More on Iran's atoms.
Count 1
See no evil?
(Washington, D.C.): The leaking earlier this month of a National
Intelligence Estimate (NIE) projection that Iran is a decade away from
obtaining nuclear weapons - doubling previous official estimates - is, in
some ways, more ominous than would have been a finding that the mullahs are
about to get "the Bomb." After all, the latter would be no surprise, given
the considerable evidence (albeit, much of it circumstantial) that has
accumulated about Tehran's intentions and activities in this area.
By contrast, the pollyanish assessment not only seems wildly out of touch
with such realities. Worse yet, the fact that it is one of the first
products of the newly "reformed" intelligence community suggests that - far
from reducing the dangers of strategic surprise and unconnected "dots" - the
Foreign Service Officer-dominated Director of National Intelligence
bureaucracy is going to exacerbate past failings and mistakes.
"Intelligence" vs. Reality
Several weeks ago, the Islamic Republic of Iran publicly announced that it
was defying its European negotiating partners and the will of the so-called
"international community" by resuming the conversion of 37 tons of natural
uranium into its gaseous form. It is widely believed that within a month of
taking such a step the uranium would be ready for enrichment - a critical
step toward having bomb-grade material for weapons purposes.
Yet, the NIE's authors evidently have allowed a highly debatable assumption
to drive their conclusion that Iran is a full decade away from having
nuclear weapons: They assert that Iran's centrifuges are inadequate for the
task and that, moreover, its scientists will have difficulty connecting them
to a "cascade" (by which uranium flows from one machine to the next).
Incredibly, even the International Atomic Energy Agency's officials -
typically the most inclined to see-no-evil when it comes to would be
proliferators like Iran - are confident that Iran can produce and cascade
high-quality centrifuges. Indeed, as far back as 2002, Iranian scientists
were able secretly to enrich uranium in an experimental cascade, a fact the
IAEA did not discover until the following year.
As Gary Milhollin of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control suggested
in a recent op.ed. for the New York Times: "It is unreasonable to assume
that Iran could not, after deciding to begin a concerted effort, assemble a
2,000-machine cascade in a year....After a year's operation of such a
cascade, Iran would have one bomb's worth of highly enriched uranium."
Even more troubling is what we do not know. Tehran has a history of
concealment and there are abundant indications that what is being concealed
(much of it deep underground) amounts to a vast clandestine nuclear weapons
infrastructure. As Mr. Milhollin has noted, there is evidence that this
infrastructure is not only being used to advance nuclear-related weapons
components but also the manufacture of non-nuclear parts essential to such
arms. Factoring in what must be presumed to be considerable clandestine
activities would only shorten, not lengthen, estimates of the amount of time
it will take Iran to obtain nuclear weapons.
Matters are made worse by highly misleading press characterizations of other
leaks, to the effect that an IAEA investigation had concluded that traces of
weapons- grade uranium discovered by inspectors in Iran actually came from a
contaminated shipping container originating in Pakistan, not an Iranian
indigenous program. Whether this is indeed the case or not, such a finding
hardly justifies reports that there is now "no evidence" of an Iranian
nuclear weapons program.
>A Taste of What is to Come?
It may be purely coincidental, but this example of "whistling past the
graveyard" seems all too familiar given the background of the man who has
recently been entrusted by Director of National Intelligence John Negroponte
with responsibility for running the newly created National
Counter-Proliferation Center (NCPC): Ambassador Kenneth Brill.
During his tenure as the U.S. Ambassador to the IAEA, Brill showed himself
to be a tireless advocate of concessions, demarches, and appeasement
demanded by, as he put it, the "spirit of Vienna" (i.e., the lowest-common
denominator "consensus" positions usually dictated by the proliferators and
their friends). Brill repeatedly objected to and otherwise sought to
undermine Bush Administration efforts to bring effective international
pressure to bear on the world's two most dangerous proliferation threats -
Iran and North Korea.
If the U.S. government's intelligence agencies are all now being obliged to
view suspected proliferators behavior through Amb. Brill's lens, it is a
safe bet that we will see less and less evil as it emerges around the world
and be ever less able to prevent it from happening until it is too late.
Matters are made no better by the fact that Amb. Negroponte has made another
Foreign Service Officer with a record of downplaying threats - Thomas
Fingar, former Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research -
his senior Deputy for Analysis, a critical job in the assessment of all
classified information. Worse yet, past problems with "group think" - the
absence of vitally needed dissenting opinions and competitive analysis - are
likely to be compounded by Fingar also being designated the Chairman of the
National Intelligence Council.
The Bottom Line
The stakes are too high to complicate America's security posture by
entrusting the job of being America's eyes and ears in the caves and tunnels
around the world where future threats are gathering to those who have proven
less than reliably visionary in the past. Iran is a case in point, a
literally ticking time-bomb that we ignore at our peril. As Mr. Milhollin
put it: "Americans should resist the latest intelligence-agency
lullaby....Iran is determined to get the bomb - all the agencies agree on
that - and dealing with that threat is not a job that can be left for the
next administration."
lanman
wrote:
>http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/index.jsp?section=papers&code=05-D_42
>
>See no evil?
>
>(Washington, D.C.): The leaking earlier this month of a National
>Intelligence Estimate (NIE) projection that Iran is a decade away from
>obtaining nuclear weapons - doubling previous official estimates - is, in
>some ways, more ominous than would have been a finding that the mullahs are
>about to get "the Bomb." After all, the latter would be no surprise, given
>the considerable evidence (albeit, much of it circumstantial) that has
>accumulated about Tehran's intentions and activities in this area.
>
>By contrast, the pollyanish assessment not only seems wildly out of touch
>with such realities. Worse yet, the fact that it is one of the first
>products of the newly "reformed" intelligence community suggests that - far
>from reducing the dangers of strategic surprise and unconnected "dots" - the
>Foreign Service Officer-dominated Director of National Intelligence
>bureaucracy is going to exacerbate past failings and mistakes.
>
>"Intelligence" vs. Reality
>
<brevity snip>
>
>The Bottom Line
>
>The stakes are too high to complicate America's security posture by
>entrusting the job of being America's eyes and ears in the caves and tunnels
>around the world where future threats are gathering to those who have proven
>less than reliably visionary in the past. Iran is a case in point, a
>literally ticking time-bomb that we ignore at our peril. As Mr. Milhollin
>put it: "Americans should resist the latest intelligence-agency
>lullaby....Iran is determined to get the bomb - all the agencies agree on
>that - and dealing with that threat is not a job that can be left for the
>next administration."
>
If Iran were trying to develop nuclear weapons from scratch on their
own, then a 10 year estimate might be believable. However, Iran is
being assisted by Pakistan without question, and possibly by Russia,
China, and N Korea (missiles). It's not far fetched to think France
would be trying make a few francs off the Iranians either, considering
their weasel deals with Iraq in defiance of UN resolutions.
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Count 1
> >Intelligence Estimate (NIE) projection that Iran is a decade away from
> >obtaining nuclear weapons
> If Iran were trying to develop nuclear weapons from scratch on their
> own, then a 10 year estimate might be believable. However, Iran is
> being assisted by Pakistan without question, and possibly by Russia,
> China, and N Korea (missiles). It's not far fetched to think France
> would be trying make a few francs off the Iranians either, considering
> their weasel deals with Iraq in defiance of UN resolutions.
I was always skeptical of the NIE's numbers. A quick glance indicated their
report was produced by that most dreaded of beasts, the intradepartmental
commission.
kuff (Isaac Adams)
Count 1 wrote:
> http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/index.jsp?section=papers&code=05-D_42
>
> See no evil?
>
> (Washington, D.C.): The leaking earlier this month of a National
> Intelligence Estimate (NIE) projection that Iran is a decade away from
> obtaining nuclear weapons - doubling previous official estimates - is, in
> some ways, more ominous than would have been a finding that the mullahs are
> about to get "the Bomb." After all, the latter would be no surprise, given
> the considerable evidence (albeit, much of it circumstantial) that has
> accumulated about Tehran's intentions and activities in this area.
The restructing of the mechanism producing NIEs was done to readjust
the wishes-fishes balance in favor or more evidence and less politics.
No fishes found in Iraq with the previous balance.
(I do share a low-level concern that the mechanism will over react in
the opposite direction though. No evidence, yet, that such an
undershoot has occured however.)
>
> By contrast, the pollyanish assessment not only seems wildly out of touch
> with such realities.
Realities have evidence. It's wildly out of touch with such faith is
more accurate.
> Worse yet, the fact that it is one of the first
> products of the newly "reformed" intelligence community suggests that - far
> from reducing the dangers of strategic surprise and unconnected "dots" - the
> Foreign Service Officer-dominated Director of National Intelligence
> bureaucracy is going to exacerbate past failings and mistakes.
Don't know about that. The NIE restructing is meant to be more
objective and the structure has been laid out publically for
examination.
>
> "Intelligence" vs. Reality
>
> Several weeks ago, the Islamic Republic of Iran publicly announced that it
> was defying its European negotiating partners and the will of the so-called
> "international community" by resuming the conversion of 37 tons of natural
> uranium into its gaseous form. It is widely believed that within a month of
> taking such a step the uranium would be ready for enrichment - a critical
> step toward having bomb-grade material for weapons purposes.
And at that time, if Iran wants to pursue enrichment as well, it will
bring in the IAEA inspectors to remove seals and fire up the
centrifuges. While the IAEA is watching.
>
> Yet, the NIE's authors evidently have allowed a highly debatable assumption
> to drive their conclusion that Iran is a full decade away from having
> nuclear weapons: They assert that Iran's centrifuges are inadequate for the
> task and that, moreover, its scientists will have difficulty connecting them
> to a "cascade" (by which uranium flows from one machine to the next).
Oh did they? I haven't seen the NIE myaself and they are usually
classified such that I wouldn't normally be on the 'need to know' list.
If the author is talking about an unclassified version of the NIE I'd
like to know where that could be found. If the author has access to
the classified version the DoJ would like to know where he got it.
(I wish the author was more like Juan Cole over at antiwar.com and used
more URLs to bolster his arguments and reveal his sources and evidence.
He doesn't need a URL for his conclusions derived from the evidence
however. :-) )
>
> Incredibly, even the International Atomic Energy Agency's officials -
> typically the most inclined to see-no-evil when it comes to would be
> proliferators like Iran - are confident that Iran can produce and cascade
> high-quality centrifuges.
What's so surprising about that? Iran is moving, publicly, towards the
permitted full nuclear fuel cycle. It'd be damn poor planning on
Iran's part if they couldn't produce this important part of the cycle.
> Indeed, as far back as 2002, Iranian scientists
> were able secretly to enrich uranium in an experimental cascade, a fact the
> IAEA did not discover until the following year.
>
> As Gary Milhollin of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control suggested
> in a recent op.ed. for the New York Times: "It is unreasonable to assume
> that Iran could not, after deciding to begin a concerted effort, assemble a
> 2,000-machine cascade in a year....After a year's operation of such a
> cascade, Iran would have one bomb's worth of highly enriched uranium."
