F-16/cessna crash near sarasota
Larry Dighera
It's been over a year, ant there is still no FINAL NTSB report posted.
On Fri, 13 Jul 2001 19:56:09 GMT, Larry Dighera
<LDig...@socal.rr.com> wrote in Message ID
<tnI37.7664$ca.25...@typhoon.we.rr.com>:
>On Thu, 12 Jul 2001 11:18:33 -0500, "Steven P. McNicoll"
><ronca...@writeme.com> wrote:
>
>>"Wizard of Draws" <shar...@mindspring.com> wrote in message
>>news:3B2AA2...@mindspring.com...
>>>
>>> Moreover, a government/military investigation has vested interest in
>>> finding the GA pilot at fault. Look at the accident under discussion,
>>> the GA pilot shouldered nearly all of the blame according to my
>>> interpretation of the investigation so far. And as recent events in the
>>> news have shown, we can't really trust our government to be completely
>>> honest and forthcoming.>
>>
>>The NTSB investigation is not yet complete, they may take a different view
>>than the USAF did on the FAR violations.
>>
>
>According to USAF AFMAN 91-206, PARTICIPATION IN A MILITARY OF CIVIL
>AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT SAFETY INVESTIGATION, available here:
><http://afpubs.hq.af.mil/pubs/publist.asp?puborg=AF&series=91>
>
> ...
>
> The authority of the NTSB to investigate is derived from Title 49,
> U.S.C, Section 1441 and Section 1903 and other laws that apply.
> Its authority as stated in NTSB Regulation 813 includes, "sole
> responsibility for the inquiries into all accidents involving
> civil aircraft, or civil and military aircraft, within the United
> States, its possessions and terrirories [sic]." Depending on
> international policy and agreements, its authority can extend to
> accidents involving US civil and military aircraft outside the
> United States.
>
> ...
>
> By law, only the NTSB is charged with determining the probable
> cause of those aircraft accidents it is authorized to investigate.
> If there are other investigations present (such as state, local,
> military, or private), they cannot be considered joint
> investigations nor can they interfere with the activities of the
> board.
>
>...
>
> Analysis is done by the investigation group chairperson,
> investigator-in-charge, or accident investigation manager. All of
> these are representatives of the NTSB and their analysis is
> considered privileged.
>
>NTSB Contact Information:
>
> NTSB Southeast Regional Office
> 8405 N.W. 53rd Street
> Suite B-103
> Miami, Florida 33166
> Phone: 305-597-4610
> FAX: 305-597-4614
>
> <http://www.ntsb.gov/info/sources.htm>
> NTSB Public Affairs Office, Washington, D.C., (202) 314-6100
>
> NTSB Accident Number: MIA01FA028A
Flighthawk
Larry Dighera <LDig...@att.net> wrote in message
news:bu7n2usp7pfo70v68...@4ax.com...
OtisPWinslow
sheild the pilots form legal action.
"Flighthawk" <pd...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:9yQW7.243456$3d2.11...@bgtnsc06-news.ops.worldnet.att.net...
Larry Dighera
in Message ID
<9yQW7.243456$3d2.11...@bgtnsc06-news.ops.worldnet.att.net>:
>short story: The F-16 pilots messed up.
That is the way any rational person would see it, but the military
investigation also faulted the Cessna pilot for not seeing and
avoiding the F-16 wingman who was not talking with ATC in Class
Charlie airspace at ~450 knots with his transponder on standby. In my
estimation, the flight leader is solely at fault for leading his
flight into Class Bravo airspace without a clearance and exceeding the
maximum speed mandated by FAR 91.117(d). The flight leader was not
stripped of rank, and was permitted to retire with full pension
despite the fatality he caused.
To date I have not heard of any military intent to compensate the ATP
rated civilian pilot they killed, not to mention taking responsibility
for the "mishap." In light of this "mishap," how can one help but
viewing military pilots as irresponsible and out of control?
Now the military wants to fly its aircraft at night UNLIGHTED at
speeds in excess of FAR 91.117(a)'s maximum 250 knot mandate below
10,000 feet!
http://www.aopa.org/whatsnew/newsitems/2001/01-4-110x.html
http://www.aopa.org/whatsnew/air_traffic/lights_out.html
That petition gives a whole new meaning to the phrase "military
intelligence." Have they no regard at all for the safety of civilian
users of the NAS?
