Noam Chomsky on Cambodia March 6th, 2002.
Dr Darse
42164 Message:42164 42164
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Date: 3/5/2002 09:24 -0800
From: "Timothy Allen" via email
Subject: Chomsky Replies re Indochina
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At 09:22 PM 2/26/2002 -0500, you wrote:
>Jeez, and ten years from now what's he going to think....
>
>----------------
>
>-----Original Message-----
Reply from NC,
What do I make of the reports of refugees? Exactly what I made of them
when I interviewed refugees in Laos who had endured years of the most
intense bombing in history, surviving in caves. You can read it in my =book
_At War with Asia_ (1970), reprinted from articles: one should take them =
very seriously, but of course critically, considering their =circumstances
and the conditions of their existence. As Ed and I wrote several years =
later, I therefore agree entirely with the US State Department =specialists
on Cambodia, who knew more about the situation there than anyone, and on =
this matter, with Francois Ponchaud, whose book "Cambodia Year Zero" is
rightly considered the most important book written on the KR during that =
period, which is why Ed Herman and I wrote the only real review of it =that
exists, to my knowledge; we reviewed the French original, and I wouldn't =be
surprised if we were the only people in the country, outside of US
intelligence, who actually read this book, which was being very widely
quoted on the basis of reviews that utterly falsified it; you will find =the
details in the book you are reading: Political Economy of Human Rights. =In
brief, as I wrote in 1970, and as Ed and I wrote in the review and in =PEHR,
quoting Ponchaud and State Dept. intelligence, one should always take
refugee reports seriously, but it is important to understand the
circumstances and conditions in which they report, and to qualify for
that. US intelligence and Ponchaud, as we quoted, took a much more
skeptical position than we did on refugee reports, but anyone who is =even
marginally serious about the matter understands all this -- of course, =not
those who don't give a damn about the suffering that refugees report, =but
are merely using it as an ideological weapon, specifically, as a
justification for brutal atrocities. Recall that that was exactly the
crucial issue at the time, as charges about the KR and the Vietnamese, =many
of them fabrications at a level that would have impressed Stalin (as we
demonstrated), were being used as a justification for US atrocities in
Central America and elsewhere. But credible evidence of atrocities =existed
then, which is why we condemned the brutality and crimes of the Khmer
Rouge, and a lot more evidence came to light after we wrote, and after =the
reports of Ponchaud and State Department intelligence that we cited. =The
reason is that the worst atrocities were in 1978, peaking just at the =time
that the Vietnamese expelled Pol Pot and the US turned to open support =of
Pol Pot. And that was of course unknown at the time we wrote (or =Ponchaud,
or the State Dept. and other analyses we quoted), for one reason, =because
it hadn't yet happened, for another, because the wealth of refugee
testimony came after the Vietnamese expelled Pol Pot.
So on the reports you are reading, I think we should take them as =seriously
as the ones we reviewed, or that I reported from Laos, and refugee =reports
generally. I don't see why should have any hesitations about this, any
more than we did when we wrote about it in the late 70s. I do not,
incidentally, agree with the later whitewash of the Khmer Rouge by US
government scholars and the CIA -- who did in fact deny KR atrocities =after
the evidence was in, but are ignored, of course, on the internet sites =you
are exploring (I'm guessing, but I suspect it's a fair guess), because =that
would not serve the purpose of justifying US atrocities.
You might recall, perhaps, that we were probably the only commentators =to
rely on the most knowledgeable source, State Department intelligence. =Our
conclusion at the time was that it was probably the most reliable as =well
as by far the best informed, and subsequent revelations support that
tentative judgment. They were avoided in the mainstream commentary =because
their conclusions didn't fit the propaganda line that was required to
exploit the misery of the Cambodians to justify subjecting millions of
other people to comparable misery, in Central America and
elsewhere. Presumably that is also why the CIA demographic study of =1980,
regarded as authoritative by US government specialists, is totally =ignored
(I've mentioned it, and there is an extensive review by one of the major =
Cambodia historians, Michael Vickery -- an interesting story, but a
separate one).
On the reports of Jackson and his associates, I'd suggest that you look =at
the specialist literature. It is, transparently, utterly irrelevant to
anything I (or Ed and I) wrote and said, and has to be evaluated on its =own
merits. As you'll discover, it is treated with a rather large grain of
salt, though some of what they describe is well known.
It's entirely true that we had an axe to grind, and we made very clear =and
explicit what it was: one should tell the truth, as best one can, both
about enemy atrocities and our own. Naturally that infuriated many =people,
who believe that we must indulge in Stalinist-style lies about official
enemies in order to justify new atrocities of our own, and that we must
avoid or deny the atrocities for which we are responsible. But our
position was very clear and explicit. In the case of Cambodia, we
condemned atrocities that were credibly reported, and then reviewed the
full range of material that was available, making it clear that we
ourselves took no stand on the various claims that were presented =without
evidence and on the basis of considerable fabrication. For example, we
took no stand on whether Jean Lacouture might, by accident, have been =right
in his widely quoted claim that the Khmer Rouge boasted by 1977 of =killing
2 million people (based on gross falsification of the book of Ponchaud =that
he was reviewing), or whether, equally by accident, he might have been
right in his "correction" a few weeks later, in the same journal (New =York
Review), in which he said that maybe deaths were only in the thousands, =but
that it didn't matter. We simply reported his claims, and said that we
disagreed with him that it didn't matter. As we said, we thought it
mattered a lot whether the White House boasted that US troops had killed =2
million people in the post-tet pacification campaigns (which we reviewed =in
detail in PEHR, based in part on Kevin Buckley's notes), or whether =there
were only thousands killed (or, as was probably the case, tens of
thousands). Though we didn't say so, if anyone had made comparable
statements about US crimes, they would be dismissed as lunatics, though =in
this case Lacouture's stand was hailed as the height of nobility. =Beyond
that, we said only that among the various estimates, those of State
Department intelligence were clearly the best grounded, and seemed the =most
credible -- a judgment supported by subsequent studies, as I mentioned. =We
also made it clear and explicit that our goal was not to draw factual
judgments about matters that were utterly obscure at the time we wrote:
rather, to see how the evidence available was refracted through the
ideological prisms, both about our crimes and about those of official =enemies.
On Cambodia, my only statement about the likely future was in 1972, when =
the KR were a marginal and largely unknown factor; this was before the
massive bombing campaign of 1973, which played a large part in =recruiting
the KR. I said then that I hoped that something decent might yet =emerge,
referring to Prince Sihanouk's peasant supporters. This statement was =then
reinterpreted as a prediction that the KR would turn Cambodia into a =grand
utopia, in the standard style of the apologists for state violence --
concealing the date and the actual content. You've probably read it on =the
internet: the inventor of this amusing tale was David Horowitz.
On Vietnam, the only comments I made about what was likely to follow you =
can also find in _At War with Asia_ and other things I wrote at the
time. I quoted the conclusion of Bernard Fall, the very highly =respected
military historian and Vietnam specialist -- and a hawk, incidentally -- =
who wrote, just before his death in combat in 1967 -- that Vietnam might =
not survive the devastating and criminal US assault. My own view was =that
either Indochina would indeed suffer the fate he predicted, or that only =
the harshest elements would survive; in either case, the US would have =won
the war, as it clearly had by the early 1970s, for ther reasons I =discussed
then (citing, incidentally, the business press, which understood the =point)
-- that is, won the war in terms of its actual objectives, which I =reviewed
from the declassified and public records. I also went out of my way to
warn that the consequences would probably be bitter, quoting Kant (on =the
French Revolution) and Bertrand Russell (on the Russian Revolution), =both
of whom condemned the crimes but also condemned harshly the hypocrisy =and
cynicism of those who were exploiting these crimes to impose more =suffering
on miserable people, and who had no little responsibility for them. In
PEHR, Herman and I also reviewed precedents, including the very =revealing
story of the aftermath of the American revolution, fought with =pea-shooters
by modern standards, though it led to a huge flight of terrified =refugees,
fleeing the richest country in the world, including boat people who =wrote
pathetic accounts of how they were dying in the snows of Nova Scotia, =but
had to flee the victorious terrorists. The proportion of the population =
who fled in terror was roughly similar to the proportion who fled the
devastated countries of Indochina, with great inducements in this case, =of
course. And that's not counting Blacks and Native Americans, who knew =very
well what was in store for them if Washington's forces won.
All of that, naturally, infuriates those who want to exploit the =suffering
for which they are largely responsible in order to torture others -- at =the
time, primarily in Central America, but not only there.
I think that covers everything in your letter, except for your last "off =
the wall" question. It would be a miracle if there were no errors in =what
I wrote at the time. In fact, it would be unique in the history of =human
thought. In the sciences, one takes for granted that there are many =errors
in what one does. Any sane scientist spends much of his or her career
correcting earlier errors. In journalism, social sciences, history, and =
related fields errors are typically extraordinary. And I've found a few =
errors in what I wrote, and have at once corrected them, which was easy, =
because they were pretty minor. I am very pleased that there has been =such
a hysterical reaction to these writings. They've been analyzed with a =fine
tooth comb to try to find some error, and to my knowledge, the end =result
is that not even a misplaced comma has been found. True, a lot of =errors
have been found in fabricated material attributed to me, but that's a =sign
of the desperation of the apologists for state violence. If you know of =an
exception, I'd appreciate it if you'd inform me. I haven't yet seen
one. That's not because of any particular brilliance on my part (or Ed
Herman's), but because we weren't saying very much, beyond reporting
material that was for the most part well-confirmed, relying heavily on =US
government sources. So the answer to your question is that there must =be
errors, but none have been discovered, with very marginal exceptions, =apart
from those I've found myself; and all of those have been quickly and
publicly corrected, exactly as should be done.
Again, if you have some counterexamples, I'd be more than happy to
look. I'd like to find errors and correct them.
I should add that I don't pay attention to what appears on the internet
sites that you are referring to. If you want to immobilize yourself by
immersion in these sites -- as the participants in them desperately hope =
you and other activists will -- that's your choice. It's not mine. But =if
you do find this interesting, I'd suggest that you switch to sites that =are
at a similar intellectual level but a much higher moral level: I have in =
mind neo-Nazi and neo-Stalinist sites, which I presume exist. There I
suppose you'll find very similar arguments: denunciations of those who
condemned Nazi and Stalinist crimes on the basis of the terror and
atrocities of resistance forces and the horrible aftermath of the defeat =of
fascism and the collapse of the USSR. The terror and atrocities were =real,
and the aftermath was horrendous; I presume I need not review it. Of
course, sane people dismiss this with ridicule, just as they would =dismiss
what you report from the apparently very similar sites that you are
spending time on. But the neo-Nazis and neo-Stalinists are on a far =higher
moral level, for the obvious reason: fortunately, they are in no =position
to exploit the terror of the resistance and the horrendous aftermath in
order to justify, and carry out, terrible crimes. That is, they were
unable to sink to the depravity of those whose sites you are reading, =who
exploit the suffering for which they share considerable responsibility =in
order to impose misery on others, to protect them from "the Pol Pot =left"
in El Salvador (priests organizing peasants, for example), or from the
"Communists" elsewhere -- exactly as we wrote in the 70s, and as has =been
happening since.
Noam Chomsky
Nathan Folkert
Cambodia published in 1980, which he claims was a "whitewash" of the
Khmer Rouge. I was curious about the veracity of this claim, mainly
because in years past he made similar claims on ChomskyChat in
response to readers' questions regarding the Khmer Rouge (possibly in
reaction to debate here in the newsgroup, as they were swiftly posted
here). I am still occasionally allowed to enter the Stanford
University library, so I decided I'd check out these particular
claims. I was swiftly able to obtain a copy of the report, and have
decided to transcribe it here, because it has often been the subject
of conversation in the past. Before I post it, however, I would like
to cite a few references here. These are recent citations (mostly
originating at ChomskyChat, which is a relatively recent innovation, I
believe, at least relative to the crimes they discuss), so I assume
that these are Chomsky's current views:
Chomsky:
[...] I do not, incidentally, agree with the later whitewash of the
Khmer Rouge by US government scholars and the CIA -- who did in fact
deny KR atrocities after the evidence was in, but are ignored, of
course, on the internet sites you are exploring (I'm guessing, but I
suspect it's a fair guess), because that would not serve the purpose
of justifying US atrocities. You might recall, perhaps, that we were
probably the only commentators to rely on the most knowledgeable
source, State Department intelligence. Our conclusion at the time was
that it was probably the most reliable as well as by far the best
informed, and subsequent revelations support that tentative judgment.
They were avoided in the mainstream commentary because their
conclusions didn't fit the propaganda line that was required to
exploit the misery of the Cambodians to justify subjecting millions of
other people to comparable misery, in Central America and elsewhere.
Presumably that is also why the CIA demographic study of 1980,
regarded as authoritative by US government specialists, is totally
ignored (I've mentioned it, and there is an extensive review by one of
the major Cambodia historians, Michael Vickery -- an interesting
story, but a separate one).