So if Iran kicked out the IAEA today and started going
'balls-to-the-wall' they could possibly have *one* nuke in 2 years.
Optimistically.
That sets a minimum time for Iran to become a nuclear threat - 2 years.
And that timer doesn't start until the IAEA is no longer able to go
anywhere in Iran and inspect anything at will.
I'm not worried.
>
> Even more troubling is what we do not know. Tehran has a history of
> concealment and there are abundant indications that what is being concealed
> (much of it deep underground) amounts to a vast clandestine nuclear weapons
> infrastructure.
An if you have lat-longs the IAEA can go look. Like they could in
Iraq.
> As Mr. Milhollin has noted, there is evidence that this
> infrastructure is not only being used to advance nuclear-related weapons
> components but also the manufacture of non-nuclear parts essential to such
> arms. Factoring in what must be presumed to be considerable clandestine
> activities would only shorten, not lengthen, estimates of the amount of time
> it will take Iran to obtain nuclear weapons.
Uh, no. It can only bring it down to 2 years as established by the
time to build, cascade and run the centrifuges. If the futher parts
needed for the *one* nuke are not in place before the end of that
minimum 2 year interval then even futher delays will be encountered.
>
> Matters are made worse by highly misleading press characterizations of other
> leaks, to the effect that an IAEA investigation had concluded that traces of
> weapons- grade uranium discovered by inspectors in Iran actually came from a
> contaminated shipping container originating in Pakistan, not an Iranian
> indigenous program. Whether this is indeed the case or not, such a finding
> hardly justifies reports that there is now "no evidence" of an Iranian
> nuclear weapons program.
It justifies that the HEU was *not* evidence of an Iranian nuclear
weapons program. He'll have to find something else to grouse about.
>
> >A Taste of What is to Come?
>
> It may be purely coincidental, but this example of "whistling past the
> graveyard" seems all too familiar given the background of the man who has
> recently been entrusted by Director of National Intelligence John Negroponte
> with responsibility for running the newly created National
> Counter-Proliferation Center (NCPC): Ambassador Kenneth Brill.
And the restructuring of the intelligence agencies, including the
mechanism for producing NIEs, is meant to reduce the influence of
politics and ill-wishers.
The NCPC is free to use intel as it will but it's use, or misuse, is a
separate question from the quality of the intel. NCPC lookws like a
D-OPS thing. NIEs and such come from D-INT.
>
> During his tenure as the U.S. Ambassador to the IAEA, Brill showed himself
> to be a tireless advocate of concessions, demarches, and appeasement
> demanded by, as he put it, the "spirit of Vienna" (i.e., the lowest-common
> denominator "consensus" positions usually dictated by the proliferators and
> their friends). Brill repeatedly objected to and otherwise sought to
> undermine Bush Administration efforts to bring effective international
> pressure to bear on the world's two most dangerous proliferation threats -
> Iran and North Korea.
>
> If the U.S. government's intelligence agencies are all now being obliged to
> view suspected proliferators behavior through Amb. Brill's lens, it is a
> safe bet that we will see less and less evil as it emerges around the world
> and be ever less able to prevent it from happening until it is too late.
> Matters are made no better by the fact that Amb. Negroponte has made another
> Foreign Service Officer with a record of downplaying threats - Thomas
> Fingar, former Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research -
> his senior Deputy for Analysis, a critical job in the assessment of all
> classified information. Worse yet, past problems with "group think" - the
> absence of vitally needed dissenting opinions and competitive analysis - are
> likely to be compounded by Fingar also being designated the Chairman of the
> National Intelligence Council.
And the restructing is meant to reduce the politics and desires and
increase the evidence which goes into D-INT type of products. Finger
will have less influence than he would have had a year ago.
>
> The Bottom Line
>
> The stakes are too high to complicate America's security posture by
> entrusting the job of being America's eyes and ears in the caves and tunnels
> around the world where future threats are gathering to those who have proven
> less than reliably visionary in the past. Iran is a case in point, a
> literally ticking time-bomb that we ignore at our peril. As Mr. Milhollin
> put it: "Americans should resist the latest intelligence-agency
> lullaby....Iran is determined to get the bomb - all the agencies agree on
> that - and dealing with that threat is not a job that can be left for the
> next administration."
And all agreed that Iraq had WMD. Yada, yada, yada...
Count 1
"kuff (Isaac Adams)" <kuf...@gmail.com> wrote in message
news:1125417127.4...@f14g2000cwb.googlegroups.com...
>
> Count 1 wrote:
> >
http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/index.jsp?section=papers&code=05-D_42
> >
> > See no evil?
> >
> > (Washington, D.C.): The leaking earlier this month of a National
> > Intelligence Estimate (NIE) projection that Iran is a decade away from
> > obtaining nuclear weapons - doubling previous official estimates - is,
in
> > some ways, more ominous than would have been a finding that the mullahs
are
> > about to get "the Bomb." After all, the latter would be no surprise,
given
> > the considerable evidence (albeit, much of it circumstantial) that has
> > accumulated about Tehran's intentions and activities in this area.
>
> The restructing of the mechanism producing NIEs was done to readjust
> the wishes-fishes balance in favor or more evidence and less politics.
> No fishes found in Iraq with the previous balance.
>
> (I do share a low-level concern that the mechanism will over react in
> the opposite direction though. No evidence, yet, that such an
> undershoot has occured however.)
Fascinating.
I have absolutely no idea what you're talking about.
> > By contrast, the pollyanish assessment not only seems wildly out of
touch
> > with such realities.
>
> Realities have evidence.
Including the kind labelled 'circumstantial'.
> > Worse yet, the fact that it is one of the first
> > products of the newly "reformed" intelligence community suggests that -
far
> > from reducing the dangers of strategic surprise and unconnected "dots" -
the
> > Foreign Service Officer-dominated Director of National Intelligence
> > bureaucracy is going to exacerbate past failings and mistakes.
>
> Don't know about that. The NIE restructing is meant to be more
> objective and the structure has been laid out publically for
> examination.
Yes, but the question is, will the restructuring lead to an improvement in
the NIE's output with regards to what's actually happening. This report, the
author of the essay is saying, indicates it has not improved the output.
There is no way anyone can argue for or against such a position unless they
are privy to the details of the process.
> > "Intelligence" vs. Reality
> >
> > Several weeks ago, the Islamic Republic of Iran publicly announced that
it
> > was defying its European negotiating partners and the will of the
so-called
> > "international community" by resuming the conversion of 37 tons of
natural
> > uranium into its gaseous form. It is widely believed that within a month
of
> > taking such a step the uranium would be ready for enrichment - a
critical
> > step toward having bomb-grade material for weapons purposes.
>
> And at that time, if Iran wants to pursue enrichment as well, it will
> bring in the IAEA inspectors to remove seals and fire up the
> centrifuges. While the IAEA is watching....
...what Iran wants them to watch.
> > Yet, the NIE's authors evidently have allowed a highly debatable
assumption
> > to drive their conclusion that Iran is a full decade away from having
> > nuclear weapons: They assert that Iran's centrifuges are inadequate for
the
> > task and that, moreover, its scientists will have difficulty connecting
them
> > to a "cascade" (by which uranium flows from one machine to the next).
>
> Oh did they? I haven't seen the NIE myaself and they are usually
> classified such that I wouldn't normally be on the 'need to know' list.
>
> If the author is talking about an unclassified version of the NIE I'd
> like to know where that could be found. If the author has access to
> the classified version the DoJ would like to know where he got it.
>
> (I wish the author was more like Juan Cole over at antiwar.com and used
> more URLs to bolster his arguments and reveal his sources and evidence.
> He doesn't need a URL for his conclusions derived from the evidence
> however. :-) )
>
> >
> > Incredibly, even the International Atomic Energy Agency's officials -
> > typically the most inclined to see-no-evil when it comes to would be
> > proliferators like Iran - are confident that Iran can produce and
cascade
> > high-quality centrifuges.
>
> What's so surprising about that?
There is nothing surprising about that. The author raises it because the NIE
seemed to ignore it, assuming that Iran can't do something it demonstrably
can.
> > Indeed, as far back as 2002, Iranian scientists
> > were able secretly to enrich uranium in an experimental cascade, a fact
the
> > IAEA did not discover until the following year.
> >
> > As Gary Milhollin of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control
suggested
> > in a recent op.ed. for the New York Times: "It is unreasonable to assume
> > that Iran could not, after deciding to begin a concerted effort,
assemble a
> > 2,000-machine cascade in a year....After a year's operation of such a
> > cascade, Iran would have one bomb's worth of highly enriched uranium."
>
> So if Iran kicked out the IAEA today and started going
> 'balls-to-the-wall' they could possibly have *one* nuke in 2 years.
> Optimistically.
>
> That sets a minimum time for Iran to become a nuclear threat - 2 years.
> And that timer doesn't start until the IAEA is no longer able to go
> anywhere in Iran and inspect anything at will.
>
> I'm not worried.
I doubt there's any point you'd become worried, or at least any point early
enough to effectively deal with the threat of a rogue theocracy selling
nuclear weapons to Islamic Terrorists.
But you should be aware that you are basing your unworried condition on an
op ed from someone in Wisconsin. I'm not particularly worried. But then
I'm Canadian and unlikely to be a target of an Iranian nuclear weapon.
> > Even more troubling is what we do not know. Tehran has a history of
> > concealment and there are abundant indications that what is being
concealed
> > (much of it deep underground) amounts to a vast clandestine nuclear
weapons
> > infrastructure.
>
> An if you have lat-longs the IAEA can go look. Like they could in
> Iraq.
Are you sure about that? I was under the impression the IAEA can't just go
look, but have to present a schedule to Iranian officials and be granted
access.
I could be wrong though. I don't think the IAEA has unfettered access to any
facility it wants to inspect.
> > As Mr. Milhollin has noted, there is evidence that this
> > infrastructure is not only being used to advance nuclear-related weapons
> > components but also the manufacture of non-nuclear parts essential to
such
> > arms. Factoring in what must be presumed to be considerable clandestine
> > activities would only shorten, not lengthen, estimates of the amount of
time
> > it will take Iran to obtain nuclear weapons.
>
> Uh, no. It can only bring it down to 2 years as established by the
> time to build, cascade and run the centrifuges.
That's not 'established', kuff. Its an estimate based on assumptions from a
non Iranian half a world away.
> > The Bottom Line
> >
> > The stakes are too high to complicate America's security posture by
> > entrusting the job of being America's eyes and ears in the caves and
tunnels
> > around the world where future threats are gathering to those who have
proven
> > less than reliably visionary in the past. Iran is a case in point, a
> > literally ticking time-bomb that we ignore at our peril. As Mr.
Milhollin
> > put it: "Americans should resist the latest intelligence-agency
> > lullaby....Iran is determined to get the bomb - all the agencies agree
on
> > that - and dealing with that threat is not a job that can be left for
the
> > next administration."
