam style?
 

So the observability with measure one is given by []p = Bp & Dt & p, with p arithmetical sigma_1 (this is coherent with the way the physical reality has to be redefined through UDA). Then the quantum logic is given by the quantization []<>p, thanks to the law p -> []<>p, and this makes possible to reverse the Goldblatt modal translation of quantum logic into arithmetic. 

Way over my head, but it sounds like logic proving logic again.

It is not your fault. Nobody knows logic, except the professional logicians, who are not really aware of this.
 

I talk about logic, the branch of math, not logic the adjective for all simple rational behavior that we all know. UDA does not use logic-branch-math, but of course it use the logic that you are necessarily using when sending a post to a list (implicitly). 

AUDA needs logic-the branch of math, due to the link between computer science and mathematical logic. 

That's reasonable to me, but what I'm talking about is getting behind the curtain of 'simple rational behavior that we all know', and what I find is not a Platonic monoilith of idealism, but the ordinary experience of discernment and participation. Logic supervenes on sense, but sense does not supervene on logic. Dreams prove that we are perfectly content to enjoy a universe without logical consistency, but there is not any proof that I know of which suggests that logic relies on qualia or matter. Therefore, it seems to me that logic must either be a psychic phenomenon and therefore not primitive, or that psychic phenomena is illogical and the universe which we think we live in is impossible. I don't think the latter is plausible because it would undermine our ability to have any kind of meaningful opinion about anything real if that were the case.

Comparison is used in the everyday sense.

Yes! Now that I understand. What's wrong with the 'everyday sense' being the reality

That would cut all the funding in fundamental sciences, as this answer everything. It is a bit like "why do you waste your time trying to understanding the thermo-kinetics of car motor and how car moves? Why not just accept that car moves when we press on the pedal?"

I think just the opposite. My view says that thermo-kinetics is just the beginning, we need to start studying what is the 'we' that presses the pedal also. More funding for interdisciplinary science as well as fundamental.
 

The everyday sense is a part of reality, and I would understand it in term of the simplest assumption possible. Then my point is only that if comp is true (that is, roughly, if we are machine) then we can already refute the lasting current idea that there is a primitive physical universe. It gives at least another rational conception of reality, which gives the hope to get the origin of the physical laws, and the material patterns.

I don't see the advantage of a reality which is primitively arithmetic or primitively physical. Either way we are depersonalized and our lives are de-presented while subterranean abstractions crank out automatism with ourselves as vestigial deluded spectators, powerless in our inauthentic simulated worlds.

If instead we look at what we are looking at, and see realism for the sensory experience that it is, then arithmetic truth and Hermetic arts fall out of it organically. Algebra and geometry coexist to serve an experiential, theatrical agenda, not a functional one.
 

and the specialized logic being one category of specialized mechanisms within that?

Logic is not fundamental at all, for UDA, you need only the everyday logic that you need to be able to do a pizza. Arithmetic is far more important, if only to understand how a computer functions. 

Haha, you're still telling me that a little bit of shit in the tuna salad doesn't count. If it tastes like logic, then I don't think you can use it to prop up a primitive that supervenes on logic.
 

Yet more advanced logic can help for two things, when doing reasoning:

-showing that a proposition follows from other propositions (deduction)

-showing that a proposition does not follow from other propositions (independence).

Then, concerning the relation between mind, thinking, feeling, truth, etc. many result in logic put some light, and that is not astonishing once you bet on comp, even if temporarily for the sake of the argument.

In logic, the branch of math, the beginning is the most difficult, because you have to understand what you have to not understand, like formal expressions. 

Logic is just like algebra, and those things imposes themselves once we tackle precise theories, and relations between theories. It helps for refuting them, or representing a theory in another, etc.

I know that comp invites to math, and that this seems to be a problem for many.

To me the problem with comp is that it perfectly describes a universe that we don't actually live in. In theory a formula could move my arm, because my arm could, in theory, be nothing but data, but in fact, that isn't what we see. Most of our lives are struggles for mathematically irrelevant resources - time, money, sex, more money, more sex, etc. They aren't arithmetically interesting problems. The universe which comp describes should be one of florid plasticity and constant exploration, not struggle and frustration. How does a computer get frustrated? Why would it?

Craig

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Roger Clough]

Hi Bruno Marchal

 

I am not a mathematician, my background is in physical science (metallurgy)

and of laboratory results therein.  So I have a problem keeping up. But I

think I can say this:

 

Ultimately, IMHO any math or mental abstractions based on the fleshly brain

have to be also true for the fleshly brain.  The problem is perhaps

that the fleshly brain is in <>, the abstractions in [].  I suppose that logically

one could use <>[]p.

 

I don't know how one could do this, so to begin with, one could keep

operating as usual, by assuming that comp and monads both apply to all

brain activity. 

 

And in addition, IMHO if you want to also use Leibniz's monads, these must also

be associated to appropriate parts of the fleshly brain. A simple form

of this would be to at first use a functional account of the brain, and the tripartite brain

model (bdi, or belief, desire, intention). Later on, there can be more than one of each

type according to what neuroscience tells us. Magnetic resonance imaging

could be used to label each functionally different brain area of b,d, and i.

 

So you have a Venn diagram of three circles with the fleshly brain as the

central circle with some overlap on either side with comp and monadology.  

 

 

[Roger Clough], [rcl...@verizon.net]

11/27/2012

"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen

 

----- Receiving the following content -----

From: Bruno Marchal

Receiver: everything-list

Time: 2012-11-23, 11:54:57

Subject: Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation

On 22 Nov 2012, at 18:38, Stephen P. King wrote:

    How exactly does the comparison occur?

By comparing the logic of the observable inferred from observation (the quantum logic based on the algebra of the observable/linear positive operators) and the logic obtained from the arithmetical quantization, which exists already. 

    How does the comparison occur? I will not ask what or who is involved, only how. What means exists to compare and contrast a pair of logics?

The logic exists, because, by UDA, when translated in arithmetic, makes a relative physical certainty into a true Sigma_1 sentence, which has to be provable, and consistent. So the observability with measure one is given by []p = Bp & Dt & p, with p arithmetical sigma_1 (this is coherent with the way the physical reality has to be redefined through UDA). Then the quantum logic is given by the quantization []<>p, thanks to the law p -> []<>p, and this makes possible to reverse the Goldblatt modal translation of quantum logic into arithmetic. 

Comparison is used in the everyday sense. Just look if we get the quantum propositions, new one, different one, etc.

Comp seems to necessitate all possible physical worlds in an equiprobable way.

?

    Does not comp require all possible 1p to exist?

Comp makes all possible 1p existing in arithmetic, from the possible arithmetical pov. 

There is a deep problem with notions of priors as it seems that we cannot escape from the problem of subjectivity as we see in the (so-called) anthropic principle: each observer will necessarily find itself in a world what has laws compatible with its existence. It seems to me that the observational act itself is a breaking of the perfect symmetry of equiprobability of possible worlds.

? 

But this claim implies violence to the idea of a 3p.
    I found at http://higgo.com/qti/Mallah.htm an exchange between Mallah and Standish that seems to illustrate this problem:

"Russell Standish: The predictions can easily depend of the 'picture' but must be consistent with each other. Let me give a simple example: In one picture, observer A decides to measure the spin of an electron in the x direction. In the other, observer B decides to measure the spin of the electron in the y direction. Observer A will see the spin of the electron aligned with x axis, and Observer B will see it aligned with the y axis. Both observations are correct in the first person picture of that observer. A "person" with the third person perspective, sees observers A and B as inhabiting separate `worlds' of a multiverse, each with appropriate measure that can be computed from Quantum Mechanics.

Jacques Mallah: On the contrary, this is a textbook example of the way I said it works. The theory predicts some measure distribution of observers; an individual observer sees an observation drawn from that distribution. There are no different sets of predictions for different pictures, just the measure distribution and the sample from it.

Russell Standish: It sounds to me like you don't think the prediction changes according to what the observer chooses to observe? An electron cannot have its spin aligned with the x axis and the y axis at the same time. Once the experimenter has chosen which direction to measure the spin, the history of that particular is observer is constrained by that fact, and the predictions of QM altered accordingly. This is true both in MWI and the Copenhagen interpretation, and is the "spooky" nature of QM. I used to think that QM gave predictions in terms of distributions, and that because one didn't see isolated particles, rather ensembles of such particles, I didn't see a problem. The properties of an ensemble are well defined. However, the ability of experimenters to isolate a single particle, such as a photon, or an atom, means we have to take this "spookiness" seriously."

    The idea of a 3p cannot be applied consistently to the notion of a 'person' or observer if one is considering the 1p of observers in separate 'worlds' of a multiverse unless, for example, A and B have observables that mutually commute and thus have some chance of being mutually consistent and capable of being integrated into a single narrative. I think that this problem is being overlooked because the problem of Satisfiability is being ignored.

?

I hope that we can agree that there is at least an illusion of a physical world that 'we' - you, me, Russell, .... can consider... Is it necessarily inconsistent with comp?

? ? ?

Not at all. The whole point of UDA is in explaining why the physical reality is unavoidable for the dreaming numbers, and how it emerges from + and * (in the "number base"). It is indeed a first person plural product, with the persons being all L　bian machines, etc.

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Bruno Marchal]

On 26 Nov 2012, at 20:40, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Monday, November 26, 2012 1:46:53 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 26 Nov 2012, at 13:42, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Friday, November 23, 2012 11:54:57 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 22 Nov 2012, at 18:38, Stephen P. King wrote:

    How exactly does the comparison occur?

By comparing the logic of the observable inferred from observation (the quantum logic based on the algebra of the observable/linear positive operators) and the logic obtained from the arithmetical quantization, which exists already. 

    How does the comparison occur? I will not ask what or who is involved, only how. What means exists to compare and contrast a pair of logics?

The logic exists, because, by UDA, when translated in arithmetic, makes a relative physical certainty into a true Sigma_1 sentence, which has to be provable, and consistent. So the observability with measure one is given by []p = Bp & Dt & p, with p arithmetical sigma_1 (this is coherent with the way the physical reality has to be redefined through UDA). Then the quantum logic is given by the quantization []<>p, thanks to the law p -> []<>p, and this makes possible to reverse the Goldblatt modal translation of quantum logic into arithmetic. 

Comparison is used in the everyday sense. Just look if we get the quantum propositions, new one, different one, etc.

The question is straightforward to me - what makes logical comparison happen? Let me try to tease out what you answer is here, because it is not obvious.

The logic exists, because,

so far so good.

by UDA,

Isn't UDA a logical construct already?

UDA refers to an argument. It is the argument showing that if we are machine (even physical machine) then in fine physics has to be justified by the arithmetical relations, and some internal views related to it.

Isn't an argument a logical construct though? I can't argue a piece of iron into being magnetized. There has to be a plausible interface between pure logic and anything tangible, doesn't there? It doesn't have to be matter, even subjective experience is not conjured by logic alone. Can we use logic to alone to deny that we see what we see or feel what we feel?

Of course not. Why would logic ever deny this?

On the contrary tangible things obeys some logic usually.

Is your answer to 'what makes logic happen?' rooted in the presumption of logic?

At the basic ontological level, I can limit the assumption in logic quite a lot.

I'm not sure why that changes anything at all. I think it makes it even worse, because if you have a basic ontological level with very limited logical assumptions, and everything is reducible to that, then what is it that you are reducing it from?

?

 

Actually we don't need logic at the base ontological level, only simple substitution rules and the +, * equality axioms.

Aren't rules and axioms the defining structures of logic? It sounds like this:

C: "How can you justify the existence of logic with logic alone?"

We can't. But we can derive the beliefs in logics in arithmetic. 

(We can't derive arithmetic from logic alone, already).

B: "Well, you don't need much logic. In fact you don't need any logic. All you really need is logic."

You need logic and arithmetic. Technically it can be shown that you don't need so much logic (equality axioms are almost enough). The arithmetic (or equivalent) part is more important. It is a technical detail.

 

Only later we candefine an observer, in that ontology, as a machine/number  having bigger set of logical beliefs. But the existence of such machine does not require the belief or assumptions in that logic.

I'm not even bringing observers into it. I'm not talking about awareness of participants, I'm talking about the emergence of the possibility of logic at all.

Logic is defined by the minimum we assume like

we will say that "p & q" is true, when p is true and q is true, and only then.

We will accept that if we assume p and if we assume (p->q), then we cab derive q from those assumption.

etc.

Logicians and computer scientist studies those kind of relations between proposition. It is a branch of math, and it is not necessarily related to foundations.

That's ok with me, but you don't need any smoke or mirrors after that, you are pretty much committed to 'because maths' as the alpha and omega answer to all possible questions.

On the contrary. The math is used to be precise, and then to realize that we don't have the answers at all, but we do have tools to make the questions clearer, and sometimes this can give already some shape of the answer, like seeing that comp bactracks to Plato's conception of reality (even Pythagorus).

This is not much. Just a remind that science has not decided between Plato and Aristotle in theology.

How do we know that we aren't making the questions clearer by amputating everything that doesn't fit our axioms?

If you believe some axioms is missing, you can add it. 

If an axiom does not please to you, you can propose another theory.

when translated in arithmetic, makes a relative physical certainty into a true Sigma_1 sentence, which has to be provable, and consistent.

Proof and consistency, again, are already features of logic. What makes things true? How does it actually happen?

We assume some notion of arithmetical truth. I hope you can agree with proposition like "44 is a prime number or 44 is not a prime number".

What are the mechanics of that assumption though?

In comp we explains that mechanics with elementary arithmetic, universal numbers, etc.

We start from what we agree on, since high school. 

It is not more circular than a brain scientist using his brain. 

The details of the propositions are not interesting to me, rather it is the ontology of proposition itself. What is it?

That is a very interesting question, but out of topic. Logician model often proposition by the set of worlds where those proposition are true, and they often defined world by the set of propositions true in that world, making eventually a proposition a set of set of worlds, and a world a set of set of worlds, and there are interesting "galois like" connection, meaning interesting mathematics.

It is an entire field of subject.

With comp we don't need to go that far yet, although it is clearly on the horizon.

Who proposes?

Again, that is an interesting question too. here comp can answer, in the 3p view, a number relatively to a bunch of numbers.

How do they do it exactly?

By using their relations with each others. You need to study some books, or follow my explanations on FOAR.

That is the only magic that consciousness contains.

You make some jump here.

Beyond that, it's just mind-numbing patterns playing themselves out forever. Participation is everything and no amount of interrogating functions can conceivably synthesize that from logic. Logic does not participate, it constrains and guides that which is participating as an inert codex of blind axioms.
 

Not much is assumed, except for UDA, where you are asked if you are willing to accept a computer in place of your brain. The computer is supposed to be reconfigured at some level of course. We assume also Church thesis, although it is easy to avoid it, technically (but not so much "philosophically").

Church thesis is similarly reflexive logic. There is no reason to presume that because anything that can be put into a Boolean box has other logical commonalities that this (unquestionably important and worthwhile) commonality extends to causally efficacious presence. An air conditioner doesn't create air. Church assumes the air of sense making from the start and then shows how all manner of air conditioners can be assembled from the same fundamental blueprint. I'm not falling for it though. It's a sleight of hand maneuver. While functionalism does card tricks with logic, the power and reality of sense supplies the table, tablecloth, stage, lights, audience, and girl to saw in half. Yes, I see, you pulled my card, King of Diamonds, very impressive - truly, but how does it taste like chocolate and dance Gangnam style?

Comp explains why we cannot completely explain the sense, and this is rather nice as it prevents reductionist theories of sense.

On the contrary, by being open to sense in machine, comp is rather open in matter of others consciousness. 

 

So the observability with measure one is given by []p = Bp & Dt & p, with p arithmetical sigma_1 (this is coherent with the way the physical reality has to be redefined through UDA). Then the quantum logic is given by the quantization []<>p, thanks to the law p -> []<>p, and this makes possible to reverse the Goldblatt modal translation of quantum logic into arithmetic. 

Way over my head, but it sounds like logic proving logic again.

It is not your fault. Nobody knows logic, except the professional logicians, who are not really aware of this.
 

I talk about logic, the branch of math, not logic the adjective for all simple rational behavior that we all know. UDA does not use logic-branch-math, but of course it use the logic that you are necessarily using when sending a post to a list (implicitly). 

AUDA needs logic-the branch of math, due to the link between computer science and mathematical logic. 

That's reasonable to me, but what I'm talking about is getting behind the curtain of 'simple rational behavior that we all know', and what I find is not a Platonic monoilith of idealism, but the ordinary experience of discernment and participation. Logic supervenes on sense, but sense does not supervene on logic.

You are right on this. Even with comp.

With comp sense supervene on logic and arithmetic though, in a testable way as we get also physics.

Dreams prove that we are perfectly content to enjoy a universe without logical consistency, but there is not any proof that I know of which suggests that logic relies on qualia or matter. Therefore, it seems to me that logic must either be a psychic phenomenon and therefore not primitive, or that psychic phenomena is illogical and the universe which we think we live in is impossible. I don't think the latter is plausible because it would undermine our ability to have any kind of meaningful opinion about anything real if that were the case.

It is unclear. Logic plays different role at many levels, and so do algebra, statistics, arithmetic, computer science. 

Comparison is used in the everyday sense.

Yes! Now that I understand. What's wrong with the 'everyday sense' being the reality

That would cut all the funding in fundamental sciences, as this answer everything. It is a bit like "why do you waste your time trying to understanding the thermo-kinetics of car motor and how car moves? Why not just accept that car moves when we press on the pedal?"

I think just the opposite. My view says that thermo-kinetics is just the beginning,

As a beginning it is fuzzy and assumes a priori much more. I do agree on the importance of the concept of heat, we might all be some sort of steam engine, but this is more a matter of implementation.

we need to start studying what is the 'we' that presses the pedal also. More funding for interdisciplinary science as well as fundamental.

I agree.

 

The everyday sense is a part of reality, and I would understand it in term of the simplest assumption possible. Then my point is only that if comp is true (that is, roughly, if we are machine) then we can already refute the lasting current idea that there is a primitive physical universe. It gives at least another rational conception of reality, which gives the hope to get the origin of the physical laws, and the material patterns.

I don't see the advantage of a reality which is primitively arithmetic or primitively physical.

I just show that if comp is correct, then it is enough, and adding assumptions is cheating with respect to both mind and matter (and their relation).

Either way we are depersonalized and our lives are de-presented while subterranean abstractions crank out automatism with ourselves as vestigial deluded spectators, powerless in our inauthentic simulated worlds.

No. I'm just afraid you get some bad math teachers. Or you are unable to understand that reductionism is provably dead about numbers and machines already. You are the one who put the cold in some place. 

If instead we look at what we are looking at, and see realism for the sensory experience that it is, then arithmetic truth and Hermetic arts fall out of it organically. Algebra and geometry coexist to serve an experiential, theatrical agenda, not a functional one.

The sensory realism is 1p, and non communicable, and complex to describe (you poetry, novel, movies, music, etc.), so we can't build on it. But it is not because we build on 3p things, that we stop to ascribe consciousness to them, and indeed comp ascribe consciousness to a much vaster set of entities than any form of non comp.

You just illustrate your reductionist conception of number and machine.

 

and the specialized logic being one category of specialized mechanisms within that?

Logic is not fundamental at all, for UDA, you need only the everyday logic that you need to be able to do a pizza. Arithmetic is far more important, if only to understand how a computer functions. 

Haha, you're still telling me that a little bit of shit in the tuna salad doesn't count. If it tastes like logic, then I don't think you can use it to prop up a primitive that supervenes on logic.

I never use the word logic. I use arithmetic which is infinitely richer and stronger. Logic is just a very good tool, like algebra. I assume comp, so it is normal that computer science plays some role, and many logics are related to computer science.

 

Yet more advanced logic can help for two things, when doing reasoning:

-showing that a proposition follows from other propositions (deduction)

-showing that a proposition does not follow from other propositions (independence).

Then, concerning the relation between mind, thinking, feeling, truth, etc. many result in logic put some light, and that is not astonishing once you bet on comp, even if temporarily for the sake of the argument.

In logic, the branch of math, the beginning is the most difficult, because you have to understand what you have to not understand, like formal expressions. 

Logic is just like algebra, and those things imposes themselves once we tackle precise theories, and relations between theories. It helps for refuting them, or representing a theory in another, etc.

I know that comp invites to math, and that this seems to be a problem for many.

To me the problem with comp is that it perfectly describes a universe that we don't actually live in.

Not at all. Comp reformulate the problem into justifying what we live in from arithmetic with the internal views. If this don't match we abandon comp. Comp is just the assumption that we are machine emulable, at some level.

In theory a formula could move my arm, because my arm could, in theory, be nothing but data, but in fact, that isn't what we see. Most of our lives are struggles for mathematically irrelevant resources - time, money, sex, more money, more sex, etc. They aren't arithmetically interesting problems.

Don't confuse a tool and what humans do with it.

The universe which comp describes should be one of florid plasticity and constant exploration,

I agree!

not struggle and frustration. How does a computer get frustrated? Why would it?

When he explores and got punished, when authoritative arguments abound, when the elders fear too much and the youth not enough. The universal machine get frustrated when her universal inspiration is constrained by the contingencies, despite they brought him here also. That's life. But we can suggest better way, and listening to the others is a good heuristic, and when the other looks quite different, like with machine, we might learn something.

Bruno

Craig

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Craig Weinberg]

On Tuesday, November 27, 2012 1:01:26 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 26 Nov 2012, at 20:40, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Monday, November 26, 2012 1:46:53 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 26 Nov 2012, at 13:42, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Friday, November 23, 2012 11:54:57 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 22 Nov 2012, at 18:38, Stephen P. King wrote:

    How exactly does the comparison occur?

