I think you exist, too. Kinda.
<donsto...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
news:1156194156....@75g2000cwc.googlegroups.com...
No, it takes more to exist than just that.
I overcome, I exist.
"Be all that you can be, in the Army."
We can exist, but is that really existing, in its truest meaning?
I think we came to this world to learn how to truly exist.
A carpenter that puts together a house by years of practice
truly exists.
I'm confused. Do you think he kinda exists or do you kinda think he
exists?
You could have written that in a kinda way...I think :-)
BOfL
What is `existence' ?
The experience of existing is not an argument. Something is added to "a
concept" which refers to a moment of that existence. The interaction of
these two "rerepresentations" in the brain along with the "experience"
is a complex argument, and is (inductive) and is hence a theory. You
cannot determine either way whether you know that you exist or not by
simply refering to a memory of a moment of existence a moment ago and
combining it with a theory about such events.
-------------------------------
Descartes attempts to create a foundationalist philosophy based on a
single, undeniable truth which he knows to be "fixed and assured". He
takes "I think, therefore I am" "as the first principle of the
philosophy I was seeking", believing that this is the only truth which
is necessary to found a philosophy. His logical structure , however,
relies on a second postulate. He claims that "the capacity to judge
correctly and to distinguish the true from the false is naturally equal
in all men". This postulate is more fundamental to his logical
structure than the cogito because without it, he cannot escape the
skepticism of his foundationalist structure.
------------------------------
"It must be possible," as Kant put it in a key paragraph, "for the 'I
think' to accompany all my representations; for otherwise something
would be represented in me which could not be thought at all, and that
is equivalent to saying that the representation would be impossible, or
at least would be nothing to me." (In one of the grander
understatements of his whole oeuvre, Kant concludes that paragraph by
simply noting: "From this original combination, many consequences
follow.'") Kant's point about the way in which the "I think" must be
able, in his words, to "accompany" any representation was that unless
it were possible for me to become aware of a representation as a
representation - to become aware of my experience of the stone as an
experience of the stone - then that representation would be as nothing
for me; and that any representation must therefore meet the conditions
under which it could become an object of such reflective awareness.
That particular move, of course, meant that the condition for any
representation's being a representation (having some cognitive content,
being experienced as a representation (of something) had to do with the
conditions of self-consciousness itself.
Kant's term for the kind of self-consciousness involved in such a
thought is apperception, the awareness of something as an awareness
(which itself is a condition of being able to separate the object from
the representation of the object). The question then was: what is the
nature of this apperception?
Any representation of a multiplicity as a multiplicity involves not
merely the receptivity of experience; experiencing it as one
experiential multiplicity requires the possibility of there being a
single complex thought of the experience. The unity of the multiplicity
of experience is therefore in Kant's words a "synthetic unity of
representations." A single complex thought, however, requires a single
complex subject to think it since a single complex thought could not be
distributed among different thinking subjects. (A single complex
thought might be something like, "The large black stone is lying on the
ground" - different subjects could think different elements of the
complex, such as "large," "black," etc., but that would not add up to a
single thought; it would only be a series of different thoughts.) Thus,
we need one complex thinking subject to have a single complex thought.
On Kant's picture therefore, we have on the one hand the identity of
the thinking subject, and on the other hand the multiplicity of the
representations which it has....
German Philosophy 1760-1860 : The Legacy of Idealism
by Terry Pinkard (Author)
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0521663814/
------------------------------