Thoughts come to us from the Platonic realm, which I personally, perhaps mistakenly,
associate with what would be Penrose's incomputable realm.
Heidegger's treatment of 'machination' in the Beiträge zur Philosophie begins the critique of technological thinking that would centrally characterize his later work. Unlike later discussions of technology, the critique of machination in Beiträge connects its arising to the predominance of 'lived-experience' ( Erlebnis ) as the concealed basis for the possibility of a pre-delineated, rule-based metaphysical understanding of the world. In this essay I explore this connection. The unity of machination and lived-experience becomes intelligible when both are traced to their common root in the primordial Greek attitude of techne , originally a basic attitude of wondering knowledge of nature. But with this common root revealed, the basic connection between machination and lived-experience also emerges as an important development of one of the deepest guiding thoughts of the Western philosophical tradition: the Parmenidean assertion of the sameness of being and thinking. In the Beiträge 's analysis of machination and lived-experience, Heidegger hopes to discover a way of thinking that avoids the Western tradition's constant basic assumption of self-identity, an assumption which culminates in the modern picture of the autonomous, self-identical subject aggressively set over against a pre-delineated world of objects in a relationship of mutual confrontation. In the final section, I investigate an important and illuminating parallel to Heidegger's result: the consideration of the relationship between experience and technological ways of thinking that forms the basis of the late Wittgenstein's famous rule-following considerations.
On 8/30/2012 1:53 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> I think that the Platonic realm is just time, and that time is nothing
> but experience.
Hi Craig,
I would say that time is the sequencing order of experience. The
order of simultaneously givens within experience is physical space.
>
> Thought is the experience of generating hypothetical experience.
Agreed.
>
> The mistake is presuming that because we perceive exterior realism as
> a topology of bodies that the ground of being must be defined in those
> terms.
The mistake of subtracting the observer from observations.
> In fact, the very experience you are having right now - with your eyes
> closed or half asleep...this is a concretely and physically real part
> of the universe, it just isn't experienced as objects in space because
> you are the subject of the experience.
Exactly!
> If anything, the outside world is a Platonic realm of geometric
> perspectives and rational expectations. Interior realism is private
> time travel and eidetic fugues; metaphor, irony, anticipations, etc.
> Not only Platonic, but Chthonic. Thought doesn't come from a realm,
> realms come from thought.
Thoughts might be defined as the very act of n-th order categorization.
----- Receiving the following content -----From: Craig WeinbergReceiver: everything-listTime: 2012-08-30, 13:53:09Subject: Re: Technological (Machine) Thinking and Lived Being (Erlebnis)
I think that the Platonic realm is just time, and that time is nothing but experience.
Thought is the experience of generating hypothetical experience.
The mistake is presuming that because we perceive exterior realism as a topology of bodies that the ground of being must be defined in those terms. In fact, the very experience you are having right now - with your eyes closed or half asleep...this is a concretely and physically real part of the universe, it just isn't experienced as objects in space because you are the subject of the experience. If anything, the outside world is a Platonic realm of geometric perspectives and rational expectations. Interior realism is private time travel and eidetic fugues; metaphor, irony, anticipations, etc. Not only Platonic, but Chthonic. Thought doesn't come from a realm, realms come from thought.
Craig
On Thursday, August 30, 2012 11:54:32 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote:
What is thinking ? Parmenides thought that thinking and being are one, which IMHO I agree with.
Thoughts come to us from the Platonic realm, which I personally, perhaps mistakenly,
associate with what would be Penrose's incomputable realm.
Here is a brief discussion of technological or machine thinking vs lived experience.
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/ref/10.1080/00201740310002398#tabModule
IMHO Because computers cannot have lived experience, they cannot think.
Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy
Volume 46, Issue 3, 2003
Thinking and Being: Heidegger and Wittgenstein on Machination and Lived-Experience
Version of record first published: 05 Nov 2010
everything-listHeidegger's treatment of 'machination' in the Beitr锟絞e zur Philosophie begins the critique of technological thinking that would centrally characterize his later work. Unlike later discussions of technology, the critique of machination in Beitr锟絞e connects its arising to the predominance of 'lived-experience' ( Erlebnis ) as the concealed basis for the possibility of a pre-delineated, rule-based metaphysical understanding of the world. In this essay I explore this connection. The unity of machination and lived-experience becomes intelligible when both are traced to their common root in the primordial Greek attitude of techne , originally a basic attitude of wondering knowledge of nature. But with this common root revealed, the basic connection between machination and lived-experience also emerges as an important development of one of the deepest guiding thoughts of the Western philosophical tradition: the Parmenidean assertion of the sameness of being and thinking. In the Beitr锟絞e 's analysis of machination and lived-experience, Heidegger hopes to discover a way of thinking that avoids the Western tradition's constant basic assumption of self-identity, an assumption which culminates in the modern picture of the autonomous, self-identical subject aggressively set over against a pre-delineated world of objects in a relationship of mutual confrontation. In the final section, I investigate an important and illuminating parallel to Heidegger's result: the consideration of the relationship between experience and technological ways of thinking that forms the basis of the late Wittgenstein's famous rule-following considerations.
Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net8/30/2012Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function."
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----- Receiving the following content -----From: Craig WeinbergReceiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-08-30, 18:16:32
Subject: Re: Technological (Machine) Thinking and Lived Being (Erlebnis)
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Hi Craig WeinbergAccording to Einstein, space doesn't exist per se.Remarkably, Leibniz also came this conclusion back in the 17th century.
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Bruno MarchalReceiver: everything-listTime: 2012-08-31, 09:56:27
Hi Bruno MarchalPerhaps I am misguided, but I thought that comp was moreorlessa mechanical model of brain and man activity.
I obviously need to peruse your main idea .Do you have a link ?
Hi Craig WeinbergYou're on the right track, but everybody from Plato onsays that the Platonic world is timeless, eternal.And nonextended or spaceless (nonlocal).Leibniz's world of monads satisfies these requirements.But there is more, there is the Supreme Monad, whichexperiences all. And IS the All.
Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net8/31/2012Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent himso that everything could function."
----- Receiving the following content -----From: Craig WeinbergReceiver: everything-listTime: 2012-08-30, 13:53:09Subject: Re: Technological (Machine) Thinking and Lived Being (Erlebnis)
I think that the Platonic realm is just time, and that time is nothing but experience.
Thought is the experience of generating hypothetical experience.
The mistake is presuming that because we perceive exterior realism as a topology of bodies that the ground of being must be defined in those terms. In fact, the very experience you are having right now - with your eyes closed or half asleep...this is a concretely and physically real part of the universe, it just isn't experienced as objects in space because you are the subject of the experience. If anything, the outside world is a Platonic realm of geometric perspectives and rational expectations. Interior realism is private time travel and eidetic fugues; metaphor, irony, anticipations, etc. Not only Platonic, but Chthonic. Thought doesn't come from a realm, realms come from thought.
Craig
On Thursday, August 30, 2012 11:54:32 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote:
What is thinking ? Parmenides thought that thinking and being are one, which IMHO I agree with.
Thoughts come to us from the Platonic realm, which I personally, perhaps mistakenly,
associate with what would be Penrose's incomputable realm.
Here is a brief discussion of technological or machine thinking vs lived experience.
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/ref/10.1080/00201740310002398#tabModule
IMHO Because computers cannot have lived experience, they cannot think.
Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy
Volume 46, Issue 3, 2003
Thinking and Being: Heidegger and Wittgenstein on Machination and Lived-Experience
Version of record first published: 05 Nov 2010
everything-listHeidegger's treatment of 'machination' in the Beitr锟�e zur Philosophie begins the critique of technological thinking that would centrally characterize his later work. Unlike later discussions of technology, the critique of machination in Beitr锟�e connects its arising to the predominance of 'lived-experience' ( Erlebnis ) as the concealed basis for the possibility of a pre-delineated, rule-based metaphysical understanding of the world. In this essay I explore this connection. The unity of machination and lived-experience becomes intelligible when both are traced to their common root in the primordial Greek attitude of techne , originally a basic attitude of wondering knowledge of nature. But with this common root revealed, the basic connection between machination and lived-experience also emerges as an important development of one of the deepest guiding thoughts of the Western philosophical tradition: the Parmenidean assertion of the sameness of being and thinking. In the Beitr锟�e 's analysis of machination and lived-experience, Heidegger hopes to discover a way of thinking that avoids the Western tradition's constant basic assumption of self-identity, an assumption which culminates in the modern picture of the autonomous, self-identical subject aggressively set over against a pre-delineated world of objects in a relationship of mutual confrontation. In the final section, I investigate an important and illuminating parallel to Heidegger's result: the consideration of the relationship between experience and technological ways of thinking that forms the basis of the late Wittgenstein's famous rule-following considerations.
Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net8/30/2012Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function."
----- Receiving the following content -----From: Craig WeinbergReceiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-08-31, 16:32:54Subject: Re: Re: Technological (Machine) Thinking and Lived Being (Erlebnis)
everything-listHeidegger's treatment of 'machination' in the Beitr� e zur Philosophie begins the critique of technological thinking that would centrally characterize his later work. Unlike later discussions of technology, the critique of machination in Beitr� e connects its arising to the predominance of 'lived-experience' ( Erlebnis ) as the concealed basis for the possibility of a pre-delineated, rule-based metaphysical understanding of the world. In this essay I explore this connection. The unity of machination and lived-experience becomes intelligible when both are traced to their common root in the primordial Greek attitude of techne , originally a basic attitude of wondering knowledge of nature. But with this common root revealed, the basic connection between machination and lived-experience also emerges as an important development of one of the deepest guiding thoughts of the Western philosophical tradition: the Parmenidean assertion of the sameness of being and thinking. In the Beitr� e 's analysis of machination and lived-experience, Heidegger hopes to discover a way of thinking that avoids the Western tradition's constant basic assumption of self-identity, an assumption which culminates in the modern picture of the autonomous, self-identical subject aggressively set over against a pre-delineated world of objects in a relationship of mutual confrontation. In the final section, I investigate an important and illuminating parallel to Heidegger's result: the consideration of the relationship between experience and technological ways of thinking that forms the basis of the late Wittgenstein's famous rule-following considerations.
Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net8/30/2012Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function."
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Hi Craig Weinberg
Personally I call the Platonic realm "anything inextended".Time necessarily drops out if space drops out.
everything-listHeidegger's treatment of 'machination' in the Beitr锟�e zur Philosophie begins the critique of technological thinking that would centrally characterize his later work. Unlike later discussions of technology, the critique of machination in Beitr锟�e connects its arising to the predominance of 'lived-experience' ( Erlebnis ) as the concealed basis for the possibility of a pre-delineated, rule-based metaphysical understanding of the world. In this essay I explore this connection. The unity of machination and lived-experience becomes intelligible when both are traced to their common root in the primordial Greek attitude of techne , originally a basic attitude of wondering knowledge of nature. But with this common root revealed, the basic connection between machination and lived-experience also emerges as an important development of one of the deepest guiding thoughts of the Western philosophical tradition: the Parmenidean assertion of the sameness of being and thinking. In the Beitr锟�e 's analysis of machination and lived-experience, Heidegger hopes to discover a way of thinking that avoids the Western tradition's constant basic assumption of self-identity, an assumption which culminates in the modern picture of the autonomous, self-identical subject aggressively set over against a pre-delineated world of objects in a relationship of mutual confrontation. In the final section, I investigate an important and illuminating parallel to Heidegger's result: the consideration of the relationship between experience and technological ways of thinking that forms the basis of the late Wittgenstein's famous rule-following considerations.
Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net8/30/2012Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function."
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----- Receiving the following content -----From: Craig WeinbergReceiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-09-04, 00:48:59Subject: Re: Personally I call the Platonic realm "anything inextended".Anything outside of spacetime.
everything-listHeidegger's treatment of 'machination' in the Beitr� e zur Philosophie begins the critique of technological thinking that would centrally characterize his later work. Unlike later discussions of technology, the critique of machination in Beitr� e connects its arising to the predominance of 'lived-experience' ( Erlebnis ) as the concealed basis for the possibility of a pre-delineated, rule-based metaphysical understanding of the world. In this essay I explore this connection. The unity of machination and lived-experience becomes intelligible when both are traced to their common root in the primordial Greek attitude of techne , originally a basic attitude of wondering knowledge of nature. But with this common root revealed, the basic connection between machination and lived-experience also emerges as an important development of one of the deepest guiding thoughts of the Western philosophical tradition: the Parmenidean assertion of the sameness of being and thinking. In the Beitr� e 's analysis of machination and lived-experience, Heidegger hopes to discover a way of thinking that avoids the Western tradition's constant basic assumption of self-identity, an assumption which culminates in the modern picture of the autonomous, self-identical subject aggressively set over against a pre-delineated world of objects in a relationship of mutual confrontation. In the final section, I investigate an important and illuminating parallel to Heidegger's result: the consideration of the relationship between experience and technological ways of thinking that forms the basis of the late Wittgenstein's famous rule-following considerations.
Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net8/30/2012Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function."
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everything-listHeidegger's treatment of 'machination' in the Beitr锟� e zur Philosophie begins the critique of technological thinking that would centrally characterize his later work. Unlike later discussions of technology, the critique of machination in Beitr锟�e connects its arising to the predominance of 'lived-experience' ( Erlebnis ) as the concealed basis for the possibility of a pre-delineated, rule-based metaphysical understanding of the world. In this essay I explore this connection. The unity of machination and lived-experience becomes intelligible when both are traced to their common root in the primordial Greek attitude of techne , originally a basic attitude of wondering knowledge of nature. But with this common root revealed, the basic connection between machination and lived-experience also emerges as an important development of one of the deepest guiding thoughts of the Western philosophical tradition: the Parmenidean assertion of the sameness of being and thinking. In the Beitr锟�e 's analysis of machination and lived-experience, Heidegger hopes to discover a way of thinking that avoids the Western tradition's constant basic assumption of self-identity, an assumption which culminates in the modern picture of the autonomous, self-identical subject aggressively set over against a pre-delineated world of objects in a relationship of mutual confrontation. In the final section, I investigate an important and illuminating parallel to Heidegger's result: the consideration of the relationship between experience and technological ways of thinking that forms the basis of the late Wittgenstein's famous rule-following considerations.
Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net8/30/2012Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function."
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----- Receiving the following content -----From: Craig WeinbergReceiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-09-04, 20:50:39Subject: Re: consciousness as the experiencre of time
everything-listHeidegger's treatment of 'machination' in the Beitr� e zur Philosophie begins the critique of technological thinking that would centrally characterize his later work. Unlike later discussions of technology, the critique of machination in Beitr� e connects its arising to the predominance of 'lived-experience' ( Erlebnis ) as the concealed basis for the possibility of a pre-delineated, rule-based metaphysical understanding of the world. In this essay I explore this connection. The unity of machination and lived-experience becomes intelligible when both are traced to their common root in the primordial Greek attitude of techne , originally a basic attitude of wondering knowledge of nature. But with this common root revealed, the basic connection between machination and lived-experience also emerges as an important development of one of the deepest guiding thoughts of the Western philosophical tradition: the Parmenidean assertion of the sameness of being and thinking. In the Beitr� e 's analysis of machination and lived-experience, Heidegger hopes to discover a way of thinking that avoids the Western tradition's constant basic assumption of self-identity, an assumption which culminates in the modern picture of the autonomous, self-identical subject aggressively set over against a pre-delineated world of objects in a relationship of mutual confrontation. In the final section, I investigate an important and illuminating parallel to Heidegger's result: the consideration of the relationship between experience and technological ways of thinking that forms the basis of the late Wittgenstein's famous rule-following considerations.
Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net8/30/2012Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function."
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Hi Craig Weinberg
Exactly. There may a problem with this, but its seemsthat if mind is everywhere (is inextended, so space is irrelevant),I am always part of the mind of God. So saying that- when I look outof my eyes, that is actually God looking out- which soundsof course weird. Or that there is only one perceiver, that beingthe Supreme Monad, is not illogical.
everything-listHeidegger's treatment of 'machination' in the Beitr锟�e zur Philosophie begins the critique of technological thinking that would centrally characterize his later work. Unlike later discussions of technology, the critique of machination in Beitr锟�e connects its arising to the predominance of 'lived-experience' ( Erlebnis ) as the concealed basis for the possibility of a pre-delineated, rule-based metaphysical understanding of the world. In this essay I explore this connection. The unity of machination and lived-experience becomes intelligible when both are traced to their common root in the primordial Greek attitude of techne , originally a basic attitude of wondering knowledge of nature. But with this common root revealed, the basic connection between machination and lived-experience also emerges as an important development of one of the deepest guiding thoughts of the Western philosophical tradition: the Parmenidean assertion of the sameness of being and thinking. In the Beitr锟�e 's analysis of machination and lived-experience, Heidegger hopes to discover a way of thinking that avoids the Western tradition's constant basic assumption of self-identity, an assumption which culminates in the modern picture of the autonomous, self-identical subject aggressively set over against a pre-delineated world of objects in a relationship of mutual confrontation. In the final section, I investigate an important and illuminating parallel to Heidegger's result: the consideration of the relationship between experience and technological ways of thinking that forms the basis of the late Wittgenstein's famous rule-following considerations.
On Wednesday, September 5, 2012 8:11:39 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote:Hi Craig WeinbergExactly. There may a problem with this, but its seemsthat if mind is everywhere (is inextended, so space is irrelevant),I am always part of the mind of God. So saying that- when I look outof my eyes, that is actually God looking out- which soundsof course weird. Or that there is only one perceiver, that beingthe Supreme Monad, is not illogical.
I don't think that it sounds any weirder to say that then to say that when we look out of our eyes, we can see is the dust from the Big Bang. We are the totality-singularity (Supreme Monad or everythingness, etc) subdivided as reflected capacities to experience. The universe is nothing but a capacity to experience and to juxtapose that capacity with itself (which is what experience actually is).
Craig
On 9/5/2012 11:37 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Wednesday, September 5, 2012 8:11:39 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote:Hi Craig WeinbergExactly. There may a problem with this, but its seemsthat if mind is everywhere (is inextended, so space is irrelevant),I am always part of the mind of God. So saying that- when I look outof my eyes, that is actually God looking out- which soundsof course weird. Or that there is only one perceiver, that beingthe Supreme Monad, is not illogical.
I don't think that it sounds any weirder to say that then to say that when we look out of our eyes, we can see is the dust from the Big Bang. We are the totality-singularity (Supreme Monad or everythingness, etc) subdivided as reflected capacities to experience. The universe is nothing but a capacity to experience and to juxtapose that capacity with itself (which is what experience actually is).
Craig
Dear Craig,
I would only add to your illuminating remark that this "capacity" is to both self-observe and other-observe.
Observation, IMHO, is nothing more that the ability to generate a simulation. Only when there is a match between the simulations of multiple "reflected capacities to experience" that truth obtains.