Is Non-Contradictory Identification contingent upon another postulate besides itself?
Immortalist
> Non-contradictory identification; you cant
> deny something exists without first accepting
> that thing exists to deny, i.e. without contradiction.
>
> Therefore existence is an axiomatic principle of
> your knowledge, a fact of reality and it doesn't
> matter what we may call it.
>
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Objectivist_epistemology
> [see "concept formation"]
>
Your trying to create a foundationalist philosophy based on a single,
undeniable truth which you seem to imply is fixed and assured.
Your first principle that "we cannot deny that something exists
without first accepting that thing exists to deny, i.e. without
contradiction" depends upon a logical structure which is really a
second postulate.
Your unjustifiably claiming that the capacity to judge correctly, to
distinguish the true from the false and to determine what is
contradictory or non-contradictory cannot be mistaken or has no chance
for error, and this non-contradictory identification remains
theoretical, but theoretically it is the best theory, that is all.
A revised version that is theoretically and inductively [tight] might
go, "IF the capacity to judge correctly, to distinguish the true from
the false and to determine what is contradictory or non-contradictory,
is completely certain and cannot be mistaken, THEN it is the case that
we cannot deny that something exists without first accepting that
thing exists to deny, i.e. without contradiction.
Adapted from Descartes' -circle-game- [out of print]
http://groups.google.com/group/alt.philosophy/msg/439d949cee00a1a9
Michael Gordge
> Your trying to create a foundationalist philosophy based on a single,
> undeniable truth which you seem to imply is fixed and assured.
I am not trying to create anything Mort, I am saying, "non-
contradictory identification" is the standard for man to determine the
truth / reality from lies / fiction.
Indeed Mort, try and deny that standard is the standard of the truth,
without accepting it (non-contradictory identification) as the
standard to do so, i.e. without contradicting yourself.
> Your first principle that "we cannot deny that something exists
> without first accepting that thing exists to deny, i.e. without
> contradiction" depends upon a logical structure which is really a
> second postulate.
>
> Your unjustifiably claiming that the capacity to judge correctly,
No no no, Mortal, that is not what I am saying, I am saying some thing
much much much more simple than that, I am saying that, you, that's
you, can not call a cat a dog, thats if if if you need other human
beings to understand what the fuck you are on about.
Or
You can not call a "1 meter off the ground" the same thing as "10,000
meters off the ground" before you make a decision to jump from a plane
without a parachute, why?
Well, simple really, thats because,,,,, "1 meter off the ground" means
you will most likely survive, "10,000 meters off the ground" means you
will most likely die
Michael Gordge
Immortalist
> On Sep 2, 2:49 pm, Immortalist <reanimater_2...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> > Your trying to create a foundationalist philosophy based on a single,
> > undeniable truth which you seem to imply is fixed and assured.
>
> I am not trying to create anything Mort, I am saying, "non-
> contradictory identification" is the standard for man to determine the
> truth / reality from lies / fiction.
>
The your saying it is a custom or just an agreement to do things a
certain way as opposed to some other ways? You say "X" is the standard
for "Y" but what justifies "X" ?
> Indeed Mort, try and deny that standard is the standard of the truth,
> without accepting it (non-contradictory identification) as the
> standard to do so, i.e. without contradicting yourself.
>
> > Your first principle that "we cannot deny that something exists
> > without first accepting that thing exists to deny, i.e. without
> > contradiction" depends upon a logical structure which is really a
> > second postulate.
>
> > Your unjustifiably claiming that the capacity to judge correctly,
>
> No no no, Mortal, that is not what I am saying, I am saying some thing
> much much much more simple than that, I am saying that, you, that's
> you, can not call a cat a dog, thats if if if you need other human
> beings to understand what the fuck you are on about.
>
Your trying to shift the burden of proof and at the same time
insisting that we "beg the question"
You have provided a principle or postulate but you refuse to justify
it with any other proposal than that we need these things to
communicate about proposals. The burden is on you brother to show what
meta-principle your using to justify this foundational approach of
yours.
II. The Problem of Meta-Justification.
...the problem of determining how we can justify standards of
justification without ultimately begging the question. To help
elaborate this rough account, I invite the reader to consider two
closely related questions:
(1) For some standard of justification, what is it in virtue of which
belief in it is, or could be, justified?
(2) For some standard of justification, how can we justify it?
Let us briefly set aside the differences between these two questions
and discuss why we should care about any such question at all. The
same curiosity that properly motivates investigation into first-order
epistemological questions - e.g., "In what circumstances is a visual
belief that p justified?" can and should also motivate investigation
into second-order epistemological questions. If we are well-motivated
in asking what the conditions of justification are, and (acting on our
motivation) we produce a j-standard, then we would appear to be
equally well-motivated in asking how we are justified in believing the
j-standard.
Now consider the difference between the two questions. Question (1)
asks for an account of that in virtue of which belief in a standard is
justified; (2) asks that we justify the standard. Question (1) asks
that justifiers be adduced, or at least that it be shown that they
exist; (2) asks for an act of justification. That the questions are
different is clear, even if it should turn out that they require the
same sort of answer.
Indeed, one might well think that the questions require the same sort
of answer: namely, something that can be converted into an argument
that has a j-standard as its conclusion. I wish to defend this view.
It assumes, in the case of (1), that
(1a) Whatever it is in virtue of which belief in a standard of
justification is (or could be) justified, can be properly interpreted
and evaluated as an argument.
and in the case of (2), that
(2a) The act of justifying a standard of justification is, or may be
interpreted and evaluated as, giving an argument.
In what follows, I will examine the merits of (1a) and (2a).