>
> And all agreed that Iraq had WMD. Yada, yada, yada...
Iraq raises an interesting point. Obeidi's book presents a fascinating tale
of how incredibly easy it was for Iraq to begin work towards a nuclear bomb
without having anyone outside the country knowing. They were even able to
get critical information from American educational institutions, and by
parsing out manufacturing contracts to various European firms were able to
build critical components without raising suspicion.
Iraq does indeed present a very good reason as to why we need to be
concerned when rogue regimes start to even *indicate* they may be building a
bomb.
kuff (Isaac Adams)
Count 1 wrote:
> "kuff (Isaac Adams)" <kuf...@gmail.com> wrote in message
> news:1125417127.4...@f14g2000cwb.googlegroups.com...
> >
> > Count 1 wrote:
> > >
> http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/index.jsp?section=papers&code=05-D_42
> > >
> > > See no evil?
> > >
> > > (Washington, D.C.): The leaking earlier this month of a National
> > > Intelligence Estimate (NIE) projection that Iran is a decade away from
> > > obtaining nuclear weapons - doubling previous official estimates - is,
> in
> > > some ways, more ominous than would have been a finding that the mullahs
> are
> > > about to get "the Bomb." After all, the latter would be no surprise,
> given
> > > the considerable evidence (albeit, much of it circumstantial) that has
> > > accumulated about Tehran's intentions and activities in this area.
> >
> > The restructing of the mechanism producing NIEs was done to readjust
> > the wishes-fishes balance in favor or more evidence and less politics.
> > No fishes found in Iraq with the previous balance.
> >
> > (I do share a low-level concern that the mechanism will over react in
> > the opposite direction though. No evidence, yet, that such an
> > undershoot has occured however.)
>
> Fascinating.
>
> I have absolutely no idea what you're talking about.
Just organizational crap (science?). The org was burned by apparently
over hyping the Irag threat. Without structural/system changes the
tendency might be to under-hype the next threat assessment. Moving
from faith-based (Feith-based?) to more fact-based should reduce this
danger.
>
>
> > > By contrast, the pollyanish assessment not only seems wildly out of
> touch
> > > with such realities.
> >
> > Realities have evidence.
>
> Including the kind labelled 'circumstantial'.
Ooooh, the intel guys hate coencidence (circumstantial) information.
Like a red flag. They dive into those with relish.
>
>
> > > Worse yet, the fact that it is one of the first
> > > products of the newly "reformed" intelligence community suggests that -
> far
> > > from reducing the dangers of strategic surprise and unconnected "dots" -
> the
> > > Foreign Service Officer-dominated Director of National Intelligence
> > > bureaucracy is going to exacerbate past failings and mistakes.
> >
> > Don't know about that. The NIE restructing is meant to be more
> > objective and the structure has been laid out publically for
> > examination.
>
> Yes, but the question is, will the restructuring lead to an improvement in
> the NIE's output with regards to what's actually happening.
Yes, I think it will. Increased information sharing and source
qualification. NIE constructors will no longer take things on faith.
> This report, the
> author of the essay is saying, indicates it has not improved the output.
His only complaint appears to be that the product/output does not match
what his faith says it should.
>
> There is no way anyone can argue for or against such a position unless they
> are privy to the details of the process.
I believe the process details are 'out there' in the public sphere.
If you're realy interested in this I could see what I can find. (I
recall a high level description float past in a NYT article a couple of
weeks ago.)
>
>
> > > "Intelligence" vs. Reality
> > >
> > > Several weeks ago, the Islamic Republic of Iran publicly announced that
> it
> > > was defying its European negotiating partners and the will of the
> so-called
> > > "international community" by resuming the conversion of 37 tons of
> natural
> > > uranium into its gaseous form. It is widely believed that within a month
> of
> > > taking such a step the uranium would be ready for enrichment - a
> critical
> > > step toward having bomb-grade material for weapons purposes.
> >
> > And at that time, if Iran wants to pursue enrichment as well, it will
> > bring in the IAEA inspectors to remove seals and fire up the
> > centrifuges. While the IAEA is watching....
>
> ...what Iran wants them to watch.
It's what they asked to watch.
>
>
> > > Yet, the NIE's authors evidently have allowed a highly debatable
> assumption
> > > to drive their conclusion that Iran is a full decade away from having
> > > nuclear weapons: They assert that Iran's centrifuges are inadequate for
> the
> > > task and that, moreover, its scientists will have difficulty connecting
> them
> > > to a "cascade" (by which uranium flows from one machine to the next).
> >
> > Oh did they? I haven't seen the NIE myaself and they are usually
> > classified such that I wouldn't normally be on the 'need to know' list.
> >
> > If the author is talking about an unclassified version of the NIE I'd
> > like to know where that could be found. If the author has access to
> > the classified version the DoJ would like to know where he got it.
I still would like some insight into where the author gets his
information about the possibly classified NIE he is characterizing.
> >
> > (I wish the author was more like Juan Cole over at antiwar.com and used
> > more URLs to bolster his arguments and reveal his sources and evidence.
> > He doesn't need a URL for his conclusions derived from the evidence
> > however. :-) )
> >
> > >
> > > Incredibly, even the International Atomic Energy Agency's officials -
> > > typically the most inclined to see-no-evil when it comes to would be
> > > proliferators like Iran - are confident that Iran can produce and
> cascade
> > > high-quality centrifuges.
> >
> > What's so surprising about that?
>
> There is nothing surprising about that. The author raises it because the NIE
> seemed to ignore it, assuming that Iran can't do something it demonstrably
> can.
We, you and I, need to know how the author comes to this conclusion
about an NIE that he can't legally see.
I'm not convinced your parsing of the author's use of "incredibly" is
correct. It is a given Iran can manufacture centrifuges in whatever
quantity it needs.
>
>
> > > Indeed, as far back as 2002, Iranian scientists
> > > were able secretly to enrich uranium in an experimental cascade, a fact
> the
> > > IAEA did not discover until the following year.
> > >
> > > As Gary Milhollin of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control
> suggested
> > > in a recent op.ed. for the New York Times: "It is unreasonable to assume
> > > that Iran could not, after deciding to begin a concerted effort,
> assemble a
> > > 2,000-machine cascade in a year....After a year's operation of such a
> > > cascade, Iran would have one bomb's worth of highly enriched uranium."
> >
> > So if Iran kicked out the IAEA today and started going
> > 'balls-to-the-wall' they could possibly have *one* nuke in 2 years.
> > Optimistically.
> >
> > That sets a minimum time for Iran to become a nuclear threat - 2 years.
> > And that timer doesn't start until the IAEA is no longer able to go
> > anywhere in Iran and inspect anything at will.
> >
> > I'm not worried.
>
> I doubt there's any point you'd become worried, or at least any point early
> enough to effectively deal with the threat of a rogue theocracy selling
> nuclear weapons to Islamic Terrorists.
I'm not sure why you are calling them a rogue theocracy. But I'd raise
an eyebrow if the IAEA were thrown out as that would start the 2 year,
best case clock for Iran to construct *one* nuke.
And if, as you've maintained in the past, making a nuke is so
incredibly complex the design has to be tested before it can be known
to actually work, then I have even more than 2 years. Because once
one is tested then more have to be on hand to deter attackers who
whould now be considerably riled up.
>
> But you should be aware that you are basing your unworried condition on an
> op ed from someone in Wisconsin.
It's an op ed you yourself put forward for that very purpose - to raise
alarm and to challenge the US's new NIE with a 10 year window for an
Iranian nuke.
> I'm not particularly worried.
But not everyone is as familiar with the actual facts as you are.
> But then
> I'm Canadian and unlikely to be a target of an Iranian nuclear weapon.
Likely targets for a fielded Iranian nuclear weapon would be massed
threatening military assets within an 800 kilometer or so range.
I'm unlikely to be in that group so I too am unlikely to be a target of
an Iranian nuclear weapon. (One of my kids might but that's just the
breaks.)
>
>
> > > Even more troubling is what we do not know. Tehran has a history of
> > > concealment and there are abundant indications that what is being
> concealed
> > > (much of it deep underground) amounts to a vast clandestine nuclear
> weapons
> > > infrastructure.
> >
> > An if you have lat-longs the IAEA can go look. Like they could in
> > Iraq.
>
> Are you sure about that? I was under the impression the IAEA can't just go
> look, but have to present a schedule to Iranian officials and be granted
> access.
>
> I could be wrong though. I don't think the IAEA has unfettered access to any
> facility it wants to inspect.
The Additional Protocol to the NPT, signed only by Iran I believe,
includes this sort of snap inspection.
>
> > > As Mr. Milhollin has noted, there is evidence that this
> > > infrastructure is not only being used to advance nuclear-related weapons
> > > components but also the manufacture of non-nuclear parts essential to
> such
> > > arms. Factoring in what must be presumed to be considerable clandestine
> > > activities would only shorten, not lengthen, estimates of the amount of
> time
> > > it will take Iran to obtain nuclear weapons.
> >
> > Uh, no. It can only bring it down to 2 years as established by the
> > time to build, cascade and run the centrifuges.
>
> That's not 'established', kuff. Its an estimate based on assumptions from a
> non Iranian half a world away.
It was the worst case the author of your alarmist piece could come up
with - though he tried mightily to obscure it. :-)
>
>
> > > The Bottom Line
> > >
> > > The stakes are too high to complicate America's security posture by
> > > entrusting the job of being America's eyes and ears in the caves and
> tunnels
> > > around the world where future threats are gathering to those who have
> proven
> > > less than reliably visionary in the past. Iran is a case in point, a
> > > literally ticking time-bomb that we ignore at our peril. As Mr.
> Milhollin
> > > put it: "Americans should resist the latest intelligence-agency
> > > lullaby....Iran is determined to get the bomb - all the agencies agree
> on
> > > that - and dealing with that threat is not a job that can be left for
> the
> > > next administration."
> >
> > And all agreed that Iraq had WMD. Yada, yada, yada...
>
> Iraq raises an interesting point. Obeidi's book presents a fascinating tale
> of how incredibly easy it was for Iraq to begin work towards a nuclear bomb
> without having anyone outside the country knowing. They were even able to
> get critical information from American educational institutions, and by
> parsing out manufacturing contracts to various European firms were able to
> build critical components without raising suspicion.
True. When'd they stop doing that BTW? Who was their 'friend' while
they were getting away it it?
>
> Iraq does indeed present a very good reason as to why we need to be
> concerned when rogue regimes start to even *indicate* they may be building a
> bomb.
It's an object lesson for not having a faith-based intel operation. :-)
Count 1
> > I'm not particularly worried.
>
> But not everyone is as familiar with the actual facts as you are.
>
> > But then
> > I'm Canadian and unlikely to be a target of an Iranian nuclear weapon.
>
> Likely targets for a fielded Iranian nuclear weapon would be massed
> threatening military assets within an 800 kilometer or so range.