I wonder what's taking the NTSB so long in finalizing their report?
Perhaps the delay is a result of having to propose changes in the
military's high-speed low-level operations in civil airspace. We can
hope.
S. Ramirez
> >short story: The F-16 pilots messed up.
>
> That is the way any rational person would see it, but the military
> investigation also faulted the Cessna pilot for not seeing and
> avoiding the F-16 wingman who was not talking with ATC in Class
> Charlie airspace at ~450 knots with his transponder on standby. In my
> estimation, the flight leader is solely at fault for leading his
> flight into Class Bravo airspace without a clearance and exceeding the
> maximum speed mandated by FAR 91.117(d). The flight leader was not
> stripped of rank, and was permitted to retire with full pension
> despite the fatality he caused.
Hey, Larry, wasn't there some fault with the ATC controllers in Tampa
as well? I heard that they were subpoenaed to appear in court but refused.
If true, they were scared of something. Plus I can't understand how someone
can refuse to appear in court with a subpoena out on them. Perhaps some of
our ATC buddies in this newsgroup would like to comment on this.
Simon Ramirez
Steven P. McNicoll
>
> Now the military wants to fly its aircraft at night UNLIGHTED at
> speeds in excess of FAR 91.117(a)'s maximum 250 knot mandate below
> 10,000 feet!
>
But only in MOAs, where the speed limit does not apply anyway. The only
change requested is operating without lights.
>
> I wonder what's taking the NTSB so long in finalizing their report?
> Perhaps the delay is a result of having to propose changes in the
> military's high-speed low-level operations in civil airspace. We can
> hope.
>
The applicable rules were not followed, this incident does not indicate any
changes are needed to the existing rules.
Steven P. McNicoll
"S. Ramirez" <sram...@cfl.rr.com> wrote in message
news:Za%W7.206034$Ga5.36...@typhoon.tampabay.rr.com...
>
> Hey, Larry, wasn't there some fault with the ATC controllers in Tampa
> as well? I heard that they were subpoenaed to appear in court but
refused.
> If true, they were scared of something. Plus I can't understand how
someone
> can refuse to appear in court with a subpoena out on them. Perhaps some
of
> our ATC buddies in this newsgroup would like to comment on this.
>
I've seen nothing that suggested any fault on the part of the controllers.
The only party on an ATC frequency at the time was the Skyhawk pilot, he was
issued a traffic advisory on the F-16 flight. It came right about at the
time of impact, obviously too late to make a difference. Had the jets been
complying with the speed limit the warning might have made the difference.
I hadn't heard that this matter has reached the courts, and don't see how
the controllers could avoid appearing if subpoenaed.
Larry Dighera
wrote in Message ID
<Za%W7.206034$Ga5.36...@typhoon.tampabay.rr.com>:
>"Larry Dighera" <LDig...@att.net> wrote in message
>news:5pso2uce9iu1bkcsb...@4ax.com...
>> >short story: The F-16 pilots messed up.
>>
>> That is the way any rational person would see it, but the military
>> investigation also faulted the Cessna pilot for not seeing and
>> avoiding the F-16 wingman who was not talking with ATC in Class
>> Charlie airspace at ~450 knots with his transponder on standby. In my
>> estimation, the flight leader is solely at fault for leading his
>> flight into Class Bravo airspace without a clearance and exceeding the
>> maximum speed mandated by FAR 91.117(d). The flight leader was not
>> stripped of rank, and was permitted to retire with full pension
>> despite the fatality he caused.
>
> Hey, Larry, wasn't there some fault with the ATC controllers in Tampa
>as well?