By comparing the logic of the observable inferred from observation (the quantum logic based on the algebra of the observable/linear positive operators) and the logic obtained from the arithmetical quantization, which exists already. 

    How does the comparison occur? I will not ask what or who is involved, only how. What means exists to compare and contrast a pair of logics?

The logic exists, because, by UDA, when translated in arithmetic, makes a relative physical certainty into a true Sigma_1 sentence, which has to be provable, and consistent. So the observability with measure one is given by []p = Bp & Dt & p, with p arithmetical sigma_1 (this is coherent with the way the physical reality has to be redefined through UDA). Then the quantum logic is given by the quantization []<>p, thanks to the law p -> []<>p, and this makes possible to reverse the Goldblatt modal translation of quantum logic into arithmetic. 

Comparison is used in the everyday sense. Just look if we get the quantum propositions, new one, different one, etc.

The question is straightforward to me - what makes logical comparison happen? Let me try to tease out what you answer is here, because it is not obvious.

The logic exists, because,

so far so good.

by UDA,

Isn't UDA a logical construct already?

UDA refers to an argument. It is the argument showing that if we are machine (even physical machine) then in fine physics has to be justified by the arithmetical relations, and some internal views related to it.

Isn't an argument a logical construct though? I can't argue a piece of iron into being magnetized. There has to be a plausible interface between pure logic and anything tangible, doesn't there? It doesn't have to be matter, even subjective experience is not conjured by logic alone. Can we use logic to alone to deny that we see what we see or feel what we feel?

Of course not. Why would logic ever deny this?

On the contrary tangible things obeys some logic usually.

The question though is how does that happen? How do tangible things interface with logic - how do they know the logic is there, how do they 'obey' it, and through what capacity can they express that obedience?
 

Is your answer to 'what makes logic happen?' rooted in the presumption of logic?

At the basic ontological level, I can limit the assumption in logic quite a lot.

I'm not sure why that changes anything at all. I think it makes it even worse, because if you have a basic ontological level with very limited logical assumptions, and everything is reducible to that, then what is it that you are reducing it from?

?

If a roast pork loin is really a string of binary instructions, then why isn't it a string of binary instructions? We do we need the pork loin? Why do binary instructions make themselves seem like pork (or shapes or anything other than what they actually are)?
 

 

Actually we don't need logic at the base ontological level, only simple substitution rules and the +, * equality axioms.

Aren't rules and axioms the defining structures of logic? It sounds like this:

C: "How can you justify the existence of logic with logic alone?"

We can't. But we can derive the beliefs in logics in arithmetic. 

(We can't derive arithmetic from logic alone, already).

We can derive logic from sense though. All logic makes sense but not everything that makes sense is logical.
 

B: "Well, you don't need much logic. In fact you don't need any logic. All you really need is logic."

You need logic and arithmetic. Technically it can be shown that you don't need so much logic (equality axioms are almost enough). The arithmetic (or equivalent) part is more important. It is a technical detail.

What does logic and arithmetic need?
 

 

Only later we candefine an observer, in that ontology, as a machine/number  having bigger set of logical beliefs. But the existence of such machine does not require the belief or assumptions in that logic.

I'm not even bringing observers into it. I'm not talking about awareness of participants, I'm talking about the emergence of the possibility of logic at all.

Logic is defined by the minimum we assume like

we will say that "p & q" is true, when p is true and q is true, and only then.

We will accept that if we assume p and if we assume (p->q), then we cab derive q from those assumption.

etc.

Logicians and computer scientist studies those kind of relations between proposition. It is a branch of math, and it is not necessarily related to foundations.

So you are saying that logic comes from human teachings about how we can simplify the relations of ideas, not a universal primitive which is capable of animating matter or minds by itself.
 

That's ok with me, but you don't need any smoke or mirrors after that, you are pretty much committed to 'because maths' as the alpha and omega answer to all possible questions.

On the contrary. The math is used to be precise, and then to realize that we don't have the answers at all, but we do have tools to make the questions clearer, and sometimes this can give already some shape of the answer, like seeing that comp bactracks to Plato's conception of reality (even Pythagorus).

This is not much. Just a remind that science has not decided between Plato and Aristotle in theology.

How do we know that we aren't making the questions clearer by amputating everything that doesn't fit our axioms?

If you believe some axioms is missing, you can add it. 

If an axiom does not please to you, you can propose another theory.

I start from the entire universe as a single indivisible axiom and refine focus from there.
 

when translated in arithmetic, makes a relative physical certainty into a true Sigma_1 sentence, which has to be provable, and consistent.

Proof and consistency, again, are already features of logic. What makes things true? How does it actually happen?

We assume some notion of arithmetical truth. I hope you can agree with proposition like "44 is a prime number or 44 is not a prime number".

What are the mechanics of that assumption though?

In comp we explains that mechanics with elementary arithmetic, universal numbers, etc.

We start from what we agree on, since high school. 

It is not more circular than a brain scientist using his brain. 

I agree it is no more circular than neuroscience, but I think the current neuroscientific approach to explaining consciousness is ultimately circular too. It might be a clue that the only way that we ourselves can disengage from circular thoughts is by using our will to consciously shift our attention from it.

The details of the propositions are not interesting to me, rather it is the ontology of proposition itself. What is it?

That is a very interesting question, but out of topic. Logician model often proposition by the set of worlds where those proposition are true, and they often defined world by the set of propositions true in that world, making eventually a proposition a set of set of worlds, and a world a set of set of worlds, and there are interesting "galois like" connection, meaning interesting mathematics.

It is an entire field of subject.

With comp we don't need to go that far yet, although it is clearly on the horizon.

So comp is a proposition which has not yet proposed a theory of what a proposition is.
 

Who proposes?

Again, that is an interesting question too. here comp can answer, in the 3p view, a number relatively to a bunch of numbers.

Why and how does a number propose (undefined non-numbers?) to numerous other numbers?
 

How do they do it exactly?

By using their relations with each others. You need to study some books, or follow my explanations on FOAR.

What does it mean to use a relation though? It's sensory-motor metaphor. To use is to employ something as an object for a subjective motive.
 

That is the only magic that consciousness contains.

You make some jump here.

Yes, it's only an editorial comment.

Beyond that, it's just mind-numbing patterns playing themselves out forever. Participation is everything and no amount of interrogating functions can conceivably synthesize that from logic. Logic does not participate, it constrains and guides that which is participating as an inert codex of blind axioms.
 

Not much is assumed, except for UDA, where you are asked if you are willing to accept a computer in place of your brain. The computer is supposed to be reconfigured at some level of course. We assume also Church thesis, although it is easy to avoid it, technically (but not so much "philosophically").

Church thesis is similarly reflexive logic. There is no reason to presume that because anything that can be put into a Boolean box has other logical commonalities that this (unquestionably important and worthwhile) commonality extends to causally efficacious presence. An air conditioner doesn't create air. Church assumes the air of sense making from the start and then shows how all manner of air conditioners can be assembled from the same fundamental blueprint. I'm not falling for it though. It's a sleight of hand maneuver. While functionalism does card tricks with logic, the power and reality of sense supplies the table, tablecloth, stage, lights, audience, and girl to saw in half. Yes, I see, you pulled my card, King of Diamonds, very impressive - truly, but how does it taste like chocolate and dance Gangnam style?

Comp explains why we cannot completely explain the sense, and this is rather nice as it prevents reductionist theories of sense.

On the contrary, by being open to sense in machine, comp is rather open in matter of others consciousness. 

I don't see that explains the sense at all though. It explains how to use a certain kind of sense in a very powerful and extensible way, but it doesn't get to the hard problem.

 

So the observability with measure one is given by []p = Bp & Dt & p, with p arithmetical sigma_1 (this is coherent with the way the physical reality has to be redefined through UDA). Then the quantum logic is given by the quantization []<>p, thanks to the law p -> []<>p, and this makes possible to reverse the Goldblatt modal translation of quantum logic into arithmetic. 

Way over my head, but it sounds like logic proving logic again.

It is not your fault. Nobody knows logic, except the professional logicians, who are not really aware of this.
 

I talk about logic, the branch of math, not logic the adjective for all simple rational behavior that we all know. UDA does not use logic-branch-math, but of course it use the logic that you are necessarily using when sending a post to a list (implicitly). 

AUDA needs logic-the branch of math, due to the link between computer science and mathematical logic. 

That's reasonable to me, but what I'm talking about is getting behind the curtain of 'simple rational behavior that we all know', and what I find is not a Platonic monoilith of idealism, but the ordinary experience of discernment and participation. Logic supervenes on sense, but sense does not supervene on logic.

You are right on this. Even with comp.

With comp sense supervene on logic and arithmetic though, in a testable way as we get also physics.

Comp bases that supervenience on its own amputated axioms though. It says, 'whatever fits in this box also fits in every other box that is the same size'. It disqualifies everything out of its own box though. It has no theory of where logic and arithmetic emerge, while it is clear to me that they emerge from sense. Counting is the intellectual act of making sense of a quantity - of naming experiences as an abstract collection.

Dreams prove that we are perfectly content to enjoy a universe without logical consistency, but there is not any proof that I know of which suggests that logic relies on qualia or matter. Therefore, it seems to me that logic must either be a psychic phenomenon and therefore not primitive, or that psychic phenomena is illogical and the universe which we think we live in is impossible. I don't think the latter is plausible because it would undermine our ability to have any kind of meaningful opinion about anything real if that were the case.

It is unclear. Logic plays different role at many levels, and so do algebra, statistics, arithmetic, computer science. 

It isn't clear that logic is the cause. To the contrary, I think it has to be an effect.
 

Comparison is used in the everyday sense.

Yes! Now that I understand. What's wrong with the 'everyday sense' being the reality

That would cut all the funding in fundamental sciences, as this answer everything. It is a bit like "why do you waste your time trying to understanding the thermo-kinetics of car motor and how car moves? Why not just accept that car moves when we press on the pedal?"

I think just the opposite. My view says that thermo-kinetics is just the beginning,

As a beginning it is fuzzy and assumes a priori much more. I do agree on the importance of the concept of heat, we might all be some sort of steam engine, but this is more a matter of implementation.

we need to start studying what is the 'we' that presses the pedal also. More funding for interdisciplinary science as well as fundamental.

I agree.

 

The everyday sense is a part of reality, and I would understand it in term of the simplest assumption possible. Then my point is only that if comp is true (that is, roughly, if we are machine) then we can already refute the lasting current idea that there is a primitive physical universe. It gives at least another rational conception of reality, which gives the hope to get the origin of the physical laws, and the material patterns.

I don't see the advantage of a reality which is primitively arithmetic or primitively physical.

I just show that if comp is correct, then it is enough, and adding assumptions is cheating with respect to both mind and matter (and their relation).

Then I don't see the advantage of a reality which is comp or materialist.
 

Either way we are depersonalized and our lives are de-presented while subterranean abstractions crank out automatism with ourselves as vestigial deluded spectators, powerless in our inauthentic simulated worlds.

No. I'm just afraid you get some bad math teachers. Or you are unable to understand that reductionism is provably dead about numbers and machines already. You are the one who put the cold in some place. 

It's hidden right in your words. "I'm just afraid you get some bad math teachers" is admission that the beauty and warmth of mathematics requires seeing them with the right eyes. It's your sense of numbers which is wonderful - your sensitivity to them, not the numbers themselves. They are just unconscious, automatic fragments of mirror which will refelect whatever light is present. If your reason is particularly illuminating in the mathematical-logical band of sense, then it's like lighting up a fluorescent disco with a black light. If I go in there with only my FM radio to listen to, I don't hear much of anything.

If instead we look at what we are looking at, and see realism for the sensory experience that it is, then arithmetic truth and Hermetic arts fall out of it organically. Algebra and geometry coexist to serve an experiential, theatrical agenda, not a functional one.

The sensory realism is 1p, and non communicable, and complex to describe (you poetry, novel, movies, music, etc.), so we can't build on it. But it is not because we build on 3p things, that we stop to ascribe consciousness to them, and indeed comp ascribe consciousness to a much vaster set of entities than any form of non comp.

You just illustrate your reductionist conception of number and machine.

Machine and number I think are as vast a universe as 1p experience, but in the impersonal 3p mode. From my view, it is functionalism which overstates 3p assumptions and compulsively assigns them to 1p, mainly out of a fear of personal realism.
 

 

and the specialized logic being one category of specialized mechanisms within that?

Logic is not fundamental at all, for UDA, you need only the everyday logic that you need to be able to do a pizza. Arithmetic is far more important, if only to understand how a computer functions. 

Haha, you're still telling me that a little bit of shit in the tuna salad doesn't count. If it tastes like logic, then I don't think you can use it to prop up a primitive that supervenes on logic.

I never use the word logic. I use arithmetic which is infinitely richer and stronger. Logic is just a very good tool, like algebra. I assume comp, so it is normal that computer science plays some role, and many logics are related to computer science.

Isn't arithmetic a kind of logic though? Doesn't counting and addition require that an output is guided by logical transformations on an input?

 

Yet more advanced logic can help for two things, when doing reasoning:

-showing that a proposition follows from other propositions (deduction)

-showing that a proposition does not follow from other propositions (independence).

Then, concerning the relation between mind, thinking, feeling, truth, etc. many result in logic put some light, and that is not astonishing once you bet on comp, even if temporarily for the sake of the argument.

In logic, the branch of math, the beginning is the most difficult, because you have to understand what you have to not understand, like formal expressions. 

Logic is just like algebra, and those things imposes themselves once we tackle precise theories, and relations between theories. It helps for refuting them, or representing a theory in another, etc.

I know that comp invites to math, and that this seems to be a problem for many.

To me the problem with comp is that it perfectly describes a universe that we don't actually live in.

Not at all. Comp reformulate the problem into justifying what we live in from arithmetic with the internal views. If this don't match we abandon comp. Comp is just the assumption that we are machine emulable, at some level.

That assumption makes it so that all internal views are modeled in a way which automatically justifies them to comp. It is the yellow glasses that prove that everything is yellow.
 

In theory a formula could move my arm, because my arm could, in theory, be nothing but data, but in fact, that isn't what we see. Most of our lives are struggles for mathematically irrelevant resources - time, money, sex, more money, more sex, etc. They aren't arithmetically interesting problems.

Don't confuse a tool and what humans do with it.

Why not? What is a tool for humans other than some implement with which humans do things?
 

The universe which comp describes should be one of florid plasticity and constant exploration,

I agree!

not struggle and frustration. How does a computer get frustrated? Why would it?

When he explores and got punished,

I think that is an anthropomorphic projection. Is there any mathematical evidence which shows outcomes effected by punishment? Not talking about disadvantageous game conditions, but actual cruelty and intention to cause hurt feelings. Do computers care if you punish them?
 

when authoritative arguments abound, when the elders fear too much and the youth not enough. The universal machine get frustrated when her universal inspiration is constrained by the contingencies, despite they brought him here also. That's life.

That is life, but I don't think it's arithmetic.
 

But we can suggest better way, and listening to the others is a good heuristic, and when the other looks quite different, like with machine, we might learn something.

The way I see it, my way opens the door to a whole new universe of impersonal artifacts and beauty, while I think with comp, all we will end up doing is reinventing ourselves.

Craig
 

[Bruno Marchal]

On 27 Nov 2012, at 11:55, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Bruno Marchal

 

I am not a mathematician, my background is in physical science (metallurgy)

and of laboratory results therein.  So I have a problem keeping up. But I

think I can say this:

 

Ultimately, IMHO any math or mental abstractions based on the fleshly brain

have to be also true for the fleshly brain.  The problem is perhaps

that the fleshly brain is in <>, the abstractions in [].  I suppose that logically

one could use <>[]p.

Hmm... You are too quick here. I can see the idea though, but to answer this precisely would be long, and premature.

 

I don't know how one could do this, so to begin with, one could keep

operating as usual, by assuming that comp and monads both apply to all

brain activity. 

I think that the monads might be just the number, but seen relatively to some universal number, and so they are programs. the supreme monads is then played by the universal number. You need a universal system to start, and arithmetic is handy for that, conceptually.

 

And in addition, IMHO if you want to also use Leibniz's monads, these must also

be associated to appropriate parts of the fleshly brain.

The fleshy brain is associate with infinities of computations. It includes all the different computations going thorugh your mind state, but that you cannot distinguish from you 1p view. There is an infinity of such computations in arithmetic.

A simple form

of this would be to at first use a functional account of the brain, and the tripartite brain

model (bdi, or belief, desire, intention). Later on, there can be more than one of each

type according to what neuroscience tells us. Magnetic resonance imaging

could be used to label each functionally different brain area of b,d, and i.

 

So you have a Venn diagram of three circles with the fleshly brain as the

central circle with some overlap on either side with comp and monadology.  

I reason from comp, and then look how make sense of what we can observe. here you are too fuzzy, and probably have not yet see that "fleshy" is an emergent pattern in the dream of the numbers, not something existing in some primitive reality. That's the point of reasoning assuming comp. 

Bruno

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Bruno Marchal]

On 26 Nov 2012, at 17:09, meekerdb wrote:

On 11/23/2012 8:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

    How does the comparison occur? I will not ask what or who is involved, only how. What means exists to compare and contrast a pair of logics?

The logic exists, because, by UDA, when translated in arithmetic, makes a relative physical certainty into a true Sigma_1 sentence, which has to be provable, and consistent. So the observability with measure one is given by []p = Bp & Dt & p, with p arithmetical sigma_1 (this is coherent with the way the physical reality has to be redefined through UDA). Then the quantum logic is given by the quantization []<>p, thanks to the law p -> []<>p, and this makes possible to reverse the Goldblatt modal translation of quantum logic into arithmetic. 

Comparison is used in the everyday sense. Just look if we get the quantum propositions, new one, different one, etc.

The question is why is the sentence about anything. 

Well, we are supposed to choose them accordingly. 

It's easy to write down axioms and prove theorems from them, but that doesn't make them true of anything.

No. That is why we ask politely at the start if you agree with them, if only temporarily for the sake of the argument.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[meekerdb]

On 11/27/2012 10:52 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

The question though is how does that happen? How do tangible things interface with logic - how do they know the logic is there, how do they 'obey' it, and through what capacity can they express that obedience?

It's the other way around.  Language was invented to describe things and logic is just some rules about making inferences in a way such that you don't end up inadvertently contradicting yourself.

Brent

[Craig Weinberg]

Right. That's what I'm getting at. Logic didn't invent consciousness. Even if logic could invent something, it wouldn't be able to tell that it had. Before arithmetic truths or physical laws can exist, there must first exist the capacity to detect, discern, and participate in sensory experience of some kind. That is the only conceivable universal primitive: sense.

Craig
 

Brent

[Bruno Marchal]

On 27 Nov 2012, at 19:52, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Tuesday, November 27, 2012 1:01:26 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 26 Nov 2012, at 20:40, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Monday, November 26, 2012 1:46:53 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 26 Nov 2012, at 13:42, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Friday, November 23, 2012 11:54:57 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 22 Nov 2012, at 18:38, Stephen P. King wrote:

    How exactly does the comparison occur?

By comparing the logic of the observable inferred from observation (the quantum logic based on the algebra of the observable/linear positive operators) and the logic obtained from the arithmetical quantization, which exists already. 

<snip>

UDA refers to an argument. It is the argument showing that if we are machine (even physical machine) then in fine physics has to be justified by the arithmetical relations, and some internal views related to it.

Isn't an argument a logical construct though? I can't argue a piece of iron into being magnetized. There has to be a plausible interface between pure logic and anything tangible, doesn't there? It doesn't have to be matter, even subjective experience is not conjured by logic alone. Can we use logic to alone to deny that we see what we see or feel what we feel?

Of course not. Why would logic ever deny this?

On the contrary tangible things obeys some logic usually.

The question though is how does that happen?

Actually comp is better than physics here. in physics we don't know why and how electron obey the SWE. It is the ureasonable use of math in physics. With comp there is only math (arithmetic) and from this we can explain why numbers develop beliefs (axiomatically defined) and why they obey apparent laws

How do tangible things interface with logic -

I guess they would not tangible if they do not. tangibility ask for some amount of consistency.

how do they know the logic is there, how do they 'obey' it, and through what capacity can they express that obedience?

With comp this can be derived from the laws to  which the entities (actually 0, 1, 2, 3, ...) obeys.

The number tree does not need to know anything for being able to divide 6, for example.

 

Is your answer to 'what makes logic happen?' rooted in the presumption of logic?

At the basic ontological level, I can limit the assumption in logic quite a lot.

I'm not sure why that changes anything at all. I think it makes it even worse, because if you have a basic ontological level with very limited logical assumptions, and everything is reducible to that, then what is it that you are reducing it from?

?

If a roast pork loin is really a string of binary instructions,

It can be that, but a string + a universal number can be decoded by a universal numbers into the apperance of a roast pork.

then why isn't it a string of binary instructions? We do we need the pork loin?

Worst, we cannot make sense of it in some absolute ontological sense, bu assuming comp, we can't avoid the delusion by the universal numbers about it.

Why do binary instructions make themselves seem like pork (or shapes or anything other than what they actually are)?

By the decoding process, like 100011011110 can be decoded into add 0 to the content of register 1000. Of course it is more involved in the "real case" of the "roasted pork smelly experiences".

 

 

Actually we don't need logic at the base ontological level, only simple substitution rules and the +, * equality axioms.

Aren't rules and axioms the defining structures of logic? It sounds like this:

C: "How can you justify the existence of logic with logic alone?"

We can't. But we can derive the beliefs in logics in arithmetic. 

(We can't derive arithmetic from logic alone, already).

We can derive logic from sense though. All logic makes sense but not everything that makes sense is logical.

You are right, even with comp. You need arithmetic above. At least, and with UDA: at most.

 

B: "Well, you don't need much logic. In fact you don't need any logic. All you really need is logic."