(http://groups.google.com/groups?selm=4b923300.0203072332.7055eb86%40posting.google.com)
[...] The CIA, in its demographic study in 1980, claims that Pol Pot
killed 50-100,000 people and attributes most deaths to the Vietnamese
invasion, also denying flatly the atrocities of 1978, which were by
far the worst (that's the source of the famous piles of skulls, etc.;
these became known after the Vietnamese invasion in 1979, and were
certainly known to the CIA). Michael Vickery has written about the CIA
study, suggesting that it was tailored to fit the fact that the US was
tacitly supporting Pol Pot in '78 and later. There's a careful
analysis in Vickery's "Cambodia." He's a very serious Cambodia
scholar, and his analysis is taken seriously by other reputable
scholars (e.g., Australian scholar Robert Cribb, in his standard
scholarly work on the Indonesian massacres with comparative evidence).
Vickery estimates about 700,000 deaths "above the normal" in the Pol
Pot years -- which, if accurate, would be about the same as deaths
during the US war (the first phase of the "Decade of Genocide," as
1969-79 is called by the one independent government analysis,
Finland). For that period, the CIA estimates 600,000 deaths. The Yale
Genocide project (Ben Kiernan and others) gives higher estimates,
about 1.5 million. In fact, no one knows. No one ever knows in such
cases, within quite a broad range. When numbers are put forth with any
confidence, and without a big plus-or-minus, you can be sure that
there is an ideological agenda, in any such case. Demographic analyses
are very weak. If we wanted to be serious, we would also ask how many
of the post-1975 deaths are the result of the US war. [...]
(http://www.zmag.org/forums/chomcambodforum.htm)
You're quite right that the worst atrocities were in 1978, at the time
of US support for Pol Pot (the famous piles of skulls, etc.). That's
now undisputed among serious analysts. Presumably US support is the
reason why the CIA, in its demographic study of Cambodia in the 70's,
denied totally the atrocities of 1978, and claimed that the early
atrocities (which it estimated at 50,000-100,000 killed, a ludicrous
underestimate) had ended by 1977, and that few peasants really
suffered. Published in 1980, and regarded as definitive by top US
government specialists (including the leading State Department
"Cambodia watcher," later US Ambassador to Phnom Penh), the CIA study
was completely suppressed, because the conclusions were plainly
intolerable to the doctrinal system. I have a brief comment about it
in "Towards a New Cold War." Vickery, one of the very few serious
Cambodia scholars, reviewed it in detail in the "Bulletin of Concerned
Asian Scholars" and his book, and (if I recall) gives this explanation
for the CIA's curious behavior, which is not alone. In late '79, when
the facts were in, the leading US government scholar, Douglas Pike,
also produced quite positive comments about the Pol Pot regime. For
Lewis and the like, such apologetics are not useful, so they are
suppressed. His comments are quoted in various places, including (if I
recall) Ed Herman's and my review of all of this in "Manufacturing
Consent."
(http://www.zmag.org/forums/chomchatarch.htm)
[...] Much more extensive evidence became available in 1980, with the
huge flow of refugees after the Vietnamese invasion drove out the
Khmer Rouge. Based on that, the CIA issued a demographic study that
was completely ignored in the media, though praised by the highest US
authorities as the best account available. The study was outlandish.
It attributed most of the deaths to the Vietnamese, and largely
exonerated the Khmer Rouge, claiming that 50-100,000 people were
killed (mostly military and government officials), that the atrocities
were mostly in the early period, and that most peasants didn't make
out badly under the KR. [...]
(http://groups.google.com/groups?selm=36ACFC7A.3565%40columbia-center.org)
Remember these claims by Chomsky concerning the CIA study:
1. It flatly denied the atrocities of 1978.
2. It blamed the majority of the deaths on the Vietnamese invasion.
3. It claimed that only 50,000 - 100,000 were killed by Pol Pot.
4. It claimed that few peasants really suffered.
Please compare these points with what the CIA study actually says in
the following posts.
- Nate
Nathan Folkert
limitations on the quantity of text I can submit through the form. I
attempted to transcribe this as faithfully as possible, though I
occasionally needed to reformat tables. If any errors were made in
transcription, they were inadvertent, but it is a fairly long
document. If you detect any, please notify me, and I will post
corrections. Thanks. -Nate]
National Foreign Assessment Center
Kampuchea:
A Demographic Catastrophe
A Research Paper
_Research for this report was completed on 17 January 1980._
Comments and queries on this report are welcome and may be directed
to:
Director of Public Affiars
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505
(703) 351-7676
For information on obtaining additional copies, see the inside of
front cover.
GC 80-10019U
May 1980
[end of cover page]
Kampuchea:
A Demographic Catastrophe
Summary
The estimated decline in the Kampuchean population between 1970 and
1979 is unprecedented in any national population since World War II.
A decade of war, social revolution, and invasion has thrown the
country into chaos. Precise population figures are not available. To
measure the demographic impact of the social upheavals on the
Kampuchean population during the 1970s, we prepared population
estimates for the period 1970 to 1979, using the 1962 census as a
base. The December 1979 population is estimated to range between 4.7
million and 5.5 million persons, with the most likely estimate 5.2
million -- down from 7.1 million in 1970. Under normal demographic
circumstances the population would have totaled roughly 9 million by
yearend 1979.
After four years of sharply reduced growth, population numbers plunged
following the takeover by the Cambodian Communist regime in April 195;
the decline continued through the nearly four years of Khmer Rouge
dominance. By our estimates, the savagery of that regime caused an
actual drop of between 1.2 million and 1.8 million people. The
downward trend continued under the Vietnamese-supported Heng Samrin
regime, with an estimated decline of about 700,000 persons by December
1979. The elevated number of deaths from inadequate diet and disease,
the small number of births, and the flight of refugees ensure a
continued decline.
The grim demographic outlook is for a Kampuchean population of a few
children, few elderly people, and many prematurely old people whose
lifespan has been drastically shortened by events. Decimated by
disease, famine, and war, and bereft of its leaders and its labor
force, the Kampuchean society will need decades to come back, if it
survives at all.
[end of page] ii
Kampuchea:
A Demographic Catastrophe
Discussion
Ten years of war, social revolution, and invasion have played havoc
with the Kampuchean population. Over the centuries the Khmers have
repeatedly weathered expansionist incursions by neighboring states and
European colonialism, but now they may be threatened with virtual
extinction as a people.
The situation is chaotic, and precise population figures are not
available. The only hard demographic data are from the 1962 census.
The lack of a recent reliable population estimate supported by
systematic assumptions relating to its preparation has led to the use
of a wide range of population figures from a host of differing
sources. Published 1979 population estimates range from 4 million to
9 million. The lower figure is the unsubstantiated estimate used by
the Heng Samrin regime; the latter is a recent UN projection that
gives little or no consideration to the effects of the social
upheavals of the 1970s. [Footnote 1: In 1978, the UN published
projections that imply a 1 December 1979 Kampuchean population in the
range of 8.7 million to 9.0 million people. It estimated a population
increase of 15.0 percent between 1970 and 1975, and a 9.0 - 14.0
percent increase in the 1975-80 period. Overall, the UN projections
for 1970 to 1980 show what Kampuchea's growth would have been in the
absence of emigration and deaths from war, mass executions, and
famine. As such, it provides a benchmark for estimating the full
population impact of the past decade of social upheaval.]
CIA Estimation Series
In an attempt to measure the impact of events during the 1970s on the
Kampuchean population, we prepared population estimates for the period
1970 to 1979 (table I-1). Using the UN 1970 population estimate of
7.1 million as a base and incorporating the possible demographic
impact of events during the 1970s, we estimate the 1 December 1979
population at somewhere between 4.7 million and 5.5 million. Our most
likely estimate is 5.2 million. [Footnote 2: Ordinarily, population
estimates based on incomplete data are made by using demographic
parameters from other countries at similar levels of development, or
by using demographic models constructed for developing countries. In
the case of Kampuchea, and especially for the period 1975-79, the
reported events were so bizarre that it was impossible to assume a
demographic similarity with any other country or with an existing
model. Consequently, demographic estimates were linked to the unique
conditions in the country as reconstructed from narrative reports by
US Government sources for 1970-75 and by journalists, refugees, and
relief workers for 1975-79.] Therefore, since 1970, the Kampuchean
population has declined by 1.5 million to 2.4 million people, or by
22-34 percent; the drop has been even more pronounced since the
Communist takeover in April 1975. The difference between the CIA
estimate and the UN estimate -- 3.5 million or more people --
illustrates the full extent of the demographic disaster visited upon
the Kampuchean people during this period (figure I-1).
This report is in two parts. Part I briefly traces the demographic
events of the past decade, highlighting the estimated ranges in
population during the three regimes between July 1970 and December
1979, and discusses the outlook for the Kampuchean population. Part
II presents the methodology used in obtaining our estimates.
We acknowledge that our assumptions are highly speculative given the
uncertainty surrounding events in Kampuchea and their demographic
impact; therefore, all estimates are presented in three series. The
Medium Series portrays, in our view, the most likely pattern of
demographic events. The High and Low Series, which incorporate more
favorable and more adverse assumptions, respectively, set reasonable
limits within which the population statistics are likely to fall.
Population estimates cited in part I are from the Medium Series. (A
detailed chronology of events, their estimated demographic impact,
estimation assumptions, and total populations by period can be found
in table II-4, enclosed herewith, inside back cover. [appended at end
of this transcription])
[end of page] 1
Table I-1
Population Estimates,
1970-79
[Plain text formatting constraints require reformatting table]
[Column Keys: Col 1: Midyear, Col 2: High Series Total Population
(thousands), Col 3: High Series Growth Rate [Footnote 1: Groth rates
are for the preceding 12-month period, unless otherwise indicated.
The rates are calculated according to the formula for exponential
change: P_n = P_0*e^(rt) where P_n is the population at the end of the
period, P_0 is the initial population, e is a mathematical constant, r
is the constant rate of change applied continuously, and t is time.]
(percent), Col 4: Medium Series (Most Likely) Total Population
(thousands), Col 5: Growth Rate [See footnote 1] (percent), Col 6: Low
Series Total Population (thousands), Col 7: Growth Rate [See footnote
1] (percent)]
[Mid] [HiPop] [HiGr] [MidPop] [MidGr] [LowPop] [LowGr]
1970 7,060 7,060 7,060
1971 7,133 1.03 7,133 1.03 7,111 0.72
1972 7,201 0.95 7,201 0.95 7,157 0.64
1973 7,270 0.95 7,270 0.95 7,204 0.65
1974 7,334 0.88 7,334 0.88 7,245 0.57
1975 6,877 -6.43 6,726 -8.65 6,358 -13.06
1976 6,544 -4.96 6,191 -8.29 5,812 -8.98
1977 6,407 -2.12 6,012 -2.93 5,626 -3.25
1978 6,284 -1.94 5,899 -1.90 5,507 -2.14
1979 6,141 -2.30 5,767 -2.26 5,337 -3.14
1 Dec. 5,521 -25.56 5,160 -26.71 4,684 -31.34
1979
[Footnote 2: for Growth Rates in 1979: Rate of growth for the period 1
July - 1 December 1979.]
Part I. Estimates and Conditions by Period
Lon Nol Regime
(1 July 1970 to 17 April 1975)
The war between the Lon Nol regime and the Communist Khmer Rouge set
the stage for the cataclysmic decline of the Kampuchean population
that was to follow. Families were separated, food networks disrupted,
and health services thrown into chaos as a result of the war
emergency. Malnutrition, long recognized as a major problem for the
poorest Cambodian families, rapidly engulfed other segments of the
population. For this period, we assumed that birth rates declined as
conditions worsened. Death rates, high since the 1960s, soared with
the addition of an estimated 600,000 to 700,000 war-related deaths.
During the Lon Nol regime the population increased by only an
estimated 324,000 as the population growth rate fell from 2.8 percent
(1965-70) to less than 1.0 percent (table I-2).
An even more consequential impact of this period of strife was the
change in the makeup of the population, from a traditional rural
society to one that was largely urban based. Large numbers of people
fleeing the war moved from the countryside to the perceived safety of
villages and cities, and from city to city as the war enveloped ever
greater areas of the country. As the fighting intensified in the
early months of 1975, more people crowded into the cities. By the
time the Lon Nol regime fell in April 1975 the urban population
probably was on the order of 4 million, more than half the total
population. (UN projection in 1973-74 had assumed that only about
one-fourth of the total population would be urban by 1975.)
[end of page] 2
[Figure I-1 cannot be reproduced in text format. It is a comparison
of the three CIA series (high, medium, and low, given in Table I-1)
against the UN medium projections for Cambodian population as a line
chart with population on the vertical axis and date on the horizontal
axis. The figure shows the UN projection rising more or less linearly
from about 7.1 million (my estimate, from eyeballing the graph) in
1970 to about 9 million in 1980. It also shows the CIA estimates
which are pretty flat from 70-75, drop sharply between April and
midyear 75, less sharply, but still sharply dropping from midyear 75
to 76, and then decreasing, at perhaps the same rate as the UN
projected increase, until 1979, when it drops sharply again (at a
slope less than the sharp decrease in 1975, but sharper than the
decrease between midyear 75 and 76). See Table I-1 for the data.]