To begin with (1a). If one does adduce the justifiers of a belief in a
standard, then regardless of whether they are presented as premises of
an argument in which the standard is the conclusion, nonetheless the
justifiers-cum-standard - the standard's meta-justification - may be
treated as an argument. Here is why. If the same relation of support
that must hold between the premises and conclusion of a good argument
does not hold between the adduced justifiers and the standard, then
regardless of how the latter is presented, the justification will be
rejected. The standards of successful support are the same as the
standards of good argumentation. So other philosophers may interpret
and evaluate the justifiers (regardless of how they are billed) as
premises of a meta-justificatory argument.
Admittedly, evaluating a proposed meta-justification in this way might
require considerable and difficult interpretation. If, for example,
someone insists that it is coherence with a doxastic system that
justifies a coherentist j-standard, it is not immediately obvious how
this coherence-cum-standard is to be formulated as an argument. And
unfortunately when philosophers do take up the Problem of Meta-
Justification their attempts are often rather sketchy. But in order to
evaluate their claims that their standards are successfully justified,
such an argument - or some sort of story that can be converted into an
argument - must be spelled out in sufficient detail. The coherentist
should not expect us to accept on his say-so, or with only sketchy
generalities, that his standard is successfully supported by the
coherence of his (or some) doxastic system.
It is now common for externalists to insist - what is admittedly not
obvious at first glance - that in some circumstances it is possible to
be justified in a belief even when one cannot say what the
justification is (what the justifiers are). Perhaps first-person
appearance beliefs (e.g., "It seems to me I am seeing something orange
and round") have such a justification. In such cases it is possible,
perhaps, to adduce the justifiers for the belief, but obviously one
should not attribute an explicit argument to the believer. So
externalists might on these grounds disagree that a meta-justification
ought be interpreted, and evaluated, as an argument. Our externalist
might say that it is possible to be meta-justified in believing a
standard, without being able to say what the justification is.[3]
As powerful as this basic externalist insight is for solving other
problems in epistemology, it is of little help here. Suppose I advance
(for example) a reliabilist j-standard, and when I am asked, "What
justifies you in believing that?" I reply, "The fact that my belief in
this standard is the result of a reliable process." Suppose, however
plausible that might be, that in the next breath I insist that I need
not be aware of these justifiers, and that hence they are not part of
an argument. We scarcely know how to reply to such a move. Are we to
evaluate whether the alleged meta-justification succeeds in supporting
the standard (because it is presented as doing so), or aren't we
(because it is denied that it constitutes an argument)? At any rate,
until the meta-justification is actually spelled out in such a way as
can be construed as an argument, we shall be unable to determine
whether it actually does support the standard.[4] So, for all I have
said so far, the reliabilist could be correct that his standard is
meta-justified; but until he specifies what the meta-justification is,
he hasn't done anything interesting philosophically.
Perhaps someone might try to bypass these concerns by arming himself
with an existence proof: he can show that a meta-justification for a
standard exists, even if he cannot say what it is. His proof is not an
argument for the standard (and is not, thus, itself a meta-
justification); it is, rather, an argument that a meta-justification
exists.
Notice, however, that this does not contradict (1a), which says that a
standard's justification can properly be expressed and evaluated as an
argument. Indeed, the existence proof imagined here does not answer
the original question (1): what is it in virtue of which belief in the
standard is, or could be, justified? Simply to be told that the meta-
justification exists does not satisfy our curiosity about what it is.
Indeed it would only increase that very curiosity by showing that
there is a meta-justification to be formulated. After all, we are
probably not seriously in doubt about the meta-justifiability of some
basic standards; what piques our curiosity is precisely how their meta-
justification works.
Next consider (2a), according to which the act of justifying a
standard is, or may be interpreted and evaluated as, giving an
argument. This is not always true, at least according to the way that
`justify' has been used by some philosophers. In his classic essay "De
Principiis Non Disputandum...?",[5] Herbert Feigl distinguishes
between two senses of `justification': validation and vindication .
The Problem of Meta-Justification can be neatly solved, if we are
willing to justify standards in the sense of vindicating them;
validating standards might require arguments for them, but vindication
does not.[6] Let us see what merit there is to this move.
As far as I can make out, for Feigl, to validate is to give a good
argument, while to vindicate is to offer a kind of "`pragmatic' or
`instrumental' justification"[7] according to which it is shown that
the adoption of the principle (up for vindication ) is the best means
to attaining some desired end. Whether a j-standard is successfully
vindicated, then, depends on what end it is taken to serve, and on how
well it serves that end.
A dilemma may be used to show that an argument (or something that can
properly be regarded as an argument) will be required in any
justification of the sort that satisfies a typical epistemologist's
curiosity about the PMJ. Assume for both horns of the dilemma that
someone advances a j-standard and then attempts to justify it by
vindicating it.
Suppose, on the one hand, that the end that the standard is supposed
to serve is a truth-linked quality; in other words, the end in
question is truth, probable truth, or some epistemic quality that is
supposed to secure one of these. If this is the end to which the
vindication is directed, there is no substantial difference between
vindicating and arguing. For the principle to be vindicated in this
sense is simply to show that adopting the principle is an excellent
means to gaining a true, or a probably true, belief. The vindication
may then be evaluated in just the way that an argument is evaluated.
Here it might be objected that, notwithstanding the fact that the
vindication may be evaluated as an argument, nonetheless the
vindication is not itself, and is not intended as, any manner of
argumentative support. But it does not matter how this sort of
vindication is intended. It succeeds only if it can in fact serve as
argumentative support for the standard. Correspondingly, the extent to
which it fails to offer argumentative support for the standard is
precisely the extent to which it fails as this sort of vindication.
Suppose, on the other hand, that the end that the standard is supposed
to serve is not a truth-linked quality - for example, the end might be
to secure as much pleasure for the believer as possible. In that case,
the vindication of the standard, no matter how successful, will not
satisfy a typical philosopher's natural desire to justify the
standard. Evidently, when we ask how we might justify a standard of
justification, we want to be told something other than that the
standard will give us pleasure. That might be nice to know but it is
irrelevant to what we were asking about. In short, we are seeking an
epistemic justification, which excludes some kinds of vindication.