You need logic and arithmetic. Technically it can be shown that you don't need so much logic (equality axioms are almost enough). The arithmetic (or equivalent) part is more important. It is a technical detail.

What does logic and arithmetic need?

?

Nothing, I would say.

 

 

Only later we candefine an observer, in that ontology, as a machine/number  having bigger set of logical beliefs. But the existence of such machine does not require the belief or assumptions in that logic.

I'm not even bringing observers into it. I'm not talking about awareness of participants, I'm talking about the emergence of the possibility of logic at all.

Logic is defined by the minimum we assume like

we will say that "p & q" is true, when p is true and q is true, and only then.

We will accept that if we assume p and if we assume (p->q), then we cab derive q from those assumption.

etc.

Logicians and computer scientist studies those kind of relations between proposition. It is a branch of math, and it is not necessarily related to foundations.

So you are saying that logic comes from human teachings about how we can simplify the relations of ideas, not a universal primitive which is capable of animating matter or minds by itself.

Yes.

 

That's ok with me, but you don't need any smoke or mirrors after that, you are pretty much committed to 'because maths' as the alpha and omega answer to all possible questions.

On the contrary. The math is used to be precise, and then to realize that we don't have the answers at all, but we do have tools to make the questions clearer, and sometimes this can give already some shape of the answer, like seeing that comp bactracks to Plato's conception of reality (even Pythagorus).

This is not much. Just a remind that science has not decided between Plato and Aristotle in theology.

How do we know that we aren't making the questions clearer by amputating everything that doesn't fit our axioms?

If you believe some axioms is missing, you can add it. 

If an axiom does not please to you, you can propose another theory.

I start from the entire universe as a single indivisible axiom and refine focus from there.

What entire universe? What is that, where does it come from? What is the relation with consciousness. You start from what I want to explain.

 

when translated in arithmetic, makes a relative physical certainty into a true Sigma_1 sentence, which has to be provable, and consistent.

Proof and consistency, again, are already features of logic. What makes things true? How does it actually happen?

We assume some notion of arithmetical truth. I hope you can agree with proposition like "44 is a prime number or 44 is not a prime number".

What are the mechanics of that assumption though?

In comp we explains that mechanics with elementary arithmetic, universal numbers, etc.

We start from what we agree on, since high school. 

It is not more circular than a brain scientist using his brain. 

I agree it is no more circular than neuroscience, but I think the current neuroscientific approach to explaining consciousness is ultimately circular too. It might be a clue that the only way that we ourselves can disengage from circular thoughts is by using our will to consciously shift our attention from it.

Or resolve the circularity. Computer science provides tools for doing that.

The details of the propositions are not interesting to me, rather it is the ontology of proposition itself. What is it?

That is a very interesting question, but out of topic. Logician model often proposition by the set of worlds where those proposition are true, and they often defined world by the set of propositions true in that world, making eventually a proposition a set of set of worlds, and a world a set of set of worlds, and there are interesting "galois like" connection, meaning interesting mathematics.

It is an entire field of subject.

With comp we don't need to go that far yet, although it is clearly on the horizon.

So comp is a proposition which has not yet proposed a theory of what a proposition is.

Indeed. Proposition, as opposed to mere syntactical sentences, is as mysterious as consciousness, meaning, reality, etc. We need much more progress to handle that kind of things. But we can avoid the difficulties in comp by attaching proposition to couple "sentence" + "what a universal machine can do with the sentences". But this does not solve the riddle, but it can help.

Keep in mind that all what I show in how complex the mind-body issue is with comp, if only because we must change our mind on the (currently aristotelian) physics.

 

Who proposes?

Again, that is an interesting question too. here comp can answer, in the 3p view, a number relatively to a bunch of numbers.

Why and how does a number propose (undefined non-numbers?) to numerous other numbers?

By virtue of the fact that they obeys the laws of addition and multiplication, which enable them to have complex computational relations with each others.

 

How do they do it exactly?

By using their relations with each others. You need to study some books, or follow my explanations on FOAR.

What does it mean to use a relation though? It's sensory-motor metaphor.

You can't redefined all term. I use relation in the usual (mathematical sense). A relation on a set A can be defined as a subset of AxA, for example.

To use is to employ something as an object for a subjective motive.

That's an higher level notion.

 

That is the only magic that consciousness contains.

You make some jump here.

Yes, it's only an editorial comment.

Lol

Beyond that, it's just mind-numbing patterns playing themselves out forever. Participation is everything and no amount of interrogating functions can conceivably synthesize that from logic. Logic does not participate, it constrains and guides that which is participating as an inert codex of blind axioms.
 

Not much is assumed, except for UDA, where you are asked if you are willing to accept a computer in place of your brain. The computer is supposed to be reconfigured at some level of course. We assume also Church thesis, although it is easy to avoid it, technically (but not so much "philosophically").

Church thesis is similarly reflexive logic. There is no reason to presume that because anything that can be put into a Boolean box has other logical commonalities that this (unquestionably important and worthwhile) commonality extends to causally efficacious presence. An air conditioner doesn't create air. Church assumes the air of sense making from the start and then shows how all manner of air conditioners can be assembled from the same fundamental blueprint. I'm not falling for it though. It's a sleight of hand maneuver. While functionalism does card tricks with logic, the power and reality of sense supplies the table, tablecloth, stage, lights, audience, and girl to saw in half. Yes, I see, you pulled my card, King of Diamonds, very impressive - truly, but how does it taste like chocolate and dance Gangnam style?

Comp explains why we cannot completely explain the sense, and this is rather nice as it prevents reductionist theories of sense.

On the contrary, by being open to sense in machine, comp is rather open in matter of others consciousness. 

I don't see that explains the sense at all though. It explains how to use a certain kind of sense in a very powerful and extensible way, but it doesn't get to the hard problem.

Indeed, comp does not solve it per se. You need the G/G* incompleteness to approach the explanation, which can be shown to be necessarily incompletable. 

 

So the observability with measure one is given by []p = Bp & Dt & p, with p arithmetical sigma_1 (this is coherent with the way the physical reality has to be redefined through UDA). Then the quantum logic is given by the quantization []<>p, thanks to the law p -> []<>p, and this makes possible to reverse the Goldblatt modal translation of quantum logic into arithmetic. 

Way over my head, but it sounds like logic proving logic again.

It is not your fault. Nobody knows logic, except the professional logicians, who are not really aware of this.
 

I talk about logic, the branch of math, not logic the adjective for all simple rational behavior that we all know. UDA does not use logic-branch-math, but of course it use the logic that you are necessarily using when sending a post to a list (implicitly). 

AUDA needs logic-the branch of math, due to the link between computer science and mathematical logic. 

That's reasonable to me, but what I'm talking about is getting behind the curtain of 'simple rational behavior that we all know', and what I find is not a Platonic monoilith of idealism, but the ordinary experience of discernment and participation. Logic supervenes on sense, but sense does not supervene on logic.

You are right on this. Even with comp.

With comp sense supervene on logic and arithmetic though, in a testable way as we get also physics.

Comp bases that supervenience on its own amputated axioms though.

Comp is the bet that we are machine (roughly speaking). This amputates nothing, unless you amputate machines from thinking, consciousness, but then it is your theory which amputates certain person.

It says, 'whatever fits in this box also fits in every other box that is the same size'. It disqualifies everything out of its own box though.

As a consequence we lost primitive matter, but then nobody has ever shown even one evidence for the existence of primitive matter, beyond the natural extrapolation of what we see (which proves nothing for the ontology).

It has no theory of where logic and arithmetic emerge,

We need to start from simple truth on which you can agree. If you doubt that 43 is prime, then I can explain nothing, indeed. But you seem to start from the entire universe, and sense, which nobody can really agree on. It is only recent that scientists approach the notion of sense, and the notion of physical universe is controversial.

while it is clear to me that they emerge from sense.

You are lucky.

Counting is the intellectual act of making sense of a quantity

OK, but how will you define quantity, then?

- of naming experiences as an abstract collection.

From what, on what?

Dreams prove that we are perfectly content to enjoy a universe without logical consistency, but there is not any proof that I know of which suggests that logic relies on qualia or matter. Therefore, it seems to me that logic must either be a psychic phenomenon and therefore not primitive, or that psychic phenomena is illogical and the universe which we think we live in is impossible. I don't think the latter is plausible because it would undermine our ability to have any kind of meaningful opinion about anything real if that were the case.

It is unclear. Logic plays different role at many levels, and so do algebra, statistics, arithmetic, computer science. 

It isn't clear that logic is the cause. To the contrary, I think it has to be an effect.

No problem with this. I am a bit neutral on this issue.

 

Comparison is used in the everyday sense.

Yes! Now that I understand. What's wrong with the 'everyday sense' being the reality

That would cut all the funding in fundamental sciences, as this answer everything. It is a bit like "why do you waste your time trying to understanding the thermo-kinetics of car motor and how car moves? Why not just accept that car moves when we press on the pedal?"

I think just the opposite. My view says that thermo-kinetics is just the beginning,

As a beginning it is fuzzy and assumes a priori much more. I do agree on the importance of the concept of heat, we might all be some sort of steam engine, but this is more a matter of implementation.

we need to start studying what is the 'we' that presses the pedal also. More funding for interdisciplinary science as well as fundamental.

I agree.

 

The everyday sense is a part of reality, and I would understand it in term of the simplest assumption possible. Then my point is only that if comp is true (that is, roughly, if we are machine) then we can already refute the lasting current idea that there is a primitive physical universe. It gives at least another rational conception of reality, which gives the hope to get the origin of the physical laws, and the material patterns.

I don't see the advantage of a reality which is primitively arithmetic or primitively physical.

I just show that if comp is correct, then it is enough, and adding assumptions is cheating with respect to both mind and matter (and their relation).

Then I don't see the advantage of a reality which is comp or materialist.

If you search advantages, then you let your mind open to wishful thinking, which is not a truth friendly attitude, even if the Löb formula seems to give a sort of role to a form of arithmetical placebo (see sane04 part 2).

 

Either way we are depersonalized and our lives are de-presented while subterranean abstractions crank out automatism with ourselves as vestigial deluded spectators, powerless in our inauthentic simulated worlds.

No. I'm just afraid you get some bad math teachers. Or you are unable to understand that reductionism is provably dead about numbers and machines already. You are the one who put the cold in some place. 

It's hidden right in your words. "I'm just afraid you get some bad math teachers" is admission that the beauty and warmth of mathematics requires seeing them with the right eyes.

Yes, OK.

It's your sense of numbers which is wonderful - your sensitivity to them, not the numbers themselves.

That is debatable. I have learn to appreciate the numbers because some people found amazing relations, and succeed in convincing me, and everyone taking the time to do the work,  about the truth of those relations.

They are just unconscious, automatic fragments of mirror which will refelect whatever light is present.

Yes.

If your reason is particularly illuminating in the mathematical-logical band of sense, then it's like lighting up a fluorescent disco with a black light. If I go in there with only my FM radio to listen to, I don't hear much of anything.

OK.

If instead we look at what we are looking at, and see realism for the sensory experience that it is, then arithmetic truth and Hermetic arts fall out of it organically. Algebra and geometry coexist to serve an experiential, theatrical agenda, not a functional one.

The sensory realism is 1p, and non communicable, and complex to describe (you poetry, novel, movies, music, etc.), so we can't build on it. But it is not because we build on 3p things, that we stop to ascribe consciousness to them, and indeed comp ascribe consciousness to a much vaster set of entities than any form of non comp.

You just illustrate your reductionist conception of number and machine.

Machine and number I think are as vast a universe as 1p experience, but in the impersonal 3p mode. From my view, it is functionalism which overstates 3p assumptions and compulsively assigns them to 1p, mainly out of a fear of personal realism.

It assigns 1p to them, yes. Strong AI too. It is part of the assumption. The opposite assumption treats them as zombie. In case of doubt I think the attribution of consciousness to zombie is less damageable. 

 

 

and the specialized logic being one category of specialized mechanisms within that?

Logic is not fundamental at all, for UDA, you need only the everyday logic that you need to be able to do a pizza. Arithmetic is far more important, if only to understand how a computer functions. 

Haha, you're still telling me that a little bit of shit in the tuna salad doesn't count. If it tastes like logic, then I don't think you can use it to prop up a primitive that supervenes on logic.

I never use the word logic. I use arithmetic which is infinitely richer and stronger. Logic is just a very good tool, like algebra. I assume comp, so it is normal that computer science plays some role, and many logics are related to computer science.

Isn't arithmetic a kind of logic though?

Not really. (of course with "kind of" you might say that everything is a kind of something).

Doesn't counting and addition require that an output is guided by logical transformations on an input?

Not purely logical. It needs to assume some stuff, like 0 is a number, and that is not logical. The early 20th century logicians have tried to deduce "0 is a number" from logic, but they failed, and eventually we understand now what it has to fail (failure of logicism, discovery of the importance of intuition in math).

 

Yet more advanced logic can help for two things, when doing reasoning:

-showing that a proposition follows from other propositions (deduction)

-showing that a proposition does not follow from other propositions (independence).

Then, concerning the relation between mind, thinking, feeling, truth, etc. many result in logic put some light, and that is not astonishing once you bet on comp, even if temporarily for the sake of the argument.

In logic, the branch of math, the beginning is the most difficult, because you have to understand what you have to not understand, like formal expressions. 

Logic is just like algebra, and those things imposes themselves once we tackle precise theories, and relations between theories. It helps for refuting them, or representing a theory in another, etc.

I know that comp invites to math, and that this seems to be a problem for many.

To me the problem with comp is that it perfectly describes a universe that we don't actually live in.

Not at all. Comp reformulate the problem into justifying what we live in from arithmetic with the internal views. If this don't match we abandon comp. Comp is just the assumption that we are machine emulable, at some level.

That assumption makes it so that all internal views are modeled in a way which automatically justifies them to comp. It is the yellow glasses that prove that everything is yellow.

All theories are such glasses. You statement attacks science, not just the comp assumption. It criticize the act of doing assumption, it seems to me. Of course we can stop science and enjoy the view, and that can be a good philosophy of life, but it is not what scientists do.

 

In theory a formula could move my arm, because my arm could, in theory, be nothing but data, but in fact, that isn't what we see. Most of our lives are struggles for mathematically irrelevant resources - time, money, sex, more money, more sex, etc. They aren't arithmetically interesting problems.

Don't confuse a tool and what humans do with it.

Why not? What is a tool for humans other than some implement with which humans do things?

So human can be guilty, not the tools. Guns are pacific, when human let them sleep in the closet. 

 

The universe which comp describes should be one of florid plasticity and constant exploration,

I agree!

not struggle and frustration. How does a computer get frustrated? Why would it?

When he explores and got punished,

I think that is an anthropomorphic projection. Is there any mathematical evidence which shows outcomes effected by punishment?

As much as with human, by definition as humans are machine, by the comp assumption. 

Not talking about disadvantageous game conditions, but actual cruelty and intention to cause hurt feelings. Do computers care if you punish them?

Yes. By definition of comp. I mean humans are computer and seems to care about punishment.

 

when authoritative arguments abound, when the elders fear too much and the youth not enough. The universal machine get frustrated when her universal inspiration is constrained by the contingencies, despite they brought him here also. That's life.

That is life, but I don't think it's arithmetic.

Yes, but that is due to your a priori that machines cannot think, be conscious, ...

 

But we can suggest better way, and listening to the others is a good heuristic, and when the other looks quite different, like with machine, we might learn something.

The way I see it, my way opens the door to a whole new universe of impersonal artifacts and beauty, while I think with comp, all we will end up doing is reinventing ourselves.

Perhaps. There is a sense to say that the creation is what God can use to reivent himself all the time. But why would that prevent artifacts and beauty? Is not more beautiful? Well, that's personal taste of course, a priori independent of what is, or not.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Richard Ruquist]

Bruno,
Does any or all forms of energy come from arithmetic?

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[Roger Clough]

Hi Bruno Marchal

 

To simplify my suggestion, let me put it this way.

 

1) Let a bridge be a noncausal (monitoring only) connection to the fleshly brain.

As a bridge, it just monitors, it does not do anything.

The only thing that does anything is the fleshly brain.

I think the connections to the brain in functionalism are called bridges.

 

2) The brain can be viewed from the outside, say as one

can see it visually or with magnetic resonance imagining. 

This is the physical or objective brain, and changes to it 

are quantitative or numerical. I believe that this is what comp detects.

 

 

3) Any changes to the objective brain are likely to cause

changes to the subjective brain, which is the experiential

of qualitative view of the brain. It is the realm of consciousness

and personal identity.  This is the realm described by monads.

 

4) any change to the objective brain will be reflected synchronistically

with changes to the subjective brain. And vice versa.  These could

be causal, but I will remain moot on that point. They just

correspond or are synchronistic.

 

5) So you have a brain, comp. and monads, and these are

all synchronized, but whether they cause one another I do not say,

I simply observe that they are synchronized in operation.

That is to say, connected by bridges.  

 

[Roger Clough], [rcl...@verizon.net]

11/28/2012

"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen

 

----- Receiving the following content -----

From: Bruno Marchal

Receiver: everything-list

Time: 2012-11-27, 14:05:11

Subject: Re: On method. The applicability of comp and Leibniz to the fleshlybrain

[Roger Clough]

Hi Bruno,

 

how about this summary ?

 

1) comp is a monitor of the objective or quantitative (physical) brain.

 

2) changes to the objective brain are synchronized with changes to the subjective brain and vice versa.

 

3) monads monitor (are synchronized with changes in) the subjective (experiential) brain.

 

4) therefore, comp and monads, the quantitative and qualitative views, are noncausally synchronized. 

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

 

so a synchronization triangle exists:

 

at the top, the brain, qualitatively and quantitatively linked or bridged

 

at the bottom left, comp, a monitor of the quantitative or physical brain

 

at the bottom right, monads, which are monitors of the qualitative or subjective brain

 

the bottom line then says that comp and monads are synchronized noncausally.

 

How the bridge of synchronicity between comp and monads is constructed, I offer the

following hypothesis:

 

Comp is the perceptions of the monads (each referring to a particular part of the brain)

with each other, which is constantly updated by the supremem monad (the One).  

 

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    

 

 

[Roger Clough], [rcl...@verizon.net]

11/28/2012

"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen

 

----- Receiving the following content -----

From: Roger Clough

Receiver: everything-list

Time: 2012-11-28, 07:15:28

Subject: The brain, inside and out

[meekerdb]

On 11/28/2012 2:49 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

The question though is how does that happen?

Actually comp is better than physics here. in physics we don't know why and how electron obey the SWE. It is the ureasonable use of math in physics. With comp there is only math (arithmetic) and from this we can explain why numbers develop beliefs (axiomatically defined) and why they obey apparent laws

So you say.  But where is the explanation and the explanation of why this electron instead of that electron?  It seems your arguments are all of the form, "If comp is true, then everything true is explained by comp."

Brent

[Bruno Marchal]

On 28 Nov 2012, at 02:12, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Tuesday, November 27, 2012 7:29:42 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:

On 11/27/2012 10:52 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

The question though is how does that happen? How do tangible things interface with logic - how do they know the logic is there, how do they 'obey' it, and through what capacity can they express that obedience?

It's the other way around.  Language was invented to describe things and logic is just some rules about making inferences in a way such that you don't end up inadvertently contradicting yourself.

Right. That's what I'm getting at. Logic didn't invent consciousness.

OK.

Even if logic could invent something, it wouldn't be able to tell that it had.

Not really.

PA can discover and prove the existence of prime numbers, and can also prove that PA can prove the existence of the prime numbers. In at least a sense, she can know the prime numbers exist, and she can know that she can know that prime numbers exist.

Before arithmetic truths or physical laws can exist, there must first exist the capacity to detect, discern, and participate in sensory experience of some kind.

OK.

And the comp hypothesis suggest to explain or defined the capacity to detect, discern, and participate in sensory experience of some kind by mechanical, or arithmetical (it is equivalent, with CT), relation.

The riddle of consciousness is explained by the existence of truth about numbers, that numbers can develop many beliefs about, sometimes true, yet unjustifiable, and in some case knowingly unjustifiable by them.

At the propositional level we inherit for the ideal sound machines two logics of self-reference, one give the provable part of self-reference (G) and the other (G*) give the true, including the non provable, part of self-reference. 

That is the only conceivable universal primitive: sense.

Which sense? Mine? Yours? The jumping spider's sense? The computer's sense?

Sorry but it is easier for me to make sense of numbers making sense, than making sense of sense making numbers not making sense.

There is a theory of self-reference for the relative numbers, relative to *probable* universal numbers.

Physics origin is explained by that probability calculus on the universal number histories competing for your continuation (from your 1p view).

Comp extends "Darwin and Everett" on arithmetic, somehow. And I don't say the result is the true physics,  I say that it is testable.

Bruno

Craig
 

Brent

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Craig Weinberg]

On Wednesday, November 28, 2012 5:49:19 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Of course not. Why would logic ever deny this?

On the contrary tangible things obeys some logic usually.

The question though is how does that happen?

Actually comp is better than physics here. in physics we don't know why and how electron obey the SWE. It is the ureasonable use of math in physics. With comp there is only math (arithmetic) and from this we can explain why numbers develop beliefs (axiomatically defined) and why they obey apparent laws

I agree that given the choice between math and physics, I would choose math as a fundamental as physics would have to supervene on math. The same goes for geometry and algebra - geometry needs algebra to really do anything interesting but algebra doesn't need geometry at all from a functional perspective. Both math and physics however rely on some form of sense experience - both for their concrete manifestation and their appreciation/meaning.
 

How do tangible things interface with logic -

I guess they would not tangible if they do not. tangibility ask for some amount of consistency.

There can be consistency without tangibility though. There doesn't seem to be any 'handle' on logic to modulate its capacity to control, be controlled by, or remain aloof from tangible conditions.
 

how do they know the logic is there, how do they 'obey' it, and through what capacity can they express that obedience?

