All,
This email commences a six-week public discussion of Deutsche Telekom Security’s request to include the following CA certificates as publicly trusted root certificates in one or more CCADB Root Store Member’s program. This discussion period is scheduled to close on December 13, 2023.
The purpose of this public discussion process is to promote openness and transparency. However, each Root Store makes its inclusion decisions independently, on its own timelines, and based on its own inclusion criteria. Successful completion of this public discussion process does not guarantee any favorable action by any root store.
Anyone with concerns or questions is urged to raise them on this CCADB Public list by replying directly in this discussion thread. Likewise, a representative of the applicant must promptly respond directly in the discussion thread to all questions that are posted.
CCADB Case Number: 00001269
Organization Background Information (listed in CCADB):
CA Owner Name:Deutsche Telekom Security GmbH
Website: https://www.telesec.de/
Address: Untere Industriestrasse 20, Netphen, 57250 Germany
Problem Reporting Mechanisms: https://www.telesec.de/en/kontakt-en
Organization Type: Private Corporation
Deutsche Telekom Security is a subsidiary of Deutsche Telekom AG
Repository URL: https://www.telesec.de/en/service/downloads/pki-repository/
Certificates Requesting Inclusion:
Telekom Security SMIME ECC Root 2021:
Certificate download links: (CA Repository, crt.sh)
Use cases served/EKUs:
Secure Email (S/MIME) 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.4
Test websites: N/A (S/MIME CA)
Telekom Security TLS ECC Root 2020:
Certificate download links: (CA Repository, crt.sh)
Use cases served/EKUs:
Server Authentication 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1
Client Authentication 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2
Test websites:
Telekom Security SMIME RSA Root 2023:
Certificate download links: (CA Repository, crt.sh)
Use cases served/EKUs:
Secure Email (S/MIME) 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.4
Client Authentication 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2
Test websites: N/A (S/MIME CA)
Telekom Security TLS RSA Root 2023:
Certificate download links: (CA Repository, crt.sh)
Use cases served/EKUs:
Server Authentication 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1
Client Authentication 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2
Test websites:
Existing Publicly Trusted Root CAs from Deutsche Telekom Security:
T-TeleSec GlobalRoot Class 2:
Certificate download links: CA Repository, crt.sh
Use cases served/EKUs:
Server Authentication (TLS) 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1
Secure Email (S/MIME) 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.4
Client Authentication 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2
Certificate Corpus: here (requires Censys account)
Included in: Apple, Chrome, Microsoft, Mozilla
T-TeleSec GlobalRoot Class 3:
Certificate download links: CA Repository, crt.sh
Use cases served/EKUs:
Server Authentication (TLS) 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1;
Client Authentication 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2
Certificate Corpus: here (requires Censys account)
Included in: Apple, Chrome, Microsoft, Mozilla
Relevant Policy and Practices Documentation:
Certificate Policy - v. 4.0 (Sept. 1, 2023), https://www.telesec.de/assets/downloads/PKI-Repository/Telekom-Security-CP-EN-V4.0.pdf
Certification Practices Statement - v. 6.0 (Sept. 1, 2023), https://www.telesec.de/assets/downloads/PKI-Repository/Telekom-Security-CPS-Public-EN-V6.0.pdf
Most Recent Self-Assessment:
Audit Statements:
Auditor: TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH
Audit Criteria: ETSI EN 319 411-1 V1.3.1 (2021-05); ETSI EN 319 411-2, V2.4.1 (2021-11)
Date of Audit Letter Issuance: June 21, 2023
For Period of Time: April 8, 2022, through April 7, 2023
Audit Statement(s):
Incident Summary (Bugzilla incidents from previous 24 months):
Improper use of a domain validation method (Bugzilla Bug #1825780)
Hi,
For our answer we assume that "Deutsche Telekom AG" is meant rather than "Deutsche Telekom GmbH" (such a company does not exist).
The relationship is as follows:
- Deutsche Telekom AG is the Group’s parent company
- Deutsche Telekom Security GmbH is a 100% subsidiary of Deutsche Telekom AG
- T-Systems International GmbH is a 100% subsidiary of Deutsche Telekom AG
With regard to the publicly trusted certificates, T-Systems International GmbH was the owner of the Root CA certificates as well as the operator of all Sub CAs of the Deutsche Telekom Group until 2020.
With the establishment of Deutsche Telekom Security GmbH in 2020, ownership of the Root CAs as well as operation of the Sub CAs of the Deutsche Telekom Group were transferred internally from T-Systems International GmbH to Deutsche Telekom Security GmbH.
As the transfer also included all employees concerned, and operations continued at the same physical locations under the same conditions, the change mainly only took place on paper, with the name "T-Systems International GmbH" being replaced by "Deutsche Telekom Security GmbH" in the relevant documents and contracts.