I thought you've said that you think anything could be made 'nuclear
capable'. This of course means that Iran is not limited by the range of her
missiles.
> I'm unlikely to be in that group
If you're an American, you're in that group.
> > Are you sure about that? I was under the impression the IAEA can't just
go
> > look, but have to present a schedule to Iranian officials and be granted
> > access.
> >
> > I could be wrong though. I don't think the IAEA has unfettered access to
any
> > facility it wants to inspect.
>
> The Additional Protocol to the NPT, signed only by Iran I believe,
Nope. As of January of this year 62 countries have signed and ratified and
28 have signed but not yet ratified.
> includes this sort of snap inspection.
AFAICT, Iran hasn't ratified the Additional Protocol, although diplomats
were given assurances by Iran that she would act as it had been ratified.
Those assurances are pretty weak considering Iran's tendency to lie about
her nuclear development program.
> > > > As Mr. Milhollin has noted, there is evidence that this
> > > > infrastructure is not only being used to advance nuclear-related
weapons
> > > > components but also the manufacture of non-nuclear parts essential
to
> > such
> > > > arms. Factoring in what must be presumed to be considerable
clandestine
> > > > activities would only shorten, not lengthen, estimates of the amount
of
> > time
> > > > it will take Iran to obtain nuclear weapons.
> > >
> > > Uh, no. It can only bring it down to 2 years as established by the
> > > time to build, cascade and run the centrifuges.
> >
> > That's not 'established', kuff. Its an estimate based on assumptions
from a
> > non Iranian half a world away.
>
> It was the worst case the author of your alarmist piece could come up
> with - though he tried mightily to obscure it. :-)
I don't think its the worst case he could come up with - he was quoting
someone with an opinion, he wasn't 'establishing' the facts.
Then why is it you uncritically believe a rogue theocracy and ignore the
obvious?
When'd they stop doing that BTW? Who was their 'friend' while
> they were getting away it it?
Mainly russia and france. In terms of people unwittingly helping them mainly
germans and swiss.
> > Iraq does indeed present a very good reason as to why we need to be
> > concerned when rogue regimes start to even *indicate* they may be
building a
> > bomb.
>
> It's an object lesson for not having a faith-based intel operation. :-)
Its an object lesson in not believing what rogue regimes tell you. :-)
Count 1
> > I doubt there's any point you'd become worried, or at least any point
early
> > enough to effectively deal with the threat of a rogue theocracy selling
> > nuclear weapons to Islamic Terrorists.
>
> I'm not sure why you are calling them a rogue theocracy.
Because that's what they are.
IIRC from my Poli Sci days a country is considered rogue when she threatens
her neighbors and/or supports criminals conducting crimes in other
countries.
> And if, as you've maintained in the past, making a nuke is so
> incredibly complex the design has to be tested before it can be known
> to actually work, then I have even more than 2 years.
No - sorry - doesn't follow. For one, Iran probably could build a bomb quite
a bit quicker than the two year time frame, considering we really don't know
how much they got from Khan's network. And for two the testing portion
doesn't have to come before a sizeable arsenal is made. Although's Iran's
are probably still a decade behind - they should have the systems in place
for them to computer model a detonation of their bombs to a high degree of
certainty.
kuff (Isaac Adams)
Count 1 wrote:
> > > I'm not particularly worried.
> >
> > But not everyone is as familiar with the actual facts as you are.
> >
> > > But then
> > > I'm Canadian and unlikely to be a target of an Iranian nuclear weapon.
> >
> > Likely targets for a fielded Iranian nuclear weapon would be massed
> > threatening military assets within an 800 kilometer or so range.
>
> I thought you've said that you think anything could be made 'nuclear
> capable'. This of course means that Iran is not limited by the range of her
> missiles.
True. They'd be wasting time and resources putting them on aircraft
though.
>
> > I'm unlikely to be in that group
>
> If you're an American, you're in that group.
If you're a Western civilizationaloid wouldn't you be in that group?
>
> > > Are you sure about that? I was under the impression the IAEA can't just
> go
> > > look, but have to present a schedule to Iranian officials and be granted
> > > access.
> > >
> > > I could be wrong though. I don't think the IAEA has unfettered access to
> any
> > > facility it wants to inspect.
> >
> > The Additional Protocol to the NPT, signed only by Iran I believe,
>
> Nope. As of January of this year 62 countries have signed and ratified and
> 28 have signed but not yet ratified.
Ah, you are correct. Might even be more than 62.
>
> > includes this sort of snap inspection.
>
> AFAICT, Iran hasn't ratified the Additional Protocol, although diplomats
> were given assurances by Iran that she would act as it had been ratified.
Hmm, I believe you are correct.
> Those assurances are pretty weak considering Iran's tendency to lie about
> her nuclear development program.
There's always the chance that ratification will not occur after
signing. Like the US did with the International Criminal Court for
example. A different Iranian administration could see things
differently.
>
>
> > > > > As Mr. Milhollin has noted, there is evidence that this
> > > > > infrastructure is not only being used to advance nuclear-related
> weapons
> > > > > components but also the manufacture of non-nuclear parts essential
> to
> > > such
> > > > > arms. Factoring in what must be presumed to be considerable
> clandestine
> > > > > activities would only shorten, not lengthen, estimates of the amount
> of
> > > time
> > > > > it will take Iran to obtain nuclear weapons.
> > > >
> > > > Uh, no. It can only bring it down to 2 years as established by the
> > > > time to build, cascade and run the centrifuges.
> > >
> > > That's not 'established', kuff. Its an estimate based on assumptions
> from a
> > > non Iranian half a world away.
> >
> > It was the worst case the author of your alarmist piece could come up
> > with - though he tried mightily to obscure it. :-)
>
> I don't think its the worst case he could come up with - he was quoting
> someone with an opinion, he wasn't 'establishing' the facts.
Yeah, you snipped out the bit where I wished he would be more like Juan
Cole. He seems to be running a fact deficit (in fact).
With all the snippage I can no longer see his exact words and context
and his piece is to flawed to be worth the time to go back and look it
up.
(I wonder what his purpose was in quoting someone with an opinion? To
disagree with them? I don't recall him doing that.)
Um, if they told me this wasn't the way to quietly acquire nuclear
technology then I'd be very critical.
What do you think it is I am to believe or disbelieve about this
particular area of quietly acquiring technological and industrial
capability?
>
> When'd they stop doing that BTW? Who was their 'friend' while
> > they were getting away it it?
>
> Mainly russia and france. In terms of people unwittingly helping them mainly
> germans and swiss.
I notice you avoided the date question.
>
> > > Iraq does indeed present a very good reason as to why we need to be
> > > concerned when rogue regimes start to even *indicate* they may be
> building a
> > > bomb.
> >
> > It's an object lesson for not having a faith-based intel operation. :-)
>
> Its an object lesson in not believing what rogue regimes tell you. :-)
The "rogue regime" said they didn't have WMD. Lo and behold...
Count 1
about
> > her nuclear development program.
>
> There's always the chance that ratification will not occur after
> signing. Like the US did with the International Criminal Court for
> example. A different Iranian administration could see things
> differently.
Maybe. A scenario significantly more likely if this hypothetical
administration takes on a significantly more - ie "actual" - democratic
character.
> > Then why is it you uncritically believe a rogue theocracy and ignore the
> > obvious?
>
> Um, if they told me this wasn't the way to quietly acquire nuclear
> technology then I'd be very critical.
But you're not critical when you say they aren't interested in nuclear
weapons. Why is that?
> > When'd they stop doing that BTW? Who was their 'friend' while
> > > they were getting away it it?
> >
> > Mainly russia and france. In terms of people unwittingly helping them
mainly
> > germans and swiss.
>
> I notice you avoided the date question.
I noticed you were asking another irrelevent question. I know you like you
to turn everything - no matter how unrelated - into a 'bash america first'
trip, and I prefer not to encourage you.
> > > > Iraq does indeed present a very good reason as to why we need to be
> > > > concerned when rogue regimes start to even *indicate* they may be
> > building a
> > > > bomb.
> > >
> > > It's an object lesson for not having a faith-based intel operation.
:-)
> >
> > Its an object lesson in not believing what rogue regimes tell you. :-)
>
> The "rogue regime" said they didn't have WMD. Lo and behold...
The rogue regime also said it was abiding by all NPT provisions. Lo and
behold....
kuff (Isaac Adams)
Count 1 wrote:
> > > I doubt there's any point you'd become worried, or at least any point
> early
> > > enough to effectively deal with the threat of a rogue theocracy selling
> > > nuclear weapons to Islamic Terrorists.
> >
> > I'm not sure why you are calling them a rogue theocracy.
>
> Because that's what they are.
>
> IIRC from my Poli Sci days a country is considered rogue when she threatens
> her neighbors and/or supports criminals conducting crimes in other
> countries.
A survey Poli Sci course, right? Definition seems pretty vague.
'Crimes' to who? Threatening over what?
>
> > And if, as you've maintained in the past, making a nuke is so
> > incredibly complex the design has to be tested before it can be known
> > to actually work, then I have even more than 2 years.
>
> No - sorry - doesn't follow. For one, Iran probably could build a bomb quite
> a bit quicker than the two year time frame, considering we really don't know
> how much they got from Khan's network.
Well this discussion orginated with the opinion piece you posted. In
that the author objected to the 10 year NIE estimate put forward by the
US then went on to give someone else's opinion that it could be as
little as 2 years.
Within the context of this thread I don't see how you can reasonably go
less than 2 years without something more informative than just your
fears.
> And for two the testing portion
> doesn't have to come before a sizeable arsenal is made.
True. Maybe you don't recall our discussion of a year or so back - I
maintained that nukes were simple enough to build without having to
test them. You said they were so complex that a 'rogue' builder would
have to test one to know that they worked.
And the first *one* of the arsenal could come off the line in as little
as 2 years. How long would it take to build an arsenal of more than
one? I don't know. Depends on the number of centrifuges I suppose.
SWAGging it I'd guess if the first one came of the line in 2 years then
the 10th one would come off the line in about 4 years. Then you'd
have an "arsenal".
> Although's Iran's
> are probably still a decade behind - they should have the systems in place
> for them to computer model a detonation of their bombs to a high degree of
> certainty.
Yeah, that's pretty much what I was saying way back then. Or just use
the warhead design floating around on the CDs from Pakistan.
kuff (Isaac Adams)
Count 1 wrote:
> > > Those assurances are pretty weak considering Iran's tendency to lie
> about
> > > her nuclear development program.
> >
> > There's always the chance that ratification will not occur after
> > signing. Like the US did with the International Criminal Court for
> > example. A different Iranian administration could see things
> > differently.
>
> Maybe. A scenario significantly more likely if this hypothetical
> administration takes on a significantly more - ie "actual" - democratic
> character.
>
Well, the US administration was democratic and it took on a more
hardline posture vis-a-vis a signed but unratified agreement so I don't
see how your comment is germane. Doesn't seem to make much
difference.