Hence, if someone advances a vindication of a belief in a j-standard,
then either the vindication may be treated as an argument, or else it
is not the sort of thing that we asked for, that will satisfy our
curiosity.
The considerations of the last few pages are intended to support the
claim that, however exactly the question is formulated, when we get
curious about the justification of standards, it is only good
arguments for those standards (or what may serve as such arguments)
that will satisfy us.
Some more prosaic considerations can help convince us of the same
thing. Epistemologists habitually advance standards of justification,
and other epistemologists habitually call them to task for it, not
only stating specific objections to those standards, but also asking
for and evaluating positive arguments for the standards. And so,
however all the talk about justification, justifying, validation, and
vindication might be, we do as a matter of course require arguments
for the standards we advance. To say this is not to argue that such
behavior is rational - but it does, at least, lay a heavy burden of
proof squarely on whomever wishes to deny that some particular j-
standard does not require argument in order to be justifiably held or
propounded. We certainly do not, for example, let reliabilists off the
hook simply because, according to their theory, they might be
justified in accepting their theory without knowing that that are so
justified.
Philosophers are not, of course, the only people who accept j-
standards. At the very least, scientists, lawyers, and other
intellectuals accept various standards as well. And indeed such people
could be justified in believing their standards without being able to
produce anything like a rigorous argument for those standards.[8] Why
not philosophers as well, then? It is the unique, special task of
philosophy to face such problems as the PMJ. For a philosopher to
renounce such a problem without giving it any serious consideration is
to propose a radically different conception of what it means to be a
philosopher.[9] So naturally, in our capacities as philosophers at
least, we do not want to know simply whether we are justified in
accepting our standards of justification but whether we can support
those standards with good arguments, or what the meta-justification
is.
So henceforth I will treat meta-justifications as arguments for j-
standards.
One more point of discussion about the PMJ is apropos here. We might
well imagine someone offering the following argument:
The PMJ is the problem that, when we try to go very deep justifying
our j-standards, there is a circularity problem involved in the
attempt: any belief in a j-standard that is justified will be
justified in accordance with a j-standard. Now, ordinarily, in order
to be justified in holding a belief (including a belief in a j-
standard), one doesn't have to justify all the supporting beliefs all
the way down; one can just take a lot of beliefs (including beliefs in
standards) for granted. So on the ordinary sense of `justification',
there is no problem about meta-justification. On a stricter (indeed,
impossibly strict ) sense, which requires that one justify all the
justifiers for any belief in order for the belief to be justified, it
is obvious that one can't fulfill the requirement, since one will
obviously have to take some j-standard for granted. That just means we
can reject the stricter sense of justification, leaving us with the
ordinary sense. In that case, we can indeed just take some standards
for granted. So there's no real problem here; why go on talking about
it, then?
This is, in fact, rather similar to my own approach to the PMJ. But I
maintain that there is a real problem, or at least, that there is a
lot of real work to be done in explaining why it is not such a problem
after all.
Anyone who offers the above sort of argument has a lot of questions to
answer. In what sense would a meta-justification involve us in
circularity? If it is not simply premise circularity, then is there
really anything wrong with it? (If there's nothing wrong with the
circularity in question, perhaps we can provide a meta-justification
in the stricter sense of `justification'.) Perhaps according to an
ordinary sense of `justification', we can take a lot of beliefs for
granted and still be justified in holding those beliefs - but what
sorts of beliefs can be taken for granted? Those are just a few of the
more obvious questions that come to mind; as we will see, there are
many others that come up in an in-depth exploration of the PMJ.
So if the conclusion we will arrive at in Chapter 4 - that we will
simply have to take some standards for granted already appears
obvious, one should bear in mind that simply saying this does not
constitute an adequate discussion of the problem, nor does it address
the various bold attempts philosophers have made to solve it head-on.
It might turn out that the PMJ, like many philosophical problems, is
indeed another pseudo-problem; but in order to be fully justified in
making that claim, an in-depth exploration of the problem is needed.
forgot the source--http://
Michael Gordge
> The your saying it is a custom or just an agreement to do things a
> certain way as opposed to some other ways?
Nope, I am saying nothing more simple than, you cant deny non-
contradiction as your standard of reality, without embracing it to
deny it.
You're not a custom Mortal and you can only be in agreement with
yourself when it comes to constructing YOUR knowledge, I cant have
your knowledge for you Mortal, you are human, now start thinking like
one.
MG
Immortalist
> On Sep 5, 10:55 am, Immortalist <reanimater_2...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> > The your saying it is a custom or just an agreement to do things a
> > certain way as opposed to some other ways?
>
> Nope, I am saying nothing more simple than, you cant deny non-
> contradiction as your standard of reality, without embracing it to
> deny it.
>
If I agree to the customs and constructed rules of logic then I play
by the game of logic. This doesn't mean that my acceptance of these
customs makes them completely certain and without error.
You believe and accept the custom of logic that is all. By practicing
the customs of logic and claiming that this justifies the truth or
certainty of these customs is "begging the question" by simply re-
stating in the conclusion of your argument something that was in one
of your premises. There are other customs of logic like the exposition
of circular reasoning.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Begging_the_question
> You're not a custom Mortal and you can only be in agreement with
> yourself when it comes to constructing YOUR knowledge, I cant have
> your knowledge for you Mortal, you are human, now start thinking like
> one.
>
I didn't claim that I was a custom. When you say "you can only be...
when" you are merely describing the agreed upon customs of some
humans. That does not make it certain. What is highly coherent is that
if you practice those customs your conclusion would apply to
practicing those customs.
