Attack On Objectivist Epistemology
Dan Ryan
I've seen demonstrated here might find enough satisifaction in a
certain issue to take it on.
For a short while I was a member of a group on Yahoo called
Objectivist Outcasts. Save the boos, I know that if you know of it, or
when or if ever you do, that most of you likley won't approve of it.
Anyway, there is a very intense debate going on there that I started
but bailed out on, and took my posts with me, which I now regret since
others have come to the rescue so to speak after I had chickened out.
The debate is about the notorious book by someone named Scott Ryan (no
relation to me I assure you) called "Objectivism and The Corruption Of
Rationality. If you don't yet know about this book, you need to. It is
gaining momentum and is being considered seriously as a refutation of
Ayn Rands Objectivist epistemology.
Now I have problems with Objectivism in some areas - namely, parts of
its politics and esthetics, and that is where most here would be in
disagreement with me. But as far as Objecitvist metaphysics,
epistemology and ethics goes, I subscribe to Rand's views 100%. And
the only place I've seen so far that is attempting to serioulsy refute
Scott Ryan's alleged refutation of Objectivist epistemology is the
discussion on the group I mentioned.
I have seen some fantastic posts here in this group by some who
demonstrate a great understanding of the issues involved, as well as a
great ability to communicate it. Please have a look at the debate and
decide if is in your interest (of course) to defend Objectivist
epistemology, which will give you: 1) a better understanding of it as
you put forth the effort to make your viwes explcit and clear, and 2)
may encourage others to understand and adopt it, thus adding one more
Objectivist (at least epistemologically, and that's a start) to
societry, which makes society a better place to live in. If there is
value in fighting for Objectivist epistemology against Scott Ryan,
then I hope you take (at least some) of the fight to the group I
metiioned. And if not, PLEASE become familar with Scott Ryan's work.
It NEEDS to be refuted seriously, and so far all that exists are just
casual dismissals, and those are seen (by the other side) as a joke.
If you must know a little about Ryan's work before you look into it,
in general, he is a deist, a platonic idealist, his main case agains
Rand is that: 1) she prejudicially desired an atheistic system and
then set about to constuct it to fulfill that end, 2) that she was at
least partially ignorant of the sholarship in the field of philosophy,
and 3) that she never solved the problem of universals - that she
never even correctly identifed the problem (I know, its hard to keep
from screaimg after hearing that if you've ever read ITOE). He tries
to make the case for what he calls "real universals", akin to Plato's
essences and all that crap.
It's hard to find Ryan's stuff now because he has started to sell it,
but it is available in pieces here and there if you do a Google
search. If anyone is at all interested, here is a link to the debate
I'm talking about:
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/ObjectivistOutcasts/message/149
AND (two threads, same debate)
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/ObjectivistOutcasts/message/159
This guy Scott Ryan should be challenged, on any front, in every way,
at every opportunity, and I'm just not capable enough by myself, and
no one seems interested. He has the potential to be more dangerous
than Sadam or Osama - and if you understand the fundametal nature of
what is at sake here, you know that this is possible.
Thanks for listening,
Dan Ryan
bearcat
>
> Now I have problems with Objectivism in some areas - namely, parts of
> its politics and esthetics, and that is where most here would be in
> disagreement with me. But as far as Objecitvist metaphysics,
> epistemology and ethics goes, I subscribe to Rand's views 100%. And
> the only place I've seen so far that is attempting to serioulsy refute
> Scott Ryan's alleged refutation of Objectivist epistemology is the
> discussion on the group I mentioned.
There should be more awareness of Scott Ryan's work.
Btw, what does ARI and TOC have to say about it?
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bearcat
> I have seen some fantastic posts here in this group by some who
> demonstrate a great understanding of the issues involved, as well as a
> great ability to communicate it. Please have a look at the debate and
> decide if is in your interest (of course) to defend Objectivist
> epistemology, which will give you: 1) a better understanding of it as
> you put forth the effort to make your viwes explcit and clear, and
How about this, o dogmatist: a better understanding of epistemology period
might be your reward.
2)
> may encourage others to understand and adopt it, thus adding one more
> Objectivist (at least epistemologically, and that's a start) to
> societry, which makes society a better place to live in.
LOL
If there is
> value in fighting for Objectivist epistemology against Scott Ryan,
> then I hope you take (at least some) of the fight to the group I
> metiioned. And if not, PLEASE become familar with Scott Ryan's work.
> It NEEDS to be refuted seriously, and so far all that exists are just
> casual dismissals, and those are seen (by the other side) as a joke.
Yep.
--
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bearcat
> If you must know a little about Ryan's work before you look into it,
> in general, he is a deist, a platonic idealist,
As I recall, Scott is a rationalist and an Absolute Idealist in the vein of
Hegel and the British Idealists. His favorite philosopher is the brilliant
and undervalued 20th century thinker Brand Blanshard.
his main case agains
> Rand is that: 1) she prejudicially desired an atheistic system and
> then set about to constuct it to fulfill that end, 2) that she was at
> least partially ignorant of the sholarship in the field of philosophy,
Or how about, didn't understand the relevant issues.
> and 3) that she never solved the problem of universals - that she
> never even correctly identifed the problem (I know, its hard to keep
> from screaimg after hearing that if you've ever read ITOE).
How many other books on universals have you read? Two anthologies are
*Properties* ed by D.H. Mellor and *The Problem of Universals* ed. by
Schoedinger.
He tries
> to make the case for what he calls "real universals", akin to Plato's
> essences and all that crap.
Haven't his work in front of me, but Ryan's position seemed much closer
overall to that of Aristotle's realism than to Plato's.
>
> It's hard to find Ryan's stuff now because he has started to sell it,
> but it is available in pieces here and there if you do a Google
> search. If anyone is at all interested, here is a link to the debate
> I'm talking about:
>
> http://groups.yahoo.com/group/ObjectivistOutcasts/message/149
>
> AND (two threads, same debate)
>
> http://groups.yahoo.com/group/ObjectivistOutcasts/message/159
>
> This guy Scott Ryan should be challenged, on any front, in every way,
> at every opportunity, and I'm just not capable enough by myself, and
> no one seems interested.
The criticisms of Scott Ryan (and Michael Huemer, and Robert Bass) are more
easily ignored than confronted.
He has the potential to be more dangerous
> than Sadam or Osama - and if you understand the fundametal nature of
> what is at sake here, you know that this is possible.
>
> Thanks for listening,
Thanks for the reminder of the Objectivist mentality with your Osama
comparisons.
George Dance
5a45...@posting.google.com>...
> Hello everyone. I am here to see if any of the fomidable minds that
> I've seen demonstrated here might find enough satisifaction in a
> certain issue to take it on.
snip
> The debate is about the notorious book by someone named Scott Ryan (no
> relation to me I assure you) called "Objectivism and The Corruption Of
> Rationality. If you don't yet know about this book, you need to. It is
> gaining momentum and is being considered seriously as a refutation of
> Ayn Rands Objectivist epistemology.
snip
You might find it helpful to read over the previous discussions of
Ryan's book, back when it was webbed. There are quite a few articles
on it, which you can access using this link:
http://groups.google.com/groups?hl=en&lr=&ie=UTF-8&oe=UTF-8&q=Objectivism+C
orruption+Rationality+Ryan+group%3Ahumanities.philosophy.objectivism&btnG=G
oogle+Search
My favourite in the bunch is the post that mentioned Ryan's refutation
of Rand's maxim, "You can't have your cake and eat it too." Ryan's
reply was along the lines of: 'Having cake' and 'eating cake' mean
the same thing; for example, when people say "We will be having cake
for dinner tonight," and "We will be eating cake for dinner", they
mean the same thing by both sentences. Therefore, it is possible to
have your cake and eat it too, and therefore Rand was wrong.
The poster's only comment: "I stopped reading at that point."
Helen
5a45...@posting.google.com>...
> but bailed out on, and took my posts with me, which I now regret since
> others have come to the rescue so to speak after I had chickened out.
> The debate is about the notorious book by someone named Scott Ryan (no
> relation to me I assure you) called "Objectivism and The Corruption Of
> Rationality. If you don't yet know about this book, you need to. It is
> gaining momentum and is being considered seriously as a refutation of
> Ayn Rands Objectivist epistemology.
Really? I am surprised anybody (well, anybody who is not initiated in
the cult) would think it needs any serious effort at refutation
anyway. The so-called "objectivist epistemology" is a joke, and a bad
one even at that.
> It NEEDS to be refuted seriously, and so far all that exists are just
> casual dismissals, and those are seen (by the other side) as a joke.
Rightly so, I might add.
> If you must know a little about Ryan's work before you look into it,
> in general, he is a deist, a platonic idealist, his main case agains
> Rand is that: 1) she prejudicially desired an atheistic system and
> then set about to constuct it to fulfill that end,
This is an incidental point of his case, at most.
> 2) that she was at least partially ignorant of the sholarship
> in the field of philosophy,
So, what else is new? It is entirely clear that Alissa had next to no
grasp at all of what she was so venomenously attacking. Just ask
Malenor here about her understanding of Kant...
> and 3) that she never solved the problem of universals - that she
> never even correctly identifed the problem (I know, its hard to keep
> from screaimg after hearing that if you've ever read ITOE).
I read it, and found it a collection of incoherent assertions, many of
them obvious fabrications out of whole cloth, with next to no rational
logic keeping the various statements together. As an attempt at a
philosophical treatise it is a bad joke, but as an example of what
happens when some incompetent hobby-philosopher tries her hand at some
serious thinking, it can be quite amusing, actually. What I found
particularly hilarious was the transcript of the "objectivist
workshop" in the appendix. More than a little bit revealing, in
fact...
> This guy Scott Ryan should be challenged, on any front, in every way,
> at every opportunity, and I'm just not capable enough by myself, and
> no one seems interested. He has the potential to be more dangerous
> than Sadam or Osama - and if you understand the fundametal nature of
> what is at sake here, you know that this is possible.
[Laughing] As if anybody gives a fig about Alissa's stillborn
brainchild.
-- Helen.
Churl Beck
[...]
> But as far as Objecitvist metaphysics, epistemology and ethics
> goes, I subscribe to Rand's views 100%.
My standard response to proponents of Objectivist epistemology is to present
them with a simple challenge: define the word "furniture" such that it
satisfies all of Rand's rules of concept-formation. So far, no one has
succeeded.
Rand provides her own definition on page 22: "Movable man-made objects
intended to be used in a human habitation, which can support the weight of
the human body or support and/or store other, smaller objects." However,
remember that a concept is supposed to be "a mental integration of two or
more units possessing the *same distinguishing characteristic(s)*, with
their particular measurements omitted" (emphasis added). What Rand has done
is list three independent characteristics, and stipulate that furniture need
only have one of them. In other words, some furniture "can support the
weight of the human body," while some other furniture "can support the
weight of other, smaller objects," and still other furniture "can store
other, smaller objects."
Only the part about "movable man-made objects intended to be used in a human
habitation" is common to all three. But that, by itself, is too broad to be
taken as a distinguishing characteristic of furniture. It includes, for
instance, vacuum cleaners, silverware, curtains, and kitty litter boxes,
just to name a few.
[...]
> This guy Scott Ryan should be challenged, on any front, in every way,
> at every opportunity, and I'm just not capable enough by myself, and
> no one seems interested. He has the potential to be more dangerous
> than Sadam or Osama - and if you understand the fundametal nature
> of what is at sake here, you know that this is possible.
In other words, you've been presented with an argument that you can't refute
but you're convinced that it's wrong anyway, so it must be evil. Good for
you.
--CHuRL
Helen
5a45...@posting.google.com>...
> at every opportunity, and I'm just not capable enough by myself,
P.S.: I just looked at your links (still wiping the tears out of my
eyes laughing...) So, let's see, here is my translation of the above:
You understand that you got slapped around by Craig Heath real good,
and that you do not have a shadow of a clue as to how you could save
Alissa's face, so now you are looking here for someone to bail you
out. Well, good luck, son...
-- Helen.
Fred Weiss
"Dan Ryan" <danr...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
news:be8bd462.03022...@posting.google.com...
> The debate is about the notorious book by someone named Scott Ryan (no
> relation to me I assure you) called "Objectivism and The Corruption Of
> Rationality. If you don't yet know about this book, you need to. It is
> gaining momentum and is being considered seriously as a refutation of
> Ayn Rands Objectivist epistemology.
"Gaining momentum" where? As of this afternoon the book ranked 1,779,411 at
Amazon.com. That's virtually zero sales. Was it at 2,000,000 before and is
now racing from selling 1 copy every few months to 2?
Since apparently hardly anyone is reading the book who exactly is being
referred to by "being considered seriously" other than the usual
subterranean creatures who long ago declared their disagreement with ITOE or
who would be incapable of understanding it in any case?
Fred Weiss
bearcat
"Helen" <GHMoh...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:1a8f5fe5.03022...@posting.google.com...
I thought this was really funny:
"As for myself, unless I state otherwise, I am not just giving my opinion. I
say that ITOE makes an irrefutable case, and that Ryan has not refuted it.
It is *not* the obligation of myself or anyone else to refute Ryan, since
Ryan's work is allegedly itself a refutation, which has yet to be presented
here (in fact, what little of it *has* been presented has come from an
opponent: me). ITOE has been posited; it is familiar to many interested in
O'ism, and has even been (grudgingly) admitted to being a seminal work
without refutation by philosophy academia."
:-)
dave odden
> My standard response to proponents of Objectivist epistemology is to
present
> them with a simple challenge: define the word "furniture" such that it
> satisfies all of Rand's rules of concept-formation. So far, no one has
> succeeded.
> Rand provides her own definition on page 22: "Movable man-made objects
> intended to be used in a human habitation, which can support the weight of
> the human body or support and/or store other, smaller objects." However,
> remember that a concept is supposed to be "a mental integration of two or
> more units possessing the *same distinguishing characteristic(s)*, with
> their particular measurements omitted" (emphasis added). What Rand has
done
> is list three independent characteristics, and stipulate that furniture
need
> only have one of them. In other words, some furniture "can support the
> weight of the human body," while some other furniture "can support the
> weight of other, smaller objects," and still other furniture "can store
> other, smaller objects."
Why is that a disqualification of her definition? I would agree that the
first two clauses unnecessarily differentiate; all three could be integrated
into "intended to support or contain an object not (much) larger than a
human". [fn: I'm not sure that there needs to be any condition regarding the
size of the object being supported. Stoves and freezers are the only typical
household objects larger than people, I think, and they aren't contained or
supported. Anyhow, babies are people but are smaller than some vases, so
size doesn't matter as far as I can see]. The only useful purpose of saying
"support humans...or, support or store smaller non-human objects" is to say
that we don't 'store' humans or other living objects. That's a non-essential
fact about furniture (and living objects), in my opinion,
Are you objecting to disjunctions in definitions, i.e. are you contending
that, per Rand, a concept is defined only in terms of the conjunction of
other concepts, and never disjunctions? If so, the furniture problem would
seem to stem from the lack of a lexical item in English which extends to
"contain" and "support". Concepts are not the same as lexical items, though.