>
> > > Then why is it you uncritically believe a rogue theocracy and ignore the
> > > obvious?
> >
> > Um, if they told me this wasn't the way to quietly acquire nuclear
> > technology then I'd be very critical.
>
> But you're not critical when you say they aren't interested in nuclear
> weapons. Why is that?
>
I believe I've mentioned a few times since the invasion of Iraq why
Iran would be interested in nukes. You didn't very much like my
deterrence arguments as I recall.
Also Iran is a theocracy (you probably noticed :-) ). If was for
religious reasons they demurred in engaging Iraq with chemical weapons
until the level of Iranian dead forced them to respond with un-Islamic
weapons.
They consider nukes to be un-Islamic too. Now you can say they really
aren't a theocracy and would have no moral objections to developing and
using nukes but then you'd be undermining your arguments that Iran is
untrustworthy because it is a theocracy.
I think the Iranians, for religious reasons, don't want nukes. But
the relative secularists in the regime, and the securlarizing younger
population, are pushing for them. Their behavior in the Iran-Iraq war
regarding chemical weapons makes me tend to believe them when they say
they are religious and take moral calculations into account when
deciding what to do.
But the Iran-Iraq war also tell me that if they are provoked and
pressed and threatened hard enough they will overcome their repugnance
and develop such weapons.
Right now my take is that it is the hated mullahs which are the major
*impediment* to Iran developing nukes. Take out the mullahs and
install a more secular (and democratic) government and that impediment
is removed.
>
> > > When'd they stop doing that BTW? Who was their 'friend' while
> > > > they were getting away it it?
> > >
> > > Mainly russia and france. In terms of people unwittingly helping them
> mainly
> > > germans and swiss.
> >
> > I notice you avoided the date question.
>
> I noticed you were asking another irrelevent question. I know you like you
> to turn everything - no matter how unrelated - into a 'bash america first'
> trip, and I prefer not to encourage you.
>
I thought you wanted the facts. (Didn't really.)
>
> > > > > Iraq does indeed present a very good reason as to why we need to be
> > > > > concerned when rogue regimes start to even *indicate* they may be
> > > building a
> > > > > bomb.
> > > >
> > > > It's an object lesson for not having a faith-based intel operation.
> :-)
> > >
> > > Its an object lesson in not believing what rogue regimes tell you. :-)
> >
> > The "rogue regime" said they didn't have WMD. Lo and behold...
>
> The rogue regime also said it was abiding by all NPT provisions. Lo and
> behold....
It was. Where's the Iraqi WMD?
Count 1
>
> Count 1 wrote:
> > > > I doubt there's any point you'd become worried, or at least any
point
> > early
> > > > enough to effectively deal with the threat of a rogue theocracy
selling
> > > > nuclear weapons to Islamic Terrorists.
> > >
> > > I'm not sure why you are calling them a rogue theocracy.
> >
> > Because that's what they are.
> >
> > IIRC from my Poli Sci days a country is considered rogue when she
threatens
> > her neighbors and/or supports criminals conducting crimes in other
> > countries.
>
> A survey Poli Sci course, right?
No, I forget the exact title. It was a second year course IIRC.
> > > And if, as you've maintained in the past, making a nuke is so
> > > incredibly complex the design has to be tested before it can be known
> > > to actually work, then I have even more than 2 years.
> >
> > No - sorry - doesn't follow. For one, Iran probably could build a bomb
quite
> > a bit quicker than the two year time frame, considering we really don't
know
> > how much they got from Khan's network.
>
> Well this discussion orginated with the opinion piece you posted. In
> that the author objected to the 10 year NIE estimate put forward by the
> US then went on to give someone else's opinion that it could be as
> little as 2 years.
>
> Within the context of this thread I don't see how you can reasonably go
> less than 2 years without something more informative than just your
> fears.
'Concerns'.
> > And for two the testing portion
> > doesn't have to come before a sizeable arsenal is made.
>
> True. Maybe you don't recall our discussion of a year or so back - I
> maintained that nukes were simple enough to build without having to
> test them. You said they were so complex that a 'rogue' builder would
> have to test one to know that they worked.
And that's still true.
> And the first *one* of the arsenal could come off the line in as little
> as 2 years. How long would it take to build an arsenal of more than
> one? I don't know. Depends on the number of centrifuges I suppose.
> SWAGging it I'd guess if the first one came of the line in 2 years then
> the 10th one would come off the line in about 4 years. Then you'd
> have an "arsenal".
You seem stuck on this fantasy number of 2 years.
> > Although's Iran's
> > are probably still a decade behind - they should have the systems in
place
> > for them to computer model a detonation of their bombs to a high degree
of
> > certainty.
>
> Yeah, that's pretty much what I was saying way back then. Or just use
> the warhead design floating around on the CDs from Pakistan.
That's for building, that's not for testing. Do you think it'll take them
two years to download the information from the CD? :-)
Count 1
>
> Count 1 wrote:
> > > > Those assurances are pretty weak considering Iran's tendency to lie
> > about
> > > > her nuclear development program.
> > >
> > > There's always the chance that ratification will not occur after
> > > signing. Like the US did with the International Criminal Court for
> > > example. A different Iranian administration could see things
> > > differently.
> >
> > Maybe. A scenario significantly more likely if this hypothetical
> > administration takes on a significantly more - ie "actual" - democratic
> > character.
> >
>
> Well, the US administration was democratic and it took on a more
> hardline posture vis-a-vis a signed but unratified agreement so I don't
> see how your comment is germane. Doesn't seem to make much
> difference.
You were the one saying a different administration may make a different
decision. My point was the chances of Iran doing what's necessary for it to
be considered a trustworthy member of the international community are
increased if the people are actually allowed to decide who governs the
country.
But maybe not - who knows. These are complicated and often the public are
duped. Like when they talk about an outgoing president signing a very
controversial international agreement in his final days just so he can stick
it to his rival predecessor and pretending this represents something more
than small minded politcal posturing.
> > > > Then why is it you uncritically believe a rogue theocracy and ignore
the
> > > > obvious?
> > >
> > > Um, if they told me this wasn't the way to quietly acquire nuclear
> > > technology then I'd be very critical.
> >
> > But you're not critical when you say they aren't interested in nuclear
> > weapons. Why is that?
> >
>
> I believe I've mentioned a few times since the invasion of Iraq why
> Iran would be interested in nukes. You didn't very much like my
> deterrence arguments as I recall.
Irrelevent. When Iran says they aren't building and don't want Nuclear
bombs, you bend over the table. Why is that?
> They consider nukes to be un-Islamic too.
??
> I think the Iranians, for religious reasons, don't want nukes.
I think the Iranians, for religous and nationalistic reasons, which are one
and the same to them, want nukes to 'Wipe Israel from the map'.
But
> the relative secularists in the regime, and the securlarizing younger
> population, are pushing for them. Their behavior in the Iran-Iraq war
> regarding chemical weapons makes me tend to believe them when they say
> they are religious and take moral calculations into account when
> deciding what to do.
> But the Iran-Iraq war also tell me that if they are provoked and
> pressed and threatened hard enough they will overcome their repugnance
> and develop such weapons.
>
> Right now my take is that it is the hated mullahs which are the major
> *impediment* to Iran developing nukes.
Right. I suspect the Iranian Mullahs are the ones trying to improve the
human rights conditions of Iranains as well.
Take out the mullahs and
> install a more secular (and democratic) government and that impediment
> is removed.
Of course the mullah's aren't the impediment, they are the impetus.
> > > > When'd they stop doing that BTW? Who was their 'friend' while
> > > > > they were getting away it it?
> > > >
> > > > Mainly russia and france. In terms of people unwittingly helping
them
> > mainly
> > > > germans and swiss.
> > >
> > > I notice you avoided the date question.
> >
> > I noticed you were asking another irrelevent question. I know you like
you
> > to turn everything - no matter how unrelated - into a 'bash america
first'
> > trip, and I prefer not to encourage you.
> >
>
> I thought you wanted the facts.
Then why didn't you post them? You asked a question, you didn't present
facts.
> > > > > > Iraq does indeed present a very good reason as to why we need to
be
> > > > > > concerned when rogue regimes start to even *indicate* they may
be
> > > > building a
> > > > > > bomb.
> > > > >
> > > > > It's an object lesson for not having a faith-based intel
operation.
> > :-)
> > > >
> > > > Its an object lesson in not believing what rogue regimes tell you.
:-)
> > >
> > > The "rogue regime" said they didn't have WMD. Lo and behold...
> >
> > The rogue regime also said it was abiding by all NPT provisions. Lo and
> > behold....
>
> It was.
LOL....Iran only admitted that Arak and Natanz were nuclear facilities after
a dissident group revealed their existence to us. This lack of admission
put them in direct violation of the NPT, which started this current crisis
with Iran.
Do you need to go over the basics again?
kuff (Isaac Adams)
Count 1 wrote:
> "kuff (Isaac Adams)" <kuf...@gmail.com> wrote in message
> news:1125432673.6...@o13g2000cwo.googlegroups.com...
> >
> > Count 1 wrote:
...
>
> > And the first *one* of the arsenal could come off the line in as little
> > as 2 years. How long would it take to build an arsenal of more than
> > one? I don't know. Depends on the number of centrifuges I suppose.
> > SWAGging it I'd guess if the first one came of the line in 2 years then
> > the 10th one would come off the line in about 4 years. Then you'd
> > have an "arsenal".
>
> You seem stuck on this fantasy number of 2 years.
It was from the article you posted. Not liking the US's NIE of 10
years the smallest he could make it was 2 years. It's a minimum
number BTW. 2+ years is likely more accurate (if less precise).
...
kuff (Isaac Adams)
Count 1 wrote:
> "kuff (Isaac Adams)" <kuf...@gmail.com> wrote in message
> news:1125433362.5...@g14g2000cwa.googlegroups.com...
> >
> > Count 1 wrote:
> > > > > > > Iraq does indeed present a very good reason as to why we need to
> be
> > > > > > > concerned when rogue regimes start to even *indicate* they may
> be
> > > > > building a
> > > > > > > bomb.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > It's an object lesson for not having a faith-based intel
> operation.
> > > :-)
> > > > >
> > > > > Its an object lesson in not believing what rogue regimes tell you.
> :-)
> > > >
> > > > The "rogue regime" said they didn't have WMD. Lo and behold...
> > >
> > > The rogue regime also said it was abiding by all NPT provisions. Lo and
> > > behold....
> >
> > It was.
>
> LOL....Iran only admitted that Arak and Natanz were nuclear facilities after
> a dissident group revealed their existence to us. This lack of admission
> put them in direct violation of the NPT, which started this current crisis
> with Iran.
>
> Do you need to go over the basics again?
One of us does. You snipped away were I was clearly talking about
Iraq. Maybe you need to review your debating tactics basics.
Count 1
>
> Count 1 wrote:
> > "kuff (Isaac Adams)" <kuf...@gmail.com> wrote in message
> > news:1125432673.6...@o13g2000cwo.googlegroups.com...