With comp this can be derived from the laws to  which the entities (actually 0, 1, 2, 3, ...) obeys.

The number tree does not need to know anything for being able to divide 6, for example.

Why not? How do three and six know what they are and how to relate to each other? Of if it isn't knowledge, what is it that binds arithmetic function together? We know from our own experience that it is possible to make errors in computation, so how does that really happen?
 

 

Is your answer to 'what makes logic happen?' rooted in the presumption of logic?

At the basic ontological level, I can limit the assumption in logic quite a lot.

I'm not sure why that changes anything at all. I think it makes it even worse, because if you have a basic ontological level with very limited logical assumptions, and everything is reducible to that, then what is it that you are reducing it from?

?

If a roast pork loin is really a string of binary instructions,

It can be that, but a string + a universal number can be decoded by a universal numbers into the apperance of a roast pork.

Why would it be though? What would be the point of a decoded 'appearance'? It's the same thing as the geometry question. If you have exponents and irrational numbers, why would you need a trigonometric appearance? How would you create that even if it was desirable for some reason?
 

then why isn't it a string of binary instructions? We do we need the pork loin?

Worst, we cannot make sense of it in some absolute ontological sense, bu assuming comp, we can't avoid the delusion by the universal numbers about it.

Is that an admission that sensation and qualia make no sense in comp? :)
 

Why do binary instructions make themselves seem like pork (or shapes or anything other than what they actually are)?

By the decoding process, like 100011011110 can be decoded into add 0 to the content of register 1000. Of course it is more involved in the "real case" of the "roasted pork smelly experiences".

I understand what you are saying, but there is still no plausible explanation why adding 0 to the content of register 1000 could, should, or would be anything other than exactly that. The computation associated with modeling this vast matrix of data - the remote evaluation of viable nutritional content, masking of cognitive dissonance triggers so that the pork data doesn't revert to unconditioned murdered pig carcass data, etc...all kinds of data. It's all going to be values in local registers, so why wouldn't the 1p experience of those registers be exactly that - binary code? Why have an experience at all?
 

 

 

Actually we don't need logic at the base ontological level, only simple substitution rules and the +, * equality axioms.

Aren't rules and axioms the defining structures of logic? It sounds like this:

C: "How can you justify the existence of logic with logic alone?"

We can't. But we can derive the beliefs in logics in arithmetic. 

(We can't derive arithmetic from logic alone, already).

We can derive logic from sense though. All logic makes sense but not everything that makes sense is logical.

You are right, even with comp. You need arithmetic above. At least, and with UDA: at most.

Cool.
 

 

B: "Well, you don't need much logic. In fact you don't need any logic. All you really need is logic."

You need logic and arithmetic. Technically it can be shown that you don't need so much logic (equality axioms are almost enough). The arithmetic (or equivalent) part is more important. It is a technical detail.

What does logic and arithmetic need?

?

Nothing, I would say.

It would seem that there are a lot of states of consciousness which have no access to logic or arithmetic. It would seem that even healthy baby humans need several years of development before they can participate meaningfully in any kind of logic or arithmetic understanding. What are they missing or what obstacle prevents them from accessing these things that should need nothing to be accessed?
 

 

 

Only later we candefine an observer, in that ontology, as a machine/number  having bigger set of logical beliefs. But the existence of such machine does not require the belief or assumptions in that logic.

I'm not even bringing observers into it. I'm not talking about awareness of participants, I'm talking about the emergence of the possibility of logic at all.

Logic is defined by the minimum we assume like

we will say that "p & q" is true, when p is true and q is true, and only then.

We will accept that if we assume p and if we assume (p->q), then we cab derive q from those assumption.

etc.

Logicians and computer scientist studies those kind of relations between proposition. It is a branch of math, and it is not necessarily related to foundations.

So you are saying that logic comes from human teachings about how we can simplify the relations of ideas, not a universal primitive which is capable of animating matter or minds by itself.

Yes.

Cool.
 

 

That's ok with me, but you don't need any smoke or mirrors after that, you are pretty much committed to 'because maths' as the alpha and omega answer to all possible questions.

On the contrary. The math is used to be precise, and then to realize that we don't have the answers at all, but we do have tools to make the questions clearer, and sometimes this can give already some shape of the answer, like seeing that comp bactracks to Plato's conception of reality (even Pythagorus).

This is not much. Just a remind that science has not decided between Plato and Aristotle in theology.

How do we know that we aren't making the questions clearer by amputating everything that doesn't fit our axioms?

If you believe some axioms is missing, you can add it. 

If an axiom does not please to you, you can propose another theory.

I start from the entire universe as a single indivisible axiom and refine focus from there.

What entire universe? What is that, where does it come from? What is the relation with consciousness. You start from what I want to explain.

The entire universe is uni- (solitary coherence) -verse (versions, diversions, aversions, etc). It's the totality of sense perception and motor participation. It is the source of whats and wheres, but it is not subject to those distinctions on the level of the absolute. There is nowhere that it doesn't come from, nothing that it is not. It is the 'ing' in both feeling, thinking, knowing, believing, and just thing. 

Its relation to consciousness depends on how you consider consciousness - in the most common definition, when ppl say consciousness, they mean sort of waking human ego-centered healthy adult contemporary qualities of awareness and channels of sense. If this is what we mean by consciousness, then the relation is like that of the entire electromagnetic spectrum to a few narrow bands of frequencies scattered within a popularly accessible range of the continuum.

If you start from there instead, from input-output experience and participation, you can derive Turing from that and find math as well as geometry, physics, biology, etc as qualitative elaborations of that continuum folded in on itself.

 

when translated in arithmetic, makes a relative physical certainty into a true Sigma_1 sentence, which has to be provable, and consistent.

Proof and consistency, again, are already features of logic. What makes things true? How does it actually happen?

We assume some notion of arithmetical truth. I hope you can agree with proposition like "44 is a prime number or 44 is not a prime number".

What are the mechanics of that assumption though?

In comp we explains that mechanics with elementary arithmetic, universal numbers, etc.

We start from what we agree on, since high school. 

It is not more circular than a brain scientist using his brain. 

I agree it is no more circular than neuroscience, but I think the current neuroscientific approach to explaining consciousness is ultimately circular too. It might be a clue that the only way that we ourselves can disengage from circular thoughts is by using our will to consciously shift our attention from it.

Or resolve the circularity. Computer science provides tools for doing that.

Resolve or skip? How does computer science resolve the liar's paradox?
 

The details of the propositions are not interesting to me, rather it is the ontology of proposition itself. What is it?

That is a very interesting question, but out of topic. Logician model often proposition by the set of worlds where those proposition are true, and they often defined world by the set of propositions true in that world, making eventually a proposition a set of set of worlds, and a world a set of set of worlds, and there are interesting "galois like" connection, meaning interesting mathematics.

It is an entire field of subject.

With comp we don't need to go that far yet, although it is clearly on the horizon.

So comp is a proposition which has not yet proposed a theory of what a proposition is.

Indeed. Proposition, as opposed to mere syntactical sentences, is as mysterious as consciousness, meaning, reality, etc.

Exactly!
 

We need much more progress to handle that kind of things. But we can avoid the difficulties in comp by attaching proposition to couple "sentence" + "what a universal machine can do with the sentences". But this does not solve the riddle, but it can help.

Keep in mind that all what I show in how complex the mind-body issue is with comp, if only because we must change our mind on the (currently aristotelian) physics.

Are there still hardliners for aristotelian physics? It seems to me that all anyone is talking about is QM and information-theoretic views now.
 

 

Who proposes?

Again, that is an interesting question too. here comp can answer, in the 3p view, a number relatively to a bunch of numbers.

Why and how does a number propose (undefined non-numbers?) to numerous other numbers?

By virtue of the fact that they obeys the laws of addition and multiplication, which enable them to have complex computational relations with each others.

That sounds circular to me. Like 'How and why do I wake up?', 'by obeying social conventions of civilization'. It's more of an accounting of why propositions are useful, not an explanation of how they occur.
 

 

How do they do it exactly?

By using their relations with each others. You need to study some books, or follow my explanations on FOAR.

What does it mean to use a relation though? It's sensory-motor metaphor.

You can't redefined all term. I use relation in the usual (mathematical sense). A relation on a set A can be defined as a subset of AxA, for example.

It's just figurative though. You are the one who is relating the sets mentally and intentionally. There is no theory of how sets themselves are able to relate to each other, is there?
 

To use is to employ something as an object for a subjective motive.

That's an higher level notion.

I agree, that's why I think it is a mistake to anthropomorphize numbers as being able to use anything, particularly tangible things.
 

 

That is the only magic that consciousness contains.

You make some jump here.

Yes, it's only an editorial comment.

Lol

Beyond that, it's just mind-numbing patterns playing themselves out forever. Participation is everything and no amount of interrogating functions can conceivably synthesize that from logic. Logic does not participate, it constrains and guides that which is participating as an inert codex of blind axioms.
 

Not much is assumed, except for UDA, where you are asked if you are willing to accept a computer in place of your brain. The computer is supposed to be reconfigured at some level of course. We assume also Church thesis, although it is easy to avoid it, technically (but not so much "philosophically").

Church thesis is similarly reflexive logic. There is no reason to presume that because anything that can be put into a Boolean box has other logical commonalities that this (unquestionably important and worthwhile) commonality extends to causally efficacious presence. An air conditioner doesn't create air. Church assumes the air of sense making from the start and then shows how all manner of air conditioners can be assembled from the same fundamental blueprint. I'm not falling for it though. It's a sleight of hand maneuver. While functionalism does card tricks with logic, the power and reality of sense supplies the table, tablecloth, stage, lights, audience, and girl to saw in half. Yes, I see, you pulled my card, King of Diamonds, very impressive - truly, but how does it taste like chocolate and dance Gangnam style?

Comp explains why we cannot completely explain the sense, and this is rather nice as it prevents reductionist theories of sense.

On the contrary, by being open to sense in machine, comp is rather open in matter of others consciousness. 

I don't see that explains the sense at all though. It explains how to use a certain kind of sense in a very powerful and extensible way, but it doesn't get to the hard problem.

Indeed, comp does not solve it per se. You need the G/G* incompleteness to approach the explanation, which can be shown to be necessarily incompletable. 

If comp doesn't really solve the hard problem, what does it solve?
 

 

So the observability with measure one is given by []p = Bp & Dt & p, with p arithmetical sigma_1 (this is coherent with the way the physical reality has to be redefined through UDA). Then the quantum logic is given by the quantization []<>p, thanks to the law p -> []<>p, and this makes possible to reverse the Goldblatt modal translation of quantum logic into arithmetic. 

Way over my head, but it sounds like logic proving logic again.

It is not your fault. Nobody knows logic, except the professional logicians, who are not really aware of this.
 

I talk about logic, the branch of math, not logic the adjective for all simple rational behavior that we all know. UDA does not use logic-branch-math, but of course it use the logic that you are necessarily using when sending a post to a list (implicitly). 

AUDA needs logic-the branch of math, due to the link between computer science and mathematical logic. 

That's reasonable to me, but what I'm talking about is getting behind the curtain of 'simple rational behavior that we all know', and what I find is not a Platonic monoilith of idealism, but the ordinary experience of discernment and participation. Logic supervenes on sense, but sense does not supervene on logic.

You are right on this. Even with comp.

With comp sense supervene on logic and arithmetic though, in a testable way as we get also physics.

Comp bases that supervenience on its own amputated axioms though.

Comp is the bet that we are machine (roughly speaking). This amputates nothing, unless you amputate machines from thinking, consciousness, but then it is your theory which amputates certain person.

That makes it seem like Comp isn't really betting on anything, it's just categorizing any given phenomenon as mechanical by fiat and expanding the notion of machine without constraint. It's a machina ex deus.
 

It says, 'whatever fits in this box also fits in every other box that is the same size'. It disqualifies everything out of its own box though.

As a consequence we lost primitive matter, but then nobody has ever shown even one evidence for the existence of primitive matter, beyond the natural extrapolation of what we see (which proves nothing for the ontology).

It's not the loss of matter that bothers me, it's the presumption of perception and participation without any explicit formula.
 

It has no theory of where logic and arithmetic emerge,

We need to start from simple truth on which you can agree. If you doubt that 43 is prime, then I can explain nothing, indeed. But you seem to start from the entire universe, and sense, which nobody can really agree on. It is only recent that scientists approach the notion of sense, and the notion of physical universe is controversial.

I think that something that nobody can really agree on is the perfect place to start. Or if you want something undoubtable, I would go with 'feelings influence our behavior'. That goes down to at least eukaryotes if not fundamental particles. The idea that 43 is prime is not even on the radar for probably 80% of the human population on Earth, let alone all of the other species. It's true if you have the capacity to understand that it is true, but that understanding by itself doesn't cause tangible things to happen in spacetime.
 

while it is clear to me that they emerge from sense.

You are lucky.

Heh.
 

Counting is the intellectual act of making sense of a quantity

OK, but how will you define quantity, then?

Quantity is like the gap in between qualities. It is the minimally personal sensitivity that is possible to have, and therefore the maximally impersonal and universal representation of any given phenomenon. Quantity is what you get when you take a thin cross section of the spaghetti of experienced eternity and squish it infinitely thin with a logical rolling pin.

- of naming experiences as an abstract collection.

From what, on what?

from personal thoughts about organizing semiotic referents.

Dreams prove that we are perfectly content to enjoy a universe without logical consistency, but there is not any proof that I know of which suggests that logic relies on qualia or matter. Therefore, it seems to me that logic must either be a psychic phenomenon and therefore not primitive, or that psychic phenomena is illogical and the universe which we think we live in is impossible. I don't think the latter is plausible because it would undermine our ability to have any kind of meaningful opinion about anything real if that were the case.

It is unclear. Logic plays different role at many levels, and so do algebra, statistics, arithmetic, computer science. 

It isn't clear that logic is the cause. To the contrary, I think it has to be an effect.

No problem with this. I am a bit neutral on this issue.

Cool.
 

 

Comparison is used in the everyday sense.

Yes! Now that I understand. What's wrong with the 'everyday sense' being the reality

That would cut all the funding in fundamental sciences, as this answer everything. It is a bit like "why do you waste your time trying to understanding the thermo-kinetics of car motor and how car moves? Why not just accept that car moves when we press on the pedal?"

I think just the opposite. My view says that thermo-kinetics is just the beginning,

As a beginning it is fuzzy and assumes a priori much more. I do agree on the importance of the concept of heat, we might all be some sort of steam engine, but this is more a matter of implementation.

we need to start studying what is the 'we' that presses the pedal also. More funding for interdisciplinary science as well as fundamental.

I agree.

 

The everyday sense is a part of reality, and I would understand it in term of the simplest assumption possible. Then my point is only that if comp is true (that is, roughly, if we are machine) then we can already refute the lasting current idea that there is a primitive physical universe. It gives at least another rational conception of reality, which gives the hope to get the origin of the physical laws, and the material patterns.

I don't see the advantage of a reality which is primitively arithmetic or primitively physical.

I just show that if comp is correct, then it is enough, and adding assumptions is cheating with respect to both mind and matter (and their relation).

Then I don't see the advantage of a reality which is comp or materialist.

If you search advantages, then you let your mind open to wishful thinking, which is not a truth friendly attitude, even if the Löb formula seems to give a sort of role to a form of arithmetical placebo (see sane04 part 2).

I'm not looking for advantages to us as people, only to theoretical wholeness. Both comp and materialism leave out the only part that the theory should care about - which is explaining consciousness and its relation to the universe.
 

 

Either way we are depersonalized and our lives are de-presented while subterranean abstractions crank out automatism with ourselves as vestigial deluded spectators, powerless in our inauthentic simulated worlds.

No. I'm just afraid you get some bad math teachers. Or you are unable to understand that reductionism is provably dead about numbers and machines already. You are the one who put the cold in some place. 

It's hidden right in your words. "I'm just afraid you get some bad math teachers" is admission that the beauty and warmth of mathematics requires seeing them with the right eyes.

Yes, OK.

:)
 

It's your sense of numbers which is wonderful - your sensitivity to them, not the numbers themselves.

That is debatable. I have learn to appreciate the numbers because some people found amazing relations, and succeed in convincing me, and everyone taking the time to do the work,  about the truth of those relations.

It gets a bit biased I think. For some, taking the time isn't enough. They find it difficult and tedious, they make too many mistakes, they forget too easily, etc. It's like the Mandelbrot set - it looks great as a graphic visual display, but isn't very impressive any other way. If you can't see, the Mandelbrot set doesn't resonate very well with you as particularly significant. I don't know what a blind mathematician would imagine that it looks like, but as deeply captivating as it looks to us as a computer animation, I would think that the blind mathematician would conjure up something that would make the 'real thing' a bit of a disappointment. Just a guess, but judging on the gap between the ideas behind computer graphics and the reality of their rendering as visual art, I think that the weakness of the inorganic approach is what stands out.
 

They are just unconscious, automatic fragments of mirror which will refelect whatever light is present.

Yes.

If your reason is particularly illuminating in the mathematical-logical band of sense, then it's like lighting up a fluorescent disco with a black light. If I go in there with only my FM radio to listen to, I don't hear much of anything.

OK.

If instead we look at what we are looking at, and see realism for the sensory experience that it is, then arithmetic truth and Hermetic arts fall out of it organically. Algebra and geometry coexist to serve an experiential, theatrical agenda, not a functional one.

The sensory realism is 1p, and non communicable, and complex to describe (you poetry, novel, movies, music, etc.), so we can't build on it. But it is not because we build on 3p things, that we stop to ascribe consciousness to them, and indeed comp ascribe consciousness to a much vaster set of entities than any form of non comp.

You just illustrate your reductionist conception of number and machine.

Machine and number I think are as vast a universe as 1p experience, but in the impersonal 3p mode. From my view, it is functionalism which overstates 3p assumptions and compulsively assigns them to 1p, mainly out of a fear of personal realism.

It assigns 1p to them, yes. Strong AI too. It is part of the assumption. The opposite assumption treats them as zombie. In case of doubt I think the attribution of consciousness to zombie is less damageable. 

I agree, but I think the fact that it is such a point of contention speaks to the deeper complexity of the issue. It's not an either-or dichotomy, consciousness is a matter of quality. It has correlation to complexity, but it is not clear that complexity itself improves the quality of consciousness.
 

 

 

and the specialized logic being one category of specialized mechanisms within that?

Logic is not fundamental at all, for UDA, you need only the everyday logic that you need to be able to do a pizza. Arithmetic is far more important, if only to understand how a computer functions. 

Haha, you're still telling me that a little bit of shit in the tuna salad doesn't count. If it tastes like logic, then I don't think you can use it to prop up a primitive that supervenes on logic.

I never use the word logic. I use arithmetic which is infinitely richer and stronger. Logic is just a very good tool, like algebra. I assume comp, so it is normal that computer science plays some role, and many logics are related to computer science.

Isn't arithmetic a kind of logic though?

Not really. (of course with "kind of" you might say that everything is a kind of something).

It seems like arithmetic relies on some very strong logic of cardinality and ordinality.
 

Doesn't counting and addition require that an output is guided by logical transformations on an input?

Not purely logical. It needs to assume some stuff, like 0 is a number, and that is not logical. The early 20th century logicians have tried to deduce "0 is a number" from logic, but they failed, and eventually we understand now what it has to fail (failure of logicism, discovery of the importance of intuition in math).

Yeah, if I had the math chops I would be interested in starting math over from scratch using 1 as the only number, and 0 as an imaginary absence of 1. Maybe someone has tried it.
 

 

Yet more advanced logic can help for two things, when doing reasoning:

-showing that a proposition follows from other propositions (deduction)

-showing that a proposition does not follow from other propositions (independence).

Then, concerning the relation between mind, thinking, feeling, truth, etc. many result in logic put some light, and that is not astonishing once you bet on comp, even if temporarily for the sake of the argument.

In logic, the branch of math, the beginning is the most difficult, because you have to understand what you have to not understand, like formal expressions. 

Logic is just like algebra, and those things imposes themselves once we tackle precise theories, and relations between theories. It helps for refuting them, or representing a theory in another, etc.

I know that comp invites to math, and that this seems to be a problem for many.

To me the problem with comp is that it perfectly describes a universe that we don't actually live in.

Not at all. Comp reformulate the problem into justifying what we live in from arithmetic with the internal views. If this don't match we abandon comp. Comp is just the assumption that we are machine emulable, at some level.

That assumption makes it so that all internal views are modeled in a way which automatically justifies them to comp. It is the yellow glasses that prove that everything is yellow.

All theories are such glasses. You statement attacks science, not just the comp assumption. It criticize the act of doing assumption, it seems to me. Of course we can stop science and enjoy the view, and that can be a good philosophy of life, but it is not what scientists do.

I think that is true to some extent, but science is always susceptible to revolution by empirical tests. Comp can always take credit for anything that we are or experience first, and then promise to look into it later.

 

In theory a formula could move my arm, because my arm could, in theory, be nothing but data, but in fact, that isn't what we see. Most of our lives are struggles for mathematically irrelevant resources - time, money, sex, more money, more sex, etc. They aren't arithmetically interesting problems.

Don't confuse a tool and what humans do with it.

Why not? What is a tool for humans other than some implement with which humans do things?

So human can be guilty, not the tools. Guns are pacific, when human let them sleep in the closet. 

As long as no humans find out that they're there.
 

 

The universe which comp describes should be one of florid plasticity and constant exploration,

I agree!

not struggle and frustration. How does a computer get frustrated? Why would it?

When he explores and got punished,

I think that is an anthropomorphic projection. Is there any mathematical evidence which shows outcomes effected by punishment?

As much as with human, by definition as humans are machine, by the comp assumption. 