The main problem that I see in her wording is that her "can" should be
"intended", i.e. it's not just that a chair *can* support a person (which a
TV could as well, depending on the TV and the person) but that that is it's
function.
The real challenge is to define "dog" non-circularly.
Churl Beck
[...]
> Are you objecting to disjunctions in definitions [...] ?
Correct. According to Rand, an object is a piece of furniture if it has
*either* characteristic A *or* characteristic B *or* characteristic C, but
it need not have them all. Which is to say that (contrary to her definition
of a concept) not all pieces of furniture need to possess "the same
distinguishing characteristic(s)."
> If so, the furniture problem would seem to stem from the lack of a lexical
> item in English which extends to "contain" and "support". Concepts are
> not the same as lexical items, though.
[...]
Conceptually, "contain" and "support" are distinct functions. A third
concept (let's call it "contain-support") which meant "either contain or
support" would violate Rand's "razor" (ITOE, pg. 72). At best, it could be
applied to object which contain, and also to objects which support, but
there is no such thing as an object which "contain-supports." (Unless, by
that term, you mean an object which does one or the other, but you don't
know which. If not, then you are forced to argue that indefinite properties
apply to definite objects.)
--CHuRL
Acar
"George Dance" <georg...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
news:6312c50b.03022...@posting.google.com...
.......thus missing the point and showing his inability to understand the
argument. Philosophy deals with the highest possible tolerance of
distinctions, therefore rigor in language is paramount. Amateurs (ouch!)
need not apply. It seems to me that Ryan was trying to dismiss the argument
as unsuitable for philosophical use due to lack of rigor. The statement
relies on the subjectivity of the reader to extract its meaning. It lacks
objective focus. If Ryan can prove that there is too much of this
imprecision in Rand's argument, he has proved that she can not betaken
seriously as a philospher, not as a mere technical disqualification, but on
the same grounds of a physicist whose equations are imprecise.
Fred Weiss
"dave odden" <od...@ling.ohio-state.edu> wrote in message
news:b3j5d1$g6f$1...@charm.magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu...
> The main problem that I see in her wording is that her "can" should be
> "intended", i.e. it's not just that a chair *can* support a person (which
a
> TV could as well, depending on the TV and the person) but that that is
it's
> function.
A TV could be used as furniture even though that's not its (original)
intended use. For some years I've been using some old stereo speakers as
kind of end tables.
But I don't see the earthshaking significance of this issue in any case and
its fairly typical of the issues Churl raises. He seems to have a
perspective on Objectivism similar to an ant looking up at a curb or, to put
it bluntly, at a level of mind-numbing triviality. As another example.
check the discussion of "value" which he initiated and pursued for post
after tedious post a few months ago - and which amounted to absolutely
nothing...as, you can be sure, will also be the case with ...errr(is he
serious?)...the definition of "furniture".
Fred Weiss
jposamen
I've read some of Scott Ryan's stuff, and his is worthy of discussion,
but I'm afraid those threads you sent are far too deep for outsiders
to jump in conveniently. If you start a thread here, limiting its
scope and asking the right questions, then I'll be you'll get a few
takers.
-Jordan-
HPO JURY = Malenor
wrote:
>Dan Ryan <danr...@hotmail.com> wrote in message news:<be8bd462.0302260107.
>5a45...@posting.google.com>...
>> It NEEDS to be refuted seriously, and so far all that exists are just
>> casual dismissals, and those are seen (by the other side) as a joke.
>
>Rightly so, I might add.
>
>> If you must know a little about Ryan's work before you look into it,
>> in general, he is a deist, a platonic idealist, his main case agains
>> Rand is that: 1) she prejudicially desired an atheistic system and
>> then set about to constuct it to fulfill that end,
Ryan is an Objectivist Idealist. But of course every philosopher must
be reduced to either Plato or Aristotle, black or white, evil or good.
What the Randroids don't realize is that Aristotle himself is
reducable to Plato.
>This is an incidental point of his case, at most.
>> 2) that she was at least partially ignorant of the sholarship
>> in the field of philosophy,
>
>So, what else is new? It is entirely clear that Alissa had next to no
>grasp at all of what she was so venomenously attacking. Just ask
>Malenor here about her understanding of Kant...
Me? Oh yes, her understanding of that was nil. Less than nil...
>> This guy Scott Ryan should be challenged, on any front, in every way,
>> at every opportunity, and I'm just not capable enough by myself, and
>> no one seems interested. He has the potential to be more dangerous
>> than Sadam or Osama - and if you understand the fundametal nature of
>> what is at sake here, you know that this is possible.
>[Laughing] As if anybody gives a fig about Alissa's stillborn
>brainchild.
This is partly reflected in the very first sentence of Ryan's
foreword: "I suppose the readership at which this book is aimed
consists of two main groups: readers of Ayn Rand who have little
acquaintance with philosophy in general, and philosophers who have
not considered Rand worth the bother of refuting."
HPO JURY = Malenor
wrote:
>> If you must know a little about Ryan's work before you look into it,
>> in general, he is a deist, a platonic idealist, his main case agains
>> Rand is that: 1) she prejudicially desired an atheistic system and
>> then set about to constuct it to fulfill that end,
"...I have generally tried to offer critiques that do not depend on
the acceptance of any specific philosophical outlook.."
Scott G. Ryan, from the Foreword.
Gordon Sollars
pape...@ix.netcom.com says...
> But I don't see the earthshaking significance of this issue in any case and
> its fairly typical of the issues Churl raises.
I can't speak to what is fairly typical for Churl, but the problem here
is that the definition is of Rand's own choosing. Theories don't have
to work perfectly to be good, but when they break down on the author's
own examples, it's at least a six on the Richter Scale.
--
Gordon Sollars
gsol...@pobox.com
HPO JURY = Malenor
wrote:
>"As for myself, unless I state otherwise, I am not just giving my opinion. I
>say that ITOE makes an irrefutable case, and that Ryan has not refuted it.
>It is *not* the obligation of myself or anyone else to refute Ryan, since
>Ryan's work is allegedly itself a refutation, which has yet to be presented
>here (in fact, what little of it *has* been presented has come from an
>opponent: me).
I presented a great deal of Ryan's work months ago here.
..
..
..
..
..
.
HPO JURY = Malenor
<pape...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
>"Gaining momentum" where? As of this afternoon the book ranked 1,779,411 at
>Amazon.com. That's virtually zero sales.
Then you should be thanking Dan for advertising it.
TommCatt
> Dan Ryan wrote:
>
>>But as far as Objecitvist metaphysics, epistemology and ethics
>>goes, I subscribe to Rand's views 100%.
>
> My standard response to proponents of Objectivist epistemology is to present
> them with a simple challenge: define the word "furniture" such that it
> satisfies all of Rand's rules of concept-formation. So far, no one has
> succeeded.
>
> Rand provides her own definition on page 22: "Movable man-made objects
> intended to be used in a human habitation, which can support the weight of
> the human body or support and/or store other, smaller objects." However,
> remember that a concept is supposed to be "a mental integration of two or
> more units possessing the *same distinguishing characteristic(s)*, with
> their particular measurements omitted" (emphasis added). What Rand has done
> is list three independent characteristics, and stipulate that furniture need
> only have one of them. In other words, some furniture "can support the
> weight of the human body," while some other furniture "can support the
> weight of other, smaller objects," and still other furniture "can store
> other, smaller objects."
>
> Only the part about "movable man-made objects intended to be used in a human
> habitation" is common to all three. But that, by itself, is too broad to be
> taken as a distinguishing characteristic of furniture. It includes, for
> instance, vacuum cleaners, silverware, curtains, and kitty litter boxes,
> just to name a few.
I would not say I agree with Rand 100%. I have found areas where she
was wrong. I'm sure most people have who have studied her writings. So
what? Not even Einstein was 100% correct but his theories of relativity
are still going strong.
However, I don't understand your problem with the definition of
furniture. Her definition was in the form of A and (B or C or D)]. You
think this is wrong because A by itself includes other, non-furniture
items? Of course it does. The A term being true does not make the
whole definition true. One or more of the other terms must also be true.
However, assume for a minute that the definitions was wrong.
Then...what? Does that invalidate the entire epistemology? How so? Is
the definition of furniture the foundation upon which everything else in
Objectivism rests? Contrary to the claim of a few detractors,
Objectivism is just a philosophy, not a religion. Other than the
possible exception of Piekoff, no one claims Rand was inspired (in the
way the Christians claim for the writers of the Bible) and wrote
Unerring Truth. Fortunately for us, and the followers of any other
philosophy, unerring perfection is not a requirement.
So you have (or think you have) discovered a problem with Rand's
definition of furniture. That's nice. When you can show some existence
that doesn't exist, wake me up.
Tomm
--
I'm desperately trying to figure out why kamikaze pilots wore helmets.
- Dave Edison
Churl Beck
> I can't speak to what is fairly typical for Churl, but the problem here
> is that the definition is of Rand's own choosing. Theories don't have
> to work perfectly to be good, but when they break down on the
> author's own examples, it's at least a six on the Richter Scale.
It's worse than that. The problem isn't Rand's definition of "furniture."
The problem is that there *isn't* a definition of "furniture" which
satisfies her requirements for concept-formation. But Fred will never
realize this. He can't be bothered by trivial details, like whether or not
the tenets of Objectivism are true.
--CHuRL
Churl Beck
[...]
> But I don't see the earthshaking significance of this issue in any case
> and its fairly typical of the issues Churl raises. He seems to have
> a perspective on Objectivism similar to an ant looking up at a curb
> or, to put it bluntly, at a level of mind-numbing triviality. As
> another example. check the discussion of "value" which he
> initiated and pursued for post after tedious post a few months
> ago - and which amounted to absolutely nothing...as, you can be
> sure, will also be the case with ...errr(is he serious?)...the
> definition of "furniture".
Ah, yes. I'm always raising trivial issues, such as (in this case) that
Rand's theory of concepts is wrong, or (in the conversation that you allude
to) that her theory of values is wrong. Shame on me.
--CHuRL
Arnold
"Churl Beck" <chur...@subdimension.com> wrote in message
news:Q467a.243537$2H6.4248@sccrnsc04...
>
> My standard response to proponents of Objectivist
epistemology is to present
> them with a simple challenge: define the word "furniture"
such that it
> satisfies all of Rand's rules of concept-formation. So
far, no one has
> succeeded.
Perhaps because definitions are not the concept, but
describe the concept.
Have you confused the two?
--
Arnold
Churl Beck
[...]
> However, I don't understand your problem with the definition of
> furniture. Her definition was in the form of A and (B or C or D)].
Correct.
> You think this is wrong because A by itself includes other,
> non-furniture items?
No. Primarily it is wrong because it contradicts Rand's own criteria for
concept-formation. See my response to Dave Odden.
[...]
> However, assume for a minute that the definitions was wrong.
> Then...what? Does that invalidate the entire epistemology?
> How so? Is the definition of furniture the foundation upon
> which everything else in Objectivism rests?
The issue isn't exactly whether or not the definition is correct. The issue
is whether or not it satisfies Rand's own criteria for concept-formation.
If not, then the next question is whether or not it can be corrected so that
it does. If it can't, then it's time to rethink Rand's theory of concepts.
(For the record, I have raised this question many times on HPO and so far no
one has succeeded in correcting Rand's definition.)
[...]
> So you have (or think you have) discovered a problem with Rand's
> definition of furniture. That's nice. When you can show some
> existence that doesn't exist, wake me up.
I would be much obliged if you would wake up sooner than that.
--CHuRL
Churl Beck
> Perhaps because definitions are not the concept, but
> describe the concept.
> Have you confused the two?
Nope. A definition is supposed to specify the distinguishing
characteristic(s) of the concept (ITOE, pg 41), and all units of a concept
are supposed to have the same distinguishing characteristic(s) (ibid., pg
13). You do the math.
--CHuRL
Arnold
I don't see the big deal here. Definitions can change,
while concepts may not. For example, if one had only known
of birds that flew, one could define a bird as an animal
that flew. That definition would have to be altered when
the first Ostrich booted your shins.
If you don't like the definition of furniture, find a
better one. Keep it short though.
--
Arnold
bearcat
> My favourite in the bunch is the post that mentioned Ryan's refutation
> of Rand's maxim, "You can't have your cake and eat it too." Ryan's
> reply was along the lines of: 'Having cake' and 'eating cake' mean
> the same thing; for example, when people say "We will be having cake
> for dinner tonight," and "We will be eating cake for dinner", they
> mean the same thing by both sentences. Therefore, it is possible to
> have your cake and eat it too, and therefore Rand was wrong.
>
> The poster's only comment: "I stopped reading at that point."
I couldn't find anything like that in Ryan's updated ebook. Did you read it
yourself?
Ryan does mention it once. Here is the relevant quote:
"It is as well to remind ourselves now and again that Rand made her living,
indeed achieved her initial fame, by dealing almost exclusively in what she
herself knew to be counterfactuals. Howard Roark was not, after all, a real
person, and Rand's express purpose in writing ATLAS SHRUGGED was to prevent
it from becoming a true story. But if writing fiction is a legitimate
activity, then Rand's strictures on "valid" concept-formation are just
wrong. Her theory and practice of esthetics are at war with her
epistemology.
"Which means that Rand has a deep difficulty here. Rand cannot eat her cake
and have it too; she cannot practice the art of fiction (and regard the
projection of a moral ideal as an important undertaking), and also regard it
as crucially important that our process of concept-formation be strictly and
firmly tied to what is given in purely sensory perception. Is her projection
of a moral ideal really just a matter of "rearrang[ing] the things [Rand]
has observed in reality" via sensory perception? Here again we find a
problem Rand has brought upon herself by trying to subordinate reason to
perception in epistemology despite her somewhat better judgment elsewhere."
I would very strongly recommend that anyone interested in a good critique of
Rand's philosophy check Scott Ryan's work out.
dave odden
"Fred Weiss" wrote:
> > The main problem that I see in her wording is that her "can" should be
> > "intended", i.e. it's not just that a chair *can* support a person
(which
> a
> > TV could as well, depending on the TV and the person) but that that is
> it's
> > function.
> A TV could be used as furniture even though that's not its (original)
> intended use. For some years I've been using some old stereo speakers as
> kind of end tables.
For which reason, the relevant intent is the intent of the owner / user, and
not that of the manufacturer.
dave odden
> > Are you objecting to disjunctions in definitions [...] ?
> Correct. According to Rand, an object is a piece of furniture if it has
> *either* characteristic A *or* characteristic B *or* characteristic C, but
> it need not have them all. Which is to say that (contrary to her
definition
> of a concept) not all pieces of furniture need to possess "the same
> distinguishing characteristic(s)."
Since I'm not persuaded that a disjunction is needed for "furniture" in the
first place, this point may be moot, but the main point is of interest. Now
maybe it really *was* Rand's intent to say that defining characteristics
can't contain an "or", but I don't recall any such explicit statement on her
part. You seem to be saying that Rand actually made such a claim -- if she
did, could you tell me where? Otherwise, I think you're imputing to the term
"characteristic" a property that Rand did not assume, and if she didn't say
that, her furniture definition isn't inconsistent with her system.