> > >
> > > Count 1 wrote:
>
> ...
>
> >
> > > And the first *one* of the arsenal could come off the line in as
little
> > > as 2 years. How long would it take to build an arsenal of more than
> > > one? I don't know. Depends on the number of centrifuges I suppose.
> > > SWAGging it I'd guess if the first one came of the line in 2 years
then
> > > the 10th one would come off the line in about 4 years. Then you'd
> > > have an "arsenal".
> >
> > You seem stuck on this fantasy number of 2 years.
>
> It was from the article you posted.
Irrelevent. You shouldn't be so impressed with throw away lines with no
foundation. Especially about a time frame for a country to build a bomb.
Throw away lines are not established facts, as much as you may wish to
portray them as such.
Not liking the US's NIE of 10
> years the smallest he could make it was 2 years.
Why do you keep saying that? I'm sure the author of the essay could have
made it even smaller. He was merely quoting someone with a different view.
Now if he had asked me I would have said its more than likely that Iran has
a very active Nuclear weapons development program - in Syria.
And I know I could count on you to quote that as an established fact. :-)
But lets assume the 2 year number is accurate. That's not very long, is it.
What do you think the international community, most importantly Israel,
should do in that two years to make sure Iran doesn't get nuclear weapons?
I know anyone who reads and relies on a website called 'antiwar' must be
abhorred at the prospect of an rogue theocratic regime attaining nuclear
bombs. :-)
Count 1
Ohhh...you were talking about Iraq. Pardon me - I thought we had
transitioned back to the relevent subject matter.
If its your contention that Iraq was abiding by the NPT then you really need
to do some homework. Obeidi's book would be a good place to start. You
might be surprised at just how much Iraq violated the NPT. In fact so much
clandestine activity was uncovered after Gulf War one the IAEA had to
significantly broaden its scope of searching activities.
kuff (Isaac Adams)
Count 1 wrote:
> "kuff (Isaac Adams)" <kuf...@gmail.com> wrote in message
> news:1125434994.6...@g14g2000cwa.googlegroups.com...
> >
> > Count 1 wrote:
> > > "kuff (Isaac Adams)" <kuf...@gmail.com> wrote in message
> > > news:1125432673.6...@o13g2000cwo.googlegroups.com...
> > > >
> > > > Count 1 wrote:
> >
> > ...
> >
> > >
> > > > And the first *one* of the arsenal could come off the line in as
> little
> > > > as 2 years. How long would it take to build an arsenal of more than
> > > > one? I don't know. Depends on the number of centrifuges I suppose.
> > > > SWAGging it I'd guess if the first one came of the line in 2 years
> then
> > > > the 10th one would come off the line in about 4 years. Then you'd
> > > > have an "arsenal".
> > >
> > > You seem stuck on this fantasy number of 2 years.
> >
> > It was from the article you posted.
>
> Irrelevent.
I think it is very relevant that you posted it and now don't seem to
like it very much.
> You shouldn't be so impressed with throw away lines with no
> foundation.
I think my initial posting indicated the whole article was mostly throw
away lines. Makes one wonder why you bothered to post such an
irrelevant piece. :-)
> Especially about a time frame for a country to build a bomb.
> Throw away lines are not established facts, as much as you may wish to
> portray them as such.
It was the closest thing he (and by inverse proxy, you) put forward as
a fact about duration.
And most of the time wasn't in the building of the bomb. It was in
the building of the thousands of centrifuges and the long, long time
they'd have to run to create enough HEU to actually build a bomb.
>
>
> Not liking the US's NIE of 10
> > years the smallest he could make it was 2 years.
>
> Why do you keep saying that?
Because the author didn't like the 10 year outlook but could only come
up with a 2 year outlook to replace it.
> I'm sure the author of the essay could have
> made it even smaller.
I think he reached the limit of how low he could make it, while
referring to more than just his opinion. If he could have made it
smaller he would have.
> He was merely quoting someone with a different view.
> Now if he had asked me I would have said its more than likely that Iran has
> a very active Nuclear weapons development program - in Syria.
>
> And I know I could count on you to quote that as an established fact. :-)
>
> But lets assume the 2 year number is accurate. That's not very long, is it.
It's how long the clock runs once it is *started*. It'll start when
the IAEA are kicked out of the country. So, unless something
newsworthy has happened today, it is not 2 years from today. It's 2
years from some "whenever" date in the future.
> What do you think the international community, most importantly Israel,
> should do in that two years to make sure Iran doesn't get nuclear weapons?
I'm not sure Israel is a very good member of the international
community. But, excluding Israel, the international community can
decide for itself democratically whether or not it agrees with Iran
acquiring nuclear weapons and, more importantly, what it is prepared to
do about it.
Once they decide that then there's plenty of time to decide what legal
measures can be undertaken to prevent it. Personally, I don't see any
legal measures that could be but perhaps the international community
can democratically come up with some.
>
> I know anyone who reads and relies on a website called 'antiwar' must be
> abhorred at the prospect of an rogue theocratic regime attaining nuclear
> bombs. :-)
It doesn't matter to me. I see pluses and minuses both ways.
I might also be abhorred at a rogue theocratic regime with nuclear
bombs forcing others not to have them. :-)
kuff (Isaac Adams)
Must have been why you snipped out my explicit reference to Iraq, huh?
>
> If its your contention that Iraq was abiding by the NPT then you really need
> to do some homework. Obeidi's book would be a good place to start. You
> might be surprised at just how much Iraq violated the NPT. In fact so much
> clandestine activity was uncovered after Gulf War one the IAEA had to
> significantly broaden its scope of searching activities.
15 years ago. I'm surprise to see you relying on such ancient
texts... :-)
Count 1
> > But lets assume the 2 year number is accurate. That's not very long, is
it.
>
> It's how long the clock runs once it is *started*. It'll start when
> the IAEA are kicked out of the country. So, unless something
> newsworthy has happened today, it is not 2 years from today. It's 2
> years from some "whenever" date in the future.
Its two years from when they start - based on a whole variety of
assumptions. And for all we know, the may have started 1 and half years ago.
> > What do you think the international community, most importantly Israel,
> > should do in that two years to make sure Iran doesn't get nuclear
weapons?
>
> I'm not sure Israel is a very good member of the international
> community. But, excluding Israel, the international community can
> decide for itself democratically whether or not it agrees with Iran
> acquiring nuclear weapons and, more importantly, what it is prepared to
> do about it.
Yes Kuff - I know. And what would ***your*** advice be?
Count 1
I don't think I did snip it away. check again.
> > If its your contention that Iraq was abiding by the NPT then you really
need
> > to do some homework. Obeidi's book would be a good place to start. You
> > might be surprised at just how much Iraq violated the NPT. In fact so
much
> > clandestine activity was uncovered after Gulf War one the IAEA had to
> > significantly broaden its scope of searching activities.
>
> 15 years ago. I'm surprise to see you relying on such ancient
> texts... :-)
You made the claim iraq was abiding by the NPT. Of course now you know
better. You're welcome.
kuff (Isaac Adams)
http://groups.google.com/group/alt.religion.islam/msg/bb822c93444973ef
> > > > > Iraq does indeed present a very good reason as to why we need to be
> > > > > concerned when rogue regimes start to even *indicate* they may be
> > > building a
> > > > > bomb.
> > > > It's an object lesson for not having a faith-based intel operation.
> :-)
> > > Its an object lesson in not believing what rogue regimes tell you. :-)
> > The "rogue regime" said they didn't have WMD. Lo and behold...
> The rogue regime also said it was abiding by all NPT provisions. Lo and
> behold....
It was. Where's the Iraqi WMD?
- - - - - - - - - -
>
> > > If its your contention that Iraq was abiding by the NPT then you really
> need
> > > to do some homework. Obeidi's book would be a good place to start. You
> > > might be surprised at just how much Iraq violated the NPT. In fact so
> much
> > > clandestine activity was uncovered after Gulf War one the IAEA had to
> > > significantly broaden its scope of searching activities.
> >
> > 15 years ago. I'm surprise to see you relying on such ancient
> > texts... :-)
>
> You made the claim iraq was abiding by the NPT.
When it was invaded. 15 years before I'm not sure about.
kuff (Isaac Adams)
Count 1 wrote:
> >
> > > But lets assume the 2 year number is accurate. That's not very long, is
> it.
> >
> > It's how long the clock runs once it is *started*. It'll start when
> > the IAEA are kicked out of the country. So, unless something
> > newsworthy has happened today, it is not 2 years from today. It's 2
> > years from some "whenever" date in the future.
>
> Its two years from when they start - based on a whole variety of
> assumptions. And for all we know, the may have started 1 and half years ago.
No. The IAEA, and other 'national technical means', would have
noticed that. They haven't started on the 2 year centrifuge build out
and operation yet.
>
>
> > > What do you think the international community, most importantly Israel,
> > > should do in that two years to make sure Iran doesn't get nuclear
> weapons?
> >
> > I'm not sure Israel is a very good member of the international
> > community. But, excluding Israel, the international community can
> > decide for itself democratically whether or not it agrees with Iran
> > acquiring nuclear weapons and, more importantly, what it is prepared to
> > do about it.
>
> Yes Kuff - I know. And what would ***your*** advice be?
STFU and Iran wouldn't feel that it needed nukes to defend itself.
Then watch them very closely - sending the IAEA teams around to any
area thought suspicious. Give Israel, the only nuclear power in the
Middle East, a 2 year deadline to sign the NPT and accept IAEA
inspectors.
Count 1
> > > > If its your contention that Iraq was abiding by the NPT then you
really
> > need
> > > > to do some homework. Obeidi's book would be a good place to start.
You
> > > > might be surprised at just how much Iraq violated the NPT. In fact
so
> > much
> > > > clandestine activity was uncovered after Gulf War one the IAEA had
to
> > > > significantly broaden its scope of searching activities.
> > >
> > > 15 years ago. I'm surprise to see you relying on such ancient
> > > texts... :-)
> >
> > You made the claim iraq was abiding by the NPT.
>
> When it was invaded. 15 years before I'm not sure about.
Actually - yes you are, you're just loathe to face the fact that your posts
often appear to defend a government that represents something you also claim
to abhor, namely perverse abuse of political power by concentrating it into
the hands of a few autocrats.
But I do concede that upon reflection its quite clear you were talking about
recent events, even if you had switched countries.
Count 1
>
> Count 1 wrote:
> > >
> > > > But lets assume the 2 year number is accurate. That's not very long,
is
> > it.
> > >
> > > It's how long the clock runs once it is *started*. It'll start when
> > > the IAEA are kicked out of the country. So, unless something
> > > newsworthy has happened today, it is not 2 years from today. It's 2
> > > years from some "whenever" date in the future.
> >
> > Its two years from when they start - based on a whole variety of
> > assumptions. And for all we know, the may have started 1 and half years
ago.