But that's the only thing that corroborates it is that assumption. It isn't falsifiable any other way, even though it is apparent to anyone who has ever worked with a computer or machine that in fact they do not respond to punishment at all.
 

Not talking about disadvantageous game conditions, but actual cruelty and intention to cause hurt feelings. Do computers care if you punish them?

Yes. By definition of comp. I mean humans are computer and seems to care about punishment.

When comp actually has to earn this definition in any way...it really can't seem to do it. Comp sits there in a crib or coffin while proud parents demand eligibility for every Olympic Gold medal.

 

when authoritative arguments abound, when the elders fear too much and the youth not enough. The universal machine get frustrated when her universal inspiration is constrained by the contingencies, despite they brought him here also. That's life.

That is life, but I don't think it's arithmetic.

Yes, but that is due to your a priori that machines cannot think, be conscious, ...

If machines could think, then there would be no such thing as Comp. There would be no issue to debate. I would make a machine like a mousetrap, and we all would agree that this is a rather simple minded, but otherwise fully enfranchised person. While I understand that as a viable theoretical position for some universe, I don't see that as a scientific position in the reality that we live in. You make an a priori that our intuition that machines cannot think is superstition just because we cannot make an airtight logical case for it.
 

 

But we can suggest better way, and listening to the others is a good heuristic, and when the other looks quite different, like with machine, we might learn something.

The way I see it, my way opens the door to a whole new universe of impersonal artifacts and beauty, while I think with comp, all we will end up doing is reinventing ourselves.

Perhaps. There is a sense to say that the creation is what God can use to reivent himself all the time. But why would that prevent artifacts and beauty? Is not more beautiful? Well, that's personal taste of course, a priori independent of what is, or not.

With Comp, we are imagining that the images we discover are part of the universe that we live in, rather than new creations which extend the universe to where it has never gone before.

Craig

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Roger Clough]

Hi meekerdb

 

Have you ever seen one of those rubber balls that people squeeze

to excercise their hands ? IMHO the objective brain is like that,

the subjective brain (c0nsciousness) is like the pressure induced by the squeezing.

 

In my understanding, comp is like physics or neuroscience.

Comp monitors, and only monitors, the objective aspect of the brain,

just as physics can tell you the flight path of a thrown ball.

 

Now consider the double aspect theory of the brain.

 

At the same time IMHO the subjective aspect of the brain arises from

(or controls, we cannot be sure) the objective function of the brain.

So a thought might deform or otherwise affect (eg produce an overall

correlated quantum wave state over) the physical brain, and conversely,

some physical action on the objective brain (such as a signal on a sensory

never) mayl produce an image.

 

So comp can indirectly monitor consciousness, just as a scientific probe or

magnetic resonance imaging can.

 

 

[Roger Clough], [rcl...@verizon.net]

11/29/2012

"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen

 

----- Receiving the following content -----

From: meekerdb

Receiver: everything-list

Time: 2012-11-28, 11:42:37

Subject: Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation

[Bruno Marchal]

On 28 Nov 2012, at 22:30, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Wednesday, November 28, 2012 5:49:19 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Of course not. Why would logic ever deny this?

On the contrary tangible things obeys some logic usually.

The question though is how does that happen?

Actually comp is better than physics here. in physics we don't know why and how electron obey the SWE. It is the ureasonable use of math in physics. With comp there is only math (arithmetic) and from this we can explain why numbers develop beliefs (axiomatically defined) and why they obey apparent laws

I agree that given the choice between math and physics, I would choose math as a fundamental as physics would have to supervene on math.

Nice.

The same goes for geometry and algebra - geometry needs algebra to really do anything interesting but algebra doesn't need geometry at all from a functional perspective. Both math and physics however rely on some form of sense experience - both for their concrete manifestation and their appreciation/meaning.

OK. We disagree on this. Sense seems easier to be explained from relative number or machine's self-references, than as a sort of primitive. 

Keep in mind I am a scientist, and I want a precise and testable theory. And I want both matter and mind explained, or enlighten, and assuming either one or the other tend to not satisfy me so much, to be frank.

 

How do tangible things interface with logic -

I guess they would not tangible if they do not. tangibility ask for some amount of consistency.

There can be consistency without tangibility though. There doesn't seem to be any 'handle' on logic to modulate its capacity to control, be controlled by, or remain aloof from tangible conditions.

Forget logic. Logic is never enough. I have to assume the numbers, or the combinators, or whatever give me an enumerable set of entities, and simple laws obeyed by them.

We have to assume the simple things on which we can agree, if not we are confronted with the theory which assume authoritative solution.

 

how do they know the logic is there, how do they 'obey' it, and through what capacity can they express that obedience?

With comp this can be derived from the laws to  which the entities (actually 0, 1, 2, 3, ...) obeys.

The number tree does not need to know anything for being able to divide 6, for example.

Why not? How do three and six know what they are and how to relate to each other?

I was assuming they can't. Of course I can imagine they could, but with could it can only only quite altered state of consciousness, which are, up to now, not relevant for the mind-body issue. The little numbers, like 0, 1, 2 play crucial role indeed. But when you understand that 3 divides 6, you understand it as following simple definitions which does not relate to any idea that 3 might have some concerns about dividing 6, fell guilty perhaps :)

But you remain coherent with you non comp, and being open to mathematicalism, why not indeed confere consciousness already to each number, even the little one. 

I would insist you accept a "greek axiom" which is that the odd numbers are male and the even numbers are female.

"Number" come from "numerous" ("nombreux" in french means numerous). It already took time accepting 1 and 2 to be number. Eventually 1 succeed and became the King of the numbers, but eventually The Kind was caught in between, I like to say, the two most terrible female of Platonia 0, (death, annihilation) and 2 (life, creation, duplication).

Of if it isn't knowledge, what is it that binds arithmetic function together?

Only God knows. The point is that it is more easy to agree that 2+2=4, than to agree on any more fundamental realm to explain that. 

At least, if you accept that "2+2=4", and comp, you might eventually get some understanding that "the number <big number>, relatively to this <universal number> is in a comp state such that it will utter "there is no more orange juice in the fridge".

We know from our own experience that it is possible to make errors in computation, so how does that really happen?

Dt -> DBf

<>t -> <> [] f

If I am consistent, then it is consistent that I am inconsistent.

Godel's theorem, for arithmetic and all consistent recursively enumerable extensions: if shit does not happen, then shit might happen. With shit defined by the provability of the false.

 

 

Is your answer to 'what makes logic happen?' rooted in the presumption of logic?

At the basic ontological level, I can limit the assumption in logic quite a lot.

I'm not sure why that changes anything at all. I think it makes it even worse, because if you have a basic ontological level with very limited logical assumptions, and everything is reducible to that, then what is it that you are reducing it from?

?

If a roast pork loin is really a string of binary instructions,

It can be that, but a string + a universal number can be decoded by a universal numbers into the apperance of a roast pork.

Why would it be though? What would be the point of a decoded 'appearance'? It's the same thing as the geometry question. If you have exponents and irrational numbers, why would you need a trigonometric appearance? How would you create that even if it was desirable for some reason?

Trignometry is useful when they are angle. More generally, it is not because you can explain happening at a low level, that you can explain an happening at a high level, and many theories, even if equivalent in some direction can speed the undesratnding, or even "create it" as, with comp, the understanding is itself a process.

 

then why isn't it a string of binary instructions? We do we need the pork loin?

Worst, we cannot make sense of it in some absolute ontological sense, bu assuming comp, we can't avoid the delusion by the universal numbers about it.

Is that an admission that sensation and qualia make no sense in comp? :)

No, they can make sense, and there is precise room for this, but not in an absolute ontological sense. Like for matter.

 

Why do binary instructions make themselves seem like pork (or shapes or anything other than what they actually are)?

By the decoding process, like 100011011110 can be decoded into add 0 to the content of register 1000. Of course it is more involved in the "real case" of the "roasted pork smelly experiences".

I understand what you are saying, but there is still no plausible explanation why adding 0 to the content of register 1000 could, should, or would be anything other than exactly that.

It is the idea. Like your neurons are suppose to do some job, and not deciding to leave for example.

The computation associated with modeling this vast matrix of data - the remote evaluation of viable nutritional content, masking of cognitive dissonance triggers so that the pork data doesn't revert to unconditioned murdered pig carcass data, etc...all kinds of data. It's all going to be values in local registers, so why wouldn't the 1p experience of those registers be exactly that - binary code? Why have an experience at all?

I guess it is on the fringe of what is not expressible, still less justifiable, yet true, about the numbers/machines. It is related to the bet in a reality, and in the bet of a reality of oneself. It speeds the computability of one machine relatively to another. 

 

 

 

Actually we don't need logic at the base ontological level, only simple substitution rules and the +, * equality axioms.

Aren't rules and axioms the defining structures of logic? It sounds like this:

C: "How can you justify the existence of logic with logic alone?"

We can't. But we can derive the beliefs in logics in arithmetic. 

(We can't derive arithmetic from logic alone, already).

We can derive logic from sense though. All logic makes sense but not everything that makes sense is logical.

You are right, even with comp. You need arithmetic above. At least, and with UDA: at most.

Cool.
 

 

B: "Well, you don't need much logic. In fact you don't need any logic. All you really need is logic."

You need logic and arithmetic. Technically it can be shown that you don't need so much logic (equality axioms are almost enough). The arithmetic (or equivalent) part is more important. It is a technical detail.

What does logic and arithmetic need?

?

Nothing, I would say.

It would seem that there are a lot of states of consciousness which have no access to logic or arithmetic.

OK.

It would seem that even healthy baby humans need several years of development before they can participate meaningfully in any kind of logic or arithmetic understanding.

It takes some time, it never ends.

What are they missing or what obstacle prevents them from accessing these things that should need nothing to be accessed?

I was saying it needs nothing to be true. It needs of course works and time for a human to "get the platonic reminiscence of those things". Others can accelerate the process, or, alas, slow it down.

 

 

 

Only later we candefine an observer, in that ontology, as a machine/number  having bigger set of logical beliefs. But the existence of such machine does not require the belief or assumptions in that logic.

I'm not even bringing observers into it. I'm not talking about awareness of participants, I'm talking about the emergence of the possibility of logic at all.

Logic is defined by the minimum we assume like

we will say that "p & q" is true, when p is true and q is true, and only then.

We will accept that if we assume p and if we assume (p->q), then we cab derive q from those assumption.

etc.

Logicians and computer scientist studies those kind of relations between proposition. It is a branch of math, and it is not necessarily related to foundations.

So you are saying that logic comes from human teachings about how we can simplify the relations of ideas, not a universal primitive which is capable of animating matter or minds by itself.

Yes.

Cool.
 

 

That's ok with me, but you don't need any smoke or mirrors after that, you are pretty much committed to 'because maths' as the alpha and omega answer to all possible questions.

On the contrary. The math is used to be precise, and then to realize that we don't have the answers at all, but we do have tools to make the questions clearer, and sometimes this can give already some shape of the answer, like seeing that comp bactracks to Plato's conception of reality (even Pythagorus).

This is not much. Just a remind that science has not decided between Plato and Aristotle in theology.

How do we know that we aren't making the questions clearer by amputating everything that doesn't fit our axioms?

If you believe some axioms is missing, you can add it. 

If an axiom does not please to you, you can propose another theory.

I start from the entire universe as a single indivisible axiom and refine focus from there.

What entire universe? What is that, where does it come from? What is the relation with consciousness. You start from what I want to explain.

The entire universe is uni- (solitary coherence) -verse (versions, diversions, aversions, etc). It's the totality of sense perception and motor participation. It is the source of whats and wheres, but it is not subject to those distinctions on the level of the absolute. There is nowhere that it doesn't come from, nothing that it is not. It is the 'ing' in both feeling, thinking, knowing, believing, and just thing. 

I can make sense.

Its relation to consciousness depends on how you consider consciousness - in the most common definition, when ppl say consciousness, they mean sort of waking human ego-centered healthy adult contemporary qualities of awareness and channels of sense. If this is what we mean by consciousness, then the relation is like that of the entire electromagnetic spectrum to a few narrow bands of frequencies scattered within a popularly accessible range of the continuum.

I can't make sense.

If you start from there instead, from input-output experience and participation, you can derive Turing from that

Please do it. The "there" is not enough precise for me making sense of the existence of such derivation. You might have some implicit intuitionist understanding of comp, but with comp, this means to single out the inner God from the other one. 

It *is* "dangerous", as it can make you partially solipsist, which you are when you refuse to attribute consciousness to my sun in law, who got an artificial brain after an accident, when we come at your restaurant.

and find math as well as geometry, physics, biology, etc as qualitative elaborations of that continuum folded in on itself.

To understand "continuum" I already need a bit of math at the start.

I agree it is no more circular than neuroscience, but I think the current neuroscientific approach to explaining consciousness is ultimately circular too. It might be a clue that the only way that we ourselves can disengage from circular thoughts is by using our will to consciously shift our attention from it.

Or resolve the circularity. Computer science provides tools for doing that.

Resolve or skip? How does computer science resolve the liar's paradox?

By showing that truth on X in unexpressible (Tarski, Gödel) by X, for Löbian X. 

Tarski theorem and Gödel theorem comes from different ways to make precise the liar's paradox.

There are other, and this can be related, but is not equivalent, with the limitations of the universal machines.

Theoretical computer science/recursion theory is not born from physical computers, it is born from the liar's paradox, Russell paradox, etc.  Algorithmic information theory is born from Berry paradox, etc.

In science, all big conceptual discovery comes from some paradox. A good paradox is a confession of non-understanding of something, which is the good state of mind to learn something, or discover something.

 

The details of the propositions are not interesting to me, rather it is the ontology of proposition itself. What is it?

That is a very interesting question, but out of topic. Logician model often proposition by the set of worlds where those proposition are true, and they often defined world by the set of propositions true in that world, making eventually a proposition a set of set of worlds, and a world a set of set of worlds, and there are interesting "galois like" connection, meaning interesting mathematics.

It is an entire field of subject.

With comp we don't need to go that far yet, although it is clearly on the horizon.

So comp is a proposition which has not yet proposed a theory of what a proposition is.

Indeed. Proposition, as opposed to mere syntactical sentences, is as mysterious as consciousness, meaning, reality, etc.

Exactly!
 

We need much more progress to handle that kind of things. But we can avoid the difficulties in comp by attaching proposition to couple "sentence" + "what a universal machine can do with the sentences". But this does not solve the riddle, but it can help.

Keep in mind that all what I show in how complex the mind-body issue is with comp, if only because we must change our mind on the (currently aristotelian) physics.

Are there still hardliners for aristotelian physics?

When I was young I thought most scientist were open minded on this, but apparantly (at least) not so much are open to the idea that we might need to throw down the Aristotelian metaphysics. (Like you when you refer to (fundamental?) electromagnetic wave.

It seems to me that all anyone is talking about is QM and information-theoretic views now.

Even Everett is still Aristotelian, and quantum information theory is still too for many physicists (cf Landauer).

 

 

Who proposes?

Again, that is an interesting question too. here comp can answer, in the 3p view, a number relatively to a bunch of numbers.

Why and how does a number propose (undefined non-numbers?) to numerous other numbers?

By virtue of the fact that they obeys the laws of addition and multiplication, which enable them to have complex computational relations with each others.

That sounds circular to me. Like 'How and why do I wake up?', 'by obeying social conventions of civilization'. It's more of an accounting of why propositions are useful, not an explanation of how they occur.

Never believe anything resulting from a brain activity, when talking about the brain!   It can only be biased. Listen to the liver instead.

:-)

Come on, we have to start from little propositions on which we agree. After you get familiar with the theory (in case you are interested) we can come back on that question. 

 

 

How do they do it exactly?

By using their relations with each others. You need to study some books, or follow my explanations on FOAR.

What does it mean to use a relation though? It's sensory-motor metaphor.

You can't redefined all term. I use relation in the usual (mathematical sense). A relation on a set A can be defined as a subset of AxA, for example.

It's just figurative though. You are the one who is relating the sets mentally and intentionally. There is no theory of how sets themselves are able to relate to each other, is there?

Actually there is, as ZF is, notably and trivially, Turing universal. And the W_i, which can emulate the phi_i, can also refer to themselves, etc. 

Anything belonging to a universal type can refer to itself, relatively to some  universal type (including itself).

 

To use is to employ something as an object for a subjective motive.

That's an higher level notion.

I agree, that's why I think it is a mistake to anthropomorphize numbers as being able to use anything, particularly tangible things.

Yes, it is always a bit figurative, but when you get comp, you know that when you say that the number i is a machine, you are talking about the the ith programs in some enumeration of the phi_i or the W_i. It is never a number, nor a body who think, but the entity incarnated relatively to other universal numbers through that number.

 

 

That is the only magic that consciousness contains.

You make some jump here.

Yes, it's only an editorial comment.

Lol

Beyond that, it's just mind-numbing patterns playing themselves out forever. Participation is everything and no amount of interrogating functions can conceivably synthesize that from logic. Logic does not participate, it constrains and guides that which is participating as an inert codex of blind axioms.
 

Not much is assumed, except for UDA, where you are asked if you are willing to accept a computer in place of your brain. The computer is supposed to be reconfigured at some level of course. We assume also Church thesis, although it is easy to avoid it, technically (but not so much "philosophically").

Church thesis is similarly reflexive logic. There is no reason to presume that because anything that can be put into a Boolean box has other logical commonalities that this (unquestionably important and worthwhile) commonality extends to causally efficacious presence. An air conditioner doesn't create air. Church assumes the air of sense making from the start and then shows how all manner of air conditioners can be assembled from the same fundamental blueprint. I'm not falling for it though. It's a sleight of hand maneuver. While functionalism does card tricks with logic, the power and reality of sense supplies the table, tablecloth, stage, lights, audience, and girl to saw in half. Yes, I see, you pulled my card, King of Diamonds, very impressive - truly, but how does it taste like chocolate and dance Gangnam style?

Comp explains why we cannot completely explain the sense, and this is rather nice as it prevents reductionist theories of sense.

On the contrary, by being open to sense in machine, comp is rather open in matter of others consciousness. 

I don't see that explains the sense at all though. It explains how to use a certain kind of sense in a very powerful and extensible way, but it doesn't get to the hard problem.

Indeed, comp does not solve it per se. You need the G/G* incompleteness to approach the explanation, which can be shown to be necessarily incompletable. 

If comp doesn't really solve the hard problem, what does it solve?

The matter problem. 

99% of the hard problem.

And 100% of why there must be 1% unsolvable part in the hard problem.

 

 

So the observability with measure one is given by []p = Bp & Dt & p, with p arithmetical sigma_1 (this is coherent with the way the physical reality has to be redefined through UDA). Then the quantum logic is given by the quantization []<>p, thanks to the law p -> []<>p, and this makes possible to reverse the Goldblatt modal translation of quantum logic into arithmetic. 

Way over my head, but it sounds like logic proving logic again.

It is not your fault. Nobody knows logic, except the professional logicians, who are not really aware of this.
 

I talk about logic, the branch of math, not logic the adjective for all simple rational behavior that we all know. UDA does not use logic-branch-math, but of course it use the logic that you are necessarily using when sending a post to a list (implicitly). 

AUDA needs logic-the branch of math, due to the link between computer science and mathematical logic. 

That's reasonable to me, but what I'm talking about is getting behind the curtain of 'simple rational behavior that we all know', and what I find is not a Platonic monoilith of idealism, but the ordinary experience of discernment and participation. Logic supervenes on sense, but sense does not supervene on logic.

You are right on this. Even with comp.

With comp sense supervene on logic and arithmetic though, in a testable way as we get also physics.

Comp bases that supervenience on its own amputated axioms though.

Comp is the bet that we are machine (roughly speaking). This amputates nothing, unless you amputate machines from thinking, consciousness, but then it is your theory which amputates certain person.

That makes it seem like Comp isn't really betting on anything, it's just categorizing any given phenomenon as mechanical by fiat

The complete contrary: it explains why machines are necessarily confronted with a lot of non computable phenomena.

and expanding the notion of machine without constraint. It's a machina ex deus.

Comp is the contrary. If I am a machine, about anything else is not. Today, it might still predict too much, and that is why we must test it.

 

It says, 'whatever fits in this box also fits in every other box that is the same size'. It disqualifies everything out of its own box though.

As a consequence we lost primitive matter, but then nobody has ever shown even one evidence for the existence of primitive matter, beyond the natural extrapolation of what we see (which proves nothing for the ontology).

It's not the loss of matter that bothers me, it's the presumption of perception and participation without any explicit formula.

?

See the second part of the sane2004 paper.

 

It has no theory of where logic and arithmetic emerge,

We need to start from simple truth on which you can agree. If you doubt that 43 is prime, then I can explain nothing, indeed. But you seem to start from the entire universe, and sense, which nobody can really agree on. It is only recent that scientists approach the notion of sense, and the notion of physical universe is controversial.

I think that something that nobody can really agree on is the perfect place to start.

You can't be serious. 

It *is* funny. 

You should find a job as diplomat in the middle east. 

Or if you want something undoubtable, I would go with 'feelings influence our behavior'. That goes down to at least eukaryotes if not fundamental particles. The idea that 43 is prime is not even on the radar for probably 80% of the human population on Earth, let alone all of the other species.

And string theory is in 0,1% (and I am large). But we don't vote in science. 

We patiently convince by reason and repeatable facts.

I appreciate your wanting all people being close to the fundamental truth, and somehow I am with you, and I would say that 43 is prime is very close to must human, potentially (it is not yet illegal to assert that 43 is prime!).

It's true if you have the capacity to understand that it is true, but that understanding by itself doesn't cause tangible things to happen in spacetime.

You don't know that. Look at the conceptual explanation to understand how comp might explains this, at least from a first person plural view.

 

while it is clear to me that they emerge from sense.

You are lucky.

Heh.
 