You would be right to object that the term "characteristic" is open-ended
and that Rand didn't say exactly what she meant by that. I'm saying that a
"characteristic" could (some day) be scientifically expressed in terms of
some descriptive semantic calculus using standard conceptual glue that
includes "both" and "either" aka conjunction and disjunction. I don't know
of any reason to think that disjunction would be "bad" in Rand's view. I
would not have expected her to be any more explicit about the content of
"characteristic", because that's a scientific question about human
cognition, and not a philosophical one.
> Conceptually, "contain" and "support" are distinct functions. A third
> concept (let's call it "contain-support") which meant "either contain or
> support" would violate Rand's "razor" (ITOE, pg. 72). At best, it could
be
> applied to object which contain, and also to objects which support, but
> there is no such thing as an object which "contain-supports." (Unless, by
> that term, you mean an object which does one or the other, but you don't
> know which. If not, then you are forced to argue that indefinite
properties
> apply to definite objects.)
The problem is that there is no decent semantic calculus for expressing
basic concepts. Quantifiers and connectives and such fancy syntactic stuff
pose no problem, but when it comes to describing meanings of lexical items,
we are usually reduced to simply paraphrasing in terms of other English
words. In this case, I think the word "hold" comes fairly close to including
the essential unity of the words "support" and "contain", so that a table
can hold a vase, a drawer can hold silverware, and a chair can hold a
person. [Please don't confuse that word pronounced "hold" with the other
homophonous words like the verb in "hold your tongue" or "hold on to that
dog, he looks vicious"]. It's really just a flaw of English that we don't
have a generalized locative case that includes "on" and "in". The support /
contain distinction boils down to the fact that if object A supports B then
B is on (or under) A, and if A contains B then B is in A.
I reiterate my earlier statement that concepts and words are not the same
thing. The same concept can often be labeled via more than one word
("truth", "veracity"; "sofa", "couch", "divan") and a word can represent
more than one concept (sometimes related, sometimes unrelated: "boil",
"walk", "bear").
TommCatt
>
> I would very strongly recommend that anyone interested in a good critique of
> Rand's philosophy check Scott Ryan's work out.
The quote you gave was an example of Ryan chasing his own rhetorical
tail. Is this supposed to be a recommendation? By "good," do you
perhaps mean "hysterically funny"?
Tomm
--
"Then you admit confirming not denying you never said that?"
"No.. I mean YES!.. WHAT?!"
"I'll put 'maybe.'"
- Berke Breathed, _Bloom County_
John Shafto
>
> I reiterate my earlier statement that concepts and words are not the same
> thing. The same concept can often be labeled via more than one word
> ("truth", "veracity"; "sofa", "couch", "divan") and a word can represent
> more than one concept (sometimes related, sometimes unrelated: "boil",
> "walk", "bear").
Quite true. Translation between languages would be
impossible were it not so.
Also, 'furniture' used to mean something like 'useful stuff',
or 'necessary equipment', which applied to many contexts
(e.g. horse tack), but it has been narrowed in modern english
to the 'useful stuff' of a home. This was set before modern
appliances and gadgetry though, a time when less distinctions
about things in the home were very useful. Even the toilet
was usually outdoors.
TommCatt
> TommCatt wrote:
>
>>You think this is wrong because A by itself includes other,
>>non-furniture items?
>
> No. Primarily it is wrong because it contradicts Rand's own criteria for
> concept-formation. See my response to Dave Odden.
Which one??? I will assume it is the one where you say:
"According to Rand, an object is a piece of furniture if it has
*either* characteristic A *or* characteristic B *or* characteristic C,
but it need not have them all. Which is to say that (contrary to her
definition of a concept) not all pieces of furniture need to possess
'the same distinguishing characteristic(s).'"
If so, I really don't know if you are being serious here. We have the
concept 'furniture.' There is obviously some way to define the concept
such that all objects of type [furniture] are included and all other
objects are excluded. Otherwise, the concept is too vague to be meaningful.
Concepts are hierarchical in nature. That is, the definition of a
concept must consist of other, simpler concepts. This can be repeated
for all the component concepts until we arrive at conceptual "atoms,"
the primary concepts that cannot be broken down further. All you have
done is taken the basic idea of a concept, the fact that there must be
something in common will all instances of the concept, and then "drilled
down" into the definition to where different subconcepts are
differentiated. At this point you try to argue that, as you can
distinguish multiple concepts at this point, there cannot be one concept.
To illustrate: furniture is defined as all objects F that share the set
of characteristics C. As there is no claim that F is a primary concept,
we know the set C contains multiple subconcepts. So we can expand C to,
say, (C1 and C2). We know that the set C1, considered by itself,
consists of elements that are not in F. The same for set C2. The 'and'
tells us that F is the intersection of C1 and C2. For those a little
fuzzy on set terminology, this is just shorthand for saying 'all
elements of C1 that are also elements of C2.'
We can do the same thing with, say, C2. Only this time, the set C2 is
defined as (C21 or C22 or C23). This is any element that is a member of
C21, C22, OR C23 or any combination. Using Boolean algebra, we can
rewrite the definition as ((C1 and C21) or (C1 and C22) or (C1 and
C23)). In English: all elements that are in both C1 and C21 or in both
C1 and C22 or in both C1 and C23.
At this point you come in and try to show that there cannot be any such
set F because you can see all these separate sets C1, C21, etc. Worse,
you say that set theory itself is invalid because there is no way to
have a set contain like items because there can always be an element of
one subset that is not an element of another component subset.
Rand's definition of concepts holds because not all subcharacteristics
of 'the same [set of] distinguishing characteristic(s)' need apply to
all component characteristics in order to be a valid set.
Sorry.
Tomm
--
What sick, heartless person decided to put an 's' in the word lisp?
Fred Weiss
"Acar" <g...@d-g-s.com> wrote in message
news:IMc7a.269109$i73.50...@twister.neo.rr.com...
> > The poster's only comment: "I stopped reading at that point."
>
> .......thus missing the point and showing his inability to understand the
> argument.
Look who's talking - and if anyone is interested in an example see my recent
attempt to show Acorn something as simple as the self-refutation involved in
denying axioms (since he, of all people, has the audacity to criticize
someone else for not understanding an argument).
> Philosophy deals with the highest possible tolerance of
> distinctions, therefore rigor in language is paramount.
Such as grasping when one is stealing concepts as you *constantly* do.
Amateurs (ouch!)
> need not apply. It seems to me that Ryan was trying to dismiss the
argument
> as unsuitable for philosophical use due to lack of rigor.
Then it was a non-sequitur as most of his arguments seem to be judging from
the ones that have been displayed here so far (I particularly like the one
that "bearcub" approvingly quoted: that since fiction isn't allegedly
derived from sense perception it is therefore invalid on Objectivist terms -
this presumably to prove that Objectivism is incorrect that reason is based
on sense perception - which of course is why Malenoid, our very own Kantoid,
thinks so highly of Ryan's absurd criticisms).
"Having your cake and eating it, too" is not an argument. It is an
*expression* , a rhetorical one at that - and very well known - which is of
course not even original to Ayn Rand (nor did she ever claim it was). It is
used, when she uses it, to underscore a point, not in and of itself to
replace an argument for the point she is making. I challenge anyone to find
me a single example anywhere in the entire corpus where she uses this
expression as an argument and in replacement for an argument - and where an
argument is required.
Here is an example from Galt's Speech:
"Whatever you choose to consider, be it an object, an attribute or an
action, the law of identity remains the same. A leaf cannot be a stone at
the same time, it cannot be all red and all green at the same time, it
cannot freeze and burn at the same time. A is A. Or, if you wish it stated
in simpler language: You cannot have your cake and eat it, too"
And another from an article in The Ayn Rand Letter where it's rhetorical use
in connection with the actual argument should be very clear:
"But Mr. Markel wants to eat his cake and have it, too. He advocates public
service without public responsibility; a blank check on public funds without
public accounting; the "security" of a public income without public
control."
(Both of these quotes came from Phil Oliver's Objectivism CD-ROM)
Incidentally, George Dance is being too modest in his mention of the
previous discussion on hpo. The best part of that discussion was his own
point by point dismisal of Malenoid's effusive praise for Ryan's book.
Fred Weiss
Fred Weiss
"Churl Beck" <chur...@subdimension.com> wrote in message
news:Dqh7a.276018$HN5.1...@rwcrnsc51.ops.asp.att.net...
> Ah, yes. I'm always raising trivial issues, such as (in this case) that
> Rand's theory of concepts is wrong, ..
But your example doesn't do that by a stretch even if you were correct,
which you aren't - as has already been pointed out to you.
or (in the conversation that you allude
> to) that her theory of values is wrong.
Oh, please. You might have forgotten that I indulged your nonsense for a
number of posts myself and demonstrated that you were totally confused -
just as you are now.
Fred Weiss
George Dance
er.neo.rr.com>...
> "George Dance" <georg...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
> news:6312c50b.03022...@posting.google.com...
> > Dan Ryan <danr...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
> news:<be8bd462.0302260107.
> >
> > > The debate is about the notorious book by someone named Scott Ryan (no
> > > relation to me I assure you) called "Objectivism and The Corruption Of
> > > Rationality. If you don't yet know about this book, you need to. It is
> > > gaining momentum and is being considered seriously as a refutation of
> > > Ayn Rands Objectivist epistemology.
> >
> > snip
> >
> > You might find it helpful to read over the previous discussions of
> > Ryan's book, back when it was webbed.
snip
> > My favourite in the bunch is the post that mentioned Ryan's refutation
> > of Rand's maxim, "You can't have your cake and eat it too." Ryan's
> > reply was along the lines of: 'Having cake' and 'eating cake' mean
> > the same thing; for example, when people say "We will be having cake
> > for dinner tonight," and "We will be eating cake for dinner", they
> > mean the same thing by both sentences. Therefore, it is possible to
> > have your cake and eat it too, and therefore Rand was wrong.
> >
> > The poster's only comment: "I stopped reading at that point."
>
> .......thus missing the point and showing his inability to understand the
> argument. Philosophy deals with the highest possible tolerance of
> distinctions, therefore rigor in language is paramount. Amateurs (ouch!)
> need not apply. It seems to me that Ryan was trying to dismiss the argument
> as unsuitable for philosophical use due to lack of rigor. The statement
> relies on the subjectivity of the reader to extract its meaning. It lacks
> objective focus. If Ryan can prove that there is too much of this
> imprecision in Rand's argument, he has proved that she can not betaken
> seriously as a philospher, not as a mere technical disqualification, but on
> the same grounds of a physicist whose equations are imprecise.
Oh, FFS... 'you can't have your cake and eat it to' means, 'if you
consume an asset, it ceases to be a consumable asset.' I doubt that
there is anyone in the world, including Ryan, who does not know that
that is what it means. Just what would be the point of having a more
'rigorous' meaning, which if anything would be less easily understood
in the same way by anyone reading it (the whole point of 'rigour'
being to make precise concepts more understood, not less)?
bearcat
"jposamen" <jpos...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:c4e24252.03022...@posting.google.com...
Yeah, Dan, let's hear it. What are the relevant parts of Scott Ryan's work
that you want attention drawn to?
--
--
--
--
-
Fred Weiss
"Gordon Sollars" <gsol...@pobox.com> wrote in message
news:MPG.18c7570e8...@news.optonline.net...
>... Theories don't have
> to work perfectly to be good, but when they break down on the author's
> own examples, it's at least a six on the Richter Scale.
Or a one, if that, depending on the nature of the"breakdown" and the
example. I think it is widely acknowledged among Objectivists that AR made
mistakes in some of her examples and applications, some of which have been
discussed here, others which have been discussed ad nauseum elsewhere - the
most notorious one here probably being your and David F.'s drawn out and
typically ridiculous attempt to show that the entire corpus of Objectivism
was in question because of her charge in a private letter in a specific
context that "Milton Friedman was a Red".
This btw is a relevant point with regard to any philosopher, including ones
in opposition to Objectivism, and would be a characteristic mark of gross
unfairness - a charge btw which is often thrown at AR herself with regard to
other philosophers. Although I believe that charge is unjustified the
hypocrisy on this issue is blatant.
Fred Weiss
Paul Robinson
> Hello everyone. I am here to see if any of the fomidable minds that
> I've seen demonstrated here might find enough satisifaction in a
> certain issue to take it on.
>
> For a short while I was a member of a group on Yahoo called
> Objectivist Outcasts. Save the boos, I know that if you know of it, or
> when or if ever you do, that most of you likley won't approve of it.
You spelled "likely" worng. :) I don't boo anyone, I think that
objectivism as a system of philosophy can stand up to anything. (I'm
supposed to get people mad at me by saying something that's a non sequitur
such as, "Even Ayn Rand" :))
> Anyway, there is a very intense debate going on there that I started
> but bailed out on, and took my posts with me, which I now regret since
> others have come to the rescue so to speak after I had chickened out.
> The debate is about the notorious book by someone named Scott Ryan (no
> relation to me I assure you) called "Objectivism and The Corruption Of
> Rationality. If you don't yet know about this book, you need to. It is
> gaining momentum and is being considered seriously as a refutation of
> Ayn Rands Objectivist epistemology.
I suspect that it won't be that hard to shut him down, just find his
errors and the rest is easy. If he is right, that's another matter.
Simple answer is to examine what he has to say and then criticize it.
> Now I have problems with Objectivism in some areas - namely, parts of
> its politics and esthetics, and that is where most here would be in
> disagreement with me. But as far as Objecitvist metaphysics,
> epistemology and ethics goes, I subscribe to Rand's views 100%. And
> the only place I've seen so far that is attempting to serioulsy refute
> Scott Ryan's alleged refutation of Objectivist epistemology is the
> discussion on the group I mentioned.
We shall see.
> I have seen some fantastic posts here in this group by some who
> demonstrate a great understanding of the issues involved, as well as a
> great ability to communicate it. Please have a look at the debate and
> decide if is in your interest (of course) to defend Objectivist
> epistemology, which will give you: 1) a better understanding of it as
> you put forth the effort to make your viwes explcit and clear, and 2)
> may encourage others to understand and adopt it, thus adding one more
> Objectivist (at least epistemologically, and that's a start) to
> societry, which makes society a better place to live in. If there is
> value in fighting for Objectivist epistemology against Scott Ryan,
> then I hope you take (at least some) of the fight to the group I
> metiioned. And if not, PLEASE become familar with Scott Ryan's work.
> It NEEDS to be refuted seriously, and so far all that exists are just
> casual dismissals, and those are seen (by the other side) as a joke.
I love humor, I'll have to take a look.