Data Source:
_Demographic Estimates and Projections for the World, Regions, and
Countries as Assessed in 1978_ (United Nations provisional report), 25
January 1979.
[end of page] 3
Table I-2
Population Estimates
By Period (thousands):
Estimation 1 Jul 70 17 Apr 75 1 Jan 79 1 Dec 79
Series
High Series 7,060 7,384 6,225 5,521
Medium Series 7,060 7,384 5,845 5,160
(Most Likely)
Low Series 7,060 7,278 5,452 4,684
Period Change:
[Abbreviated for formatting: Col 1: Estimation Series, Col 2: Lon Nol
Regime 1 Jul 70-17 Apr 75, Col 3: Pol Pot Regime 17 Apr 75-1 Jan 79,
Col 4: Heng/Samrin/Vietnamese Regime 1 Jan 79-1 Dec 79. Sub Cols for
Cols 2-4 are Absolute (thousands) and Percent]
[Est] [Lon Nol] [Pol Pot] [Heng]
[Abs] [%] [Abs] [%] [Abs] [%]
High Series +324 +5 -1,159 -16 -704 -11
Medium Series +324 +5 -1,539 -21 -685 -12
(Most Likely)
Low Series +218 +3 -1,826 -25 -768 -14
Pol Pot Regime
(17 Aprl [sic] 1975 to 1 January 1979)
The almost four years of brutal rule by the Pol Pot regime drastically
accelerated the disintegration of Kampuchean society. The destructive
designs for the now largely urban population became apparent within
hours after the Pol Pot takeover of Phnom Penh on 17th April 1975.
Hundreds of thousands fled the nations immediately. Various sources
put the number of ethnic Vietnamese who left between 200,000 and
500,000. For the remaining Kampucheans, it became obvious that the
"decadent, Westernized" city dweller would be subjected to very
different conditions and policies than the idealized peasant. The
rural population, then totaling roughly 3 million people, was to be
the foundation for the new Khmer Rouge revolutionary society.
Within two weeks of the Communist takeover, the entire urban
population had been expelled from the cities and forcibly sent to the
countryside. Given no provisions en route, they sustained themselves
on foraged food and surface water. Upon arrival at designated rural
areas, the displaced urban population was classified as _new people_
and tasked with tilling fields and building shelters.
Conditions were harsh. Labor was performed by hand and foraging for
food and water was still necessary. Food intake provided no more than
800 to 1,200 calories per day. [Footnote 3: The average adult body
requires a minimum of 1,800 calories per day to perform light labor.
Below this minimum intake the body begins to use muscle mass for
protein, the person becomes thin, listless, and susceptible to
disease.] Because of inadequate food, no medical care, and a lack of
natural immunity to diseases peculiar to rural areas, the _new people_
became sick and epidemic disease spread. Then, between September and
December, hundreds of thousands of this already weakened populace,
along with the majority of the rural population living in areas
bordering Vietnam, were again relocated.
[end of page] 4
The forced marches and debilitating conditions, coupled with the
excessively hard labor under strict discipline, resulted in an
extremely high number of deaths among the _new people_. We estimate
that three times as many died as would have been expected under normal
conditions. In addition to the deaths from "natural" causes, 50,000
to 100,000 former military personnel, bureaucrats, teachers, and
educated people may have been executed. The population was further
depleted by the flight of up to 55,000 people to Thailand, half of
whom died during the journey. Because evidence was so fragmentary,
refugee flight to Vietnam was included only in the Low Series. Under
the extreme conditions that prevailed during this period, births among
the _new people_ offset only a small fraction of the population losses
from death and migration.
The _old people_ -- those living in rural areas when Pol Pot gained
control -- fared somewhat better. They too, however, suffered from
food shortages, lack of medical care, and hard labor. We estimate
that their births slightly outnumbered their deaths and that the _old
people_ population increased negligibly during this period.
The conditions imposed upon the people by the Pol Pot regime resulted
in an absolute decline in the population between April 1975 and
January 1979 of an estimated 1.2 million to 1.8 million people (figure
I-2). Educated [continued after figure I-2...]
Figure I-2
Kampuchea:
Population Estimates for _New People_ and _Old People_17 April 1975-1
December 1979 [Footnote 1: Urban and rural population reclassified as
_new people_ and _old people_, respectively, in April 1975.]
In millions
[This is a histogram giving estimates of the population of new people
and old people versus the total population estimated in the UN
demographic study. This is difficult to reproduce in format, so I
will reproduce the data values here, which are given in the chart:
Col 1: Date, Col 2: Total Population estimated by UN, Col 3: Total
Population estimated by CIA, Col 4: New People (CIA estimate), Col 5:
Old People (CIA estimate).
[Date] [UN Pop] [CIA Pop] [New] [Old]
17 Apr 1975 8.1 7.1 [foot2] 4.0 3.1
1 Jul 1975 8.1 6.7 3.6 3.2
1 Jan 1976 8.2 6.3 3.2 3.2
1 Jul 1976 8.3 6.2 3.0 3.2
1 Jan 1977 8.3 6.1 2.9 3.2
1 Jul 1977 8.4 6.0 2.8 3.2
1 Jan 1978 8.5 6.0 2.8 3.2
1 Jul 1978 8.6 5.9 2.7 3.2
1 Jan 1979 8.6 5.8 2.7 3.2
1 Dec 1979 8.8 5.2
Footnote 2: Excludes Vietnamese repatriated during this period.]
Figures may not add, due to rounding.
Data Source:
_Demographic Estimates and Projections for the World, Regions, and
Countries as Assessed in 1978_ (United Nations provisional report), 25
January 1979.
[end of page] 5
[... continued from before Figure] persons, military personnel, and
the skilled were disproportionately represented in the numbers lost.
The physical condition of the survivors was greatly weakened.
Heng Samrin/Vietnamese Regime
(1 January to 1 December 1979)
The fall of Kampuchea to the Vietnamese may ultimately spell the
demise of the Khmer as a people. The first six months of the Heng
Samrin regime were characterized by the destruction of the
agricultural system and another reordering of the population. The
people were urged to leave communes into which they had been moved by
the Khmer Rouge and to return to their former villages to grow food.
Those who returned found that the Heng Samrin/Vietnamese forces were
seldom able to protect them from sporadic attacks by the Pol Pot
guerrillas, who (along with a sizable civilian population) had
retreated to mountain strongholds along the Thai border. Fearful, the
people deserted the farms for the more secure roads and towns. Most
of those who returned to the cities were denied entry and restricted
to makeshift camps in the immediate environs. Thousands of people
chose to flee the country and the increasingly chaotic conditions. By
the end of June about 17,000 more had fled to refugee camps in
Thailand.
Conditions were deteriorating swiftly for the civilian population by
late summer. The people had been unable to produce sufficient food
and the Heng Samrin regime was no longer dispensing food rations. In
July 1979 about three and one-half million people were estimated to be
in danger of starvation. In the face of the impending disaster a
great westward movement of people began in early fall, with many
seeking haven in camps and holding centers in Thailand and along the
border. Thousands of those who chose not to flee died of starvation
and disease. A conservative estimate is that for every Kampuchean
born during July-December 1979, 10 died. All told, the first year of
the Heng Samrin rule had brought an additional drop of 700,000 in the
population, to an estimated 5.2 million.
Outlook
The social upheavals in Kampuchea during the 1970s will continue to
have an adverse impact on the Khmers not only in the short term, but
also well into the next century. Even if great improvements were to
occur in food supply, living conditions, and health standards, the
catastrophic reduction of Khmer numbers will constrain recovery.
Although there is no specific information on the age, sex, or
occupational categories of the remaining population, the reduction in
size of individual groups is bound to have a lasting effect on the
future Khmer population.
Indeed, as things stand, short-term prospects are grim. After the
incountry relief food and the rice from the meager 1979-80 harvest are
gone -- probably by early spring -- severe hunger at best, famine at
worst, could again strike and possibly extend well into 1981.
Internal obstructions virtually preclude the timely distribution of
externally supplied rice for food or seed. It also seems unlikely
that there will be a bountiful 1980-81 harvest. Irrigation systems
are in disrepair, many fields are damaged, and shortages of seed,
fertilizer, draft animals, and manpower all point to a much reduced
harvest.
Even were food and health conditions to improve markedly, a rebuilding
of Kampuchean society would be a long process. The executions under
Pol Pot effectively wiped out the leadership echelon, and the extreme
conditions suffered during the last five years have decimated the
adult labor population. There are few Khmers to replace the dynamic
segments of society. The ranks of those over 20 years old are thin,
and the numbers within those ranks possessing skills are few. With a
life expectancy shortened drastically by events of the next decade,
the adult population will decrease further over the next two decades.
It could only be strengthened by the return of the Khmer now in
Thailand; even so, revitalization of the country would be a lengthy
and difficult undertaking.
[end of page] 6
Young people in their teen years are not readying themselves to fill
normal adult roles. Conditions militate against their assuming
leadership and labor positions. Their health is fragile, and their
training has been curtailed. Survival is their goal.
As for the very young, few children were born during the Pol Pot
years. The children who were born and survived the first crucial
months and years are now suffering from disease and serious
malnutrition. Many are orphaned. All children are living under
extreme circumstances that will appreciably reduce their numbers.
Whether they will be healthy and vigorous enough -- or whether there
will be enough of them -- to eventually fill the jobs and occupations
needed for a functioning society is highly questionable.
Furthermore, not many babies will be born in the next few years. The
fertility of unhealthy mothers and fathers is low. The mortality
level will undoubtedly be high for infants, for children under 5 years
of age, as well as for mothers. The prospects for regeneration of the
population by the end of the century thus are poor.
Part II. Methodology
The estimated population numbers for Kampuchea were obtained through
the use of a simple bookkeeping method. Births occurring during the
period were added to the population at the beginning of the period,
deaths and refugees were subtracted. The resulting number was assumed
to be the population at the beginning of the next period.
The estimates in this paper were developed as follows: Subjective
reporting was studied to determine its validity; analysts of
Kampuchean affairs were consulted to verify the occurrence of
historical events; and assumptions were made about the probable impact
of these events on the demographic parameters of population change --
fertility, mortality, and migration. Since the estimates are based on
available information and the expert interpretation of events, they
should be considered reasonable; but because they are founded on
incomplete historical data and attempt to evaluate the results of
nearly 10 years of war and oppression on population change, they
should be considered speculative.
Definitons
Fertility: refers to the actual reproductive performance of a
population.
Mortality: refers to deaths that occur in a population.
Vital Rates: refers to the measurement of the births and deaths (the
vital events) that occur in a population. In the following estimates
the vital events are estimated using crude birth rates, crude death
rates, and percentages dying (which are subsequently calculated as
crude death rates).
Crude Birth Rates,
Crude Death Rates: refers to the number of births or deaths during one
year per 1,000 persons based on the midyear population. In the
following estimates, however, the crude rates are defined as the
number of births or deaths occurring during a specified period per
1,000 persons based on the population at the beginning of the period.
Data Base
The only demographic data available for Kampuchea are from the
national census conducted in 1962. One important analysis of the
census, including fertility and mortality trends and estimates and
projections of the total population, was published in 1970 by George
Siampos, _The Population of Cambodia, 1945-1980_. The United Nations
has published estimates and projections for Kampuchea from 1950 to the
year 2000 in a provisional report, _Demographic Estimates and
Projections for the World, Regions and Countries as [continued on next
page...]
[end of page] 7
[continued in next post...]
Nathan Folkert
[... from previous page] Assessed in 1978_. The US Bureau of the
Census published estimates of demographic parameters and projections
for Kampuchea in 1977, which are now being updated. For the Chinese
population, William Willmott's _The Chinese in Cambodia_ was a key
source; his estimates used the 1962 census, surveys, and migration
data and were published in 1968. None of these analyses allow for the
effects of the war, and they make only very general estimates for 1975
to 1980.
There are estimates by US officials for the urban population, for
refugees, and for war dead for 1970 to 1975, but many of these are
contradictory and highly suspect. From 1975 to 1979 Kampuchea was
closed to Western observers. Reporting was sparse and much of it was
propaganda. Since the Vietnamese invasion in January 1979 and the
increased flow of refugees to Thailand, a more complete picture of
conditions since 1975 has begun to emerge. Still, most of the
information available comes from Kampuchean refugees and thus is
piecemeal in nature and possibly biased.
Assumptions and Estimates
Lon Nol Regime
July 1970 to 17 April 1975
Base Population. The UN-estimated 1970 population of 7,060,000 was
accpeted as the base population for all series in this estimation set.
The United Nations derived this estimate by projecting population
trends evident in the 1962 census.
Crude Birth Rate Estimates. The adjusted 1970 UN crude birth rate
served as the base fertility measure for all estimation series. The
1970 rate was decreased by 6.0 percent in all series for mid-1970 to
April 1975. The estimated rate of decline in the crude birth rate for
Kampuchea was based on reported declines in Bangladesh. A recent
study of war-impacted rural area in Bangladesh showed that crude death
rates increased in the civilian population as a result of the 1971 War
of Independence; malnutrition levels and incidence of disease also
increased rapidly. While in no way implying htat similar conditions
prevailed in the Bangladesh study area as in Kampuchea in 1970 to
1975, the assumed 6.0-percent decline in the birth rate is a
reasonable assumption and possibly a conservative one. The impact of
war conditions in Kampuchea may have intensified over the five years,
and a faster rate of decline near the end of the period may have been
justified. However, living conditions varied greatly and a
conservative outlook was adopted. The rounded crude birth rates
assumed are 46 per 1,000 in 1970, 45 for 1971 and 1972, 44 for 1973
and 1974, and 43 for 1 January 1975 to 17 April 1975.