The Straw Man fallacy is committed when a person simply ignores a
person's actual position and substitutes a distorted, exaggerated or
misrepresented version of that position. This sort of "reasoning" is
fallacious because attacking a distorted version of a position simply
does not constitute an attack on the position itself. One might as
well expect an attack on a poor drawing of a person to hurt the
person.
http://www.nizkor.org/features/fallacies/straw-man.html
> MG
Michael Gordge
> If I agree to the customs and constructed rules of logic then I play
> by the game of logic. This doesn't mean that my acceptance of these
> customs makes them completely certain and without error.
Doesn't it?
MG
Don Stockbauer
So, you think you're Immortal by calling others Mortal, Gordge?? Sad,
because you die, you rot, your "soul" was nothing more than your body
in operation, you become dust in the wind, "Immortal" Gordge. Live
with that until you die.
Michael Gordge
> On Sep 6, 2:58 am, Michael Gordge <mikegor...@xtra.co.nz> wrote:
>
> > On Sep 5, 10:55 am, Immortalist <reanimater_2...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> > > The your saying it is a custom or just an agreement to do things a
> > > certain way as opposed to some other ways?
>
> > Nope, I am saying nothing more simple than, you cant deny non-
> > contradiction as your standard of reality, without embracing it to
> > deny it.
>
> > You're not a custom Mortal and you can only be in agreement with
> > yourself when it comes to constructing YOUR knowledge, I cant have
> > your knowledge for you Mortal, you are human, now start thinking like
> > one.
>
> > MG
>
> So, you think you're Immortal
Shucks no, thats my point, wake up.
MG
Immortalist
If I agree to go about reasoning with those rules of logic, that act
of agreement doesn't make it logically impossibile that these rules
are the true rules or the correct rules for describing reality. By
simply agreeing to accept what seems to be the best way to infer isn't
deductive or complete justification for those customs being true, it
merely is a belief accepted on faith.
> MG
Immortalist
But I am the Immortal one here-a-bouts man, not you.
> MG-
Michael Gordge
>
> - Show quoted text -
More of your very own beliefs about other beliefs which are only based
upon your belief of other beliefs Mortal and even then its only a
belief that you only have beliefs based on other beliefs? Weird thing
is you speak with so much authority that your beliefs are more than
just beliefs.
Why dont you start each and every sentence with *I only believe*
Mortal?
MG
Michael Gordge
> But I am the Immortal one here-a-bouts man, not
> you.
More of your sense-less beliefs Mortal?
MG
Immortalist
Why because I was talking about your justification for accepting your
beliefs about the rules and customs of logic, specifically
contradiction. You seemed to claim that you had some sort of
justification for this acceptance of your belief about the matter that
could not be mistaken. My request is not about belief-belief-belief
but about belief-acceptance-justification. How can you be completely
certain of the truth of the beliefs you have accepted about logic?
mfitzg...@nc.rr.com
formula, I am merely expressing a belief based on faith?
mfitzg...@nc.rr.com
If you choose to appear uncertain about everything (which you
obviously are NOT), why then seek justification from the logic-bearing
fools and their crazy beliefs in empiricism, etc?
I'll tell you why.
Because when you can state that even LOGIC can never be fully
validated, then there will be room for your own hopelessly
unjustifiable beliefs. Since you cannot validate your own theories,
you destroy anyone's ability to validate anything...
But life goes on, and so does validation, all around the world. Some
(like me) are correct, and others (like you) are mystical.
Michael Gordge
> Why because I was talking about your justification for accepting your
> beliefs about the rules and customs of logic, specifically
> contradiction.
Mortal (a) why dont you TEST my claims, why dont you see if what I am
saying is a statement of fact about or of reality or whether it is
what you claim and is just a "belief" I have, e.g. here, test this,
step out in front of a speeding bus, why? because I am stating that
not very nice things will happen to you (b) logic is the art or
process of NON-contradictory identification and integration (c) see if
you can find a contradiction in my statement of fact that stepping out
in front of a speeding bus is a dumb fucking idea.
When you're done with that, if you can of course, test this theory of
reality, sulphuric acid is deadly when not treated as such, now dunk
your entire and bare head in a bucket of 100% pure sulphuric acid for
10 seconds will do the trick.
If you survive both, then (a) I'll start calling you god, (b) jump
into a space ship and fuck off into space and when up there go for a
walk in what man calls the vacuum of space wearing nothing but your
birthday suit and see if you pop.
Michael Gordge
Michael Gordge
> So then, by simply agreeing that 2+2=4 without actually testing the
> formula, I am merely expressing a belief based on faith?
Yes, thats what the twit is saying.
MG
Dis
Excuse me, but can I interupt this little episode of the Walton's and
ask where's the best place, text or whatever to learn about an
Objectivist Philosophy of Mind, if there is such?
Thanks - - - - I need an antidote to a nasty dose of Wittgenstein.
Michael Gordge
Its not a recognized *Objectivist* site but its pretty good.
http://www.importanceofphilosophy.com/
A philosophic system is an integrated view of existence. As a human
being, you have no choice about the fact that you need a philosophy.
Your only choice is whether you define your philosophy by a conscious,
rational, disciplined process of thought and scrupulously logical
deliberation -- or let your subconscious accumulate a junk heap of
unwarranted conclusions, false generalizations, undefined
contradictions, undigested slogans, unidentified wishes, doubts and
fears, thrown together by chance, but integrated by your subconscious
into a kind of mongrel philosophy and fused into a single, solid
weight: self-doubt, like a ball and chain in the place where your
mind's wings should have grown. Ayn Rand, Philosophy: Who Needs It
MG
Dis
> Its not a recognized *Objectivist* site but its pretty good.
>
> http://www.importanceofphilosophy.com/
>
> A philosophic system is an integrated view of existence. As a human
> being, you have no choice about the fact that you need a philosophy.