> If you must know a little about Ryan's work before you look into it,
> in general, he is a deist, a platonic idealist, his main case agains
> Rand is that: 1) she prejudicially desired an atheistic system and
> then set about to constuct it to fulfill that end,
That is entirely possible. I really wish, in Galt's Speech, that she
hadn't come out firmly in saying that God does not exist. Not because I
want to believe in it, but because as long as you don't claim actual
answers to metaphysical questions you are on safe grounds. Once you make
an affirmative answer to any metaphysical question you cross over the line
into religion. Atheism and Christianity/Muslim/Judaism are two sides of
the same coin, a belief in a particular system of religion. Atheism
believes in No God, Christianity/Muslim/Judaism believe in One God. Then
there's the Norse who believe in a lot of things...
> 2) that she was at least partially ignorant of the sholarship in the
> field of philosophy, and
Nobody is going to be expert in everything. And maybe it isn't necessary
if you get the essentials right. If there are 6 or 60 or 600 different
major philosophers who have important writings, whether some of them may
have important things to say is irrelevant as long as you get it right in
what you have to say.
--
Paul Robinson "Above all else... We shall go on..."
"...And continue!"
"If the lessons of history teach us anything it is
that nobody learns the lessons that history teaches us."
Churl Beck
[...]
> My favourite in the bunch is the post that mentioned Ryan's refutation
> of Rand's maxim, "You can't have your cake and eat it too." Ryan's
> reply was along the lines of: 'Having cake' and 'eating cake' mean
> the same thing; for example, when people say "We will be having cake
> for dinner tonight," and "We will be eating cake for dinner", they
> mean the same thing by both sentences. Therefore, it is possible to
> have your cake and eat it too, and therefore Rand was wrong.
>
> The poster's only comment: "I stopped reading at that point."
I remember once seeing a critique of Objectivism that made this claim, but I
assure you it wasn't by Scott Ryan.
--CHuRL
Churl Beck
> I don't see the big deal here. Definitions can change,
> while concepts may not. For example, if one had only known
> of birds that flew, one could define a bird as an animal
> that flew. That definition would have to be altered when
> the first Ostrich booted your shins.
> If you don't like the definition of furniture, find a
> better one. Keep it short though.
If you don't see the big deal, then all the worse for you. I contend that
there is no definition of "furniture" which satisfies all of Rand's
requirements for concept-fomation. You are invited to prove me wrong.
--CHuRL
Churl Beck
> Since I'm not persuaded that a disjunction is needed for "furniture" in
> the first place, this point may be moot, but the main point is of
> interest. Now maybe it really *was* Rand's intent to say that
> defining characteristics can't contain an "or", but I don't recall any
> such explicit statement on her part. You seem to be saying that
> Rand actually made such a claim -- if she did, could you tell me
> where?
No, she never explicitly said that. It is a straightforward feature of her
definition of a concept. For the third time, if the units subsumed under a
concept must possess "the same distinguishing characteristic(s)" (ITOE, pg
13), then what does that suggest to you? Does it mean that some of the
units of the concept can have distinguishing characteristic A, while other
units of the concept can have distinguishing characteristic B? Surely not!
[...]
> In this case, I think the word "hold" comes fairly close to including the
> essential unity of the words "support" and "contain", so that a table
> can hold a vase, a drawer can hold silverware, and a chair can hold a
> person.
My dictionary lists 41 uses for the word "hold." One of them is "to lift
and keep in position" and another is "to contain." I don't see any single
definition that includes both, nor can I think of a situation where both
would be applicable. Given your emphasis on the difference between words
and concepts, the point should be obvious.
[...]
> I reiterate my earlier statement that concepts and words are not the same
> thing. The same concept can often be labeled via more than one word
> ("truth", "veracity"; "sofa", "couch", "divan") and a word can represent
> more than one concept (sometimes related, sometimes unrelated: "boil",
> "walk", "bear").
I specifically addressed concepts--not words--the first time that you
brought this up, so I'm not sure why you're repeating it. Your argument, if
I understand it correctly, is that there is a concept ("contain-support")
for which there is no corresponding word. I deny that there is such a
concept and that, even if there is, it violates Rand's razor. But if I am
wrong, then you should have no trouble defining it *using Rand's guidelines
for concept-formation*.
As you can see, all this does is shift the burden from "furniture" to
"contain-supports." I'm not even sure what such a concept would entail. As
I already said, it
can't be that it simply means "contains" in one context and "supports" in
another, because that implies that it has two meanings rather than one. It
has to be that certain objects have a property which can only be described
as "contains or supports." As far as that's concerned, the best
interpretation that I can muster is that of an object which is able to be
reconfigured: it is able to contain objects in one mode, or supports them in
another. (For example, think of a jar. You can put things inside of it, or
you can turn it upside down and set things on top of it.) Of course this is
not what you are referring to when you talk about furniture.
--CHuRL
Acar
> .....
> Oh, FFS... 'you can't have your cake and eat it to' means, 'if you
> consume an asset, it ceases to be a consumable asset.'
It depends, which is precisely the point of the attributed quote. Having it
and eating it may be same thing. There's no one in the world who doesn't
know this.
> I doubt that
> there is anyone in the world, including Ryan, who does not know that
> that is what it means. Just what would be the point of having a more
> 'rigorous' meaning, which if anything would be less easily understood
> in the same way by anyone reading it
In the first place I don't know if Ryan raised that objection in that way. I
reacted to the attribution, which could be well taken in a context such as I
suggested. The answer to "everybody knows which of the possible meanings
applies" is that this understanding which "everybody" shares is
inter-subjective based on consensus, is not "objective" in the ordinary
sense.
>(the whole point of 'rigour'
> being to make precise concepts more understood, not less)?
More precise, yes. "More" understood, no. Vulgarizations and populist
rhetoric are "more" understood, but less precise. For the sake of precision
philosophy develops a jargon which is less easily understood by the
untrained reader.
Acorn
"Fred Weiss" <pape...@ix.netcom.com> wrote in message
news:b3lkd1$nig$1...@slb9.atl.mindspring.net...
>
>
> "Acar" <g...@d-g-s.com> wrote in message
> news:IMc7a.269109$i73.50...@twister.neo.rr.com...
>
> > > The poster's only comment: "I stopped reading at that point."
> >
> > .......thus missing the point and showing his inability to understand
the
> > argument.
>
> Look who's talking - and if anyone is interested in an example see my
recent
> attempt to show Acorn something as simple as the self-refutation involved
in
> denying axioms
Your recent attempt was a result of your failure to understand my argument.
For example if you say that Rand's genius is axiomatic and I deny it, I will
not be denying an axiom. If you say that my right shoe is an axiom and I am
barefoot, I can deny your axiom without fear of stealing anything.
> since he, of all people, has the audacity to criticize
> someone else for not understanding an argument).
>
> > Philosophy deals with the highest possible tolerance of
> > distinctions, therefore rigor in language is paramount.
>
> Such as grasping when one is stealing concepts as you *constantly* do.
>
> Amateurs (ouch!)
> > need not apply. It seems to me that Ryan was trying to dismiss the
> argument
> > as unsuitable for philosophical use due to lack of rigor.
>
> Then it was a non-sequitur as most of his arguments seem to be judging
from
> the ones that have been displayed here so far (I particularly like the one
> that "bearcub" approvingly quoted: that since fiction isn't allegedly
> derived from sense perception it is therefore invalid on Objectivist
terms -
> this presumably to prove that Objectivism is incorrect that reason is
based
> on sense perception - which of course is why Malenoid, our very own
Kantoid,
> thinks so highly of Ryan's absurd criticisms).
AIU bearcub's report Ryan made the argument that Rand relied on sense
perception as the basis for an ideal that can only be actualized in fiction.
But this is a somewhat sophisticated argument, so don't wrestle with it..
> "Having your cake and eating it, too" is not an argument.
Sorry, it is an argument in other words. The argument is in the appeal to
logic.
> It is an
> *expression* , a rhetorical one at that - and very well known - which is
of
> course not even original to Ayn Rand (nor did she ever claim it was). It
is
> used, when she uses it, to underscore a point, not in and of itself to
> replace an argument for the point she is making. I challenge anyone to
find
> me a single example anywhere in the entire corpus where she uses this
> expression as an argument and in replacement for an argument - and where
an
> argument is required.
Wherever she argues against contradictions. "You can not destroy something
and still have it" is an argument based on the law of non-contradiction..
> Here is an example from Galt's Speech:
>
> "Whatever you choose to consider, be it an object, an attribute or an
> action, the law of identity remains the same. A leaf cannot be a stone at
> the same time, it cannot be all red and all green at the same time, it
> cannot freeze and burn at the same time. A is A. Or, if you wish it stated
> in simpler language: You cannot have your cake and eat it, too"
She tells you and you don't believe her. The same argument "in simpler
language", she says. (And less precise, I may add.)
> And another from an article in The Ayn Rand Letter where it's rhetorical
use
> in connection with the actual argument should be very clear:
>
> "But Mr. Markel wants to eat his cake and have it, too. He advocates
public
> service without public responsibility; a blank check on public funds
without
> public accounting; the "security" of a public income without public
> control."
She is arguing that certain policies are mutually contradictory. For support
she appeals to the logic of the cake argument
Acorn, to you.
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
bearcat
So this is total hokum, right? That is what I thought after looking at the
recent e-book, though it is possible that he made some comment in an earlier
version that they took out of context. And yet they go on and on instead of
confronting his arguments.
--
--
bearcat
> I specifically addressed concepts--not words--the first time that you
> brought this up, so I'm not sure why you're repeating it. Your argument,
if
> I understand it correctly, is that there is a concept ("contain-support")
> for which there is no corresponding word. I deny that there is such a
> concept and that, even if there is, it violates Rand's razor. But if I am
> wrong, then you should have no trouble defining it *using Rand's
guidelines
> for concept-formation*.
>
Scott Ryan's critique makes an interesting and related point here:
"There are a number of other questions we could address here as well. For
example, Rand vacillates mightily on whether a concept exists prior to its
being assigned a "word". On p. 11 of IOE she tells us that "[w]ords
transform concepts into (mental) entities" (which, indeed, the unwary might
have thought they were already). Yet on the very same page, she describes a
child's concept-formation as occurring "wordlessly" - the child having, "as
yet, no knowledge of words". Perhaps the child's concepts are therefore
something other than "mental entities"? If so, then what?"
dave odden
> > Now maybe it really *was* Rand's intent to say that
> > defining characteristics can't contain an "or", but I don't recall any
> > such explicit statement on her part. You seem to be saying that
> > Rand actually made such a claim -- if she did, could you tell me
> > where?
> No, she never explicitly said that. It is a straightforward feature of
her
> definition of a concept. For the third time, if the units subsumed under
a
> concept must possess "the same distinguishing characteristic(s)" (ITOE, pg
> 13), then what does that suggest to you? Does it mean that some of the
> units of the concept can have distinguishing characteristic A, while other
> units of the concept can have distinguishing characteristic B? Surely
not!
Surely so: if the characteristic is "being A or B". As I said, this all
hinges on the nature of "characteristic". What is a "characteristic"? It
can't be "concept", for surely she would have said "concept" if that is what
she meant. For the life of me, I can't see any reason to believe that Rand
would say "A characteristic is a proposition expressible in the predicate
calculus using no disjunctions". Disjunctions -- choices -- are a natural
part of human cognition, and I don't see why you would assume that she would
not bear that fact in mind when she speaks of "characteristics". Sorry it's
the third time, but for the third time, I don't see what it is in the nature
of the term "characteristic" that allows only logical conjunctions and not
disjunctions.
> > In this case, I think the word "hold" comes fairly close to including
the
> > essential unity of the words "support" and "contain", so that a table
> > can hold a vase, a drawer can hold silverware, and a chair can hold a
> > person.
> My dictionary lists 41 uses for the word "hold." One of them is "to lift
> and keep in position" and another is "to contain." I don't see any single
> definition that includes both, nor can I think of a situation where both
> would be applicable. Given your emphasis on the difference between words
> and concepts, the point should be obvious.
Totally, and that was just a pre-emptive means of my saying that if you come
up with supposed problem for the definition in terms of "hold" which
depended on a completely different sense of the word, that would not be an
actual problem. I didn't actually expect you to make that mistake, but one
thing I've learned here is to expect the unexpected.
However, the point that your dictionary does not give any single definition
that includes "contain" and "lift and keep in position" isn't, from my POV,
at all relevant, since dictionaries are dubious tools for uncovering
meanings. Meanings of words do not derive from dictionaries; on the
contrary, dictionaries are attempts to express meanings that actually exist
(in human heads). They do not purport to be scientific reference sources
(except in the case of dictionaries of scientific terminology).
So if you were saying, indirectly, that your dictionary fails to express the
semantic primes that include "support" and "contain". I'd say you're
preaching to the choir, brother.
> I specifically addressed concepts--not words--the first time that you
> brought this up, so I'm not sure why you're repeating it. Your argument,
if
> I understand it correctly, is that there is a concept ("contain-support")
> for which there is no corresponding word. I deny that there is such a
> concept and that, even if there is, it violates Rand's razor. But if I am
> wrong, then you should have no trouble defining it *using Rand's
guidelines
> for concept-formation*.
Well, why aren't you happy with generalized "hold"? Or is it that you don't
grok the essentials of the concept? The main relevant concept is "location"
(cf. my reference to "locatives" -- sorry, I should have explained more
clearly, without jargon). The main division of locational concepts is
between stative ones (being in a location for a period of time) and dynamic
ones (change of location). The distinction between the words is largely in
terms of "enclosure" (to be "contained" in A, B must be surrounded -- to
some extent -- by A). Orientational differences are responsible for the
differences "on", "in", "under", and all you have to do is omit those
specific differentia and you have the generalized stative locative concept.
> As you can see, all this does is shift the burden from "furniture" to
> "contain-supports."
Appropriately, it seems to me, because the problem isn't that "furniture" is
an incoherent disjunctive concept, but that Rand's expression of it was,
well, I'm sorry, a little ham-fisted. The main problem as I see it is that
Rand had a crappy grip on the scientific details of language, but so
what? -- she never claimed to be a scientist. Your argument has been not
that her specific definition is wrong, but rather that no definition would
be possible (consistent with her principles). The problem *is* that her
definition with "or" is unnecessary, and the problem *isn't* with
"furniture".
So, we have two completely separate questions. First, in this specific case,
is a definition with "or" necessary. I say no. Second, in *any* case, is a
definition with "or" necessary. I strongly suspect "no" (the question is in
the hopper and I'll see whether I think of anything, and in the meantime if
you've got a clearer case of "definition with necessary disjunction", I'm
listening).
> it
> can't be that it simply means "contains" in one context and "supports" in
> another, because that implies that it has two meanings rather than one.
My proposal is that the one meaning is "stative locative". No disjunctions.
Context plays no role here.
> As far as that's concerned, the best
> interpretation that I can muster is that of an object which is able to be
> reconfigured: it is able to contain objects in one mode, or supports them
in
> another. (For example, think of a jar. You can put things inside of it,
or
> you can turn it upside down and set things on top of it.) Of course this
is
> not what you are referring to when you talk about furniture.