Crude Death Rate Estimates. The estimated UN 1970 crude death rate of
18 per 1,000 was used in all estimation series and was held constant
throughout the period. The decision to hold the rate constant implies
that no deterioration in the standard of living occurred between 1970
and 1975. As this most likely was not the case and since the war
eventually enveloped the entire population, an assumption about
war-related deaths was necessary.
War-related deaths totaling 600,000 were added to those resulting from
applying the 18-per-1,000 death rate to the population in the High and
Medium Series, and 700,000 were added in the Low Series. (The deaths
were prorated throughout the period as a demographic convenience. The
level of such deaths in any one period is not known.) When deaths
resulting from the estimated death rate are added to war-related
deaths, the crude death rates in the High and Medium Series are 36 per
1,000 for 1970 and 35 per 1,000 for each year from 1971 to the end of
the period. The rates for the Low Series are 39 per 1,000 for 1970
and 1971 and 38 per 1,000 for each year from 1972 to the end of the
period.
The assumed number of war-related deaths (600,000 to 700,000) is
debatable; US government sources put the figure unofficially at
600,000 to 700,000; authorities of Democratic Kampuchea say 600,000 to
800,000; Prince Sihanouk is quoted as saying 600,000. None of these
estimates is well founded. However, by [continued on next page...]
[end of page] 8
[... continued from previous page] accepting 600,000 to 700,000
additional deaths, the death rate is about double the UN-estimated
18-per-1,000 rate. From the rural Bangladesh study, it is seen that
death rates rose by 40 percent in the civilian population after a war
of only a few months; therefore, a doubling of the rates for a war of
five years duration does not seem unreasonable.
Pol Pot Regime
Phase 1: 17 April to 1 July 1975
Total Population. Estimates for this period were driven largely by
two events: (1) the people of Vietnamese origin and Kampucheans with
ties to them were repatriated to Vietnam immediately after the Khmer
Rouge takeover; and (2) the remaining Kampuchean population was
divided into two distinct groups and each group treated differently,
resulting in a unique demographic impact on each.
The estimated number of repatriates to Vietnam varies widely; sources
put the numbers between 200,000 and 500,000. In the High and Medium
Series an estimated 250,000 repatriates were subtracted from the 17
April 1975 population of 7,384,000, leaving a Kampuchean population of
7,134,000. In the Low Series 500,000 were subtracted from a total of
7,279,000, leaving 6,779,000 Kampucheans.
The 17 April 1975 Kampuchean population (total population minus those
repatriated to Vietnam) was divided into two groups, the _old people_
and the _new people_. The urban (_new people_) population base is
estimated at 4.0 million. The 4.0 million subtracted from the total
Kampuchean population leaves the rural (_old people_) population at
3,134,000 in the High and Medium Series, and 2,779,000 in the Low
Series (tables II-1A and II-1B).
Vital Rates for Old People. The crude birth and death rates during
this period were assumed to be the same as the rates for the total
population in the preceding period. The assumption is that conditions
did not appreciably worsen for them immediately after the Khmer Rouge
victory.
Vital Rates for New People. During this 10-week period about 10
percent of this population was assumed as having dies in the Medium
and Low Series, and 7 percent in the High Series. These percentages
compare with the estimated 4 percent of the total population who died
in each year during the Lon Nol period. Our assumption about the high
number of deaths in the early Pol Pot period rests largely on refugee
reports and other eyewitness accounts. Given the brutal circumstances
surrounding the evacuation of about 4 million people from the cities
and their eventual dispersal into the countryside, it is certain that
many of the old, very young, weak or sick people died in far greater
numbers than would be expected.
The Khmer Rouge methodically hunted down former members of the Lon Nol
military, civil servants, and the intelligentsia. Nearly 100,000 _new
people_ were assumed executed in the Medium and Low Series -- 50,000
in this period, 30,000 from July 1975 to January 1976, 10,000 from
January 1976 to July 1976, and 10,000 from July 1976 to January 1977.
Only half as many were assumed executed in the High Series -- 25,000
in this period, 10,000 in each of the next two six-month periods from
July 1975 to July 1976, and 5,000 from July 1976 to January 1977.
The crude birth rate of 43 per 1,000 from the preceding period was
used to estimate expected births. It was assumed that the deaths of
pregnant women would increase over expected levels under the harsh
conditions and lack of medical care, thereby reducing the expected
number of births. The births were reduced by about 10 percent in the
High Series, yielding a crude birth rate of 39 per 1,000; by 25
percent in the Medium Series, yielding a rate of 32 per 1,000; and by
50 percent in the Low Series, yielding 22 per 1,000.
Refugees to Vietnam and to Thailand. The evidence of Khmer refugee
flight to Vietnam is fragmentary. The number of such refugees is even
more questionable. Because of the great uncertainty involved, the
assumption of Khmer flight to Vietnam was included in the Low Series
only. The number 30,000 was chosen arbitrarily for the entire Pol Pot
period, and these refugees were assumed to come from the _new people_
population.
[end of page] 9
Table II-1A
Population Estimates for _New People_
[this is a very large table, consisting of population, growth, and
vital rates for each of the series. Because of width constraints, I
will break the table into three subtables, one for each of the series]
High Series
[Col 1: Date/Period, Col 2: Population (thousands), Col 3: Period
Growth Rate (percent), Col 4: Period Vital Rates: Estimated Crude
Birth Rate (per thousand), Col 5: Period Vital Rates: Implied Crude
Death Rate (per thousand)
[Date] [Pop] [Growth] [Birth] [Death]
17 April 1975 4,000 -34.4 39.0 371.0
17 April-
1 July 1975
1 July 1975 3,727 -14.8 15.0 155.0
1 July 1975-
1 January 1976
1 January 1976 3,460 -4.8 10.0 56.0
1 January-
1 July 1976
1 July 1976 3,378 -4.5 10.0 53.0
1 July 1976-
1 January 1977
1 January 1977 3,302 -4.2 10.0 50.0
1 January-
1 July 1977
1 July 1977 3,233 -4.2 10.0 50.0
1 July 1977
1 January 1978
1 January 1978 3,166 -4.2 10.0 50.0
1 January-
1 July 1978
1 July 1978 3,101 -4.2 10.0 50.0
1 July 1978-
1 January 1979
1 January 1979 3,037
Medium Series (Most Likely)
[Col 1: Date/Period, Col 2: Population (thousands), Col 3: Period
Growth Rate (percent), Col 4: Period Vital Rates: Estimated Crude
Birth Rate (per thousand), Col 5: Period Vital Rates: Implied Crude
Death Rate (per thousand)
[Date] [Pop] [Growth] [Birth] [Death]
17 April 1975 4,000 -54.5 32.0 547.0
17 April-
1 July 1975
1 July 1975 3,576 -25.1 15.0 240.0
1 July 1975-
1 January 1976
1 January 1976 3,153 -8.3 10.0 87.0
1 January-
1 July 1976
1 July 1976 3,025 -8.3 10.0 86.0
1 July 1976-
1 January 1977
1 January 1977 2,902 -4.5 10.0 50.0
1 January-
1 July 1977
1 July 1977 2,838 -4.4 10.0 50.0
1 July 1977
1 January 1978
1 January 1978 2,776 -4.4 10.0 50.0
1 January-
1 July 1978
1 July 1978 2,716 -4.4 10.0 50.0
1 July 1978-
1 January 1979
1 January 1979 2,657
Low Series
[Col 1: Date/Period, Col 2: Population (thousands), Col 3: Period
Growth Rate (percent), Col 4: Period Vital Rates: Estimated Crude
Birth Rate (per thousand), Col 5: Period Vital Rates: Implied Crude
Death Rate (per thousand)
[Date] [Pop] [Growth] [Birth] [Death]
17 April 1975 4,000 -56.0 22.0 547.0
17 April-
1 July 1975
1 July 1975 3,565 -25.5 15.0 241.0
1 July 1975-
1 January 1976
1 January 1976 3,137 -8.6 10.0 86.0
1 January-
1 July 1976
1 July 1976 3,005 -8.6 10.0 86.0
1 July 1976-
1 January 1977
1 January 1977 2,878 -4.7 10.0 50.0
1 January-
1 July 1977
1 July 1977 2,811 -4.7 10.0 50.0
1 July 1977
1 January 1978
1 January 1978 2,746 -4.7 10.0 50.0
1 January-
1 July 1978
1 July 1978 2,683 -4.5 10.0 50.0
1 July 1978-
1 January 1979
1 January 1979 2,623
[end of page] 10
Table II-1B
Population Estimates for _Old People_
[Same problem as previous table, but this time the table is only
broken into two series -- one for the High and Medium Series, and one
for the Low Series. Again, I'll break the table into two subtables]
High and Medium Series
[Col 1: Date/Period, Col 2: Population (thousands), Col 3: Period
Growth Rate (percent), Col 4: Period Vital Rates: Estimated Crude
Birth Rate (per thousand), Col 5: Period Vital Rates: Implied Crude
Death Rate (per thousand)
[Date] [Pop] [Growth] [Birth] [Death]
17 April 1975 3,134 2.5 43.0 18.0
17 April-
1 July 1975
1 July 1975 3,150 0.5 30.0 25.0
1 July 1975-
1 January 1976
1 January 1976 3,158 0.5 30.0 25.0
1 January-
1 July 1976
1 July 1976 3,166 0.3 28.0 25.0
1 July 1976-
1 January 1977
1 January 1977 3,170 0.3 28.0 25.0
1 January-
1 July 1977
1 July 1977 3,174 0.3 28.0 25.0
1 July 1977
1 January 1978
1 January 1978 3,179 0.3 28.0 25.0
1 January-
1 July 1978
1 July 1978 3,183 0.3 28.0 25.0
1 July 1978-
1 January 1979
1 January 1979 3,188
Low Series
[Col 1: Date/Period, Col 2: Population (thousands), Col 3: Period
Growth Rate (percent), Col 4: Period Vital Rates: Estimated Crude
Birth Rate (per thousand), Col 5: Period Vital Rates: Implied Crude
Death Rate (per thousand)
[Date] [Pop] [Growth] [Birth] [Death]
17 April 1975 2,778 2.5 43.0 18.0
17 April-
1 July 1975
1 July 1975 2,793 0.5 30.0 25.0
1 July 1975-
1 January 1976
1 January 1976 2,800 0.5 30.0 25.0
1 January-
1 July 1976
1 July 1976 2,807 0.3 28.0 25.0
1 July 1976-
1 January 1977
1 January 1977 2,811 0.3 28.0 25.0
1 January-
1 July 1977
1 July 1977 2,815 0.4 28.0 25.0
1 July 1977
1 January 1978
1 January 1978 2,820 0.3 28.0 25.0
1 January-
1 July 1978
1 July 1978 2,824 0.4 28.0 25.0
1 July 1978-
1 January 1979
1 January 1979 2,829
[end of page] 11
The number of refugees that arrived in Thailand during the Pol Pot
years is also very much in question. On the basis of journalists'
reports, subjective refugee stories, and probable conditions within
the country, we estimate refugee flight to Thailand from mid-1975
through 1978 at 55,000 in the Medium and Low Series, and at 20,000 in
the High Series.
Phase 2: July 1975 to January 1976
A second forced population displacement, this time affecting both _old
people_ and _new people_, occurred during September to December 1975.
Although more orderly and accomplished by vehicle rather than on foot,
again there was no provision made for food or water during the journey
or for adequate shelter at the destination.
Famine affected many areas from July 1975 to the end of the year.
Epidemic diseases, malaria, and food deficiency maladies were rampant
among the already weakened populace. Although the entire population
was adversely affected by the deteriorating health conditions, the
_new people_ population was assumed to have suffered most.
Vital Rates for Old People. Crude birth rates were estimated to have
declined by about 30 percent, from 43 per 1,000 to 30 per 1,000. A
30-percent decline is similar to the reduction observed in one year
following the 1974 famine in Bangladesh. The United Nations also
decreased birth rates by some 30 percent in its projections for the
1970-75 and 1975-80 periods. The decision to reduce birth rates in
our estimates was taken with some degree of assurance, given the
impact of bad health conditions and social dislocations on women in
childbearing ages.
Estimated crude death rates were increased from 18 per 1,000 to 25 per
1,000. The rate of 25 per 1,000 during this period is the same rate
estimated in UN projections for earlier stages of development, for
example, 1950 to 1955. A return to this high level is a reasonable
assumption, given the forced marches, disrupted medical care, and
inadequate diet.
Vital Rates for New People. Crude birth rates for all series were
estimated at 15 per 1,000, one-half the _old people's_ rate. Harsh
living conditions, psychological stress, bad diet, and no medical care
would cause a high incidence of spontaneous abortions and, indeed, the
death of many pregnant women. The assumed drastic decline in the
birth rates seems a likely possibility under the prevailing
conditions.