Counting is the intellectual act of making sense of a quantity

OK, but how will you define quantity, then?

Quantity is like the gap in between qualities. It is the minimally personal sensitivity that is possible to have, and therefore the maximally impersonal and universal representation of any given phenomenon. Quantity is what you get when you take a thin cross section of the spaghetti of experienced eternity and squish it infinitely thin with a logical rolling pin.

This can make sense.

- of naming experiences as an abstract collection.

From what, on what?

from personal thoughts about organizing semiotic referents.

Dreams prove that we are perfectly content to enjoy a universe without logical consistency, but there is not any proof that I know of which suggests that logic relies on qualia or matter. Therefore, it seems to me that logic must either be a psychic phenomenon and therefore not primitive, or that psychic phenomena is illogical and the universe which we think we live in is impossible. I don't think the latter is plausible because it would undermine our ability to have any kind of meaningful opinion about anything real if that were the case.

It is unclear. Logic plays different role at many levels, and so do algebra, statistics, arithmetic, computer science. 

It isn't clear that logic is the cause. To the contrary, I think it has to be an effect.

No problem with this. I am a bit neutral on this issue.

Cool.
 

 

Comparison is used in the everyday sense.

Yes! Now that I understand. What's wrong with the 'everyday sense' being the reality

That would cut all the funding in fundamental sciences, as this answer everything. It is a bit like "why do you waste your time trying to understanding the thermo-kinetics of car motor and how car moves? Why not just accept that car moves when we press on the pedal?"

I think just the opposite. My view says that thermo-kinetics is just the beginning,

As a beginning it is fuzzy and assumes a priori much more. I do agree on the importance of the concept of heat, we might all be some sort of steam engine, but this is more a matter of implementation.

we need to start studying what is the 'we' that presses the pedal also. More funding for interdisciplinary science as well as fundamental.

I agree.

 

The everyday sense is a part of reality, and I would understand it in term of the simplest assumption possible. Then my point is only that if comp is true (that is, roughly, if we are machine) then we can already refute the lasting current idea that there is a primitive physical universe. It gives at least another rational conception of reality, which gives the hope to get the origin of the physical laws, and the material patterns.

I don't see the advantage of a reality which is primitively arithmetic or primitively physical.

I just show that if comp is correct, then it is enough, and adding assumptions is cheating with respect to both mind and matter (and their relation).

Then I don't see the advantage of a reality which is comp or materialist.

If you search advantages, then you let your mind open to wishful thinking, which is not a truth friendly attitude, even if the Löb formula seems to give a sort of role to a form of arithmetical placebo (see sane04 part 2).

I'm not looking for advantages to us as people, only to theoretical wholeness. Both comp and materialism leave out the only part that the theory should care about - which is explaining consciousness and its relation to the universe.

You are unfair. I agree (weak) materialist hides the problem since 1500 years, under authoritative propositions, but comp start from it and focus on it. Well, there are physicalist computationalist who still try hard to hide the problems, or to use inconsistent or non sensical identification, but let them progress.

 

 

Either way we are depersonalized and our lives are de-presented while subterranean abstractions crank out automatism with ourselves as vestigial deluded spectators, powerless in our inauthentic simulated worlds.

No. I'm just afraid you get some bad math teachers. Or you are unable to understand that reductionism is provably dead about numbers and machines already. You are the one who put the cold in some place. 

It's hidden right in your words. "I'm just afraid you get some bad math teachers" is admission that the beauty and warmth of mathematics requires seeing them with the right eyes.

Yes, OK.

:)
 

It's your sense of numbers which is wonderful - your sensitivity to them, not the numbers themselves.

That is debatable. I have learn to appreciate the numbers because some people found amazing relations, and succeed in convincing me, and everyone taking the time to do the work,  about the truth of those relations.

It gets a bit biased I think. For some, taking the time isn't enough. They find it difficult and tedious, they make too many mistakes, they forget too easily, etc. It's like the Mandelbrot set - it looks great as a graphic visual display, but isn't very impressive any other way.

You can't be serious about that. It is an entire field of research. 

If you can't see, the Mandelbrot set doesn't resonate very well with you as particularly significant.

The Mandelbrot set is just a classifier of the Julia sets which have been discovered by Julia 50 years before the first graphic comes out of the computer. Even a blind mathematicians might devote his life to the study of them, and perceive their great and dense beauty. 

And they might be compact version of universal dovetlaing, so you can pick one on your wall with the label "home". I could use the M set like I use arithmetic (but this is still open).

I don't know what a blind mathematician would imagine that it looks like, but as deeply captivating as it looks to us as a computer animation, I would think that the blind mathematician would conjure up something that would make the 'real thing' a bit of a disappointment.

Not all. 

Just a guess, but judging on the gap between the ideas behind computer graphics and the reality of their rendering as visual art, I think that the weakness of the inorganic approach is what stands out.
 

They are just unconscious, automatic fragments of mirror which will refelect whatever light is present.

Yes.

If your reason is particularly illuminating in the mathematical-logical band of sense, then it's like lighting up a fluorescent disco with a black light. If I go in there with only my FM radio to listen to, I don't hear much of anything.

OK.

If instead we look at what we are looking at, and see realism for the sensory experience that it is, then arithmetic truth and Hermetic arts fall out of it organically. Algebra and geometry coexist to serve an experiential, theatrical agenda, not a functional one.

The sensory realism is 1p, and non communicable, and complex to describe (you poetry, novel, movies, music, etc.), so we can't build on it. But it is not because we build on 3p things, that we stop to ascribe consciousness to them, and indeed comp ascribe consciousness to a much vaster set of entities than any form of non comp.

You just illustrate your reductionist conception of number and machine.

Machine and number I think are as vast a universe as 1p experience, but in the impersonal 3p mode. From my view, it is functionalism which overstates 3p assumptions and compulsively assigns them to 1p, mainly out of a fear of personal realism.

It assigns 1p to them, yes. Strong AI too. It is part of the assumption. The opposite assumption treats them as zombie. In case of doubt I think the attribution of consciousness to zombie is less damageable. 

I agree, but I think the fact that it is such a point of contention speaks to the deeper complexity of the issue. It's not an either-or dichotomy, consciousness is a matter of quality. It has correlation to complexity, but it is not clear that complexity itself improves the quality of consciousness.

Indeed. But comp is rather dichotomic, either your survive at the right level, or not. In which case non-comp can have many variant (the doppelganger is dead, the doppelganger is someone else, the doppelganger is a zombie, the doppelganger is you but with a feeling of loss, etc.)

 

 

 

and the specialized logic being one category of specialized mechanisms within that?

Logic is not fundamental at all, for UDA, you need only the everyday logic that you need to be able to do a pizza. Arithmetic is far more important, if only to understand how a computer functions. 

Haha, you're still telling me that a little bit of shit in the tuna salad doesn't count. If it tastes like logic, then I don't think you can use it to prop up a primitive that supervenes on logic.

I never use the word logic. I use arithmetic which is infinitely richer and stronger. Logic is just a very good tool, like algebra. I assume comp, so it is normal that computer science plays some role, and many logics are related to computer science.

Isn't arithmetic a kind of logic though?

Not really. (of course with "kind of" you might say that everything is a kind of something).

It seems like arithmetic relies on some very strong logic of cardinality and ordinality.

Arithmetical truth? yes. But we need only a tiny part of it for the ontology, and cardinality and ordinality are internal concerns of relative numbers).

 

Doesn't counting and addition require that an output is guided by logical transformations on an input?

Not purely logical. It needs to assume some stuff, like 0 is a number, and that is not logical. The early 20th century logicians have tried to deduce "0 is a number" from logic, but they failed, and eventually we understand now what it has to fail (failure of logicism, discovery of the importance of intuition in math).

Yeah, if I had the math chops I would be interested in starting math over from scratch using 1 as the only number, and 0 as an imaginary absence of 1. Maybe someone has tried it.

Of course. But historically, it is the contrary. It took time to admit 1 and 0 as numbers. Much more for zero.

 

 

Yet more advanced logic can help for two things, when doing reasoning:

-showing that a proposition follows from other propositions (deduction)

-showing that a proposition does not follow from other propositions (independence).

Then, concerning the relation between mind, thinking, feeling, truth, etc. many result in logic put some light, and that is not astonishing once you bet on comp, even if temporarily for the sake of the argument.

In logic, the branch of math, the beginning is the most difficult, because you have to understand what you have to not understand, like formal expressions. 

Logic is just like algebra, and those things imposes themselves once we tackle precise theories, and relations between theories. It helps for refuting them, or representing a theory in another, etc.

I know that comp invites to math, and that this seems to be a problem for many.

To me the problem with comp is that it perfectly describes a universe that we don't actually live in.

Not at all. Comp reformulate the problem into justifying what we live in from arithmetic with the internal views. If this don't match we abandon comp. Comp is just the assumption that we are machine emulable, at some level.

That assumption makes it so that all internal views are modeled in a way which automatically justifies them to comp. It is the yellow glasses that prove that everything is yellow.

All theories are such glasses. You statement attacks science, not just the comp assumption. It criticize the act of doing assumption, it seems to me. Of course we can stop science and enjoy the view, and that can be a good philosophy of life, but it is not what scientists do.

I think that is true to some extent, but science is always susceptible to revolution by empirical tests. Comp can always take credit for anything that we are or experience first, and then promise to look into it later.

Yes. That's how it work. 

 

In theory a formula could move my arm, because my arm could, in theory, be nothing but data, but in fact, that isn't what we see. Most of our lives are struggles for mathematically irrelevant resources - time, money, sex, more money, more sex, etc. They aren't arithmetically interesting problems.

Don't confuse a tool and what humans do with it.

Why not? What is a tool for humans other than some implement with which humans do things?

So human can be guilty, not the tools. Guns are pacific, when human let them sleep in the closet. 

As long as no humans find out that they're there.

As long as no aggressive humans find out that they're there.

 

 

The universe which comp describes should be one of florid plasticity and constant exploration,

I agree!

not struggle and frustration. How does a computer get frustrated? Why would it?

When he explores and got punished,

I think that is an anthropomorphic projection. Is there any mathematical evidence which shows outcomes effected by punishment?

As much as with human, by definition as humans are machine, by the comp assumption. 

But that's the only thing that corroborates it is that assumption. It isn't falsifiable any other way, even though it is apparent to anyone who has ever worked with a computer or machine that in fact they do not respond to punishment at all.

Today. Perhaps.

 

Not talking about disadvantageous game conditions, but actual cruelty and intention to cause hurt feelings. Do computers care if you punish them?

Yes. By definition of comp. I mean humans are computer and seems to care about punishment.

When comp actually has to earn this definition in any way...it really can't seem to do it.

It is not a definition, it is a bet in a sort of funeral rite. You will see people encoding their brain before their death before we buildthose "artificial brain", with all the con and abuse money making in the process. 

It is a bet. We will never know for sure if it is true. 

Comp sits there in a crib or coffin while proud parents demand eligibility for every Olympic Gold medal.

 

when authoritative arguments abound, when the elders fear too much and the youth not enough. The universal machine get frustrated when her universal inspiration is constrained by the contingencies, despite they brought him here also. That's life.

That is life, but I don't think it's arithmetic.

Yes, but that is due to your a priori that machines cannot think, be conscious, ...

If machines could think, then there would be no such thing as Comp. There would be no issue to debate. I would make a machine like a mousetrap, and we all would agree that this is a rather simple minded, but otherwise fully enfranchised person. While I understand that as a viable theoretical position for some universe, I don't see that as a scientific position in the reality that we live in. You make an a priori that our intuition that machines cannot think is superstition just because we cannot make an airtight logical case for it.

On the contrary. I respect non-comp (but not their invalid argument against comp).

The advantage of comp is that it is amenable to math. I prefer to search the key under the lamp.

 

 

But we can suggest better way, and listening to the others is a good heuristic, and when the other looks quite different, like with machine, we might learn something.

The way I see it, my way opens the door to a whole new universe of impersonal artifacts and beauty, while I think with comp, all we will end up doing is reinventing ourselves.

Perhaps. There is a sense to say that the creation is what God can use to reivent himself all the time. But why would that prevent artifacts and beauty? Is not more beautiful? Well, that's personal taste of course, a priori independent of what is, or not.

With Comp, we are imagining that the images we discover are part of the universe that we live in, rather than new creations which extend the universe to where it has never gone before.

No, we start stopping to take the universe as the granted big whole. We get it is part or border of something else.

Bruno

Craig

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Craig Weinberg]

On Thursday, November 29, 2012 1:48:02 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 28 Nov 2012, at 22:30, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Wednesday, November 28, 2012 5:49:19 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Of course not. Why would logic ever deny this?

On the contrary tangible things obeys some logic usually.

The question though is how does that happen?

Actually comp is better than physics here. in physics we don't know why and how electron obey the SWE. It is the ureasonable use of math in physics. With comp there is only math (arithmetic) and from this we can explain why numbers develop beliefs (axiomatically defined) and why they obey apparent laws

I agree that given the choice between math and physics, I would choose math as a fundamental as physics would have to supervene on math.

Nice.

The same goes for geometry and algebra - geometry needs algebra to really do anything interesting but algebra doesn't need geometry at all from a functional perspective. Both math and physics however rely on some form of sense experience - both for their concrete manifestation and their appreciation/meaning.

OK. We disagree on this. Sense seems easier to be explained from relative number or machine's self-references, than as a sort of primitive. 

What I am saying though, is that when you get a closer look at machine's self references, they depend on an actual machine. Doesn't matter if that machine is made of matter or not in theory, but something needs to be there performing *sensory motor functions*, i.e. Turing machine needs to be able to read, write, and compare before any computation can take place. Before any numbers or arithmetic functions can exist, the i/o to a stable medium which is a rigid body (Turing tape, memory, storage, sliding beads, whatever...again doesn't need to be physical body in theory, but something needs to act in a reliable and passive way...not made of live hamsters or fog, it has to have all kinds of uniformity and accessibility which depend on it having objective inertness).

Since all computation supervenes on these fundamental i/o principles, there is no reason to posit that computation is necessary to facilitate conscious experience. I/O and memory already gives you everything that you need to dream. Computation is only necessary to articulate certain kinds of operations within the dream - thinking, linear narrative, etc. The experience of the Turing machine can be a random string of read/writes and still have a universe of sound and fury, signifying nothing. That's consciousness, albeit a lower quality consciousness than we are used to as human beings. The sensation of reading/seeing/feeling and the motive to participate/write/act is already the solution to the hard problem.

Keep in mind I am a scientist, and I want a precise and testable theory. And I want both matter and mind explained, or enlighten, and assuming either one or the other tend to not satisfy me so much, to be frank.

The nature of the sense primitive is such that it is more primordial than explanation itself. There is only the experience of it. The feeling of moving cannot be derived arithmetically. There isn't even a suggestion of participation or perception experience in arithmetic, only the facts of transformations and equivalence. If anything, arithmetic truth is one large argument against the possibility of consciousness at all - same with physics. Experience only makes sense if it is the only thing that makes sense, and when we build out theory that way, then everything makes sense.

You already are the precise and testable theory, you just aren't seeing that as a possibility. There is no simpler explanation for your experience other than to understand it in terms of our sub-personal experiences. Theory and science can only exist within the mind. Sense exists no matter what. Matter and mind are the dual aspect canonical conjugates of sense - only they are not really discrete binary conjugates, but rather conjugate ranges. Matter is the exterior of mind in one range (I call the Pedestrian Fold), they are both fused as arithmetic-divine information in another (Platonia or I call Profound Edge to juxtapose against the Pedestrian Center Fold), mind is a side effect of matter and information in another range (Western), and matter and information are a side effect of mind in another (Orient).

The only way to prove this theoretically as far as I know is by process of elimination. Math and Physics can be explained easily as forms of sense-making, but sense can't be explained by either Math or Physics without invoking some mechanism of sense interaction which is taken for granted beneath the fundamental axioms. Axioms themselves - any axioms, rely on some modality which ultimately leads to sensory-motive concepts before it ever gets to the axioms of any systemic context like information and matter. Only motive power can make or follow a rule and only sensory detection of some kind can sense that there is a rule.

 

How do tangible things interface with logic -

I guess they would not tangible if they do not. tangibility ask for some amount of consistency.

There can be consistency without tangibility though. There doesn't seem to be any 'handle' on logic to modulate its capacity to control, be controlled by, or remain aloof from tangible conditions.

Forget logic. Logic is never enough. I have to assume the numbers, or the combinators, or whatever give me an enumerable set of entities, and simple laws obeyed by them.

We have to assume the simple things on which we can agree, if not we are confronted with the theory which assume authoritative solution.

The authoritative solution is the authority by which you manipulate the attention of your own mind. It is the Cartesian authority of 'I am'. There isn't any way to get around that authority to consider any theory about anything. There is no additional authority that needs to be given away, it is only to recognize that ultimately we cannot get out of our own way, and neither can consciousness.
 

 

how do they know the logic is there, how do they 'obey' it, and through what capacity can they express that obedience?

With comp this can be derived from the laws to  which the entities (actually 0, 1, 2, 3, ...) obeys.

The number tree does not need to know anything for being able to divide 6, for example.

Why not? How do three and six know what they are and how to relate to each other?

I was assuming they can't. Of course I can imagine they could, but with could it can only only quite altered state of consciousness, which are, up to now, not relevant for the mind-body issue. The little numbers, like 0, 1, 2 play crucial role indeed. But when you understand that 3 divides 6, you understand it as following simple definitions which does not relate to any idea that 3 might have some concerns about dividing 6, fell guilty perhaps :)

But you remain coherent with you non comp, and being open to mathematicalism, why not indeed confere consciousness already to each number, even the little one. 

I would insist you accept a "greek axiom" which is that the odd numbers are male and the even numbers are female.

The problem is the symbol grounding issue. This was the whole business with your Restaurant. A menu is not a meal. A symbol which represents masculine or feminine themes to us is not in any way a validation of the idea that the symbol medium itself embodies those qualities. If we were a species of intelligent asexual replicators, odd and even would not, could not have any such connotations to us. Likewise if we had thousands of different genders with no particular themes to them then we wouldn't think in gender dichotomy either (maybe the numbers wouldn't get sexy until they hit the four digit primes?)

This is why I make such a fuss about Puppets not Zombies. Zombies carry an imaginary charge of expectation of life which is absent. Puppets, like numbers, have no life to begin with, but they are vehicles and vessels which we use to receive sensory experience and to empower ourselves with motive enhancement. This is the critical understanding of how mind and matter are bound together, not through function only, but through metaphor. Just as the blind guy uses a cane for eyes, we use numbers to extend the human psyche far beyond the level of our direct perception. With math, we can access the sense of all matter and all logical functions, but only in the qualitatively flat mode of arithmetic instrumentalism. We become far sighted visionaries to universality but myopic to the personal, sub-personal, and super-signifying orthogonal axis. The whole of human interiority, Mozart, Van Gogh, Napoleon, Turing and Godel...their passion and genius is flattened into logic puzzles of generic self-reference. If you build a universe based on that, you would get CGI people with irrelevant faces and monotonous a-signifying histories.
 

"Number" come from "numerous" ("nombreux" in french means numerous). It already took time accepting 1 and 2 to be number. Eventually 1 succeed and became the King of the numbers, but eventually The Kind was caught in between, I like to say, the two most terrible female of Platonia 0, (death, annihilation) and 2 (life, creation, duplication).

Oh, I'm totally down with that. I know Numerology and Tarot by heart. From age 16 to 22 I pretty much did numerology charts for everyone that I met and kept them, pouring over them. I still have them in the closet somewhere. I made analytical graphs and distribution charts, polar projections. Thousands of hours contemplating this stuff.

http://www.stationlink.com/mystic/numero.html
http://stationlink.com/mystic/himandala.html

What I have come to though, is that these truths are truths within sense. One does not stand for Red and Masculine, they are different things, but they all express overlapping sense-making themes and qualia. Archetypes.

Of if it isn't knowledge, what is it that binds arithmetic function together?

Only God knows. The point is that it is more easy to agree that 2+2=4, than to agree on any more fundamental realm to explain that. 

Not for me though. To me it seems like it should be easy to agree that 2+2=4 is a particular text within a particular channel of sense making.
 

At least, if you accept that "2+2=4", and comp, you might eventually get some understanding that "the number <big number>, relatively to this <universal number> is in a comp state such that it will utter "there is no more orange juice in the fridge".

I do accept that 2+2=4, but only because there are concrete sense experiences which give meaning to that abstract distillation. The abstraction itself has no meaning, it is only awareness of the intention to apply that idea to other ideas which gives it meaning.
 

We know from our own experience that it is possible to make errors in computation, so how does that really happen?

Dt -> DBf

<>t -> <> [] f

If I am consistent, then it is consistent that I am inconsistent.

Nice. Although that is a general statement of probability/inevitability. It doesn't specify how it translates into specific incidents of failed computation. I can derive the same thing from sense though. If two or more participants relate to each other, their sense of everything outside of each others sensitivity is attenuated. The stronger a group is connected, the more they all overlook that which is considered least significant to the group.

Godel's theorem, for arithmetic and all consistent recursively enumerable extensions: if shit does not happen, then shit might happen. With shit defined by the provability of the false.

That I can see in sense terms too, but more upside down. With the sense primitive, the universe is that shit which happens, and 'might happen' can only be the expectation of a participant who is already happening.
 

 

 

Is your answer to 'what makes logic happen?' rooted in the presumption of logic?

At the basic ontological level, I can limit the assumption in logic quite a lot.

I'm not sure why that changes anything at all. I think it makes it even worse, because if you have a basic ontological level with very limited logical assumptions, and everything is reducible to that, then what is it that you are reducing it from?

?

If a roast pork loin is really a string of binary instructions,

It can be that, but a string + a universal number can be decoded by a universal numbers into the apperance of a roast pork.