Good point, and thanks for bringing that example up. The essential
difference between furniture and a jar is that furniture is intended to
"stative locate" objects specifically in the home. A jar on the other hand
is not restricted in that way: it is designed to contain its contents,
irrespective of where it might happen to be. In addition (having looked at
the furniture around the house, thus performing an exhaustive search), all
of the furniture is intended to be in contact with the inside parts of the
house structure. While you can put a jar on the floor, that is abnormal and
jars are not specifically intended to go on the floor.
bearcat
was in.
I do believe Dan's call for help will go unheeded, because the response I'm
seeing remains a joke. :-)
Tom S.
news:6312c50b.03022...@posting.google.com...
> Acar <g...@d-g-s.com> wrote in message
news:<IMc7a.269109$i73.50658218@twist
> er.neo.rr.com>...
>
> consume an asset, it ceases to be a consumable asset.' I doubt that
> there is anyone in the world, including Ryan, who does not know that
> that is what it means. Just what would be the point of having a more
> 'rigorous' meaning, which if anything would be less easily understood
> in the same way by anyone reading it (the whole point of 'rigour'
> being to make precise concepts more understood, not less)?
Crips, even little kids can understand that one. Acron obviously Kant.
Tom
**
Life Sucks...then you turn to the documentation and discover that's a
feature, not a bug.
Fred Weiss
"Churl Beck" <chur...@subdimension.com> wrote in message
news:49i7a.280642$vm2.213392@rwcrnsc54...
> TommCatt wrote:
>
> [...]
> > However, I don't understand your problem with the definition of
> > furniture. Her definition was in the form of A and (B or C or D)].
>
> Correct.
>
> > You think this is wrong because A by itself includes other,
> > non-furniture items?
>
> No. Primarily it is wrong because it contradicts Rand's own criteria for
> concept-formation.
Which of course begs the question. You are arbitrarily declaring that "(B or
C or D)" cannot be regarded as "the same characteristic(s)", even though
they are all part of the same class of A. You have arbitrarily pronounced
that since B is not the same as C which is not the same as D, they cannot
all be in the same class of A. That if an object "supports" or "stores", but
not necessarily both, it cannot be regarded as "the same characteristic(s)".
Why couldn't it be? Because Churl has pronounced it.
Except of course furniture does...err..."support or store, but not
necessarily both".
Since, as I said, Churl has the perspective of an ant looking up at a curb,
he doesn't step back and do the obvious which is to ask the question: "why
then do we need the concept 'furniture'? It's not a particularly tough one
for homeowners or retailers. So that generally when you go to a "furniture
store" you would normally expect to find beds and chairs (for support) and
cabinets and chests of drawers (for storage) but not TV's or vacuum
cleaners. Why is that? Why wouldn't you have a store that sells, say, vacuum
cleaners and beds? Or ones that sell end tables and dvd players? (Putting
aside general dept stores which by their nature sell a broad range of
products).
I've never really given the matter much thought but there are in fact a
number of basics of any household, basics which have been true of households
prior to the age of electronics and modern conveniences, namely, someplace
to sit and sleep and someplace to store things. People also have at least
some tendency to want these objects to match in look and style, hence
"bedroom set" or "living room set" or "dining room set". Most people
wouldn't have a Victorian style living room and a Swedish modern style
bedroom. Or in other words, if Churl wasn't an ant, he'd note that people do
tend to group these different objects even though some of them are just for
support but not storage and vice versa.
Or in other words, none of us have any great difficulty with the concept
"furniture", as Thom says, as A + (B or C or D).
Since Churl thinks this is a problem maybe what we need to do is pass a
regulation that prevents a furniture store from selling beds and cabinets
since "obviously", according to Churl, they don't have "the same
characteristic(s)".
However, as has already been said, even if there were a problem with a
definition in the form A + (B or C or D), that would simply mean you need to
find a definition that does join them on a more fundamental level and in
which case it would have no effect on AR's theory of concepts. Look, even
Churl is implicitly admitting this. Either there is a valid concept
"furniture" or this isn't. If there isn't, then there's no issue. If there
is and he doesn't like the way AR defined it then you would think before
declaring the whole theory false that he would see if he could find a better
defnition.
Obviously people mean something by "furniture". And I assume even Malenoid
doesn't assume we know what it is by a priori pure logic. (Well, maybe I
shouldn't assume that).
Fred Weiss
TommCatt
>
> Scott Ryan's critique makes an interesting and related point here:
>
> "There are a number of other questions we could address here as well. For
> example, Rand vacillates mightily on whether a concept exists prior to its
> being assigned a "word". On p. 11 of IOE she tells us that "[w]ords
> transform concepts into (mental) entities" (which, indeed, the unwary might
> have thought they were already). Yet on the very same page, she describes a
> child's concept-formation as occurring "wordlessly" - the child having, "as
> yet, no knowledge of words". Perhaps the child's concepts are therefore
> something other than "mental entities"? If so, then what?"
He was on the right track. Maybe he thought his final question had no
answer. Maybe he knew it did and just relied on his readers not being
able to think of the answer. Without words, a child's mind contains
just vague, wordless concepts. The child can be aware of them but,
because he has no words for them, he cannot do anything with the
concepts. He cannot manipulate them, compare them, study them. Not
until he can identify one entity from another by assigning them
different labels do those concepts become something his mind can work
with. Just as his hands need soft, colorful physical entities to work with.
So far, everything quoted here from this Ryan fellow has been nothing
more than equivocations. He plays word games by using the subtle and
alternate meanings of words in the wrong places to change the meaning of
what he purports to be attacking. He's good at it, he has obviously
fooled a lot of people. But don't mistake your inability to identify
flawed logic with flawless logic. If you can't see it for yourself,
take the quotes to any good philosophy prof and ask him if they are
logically sound.
Tomm
--
A day without sunshine is like night.
Fred Weiss
"Acorn" <g...@d-g-s.com> wrote in message
news:4Au7a.272340$i73.51...@twister.neo.rr.com...
> Your recent attempt was a result of your failure to understand my
argument.
> For example if you say that Rand's genius is axiomatic and I deny it, I
will
> not be denying an axiom. If you say that my right shoe is an axiom and I
am
> barefoot, I can deny your axiom without fear of stealing anything.
Actually, you just made my point regarding your inability to follow an
argument since this has nothing whatever to do with what we were discussing.
> ...AIU bearcub's report Ryan made the argument that Rand relied on sense
> perception as the basis for an ideal that can only be actualized in
fiction.
> But this is a somewhat sophisticated argument, so don't wrestle with it..
Oh, please let's hear it. However what might be even more interesting is if
Bearcub attempted this argument on his own instead of merely citing the
authority of others which is all he usually does.
> Wherever she argues against contradictions. "You can not destroy something
> and still have it" is an argument based on the law of non-contradiction..
That's not an argument in and of itself and she would never do that. She
would first show why you can't have "it" after you've destroyed it or how
you are advocating destroying something while claiming to still have it.
However if you can find an exception, let me know. Of course we can't expect
that from you since you've never read anything she wrote nor do you possess
any of her books.
> > Here is an example from Galt's Speech:
> >
> > "Whatever you choose to consider, be it an object, an attribute or an
> > action, the law of identity remains the same. A leaf cannot be a stone
at
> > the same time, it cannot be all red and all green at the same time, it
> > cannot freeze and burn at the same time. A is A. Or, if you wish it
stated
> > in simpler language: You cannot have your cake and eat it, too"
>
> She tells you and you don't believe her. The same argument "in simpler
> language", she says. (And less precise, I may add.)
Oh, brother, like the preceding three sentences don't exist for you.
>
> > And another from an article in The Ayn Rand Letter where it's rhetorical
> use
> > in connection with the actual argument should be very clear:
> >
> > "But Mr. Markel wants to eat his cake and have it, too. He advocates
> public
> > service without public responsibility; a blank check on public funds
> without
> > public accounting; the "security" of a public income without public
> > control."
>
> She is arguing that certain policies are mutually contradictory. For
support
> she appeals to the logic of the cake argument
She points out that the policies are mutually contradictory and then says
this is an example of "cake". Or in other words she first makes her case and
*then* states "cake".
Anyway, let's keep our eye on the ball. We're discussing Ryan's claim that
her use of "cake" is invalid. Where is the invalidity? I'm saying that, like
you, he's a moron. You've haven't yet proven me wrong.
Fred Weiss
Fred Weiss
"bearcat" <bea...@nomail.com> wrote in message
news:v5su79j...@corp.supernews.com...
>...And yet they go on and on instead of confronting his arguments.
Well, gee, bearcub, is anyone stopping you from confronting "they"?
Let's hear the arguments.
Fred Weiss
John Shafto
pernews.com...
>
>
>
> Scott Ryan's critique makes an interesting and related point here:
>
> "There are a number of other questions we could address here as well. For
> example, Rand vacillates mightily on whether a concept exists prior to its
> being assigned a "word". On p. 11 of IOE she tells us that "[w]ords
> transform concepts into (mental) entities" (which, indeed, the unwary might
> have thought they were already).
I would agree that the sentence is poorly stated, I don't know
exactly what it is supposed to mean. I think that words, symbols,
or hand signals transform concepts into ~communicative~
mental entities, or externally identifiable mental entities.
> Yet on the very same page, she describes a child's
> concept-formation as occurring "wordlessly" - the child having, "as
> yet, no knowledge of words".
It seems from this, and all else she wrote, that Rand would
have agreed with me.
> Perhaps the child's concepts are therefore
> something other than "mental entities"? If so, then what?"
I don't know of any reason to make this leap for her,
and don't see how this extrapolated nit refutes her at all.
It's stuff like this that makes so many critiques of
Rand seem so contrived and bogus.
(I do think she probably over emphasized "measurement omission"
in ITOE though, even as it may be a primary attribute for omission
in concept formation, it seems that "attribute omission" is a
better (weaker) generalization for describing concept formation.)
Fred Weiss
"bearcat" <bea...@nomail.com> wrote in message
news:v5suivq...@corp.supernews.com...
> Scott Ryan's critique makes an interesting and related point here:
>
> "There are a number of other questions we could address here as well. For
> example, Rand vacillates mightily on whether a concept exists prior to its
> being assigned a "word". On p. 11 of IOE she tells us that "[w]ords
> transform concepts into (mental) entities" (which, indeed, the unwary
might
> have thought they were already). Yet on the very same page, she describes
a
> child's concept-formation as occurring "wordlessly" - the child having,
"as
> yet, no knowledge of words". Perhaps the child's concepts are therefore
> something other than "mental entities"? If so, then what?"
Yeah, this is obviously typical of Ryan's "critiques" and it's no surprise
that you are impressed with it.
(It wouldn't occur to you that she might know what she was doing if the
seeming contradiction were on precisely the very same page).
The point is that some elementary concepts apparently do in fact and
probably must precede the knowledge of words. But it is also clear that the
child's intellectual development would be severely stunted if it didn't
learn language, i.e. that words are necessary for full conceptual
development. (The best presentation of this being The Miracle Worker based
on the true story of Helen Keller).
Fred Weiss
bearcat
> Oh, please let's hear it. However what might be even more interesting is
if
> Bearcub attempted this argument on his own instead of merely citing the
> authority of others which is all he usually does.
1. I already posted it.
2. Elsewhere you complained that I wasn't showing Scott Ryan's arguments.
But Dan, who started this thread, still hasn't told us what he takes issue
with from Scott's critique. So here and there I'm posting what I can.
Mostly, I want people to read it themselves.
So what do you want, an argument from me or Scott?
I don't find your arguments interesting or compelling, so lately I haven't
been responding to them. Trying to explain the difference between
perception and sensation to you earlier was enough of a mind-numbing chore.
You're not an interesting foil, dude, get over it. You'd do the
Objectivists a service by staying off the keyboard and letting George Dance,
Dave Odden, and others who can think defend Rand's position.
John Shafto
>
> If you don't see the big deal, then all the worse for you. I contend that
> there is no definition of "furniture" which satisfies all of Rand's
> requirements for concept-fomation. You are invited to prove me wrong.
Why are you trying to shift the burden of proof?
I don't see how any common definition of 'furniture'
disproves Rand's ideas of concept formation.
If you know something I don't, let's hear it.
All you have done so far is criticize her definition,
and very poorly at that.
Fred Weiss
"bearcat" <bea...@nomail.com> wrote in message
news:v5t7178...@corp.supernews.com...
>
>
> > Oh, please let's hear it. However what might be even more interesting is
> if
> > Bearcub attempted this argument on his own instead of merely citing the
> > authority of others which is all he usually does.
>
> 1. I already posted it.
First of all you didn't post your own argument. And what you posted isn't an
argument. What you posted was a non-sequitur assertion by a moron. Are you
prepared to defend it?
> Mostly, I want people to read it themselves.
Something more presumably than the nobody who is reading it now. But that
aside you haven't given us anything other than evidence that he is a moron.
A total moron. Sort of like you.
> ... Trying to explain the difference between
> perception and sensation to you earlier was enough of a mind-numbing
chore.
What does that have to do with anything. Earth to Bearcub, try and stay
focused on what we're discussing.
>
> You're not an interesting foil, dude, get over it. You'd do the
> Objectivists a service by staying off the keyboard and letting George
Dance,
> Dave Odden, and others who can think defend Rand's position.
Oh, have you been engaging them in interesting arguments. Maybe I've missed
some of your scintillating discussion. Can you give me a few cites? Thanks.
Once again, Bearcub, let's review this much: you're a rank second-hander and
a moron and obviously can't do anything except quote other people or wag
your tail around other people who are arguing. Want to prove me wrong,
please go right ahead. You're the one who claimed this group is "dying", so
here's your big chance.
Fred Weiss
Arnold
You have ignored what I wrote.
A definition is just a label for identifying the concept.
It doesn't include everything in the concept. A definition
is not the concept, and so need not satisfy "all of Rand's
requirements for concept formation." The features which
most distinguish the concept from other concepts make the
clearest definition.
Definitions change because they are no longer able to
distinguish - as mentioned with the birds above. Brevity is
an important part of definiens, so if one defines furniture
as: "objects used for support in human living spaces" it
may be sufficient. If you wish to add size limits, along
with shapes, the definition becomes more of a description.
Definitions are limited in their descriptions, but should
be clear enough to explain the concept.
--
Arnold
Acar
One debates Fred for fun, not as a challenge. Of course at some point it's
not fun anymore.
Acar
"Tom S." <tms...@qwest.net> wrote in message
news:t0v7a.518$GK.1...@news.uswest.net...
> "George Dance" <georg...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
> news:6312c50b.03022...@posting.google.com...
> > Acar <g...@d-g-s.com> wrote in message
> news:<IMc7a.269109$i73.50658218@twist
> > er.neo.rr.com>...
> >
> > Oh, FFS... 'you can't have your cake and eat it to' means, 'if you
> > consume an asset, it ceases to be a consumable asset.' I doubt that
> > there is anyone in the world, including Ryan, who does not know that
> > that is what it means. Just what would be the point of having a more
> > 'rigorous' meaning, which if anything would be less easily understood
> > in the same way by anyone reading it (the whole point of 'rigour'
> > being to make precise concepts more understood, not less)?