In all series the number of deaths from July 1975 to January 1976 was
estimated to be equal to the number of deaths sustained from April to
July 1975. In part because of the weakened condition of the populace,
the second forced march was as detrimental as was the April 1975
exodus from the cities. Deaths resulting from the second march were
estimated at 400,000 in the Medium and Low Series and 280,000 in the
High Series.
Phase 3: January 1976 to January 1977.
Food was more plentiful for the first half of 1976, but still rationed
and inadequate given the severe physical demands placed on the
population. Food shortages, disease, and poor living conditions kept
birth rates low and death rates high.
Vital Rates for Old People. The crude birth rate was held constant at
30 per 1,000 for the first six months in all series. An additional
6-percent decline (bringing the rate down to 28 per 1,000) was assumed
for the last six months. The crude death rate was assumed to remain
constant at 25 per 1,000 in all series for the entire period.
Vital Rates for New People. The crude birth rate was assumed to
decline to 10 per 1,000 in the first six months for all series. It
was then held constant in the second six months.
For each six-month period, in the Medium and Low Series, we assumed
that about 4 percent of the population died from more or less natural
causes and that an additional 10,000 were executed. Implicit in the
lower percentage of deaths is the assumption that a slightly better
food supply and marginally more stable living conditions contributed
to a higher survivor rate than in previous periods. Presumably the
remaining population learned the techniques of survival under harsh
conditions.
[end of page] 12
In the High Series the crude death rate was assumed to be 50 per 1,000
for both six-month periods, or double the _old people's_ crude death
rate. (Assumed deaths total about 2.5 percent of the population
during each period.) An additional 10,000 were assumed executed in
the first six months, and 5,000 in the second six months.
Phase 4: January 1977 to January 1979
Living conditions most likely did not vary during these two years from
the conditions during 1976.
Vital Rates for Old People. This population barely grew throughout
the period. Estimated crude birth rates were assumed to be 28 per
1,000; crude death rates, 25 per 1,000.
Vital Rates for New People. This population continued to decline.
Crude birth rates for all series were held constant at 10 per 1,000.
In the Medium and Low Series the percentage dying was held at 2.5
percent resulting in death rates of 50 per 1,000.
Heng Samrin Regime
January 1979 to July 1979
The Heng Samrin regime did not provide additional food rations, health
services, or even a semblance of social order. Under these conditions
the former _old people_ were assumed to have lost their slightly
favored position. They most likely shared with the _new people_ the
food taken from warehouses and harvested after the Pol Pot forces
left, but they also shared the ensuing food shortages. In the eyes of
marauding Pol Pot forces they were just as suspect of collaboration
with the Vietnamese as were the _new people_ and suffered the same
retaliation. The Heng Samrin government made no distinction between
_old people_ and _new people_; neither received food or services and
both were caught between the opposing forces fighting in Kampuchea.
Vital Rates, Total Population. For this period, we assumed that the
wide disparity in birth rates between the two populations narrowed
slightly. The rate for the former _old people_ was allowed to decline
to 26 per 1,000 as their living conditions became less stable; the
rate for the _new people_ was increased to 11 per 1,000 on the
assumption that with Pol Pot gone conditions improved slightly for
them. Crude birth rates for the total population were prepared by
combining the number of births from the two populations and by
assigning these births to the total population at the beginning of the
period.
An assumed 2 percent of the total population died during this period.
This percentage implies that not as many _new people_ died as in the
preceding period (estimated at 2.5 percent) and that more _old people_
died in this period than previously (estimated at 1.4 percent).
Refugees to Thailand. About 17,000 refugees were in UN camps in
Thailand by 30 June 1979. In all series these refugees were assumed
to have left Kampuchea during the first half of 1979. In the Low
Series, an additional 40,000 refugees were assumed to be in Thailand,
but not in camps.
July 1979 to December 1979
Fighting between Pol Pot and the Vietnamese resumed in September,
forcing people in the border area to flee to Thailand. The harvest at
the end of summer was meager, consisting for the most part of food
crops that were grown around the secure roads and towns. Widespread
starvation throughout the country was evident by early November. An
international relief effort was started, but as of November very
little food had been delivered and little of that had been distributed
among the civilian population. The people in the countryside did not
receive any relief supplies.
A great westward movement of people from all areas of the country
toward the Thai border began in late October. The only concentration
of Khmers in Kampuchea was around Phnom Penh; 200,000 were reported in
the environs of the city, some 70,000 in the city.
Vital Rates, Total Population. Crude birth rates were assumed to
decline to the level of 10 per 1,000 for the population as a whole.
[end of page] 13
The percentage dyring during this five-month period was estimated at 4
percent to reflect famine conditions. This is the same percentage as
was estimated for the _new people_ during the January-December 1976
food shortage.
Refugees to Thailand. In the High and Medium Series we estimated that
400,000 Khmers had entered camps and holding centers in Thailand by 1
December; the Low Series incorporated a total of 500,000. (These
estimates are rough approximations and are subject to abrupt
fluctuation because of the fluid nature of the refugee situation along
the border.) In the Low Series the 40,000 who were subtracted as
refugees in the preceding period were assumed to have voluntarily
reentered Kampuchea in August 1979. These 40,000 were added back into
the Low Series population.
Chinese in Kampuchea
There were approximately 425,000 Chinese (about 6 percent of the total
population) in Kampuchea in 1970 (table II-2). The majority lived in
urban areas, employed as rice merchants, shopkeepers, or business-men;
those who were in rural areas were engaged in small trading
enterprises or farming.
Table II-2
Thousands
Estimated Chinese Population in Kampuchea, 1970 to 1979
Date High Medium Series Low
Series (Most Likely) Series
1 July 1970 425 425 425
17 April 1975 444 444 438
1 December 1979 299 259 247
For July 1970 to 17 April 1975, it was assumed that the growth rates
estimated for the total population applied to the Chinese population
as well. It was further assumed that throughout this period, as
conditions deteriorated in the countryside, there was a gradual but
constant flow of rural and small-town Chinese to the cities to find
refuge. Growth rates for the Chinese population from April 1975 to
January 1979 thus were assumed to be the same as those for the _new
people_ population in all series. For January to December 1979, the
growth rates for the total population were used.
Estimates for People Facing Starvation
The numbers of people in danger of starvation in midsummer 1979 were
developed arithmetically using very broad assumptions. (Table II-3
gives the possible combinations considered based on populations as of
July 1979.)
Table II-3
Thousands
Estimated Number of People in Danger of Starvation, July 1979
Number facing Population
starvation High Medium Series Low
assuming: Series (Most Likely) Series
All of the new people
and one-fourth of the 3,772 3,396 3,250
old people endangered
One-half of the new
people and one-fourth 2,281 2,093 1,973
of the old people
endangered
One-half of the total 3,070 2,884 2,668
population endangered
Estimated Population
Estimation Total Old People New People
Series Population (pre-1975 rural (pre-1975 urban
population) population)
High 6,141 3,159 2,982
Medium 5,767 3,162 2,605
Low 5,337 2,783 2,554
[end of page] 14
[final post contains fold-out table from back of report...]
Nathan Folkert
[In the back cover of the paper, there was a timeline and summary of
estimations. It was a table with four columns: Date, Event, Estimated
Demographic Impact, and Estimation Assumptions (this last column was
broken into three subcolumns for the three different series, High,
Medium, and Low, though often the descriptions would span multiple
columns. After each time period, a subtable gave estimated population
values for the three series for each 6-month segment of the period. I
have tried to reproduce the table here, though formatting had to be
altered for all-text representation. It is thus not as visually
useful as the table contained in the research paper itself, but
hopefully gets across all relevant information.]
Table II-4
Chronology of Demographic Impact of Events in Kampuchea
Date: 1 Jul 70-17 Apr 75
Event: Civil war. Lon Nol government against Khmer Rouge and
Vietnamese forces.
Estimate Demographic Impact: An estimated 600,000 to 700,000
war-related deaths. Refugees flee to cities; urban population
estimated at 4 million.
Estimation Assumptions: Total population: UN estimate of 7,060,000 for
1 July 1970 used for all series.
Births: UN estimated crude birth rate of 46 per 1,000 for 1 July 1970
accepted and decreased by 6.0 percent. Rate of decline nearly three
times normal, but in line with type of decline estimated for
war-ravaged areas of Bangladesh following 1971 Bangladesh-Pakistan
War.
Deaths: UN estimated crude death rate of 18 per 1,000 for 1 July 1970
held constant; added 600,000 war-related deaths (prorated evenly) in
the High and Medium Series, and 700,000 in the Low Series.
Rates of Growth: calculated, used estimated populations for beginning
and end of period.
Total Population (in thousands)
Date High Medium Low
Series Series Series
1 Jul 70 7,060 7,060 7,060
17 Apr 75 7,384 7,384 7,278
Date 17 Apr-1 Jul 75
Event: Lon Nol defeated; Pol Pot and Khmer Rouge gain control of
Kampuchea.
Estimated Demographic Impact: Estimated 250,000 to 500,000 flee to
Vietnam.
Estimation Assumptions: High and Medium Series: Assumed 250,000
repatriated to Vietnam. Low Series: Assumed 500,000 repatriated to
Vietnam.
Event: Population divided into urban and rural groups.
Estimated Demographic Impact: Urban population expelled from cities,
forcibly moved to countryside.
Estimation Assumptions: After subtraction of repatriates to Vietnam,
assumed new people comprised the estimate 4 million in cities, old
people the remainder -- the 3.1 million assumed in rural areas. Old
people: crude birth and death rates assumed constant at January-April
1975 level.
Estimated Demographic Impact: Numerous deaths during evacuation. No
provisions, food and shelter inadequate. Population weak and
listless; high incidence of pregnant women deaths.
Estimation Assumptions: High Series: New people: assumed 90 percent of
expected births occurred (crude birth rate assumed same as old
people's). Medium Series: Assumed 75 percent of expected births
occurred. Low Series: Assumed 50 percent of expected births occurred.
High Series: Assumed 7 percent of population died. Medium and Low
Series: Assumed 10 percent of population died.
Event: Lon Nol military personnel, civilian bureaucrats, and educated
elite purged.
Estimated Demographic Impact: Destruction of leadership element of
Kampuchean society and urban-based medical system.
Estimation Assumptions: Assumed about 250,000 new people targeted for
execution -- not including familiar: 200,000 military; 30,000 civil
servants; 20,000 of the educated, particularly teachers. Of 250,000:
20 percent died of hunger and disease, 50 percent of remaining
executed in Medium and Low Series and 50 percent of that number
executed in High Series.
Estimated Demographic Impact: Executions begin.
Estimation Assumptions: High Series: Assumed 25,000 executed. Medium
and Low Series: Assumed 50,000 executed.
Estimated Demographic Impact: Kampuchean refugees begin to flee to
Vietnam.
Estimation Assumptions: High and Medium Series: Assumed no refugees to
Vietnam. Low Series: Assumed 30,000 fled to Vietnam during 1975-79
from new people population. Assumed 3,000 refugees to Vietnam
Total Population (in thousands)
Date High Medium Low
Series Series Series
17 Apr 75 7,384 7,384 7,278
1 Jul 75 6,877 6,726 6,358
Date 1 Jul 75-1 Jan 76
Event: Second forced displacement, included both old and new people.
Estimated Demographic Impact: Famine occurs in some areas; no medical
care; incidence of malaria, dysentery, and other diseases increasing.
Extremely hard work required by all.
Estimation Assumptions: Old people: assumed 30-percent drop in crude
birth rate. Assumed crude death rate rose to 25 per 1,000 (UN
estimated 1950-55 level). New people: assumed same number died in
this period as died in previous period. Crude birth rate 50 percent
of old people's rate.
High Series: Assumed 20,000 new people fled to Thailand between July
1975 and January 1979. Medium and Low Series: Assumed 55,000 new
people -- 21,000 to camps, 8,000 illegals, and 26,000 died in attempt
-- fled to Thailand between July 1975 and January 1979.
Estimated Demographic Impact: Refugee flight continues to Vietnam and
begins to Thailand.
Estimation Assumptions: High Series: Assumed 5,000 refugees to Thai
camps. Medium and Low Series: Assumed 5,000 to Thai camps, 5,000
illegals, 10,000 died in attempt. Low Series: Assumed 5,000 refugees
to Vietnam.
Estimated Demographic Impact: More executions.
Estimation Assumptions: High Series: Assumed 10,000 executed. Medium
and Low Series: Assumed 30,000 executed.
Total Population (in thousands)
Date High Medium Low
Series Series Series
1 Jul 75 6,877 6,726 6,358
1 Jan 76 6,618 6,311 5,937
Date: 1 Jan-1 Jul 76
Event: Meager rice harvest. Khmer Rouge firmly in control of
population.
Estimated demographic impact: Food rations above starvation level and
most people sheltered. Unrelenting hard work on inadequate diet and
lack of basic medical care, disease spreads among weakened populace.