Regarding the change of the Root ownership see also
https://groups.google.com/g/mozilla.dev.security.policy/c/pOu_jWY0SVY/m/2uLyuK4TAwAJ
Greetings
Stefan
o Deutsche Telekom Security is a subsidiary of Deutsche Telekom AG
· Repository URL: https://www.telesec.de/en/service/downloads/pki-repository/
Certificates Requesting Inclusion:
1. Telekom Security SMIME ECC Root 2021:
o Certificate download links: (CA Repository, crt.sh)
o Use cases served/EKUs:
§ Secure Email (S/MIME) 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.4
o Test websites: N/A (S/MIME CA)
2. Telekom Security TLS ECC Root 2020:
o Certificate download links: (CA Repository, crt.sh)
o Use cases served/EKUs:
§ Server Authentication 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1
§ Client Authentication 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2
o Test websites:
§ Valid: https://active.tstlser20.test.telesec.de/
§ Revoked:https://revoked.tstlser20.test.telesec.de/
§ Expired: https://expired.tstlser20.test.telesec.de/
3. Telekom Security SMIME RSA Root 2023:
o Certificate download links: (CA Repository, crt.sh)
o Use cases served/EKUs:
§ Secure Email (S/MIME) 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.4
§ Client Authentication 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2
o Test websites: N/A (S/MIME CA)
4. Telekom Security TLS RSA Root 2023:
o Certificate download links: (CA Repository, crt.sh)
o Use cases served/EKUs:
§ Server Authentication 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1
§ Client Authentication 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2
o Test websites:
§ Valid: https://active.tstlsrr23.test.telesec.de/
§ Revoked: https://revoked.tstlsrr23.test.telesec.de/
§ Expired: https://expired.tstlsrr23.test.telesec.de/
Existing Publicly Trusted Root CAs from Deutsche Telekom Security:
1. T-TeleSec GlobalRoot Class 2:
o Certificate download links: CA Repository, crt.sh
o Use cases served/EKUs:
§ Server Authentication (TLS) 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1
§ Secure Email (S/MIME) 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.4
§ Client Authentication 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2
o Certificate Corpus: here (requires Censys account)
o Included in: Apple, Chrome, Microsoft, Mozilla
2. T-TeleSec GlobalRoot Class 3:
o Certificate download links: CA Repository, crt.sh
o Use cases served/EKUs:
§ Server Authentication (TLS) 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1;
§ Client Authentication 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2
o Certificate Corpus: here (requires Censys account)
o Included in: Apple, Chrome, Microsoft, Mozilla
Relevant Policy and Practices Documentation:
· Certificate Policy - v. 4.0 (Sept. 1, 2023), https://www.telesec.de/assets/downloads/PKI-Repository/Telekom-Security-CP-EN-V4.0.pdf
· Certification Practices Statement - v. 6.0 (Sept. 1, 2023), https://www.telesec.de/assets/downloads/PKI-Repository/Telekom-Security-CPS-Public-EN-V6.0.pdf
Most Recent Self-Assessment:
Audit Statements:
· Auditor: TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH
· Audit Criteria: ETSI EN 319 411-1 V1.3.1 (2021-05); ETSI EN 319 411-2, V2.4.1 (2021-11)
· Date of Audit Letter Issuance: June 21, 2023
· For Period of Time: April 8, 2022, through April 7, 2023
· Audit Statement(s):
Incident Summary (Bugzilla incidents from previous 24 months):
· Improper use of a domain validation method (Bugzilla Bug #1825780)
Thanks,
Ryan, on behalf of the CCADB Steering Committee
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Hi Moudrick,
yes, these Root-CAs that are the subject of this Root Inclusion Request are fully managed by Deutsche Telekom Security GmbH.
Greetings
Stefan
To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/a/ccadb.org/d/msgid/public/BE1P281MB15064D740925362E1595C9A7FAAAA%40BE1P281MB1506.DEUP281.PROD.OUTLOOK.COM.
On November 1, 2023, we began a six-week, public discussion [1] on the request from Deutsche Telekom Security for inclusion of its root certificate(s):
Telekom Security SMIME ECC Root 2021
Telekom Security TLS ECC Root 2020
Telekom Security SMIME RSA Root 2023
Telekom Security TLS RSA Root 2023
The public discussion period ended on December 13, 2023.
Note: the Summary of Discussion below includes an item that was stated after the public discussion period ended and as of the time of this message does not include a response from Deutsche Telekom Security. Deutsche Telekom Security can still respond to this item, if desired.
==========================
Summary of Discussion
Discussion Item #1: Clarification was sought regarding the applicant's organizational structure and CA management.
Deutsche Telekom Security Response to Discussion Item #1: Deutsche Telekom confirmed that the root CA certificates in the inclusion request are fully managed by Deutsche Telekom Security GmbH [2]. The organizational structure was defined [3] as:
Deutsche Telekom AG is the Group’s parent company
Deutsche Telekom Security GmbH is a 100% subsidiary of Deutsche Telekom AG
T-Systems International GmbH is a 100% subsidiary of Deutsche Telekom AG
Discussion Item #2 [after the public discussion period ended]: A perspective was shared that the content and delivery of a past incident report was worrisome [4].
==========================
We thank community members for their review and consideration during this period. Root Store Programs will make final inclusion decisions independently, on their own timelines, and based on each Root Store Member’s inclusion criteria. Further discussion may take place in the independently managed Root Store community forums (i.e., MDSP).
Thank you,
-Chris, on behalf of the CCADB Steering Committee
[1] https://groups.google.com/a/ccadb.org/g/public/c/yiJ-bkv-Ftg/m/JsbbxpZJBAAJ
[2] https://groups.google.com/a/ccadb.org/g/public/c/yiJ-bkv-Ftg/m/dsHfRRZXBQAJ
[3] https://groups.google.com/a/ccadb.org/g/public/c/yiJ-bkv-Ftg/m/JD8quX3nBAAJ
[4] https://groups.google.com/a/ccadb.org/g/public/c/yiJ-bkv-Ftg/m/cHCi1jjjAwAJ