>
> Crips, even little kids can understand that one.
True. But a lot of things go over the head of little kids. In other words,
you get a zero for that one.
>Acron obviously Kant.
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
xx
x.
bearcat
>
> First of all you didn't post your own argument. And what you posted isn't
an
> argument. What you posted was a non-sequitur assertion by a moron. Are you
> prepared to defend it?
>
<snip>
>
> Something more presumably than the nobody who is reading it now. But that
> aside you haven't given us anything other than evidence that he is a
moron.
> A total moron. Sort of like you.
<snip>
> Once again, Bearcub, let's review this much: you're a rank second-hander
and
> a moron and obviously can't do anything except quote other people or wag
> your tail around other people who are arguing. Want to prove me wrong,
> please go right ahead. You're the one who claimed this group is "dying",
so
> here's your big chance.
>
> Fred Weiss
>
Hey, thanks for the Shakespeare....
--
--
--
--
--
--
-
Arnold
>
> Yet on the very same page, she describes a
> child's concept-formation as occurring "wordlessly" - the
child having, "as
> yet, no knowledge of words". Perhaps the child's concepts
are therefore
> something other than "mental entities"? If so, then
what?"
>
parallels his putting words to concepts. He may have a
awareness of motion, but it takes time to put a word to the
abstract of motion. I believe this "awareness" is what is
meant by wordless concept formation. If you have ever found
yourself looking for a word to get a concept across, you
can imagine the frustration a kid can have. The movie "The
Miracle Worker" demonstrates the frustration of having a
concept without words. I suspect temper tantrums often
result from this lack of words to convey a concept.
--
Arnold
adoega
$tq4.6313@sccrnsc01>...
> Dave Odden wrote:
>
> My dictionary lists 41 uses for the word "hold." One of them is "to lift
> and keep in position" and another is "to contain." I don't see any single
> definition that includes both, nor can I think of a situation where both
> would be applicable. Given your emphasis on the difference between words
> and concepts, the point should be obvious.
>
Isn't 'to keep in position' a concept, just as 'to contain' is another
different concept? These two different concepts may use the same word
but aren't they different concepts?
Gordon Sollars
pape...@ix.netcom.com says...
>
> "Gordon Sollars" <gsol...@pobox.com> wrote in message
> >... Theories don't have
> > to work perfectly to be good, but when they break down on the author's
> > own examples, it's at least a six on the Richter Scale.
>
> Or a one, if that, depending on the nature of the"breakdown" and the
> example.
For myself, I suspect that a network is a much better model for concepts
than a hierarchy, and that much of ITOE is contradicted by cognitive
psychology or linguistics - but I have enough irons in the fire.
The only point I was making here was that a proponent of a theory has to
be willing to defend it, not simply brush off a counterexample as
trivial - at least when that example was seriously put forward within
the theory. (But some others here actually took up the challenge of
defending the theory against Churl's claim, and now it appears in some
post nearby that you might be rising to the challenge, too.)
> I think it is widely acknowledged among Objectivists that AR made
> mistakes in some of her examples and applications, some of which have been
> discussed here, others which have been discussed ad nauseum elsewhere - the
> most notorious one here probably being your and David F.'s drawn out and
> typically ridiculous attempt to show that the entire corpus of Objectivism
> was in question because of her charge in a private letter in a specific
> context that "Milton Friedman was a Red".
Come now. That was only one example. I have come at the "context
doctrine" in a variety of ways. Nor does it represent (I hope) the
"entire corpus" of Objectivism.
> This btw is a relevant point with regard to any philosopher, including ones
> in opposition to Objectivism, and would be a characteristic mark of gross
> unfairness - a charge btw which is often thrown at AR herself with regard to
> other philosophers. Although I believe that charge is unjustified the
> hypocrisy on this issue is blatant.
Philosophers get exposed to searching criticism by other philosophers,
and you can rest assured that /any/ philosopher who has a self-chosen
example blow up in his face (if, indeed, the "furniture example" is such
a blow up) gets a little roughing up. You can either answer Churl's
critique or you can't. Crying about hypocrisy does not cut any
philosophical ice.
--
Gordon Sollars
gsol...@pobox.com
Lon
mputer.org>...
> Churl Beck wrote:
> > TommCatt wrote:
>
> If so, I really don't know if you are being serious here. We have the
> concept 'furniture.' There is obviously some way to define the concept
> such that all objects of type [furniture] are included and all other
> objects are excluded. Otherwise, the concept is too vague to be meaningful.
>
> Tomm
I don't see why you see this as obvious. Even if you take a simple
concept like "red" there will be some shades which clearly are red
and some which aren't. There will also be shades in the middle for
which it is not so clear whether they should count as red or not.
Some people likely would count them, others not, and others have
no opinion on the matter. Why would this make "red" too vague to
be meaningful? Most of our language would become meaningful if this
was the case.
Lon
HPO JURY = Malenor
<postm...@paul.washington.dc.us> wrote:
>> 2) that she was at least partially ignorant of the sholarship in the
>> field of philosophy, and
>Nobody is going to be expert in everything. And maybe it isn't necessary
>if you get the essentials right. If there are 6 or 60 or 600 different
>major philosophers who have important writings, whether some of them may
>have important things to say is irrelevant as long as you get it right in
>what you have to say.
The author wasn't so generous as to say she was "at least partially
ignorant" of philosophical scholarship. He is saying that she was
almost completely, if not completely, ignorant of it.
Fred Weiss
"Lon" <bec...@bgnet.bgsu.edu> wrote in message
news:c24964d1.03022...@posting.google.com...
> I don't see why you see this as obvious. Even if you take a simple
> concept like "red" there will be some shades which clearly are red
> and some which aren't. There will also be shades in the middle for
> which it is not so clear whether they should count as red or not.
> Some people likely would count them, others not, and others have
> no opinion on the matter. Why would this make "red" too vague to
> be meaningful? Most of our language would become meaningful if this
> was the case.
This is covered in her discussion of "borderline cases". Colors are in fact
a paradigm example of the issue and you can observe how we've developed
concepts for shadings which are at the edges of the spectrum for a
particular color. It's important in any field where color is an important
aspect, such as graphic design.
Fred Weiss
George Dance
$iG3.29665@sccrnsc02>...
> George Dance wrote:
>
> [...]
> > My favourite in the bunch is the post that mentioned Ryan's refutation
> > of Rand's maxim, "You can't have your cake and eat it too." Ryan's
> > reply was along the lines of: 'Having cake' and 'eating cake' mean
> > the same thing; for example, when people say "We will be having cake
> > for dinner tonight," and "We will be eating cake for dinner", they
> > mean the same thing by both sentences. Therefore, it is possible to
> > have your cake and eat it too, and therefore Rand was wrong.
> >
> > The poster's only comment: "I stopped reading at that point."
>
> I remember once seeing a critique of Objectivism that made this claim, but I
> assure you it wasn't by Scott Ryan.
>
> --CHuRL
Quite right; after reading this, I did a search for the post, and
found that it referenced a different on-line critique, John Ku's
critique of Objectivist ethics:
Robert Kolker
adoega wrote:
> Isn't 'to keep in position' a concept, just as 'to contain' is another
> different concept? These two different concepts may use the same word
> but aren't they different concepts?
Not quite. A container keeps in place its contents and prevents their
spilling all about. The notions of hold are associated but not
necessarily in a stricted genus-species hierarchy.
Bob Kolker
Robert Kolker
Gordon Sollars wrote:
> For myself, I suspect that a network is a much better model for concepts
> than a hierarchy, and that much of ITOE is contradicted by cognitive
> psychology or linguistics - but I have enough irons in the fire.
Give that lad a Macenudo! I hope you smoke cigars.
Bob Kolker
Churl Beck
>> If you don't see the big deal, then all the worse for you. I contend
>> that there is no definition of "furniture" which satisfies all of Rand's
>> requirements for concept-fomation. You are invited to prove me
>> wrong.
>
> Why are you trying to shift the burden of proof?
What am I supposed to do? Prove that every valid definition of furniture
that ever was or ever could be is inconsistent with Rand's theory of
concepts? How do you propose that I do that?
Whenever I bring up this issue, the response invariably comes: "Well, if
Rand's definition of furniture is inconsistent with her theory of concepts,
then just find a definition for furniture that isn't. Problem solved."
True enough; the problem would be solved *if* such a definition can be
found. But the problem is *not* solved just by declaring (without proof--as
Arnold and Fred, and others before have done) that such a definition
necessarily exists. It is not my burden to find proof for their claims.
> I don't see how any common definition of 'furniture'
> disproves Rand's ideas of concept formation.
> If you know something I don't, let's hear it.
>
> All you have done so far is criticize her definition,
> and very poorly at that.
I haven't criticized her definition. On the contrary, I have assumed it to
be correct.
--CHuRL
Rob
> > Perhaps the child's concepts are therefore
> > something other than "mental entities"? If so, then what?"
>
> I don't know of any reason to make this leap for her,
> and don't see how this extrapolated nit refutes her at all.
> It's stuff like this that makes so many critiques of
> Rand seem so contrived and bogus.
There's not much of a leap involved. She says that words transform
concepts into mental entities. If that's a general claim, then it
implies that concepts without words are not mental entitities. Since
she also talks about the child's wordless acquisition of concepts, she
must, to be consistent, think that those wordless concepts are not
mental entities. What, then, are they?
I don't know that this observation is supposed to refute Rand. No
major part of her epistemology need go by the board if she admits that
concepts are mental entities from the beginning, whether or not formed
by a language-user. What the observation does show is how careless she
was in writing.
Rob
John Shafto
news:ea1f2acf.03022...@posting.google.com...
> John Shafto <jo...@moc.otam> wrote:
>
> > > Perhaps the child's concepts are therefore
> > > something other than "mental entities"? If so, then what?"
> >
> > I don't know of any reason to make this leap for her,
> > and don't see how this extrapolated nit refutes her at all.
> > It's stuff like this that makes so many critiques of
> > Rand seem so contrived and bogus.
>
> There's not much of a leap involved. She says that words transform
> concepts into mental entities. If that's a general claim, then it
> implies that concepts without words are not mental entitities.
No, there is no "general claim" there, nor is she "vaccillating
mightly" (as Scott Ryan desires to see it). It really doesn't say
what you want it to say at all, particularly if you consider the
entire sentence, and in the context of the sentences around it...
The previous paragraph talks about the function of language,
and how words create perceptual concretes. Then, the first
sentence of the next paragraph, in it's entirety, is:
"Words transform concepts into (mental) entities;
definitions provide them with identity.", followed by
"(Words without definitions are not language but inarticulate
sounds.)"
She seems plainly to be talking about how words
transform mental entities (concepts) into externally
identifiable, (albeit mentally created) entities (which are
then defined in external language, with other words and
their associated internal concepts), not about whether or
not concepts *are* mental entities.
> Since
> she also talks about the child's wordless acquisition of concepts, she
> must, to be consistent, think that those wordless concepts are not
> mental entities. What, then, are they?
>
> I don't know that this observation is supposed to refute Rand. No
> major part of her epistemology need go by the board if she admits that
> concepts are mental entities from the beginning, whether or not formed
> by a language-user. What the observation does show is how careless she
> was in writing.
Yes, I have already agreed that the particular sentence
fragment is poorly worded, but it is quite a leap, that
requires ignoring much else she wrote, to assume that
she meant to say there that concepts are *not* mental entities.
Further, I cannot generalize from this, as you seem so
ready to do, that she was across-the-board a careless writer.
Particularly given the volume of words she laid down in her life,
and how crystal clear she was on so many issues.
John Shafto
0$iG3.30896@sccrnsc02...
> John Shafto wrote:
>
> >> If you don't see the big deal, then all the worse for you. I contend
> >> that there is no definition of "furniture" which satisfies all of Rand's
> >> requirements for concept-fomation. You are invited to prove me
> >> wrong.
> >
> > Why are you trying to shift the burden of proof?
>
> What am I supposed to do? Prove that every valid definition of furniture
> that ever was or ever could be is inconsistent with Rand's theory of
> concepts? How do you propose that I do that?
I wonder if you can explain how *any* common definition
is inconsistent.
> Whenever I bring up this issue, the response invariably comes: "Well, if
> Rand's definition of furniture is inconsistent with her theory of concepts,
> then just find a definition for furniture that isn't. Problem solved."
I don't know who you are quoting there, nor do I think you have
shown how her definition is inconsistent. You are just begging
the question.
Fred Weiss
"Rob" <log...@mailandnews.com> wrote in message
news:ea1f2acf.03022...@posting.google.com...
> John Shafto <jo...@moc.otam> wrote:
>
> > > Perhaps the child's concepts are therefore
> > > something other than "mental entities"? If so, then what?"
> >
> > I don't know of any reason to make this leap for her,
> > and don't see how this extrapolated nit refutes her at all.
> > It's stuff like this that makes so many critiques of
> > Rand seem so contrived and bogus.
>
> There's not much of a leap involved. She says that words transform
> concepts into mental entities.
But the context is *clearly* when one is viewing concepts in regard to their
more advanced role in forming higher level abstractions. The section in
which resides the sentence where she refers to the role of words is a
*preface* to the later, more detailed discussion. In those very same
prefatory remarks she refers to the somewhat broader concept of *language*
which is she says "a code of visual-auditory symbols" (which wouldn't
necessarily have to be words) - in fact she discusses this later in
connection with a child's "pictorial" representation of concepts prior to
their learning words.
Furthermore, in the *very next paragraph* she says: "The above is a
*general* description of the nature of concepts as products of a certain
mental process" <emphasis mine>.
Later on, as I said, in that very same section she states her view that
children, prior to learning language, hold concepts "pictorally".
>What the observation does show is how careless she was in writing.
Or actually, what it shows is your inability to keep context - to such an
extent that something written even a few pages - or even mere paragraphs
later is disregarded. But, hey, join the rest of the ants here trying to
approach philosophy as a process of looking up at a curb.
And...err...wasn't it you, or am I thinking of someone else, who thought
rather outrageously (let alone, carelessly) that The Sopranos could be
regarded as a "libertarian statement". All one had to do, according to you
(if it was you) was approach it in a more "nuanced" manner. Uh, huh.
Well, let's just say that AR is a shining light of crystal clarity in
comparison to that kind of crap.
Fred Weiss
dave odden
> The previous paragraph talks about the function of language,
> and how words create perceptual concretes. Then, the first
> sentence of the next paragraph, in it's entirety, is:
> "Words transform concepts into (mental) entities;
> definitions provide them with identity.", followed by
> "(Words without definitions are not language but inarticulate
> sounds.)"
> She seems plainly to be talking about how words
> transform mental entities (concepts) into externally
> identifiable, (albeit mentally created) entities (which are
> then defined in external language, with other words and
> their associated internal concepts), not about whether or
> not concepts *are* mental entities.