Estimation Assumptions: Old people: crude birth and death rates from
previous period remain constant. New people: crude birth rate
declines a further 33 percent. High Series: Crude death rate double
old people's rate, about 2.5 percent of population died. Medium and
Low Series: Assumed 4 percent of population died.
Estimated Demographic Impact: Refugee flight continues.
Estimation Assumptions: High Series: Assumed 3,000 refugees to Thai
camps. Medium and Low Series: Assumed 3,000 refugees to Thai camps,
2,000 illegals, 3,000 died in attempt to escape.
Estimated Demographic Impact: More executions.
Estimation Assumptions: High Series: Assumed 10,000 executed. Medium
and Low Series: Assumed 10,000 executed.
Total Population (in thousands)
Date High Medium Low
Series Series Series
1 Jan 76 6,618 6,311 5,937
1 Jul 76 6,544 6,191 5,812
Date: 1 Jul 76-1 Jan 77
Event: Food again in short supply.
Estimated Demographic Impact: Famine again occurs in some areas;
disease spreads among total population.
Estimation Assumptions: Old people: crude birth rate declines 6
percent. Crude death rate remains constant. New people: crude birth
rate remains constant. High Series: Crude death rate remains
constant. Medium and Low Series: Assumed 4 percent of population
died.
Estimated Demographic Impact: Refugee flight continues.
Estimation Assumptions: High Series: Assumed 3,000 refugees to Thai
camps. Medium and Low Series: Assumed 3,000 refugees to Thai camps,
1,000 illegals, 3,000died in attempt to escape. Low Series: Assumed
5,000 refugees to Vietnam.
Estimated Demographic Impact: Final executions.
Estimation Assumptions: High Series: Assumed 5,000 executed. Low
Series: Assumed 10,000 executed.
Total Population (in thousands)
Date High Medium Low
Series Series Series
1 Jul 76 6,544 6,191 5,812
1 Jan 77 6,472 6,072 5,689
Date: 1 Jan 77-1 Jan 79
Event: Khmer Rouge still in control.
Estimated Demographic Impact: Food remains in short supply. Among the
new people, the weak and vulnerable dead. Survivors learning to live
under conditions, although still in dire straits.
Estimation Assumptions: Old people: crude birth and death rates remain
constant for each half-year of the period. New people: crude birth
rates remain constant for each half-year period.
High Series: Crude death rate remains constant for each half-year
period. Medium and Low Series: About 2.5 percent of population died
during each half-year period.
Estimated Demographic Impact: Refugee flight continues.
Estimation Assumptions: High Series: Assumed for each successive
half-year period: 3,000, 2,000, 2,000, and 2,000 refugees to Thai
camps. Medium and Low Series: Assumed for each successive half-year:
2,500 refugees, 2,500 died in attempt, and no illegals. Low Series:
Assumed for each successive half-year of the period: 4,000, 4,000,
3,000, and 1,000 refugees to Vietnam.
Total Population (in thousands)
Date High Medium Low
Series Series Series
1 Jan 77 6,472 6,072 5,689
1 Jul 77 6,407 6,012 5,626
1 Jan 78 6,345 5,955 5,566
1 Jul 78 6,284 5,899 5,507
1 Jan 79 6,225 5,845 5,452
Date: 1 Jan-1 Jul 79
Event: On January 1979 Phnom Penh fell to Vietnamese troops. Heng
Samrin installed as head of new government.
Estimated Demographic Impact: Harsh labor requirements and oppressive
control measures of Pol Pot regime lifted, but new government unable
to supply food, shelter, clothing, or health care.
Estimation Assumptions: Assumed crude birth rate for old people
declined by 6 percent while rate for new people increases by 6
percent. Assumed about 2.0 percent of total population died during
period.
Estimated Demographic Impact: In Pol Pot-controlled areas, general
deprivation and strict control still enforced. Physical security for
civilian population poor as opposing forces fight for dominance.
Estimated Demographic Impact: Food for civilians, Vietnamese, and Pol
Pot forces in short supply.
Estimated Demographic Impact: Refugee flight continues.
Estimation Assumptions: High and Medium Series: Assumed 17,000
refugees to Thai camps. Low Series: Assumed 17,000 refugees to Thai
camps and an additional 40,000 in Thailand but not in camps.
Total Population (in thousands)
Date High Medium Low
Series Series Series
1 Jan 79 6,225 5,845 5,452
1 Jul 79 6,141 5,767 5,337
Date: 1 Jul-1 Dec 79
Event: Fighting resumed between Heng Samrin/Vietnamese and Pol Pot
forces.
Estimation Assumptions: Assumed crude birth rate of 10 per 1,000 for
total population.
Event: Meager harvest.
Estimated Demographic Impact: Famine becomes widespread by end of
October.
Estimation Assumptions: Assumed about 4.0 percent of total population
died.
Event: International relief effort started.
Estimated Demographic Impact: International relief effort not able to
alleviate conditions.
Estimated Demographic Impact: Refugees from every part of country join
flight.
Estimation Assumptions: High and Medium Series: Assumed 400,000
refugees to Thai camps. Low Series: Assumed 40,000 refugees from
previous period returned to Kampuchea. Assumed 500,000 new refugees
to Thai camps.
Total Population (in thousands)
Date High Medium Low
Series Series Series
1 Jul 79 6,141 5,767 5,337
1 Dec 79 5,521 5,160 4,684
[the end]
Nathan Folkert
Chomsky's claims regarding the content of the CIA paper:
1. It flatly denied the atrocities of 1978.
This is a lie. There was no "flat denial" of the atrocities of 1978.
They didn't even claim that they "doubted" the atrocities of 1978
occurred. They simply weren't included in the calculation, if they
were, in fact, known by the author (no atrocities are included for
1977, either, nor, for that matter, for 1979). Chomsky claims that
they should have been included, that the CIA should have known about
them. This may well be true, but this does not support Chomsky's
claim that the atrocities were "flatly denied".
I suspect that this, and the related statement that the report
"claimed that early atrocities [...] had ended by 1977" was taken from
Vickery's account, his "careful reading", as he would put it.
Throughout the report, there is reference to the estimate that 50,000
- 100,000 new people were likely executed. No other executions are
included in the estimates, though other killings of civilians are
mentioned, as noted below. On the fold out table in the back cover of
the report, in listing the events and their estimated demographic
impact, the entries on these executions, which clearly, in context,
refer to these executions, were abbreviated to "executions begin",
"more executions", and "final executions". Vickery interprets this
"final executions" to mean not that the last of the specific 50,000 -
100,000 executions of new people included in the estimates had ended,
but that all executions had ended, and apparently Chomsky has accepted
this "careful analysis" (which appears to me to be a deliberate
misinterpretation) as claiming that the atrocities ended by 1977. Of
course, it never made this claim. Again, one might argue (as Chomsky
and Vickery do) that the report *should* have included atrocities in
1977 and onward, which the CIA *should* have known about, and this may
well have been true (and it is entirely possible, though I think not
plausible, that the CIA was being deliberately dishonest in leaving
them out), but it is patently a lie to state that the CIA *claimed*
that the atrocities had ended.
2. It blamed the majority of the deaths on the Vietnamese invasion.
This is an outright lie. Using 18 deaths per 1,000 as the "normal"
death rate, the CIA report suggests that under the KR regime there
were about 1,300,000 deaths over the normal in their Medium Series (my
calculation, not theirs). Using the same assumption, the CIA report
suggests that under the Vietnamese regime there were about 240,000
deaths over the normal in their Medium Series (again, mine), and they
make the explicit claim of 600,000 - 700,000 deaths over the normal
under the Lon Nol regime (about 120,000 per year average, though
there's no reason to suspect that these were distributed evenly). In
their account of the Vietnamese regime, they do not specifically blame
these deaths on the Vietnamese, and in fact suggest that the peasants
suspected of "collaboration" suffered retaliation from the "marauding
Pol Pot forces", and that "the Heng Samrin/Vietnamese forces were
seldom able to protect [the peasants] from sporadic attacks by the Pol
Pot guerrillas". Far from blaming the Vietnamese invasion for the
majority of the deaths, they attributed only a fraction of the deaths
to 1979, and suggested that some unspecified number of the deaths in
that year were the responsibility of Pol Pot forces.
3. It claimed that only 50,000 - 100,000 were killed by Pol Pot.
This is a lie, or, if we are to be charitable, a misleading
half-truth. It claimed that 250,000 new people (specifically
military, administration, and educated people) were targeted for
execution and estimated that roughly 40% of these were actually
executed (20% died of hunger or disease, and 50% of remainder
executed). It made no claim about these being the "only" executions
(much less the only killings), though these were the only executions
it specifically included in estimates. The report does claim, as I
note above, that marauding Pol Pot forces targeted peasants for
retaliation, though it makes no estimate of the numbers killed, so it
is clear that there are atrocities that the report simply doesn't even
attempt to quantify, whether they know about them or not. (Before
someone points this out as evidence that the CIA were whitewashing Pol
Pot, I must note that it likewise makes no attempt to estimate the
number of people killed by the Vietnamese).
4. It claimed that few peasants really suffered.
This is a lie, or, at best, a dishonest semantic interpretation:
"The _old people_ -- those living in rural areas when Pol Pot gained
control -- fared somewhat better. They too, however, suffered from
food shortages, lack of medical care, and hard labor."
Those are just the peasants who remained in the countryside when Pol
Pot took control. The peasants who fled to the cities (implied from
the estimates in the paper, approximately 2 million people, or about a
quarter of the population, based on UN estimate that about a quarter
of population would be urban in 1975, when in fact more than half was)
and were then, by definition, "new people", suffered significantly
more, but the report in no way implies or suggests that "few peasants
really suffered" or "most peasants didn't make out badly".
Whatever the merits or demerits of this report, it is clear that
Chomsky's description of the report is a string of lies. Chomsky made
four easily-checked lies -- lies that can be verified as such simply
by reading the CIA report and require no further deep knowledge on the
events in Southeast Asia.
At some point in the near future, I may also comment on Vickery's
analysis of this report (I found a post of his at
http://groups.google.com/groups?selm=Pine.A32.3.91.970217145711.44886a-200000%40usm.my
which outlines his basic position).
- Nate
djinn
news:4b923300.0203...@posting.google.com:
snip report
>
> Whatever the merits or demerits of this report, it is clear that
> Chomsky's description of the report is a string of lies. Chomsky made
> four easily-checked lies -- lies that can be verified as such simply
> by reading the CIA report and require no further deep knowledge on the
> events in Southeast Asia.
>
> At some point in the near future, I may also comment on Vickery's
> analysis of this report (I found a post of his at
> http://groups.google.com/groups?selm=Pine.A32.3.91.970217145711.44886a-
> 200000%40usm.my which outlines his basic position).
>
> - Nate
Thats pretty cool. A straightforward comparison between a reference and the
source itself, showing that the reference is dishonest.
Its odd that Chomsky keeps on about Cambodia. He's demonstrated over 25
years that he doesn't know anything about the place or the people, yet he
keeps right on. Perhaps he thinks very few people will either check his
references or know that he's wrong.
Thanks for the posts.
Nathan Folkert
nfol...@cs.stanford.edu (Nathan Folkert) wrote in message news:<4b923300.0203...@posting.google.com>...
[snip]
> 3. It claimed that only 50,000 - 100,000 were killed by Pol Pot.
I should probably clarify on this or someone will claim that I am
being dishonest. Chomsky did not use the words "only 50,000 - 100,000
were killed" (I'm not sure what I was thinking when I put that in
quotes below -- I think I was quoting myself after I paraphrased
Chomsky, which is inaccurate). Rather, he said that the CIA estimated
50,000 - 100,000 killings and then called this a "ludicrous
underestimate" (presumably at least partly why he later accused the
CIA of "whitewash"), suggesting, of course, that they did estimate
only 50,000 - 100,000 killings.
It should be noted that Chomsky does not make similar complaints about
the Finnish Government Study, "Kampuchea: Decade of the Genocide",
conducted several years after the CIA study. It stated that
"realistic estimates" of executions were between 75,000 - 150,000,
within which the "most likely" estimate for the CIA, 100,000, fell.
Chomsky has not, so far as I know, claimed that the Finnish study is a
"ludicrous underestimate", even considering that it estimates that
less than one million died (total) during Pol Pot's reign, which is
not significantly more than double the expected (18 per 1,000 death
rate) numbers, and considering that it, like the CIA study, claimed
that some 2.5-3 million people who lived in rural areas before the
revolution (the "old people" in the CIA study) "did not suffer nearly
as much under the Pol Pot administration" (which is still, of course,
different from claiming that they did not suffer, or that they didn't
make out badly).
> This is a lie, or, if we are to be charitable, a misleading
> half-truth. It claimed that 250,000 new people (specifically
> military, administration, and educated people) were targeted for
> execution and estimated that roughly 40% of these were actually
> executed (20% died of hunger or disease, and 50% of remainder
> executed). It made no claim about these being the "only" executions
> (much less the only killings), though these were the only executions
> it specifically included in estimates.
[snip]
- Nate
Jeffrey Ketland
<4b923300.02031...@posting.google.com>...
Nathan---thanks for doing this research. I for one will try and read your
transcript.