>
> No. The IAEA, and other 'national technical means', would have
> noticed that. They haven't started on the 2 year centrifuge build out
> and operation yet.
Ummmm....no. I have to disagree.
We know we haven't found conclusive evidence of such an operation. We don't
know they don't have one.
Now in my opinion we can't trust their word. And in my opinion there is a
ton of ancilliary evidence suggesting they intend to develop a nuclear bomb.
What I'd like to know more about is the verification and inspection process
*as it plays out on the ground*, not as its outlined in a document written
in Geneva. If I can be convinced it did a reasonable job I'd be willing to
say they don't have such an operation. Which does not address their future
intentions.
> > > > What do you think the international community, most importantly
Israel,
> > > > should do in that two years to make sure Iran doesn't get nuclear
> > weapons?
> > >
> > > I'm not sure Israel is a very good member of the international
> > > community. But, excluding Israel, the international community can
> > > decide for itself democratically whether or not it agrees with Iran
> > > acquiring nuclear weapons and, more importantly, what it is prepared
to
> > > do about it.
> >
> > Yes Kuff - I know. And what would ***your*** advice be?
>
> STFU and Iran wouldn't feel that it needed nukes to defend itself.
From who? Who was threatening Iran? I know Israel wasn't threatening Iran
with nuclear obliteration, she doesn't even admit to her aresenal, let alone
go around shaking it in other's faces. Pakistan has her hands tied with
India, Afghanistan's fucked, Iraq's fucked....Was it that darn pesky
Turkmenistan? Those naughty, naughty boys....
What exactly were people saying - people in actual power, not groups like
Human Rights Watch, or other NGO's - that they need to STFU over because it
was threatening to Iran? (Before it was revealed by the Iranian dissident
group that Iran was in breach of its NPT obligations)
> Then watch them very closely - sending the IAEA teams around to any
> area thought suspicious. Give Israel, the only nuclear power in the
> Middle East, a 2 year deadline to sign the NPT and accept IAEA
> inspectors.
Yeah, I've been waiting for this card to be played. I think anything that
requires Israel to admit her nuclear capability is a mistake in the long
run. Not until she is surrounded by democracies should she give one inch
here.
kuff (Isaac Adams)
Count 1 wrote:
> "kuff (Isaac Adams)" <kuf...@gmail.com> wrote in message
> news:1125441197....@o13g2000cwo.googlegroups.com...
> >
> > Count 1 wrote:
> > > >
> > > > > But lets assume the 2 year number is accurate. That's not very long,
> is
> > > it.
> > > >
> > > > It's how long the clock runs once it is *started*. It'll start when
> > > > the IAEA are kicked out of the country. So, unless something
> > > > newsworthy has happened today, it is not 2 years from today. It's 2
> > > > years from some "whenever" date in the future.
> > >
> > > Its two years from when they start - based on a whole variety of
> > > assumptions. And for all we know, the may have started 1 and half years
> ago.
> >
> > No. The IAEA, and other 'national technical means', would have
> > noticed that. They haven't started on the 2 year centrifuge build out
> > and operation yet.
>
> Ummmm....no. I have to disagree.
>
> We know we haven't found conclusive evidence of such an operation. We don't
> know they don't have one.
Let's not go to pink unicorn territory okay? Should be concentrating
on proving a positive rather than a negative. Evidence.
>
> Now in my opinion we can't trust their word.
Not just that, no. I don't know many countries in the world I would
trust just their word on. "Trust but verify" is a good dictum (and
ties back in to 'national technical means'.)
> And in my opinion there is a
> ton of ancilliary evidence suggesting they intend to develop a nuclear bomb.
That may be but have they started the 2 year clock on it yet? And as I
mentioned at another place in this thread, if there's
ancilliary/circumstantial evidence the spooks will follow up on that
eagerly.
I tend to somewhat discount political bluster meant for internal
consumption so some of your ancilliary evidence I might reject.
> What I'd like to know more about is the verification and inspection process
> *as it plays out on the ground*, not as its outlined in a document written
> in Geneva. If I can be convinced it did a reasonable job I'd be willing to
> say they don't have such an operation. Which does not address their future
> intentions.
>
Fair enough. Lot of boring documentation to wade through on that I
think. There are the period reports the IAEA does on Iran and it may
have of that in it. There may even be some procedures manuals online
for IAEA.
I haven't studied their processes in detail (but they were spot on WRT
Iraq). I'd understand you'd want more confidence in them though.
>
> > > > > What do you think the international community, most importantly
> Israel,
> > > > > should do in that two years to make sure Iran doesn't get nuclear
> > > weapons?
> > > >
> > > > I'm not sure Israel is a very good member of the international
> > > > community. But, excluding Israel, the international community can
> > > > decide for itself democratically whether or not it agrees with Iran
> > > > acquiring nuclear weapons and, more importantly, what it is prepared
> to
> > > > do about it.
> > >
> > > Yes Kuff - I know. And what would ***your*** advice be?
> >
> > STFU and Iran wouldn't feel that it needed nukes to defend itself.
>
> From who? Who was threatening Iran?
Drones. Saber rattling over nuke program. "Nothing's off the table"
to deal with Iran. Continuing sanctions. ...
> I know Israel wasn't threatening Iran
> with nuclear obliteration, she doesn't even admit to her aresenal, let alone
> go around shaking it in other's faces.
But she did leak noises about possibly bombing Iranian facilities last
spring. And would sure want the US to do the job for them.
Lots of Israel influence (and spies it seems) in the US intelligence
and policy execution apparatus it seems.
> Pakistan has her hands tied with
> India, Afghanistan's fucked, Iraq's fucked....Was it that darn pesky
> Turkmenistan? Those naughty, naughty boys....
>
> What exactly were people saying - people in actual power, not groups like
> Human Rights Watch, or other NGO's - that they need to STFU over because it
> was threatening to Iran?
Oh various pronouncements. Planted stories in news media. 'Official'
press columnists. That sort of thing. Hostile words and hostile
(drones, special forces, terrorist funding) actions.
> (Before it was revealed by the Iranian dissident
> group that Iran was in breach of its NPT obligations)
That was a coup for the MeK all right. However Iraq has shown us that
dissident groups are very unreliable sources. And MeK is an official
terrorist organization.
>
> > Then watch them very closely - sending the IAEA teams around to any
> > area thought suspicious. Give Israel, the only nuclear power in the
> > Middle East, a 2 year deadline to sign the NPT and accept IAEA
> > inspectors.
>
> Yeah, I've been waiting for this card to be played. I think anything that
> requires Israel to admit her nuclear capability is a mistake in the long
> run.
The 'Strategic Ambiguity' is a bit threadbare don't you think? (I'm
intersted in who tested all those different models of war heads for the
Israelis. South Africa did some I believe but there must be around 15
different kinds in their arsenal.)
I don't think it would hurt Israel one bit to admit nukes now.
"Ah ha! Israel admitted it has nukes!"
"Just how stupid are you not to have known that?"
There'd be a media flutter and the usual suspects would write the usual
columns about the Israel and the 'evil Jooz' but I don't see any harm
at all.
Reducing the arsenal and/or subjecting themselves to an NPT regime is
more complicated.
> Not until she is surrounded by democracies should she give one inch
> here.
Personally, I think Israel is lucky *not* to have been surrounded by
democracies. Democracies would have been so very hard to manage by the
US and allies, and anti-Israeli public sentiment in the surrounding
countries would have be expressed more forcefully than what we have
seen.
In my opinion, if you want harm to come to Israel then wish for all
it's neighbors to become suddenly democratic.
Count 1
I think in terms of definitive statements "They don't have one" is less
supportable then "We don't have any evidence they have one."
> > From who? Who was threatening Iran? I know Israel wasn't threatening
Iran
> > with nuclear obliteration, she doesn't even admit to her aresenal, let
alone
> > go around shaking it in other's faces. Pakistan has her hands tied with
> > India, Afghanistan's fucked, Iraq's fucked....Was it that darn pesky
> > Turkmenistan? Those naughty, naughty boys....
> >
> > What exactly were people saying - people in actual power, not groups
like
> > Human Rights Watch, or other NGO's - that they need to STFU over because
it
> > was threatening to Iran? (Before it was revealed by the Iranian
dissident
> > group that Iran was in breach of its NPT obligations)
>
> That was a coup for the MeK all right. However Iraq has shown us that
> dissident groups are very unreliable sources.
But not in this case. Remember, Iran has **admitted** they were in breach of
the NPT.
I snipped your inner responses because they pertained to post NPT violation
admission and saved this one, which seemed to sum up what you're saying...
> Oh various pronouncements. Planted stories in news media. 'Official'
> press columnists. That sort of thing. Hostile words and hostile
> (drones, special forces, terrorist funding) actions.
I'd like a more specific response as to who was threatening Iran before
their admission about violating the NPT. Like actual countries -
statements - that kind of thing. You know....*facts*.
(Yes, I know Israel ruminiated on the possibility of taking out some key
Iranian targets, but that was after Iran's antics came to light.)
> > > Then watch them very closely - sending the IAEA teams around to any
> > > area thought suspicious. Give Israel, the only nuclear power in the
> > > Middle East, a 2 year deadline to sign the NPT and accept IAEA
> > > inspectors.
> >
> > Yeah, I've been waiting for this card to be played. I think anything
that
> > requires Israel to admit her nuclear capability is a mistake in the long
> > run.
>
> The 'Strategic Ambiguity' is a bit threadbare don't you think? (I'm
> intersted in who tested all those different models of war heads for the
> Israelis. South Africa did some I believe but there must be around 15
> different kinds in their arsenal.)
>
> I don't think it would hurt Israel one bit to admit nukes now.
Of course it would. One thing you don't want your enemy to have is
information about the size of your arsenal. That's pretty much common sense.
> > Not until she is surrounded by democracies should she give one inch
> > here.
>
> Personally, I think Israel is lucky *not* to have been surrounded by
> democracies. Democracies would have been so very hard to manage by the
> US and allies, and anti-Israeli public sentiment in the surrounding
> countries would have be expressed more forcefully than what we have
> seen.
I'm not sure how much 'management' the US has been doing in the region, I
know moonbats like Cole and Raimondo tend to blow that horn a lot, so I'm
not surprised you're convinced. However democracies dont' need to be
managed. They tend to be friendly to each other.
> In my opinion, if you want harm to come to Israel then wish for all
> it's neighbors to become suddenly democratic.
Do you have an opinion that doesn't fly in the face of the last 50 years of
geopolitical history? Or are you of the opinion that its not the governments
but the people of the region who want to annihilate Israel? Considering the
fact that you've never been to the region, and considering the fact that
information coming out of those countries tends to be tightly controlled,
I'd wonder how you arrive at that conclusion.
kuff (Isaac Adams)
Count 1 wrote:
> "kuff (Isaac Adams)" <kuf...@gmail.com> wrote in message
> news:1125446282.6...@f14g2000cwb.googlegroups.com...