There is a lot of information here:
http://groups.google.com/groups?hl=en&threadm=4kcq6.40489%24LO3.4592844%40typhoon.we.rr.com&rnum=1&prev=/groups%3Fas_epq%3DF-16/cessna%2520crash%2520near%2520sarasota%26as_ugroup%3Drec.aviation.piloting%26hl%3Den
http://groups.google.com/groups?hl=en&threadm=NJRV6.10665%24Ts6.836973%40typhoon.we.rr.com&rnum=2&prev=/groups%3Fas_epq%3DF-16/cessna%2520crash%2520near%2520sarasota%26as_ugroup%3Drec.aviation.piloting%26hl%3Den
http://www2.acc.af.mil/accnews/mar01/01080.html
http://www.aero-news.net/news/archive2000/1100news/113000a.htm
http://www.cnn.com/2001/US/03/06/pilot.crash/index.html
http://www.ntsb.gov/NTSB/brief.asp?ev_id=20001212X22313&key=1
http://www.flysouth.co.za/news/Archive/News%20Article%20Archive%2015-12-00.htm
Here's a representative excerpt:
http://www.sptimes.com/News/030701/TampaBay/F_16_shares_blame_in_.shtml
© St. Petersburg Times, published March 7, 2001
"The investigator, Brig. Gen. Robin Scott, did not accept all the
blame for the Air Force. He said Olivier violated the basic tenet
of fair-weather flying, the pilot's responsibility to see and
avoid other aircraft.
And he said Tampa International Airport approach controllers
received a "conflict alert," an electronic warning of an impending
collision, 30 seconds before it happened but failed to warn
Olivier, with whom they were in radio contact.
Had the controllers responded immediately, Scott said, "likely the
pilot would have had the time to maneuver his plane and avoid the
collision."
[...]
The FAA said it would review the Air Force report but would have
no comment on the reported conflict alert.
Howard Coker, an attorney for Olivier's widow, Danielle, said it
was "an insult" for the Air Force to try to shift any of the
blame.
Bob Spohrer, also of the legal team, said: "At all times, Jacques
Olivier was where he was supposed to be as directed by air traffic
controllers, while the F-16s were lost, speeding and not in
contact with anyone. And Mr. Olivier is partly to blame? I don't
think so."
Coker said he would file a $10-million lawsuit against the Air
Force in May, and if reports of the conflict alert proved true,
would include the FAA in the suit."
It is my opinion that the military is using the exception contained in
FAR 91.117(d) to routinely operate below 10,000' at speeds which make
it unreasonable, if not impossible, to comply with the "see and avoid"
requirements of FAR 91.223(b) & (e):
Sec. 91.113 Right-of-way rules: Except water operations.
(b) General. When weather conditions permit, regardless of
whether an operation is conducted under instrument flight
rules or visual flight rules, vigilance shall be maintained by
each person operating an aircraft so as to see and avoid other
aircraft. When a rule of this section gives another aircraft
the right-of-way, the pilot shall give way to that aircraft
and may not pass over, under, or ahead of it unless well
clear.
(e) Approaching head-on. When aircraft are approaching each
other head-on, or nearly so, each pilot of each aircraft shall
alter course to the right.
At a closing speed of nearly 500 knots there is so little time
available to spot the inconspicuously minimal frontal area of military
fighter aircraft (with no high-intensity strobe lights to increase its
conspicuity), that expecting compliance with FAR 91.113's "see and
avoid" mandate is ridiculously unworkable if not irrational. This
reduction in response time also affects ATC's ability to issue timely
traffic warnings.
Long ago when the FARs were originally drafted, it was obviously
thought prudent for safety to limit the speed to 250 knots for
aircraft operating at low-level. No doubt the ATC radar facilities
were also "tuned" with this maximum speed restriction in mind.
But the military's reckless exploitation (and the FAA's negligent
assiduity) has permitted an unsafe condition to grow to proportions
that obviously threaten the safety of the flying public in this
country. The FAA is derelict in its mission to provide safe skies.
And, the military has petitioned for additional FAR exemptions
(nighttime lights-out operations) without accepting responsibility for
the safety hazards they will create. Those with the power to correct
this injustice must act now.
The FARs must be changed to mandate the use of on-board radar for air
traffic monitoring and collision avoidance, and increased conspicuity
by means of high intensity aircraft lighting, for pilots invoking the
FAR 19.117(d) exemption.
Further, the FARs must place the responsibility for aircraft
separation squarely on the pilot of the aircraft invoking FAR
91.117(d) and creating the safety hazard to civil air navigation.