-- Jeff
Mekong Network
reponds to criticism. In his latest comments on Cambodia, he insists
that those who disagree are attempting to "justify subjecting millions
of other people to comparable misery, in Central America." He claims
that he doesn't read his Internet critics, and yet he does not
hesitate to assert that they are morally lower than "neo-Nazis and
neo-Stalinists".
In essence, Chomsky adopts the same mindset as the policymakers he
condemns: "You are either with me, or you are an enemy of everything
that is good and decent."
I do not object to what Chomsky wrote about Cambodia because I support
right-wing dictatorships; In addition to writing about Cambodia, I've
also written about right-wing terror in El Salvador and Guatemala. No,
I object to what Chomsky has written about Cambodia because anyone
whose sole knowledge of Cambodia comes from Noam Chomsky's writings
will have a horribly incorrect impression of conditions under the
Khmer Rouge.
Just how wrong that impression will be depends on how much of
Chomsky's work they have read. Someone who reads only "Distortions at
Fourth Hand" will likely conclude that the bulk of the stories of
Khmer Rouge atrocities were pure fabrications. Someone who reads a
little more will probably conclude that, yes, the Khmer Rouge were
bad, but they were no worse than any of a hundred other dictatorships.
Both of these conclusions are wrong. The first conclusion is horribly
wrong: it denies the respect due the victims of one of the century's
most horrid crimes. But the second conclusion is also horribly wrong:
it prevents us from learning the lessons of one of the century's most
horrid crimes. If you deny that the Khmer Rouge regime was one of the
most repressive, brutal, and disastrous of recent history, then you
will never understand *why* it was so destructive. And if you do not
learn from history... well, we all know how the rest of that goes.
Whatever one thinks of Chomsky in general, whatever one thinks of his
theories of media manipulation and the mechanisms of state power, his
writing on Cambodia has been deeply flawed. Yet he remains stubbornly
unable to examine his own words. It's ironic: the world's foremost
linguist cannot bring himself to understand that his words have
consequences.
Why has Chomsky been so harshly criticized with regard to Cambodia?
Let's consider three possible explanations:
1. Chomsky was, in fact, wrong.
2. Chomsky may not have been wrong, but is thought wrong because
his words have been widely misinterpreted.
3. All of Chomsky's critics are depraved moral degenerates, worse
than neo-Nazis and neo-Stalinists, and they are deliberately lying in
order to justify subjecting millions of people to misery in Central
America.
Lest I be accused of making the third possibility sound deliberately
unreasonable, let me point out that I am using the very words Chomsky
himself chose for his critics. If, like Chomsky, we believe that this
third explanation is perfectly plausible, we can stop thinking about
the issue immediately: our minds are already made up, we've picked our
designated enemies, and we can sleep safely, bathed in a
self-righteous glow.
But if we're willing to consider other ideas, let's look at the first
and second possibilities in more detail.
The typical starting point for this controversy is Chomsky's
"Distortions at Fourth Hand." To people who have only a passing
familiarity with the Khmer Rouge -- and that means most people -- the
furious reaction to "Distortions" probably seems inexplicable. To
truly understand this, it's necessary to understand something about
the realities of the Khmer Rouge regime, and it's also necessary to
understand something about the three books that Chomsky and Herman
reviewed in "Distortions": "Cambodia: Starvation and Revolution," by
George Hildebrand and Gareth Porter; "Murder of a Gentle Land," by
John Barron and Anthony Paul; and "Cambodia: Year Zero," by Francois
Ponchaud.
The real flashpoint is Porter and Hildebrand's book. I cannot
overstate just how biased, misleading, and just plain wrong this book
is. This is a book that spends nearly 20 pages describing the horrible
conditions in Phnom Penh before the collapse of the Lon Nol
government... but fails to mention that the Khmer Rouge were firing
rockets into the city on a daily basis. This is a book that claims
that the evacuation of Phnom Penh - a brutal action that the west's
foremost authority on the Khmer Rouge estimates cost 20,000 lives -
was a well-organized humanitarian effort to feed a starving
population. This is a book that claims that, far from starving their
population, the Khmer Rouge quickly generated a surplus of rice
production. This is a book that discounts reports of atrocities in
Cambodia as "systematic process of mythmaking". It makes no mention of
public executions. It makes no mention of the forcible separation of
children from their families, no mention of the separation of husbands
and wives, no mention of restrictions on travel, or the abolition of
the mail system. This is a book that bears no earthly relation to the
reality of the Khmer Rouge reign. By 1978, even Gareth Porter seemed
to want to distance himself from the book. Interviewed by Ed Bradley
for the CBS documentary "What Happened to Cambodia," Porter's eyes
dart back and forth when Bradley questions him about the Khmer Rouge
regime. He casts his eyes down and stutters slightly. "My... my only
plea is for some degree of balance in assessing the human suffering
that undoubtably still exists in Cambodia."
And yet Chomsky and Herman called this "a carefully documented study
of the destructive American impact on Cambodia and the success of the
Cambodian revolutionaries in overcoming it, giving a very favorable
picture of their programs and policies, based on a wide range of
sources." This last statement is plainly and simply WRONG. A wide
range of sources?? I will restate a point that I have made before: The
primary sources for the information on conditions under the Khmer
Rouge? The Khmer Rouge. Of the footnotes in the book's final chapter,
dealing with conditions inside Cambodia, more than one-third cite
Khmer Rouge government agencies and officials. If the authors
interviewed even one Cambodian refugee, it does not seem to be
reflected in the footnotes. How would Chomsky have reacted to a book
about El Salvador, if the author had relied on the ARENA party for
over one-third of its "factual" evidence... if such a book had cited a
thesis by Alfredo Cristiani in its analysis of the Salvadoran
economy... if the author had not interviewed a single refugee. Would
Chomsky have praised its "careful documentation?" Would he have noted
the "success" of the right wing? Would he have given a respectful nod
to the "wide range of sources" consulted by the author?
Even today Chomsky refers to this book as "a heavily documented study
of US atrocities," which is pure nonsense. William Shawcross's
excellent book "Sideshow" is a heavily documented study of US
atrocities. "Starvation and Revolution" is transparent propaganda, and
the bulk of the book isn't even concerned with the the US role in
Cambodia; it is nothing but a collection of fabricated statistics,
provided primarily by the Khmer Rouge themselves, on their wonderful
agricultural progress and other such absurdities. The entire portion
of the book concerned with US policy takes up less than 30 pages.
(Contrast this with "Sideshow," which weighs in at nearly 500 pages.)
A "heavily documented study of US atrocities"? Please. This is a book
which is completely without merit. This is a book with no redeeming
value whatsoever.
And yet "Distortions" had no negative comments about Hildebrand and
Porter's book. None. But the other two books - which described Khmer
Rouge atrocities in detail - did not fare so well.
Chomsky's supporters often point out that he described Ponchaud's book
as "serious and worth reading". They rarely mention his other comments
about the book, such as his claim that the book "lacks the
documentation provided in Hildebrand and Porter and its veracity is
therefore difficult to assess" and that Ponchaud "plays fast and loose
with quotes and with numbers." Chomsky claimed that the book was
"careless, sometimes in rather significant ways." He claimed that
Ponchaud's refugee testimonies are "at best second-hand with many of
the refugees reporting what they claim to have heard from others." And
with regard to Anthony Paul and John Barron's book "Murder of a Gentle
Land," Chomsky is completely dismissive, calling it a "third-rate
propaganda tract." He discounts their sources as unreliable, implying
that connections to the US government (or the Thai government, or the
Malaysian government, or whatever) make them inherently unreliable.
(And yet the Khmer Rouge connections of Hildebrand and Porter's
sources did not strike him as inappropriate.) And, with vintage
Chomsky disdain, he further attempts to discredit Barron and Paul with
the snide remark that they "claim" to have analyzed refugee reports.
And yet the simple fact is this: Barron and Paul's and Ponchaud's
books are infinitely more accurate depictions of Khmer Rouge Cambodia
than Hildebrand and Porter's. If you don't think that this is true,
ask someone - anyone - who was among those evacuated from Phnom Penh.
(My wife was among them.) Read all three books, and then read any
memoir of the Khmer Rouge period: Pin Yathay's "Stay Alive, My Son,"
Chanrithy Him's "When Broken Glass Floats," Loung Ung's "First They
Killed My Father," Haing Ngor's "A Cambodian Odyssey," or any of a
dozen others... pick any memoir of Cambodia. Read it, and ask yourself
whose vision of the Khmer Rouge regime was accurate: Ponchaud and
Barron and Paul, or Hildebrand and Porter?
And yet Chomsky still claims that his position in "Distortions" is
quite appropriate. He continues to dismisses the conflicting
assessments of Francois Ponchaud's book, making the arrogant and
absurd claim that "I wouldn't be surprised if we were the only people
in the country, outside of US intelligence, who actually read this
book". In Chomsky's condescending view, if the media was right about
the Khmer Rouge, they were right by accident. And despite the fact
that the majority of reporters who were in Southeast Asia in the
Seventies were opposed to US policy, Chomsky inexplicably claims that
these reporters were guilty of "fabrications at a level that would
have impressed Stalin" for the purposes of "being used as a
justification for US atrocities in Central America and elsewhere."
There is enormous hypocrisy in Chomsky's accusation that his critics
"don't give a damn about the suffering that refugees report" and "are
merely using it as an ideological weapon." For twenty-five years,
Chomsky's only interest in Cambodia has been his quest to represent
the media coverage of genocide as a manufactured propaganda. In other
words, he has spent twenty-five years using it as an ideological
weapon.
Still, Chomsky does acknowledge that the Khmer Rouge were guilty of
massive human rights violations. He was very late coming to that
conclusion, but nonetheless, he does at least acknowledge it now. So
why have so many people concluded that he supported the Khmer Rouge?
Let's review:
In 1972 we have Chomsky offering his opinion that the Cambodian
revolutionaries could usher in "a new era of economic development and
social justice."
In 1977, when tens of thousands have already died - we have Chomsky
describing a book that presents "a very favorable picture" of the
Khmer Rouge as "a carefully documented study." This is in contrast to
the books describing Khmer Rouge atrocities, one of which is "at best
careless," the other of which is "third-rate propaganda." We have
Chomsky and Herman claiming that they "do not pretend to know where
the truth lies", while simultaneously describing the reports of Khmer
Rouge atrocities as a "flood of lies."
And in 1979 - after the Vietnamese invasion overthrew the Khmer Rouge
and provided irrefutable evidence of the horrors of the Khmer Rouge -
we have Chomsky claiming that if in fact the Khmer Rouge DID commit
atrocities, their actions may well have been a "direct and
understandable response to the still more concentrated and extreme
savagery of a U.S. assault that may in part have been designed to
evoke this very response."
And in virtually every year since, we have Chomsky contrasting the
paucity of coverage of human rights violations in East Timor with what
he alleges was exaggerated coverage of atrocities in Cambodia.
And Chomsky cannot bring himself to admit that many reasonable people
would see the above accumulation of facts, and interpret his position
as being one of support for the Khmer Rouge?
Rather than attempting to clarify what his beliefs were, Chomsky tries
to dismiss those who accuse him of support for the Khmer Rouge with a
typical sarcasm: "You've probably read it on the internet: the
inventor of this amusing tale was David Horowitz."
Chomsky's supporters frequently point out that he is trying to present
the side of the story that is less often seen. But there is no
guarantee that these "opposing" viewpoints have any factual merit. By
habitually parroting only the contrarian view, Chomsky creates a
skewed, inaccurate version of events. The whole approach is
fundamentally flawed: It is an approach that is concerned with
persuasiveness, and not with the truth. It's the approach of a lawyer,
not a scientist. If you are concerned about the truth, then present
the truth. ALL of it. Chomsky, by contrast, seems to say: if the media
is wrong, I'll present a view which is diametrically opposed. It's as
though he believes
that one does not solve mathematical equations by insuring the
accuracy of the calculations involved: One solves them by averaging
different wrong answers.
So in his desperate quest to oppose mainstream ideas, Chomsky asserts
that even "neo-Nazis and neo-Stalinists" are at a "much higher moral
level" than his critics. And remember... he is making this statement
about people whose work he has not even read. Since they disagree with
him, they must by necessity suffer from "depravity," and their goal is
to "exploit the suffering for which they share considerable
responsibility in order to impose misery on others".
This, from a man I once described as "a man of honor and great
integrity."
Bruce Sharp
http://www.mekong.net/cambodia
djinn
wrote:
<snip superb criticism of Chomsky.>
>
>This, from a man I once described as "a man of honor and great
>integrity."
>
>Bruce Sharp
>http://www.mekong.net/cambodia
That was an excellent presentation Bruce, wish I could write that
well.
You seem to have been wrong in your earlier description. :-)
Chomsky apparently has so much contempt for his fans that he's
willing to tell them anything, secure in the knowledge that they won't
check his sources. While his fans may be mostly a lost cause (
apparently Nathan wasn't) , anyone else who reads his stuff might be
misled. Its good that people like you and Nathan and Steve Denney are
willing to take the time to post refutations to his propaganda on
Cambodia,
Wonder if Chomsky realizes that he's just characterized most of the
population of Cambodia, as well as the thousands of resettled
refugees, 'depraved' . After all, many of them tell quite a different
story than he does.