There's a problem with "defined" vs. "defined in external language", taken
in conjunction with the statement that "Words without definitions are not
language...". Most people cannot give a truly accurate definition in
external language of most words in their language. I've yet to meet anyone
who can define "dog" except by saying "canis familiaris" which is not a
definition but a circular translation of "dog" into Latin scientific
nomenclature. Almost nobody can define "red". Nonetheless, people know what
dogs are and what things are red. Children, especially, are fairly incapable
of expressing definitions of words in external language, yet they clearly
know what words mean.
People know the definitions of words (i.e. they know those characteristics
that a word describes), but they can't necessarily *produce* those
descriptions. Technical terms like "rhombus" may indeed need to have an
explicit external-language definition in order for a person to know what a
word means. For most words, an external definition is not necessary for
understanding a word. On the other hand, there literally are no words
without (internal) definition, i.e. words not representing concepts in a
mind. Those inarticulate sounds that Rand was speaking of are not even
words -- they are just sounds.
Which does not mean that an external language definition is not possible:
simply that it is not a prerequisite for actually knowing what a word means
(how a word is defined). In other words...
> transform mental entities (concepts) into externally
> identifiable
yes
> (albeit mentally created) entities (which are
> then defined in external language
no: definable, but not necessarily defined in external language (and
actually known to the individual).
TommCatt
> TommCatt <Tomm...@computer.org> wrote:
>>We have the
>>concept 'furniture.' There is obviously some way to define the concept
>>such that all objects of type [furniture] are included and all other
>>objects are excluded. Otherwise, the concept is too vague to be meaningful.
>
> concept like "red" there will be some shades which clearly are red
> and some which aren't. There will also be shades in the middle for
> which it is not so clear whether they should count as red or not.
> Some people likely would count them, others not, and others have
> no opinion on the matter. Why would this make "red" too vague to
> be meaningful?
Actually, "red" is not the best example you could have chosen. The
concept is "color" and red is just an instance. Something better would
be the concepts such as "chair" and "stool."
This is not a matter of vagueness. In programming, the concept is known
as fuzziness. It only means that the line which separates one concept
from another, similar concept is not a sharp, distinct division. It is
an area with some discernible width and fuzzy borders. Precepts or
instances that lie within this area could rightfully be considered as
one concept or the other.
Is this a flaw in Rand's definition of concepts? No, because it applies
no matter how one defines concepts. The only way to get rid of this
"problem" is to discard concepts entirely.
> Most of our language would become meaningful if this
> was the case.
Do you mean that language is currently not meaningful? How so?
Tomm
--
The opinions in this article are my own,
and not those of the voices which tell me what to do.
Fred Weiss
"Robert Kolker" <bobk...@attbi.com> wrote in message
news:3E5F7F97...@attbi.com...
Which makes me wonder if the common denominator of furniture isn't in fact
"movable objects which....holds things (of a certain size)" where "holds" is
viewed somewhat broadly to encompass both "holding up" (as in supporting)
and "containing/storage". However, I am not of the view that a concept
cannot be of the form, as suggested by Tomm, A + (B or C or D, etc.), so I
am not inclined to pursue this matter further unless the "ant squad" insists
that if this alleged problem of the definition of "furniture" isn't solved
all of Objectivism comes crashing down.
Fred Weiss
Fred Weiss
"John Shafto" <gro.o...@nhoj.rev> wrote in message
news:v5vblsp...@corp.supernews.com...
> > Whenever I bring up this issue, the response invariably comes: "Well, if
> > Rand's definition of furniture is inconsistent with her theory of
concepts,
> > then just find a definition for furniture that isn't. Problem solved."
>
> I don't know who you are quoting there, nor do I think you have
> shown how her definition is inconsistent. You are just begging
> the question.
Exactly. He's just arbitrarily asserting that there is nothing in common or
no basis for joining objects which support and objects which store - even
though virtually the entire universe disagrees with him, not the least of
which are virtually every furniture store owner in the world and everyone
who goes to a furniture store and generally knows what to expect to find
there, namely, objects which support and/or store - and virtually every
woman in the world who goes nuts if these particular objects don't match!
But this requires taking a step back and looking at the broader perspective,
something which an ant looking up a curb is incapable of.
Precisely the same thing is going on with the "words/concepts/mental
entities" thread. All you have to do is take a step back and see the full
context of what she is discussing where and for what purpose and what she
clarifies just a few pages or even paragraphs later. Incidentally, another
context here is that AR published nothing...nothing....which wasn't edited
and re-edited and ruthlessly re-edited (some of those drafts selling for
thousands of dollars at auction a few years ago). So that it would be rather
astounding if she literally contradicted herself from one paragraph to the
next and didn't notice it -and in this instance blatantly so. But it's
easier for an ant to assume that's what she did - rather than grasp the full
context of her comments, assuming he's even capable of it.
Incidentally it is not invalid to throw it back in his face and ask him to
suggest another definition if he thinks this one has problems because either
there is something in common among items of furniture or there isn't. And if
there isn't, then it's an invalid concept and should be discarded. I might
add that the idea that concepts refer to units with "the same
characteristic(s)" isn't even unique to AR. That was also Aristotle's view
over 2,000 years ago. And I would guess that aspect of concepts is
uncontroversial and the identification of which is hardly AR's claim to
fame. So his charge doesn't even have anything uniquely to do with her
theory. He might as well say that the alleged problem with the definition of
"furniture" renders it not possible for us to form concepts!
Fred Weiss
dave odden
> Which makes me wonder if the common denominator of furniture isn't in fact
> "movable objects which....holds things (of a certain size)" where "holds"
is
> viewed somewhat broadly to encompass both "holding up" (as in supporting)
> and "containing/storage".
Has anyone suggested that in this thread?
dave odden
> This is not a matter of vagueness. In programming, the concept is known
> as fuzziness. It only means that the line which separates one concept
> from another, similar concept is not a sharp, distinct division. It is
> an area with some discernible width and fuzzy borders. Precepts or
> instances that lie within this area could rightfully be considered as
> one concept or the other.
Well, "it", namely the color problem, does have the consequence that there
are some fuzzy concepts, but it doesn't mean that all concepts are fuzzy.
When nature itself presents dramatically different existents, the concepts
will be clear, whereas color category boundaries are totally arbitrary and
based on a continuous function (so it would be utterly bizarre if color
divisions were crisp). Existence is a non-fuzzy concept, for example.
Unfortunately, it's largely higher-order concepts (true, false, etc.) that
are crisp.
John Shafto
news:b3oehr$h17$1...@charm.magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu...
> "John Shafto" wrote:
>
> > The previous paragraph talks about the function of language,
> > and how words create perceptual concretes. Then, the first
> > sentence of the next paragraph, in it's entirety, is:
> > "Words transform concepts into (mental) entities;
> > definitions provide them with identity.", followed by
> > "(Words without definitions are not language but inarticulate
> > sounds.)"
>
> > She seems plainly to be talking about how words
> > transform mental entities (concepts) into externally
> > identifiable, (albeit mentally created) entities (which are
> > then defined in external language, with other words and
> > their associated internal concepts), not about whether or
> > not concepts *are* mental entities.
>
> There's a problem with "defined" vs. "defined in external language",
> taken in conjunction with the statement that "Words without definitions
> are not language...".
Okay.
<snip>
> For most words, an external definition is not necessary for
> understanding a word. On the other hand, there literally are no words
> without (internal) definition, i.e. words not representing concepts in a
> mind. Those inarticulate sounds that Rand was speaking of are not even
> words -- they are just sounds.
They could be words to the individual using them, as you indicate,
Rand was saying that they are not 'language'.
> Which does not mean that an external language definition is not possible:
> simply that it is not a prerequisite for actually knowing what a word means
> (how a word is defined). In other words...
Your point is tangential, but I don't disagree.
It's just a question of perspective...whether we are
talking about an individual, or a process of language between
more than one person. If so, the means of definition varies
(whether by pointing at the concrete distinctions/likenesses
that are contained in the concept, by pointing at the
dictionary, by saying "ask so-and-so", or by explaining
in other terms). I only mentioned the use of language
(Rand's focus there) for definition, but I acknowledge
that is not the only way to define a word. One could
also come up with a set of symbols known only
to them, write something down, and read it later,
communicating only with themself.
In the sentence in question, I think she was trying
to explain her view of the process of words making
concepts concrete, and why they are distinct.
Concrete -> concept [-> concept...] -> concrete -> definition.
Her parenthetic "mental" was to express that words
are concrete representations of mental entities (concepts),
that their meaning is mental creation (distinction and
inductive logic), not to say that concepts are something
other than mental entities.
Her parenthetical comment that followed was a bit of
rhetorical flourish with two functions; to express that it
is necessary for people to somehow define their terms
in order for the words to be communicative,
and it further indicates her context as it directly follows the
sentence in question. It places her object of consideration
there outside of whether or not concepts are mental entities
(that was a given in her points there).
TommCatt
>
> Existence is a non-fuzzy concept, for example.
> Unfortunately, it's largely higher-order concepts (true, false, etc.) that
> are crisp.
I agree that "existence" is a crisp concept. But that is because it is
a low-order concept. Aamof, it is the lowest order of all concepts.
(It could be argued that it is the highest order and fuzziest concept in
that it contains all other concepts. I guess it all depends on your
definition of "order.") The higher the order of the concept, the
fuzzier its boundaries, even "true" and "false." In programming, we use
fuzzy logic because there is not a crisp boundary between "true" and
"false." Without fuzzy logic, we have to pick a (largely arbitrary)
threshold beyond which we flip from one to the other.
Tomm
--
Heisenberg might have slept here.
Fred Weiss
"dave odden" <od...@ling.ohio-state.edu> wrote in message
news:b3oki2$i0b$1...@charm.magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu...
What's your point?
Fred Weiss
Churl Beck
[...]
>> You are just begging the question.
>
> Exactly. He's just arbitrarily asserting that there is nothing in common
> or no basis for joining objects which support and objects which store -
> even though virtually the entire universe disagrees with him, not the
least
> of which are virtually every furniture store owner in the world and
> everyone who goes to a furniture store and generally knows what to
> expect to find there, namely, objects which support and/or store
[...]
Talk about begging the question!: (a) All concepts are formed just as AR has
described, (b) People have a concept of furniture, therefore (c) The concept
of furniture must have been formed just as AR described.
> Incidentally it is not invalid to throw it back in his face and ask him to
> suggest another definition if he thinks this one has problems because
> either there is something in common among items of furniture or
> there isn't.
This just keeps getting better. I have the burden of proving that there is
an inconsistency--AND I have the burden of proving that there isn't an
inconsistency! You're a regular Brainiac.
[...]
> I might add that the idea that concepts refer to units with "the same
> characteristic(s)" isn't even unique to AR. That was also Aristotle's view
> over 2,000 years ago. And I would guess that aspect of concepts is
> uncontroversial and the identification of which is hardly AR's claim to
> fame. So his charge doesn't even have anything uniquely to do with her
> theory.
Why does it matter if her theory is unique or not? Or are you just trying
to squeeze in an "ad populum" fallacy for old-time sake?
> He might as well say that the alleged problem with the definition of
> "furniture" renders it not possible for us to form concepts!
Naw, I think I'll stick to the argument that I have been making: that (a) we
have concepts, and (b) Rand's theory about them is wrong. This statement of
yours, which is typical of you, only demonstrates your inability to
distinguish the difference between the two statements.
--CHuRL
Churl Beck
[...]
> We have the concept 'furniture.' There is obviously some way to define
> the concept such that all objects of type [furniture] are included and all
> other objects are excluded. Otherwise, the concept is too vague to
> be meaningful.
There is no question that we have the concept "furniture." The question is
whether or not it can be justified by Rand's theory.
> Concepts are hierarchical in nature. That is, the definition of a
> concept must consist of other, simpler concepts. This can be repeated
> for all the component concepts until we arrive at conceptual "atoms,"
> the primary concepts that cannot be broken down further. All you have
> done is taken the basic idea of a concept, the fact that there must be
> something in common will all instances of the concept, and then "drilled
> down" into the definition to where different subconcepts are
> differentiated. At this point you try to argue that, as you can
> distinguish multiple concepts at this point, there cannot be one concept.
So you are saying that the feature in common with all pieces of furniture is
that they are all "Movable man-made objects intended to be used in a human
habitation, which can support the weight of the human body or support and/or
store other, smaller objects." Fine. Let's review Rand's model of
concept-formation.
As described on page 11, a child begins by observing a number of objects
which have one or more common characteristics. The characteristics
themselves must be the same across all of the objects, although the specific
measurements of those characteristics will differ. The child omits their
measurement and retains only the common characteristics, which are then
united by a specific definition.
Now apply that to the present case. For the sake of keeping this simple,
let's say that a child observes a chair and says to himself "That is a
movable man-made object...which can support the weight of the human body."
Next he sees a desk and says to himself "That is a movable man-made
object...that can store other, smaller objects." At this point he should
have all of the information that he needs in order to form a rough concept
of "furniture."
Unfortunately, the objects in question only have one distinguishing
characteristic in common: they are both "movable man-made objects intended
to be used in a human habitation." He looks at the other relevant
characteristics and notices that "can support the weight of the human body"
is qualitatively different from "can store other, smaller objects." They
are not simply different in terms of their specific measurements, they are
different in kind--i.e., their distinguishing characteristics are
incommensurate.
He observes that one of them supports and that the other one contains, but
in no case does he observe that one of them "supports or contains" and that
the other one shares this characteristic. This is true both in practice
(you don't walk into a room and "observe" that something is what it is "or
it's something else") and as one of Rand's rules for concept-formation.
I.e., one doesn't define a computer as a thing that is "electronic or
green," or a bird as a thing that "has wings or barks," etc. This is the
point Rand was making when she said "Concepts cannot be formed at random.
[...] All conceptual differentiations are made in terms of /commensurable
characteristics/ (i.e., characteristics possessing a common unit of
measurement)" (pg. 13).
I can hear the march of Fred's straw man brigade now, so let me just say
that, no, I'm not implying that the concept "furniture" has been formed at
random. I'm saying that it does not meet the standards of Objectivist
epistemology. It is a counterexample to her theory which is used on a
regular basis, without difficulty, by millions of people.
[...]
> At this point you come in and try to show that there cannot be any such
> set F because you can see all these separate sets C1, C21, etc. Worse,
> you say that set theory itself is invalid because there is no way to
> have a set contain like items because there can always be an element of
> one subset that is not an element of another component subset.
[...]
One thing I know for sure: the set of all people who are both "Objectivist"
and "logical" is disappointingly small. Save your straw men for a bonfire.
--CHuRL
Churl Beck
> > No. Primarily it is wrong because it contradicts Rand's own criteria
>> for concept-formation.
>
> Which of course begs the question. You are arbitrarily declaring that "(B
> or C or D)" cannot be regarded as "the same characteristic(s)", even
> though they are all part of the same class of A. You have arbitrarily
> pronounced that since B is not the same as C which is not the same
> as D, they cannot all be in the same class of A. That if an object
> "supports" or "stores", but not necessarily both, it cannot be regarded
> as "the same characteristic(s)". Why couldn't it be? Because Churl
> has pronounced it.