> Your only choice is whether you define your philosophy by a conscious,
> rational, disciplined process of thought and scrupulously logical
> deliberation -- or let your subconscious accumulate a junk heap of
> unwarranted conclusions, false generalizations, undefined
> contradictions, undigested slogans, unidentified wishes, doubts and
> fears, thrown together by chance, but integrated by your subconscious
> into a kind of mongrel philosophy and fused into a single, solid
> weight: self-doubt, like a ball and chain in the place where your
> mind's wings should have grown. Ayn Rand, Philosophy: Who Needs It
>
> MG
Thank you for the quote from Rand, I am familiar with most of her
writing and some of the commentaries upon her work . What I'm
searching for is any in-depth Objectivist philosophy of mind. I
imagine that someone must have constructed such on the firm
foundations of Rand's epistemology. If they haven't I may be forced to
fill the gap. Nothing like a good dose of extravagant ambition, is
there?
Thank you for the link.... my search continues.
Dis
Michael Gordge
> What I'm
> searching for is any in-depth Objectivist
> philosophy of mind.
Oh silly me, you're taking the piss.
MG
Dis
No, I'm serious. Am I to presume, from your opaque and humourless
remark, you consider an in-depth Objectivist Philosophy of Mind an
oxymoron? If so, I see no valid reason for continuing discussion of
the matter with you.
There may however be others reading this holding different views who
could provide some direction/references.
Michael Gordge
> On Sep 10, 9:21 pm, Michael Gordge <mikegor...@xtra.co.nz> wrote:
>
> > On Sep 10, 7:02 pm, Dis <picklebe...@activ8.net.au> wrote:
>
> > > What I'm
> > > searching for is any in-depth Objectivist
> > > philosophy of mind.
>
> > Oh silly me, you're taking the piss.
>
> > MG
>
> No, I'm serious.
By what standard do you distinguish the serious from the humorous?
MG
Dis
> By what standard do you distinguish the serious from the humorous?
Not yours.
Michael Gordge
I thought you said you wanted to be serious, me too, so why dont you
want to take the question seriously?
Define the standard you use to determine the serious from the
humorous?
Michael Gordge
Dis
>>
> I thought you said you wanted to be serious, me too, so why dont you
> want to take the question seriously?
>
address you in the manner you expect. I responded to your glibness
with like. End of story.
Immortalist
You have strong faith brother, you almost sound religious about this
minor problem of certainty about our beliefs and acceptance of customs
dealing with logic. What is the problem if our acceptance of logic is
not completely justifiable, I mean does your philosophy crumble apart
while good science, based upon theoretical knowledge, continues to go
on discovering things that advance humankind?
Why must we just accept that our beliefs about logic are completely
justifiable when it works just fine theoretically? Isn't the best
theory of logic about how we can explain things based upon
observations, explainations and observations?
In science, a theory is an explanation. Evolution is a theory, just
like gravitation. Gravity is not a law of nature but an explaination
of observations. If you drop something, it's going to fall. That's an
observation: unsupported things fall. But you explain that observation
with the theory of gravity, which is that the mass of what whatever it
is you dropped, a pencil or a pen or something, is attracted by the
mass...it's really a theory of gravity? But remember, a theory is an
explanation.
In philosophy epistemology is called the theory of knowledge.
Immortalist
> On Sep 9, 1:41 pm, Immortalist <reanimater_2...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> > Why because I was talking about your justification for accepting your
> > beliefs about the rules and customs of logic, specifically
> > contradiction.
>
> Mortal (a) why dont you TEST my claims, why dont you see if what I am
> saying is a statement of fact about or of reality or whether it is
> what you claim and is just a "belief" I have, e.g. here, test this,
Trying to shift the burden of proog again, trying to get me to prove
what your propose?
> step out in front of a speeding bus, why? because I am stating that
> not very nice things will happen to you (b) logic is the art or
> process of NON-contradictory identification and integration (c) see if
> you can find a contradiction in my statement of fact that stepping out
> in front of a speeding bus is a dumb fucking idea.
>
This sounds more like the theory of what might happen in some cases.
Doesn't sound much like the kind of certainty about the acceptance of
logic you were looking for.
> When you're done with that, if you can of course, test this theory of
> reality, sulphuric acid is deadly when not treated as such, now dunk
> your entire and bare head in a bucket of 100% pure sulphuric acid for
> 10 seconds will do the trick.
>
This sounds like a distraction fallacy, some appeal to ridicule or
sarcasm to take the topic spotlight off your weak position about the
justification of your beliefs about logic.
> If you survive both, then (a) I'll start calling you god, (b) jump
> into a space ship and fuck off into space and when up there go for a
> walk in what man calls the vacuum of space wearing nothing but your
> birthday suit and see if you pop.
>
Definitely an appeal to humor.Didn't anyone ever tell you that making
fun of an opponent's claims without really damaging these claims
doesn't constitute good logic?
http://wiki.cotch.net/index.php/Appeal_to_Humor
> Michael Gordge
Immortalist
Actually it was an off-topic response to an off-topic post, in good
humor.
Michael Gordge
>
> Trying to shift the burden of proog again, trying to get me to prove
> what your propose?
Nope, your claim is that I may be wrong, so I am challenging you to
test what I say, its that simple. Dunk your head in a bucket of
sulphuric acid and test my idea that that would be a stupid thing to
do.
>
> This sounds more like the theory of what might happen in some cases.
Does it? so test it.
> Doesn't sound much like the kind of certainty about the acceptance of
> logic you were looking for.
Does't it? so test it and see, I dare you to.
MG
Michael Gordge
Your response is not showing Dis, I thought you wanted to understand
something about objective ideas from subjective ideas.
MG
Immortalist
If you believe that you don't need justification for accepting your
beliefs about what will happen, in those cases, why should a test be
needed?
Michael Gordge
>
> - Show quoted text -
Because YOU claim its just a theory, whereas I am saying it is a fact
of sensory reality to state that, if you try and float around in what
man calls *the vacuum of space* without being in a specially designed
and constructed spacecraft or in a specially designed and constructed
space suit then you will pop.