Stephen Denney
Thank you for analyzing this report, Nathan. I also discussed it briefly
about almost two years ago:
http://groups.google.com/groups?q=denney+cia+demographic+kampuchea&hl=en&ie=ISO-8859-1&oe=I
SO-8859-1&selm=Pine.SOL.4.21.0006291608270.1325-100000%40apocalypse.OCF.Berkeley.EDU&rnum=1
In the OCLC database the report is listed as available in paper form in
about five university libraries (including UC Berkeley, UCLA,
Univ. of Chicago, Univ. of Michigan and Cornell) and in microfiche format
in about 60 university libraries. Here at Berkeley the call number is:
HB3644.3.U55 1980.
- Steve Denney
nfol...@cs.stanford.edu (Nathan Folkert) wrote:
> Message-ID: <4b923300.02031...@posting.google.com>
> the addition of an estimated 600,000 to 700,000 war-related deaths.
> The _old people_ -- those living in rural areas when Pol Pot gained
> control -- fared somewhat better. They too, however, suffered from
> Projections for the World, Regions and Countries as [continued on next
> page...]
>
> [end of page] 7
>
> [continued in next post...]
> -- end of forwarded message --
>
Tim Starr
news:<67874ff1.02031...@posting.google.com>...
[snip]
>So in his desperate quest to oppose mainstream ideas, Chomsky asserts that
>even "neo-Nazis and neo-Stalinists" are at a "much higher moral level" than
>his critics. And remember... he is making this statement about people whose
>work he has not even read. Since they disagree with him, they must by
>necessity suffer from "depravity," and their goal is to "exploit the
>suffering for which they share considerable
responsibility in order to impose
>misery on others".
>
>This, from a man I once described as "a man of honor and great
integrity.
Very nicely done, Bruce! I see that your opinion of Chomsky's character has
become a lot closer that of myself and James Donald.
Lemme know if you're ever in Berkeley, I'd be honored to buy you a beer.
Tim Starr
Nathan Folkert
> Thank you for analyzing this report, Nathan. I also discussed it briefly
> about almost two years ago:
>
> http://groups.google.com/groups?q=denney+cia+demographic+kampuchea&hl=en&ie=ISO-8859-1&oe=I
> SO-8859-1&selm=Pine.SOL.4.21.0006291608270.1325-100000%40apocalypse.OCF.Berkeley.EDU&rnum=1
Hey Stephen! Yeah, most of the reason I decided to look the report up
is because I recall that it was discussed in the distant past, mainly
by you and James Donald (who, I believe, was citing you). I had been
curious about it then as well, but, from what you had said about it, I
suspected I wouldn't be too happy with the results, and, in
retrospect, I'm sure I wouldn't have been.
> In the OCLC database the report is listed as available in paper form in
> about five university libraries (including UC Berkeley, UCLA,
> Univ. of Chicago, Univ. of Michigan and Cornell) and in microfiche format
> in about 60 university libraries. Here at Berkeley the call number is:
> HB3644.3.U55 1980.
I found it in paper form at the Stanford University Jonsson Library of
Government Documents. It appears that the paper may also be available
to order from CIA publications
(www.cia.gov/cia/publications/mapspub/89.html) for $22. I'm not sure
how one goes about ordering, but they probably have instructions
somewhere on their webpage.
- Nate
Mekong Network
I wouldn't say that I share James' assessment of Chomsky (in
particular, I don't agree that Chomsky is a communist), but I'm about
ready to concede that bit about "honor". Chomsky seems to be totally
incapable of accepting criticism, and a willingness to admit errors -
or at the very least, to attempt to understand other viewpoints - is
certainly a component of being honorable.
Anyway, looking back on that exchange from a couple years ago, I
regret that I lost my temper with James so quickly. I certainly still
think that James was wrong in his interpretation of what I wrote, and
wrong about what he said HE wrote - but I should've given him the
benefit of the doubt as to what he MEANT, rather than what he SAID.
But, as someone pointed out in a different thread, both politics and
the semi-anonymous nature of usenet forums can lead us to say things
online that we would never say in person. I have a lot of respect for
people (like Russil Wvong) who never seem to blow up.
If I'm every in Berkeley, I'll give you a shout.
regards,
Bruce
tims...@c2.net (Tim Starr) wrote in message
Tim Starr
>
>I wouldn't say that I share James' assessment of Chomsky (in particular, I
Have you read the speech he gave in Hanoi which Stephen Denney helped me find?
>but I'm about ready to concede that bit about "honor".
It looked to me like you already had. :-)
>Anyway, looking back on that exchange from a couple years ago, I
>regret that I lost my temper with James so quickly.
He does seem to provoke that reaction rather frequently.
>I certainly still think that James was wrong in his interpretation of what I
>wrote...
I do, too.
>If I'm every in Berkeley, I'll give you a shout.
Thanks, that'd be great!
Tim Starr
James A. Donald
Nathan Folkert:
> Anyway, looking back on that exchange from a couple years ago, I
> regret that I lost my temper with James so quickly. I certainly
> still think that James was wrong in his interpretation of what I
> wrote, and wrong about what he said HE wrote
On doing a google search for conversations between us for the
period to I find a huge number of hits, so many that it is hard
for me to tell which discussion you refer to
I did an advanced google search for articles written by me,
mentioning your name, for the period to the 24th of March 2000
(because I seem to vaguely recall your position becoming less
pinko sometime in 2000)
http://groups.google.com/groups?as_epq=Nathan&as_uauthors=jam...@echeque.com&as_drrb=b&as_mind=12&as_minm=5as_miny=1981&as_maxd=24&as_maxm=3&as_maxy=2000&as_scoring=d&hl=en
Now it is probable that in those many conversations, there is at
least one incident where I badly and unreasonably misinterpreted
your words, and you naturally bitterly hold that against me, and I
naturally do not recall it.
However the general pattern that I observe, on scimming through a
few random conversations, for example
http://groups.google.com/groups?selm=38d71d25...@nntp1.ba.best.com,
is that you used to innocently take for granted a world
view where Stalin and Ho Chi Minh and the rest were innocent
victims of US aggression, and you would make what seemed to you
like a moderate argument for some moderate position, a moderate
argument that took for granted these supposedly uncontroversial
and supposedly universally accepted facts, and you would then be
surprised and shocked to be accused of being a supporter of
Stalin, totalitarianism, and mass murder, accused of arguing for
what seemed to you like innocent and uncontroversial
presuppositions.
In the possibly unrepresentative sample that I happened to look
at, the main difference of perceptions was that you would perceive
your position to be moderate and mainstream, when, in fact, it was
not.
In the sample I found a thread, the thread containing
http://groups.google.com/groups?selm=8ECC5A241f2...@209.99.56.11
where you accuse me of lying about your words and my own, yet
David Friedman and Constantinople understood your words as I
understood them, and similarly Constantinople understood my words
as I intended them, so if that was my misunderstanding, I
misunderstood in good company.
--digsig
James A. Donald
6YeGpsZR+nOTh/cGwvITnSR3TdzclVpR0+pr3YYQdkG
6Dv4udxkmXINFY9fF9UEKcPd3Bwnwq88tdb4WsxZ
4GpNIp1lhxBuCcOx8doAgpaUcS6WA4KfekBsAJYPq
Nathan Folkert
> --
> Nathan Folkert:
> > Anyway, looking back on that exchange from a couple years ago, I
> > regret that I lost my temper with James so quickly. I certainly
> > still think that James was wrong in his interpretation of what I
> > wrote, and wrong about what he said HE wrote
>
> On doing a google search for conversations between us for the
> period to I find a huge number of hits, so many that it is hard
> for me to tell which discussion you refer to
This wasn't me, above. You were responding to Bruce Sharp. At this
point, I certainly wouldn't accuse you of being overly unfair in our
past debates. I mistook bluntness and a lack of patience on your part
as dishonesty, when, in fact, it was an understandable reaction to
someone who was objectively supporting movements and an ideology as
evil as the Nazis and fascism (and largely indistinguishable from
Nazism and fascism). To be fair to my younger self, the first time
I'd heard of most of the crimes of Communism and the left were in
these newsgroups -- despite the "propaganda model" and the "filter" of
"anticommunism", I somehow made it through childhood and a reasonably
conservative heartland education without any knowledge of the crimes
of Stalin, the crimes of Mao, or the crimes of any of the radical
totalitarian revolutionaries I had implicitly (and sometimes
explicitly) defended, or an understanding of what made the ideologies
of these empires repugnant. If I had been thinking at the time,
rather than accepting propaganda because it suited my moral
sensibilities, I would have found this much, much stranger than the
fact that the New York Times did not praise the Sandinistas in quite
as strong of words as Chomsky would have liked, for example.
So yes, I was always shocked when accused of totalitarian sympathies,
because I had no knowledge of what totalitarians did or what
totalitarianism meant, but rather "knew" that the left was more noble
and caring, and the socialism was greatly maligned by the American
media. When informed of these crimes, and their obvious relation to
the ideology of the criminals, I was too proud and too righteous to
change my mind, preferring instead to file this information away as
"propaganda", and those who revealed it as "right wing fascist
lunatics" -- much easier than critical thought and introspection.
- Nate
Tim Starr
>Nathan Folkert:
>>Anyway, looking back on that exchange from a couple years ago, I
>>regret that I lost my temper with James so quickly. I certainly
>>still think that James was wrong in his interpretation of what I
>>wrote, and wrong about what he said HE wrote
>
That'd be between you and Bruce Sharp, not Nathan Folkert. Bruce seems to me to
be agonizingly slow to form a negative judgement of Chomsky, but that has some
advantages. Nathan, on the other hand, has recently come around and reversed
his view of Chomsky. Your opinion of Nathan's previous position is pretty
accurate, but I still think you were a bit too harsh on Sharp.
Tim Starr
James A. Donald
> This wasn't me, above.
Oops:
> I certainly wouldn't accuse you of being overly unfair in our
> past debates. I mistook bluntness and a lack of patience on your part
> as dishonesty
Thanks.
Your ability to see things objectively is considerably better than most.
James A. Donald
> be agonizingly slow to form a negative judgement of Chomsky, but that has some
> advantages. Nathan, on the other hand, has recently come around and reversed
> his view of Chomsky. Your opinion of Nathan's previous position is pretty
> accurate, but I still think you were a bit too harsh on Sharp.
Are you basing that judgment that I was too harsh on Sharp on my posting
http://groups.google.com/groups?selm=396f3180....@nntp1.ba.best.com
Or on Bruce Sharp's claims as to what I supposedly said in that posting?
john smith
Nathan Folkert wrote:
>
> jam...@echeque.com (James A. Donald) wrote in message news:<96dc81b9.02032...@posting.google.com>...
> > --
> > Nathan Folkert:
> > > Anyway, looking back on that exchange from a couple years ago, I
> > > regret that I lost my temper with James so quickly. I certainly
> > > still think that James was wrong in his interpretation of what I
> > > wrote, and wrong about what he said HE wrote
> >
> > On doing a google search for conversations between us for the
> > period to I find a huge number of hits, so many that it is hard
> > for me to tell which discussion you refer to
>
> This wasn't me, above. You were responding to Bruce Sharp. At this
> point, I certainly wouldn't accuse you of being overly unfair in our
> past debates. I mistook bluntness and a lack of patience on your part
> as dishonesty, when, in fact, it was an understandable reaction to
> someone who was objectively supporting
... hmm.
could you repeat the "evidence" perhaps? or point to it...
-- js
===========http://www.fair.org/ ====================================
"Freedom without opportunity is a devils gift, and the refusal (by
government) to provide such opportunity is criminal" --Noam Chomsky
====================================================================
Nathan Folkert
> Nathan Folkert wrote:
[snip]
>> At this point, I certainly wouldn't accuse [James Donald] of being
>> overly unfair in our past debates. I mistook bluntness and a lack
of
>> patience on [his] part as dishonesty, when, in fact, it was an
>> understandable reaction to someone who was objectively supporting
>
> ... hmm.
>
> could you repeat the "evidence" perhaps? or point to it...
Evidence of what? Of my reflexive defenses of totalitarian regimes to
which James responded? The record is there for anyone to see at
groups.google.com. Most were straightforward Chomskyian comparisons
whose function was to improve the prestige of the Soviets or some
other totalitarian communists by spinning a favorable analogy (e.g.
comparing the U.S.S.R. to Brazil (in Chomsky's case) or Canada (in my
case) instead of the U.S. in order to explain its failure to provide
adequate living standards for its people or its failure to compete
against the West). These are routinely followed or preceded by pious
proclamations that the Soviets were truly evil, perhaps as evil as the
Nazis (though one would never make up such inane excuses for the
Nazis, which demonstrates that one does not *really* regard the
Soviets in such a light), proclamations which I was ignorant and
deluded enough at the time to largely believe. If you want, I can go
into more detail about what I used to post (there are many, many
examples, most better than the one I cited here, which was just the
first which I came across when I looked back at my earliest posts --
from late 1998), though James has generally done a good job of this
here and elsewhere.
[snip]
- Nate