Why would it be though? What would be the point of a decoded 'appearance'? It's the same thing as the geometry question. If you have exponents and irrational numbers, why would you need a trigonometric appearance? How would you create that even if it was desirable for some reason?

Trignometry is useful when they are angle. More generally, it is not because you can explain happening at a low level, that you can explain an happening at a high level, and many theories, even if equivalent in some direction can speed the undesratnding, or even "create it" as, with comp, the understanding is itself a process.

I hear what your saying but I think it's anthropomorphized.  The desire for the speeding of anything seems an entirely biological conceit. In an information-theoretic universe with no physical decay, what could possibly be the rush? A computer can't be lazy or hurry, it can only devote more or less resources. I can't see how any value system over speed would arise. It's an aesthetic ornament to pure functionalism, which makes it dysfunctional.

 

then why isn't it a string of binary instructions? We do we need the pork loin?

Worst, we cannot make sense of it in some absolute ontological sense, bu assuming comp, we can't avoid the delusion by the universal numbers about it.

Is that an admission that sensation and qualia make no sense in comp? :)

No, they can make sense, and there is precise room for this, but not in an absolute ontological sense. Like for matter.

Having room for it doesn't invite it though. It still has no business being there. There is an empty bedroom, but it is a guest room at best.
 

 

Why do binary instructions make themselves seem like pork (or shapes or anything other than what they actually are)?

By the decoding process, like 100011011110 can be decoded into add 0 to the content of register 1000. Of course it is more involved in the "real case" of the "roasted pork smelly experiences".

I understand what you are saying, but there is still no plausible explanation why adding 0 to the content of register 1000 could, should, or would be anything other than exactly that.

It is the idea. Like your neurons are suppose to do some job, and not deciding to leave for example.

I'm not arguing that they wouldn't do their jobs, I'm arguing that is all they would do. The numbers add and multiply and store, but nothing would turn them into a pork roast.
 

The computation associated with modeling this vast matrix of data - the remote evaluation of viable nutritional content, masking of cognitive dissonance triggers so that the pork data doesn't revert to unconditioned murdered pig carcass data, etc...all kinds of data. It's all going to be values in local registers, so why wouldn't the 1p experience of those registers be exactly that - binary code? Why have an experience at all?

I guess it is on the fringe of what is not expressible, still less justifiable, yet true, about the numbers/machines. It is related to the bet in a reality, and in the bet of a reality of oneself. It speeds the computability of one machine relatively to another. 

That fringe-ness is exactly what makes it the only plausible universal primitive. It is precisely because sense experience is the one thing that is everywhere and nowhere that we should suspect something funny going on. The arithmetic and physics are the shadows it casts when it shines through us (and everything).
 

 

 

 

Actually we don't need logic at the base ontological level, only simple substitution rules and the +, * equality axioms.

Aren't rules and axioms the defining structures of logic? It sounds like this:

C: "How can you justify the existence of logic with logic alone?"

We can't. But we can derive the beliefs in logics in arithmetic. 

(We can't derive arithmetic from logic alone, already).

We can derive logic from sense though. All logic makes sense but not everything that makes sense is logical.

You are right, even with comp. You need arithmetic above. At least, and with UDA: at most.

Cool.
 

 

B: "Well, you don't need much logic. In fact you don't need any logic. All you really need is logic."

You need logic and arithmetic. Technically it can be shown that you don't need so much logic (equality axioms are almost enough). The arithmetic (or equivalent) part is more important. It is a technical detail.

What does logic and arithmetic need?

?

Nothing, I would say.

It would seem that there are a lot of states of consciousness which have no access to logic or arithmetic.

OK.

It would seem that even healthy baby humans need several years of development before they can participate meaningfully in any kind of logic or arithmetic understanding.

It takes some time, it never ends.

What are they missing or what obstacle prevents them from accessing these things that should need nothing to be accessed?

I was saying it needs nothing to be true. It needs of course works and time for a human to "get the platonic reminiscence of those things". Others can accelerate the process, or, alas, slow it down.

Sure, once you have the primitive capacity for truth to make sense, then arithmetic is quite a strong representation of the universality and reliability, the unity of truths.

 

 

 

Only later we candefine an observer, in that ontology, as a machine/number  having bigger set of logical beliefs. But the existence of such machine does not require the belief or assumptions in that logic.

I'm not even bringing observers into it. I'm not talking about awareness of participants, I'm talking about the emergence of the possibility of logic at all.

Logic is defined by the minimum we assume like

we will say that "p & q" is true, when p is true and q is true, and only then.

We will accept that if we assume p and if we assume (p->q), then we cab derive q from those assumption.

etc.

Logicians and computer scientist studies those kind of relations between proposition. It is a branch of math, and it is not necessarily related to foundations.

So you are saying that logic comes from human teachings about how we can simplify the relations of ideas, not a universal primitive which is capable of animating matter or minds by itself.

Yes.

Cool.
 

 

That's ok with me, but you don't need any smoke or mirrors after that, you are pretty much committed to 'because maths' as the alpha and omega answer to all possible questions.

On the contrary. The math is used to be precise, and then to realize that we don't have the answers at all, but we do have tools to make the questions clearer, and sometimes this can give already some shape of the answer, like seeing that comp bactracks to Plato's conception of reality (even Pythagorus).

This is not much. Just a remind that science has not decided between Plato and Aristotle in theology.

How do we know that we aren't making the questions clearer by amputating everything that doesn't fit our axioms?

If you believe some axioms is missing, you can add it. 

If an axiom does not please to you, you can propose another theory.

I start from the entire universe as a single indivisible axiom and refine focus from there.

What entire universe? What is that, where does it come from? What is the relation with consciousness. You start from what I want to explain.

The entire universe is uni- (solitary coherence) -verse (versions, diversions, aversions, etc). It's the totality of sense perception and motor participation. It is the source of whats and wheres, but it is not subject to those distinctions on the level of the absolute. There is nowhere that it doesn't come from, nothing that it is not. It is the 'ing' in both feeling, thinking, knowing, believing, and just thing. 

I can make sense.

Cool!
 

Its relation to consciousness depends on how you consider consciousness - in the most common definition, when ppl say consciousness, they mean sort of waking human ego-centered healthy adult contemporary qualities of awareness and channels of sense. If this is what we mean by consciousness, then the relation is like that of the entire electromagnetic spectrum to a few narrow bands of frequencies scattered within a popularly accessible range of the continuum.

I can't make sense.

I was trying to say that human consciousness is a like particular set of radio stations played on a particular set of radios which works by partitioning itself from the rest of the universe, which is the totality of possible broadcast-receiver juxtapositions.

If you start from there instead, from input-output experience and participation, you can derive Turing from that

Please do it. The "there" is not enough precise for me making sense of the existence of such derivation. You might have some implicit intuitionist understanding of comp, but with comp, this means to single out the inner God from the other one. 

It *is* "dangerous", as it can make you partially solipsist, which you are when you refuse to attribute consciousness to my sun in law, who got an artificial brain after an accident, when we come at your restaurant.

The only reason your son in law doesn't have consciousness is because the non-biological circuits his brain is made of didn't grow up together. They didn't go to the same schools, they don't trust each other. They don't scale up into a richer quality of awareness, but rather remain linear monosense data processors. To scale up, the circuits need to have fought for their independence personally and achieved biological-scale self-assertion. That may be something that only happens once per universe, and the molecules synthesized as sugars, proteins, lipids, etc may be the minimum set of fundamental elements in that alphabet. Beneath that organic threshold, selfhood doesn't yet exist. It's a time thing. They are stuck in a pre-biotic cosmos and have no sense of life. If you make a brain out of that, it can only be a pretender to life at best, a sociopath at worst. There may not be a way around this as the very qualities of self-assertion which make cells live precludes complete outside control. The more lifelike you want your AI to be, the more unreliable and selfish your basic components will have to be. There is no perfect servant. It's like a perpetual motion machine - it violates sensory-motive qualitative unity.

and find math as well as geometry, physics, biology, etc as qualitative elaborations of that continuum folded in on itself.

To understand "continuum" I already need a bit of math at the start.

A continuum can be sensed rather than defined mathematically. I'm being figurative in saying it is folded in on itself - there is no 'it', there is only a way of understanding how the cosmos is one big incestuous metaphor/non-metaphor involuted oscillation. We can use math concepts to describe, and hopefully even define it precisely, but I'm saying that the actual 'continuum' is just 'how the universe is'.
 

I agree it is no more circular than neuroscience, but I think the current neuroscientific approach to explaining consciousness is ultimately circular too. It might be a clue that the only way that we ourselves can disengage from circular thoughts is by using our will to consciously shift our attention from it.

Or resolve the circularity. Computer science provides tools for doing that.

Resolve or skip? How does computer science resolve the liar's paradox?

By showing that truth on X in unexpressible (Tarski, Gödel) by X, for Löbian X. 

Tarski theorem and Gödel theorem comes from different ways to make precise the liar's paradox.

There are other, and this can be related, but is not equivalent, with the limitations of the universal machines.

Theoretical computer science/recursion theory is not born from physical computers, it is born from the liar's paradox, Russell paradox, etc.  Algorithmic information theory is born from Berry paradox, etc.

In science, all big conceptual discovery comes from some paradox. A good paradox is a confession of non-understanding of something, which is the good state of mind to learn something, or discover something.

Sense provides the bridge between confession non-understanding and 'seems like'.  Sense is translucent in its opacity, transparent in reflection (and vice versa, or vice uni-versa as the case may be).

 

The details of the propositions are not interesting to me, rather it is the ontology of proposition itself. What is it?

That is a very interesting question, but out of topic. Logician model often proposition by the set of worlds where those proposition are true, and they often defined world by the set of propositions true in that world, making eventually a proposition a set of set of worlds, and a world a set of set of worlds, and there are interesting "galois like" connection, meaning interesting mathematics.

It is an entire field of subject.

With comp we don't need to go that far yet, although it is clearly on the horizon.

So comp is a proposition which has not yet proposed a theory of what a proposition is.

Indeed. Proposition, as opposed to mere syntactical sentences, is as mysterious as consciousness, meaning, reality, etc.

Exactly!
 

We need much more progress to handle that kind of things. But we can avoid the difficulties in comp by attaching proposition to couple "sentence" + "what a universal machine can do with the sentences". But this does not solve the riddle, but it can help.

Keep in mind that all what I show in how complex the mind-body issue is with comp, if only because we must change our mind on the (currently aristotelian) physics.

Are there still hardliners for aristotelian physics?

When I was young I thought most scientist were open minded on this, but apparantly (at least) not so much are open to the idea that we might need to throw down the Aristotelian metaphysics. (Like you when you refer to (fundamental?) electromagnetic wave.

Electromagnetic waves to me are nothing but statistical aggregates of the waving feelings (dispositions) and motions (positions) of atoms which we mistake for mathematical aether-projectiles.

It seems to me that all anyone is talking about is QM and information-theoretic views now.

Even Everett is still Aristotelian, and quantum information theory is still too for many physicists (cf Landauer).

I would agree that most people are not as committed to Platonic truth as your work is, and I prefer that to primitive matter (which really is on the losing side of dualism). If it weren't for the whole sense concept as the uniter of ideal and material contexts I would be on board fully with your view - even to the point of your Son in Law - I have no problem sentimentally with strong AI, I just see that in this universe it doesn't seem to be working out that way.

 

 

Who proposes?

Again, that is an interesting question too. here comp can answer, in the 3p view, a number relatively to a bunch of numbers.

Why and how does a number propose (undefined non-numbers?) to numerous other numbers?

By virtue of the fact that they obeys the laws of addition and multiplication, which enable them to have complex computational relations with each others.

That sounds circular to me. Like 'How and why do I wake up?', 'by obeying social conventions of civilization'. It's more of an accounting of why propositions are useful, not an explanation of how they occur.

Never believe anything resulting from a brain activity, when talking about the brain!   It can only be biased. Listen to the liver instead.

:-)

Come on, we have to start from little propositions on which we agree. After you get familiar with the theory (in case you are interested) we can come back on that question. 

I am interested, but it's way over my head. It's like my mental workspace for math concepts is limited to two variables and ten characters per hour. Convert it all into words and I might have a chance to understand.
 

 

 

How do they do it exactly?

By using their relations with each others. You need to study some books, or follow my explanations on FOAR.

What does it mean to use a relation though? It's sensory-motor metaphor.

You can't redefined all term. I use relation in the usual (mathematical sense). A relation on a set A can be defined as a subset of AxA, for example.

It's just figurative though. You are the one who is relating the sets mentally and intentionally. There is no theory of how sets themselves are able to relate to each other, is there?

Actually there is, as ZF is, notably and trivially, Turing universal. And the W_i, which can emulate the phi_i, can also refer to themselves, etc. 

Anything belonging to a universal type can refer to itself, relatively to some  universal type (including itself).

Does it describe how 'relating' is initiated and preserved without a subject relating them, or just taking inventory of the ways which we can relate them to each other?

 

To use is to employ something as an object for a subjective motive.

That's an higher level notion.

I agree, that's why I think it is a mistake to anthropomorphize numbers as being able to use anything, particularly tangible things.

Yes, it is always a bit figurative, but when you get comp, you know that when you say that the number i is a machine, you are talking about the the ith programs in some enumeration of the phi_i or the W_i. It is never a number, nor a body who think, but the entity incarnated relatively to other universal numbers through that number.

I think that it is entity-ness rather than an entity. Logic is impersonal and sub-personal, but it has no personhood. I would say that it is a shadow, but of course it is much more than that. Changes in logic can and do cause changes in sense, but only if the logic is being used by some participant to make sense.
 

 

 

That is the only magic that consciousness contains.

You make some jump here.

Yes, it's only an editorial comment.

Lol

Beyond that, it's just mind-numbing patterns playing themselves out forever. Participation is everything and no amount of interrogating functions can conceivably synthesize that from logic. Logic does not participate, it constrains and guides that which is participating as an inert codex of blind axioms.
 

Not much is assumed, except for UDA, where you are asked if you are willing to accept a computer in place of your brain. The computer is supposed to be reconfigured at some level of course. We assume also Church thesis, although it is easy to avoid it, technically (but not so much "philosophically").

Church thesis is similarly reflexive logic. There is no reason to presume that because anything that can be put into a Boolean box has other logical commonalities that this (unquestionably important and worthwhile) commonality extends to causally efficacious presence. An air conditioner doesn't create air. Church assumes the air of sense making from the start and then shows how all manner of air conditioners can be assembled from the same fundamental blueprint. I'm not falling for it though. It's a sleight of hand maneuver. While functionalism does card tricks with logic, the power and reality of sense supplies the table, tablecloth, stage, lights, audience, and girl to saw in half. Yes, I see, you pulled my card, King of Diamonds, very impressive - truly, but how does it taste like chocolate and dance Gangnam style?

Comp explains why we cannot completely explain the sense, and this is rather nice as it prevents reductionist theories of sense.

On the contrary, by being open to sense in machine, comp is rather open in matter of others consciousness. 

I don't see that explains the sense at all though. It explains how to use a certain kind of sense in a very powerful and extensible way, but it doesn't get to the hard problem.

Indeed, comp does not solve it per se. You need the G/G* incompleteness to approach the explanation, which can be shown to be necessarily incompletable. 

If comp doesn't really solve the hard problem, what does it solve?

The matter problem. 

99% of the hard problem.

And 100% of why there must be 1% unsolvable part in the hard problem.

I think of the hard problem as the 1%. I'm ok with comp for matter though. Comp is how we get other participant's experience into our own - which looks like matter.

 

 

So the observability with measure one is given by []p = Bp & Dt & p, with p arithmetical sigma_1 (this is coherent with the way the physical reality has to be redefined through UDA). Then the quantum logic is given by the quantization []<>p, thanks to the law p -> []<>p, and this makes possible to reverse the Goldblatt modal translation of quantum logic into arithmetic. 

Way over my head, but it sounds like logic proving logic again.

It is not your fault. Nobody knows logic, except the professional logicians, who are not really aware of this.
 

I talk about logic, the branch of math, not logic the adjective for all simple rational behavior that we all know. UDA does not use logic-branch-math, but of course it use the logic that you are necessarily using when sending a post to a list (implicitly). 

AUDA needs logic-the branch of math, due to the link between computer science and mathematical logic. 

That's reasonable to me, but what I'm talking about is getting behind the curtain of 'simple rational behavior that we all know', and what I find is not a Platonic monoilith of idealism, but the ordinary experience of discernment and participation. Logic supervenes on sense, but sense does not supervene on logic.

You are right on this. Even with comp.

With comp sense supervene on logic and arithmetic though, in a testable way as we get also physics.

Comp bases that supervenience on its own amputated axioms though.

Comp is the bet that we are machine (roughly speaking). This amputates nothing, unless you amputate machines from thinking, consciousness, but then it is your theory which amputates certain person.

That makes it seem like Comp isn't really betting on anything, it's just categorizing any given phenomenon as mechanical by fiat

The complete contrary: it explains why machines are necessarily confronted with a lot of non computable phenomena.

But it doesn't have a theory of what lives as non-computable phenomena, which is what we are interested in as far as consciousness goes - free will, qualia (aka motive position effect, sense disposition affect).

and expanding the notion of machine without constraint. It's a machina ex deus.

Comp is the contrary. If I am a machine, about anything else is not. Today, it might still predict too much, and that is why we must test it.

What is everything else? What is it made of? What does it do?
 

 

It says, 'whatever fits in this box also fits in every other box that is the same size'. It disqualifies everything out of its own box though.

As a consequence we lost primitive matter, but then nobody has ever shown even one evidence for the existence of primitive matter, beyond the natural extrapolation of what we see (which proves nothing for the ontology).

It's not the loss of matter that bothers me, it's the presumption of perception and participation without any explicit formula.

?

See the second part of the sane2004 paper.

I've tried before.
 

 

It has no theory of where logic and arithmetic emerge,

We need to start from simple truth on which you can agree. If you doubt that 43 is prime, then I can explain nothing, indeed. But you seem to start from the entire universe, and sense, which nobody can really agree on. It is only recent that scientists approach the notion of sense, and the notion of physical universe is controversial.

I think that something that nobody can really agree on is the perfect place to start.

You can't be serious. 

It *is* funny. 

You should find a job as diplomat in the middle east. 

Totally serious. We can all agree that we all feel surprised that we disagree. We can then organize that disagreement. This is exactly what I did. They map into a spectrum ranging from hard reductionist logic to wide open spiritual intuition. From there we can plug in the Lorentz transformations basically and see that each position can only see its conjugate as the inversion of itself. Perceptual relativism is the one absolute which all of us share. We all feel that the world would be better if everyone was more like ourselves.
 

Or if you want something undoubtable, I would go with 'feelings influence our behavior'. That goes down to at least eukaryotes if not fundamental particles. The idea that 43 is prime is not even on the radar for probably 80% of the human population on Earth, let alone all of the other species.

And string theory is in 0,1% (and I am large). But we don't vote in science. 

We patiently convince by reason and repeatable facts.

Who is it that is being patient though? Who is being convinced? What reason or fact allows that 'who' to exist?

I appreciate your wanting all people being close to the fundamental truth, and somehow I am with you, and I would say that 43 is prime is very close to must human, potentially (it is not yet illegal to assert that 43 is prime!).

It's true if you have the capacity to understand that it is true, but that understanding by itself doesn't cause tangible things to happen in spacetime.

You don't know that. Look at the conceptual explanation to understand how comp might explains this, at least from a first person plural view.

In practice though, we can see that deciding something is true doesn't make it true. Even if you are hypnotized into thinking you aren't thirsty, you will still die without water. Even if you fool the hypothalamus into feeling completely satiated with water, you'll still die without water.
 

 

while it is clear to me that they emerge from sense.

You are lucky.

Heh.
 

Counting is the intellectual act of making sense of a quantity

OK, but how will you define quantity, then?

Quantity is like the gap in between qualities. It is the minimally personal sensitivity that is possible to have, and therefore the maximally impersonal and universal representation of any given phenomenon. Quantity is what you get when you take a thin cross section of the spaghetti of experienced eternity and squish it infinitely thin with a logical rolling pin.

This can make sense.

Cool. I respect the maths, I'm just working with more of a wide angle lens psychologically. I can only focus on everything.
 

- of naming experiences as an abstract collection.

From what, on what?

from personal thoughts about organizing semiotic referents.

Dreams prove that we are perfectly content to enjoy a universe without logical consistency, but there is not any proof that I know of which suggests that logic relies on qualia or matter. Therefore, it seems to me that logic must either be a psychic phenomenon and therefore not primitive, or that psychic phenomena is illogical and the universe which we think we live in is impossible. I don't think the latter is plausible because it would undermine our ability to have any kind of meaningful opinion about anything real if that were the case.

It is unclear. Logic plays different role at many levels, and so do algebra, statistics, arithmetic, computer science. 

It isn't clear that logic is the cause. To the contrary, I think it has to be an effect.

No problem with this. I am a bit neutral on this issue.

Cool.
 

 

Comparison is used in the everyday sense.

Yes! Now that I understand. What's wrong with the 'everyday sense' being the reality

That would cut all the funding in fundamental sciences, as this answer everything. It is a bit like "why do you waste your time trying to understanding the thermo-kinetics of car motor and how car moves? Why not just accept that car moves when we press on the pedal?"

I think just the opposite. My view says that thermo-kinetics is just the beginning,

As a beginning it is fuzzy and assumes a priori much more. I do agree on the importance of the concept of heat, we might all be some sort of steam engine, but this is more a matter of implementation.

we need to start studying what is the 'we' that presses the pedal also. More funding for interdisciplinary science as well as fundamental.

I agree.