Go on have a crack at it Mortal, have a crack at seeeing how fucking
dangerous, what you claim is only a "theory", in reality is.
MG
Michael Gordge
> Evolution is a theory, just
> like gravitation.
Evolution HAS a theory.
Evolution and gravitation are only words, they are symbols in the aid
of knowledge Mortal.
Specifically, they are called concepts, but still a symbol, the
concept (symbol) is the *trigger-word* which ignites an abstraction,
ignites a mental picture inside your mind of, in the case of
evolution, you can picture in your mind, through your experiences and
observations of sensory evidence, "living entities changing gradually
over time to meet the conditions required for its survival in a
changing environment".
Soooo you seeee evolution is not a theory, its a concept, therefore it
has a theory.
Michael Gordge
Immortalist
> On Sep 11, 3:34 pm, Immortalist <reanimater_2...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> > Evolution is a theory, just
> > like gravitation.
>
> Evolution HAS a theory.
>
Evolution is a theory based upon observations and explainations about
percieved events. Words and concepts are theories also.
1. I see an apple in front of me and I have memories that when I see
an apple in front of me that it is reliable information since when I
bite into them they usually tasted like apples, but this doesn't
eliminate the possibility that I was dreaming these events.
2. When I see water far away it is sometimes water and other times an
opptical illusion.
(1) is much more reliable than (2) though both could be mistaken.
Hence scientific procedures make more accurate predictions like (1)
but remain theoretical and uncertain.
Immortalist
There you go again trying to get me to prove what you claim. Didn't
anyone tell you that in good debate that is not alloed? I do claim it
is theoretical but based upon your concession by neglect. Surely you
have the competence to explain why you accept these inductively
probable outcomes as fact and having already happened. Those examples
are based upon what might happen and are surely not deductively
necessary as you try to make it seem. It is not part of the definition
of if X the Y that X is certain, you need external information to that
not contained in the hypothetical.
(Deductive Reasoning):
Socrates is a Man
All Men are mortal
Therefore, Socrates is Mortal
(Inductive Reasoning):
Every day the sun has risen
The sun rose yesterday
The sun rose the day before that
The sun rose the day before that, etc.
Therefore, the sun will rise tommorow.
Hume's problem is very simple, he asks why we should have the right to
believe conclusions that we arrive at through inductive logic. He
claims that nothing can be proved in an accurate and undenaible way
through induction, and therefore he claims that we have no reason for
beliving that the sun will rise tommorow, or that radioactive dating
technics will absolutely hold tommorow, etc.
By introducing assumptions we go beyond the given evidence our
experience affords: generally what we assume as cause is not fully or
not at all given in experience, and neither are many of the predicted
effects we deduce from these assumptions.
No observation or experiment, however extended, can give more than a
finite number of repetitions; therefore, the statement of a law - B
depends on A - always transcends experience. Yet this kind of
statement is made everywhere and all the time, and sometimes from
scanty material. It is impossible to justify a law by observation or
experiment, since it transcends experience.
http://www.maartensz.org/logic/Induction/induct0.html
Matters of Fact
Since genuine information rests upon our belief in matters of fact,
Hume was particularly concerned to explain their origin. Such beliefs
can reach beyond the content of present sense-impressions and memory,
Hume held, only by appealing to presumed connections of cause and
effect. But since each idea is distinct and separable from every
other, there is no self-evident relation; these connections can only
be derived from our experience of similar cases. So the crucial
question in epistemology is to ask exactly how it is possible for us
to learn from experience. (Enquiry IV ii)
Here, Hume supposed, the most obvious point is a negative one: causal
reasoning can never be justified rationally. In order to learn, we
must suppose that our past experiences bear some relevance to present
and future cases. But although we do indeed believe that the future
will be like the past, the truth of that belief is not self-evident.
In fact, it is always possible for nature to change, so inferences
from past to future are never rationally certain. Thus, on Hume's
view, all beliefs in matters of fact are fundamentally non-rational.
(Enquiry V i)
Consider Hume's favorite example: our belief that the sun will rise
tomorrow. Clearly, this is a matter of fact; it rests on our
conviction that each sunrise is an effect caused by the rotation of
the earth. But our belief in that causal relation is based on past
observations, and our confidence that it will continue tomorrow cannot
be justified by reference to the past. So we have no rational basis
for believing that the sun will rise tomorrow. Yet we do believe it!
Belief as a Habit
Skepticism quite properly forbids us to speculate beyond the content
of our present experience and memory, yet we find it entirely natural
to believe much more than that. Hume held that these unjustifiable
beliefs can be explained by reference to custom or habit. That's how
we learn from experience. When I observe the constant conjunction of
events in my experience, I grow accustomed to associating them with
each other. (Enquiry V ii) Although many past cases of sunrise do not
guarantee the future of nature, my experience of them does get me used
to the idea and produces in me an expectation that the sun will rise
again tomorrow. I cannot prove that it will, but I feel that it must.
Remember that the association of ideas is a powerful natural process
in which separate ideas come to be joined together in the mind. Of
course they can be associated with each other by rational means, as
they are in the relations of ideas that constitute mathematical
knowledge. But even where this is possible, Hume argued, reason is a
slow and inefficient guide, while the habits acquired by much
repetition can produce a powerful conviction independently of reason.
Although the truth of "9 × 12 = 108" can be established rationally in
principle, most of us actually learned it by reciting our
multiplication tables. In fact, what we call relative probability is,
on Hume's view, nothing more than a measure of the strength of
conviction produced in us by our experience of regularity.
Our beliefs in matters of fact, then, arise from sentiment or feeling
rather than from reason. For Hume, imagination and belief differ only
in the degree of conviction with which their objects are anticipated.
Although this positive answer may seem disappointing, Hume maintained
that custom or habit is the great guide of life and the foundation of
all natural science.