I haven't made any pronouncements. I've appealed to the good sense of the
reader which, in this newsgroup, is obviously a mistake. If you need the
argument spelled out for you, it's available in other posts.
[...]
> However, as has already been said, even if there were a problem with a
> definition in the form A + (B or C or D), that would simply mean you need
> to find a definition that does join them on a more fundamental level and
> in which case it would have no effect on AR's theory of concepts. Look,
> even Churl is implicitly admitting this. Either there is a valid concept
> "furniture" or this isn't. If there isn't, then there's no issue.
[...]
I'm amused that you consider this to be an "admission." It's simply a
logical argument: when two things contradict each other, at least one of
them has to go.
P.S. You have one hell of an imagination, Fred. I say that Rand's theory
of concepts cannot account for the concept "furniture," and you issue this
rambling tirade about how I am offended by the very concept of furniture,
that I don't understand how there can be such a concept, and that I want to
make it illegal to sell beds and cabinets under the same roof. You're
bleating like a stuck pig.
--CHuRL
John Shafto
3$2H6.4947@sccrnsc04...
<big snip>
I think you merely need to read page 22,
and I should add, ~carefully~. In particular,
notice the highlighted word ~distinquishing~,
and also the use of the word "adult" before
the definition you have been quoting.
> [...]
> > At this point you come in and try to show that there cannot be any such
> > set F because you can see all these separate sets C1, C21, etc. Worse,
> > you say that set theory itself is invalid because there is no way to
> > have a set contain like items because there can always be an element of
> > one subset that is not an element of another component subset.
> [...]
>
> One thing I know for sure: the set of all people who are both "Objectivist"
> and "logical" is disappointingly small. Save your straw men for a bonfire.
I think he's right on. Maybe you really know it too, hence
your ad hom and visions of strawman.
Lon
mputer.org>...
included or not included. This is obviously not true of fuzzy
properties as you define them. This is a problem for Rand if she
accepts your claim above, and not if she doesn't. I gather from
your response that she doesn't and then it is not a problem for
her.
> > Most of our language would become meaningful if this
> > was the case.
>
> Do you mean that language is currently not meaningful? How so?
No I meant that thte standard was a bad one. But I am getting
the impression that it is not actually part of her view so it
is not relevant to a discussion of her theory.
Lon
>
> Tomm
TommCatt
>
> As described on page 11, a child begins by observing a number of objects
> which have one or more common characteristics. The characteristics
> themselves must be the same across all of the objects, although the specific
> measurements of those characteristics will differ. The child omits their
> measurement and retains only the common characteristics, which are then
> united by a specific definition.
>
> Now apply that to the present case. For the sake of keeping this simple,
> let's say that a child observes a chair and says to himself "That is a
> movable man-made object...which can support the weight of the human body."
> Next he sees a desk and says to himself "That is a movable man-made
> object...that can store other, smaller objects." At this point he should
> have all of the information that he needs in order to form a rough concept
> of "furniture."
I have debated philosophers, economists, writers, physicists, ... just
about anyone who is willing to spend time with me. I like to think I am
sufficiently knowledgeable in enough subjects to be able to hold my own
in an argument, at least up to a certain level. I have learned a lot
from debating people more knowledgeable than I. That's what keeps me
coming back. Sometimes I jump in *way* over my head and my opponent
proceeds to wipe the floor with me. On such occasions, I can only
withdraw with whatever dignity I have left.
Now, however, it seems I have gotten into just the opposite situation.
I feel like a mathematician who overhears a man claiming to have
disproven L'Hopital's rule. The mathematician is intensely interested
and asks for the proof. As the man tells him the proof, the
mathematician comes to realize the man barely has a grasp of algebra,
much less calculus. What can the mathematician say to the man? Even to
show the man where he is wrong would require a discussion at a level far
above the man's understanding.
In reading your response, it struck me that you don't know the
difference between a concept and a definition.
What could I possibly say to you at this point? I don't have the time
or the inclination to teach you the elementary, er, concepts you need to
even recognize your error. Assuming, that is, you would even admit to
the deficiency, and I am strongly inclined to believe you will not. You
strike me as one who is more concerned with bluster than dignity, one
who would rather take the pot by bluff than lay down the strongest hand.
But I am still willing to consider that I have missed a very subtle
point. Does anyone see something I may have missed?
Tomm
--
Health is merely the slowest possible rate at which one can die.
TommCatt
> TommCatt <Tomm...@computer.org> wrote:
>>
>>Is this a flaw in Rand's definition of concepts? No, because it applies
>>no matter how one defines concepts. The only way to get rid of this
>>"problem" is to discard concepts entirely.
>
> I was only responding to your claim above that all objects are
> included or not included. This is obviously not true of fuzzy
> properties as you define them.
We can discuss solids and the characteristics of a solid even though we
know that, on the atomic level, even the most dense solid is mostly
empty space. We can discuss the general nature of concepts quite
accurately even though in our discussion we assume a crisp boundary
between concepts. So far, the discussion has been on a general enough
level to allow this.
Neither a defense nor refutation of Rand's theory of concepts requires
we consider boundary conditions to that level.
Tomm
--
Originality is the fine art of remembering what you hear, but forgetting
where you heard it.
- Laurence J. Peter
bearcat
> Churl Beck wrote:
> >
> > As described on page 11, a child begins by observing a number of objects
> > which have one or more common characteristics. The characteristics
> > themselves must be the same across all of the objects, although the
specific
> > measurements of those characteristics will differ. The child omits
their
> > measurement and retains only the common characteristics, which are then
> > united by a specific definition.
> >
> > Now apply that to the present case. For the sake of keeping this
simple,
> > let's say that a child observes a chair and says to himself "That is a
> > movable man-made object...which can support the weight of the human
body."
> > Next he sees a desk and says to himself "That is a movable man-made
> > object...that can store other, smaller objects." At this point he
should
> > have all of the information that he needs in order to form a rough
concept
> > of "furniture."
>
<snip>
> But I am still willing to consider that I have missed a very subtle
> point. Does anyone see something I may have missed?
>
> Tomm
Maybe that measurement omission is an inadequate description of the
processes humans use to form concepts?
Rand describes the CCD of furniture as
"large objects inside a human habitation." (p. 22)
Then she goes on to give an adult definition of
"'Movable man-made objects intended to be used in a human habitation, which
can support the weight of the human body or support and/or store other,
smaller objects.' This differentiates furniture from architectural features,
such as doors or windows, from ornamental objects, such as pictures or
drapes, and from a variety of smaller objects that may be used inside a
habitation, such as ashtrays, bric-a-brac, dishes, etc."
None of the fine-tuning of the adult definition has anything to do with the
CCD mentioned earlier. They are not more astute recognitions of the earlier
CCD that become evident to an adult psyche. They result from a process that
stand outside this particular CCD, and I'd say any CCD that resulted solely
from measurement omission.
--
--
--
--
Tom S.
"TommCatt" <Tomm...@computer.org> wrote in message
news:3E6058FF...@computer.org...
> Churl Beck wrote:
>
> I feel like a mathematician who overhears a man claiming to have
> disproven L'Hopital's rule. The mathematician is intensely interested
> and asks for the proof. As the man tells him the proof, the
> mathematician comes to realize the man barely has a grasp of algebra,
> much less calculus. What can the mathematician say to the man? Even to
> show the man where he is wrong would require a discussion at a level far
> above the man's understanding.
How about the man that can barely do simple arithmetic and can't balance
their checkbook?
I feel for ya, man!!
Tom S.
**
"Don't bother to examine a folly - ask yourself only what it
accomplishes." --Ayn Rand
bearcat
"Fred Weiss" <pape...@ix.netcom.com> wrote in message
news:b3osc9$uao$1...@slb0.atl.mindspring.net...
That Dave already said this, but you are too much of a dumbass to have
caught that part?
Dave, earlier: "In this case, I think the word "hold" comes fairly close to
including
the essential unity of the words "support" and "contain", so that a table
can hold a vase, a drawer can hold silverware, and a chair can hold a
person. [Please don't confuse that word pronounced "hold" with the other
homophonous words like the verb in "hold your tongue" or "hold on to that
dog, he looks vicious"]. It's really just a flaw of English that we don't
have a generalized locative case that includes "on" and "in". The support /
contain distinction boils down to the fact that if object A supports B then
B is on (or under) A, and if A contains B then B is in A."
dave odden
> So you are saying that the feature in common with all pieces of furniture
is
> that they are all "Movable man-made objects intended to be used in a human
> habitation, which can support the weight of the human body or support
and/or
> store other, smaller objects."
[snip]
> Unfortunately, the objects in question only have one distinguishing
> characteristic in common: they are both "movable man-made objects intended
> to be used in a human habitation." He looks at the other relevant
> characteristics and notices that "can support the weight of the human
body"
> is qualitatively different from "can store other, smaller objects."
As I've pointed out previously, the locution "support or store" is
superfluous. By insisting on the verb "store", you make the case for
conceptual disunity seem stronger: whereas if you changed the words you use
to represent these concepts, the unity should be clearer. The closest
approximation, as a single word in English, is "hold".
The relevant concept is "stative location". As I recall, you said that your
argument is based on concepts and not words, so the fact that there is no
single lexical item in English that clearly and unambiguously has that
meaning would be irrelevant. If the child could only think in terms of
"contain" or "hold (up)" there might well be problems with inducing the
concept "furniture" just as "green or electric" would not be a legitimate
basis for integrating or differentiation concepts. But children are not
restricted to just "contain" and "support".
Even though you could if you want describe furniture with a disjunction, it
isn't necessary to do so.
dave odden
> But I am still willing to consider that I have missed a very subtle
> point. Does anyone see something I may have missed?
There is a valid point behind CB's rejection of disjunction, seen from the
perspective of child acquisition of concepts. Children start with big
categories and learn to differentiate (this is truth, not just Rand's view,
although Rand spoke the truth there). Formally speaking there is no problem
with defining a "characteristic" as being "A or B or (D and not C)".
However, "electric" and "green" do not, in fact, join together to form a
valid cognitive category, at least in terms of child cognition.
If there were some concept that actually required "electric or green" in its
definition, random collections could be "concepts". So I'm not at all
persuaded of the necessity of disjunction in conceptual definitions,
including this putative furniture case.
As an aside, the formal algebra used to describe classes of objects in the
theories of syntax and phonology are disjunction-free: conjunction and
negation or atomic properties suffices.
Fred Weiss
"bearcat" <bea...@nomail.com> wrote in message
news:v60rrqe...@corp.supernews.com...
>
> "Fred Weiss" <pape...@ix.netcom.com> wrote in message
> news:b3osc9$uao$1...@slb0.atl.mindspring.net...
> >
> >
> > "dave odden" <od...@ling.ohio-state.edu> wrote in message
> > news:b3oki2$i0b$1...@charm.magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu...
> > > "Fred Weiss" wrote:
> > >
> > > > Which makes me wonder if the common denominator of furniture isn't
in
> > fact
> > > > "movable objects which....holds things (of a certain size)" where
> > "holds"
> > > is
> > > > viewed somewhat broadly to encompass both "holding up" (as in
> > supporting)
> > > > and "containing/storage".
> > >
> > > Has anyone suggested that in this thread?
> >
> > What's your point?
> >
> > Fred Weiss
>
> That Dave already said this, ..
Well, gee, it just goes to show that even people you least expect it from
can occasionally have a good idea. However, we're still waiting for that to
apply to you.
Fred Weiss
Robert Kolker
dave odden wrote:
> As an aside, the formal algebra used to describe classes of objects in the
> theories of syntax and phonology are disjunction-free: conjunction and
> negation or atomic properties suffices.
Think again. Look at the details of Bachus Normal Form (BNF) very carefully.
Bob Kolker
Fred Weiss
"Churl Beck" <chur...@subdimension.com> wrote in message
news:OFV7a.274208$iG3.31932@sccrnsc02...
>.. If you need the
> argument spelled out for you, it's available in other posts.
Oh, we know the argument, thanks. It just doesn't amount to anything.
> I'm amused that you consider this to be an "admission." It's simply a
> logical argument: when two things contradict each other, at least one of
> them has to go.
Except that we have patiently tried to show you there is no contradiction -
apparently to no avail.
> P.S. You have one hell of an imagination, Fred. I say that Rand's theory
> of concepts cannot account for the concept "furniture," and you issue this
> rambling tirade about how I am offended by the very concept of furniture,
> that I don't understand how there can be such a concept, and that I want
to
> make it illegal to sell beds and cabinets under the same roof. You're
> bleating like a stuck pig.
No, I'm just trying to get you to grasp something very, very simple -
something so simple that even an ant staring up at a curb should be able to
grasp it.
Try and follow: there is either a valid concept of furniture or there isn't.
Got that much? Now, if there is a valid concept then there is something in
common among all the objects we call furniture. You with me so far. (Now let
me just add that this particular principle of concept formation is not some
great discovery of AR's. It's been known for over 2,000 years and is
accepted by widely varying schools on the subject. You do agree, don't you?)
So the question is whether AR has identified what is in common or hasn't.
You say she hasn't. Which is cool. So then what do you think is in common?
Blank-out. But that's secondary. What's primary is that you are leaping from
the objection to her *particular* definition to some grand implication with
respect to her theory of concepts. Which is nonsense on the face of it.
Complete and total nonsense, so much so that even an ant should grasp it.
Since you apparently only can read and grasp disjointed sections of ITOE,
down to specific paragraphs or sentences, and are incapable of grasping a
chapter, let alone the whole of it, let me explain that the unique and
revolutionary aspect of AR's theory is *measurement omission*. What you have
to show to demolish her theory is not that *there is nothing in common among
objects of furniture* . That does ...err... a bit more than demolishes AR's
theory. It demolishes concept formation entirely (or, if you will, you end
up "proving too much"). Or it does something completely innocuous which is
to show that the concept furniture is invalid ("proving too little"). Or
maybe it does something completely bizarre which is show that there is
something utterly wierd about the concept furniture such that it cannot be
defined (which is not an uncommon view - that there are some "indefinable"
concepts - but then I didn't know you were a mystic and one has to wonder
what "ineffable" quality inheres in furniture).
This shouldn't be that hard for even an ant to grasp, should it?
Incidentally, apart from all of this, I'll give you this much which is that
what you've noticed is an interesting question. But it's a question, a
question a bright Philos. 101 student, might ask his professor, perhaps as
it might pertain to certain principles of definitions. But as typical of
ants you've taken a question, of which there are dozens and dozens in ITOE
and elsewhere in Objectivism (e.g cf the Appendix to ITOE), and converted it
into a vastly exaggerated, and purported but thoroughly unjustified
challenge to Objectivism.
(As I look at this I'm wondering if, as Thom suggested, you don't know the
difference between the concept and the definition. Do you? Do you at least
know the distinction AR makes between them? I realize, sigh, that means
holding something in mind she says in one chapter while you try and grasp
what she says in the next, but still...)
Fred Weiss