 

The everyday sense is a part of reality, and I would understand it in term of the simplest assumption possible. Then my point is only that if comp is true (that is, roughly, if we are machine) then we can already refute the lasting current idea that there is a primitive physical universe. It gives at least another rational conception of reality, which gives the hope to get the origin of the physical laws, and the material patterns.

I don't see the advantage of a reality which is primitively arithmetic or primitively physical.

I just show that if comp is correct, then it is enough, and adding assumptions is cheating with respect to both mind and matter (and their relation).

Then I don't see the advantage of a reality which is comp or materialist.

If you search advantages, then you let your mind open to wishful thinking, which is not a truth friendly attitude, even if the Löb formula seems to give a sort of role to a form of arithmetical placebo (see sane04 part 2).

I'm not looking for advantages to us as people, only to theoretical wholeness. Both comp and materialism leave out the only part that the theory should care about - which is explaining consciousness and its relation to the universe.

You are unfair. I agree (weak) materialist hides the problem since 1500 years, under authoritative propositions, but comp start from it and focus on it. Well, there are physicalist computationalist who still try hard to hide the problems, or to use inconsistent or non sensical identification, but let them progress.

I'm not trying to be unfair, I think that they are both useful approaches, but they fall short of their ostensible goal. Like AI, I'm all for a full immersion Matrix-Westworld-whatever, I only say that they are going to be automated game avatars not personal beings.

 

 

Either way we are depersonalized and our lives are de-presented while subterranean abstractions crank out automatism with ourselves as vestigial deluded spectators, powerless in our inauthentic simulated worlds.

No. I'm just afraid you get some bad math teachers. Or you are unable to understand that reductionism is provably dead about numbers and machines already. You are the one who put the cold in some place. 

It's hidden right in your words. "I'm just afraid you get some bad math teachers" is admission that the beauty and warmth of mathematics requires seeing them with the right eyes.

Yes, OK.

:)
 

It's your sense of numbers which is wonderful - your sensitivity to them, not the numbers themselves.

That is debatable. I have learn to appreciate the numbers because some people found amazing relations, and succeed in convincing me, and everyone taking the time to do the work,  about the truth of those relations.

It gets a bit biased I think. For some, taking the time isn't enough. They find it difficult and tedious, they make too many mistakes, they forget too easily, etc. It's like the Mandelbrot set - it looks great as a graphic visual display, but isn't very impressive any other way.

You can't be serious about that. It is an entire field of research. 

Oh sure, it's impressive if you study it, but isn't anything? There are entire fields of research studying a fungus or dead languages, but as far as celebrity iconic status, it's just the graphic display that brings that out for the general public.
 

If you can't see, the Mandelbrot set doesn't resonate very well with you as particularly significant.

The Mandelbrot set is just a classifier of the Julia sets which have been discovered by Julia 50 years before the first graphic comes out of the computer. Even a blind mathematicians might devote his life to the study of them, and perceive their great and dense beauty. 

And they might be compact version of universal dovetlaing, so you can pick one on your wall with the label "home". I could use the M set like I use arithmetic (but this is still open).

Absolutely. Not arguing that mathematicians wouldn't be interested in these ideas. I wasn't thinking that they showed up one day on a computer screen by accident, I only meant that the visual impact is what makes the sense they make accessible to the public.
 

I don't know what a blind mathematician would imagine that it looks like, but as deeply captivating as it looks to us as a computer animation, I would think that the blind mathematician would conjure up something that would make the 'real thing' a bit of a disappointment.

Not all. 

Yeah, I donno.
 

Just a guess, but judging on the gap between the ideas behind computer graphics and the reality of their rendering as visual art, I think that the weakness of the inorganic approach is what stands out.
 

They are just unconscious, automatic fragments of mirror which will refelect whatever light is present.

Yes.

If your reason is particularly illuminating in the mathematical-logical band of sense, then it's like lighting up a fluorescent disco with a black light. If I go in there with only my FM radio to listen to, I don't hear much of anything.

OK.

If instead we look at what we are looking at, and see realism for the sensory experience that it is, then arithmetic truth and Hermetic arts fall out of it organically. Algebra and geometry coexist to serve an experiential, theatrical agenda, not a functional one.

The sensory realism is 1p, and non communicable, and complex to describe (you poetry, novel, movies, music, etc.), so we can't build on it. But it is not because we build on 3p things, that we stop to ascribe consciousness to them, and indeed comp ascribe consciousness to a much vaster set of entities than any form of non comp.

You just illustrate your reductionist conception of number and machine.

Machine and number I think are as vast a universe as 1p experience, but in the impersonal 3p mode. From my view, it is functionalism which overstates 3p assumptions and compulsively assigns them to 1p, mainly out of a fear of personal realism.

It assigns 1p to them, yes. Strong AI too. It is part of the assumption. The opposite assumption treats them as zombie. In case of doubt I think the attribution of consciousness to zombie is less damageable. 

I agree, but I think the fact that it is such a point of contention speaks to the deeper complexity of the issue. It's not an either-or dichotomy, consciousness is a matter of quality. It has correlation to complexity, but it is not clear that complexity itself improves the quality of consciousness.

Indeed. But comp is rather dichotomic, either your survive at the right level, or not. In which case non-comp can have many variant (the doppelganger is dead, the doppelganger is someone else, the doppelganger is a zombie, the doppelganger is you but with a feeling of loss, etc.)

That's part of where comp departs from the universe that we live in. It's a toy model of consciousness. Look at those conjoined twin girls, are they one person or two?
 

 

 

 

and the specialized logic being one category of specialized mechanisms within that?

Logic is not fundamental at all, for UDA, you need only the everyday logic that you need to be able to do a pizza. Arithmetic is far more important, if only to understand how a computer functions. 

Haha, you're still telling me that a little bit of shit in the tuna salad doesn't count. If it tastes like logic, then I don't think you can use it to prop up a primitive that supervenes on logic.

I never use the word logic. I use arithmetic which is infinitely richer and stronger. Logic is just a very good tool, like algebra. I assume comp, so it is normal that computer science plays some role, and many logics are related to computer science.

Isn't arithmetic a kind of logic though?

Not really. (of course with "kind of" you might say that everything is a kind of something).

It seems like arithmetic relies on some very strong logic of cardinality and ordinality.

Arithmetical truth? yes. But we need only a tiny part of it for the ontology, and cardinality and ordinality are internal concerns of relative numbers).

The internal concerns of relative numbers sounds like sense. It sounds like subjectivity already. Again, the numbers don't need to build consciousness, they already are conscious in comp. It takes consciousness for granted from the start.

 

Doesn't counting and addition require that an output is guided by logical transformations on an input?

Not purely logical. It needs to assume some stuff, like 0 is a number, and that is not logical. The early 20th century logicians have tried to deduce "0 is a number" from logic, but they failed, and eventually we understand now what it has to fail (failure of logicism, discovery of the importance of intuition in math).

Yeah, if I had the math chops I would be interested in starting math over from scratch using 1 as the only number, and 0 as an imaginary absence of 1. Maybe someone has tried it.

Of course. But historically, it is the contrary. It took time to admit 1 and 0 as numbers. Much more for zero.

I think that parallels the transition I anticipate now. To progress we need to have a counter-Copernican revolution which restores subjectivity. This may very well mean a new arithmetic interpretation that is fundamental to that extent. If matter is to have the rug pulled out from under it and become a mathematical side effect, then zero too might need to be understood as a useful fiction - a kind of inverted shadow cast by the hole which 1 creates in infinity by being 1.
 

 

 

Yet more advanced logic can help for two things, when doing reasoning:

-showing that a proposition follows from other propositions (deduction)

-showing that a proposition does not follow from other propositions (independence).

Then, concerning the relation between mind, thinking, feeling, truth, etc. many result in logic put some light, and that is not astonishing once you bet on comp, even if temporarily for the sake of the argument.

In logic, the branch of math, the beginning is the most difficult, because you have to understand what you have to not understand, like formal expressions. 

Logic is just like algebra, and those things imposes themselves once we tackle precise theories, and relations between theories. It helps for refuting them, or representing a theory in another, etc.

I know that comp invites to math, and that this seems to be a problem for many.

To me the problem with comp is that it perfectly describes a universe that we don't actually live in.

Not at all. Comp reformulate the problem into justifying what we live in from arithmetic with the internal views. If this don't match we abandon comp. Comp is just the assumption that we are machine emulable, at some level.

That assumption makes it so that all internal views are modeled in a way which automatically justifies them to comp. It is the yellow glasses that prove that everything is yellow.

All theories are such glasses. You statement attacks science, not just the comp assumption. It criticize the act of doing assumption, it seems to me. Of course we can stop science and enjoy the view, and that can be a good philosophy of life, but it is not what scientists do.

I think that is true to some extent, but science is always susceptible to revolution by empirical tests. Comp can always take credit for anything that we are or experience first, and then promise to look into it later.

Yes. That's how it work. 

Haha. Nice work if you can get it. I would definitely start a law firm with you.
 

 

In theory a formula could move my arm, because my arm could, in theory, be nothing but data, but in fact, that isn't what we see. Most of our lives are struggles for mathematically irrelevant resources - time, money, sex, more money, more sex, etc. They aren't arithmetically interesting problems.

Don't confuse a tool and what humans do with it.

Why not? What is a tool for humans other than some implement with which humans do things?

So human can be guilty, not the tools. Guns are pacific, when human let them sleep in the closet. 

As long as no humans find out that they're there.

As long as no aggressive humans find out that they're there.

Eh, accidents happen to passively curious humans too.
 

 

 

The universe which comp describes should be one of florid plasticity and constant exploration,

I agree!

not struggle and frustration. How does a computer get frustrated? Why would it?

When he explores and got punished,

I think that is an anthropomorphic projection. Is there any mathematical evidence which shows outcomes effected by punishment?

As much as with human, by definition as humans are machine, by the comp assumption. 

But that's the only thing that corroborates it is that assumption. It isn't falsifiable any other way, even though it is apparent to anyone who has ever worked with a computer or machine that in fact they do not respond to punishment at all.

Today. Perhaps.

If something will change tomorrow, why hasn't that already happened without us? Why aren't there all kinds of geological species crawling up from the mantle of the Earth or building civilizations in the clouds?

 

Not talking about disadvantageous game conditions, but actual cruelty and intention to cause hurt feelings. Do computers care if you punish them?

Yes. By definition of comp. I mean humans are computer and seems to care about punishment.

When comp actually has to earn this definition in any way...it really can't seem to do it.

It is not a definition, it is a bet in a sort of funeral rite. You will see people encoding their brain before their death before we buildthose "artificial brain", with all the con and abuse money making in the process. 

It is a bet. We will never know for sure if it is true. 

It's not a bad bet - that encoding may work, but my bet is that it will only work well on genuine DNA and biological cells.
 

Comp sits there in a crib or coffin while proud parents demand eligibility for every Olympic Gold medal.

 

when authoritative arguments abound, when the elders fear too much and the youth not enough. The universal machine get frustrated when her universal inspiration is constrained by the contingencies, despite they brought him here also. That's life.

That is life, but I don't think it's arithmetic.

Yes, but that is due to your a priori that machines cannot think, be conscious, ...

If machines could think, then there would be no such thing as Comp. There would be no issue to debate. I would make a machine like a mousetrap, and we all would agree that this is a rather simple minded, but otherwise fully enfranchised person. While I understand that as a viable theoretical position for some universe, I don't see that as a scientific position in the reality that we live in. You make an a priori that our intuition that machines cannot think is superstition just because we cannot make an airtight logical case for it.

On the contrary. I respect non-comp (but not their invalid argument against comp).

The advantage of comp is that it is amenable to math. I prefer to search the key under the lamp.

Hah, well ok, there's good stuff under the lamp too.
 

 

 

But we can suggest better way, and listening to the others is a good heuristic, and when the other looks quite different, like with machine, we might learn something.

The way I see it, my way opens the door to a whole new universe of impersonal artifacts and beauty, while I think with comp, all we will end up doing is reinventing ourselves.

Perhaps. There is a sense to say that the creation is what God can use to reivent himself all the time. But why would that prevent artifacts and beauty? Is not more beautiful? Well, that's personal taste of course, a priori independent of what is, or not.

With Comp, we are imagining that the images we discover are part of the universe that we live in, rather than new creations which extend the universe to where it has never gone before.

No, we start stopping to take the universe as the granted big whole. We get it is part or border of something else.

If we see that there is a difference between OUR experience of the universe and THE universe, then that border is described through perceptual relativity. Uni-verse is preserved as both absolute unity and trans-finite diversity.

Craig

[Richard Ruquist]

I have previously suggested on this list (but worth repeating I think)
that the compact particles of the extra 6 dimensions of superstring
theory, in an enumerable array at a density of 10^90/cc throughout the
universe, may suffice as the required computer to carry out comp. Ref:
http://vixra.org/pdf/1101.0044v1.pdf "Is the string landscape
distributive in the universe and might it manifest a Peano cosmic
consciousness?" I believe these particles correspond to both
Leibnitz's monads and the Indra Pearls of Buddhism.
Richard

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[Craig Weinberg]

Does any topological structure really address the hard problem though? Why do these particles feel, and more to the point, why do they feel like something other than particles?

Craig

[Richard Ruquist]

The idea behind comp as far as I can tell is that the collective
arithmetic (of enumerable, distinct particles that can instantly sense
the entire universe) first manifests consciousness from which
everything else derives. Comp does not really include sensing or
particles, but it appears that the compact particles have this quality
(as well as an arithmetic property) which in a way correlates with
your Multisense Realism. Note that both particle property and quality
are hypotheses.
Richard

> https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/8gS0JqQNDVwJ.

[Craig Weinberg]

Right, but what I am saying is that if we look at the ontology of arithmetic itself, we find that it really isn't anything except protocols running on this meta-arithmetic platform of unstated instantaneous sense participation with the entire universe. It's panpsychic hardware running arithmetic software generating machine programs which think that they aren't machines.

My view is, if you are going to assume psyche from the start, then why do you need machines to produce an illusion of psyche? To me, it's clear that it is sense which defines itself through spatio-temporal geometric algebraic juxtapositions to diversify itself by quality, not because such complexity is necessary functionally. Indeed, I think that the universe is just as happy whether every planet in the universe were blown to bits or not. There is still an eternity of experience nested within an infinity of forms.

 

Comp does not really include sensing or
particles, but it appears that the compact particles have this quality
(as well as an arithmetic property) which in a way correlates with
your Multisense Realism. Note that both particle property and quality
are hypotheses.

To me it seems like comp doesn't even get into it. It takes arithmetic truth as a disembodied axiom and from there accounts for body-like and subject-like consequences of mathematical processes, without really questioning what those processes really are or how they are engaged practically. I think that means that it fails to ground symbols or qualia, matter or energy in any kind of orienting realism. It's a description of a game of a universe - which is worthwhile, but I think falls short of a real explanation of the experience we have of this universe.

Craig
 

[Bruno Marchal]

Richard,

On 28 Nov 2012, at 12:18, Richard Ruquist wrote:

> Bruno,
> Does any or all forms of energy come from arithmetic?

Yes. All forms (in the sense of stable appearances) have to come from
arithmetic if comp is true and my reasoning correct.

Bruno

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Richard Ruquist]

On Fri, Nov 30, 2012 at 10:18 AM, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> Richard,
>
>
> On 28 Nov 2012, at 12:18, Richard Ruquist wrote:
>
>> Bruno,
>> Does any or all forms of energy come from arithmetic?
>
>
>
> Yes. All forms (in the sense of stable appearances) have to come from
> arithmetic if comp is true and my reasoning correct.
>
> Bruno
>

Since energy is what makes things happen
then comp makes everything happen in Everett's universe.
Richard

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[Craig Weinberg]

On Friday, November 30, 2012 10:32:35 AM UTC-5, yanniru wrote:

On Fri, Nov 30, 2012 at 10:18 AM, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> Richard,
>
>
> On 28 Nov 2012, at 12:18, Richard Ruquist wrote:
>
>> Bruno,
>> Does any or all forms of energy come from arithmetic?
>
>
>
> Yes. All forms (in the sense of stable appearances) have to come from
> arithmetic if comp is true and my reasoning correct.
>
> Bruno
>

Since energy is what makes things happen
then comp makes everything happen in Everett's universe.
Richard

If comp made things happen then we could simulate petroleum production in a program and solve the world's energy problem. Instead, we find that in all real implementations of computing, comp invariably consumes net energy. Why would that be? Does comp allow anti-comp? Maybe we could run our computers backwards and get some kilowatt hours back.

Craig

 

[Jesse Mazer]

Seems like this argument is confusing levels of simulations. If you have one simulated world on a computer which is complex enough to have its own simulated oil production, as well as simulated physical computers, then those computers could be used to simulate another world, a simulation-within-the-simulation. But obviously having petroleum production in the simulation-within-the-simulation is not going to provide any energy to the original simulated world, despite the fact that they are both computer simulations. So, the fact that we cannot get energy from simulations of oil production, and don't get wet from simulations of rainstorms and such, is no argument against the idea that our own universe might just be a computational system.

Jesse

[Craig Weinberg]

I'm using this argument precisely to show that comp has no sensible way of handling levels of simulation. There is no simulation of energy, because energy is intrinsically tied to *the sole cosmos of realized mass and spacetime*. A simulation of motion is still motion. A simulation of color is still color. I only need one layer of hardware to simulate endless levels of cartoon universes, but none of these cartoon universes can simulate anything 'outside' of the ground floor hardware. Within the simulations, there is no problem. I can have a set of containers running virtual Windows servers, and they can have virtual Web browsers on them, which can run another virtual Windows server nested in that, etc... None of them have any problem simulating whatever worldly conditions I want to create. Whatever level confusion could arise is easily solved. I can change one byte on a virtual gear of a virtual engine and have it go from representing grinding torque and acceleration of mass to a ghostly image of gear shaped shadows spinning merrily through each other.

Nothing like this happens in the bottom level of hardware. If anything realism is defined explicitly in opposition to this arbitrary materialization. There is strict thermodynamic conservation and concretely irreversible events. From any level within any of the simulations, there is no problem making radical changes to the physics on any other level, except the level that actually touches matter-energy-space-time. Comp is based on the reckless and unfounded assumption that there is no sole cosmos of realized function, and it uses that error to lock us in a tautological multiverse of Platonic phantoms. To me, it's great fiction, but it fails to locate reality.

Craig

Jesse

[Bruno Marchal]

On 30 Nov 2012, at 16:32, Richard Ruquist wrote:

> On Fri, Nov 30, 2012 at 10:18 AM, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be>
> wrote:
>> Richard,
>>
>>
>> On 28 Nov 2012, at 12:18, Richard Ruquist wrote:
>>
>>> Bruno,
>>> Does any or all forms of energy come from arithmetic?
>>
>>
>>
>> Yes. All forms (in the sense of stable appearances) have to come from
>> arithmetic if comp is true and my reasoning correct.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>
> Since energy is what makes things happen

Wow, you are quick here. What you say assume a priori Energy, some
physical laws relating energy and happening, etc.

> then comp makes everything happen in Everett's universe.

There is a sense to say that arithmetic makes everything happen, from
the 1pov view of the arithmetical creature, and that this follows from
the comp supposition, OK, but it is still an open problem if this
gives a quantum multiverse, or Everett precise relative state. But
there are sign that it might be the case indeed. It is testable.

Bruno

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[Bruno Marchal]

Well, not really. But comp allows the consistency of non comp (but consistency is very cheap, so this does not say too much).

Maybe we could run our computers backwards and get some kilowatt hours back.

Lol

Of course (of course ?), to go backward needs reversibility, and reversibility needs no loss of energy. It is ironical. 

Bruno

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[Bruno Marchal]

I agree with your point, as a valid rebuttal of Craig, but with comp we definitely know that the universe is not a computational system a priori, as the physical reality supervene on the first person plural indeterminacy which is a sum on all computations, and this is not a priori computable. Indeed that is why we have to hunt the white rabbit away.

Digital physics implies comp, and comp implies the negation (a priori) of digital physics, and this makes digital physics inconsistent (with or without comp).

Bruno

Jesse

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[Bruno Marchal]

On 28 Nov 2012, at 17:42, meekerdb wrote:

On 11/28/2012 2:49 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

The question though is how does that happen?

Actually comp is better than physics here. in physics we don't know why and how electron obey the SWE. It is the ureasonable use of math in physics. With comp there is only math (arithmetic) and from this we can explain why numbers develop beliefs (axiomatically defined) and why they obey apparent laws

So you say.  But where is the explanation and the explanation of why this electron instead of that electron? 

Comp provides two type of explanation. Programs (that is number), and programs 1p expectation when distributed in the UD. Apparently if you look where an electron is, in some orbital (you know its excitation level of energy), there will be no explanation of why it is here or there, by first person indeterminacy on the branches relative to your knowledge of its energy. Like we can explain why nobody can explain to the W-man why he is the W-man and not the M-man, in the WM-duplication. But we can explain the "W and M and not Vienna", by the program and its local history.

It seems your arguments are all of the form, "If comp is true, then everything true is explained by comp."

OK, but this in the same sense that if physicalism is true, then everything true is explained by physicalism.

Yet, when physicalism fails on consciousness, people tend to say, "-Ah! but this means probably that consciousness is not true", and I feel like I have better to run away. It is really like changing the data when the theory is wrong, or changing the people when the tyrant is tired.

Comp start from consciousness admittance, and then explain matter by the relation than numbers have with possible truth including consciousness.

And comp is made very precise by Church thesis, and computer science, when physicalism still seem unaware of its "assumption" aspect, based on a rough speculation extrapolated by our animal conception of reality. Progress has begun when the Greeks depart from that habit, to take matter for granted, but the bad habit get back through a simplification of Aristotle imposed by tradition of authorities.

If comp is true everything HAS TO BE explained in arithmetic and arithmetic only, and with reasonable definitions. 

That would be more correct to say.

Bruno

Brent

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