Necessary Connection
According to Hume, our belief that events are causally related is a
custom or habit acquired by experience: having observed the regularity
with which events of particular sorts occur together, we form the
association of ideas that produces the habit of expecting the effect
whenever we experience the cause. But something is missing from this
account: we also believe that the cause somehow produces the effect.
Even if this belief is unjustifiable, Hume must offer some explanation
for the fact that we do hold it. His technique was to search for the
original impression from which our idea of the necessary connection
between cause and effect is copied. (Enquiry VII)
The idea does not arise from our objective experience of the events
themselves. All we observe is that events of the "cause" type occur
nearby and shortly before events of the "effect" type, and that this
recurs with a regularity that can be described as a "constant
conjunction." Although this pattern of experience does encourage the
formation of our habit of expecting the effect to follow the cause, it
includes no impression of a necessary connection.
Nor do we acquire this impression (as Locke had supposed) from our own
capacity for voluntary motion. Here the objective element of constant
conjunction is rarely experienced, since the actions of our minds and
bodies do not invariably submit to our voluntary control. And even if
volition did always produce the intended movement, Hume argued, that
would yield no notion of the connection between them. So there is no
impression of causal power here, either.
Still, we do have the idea of a necessary connection, and it must come
from somewhere. For a (non-justificatory) explanation, Hume refers us
back to the formation of a custom or habit. Our (non-rational)
expectation that the effect will follow the cause is accompanied by a
strong feeling of conviction, and it is the impression of this feeling
that is copied by our concept of a necessary connection between cause
and effect. The force of causal necessity is just the strength of our
sentiment in anticipating efficacious outcomes.
http://www.philosophypages.com/hy/4t.htm
> Go on have a crack at it Mortal, have a crack at seeeing how fucking
> dangerous, what you claim is only a "theory", in reality is.
>
> MG- Hide quoted text -
Michael Gordge
>
> Evolution is a theory...
It is a fact of sensed / observed reality that living entities change
gradually, over time, to meet the conditions required for its
survival, in a changing environment.
And soooooooo to condense all of that information and plus all of the
data observed and learnt by man, about entities changing over time,
man uses the symbol "evolution" - to represent what happens in
reality.
Man invents new "symbols" almost daily and has for thousands of years,
such as evolution i.e. concepts, that saves man lots of friggen words
Mortal helps build new knowledge quicker and conserves his energy for
more important tasks.
> based upon observations and explainations about
> percieved events. Words and concepts are theories also.
No they're not, they're only man made symbols used to condense data
and they have theories to explain them.
And if the origin of the theory is not matter, i.e. can not be sensed,
contains no matter or is not the cause of matter e.g. energy, then its
been invented entirely inside the minds of mystics and Kantians alike
and man has invented the symbol CRAP as the condense version.
The mystics god and the leftist retards "the greater good" spring to
mind as SENSE-LESS ideas, as does the cause of jets being slammed into
sky-scrappers and little boys being fucked in chazzzz'z church, who
but a catholic would name their sprog chazzz?
MG
Michael Gordge
> There you go again trying to get me to prove what
> you claim.
Nope, there you go again inventing theories in your head.
Its YOU who claims that everything YOU say, i.e. ALL of the symbols /
words you use, are all only theories and guess what Mortal?
Not only, in YOUR case, are they all just "theories" they are also
theories which are not based on facts of reality either.
MG
Immortalist
Well if you go back up into this thread you will see that you raised
this symbol thing and you also challenged me to solve some dilemmas.
All along I have been asking how it is that you justify your act of
acceptance of such theories as logic. I ask again how can you be
certain your support for logic could never be mistaken? Further you
seem to be claiming that the idea of contradiction is self-justified
but that clearly begs the question since your using contradiction to
justify contradiction, or is that circular reasoning or both?
Immortalist
> On Sep 13, 3:02 pm, Immortalist <reanimater_2...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
>
>
> > Evolution is a theory...
>
> It is a fact of sensed / observed reality that living entities change
> gradually, over time, to meet the conditions required for its
> survival, in a changing environment.
>
Lets hold it there before you go trotting off into theory land. Do you
mean that "if acceptance of sensed/observed reality and if what is
sensed/observe reality is reality? You have two assumptions there
bundled up to look like one and at the same time self-justified and
hence deductive. Pretty good trick till you look a little closer.
Michael Gordge
> Do you
> mean that "if acceptance of sensed/observed reality and if what is
> sensed/observe reality is reality?
Why are you of all people asking such a question when according to you
you can only theorize what my answer is?
Oh and why are you using so many different symbols and concepts as if
they all mean something different, when according to you, they all
mean the same thing, theory?
Why dont your questions read:
Theory theory theory theory theory theory theory theory theory theory
theory theory theory theory?
Are you seriously expecting people to read your questions as asking
anything but;
Theory theory theory theory theory theory theory theory theory?
MG
Michael Gordge
> Well if you go back up into this thread you will see...
What? You want ME to have a look at something other than a theory?
surely not.
Why are you using so many different symbols and in such a way to read,
as if they all mean something different, when YOU claim they all mean
the same thing? Theory.
Surely you should not be using any other symbol but "theory"?
Why didn't you ask me to have a listen to what was said at the
beginning of the thread?
MG
Immortalist
Well, you are proposing some theory of symbols that theoretically
represent the symbol, which circular. You need to explain your theory
of symbols better since you proposed that they had something to do
with assumptions about your theory of reality. Lest you want to
retract this symbol theory of yours, and concede the point you
attempted to refute with them.
Immortalist
> On Sep 14, 1:00 pm, Immortalist <reanimater_2...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> > Do you
> > mean that "if acceptance of sensed/observed reality and if what is
> > sensed/observe reality is reality?
>
> Why are you of all people asking such a question when according to you
> you can only theorize what my answer is?