> >
> > Count 1 wrote:
> > > "kuff (Isaac Adams)" <kuf...@gmail.com> wrote in message
> > > news:1125441197....@o13g2000cwo.googlegroups.com...
> > > >
> > > > Count 1 wrote:
...
> >
> > That was a coup for the MeK all right. However Iraq has shown us that
> > dissident groups are very unreliable sources.
>
> But not in this case.
Correct. Not in this particular case about this particular subject.
> Remember, Iran has **admitted** they were in breach of
> the NPT.
Correct. And they said why - fear of the reaction to Iran pursuing
nuclear energy and the complete fuel cycle.
>
> I snipped your inner responses because they pertained to post NPT violation
> admission and saved this one, which seemed to sum up what you're saying...
>
> > Oh various pronouncements. Planted stories in news media. 'Official'
> > press columnists. That sort of thing. Hostile words and hostile
> > (drones, special forces, terrorist funding) actions.
>
> I'd like a more specific response as to who was threatening Iran before
> their admission about violating the NPT. Like actual countries -
> statements - that kind of thing. You know....*facts*.
Note they only admitted nuclear power development *not* nuclear bomb
development. That's being driven by economic not military concerns.
The threat to Iran would be once they started running out of oil.
They only have a limited amount of time to build a self-sustaining
industrial infrastructure and that has to be nuclear based.
Plus, once the oil starts running out and the price starts shooting up
they will be well positioned, energy cost-wise, for exports of their
industrial and agricultural products.
It makes sense for Iran to go nuclear just like it makes sense for the
US or any other industrial nation to go nuclear. The oil's going
bye-bye.
>
> (Yes, I know Israel ruminiated on the possibility of taking out some key
> Iranian targets, but that was after Iran's antics came to light.)
And that supports why Iran said they kept it secret.
>
>
> > > > Then watch them very closely - sending the IAEA teams around to any
> > > > area thought suspicious. Give Israel, the only nuclear power in the
> > > > Middle East, a 2 year deadline to sign the NPT and accept IAEA
> > > > inspectors.
> > >
> > > Yeah, I've been waiting for this card to be played. I think anything
> that
> > > requires Israel to admit her nuclear capability is a mistake in the long
> > > run.
> >
> > The 'Strategic Ambiguity' is a bit threadbare don't you think? (I'm
> > intersted in who tested all those different models of war heads for the
> > Israelis. South Africa did some I believe but there must be around 15
> > different kinds in their arsenal.)
> >
> > I don't think it would hurt Israel one bit to admit nukes now.
>
> Of course it would. One thing you don't want your enemy to have is
> information about the size of your arsenal. That's pretty much common sense.
The US and Russia had no problems sharing arsenal sizes. Beyond a
certain number the precise count doesn't matter much.
And I only said admit. They don't have to supply quantities and
locations.
>
> > > Not until she is surrounded by democracies should she give one inch
> > > here.
> >
> > Personally, I think Israel is lucky *not* to have been surrounded by
> > democracies. Democracies would have been so very hard to manage by the
> > US and allies, and anti-Israeli public sentiment in the surrounding
> > countries would have be expressed more forcefully than what we have
> > seen.
>
> I'm not sure how much 'management' the US has been doing in the region, I
> know moonbats like Cole and Raimondo tend to blow that horn a lot, so I'm
> not surprised you're convinced. However democracies dont' need to be
> managed. They tend to be friendly to each other.
No, I think you may be wrong on that one. It's part of your catechism
which you should examine very closely.
>
> > In my opinion, if you want harm to come to Israel then wish for all
> > it's neighbors to become suddenly democratic.
>
> Do you have an opinion that doesn't fly in the face of the last 50 years of
> geopolitical history? Or are you of the opinion that its not the governments
> but the people of the region who want to annihilate Israel? Considering the
> fact that you've never been to the region, and considering the fact that
> information coming out of those countries tends to be tightly controlled,
> I'd wonder how you arrive at that conclusion.
I said it was my opinion. The people of the region seem more
anti-Israeli than the governments of the region are prepared to act.
Once the people become the government...
Count 1
> > their admission about violating the NPT. Like actual countries -
> > statements - that kind of thing. You know....*facts*.
>
> Note they only admitted nuclear power development *not* nuclear bomb
> development. That's being driven by economic not military concerns.
> The threat to Iran would be once they started running out of oil.
> They only have a limited amount of time to build a self-sustaining
> industrial infrastructure and that has to be nuclear based.
>
> Plus, once the oil starts running out and the price starts shooting up
> they will be well positioned, energy cost-wise, for exports of their
> industrial and agricultural products.
>
> It makes sense for Iran to go nuclear just like it makes sense for the
> US or any other industrial nation to go nuclear. The oil's going
> bye-bye.
I'll just take it that you don't know of anyone threatening Iran and has no
reason to need nukes for defence. I've asked twice and you seem to be
answering some other question.
> > (Yes, I know Israel ruminiated on the possibility of taking out some key
> > Iranian targets, but that was after Iran's antics came to light.)
>
> And that supports why Iran said they kept it secret.
The point being Iran had no reason to keep any secrets based on 'threats'.
There were no threats against her before she decided to violate the NPT, and
Israel was merely responding, in a very controlled and measured manner, to
the mullahs call to wipe her off the map
> > > > > Then watch them very closely - sending the IAEA teams around to
any
> > > > > area thought suspicious. Give Israel, the only nuclear power in
the
> > > > > Middle East, a 2 year deadline to sign the NPT and accept IAEA
> > > > > inspectors.
> > > >
> > > > Yeah, I've been waiting for this card to be played. I think anything
> > that
> > > > requires Israel to admit her nuclear capability is a mistake in the
long
> > > > run.
> > >
> > > The 'Strategic Ambiguity' is a bit threadbare don't you think? (I'm
> > > intersted in who tested all those different models of war heads for
the
> > > Israelis. South Africa did some I believe but there must be around 15
> > > different kinds in their arsenal.)
> > >
> > > I don't think it would hurt Israel one bit to admit nukes now.
> >
> > Of course it would. One thing you don't want your enemy to have is
> > information about the size of your arsenal. That's pretty much common
sense.
>
> The US and Russia had no problems sharing arsenal sizes. Beyond a
> certain number the precise count doesn't matter much.
>
> And I only said admit. They don't have to supply quantities and
> locations.
I would imagine the IAEA inspectors you want them to allow would do a basic
accounting.
>
> >
> > > > Not until she is surrounded by democracies should she give one inch
> > > > here.
> > >
> > > Personally, I think Israel is lucky *not* to have been surrounded by
> > > democracies. Democracies would have been so very hard to manage by
the
> > > US and allies, and anti-Israeli public sentiment in the surrounding
> > > countries would have be expressed more forcefully than what we have
> > > seen.
> >
> > I'm not sure how much 'management' the US has been doing in the region,
I
> > know moonbats like Cole and Raimondo tend to blow that horn a lot, so
I'm
> > not surprised you're convinced. However democracies dont' need to be
> > managed. They tend to be friendly to each other.
>
> No, I think you may be wrong on that one.
No, I'm afraid I'm not. And I'm fairly certain even you have heard of the
bipolar world that existed pre 1989. The point however stands, democracies
don't tend to need to be managed.
> > > In my opinion, if you want harm to come to Israel then wish for all
> > > it's neighbors to become suddenly democratic.
> >
> > Do you have an opinion that doesn't fly in the face of the last 50 years
of
> > geopolitical history? Or are you of the opinion that its not the
governments
> > but the people of the region who want to annihilate Israel? Considering
the
> > fact that you've never been to the region, and considering the fact that
> > information coming out of those countries tends to be tightly
controlled,
> > I'd wonder how you arrive at that conclusion.
>
> I said it was my opinion. The people of the region seem more
> anti-Israeli than the governments of the region are prepared to act.
> Once the people become the government...
So you think its the people. I'm more skeptical. I think its the
governments. I imagine the average saudi or Iranian couldn't give two shits
about the Palestinians or even israel, but their governments like to use
those topics to whip up domestic support and engineer some credibility.
I think that's one of the reasons Iran has been ratcheing up the belligerent
rhetoric towards Israel lately. Caught lying they are now trying to gain
some domestic legitimacy by saying its all for Israel. Then they play a few
tv shows about how Jews harvest palestinian organs, and show some drama
based on the protocols, and *voila*, instant boogeyman.
kuff (Isaac Adams)
Count 1 wrote:
> > > I'd like a more specific response as to who was threatening Iran before
> > > their admission about violating the NPT. Like actual countries -
> > > statements - that kind of thing. You know....*facts*.
> >
> > Note they only admitted nuclear power development *not* nuclear bomb
> > development. That's being driven by economic not military concerns.
> > The threat to Iran would be once they started running out of oil.
> > They only have a limited amount of time to build a self-sustaining
> > industrial infrastructure and that has to be nuclear based.
> >
> > Plus, once the oil starts running out and the price starts shooting up
> > they will be well positioned, energy cost-wise, for exports of their
> > industrial and agricultural products.
> >
> > It makes sense for Iran to go nuclear just like it makes sense for the
> > US or any other industrial nation to go nuclear. The oil's going
> > bye-bye.
>
> I'll just take it that you don't know of anyone threatening Iran and has no
> reason to need nukes for defence. I've asked twice and you seem to be
> answering some other question.
>
I'm answering the only question you could rationally be asking - why
would Iran hide a nuclear power program? There's no evidence of a
nuke program.
>
>
> > > (Yes, I know Israel ruminiated on the possibility of taking out some key
> > > Iranian targets, but that was after Iran's antics came to light.)
> >
> > And that supports why Iran said they kept it secret.
>
> The point being Iran had no reason to keep any secrets based on 'threats'.
> There were no threats against her before she decided to violate the NPT, and
> Israel was merely responding, in a very controlled and measured manner, to
> the mullahs call to wipe her off the map
Israel responded to the Iranian admission of a nuclear power program by
generating noises about taking it out. The Iranians were correct about
the 'threat' they faced in having a public nuclear power program.
Well, yes - probably. At least of the production facilities. But
there are two things here. (1) Admit to nukes and (2) sign on to the
NPT. All I'm talking about in this bit is (1).
And if these countries become democratic what sort of topics would be
used to garner domestic (voters) support?
>
> I think that's one of the reasons Iran has been ratcheing up the belligerent
> rhetoric towards Israel lately.
Ratcheting up? They have? You're going to have to demonstrate that.
They've seemed quiet to me.
> Caught lying they are now trying to gain
> some domestic legitimacy by saying its all for Israel.
The 'threat' of a public nuclear power program comes from both Israel
and the US. And they were correct in their assessement of that.
> Then they play a few
> tv shows about how Jews harvest palestinian organs, and show some drama
> based on the protocols, and *voila*, instant boogeyman.
Uh huh. Or throwing babies out of incubators. (Oh - wrong bogeyman).
Meanwhile the Iranians are watching 'Friends' on their satellite
dishes...
friend
> Where's the Iraqi WMD?
In that Texan Ass's belly? No?
;-)