>
I am just interested in epistemology, here review my position since
you mention my position;
The Regress Argument (also known as The Problem of Criterion and the
diallelus) is a problem in epistemology and, in general, a problem in
any situation where a statement has to be justified. According to this
argument, any proposition requires a justification. However, any
justification itself requires support, since nothing is true "just
because". This means that any proposition whatsoever can be endlessly
questioned, like a child who asks "why?" over and over again.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Regress_argument
http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=regress+argument
Epistemologists find a number of problems with finding a meta-
justification standard for justifying emperical beliefs. (adapted from
BonJour's 'Basic Antifoundationalist Argument')
http://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/TKno/TKnoHowa.htm
1. Suppose, that there are basic empirical beliefs, that is, emperical
beliefs (a) which are epistemically justified, and (b) whose
justification does not depend on that of any further emperical
beliefs.
2. For a belief to be episemically justified requires that there be a
reason why it is likely to be true.
3. A belief is justified for a person only if he is in cognitive
possession of such a reason.
4. A person is in cognitive possession of such a reason only if he
believes with justification the premises from which it follows that
the belief is likely to be true.
5. The premises of such a justifying argument must include at least
one empirical premise.
6. So, the justification of a supposed basic empirical belief depends
on the justification of at least one other empirical belief,
contradicting 1.
7. So, there can be no basic empirical beliefs.
This seems to eliminate the possibility of emperical justification of
any and all emperical beliefs. But it can lead to this untruthfullness
of human beliefs in three ways which deal with the apparent "regress"
of one belief depending upon another which depends upon another and so
on:
If the regress of emperical justification does not terminate in basic
emperical beliefs, then it must either:
(1) terminate in unjustified beleifs
(2) go on infinitely (without circularity)
(3) circle back upon itself in some way. (begging the question on
steroids)
If there is no way to justify emperical beliefs apart from an appeal
to other justified emperical beliefs, and if an infinite sequence of
distinct justified beliefs is ruled out, then the presumably finite
system of justified emperical beliefs can only be justified from
within, by birtue of the relations of its component beliefs to each
other. Coherence theory is of the variey (3) seemingly circular if
veiwed in an linear fasion, merely indicated by whatever
"property" (or complex of properties) is requisite for the
justification of such a system of beliefs. Degrees of justification
emerge out of the relations of groups of beliefs.
--------------------------
Coherence theory: "An empirical belief is realatively true if and only
if it coheres with a system of other beliefs, which together form a
comprehensive account of reality."
Stephen J. Gould, the Harvard Paleontologist, offers this definition:
In science, "fact" can only mean "confirmed to such a degree that it
would be perverse to withhold provisional assent."
Succesfully Competitive Inductive Cogency; Depends upon the evidential
and conceptual ("context") of reasoning. An inductive argument from
evidence to hypothesis is inductively cogent if and only if the
hypothesis is that hypothesis which, of all the competing hypothesis,
has the greatest probability of being true on the basis of the
evidence. Thus, whether it is reasonable to accept a hypothesis as
true, if the statements of evidence are true, is determined by whether
that hypothesis is the most probable, on the evidence, of all those
with which it competes.
So even if we accept the nature of sensory data we are left with the
nature of "emperical beliefs" and how they are to be justified. But
you would have us skip over and accept by fiat the impartial nature of
our beliefs, tramplling underfoot what is the most exciting part of
all philosophy, though the hardest to state clearly.
-----------------------------------
Philosophical Problems and Arguments: An Introduction
by James W. Cornman, Keith Lehrer, George Sotiros Pappas
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0872201244/
> Oh and why are you using so many different symbols and concepts as if
> they all mean something different, when according to you, they all
> mean the same thing, theory?
>
> Why dont your questions read:
>
> Theory theory theory theory theory theory theory theory theory theory
> theory theory theory theory?
>
Sounds like spam in Monty Python's skit, with the little old lady who
doesn't want spam.
http://youtube.com/watch?v=wZ7YedEopp4
> Are you seriously expecting people to read your questions as asking
> anything but;
>
I am conversing with you and I doubt many people read what you say.
> Theory theory theory theory theory theory theory theory theory?
>
http://youtube.com/watch?v=wZ7YedEopp4
> MG
Michael Gordge
> On Sep 13, 10:13 pm, Michael Gordge <mikegor...@xtra.co.nz> wrote:
>
> > On Sep 14, 1:00 pm, Immortalist <reanimater_2...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> > > Do you
> > > mean that "if acceptance of sensed/observed reality and if what is
> > > sensed/observe reality is reality?
>
> > Why are you of all people asking such a question when according to you
> > you can only theorize what my answer is?
>
> I am just interested in epistemology, here review my position since
> you mention my position;
>
> The Regress Argument (also known as The Problem of Criterion and the
> diallelus) is a problem in epistemology and, in general, a problem in
> any situation where a statement has to be justified. According to this
> argument, any proposition requires a justification. However, any
> justification itself requires support, since nothing is true "just
> because". This means that any proposition whatsoever can be endlessly
> questioned, like a child who asks "why?" over and over again.
>
>
> > Oh and why are you using so many different symbols and concepts as if
> > they all mean something different, when according to you, they all
> > mean the same thing, theory?
>
> > Why dont your questions read:
>
> > Theory theory theory theory theory theory theory theory theory theory
> > theory theory theory theory?
>
> Sounds like spam in Monty Python's skit, with the little old lady who
> doesn't want spam.
>
> http://youtube.com/watch?v=wZ7YedEopp4
>
> > Are you seriously expecting people to read your questions as asking
> > anything but;
>
> I am conversing with you and I doubt many people read what you say.
>
> > Theory theory theory theory theory theory theory theory theory?
>
> http://youtube.com/watch?v=wZ7YedEopp4
>
>
>
>
> - Show quoted text -
Not fucking interested in your fucking theoretical nonsense Mortal.
MG
Michael Gordge
>
> - Show quoted text -
I did, man used to draw the entire thing, now he just writes rabbit.
MG