Anything less is culpable negligence.
Newps
"S. Ramirez" wrote:
Hey, Larry, wasn't there some fault with the ATC controllers in Tampa
> as well?
Probably.
> I heard that they were subpoenaed to appear in court but refused.
No way a court case would get anywhere near the trial phase only one year from
the accident date. Christ, this is the government you're dealing with here.
>
> If true, they were scared of something.
What's to be scared of? As a controller I am untouchable and would only serve
to be a witness for one side or the other. Going to court would simply be a
weeks paid vacation.
> Plus I can't understand how someone
> can refuse to appear in court with a subpoena out on them.
They can't.
Larry Dighera
<ronca...@writeme.com> wrote in Message ID
<u2p3fqm...@corp.supernews.com>:
>"Larry Dighera" <LDig...@att.net> wrote in message
>news:5pso2uce9iu1bkcsb...@4ax.com...
>>
>> Now the military wants to fly its aircraft at night UNLIGHTED at
>> speeds in excess of FAR 91.117(a)'s maximum 250 knot mandate below
>> 10,000 feet!
>>
>
>But only in MOAs, where the speed limit does not apply anyway.
Can you cite the regulation that exempts speed limits in Military
Operations Areas? Is only the military exempt, or can a Glassair also
exceed 250 knots below 10,000' in a MOA?
>The only change requested is operating without lights.
Do think that would be safe?
>> I wonder what's taking the NTSB so long in finalizing their report?
>> Perhaps the delay is a result of having to propose changes in the
>> military's high-speed low-level operations in civil airspace. We can
>> hope.
>>
>
>The applicable rules were not followed, this incident does not indicate any
>changes are needed to the existing rules.
(The use of the word "incident" to describe the military's killing of
an innocent and respected civilian pilot is consistent with someone
who wishes to conceal the true facts. It is aligned with the
military's euphemistic use of the word "mishap" to describe this
midair collision which splattered the Cessna pilot's remains over 4
acres of the Rosedale Golf Course.)
Just because the FARs were violated by the military in this "mishap,"
it doesn't necessarily mean that the current FARs are just and/or
workable in today's NAS environment.
The FAR 91.117(d) speed exemption fails to provide adequate time for
pilots to comply with FAR 91.113(b) & (e) (as verified by military
study: http://www.aopa.org/asf/publications/sa15.pdf) in its
effectively permitting virtually unlimited speed below 10,000' in
civil airspace. The lack of a requirement for increased conspicuity
of those aircraft operating under FAR 19.117(d) is absurd. The
failure to place responsibility for air traffic separation on the
aircraft invoking the exemption and creating the hazard is inequitable
and unjust. And, the failure of FARs to mandate the use of already
on-board radar for separation is negligence.
S. Ramirez
"Newps" <scn...@attbi.com> wrote in message
news:3C2CC256...@attbi.com...
> > If true, they were scared of something.
>
> What's to be scared of? As a controller I am untouchable and would only
serve
> to be a witness for one side or the other. Going to court would simply be
a
> weeks paid vacation.
Are you saying that controllers are exempt from any legal action? Assuming
that the controller(s) was negligent in this case (which may or may not be
true), there is no way that a controller can be found guilty of negligence
or some other liability? Hmm, I thought the legal system could get to
anyone.
Simon Ramirez
Newps
"S. Ramirez" wrote:
>
> Are you saying that controllers are exempt from any legal action?
Yes. You can name me in your suit, but the very first thing that happens is my
name gets replaced by "United States of America". Who would do the job if they
were personally liable?
> Assuming
> that the controller(s) was negligent in this case (which may or may not be
> true), there is no way that a controller can be found guilty of negligence
> or some other liability? Hmm, I thought the legal system could get to
> anyone.
The only way to get me is if I deliberately try and run two airplanes together
and succeed. That's a whole 'nuther ballgame. Never happened by the way. The
types of mistakes that happen everyday, even negligence, is not actionable
against me. Look at a prime example. When that 737 ran over a Metroliner in
California some years back. The controller put the Metro in position and hols
at an intersection at night. Then promptly forgot about him while the 737 ran
him right over. Clearly the controllers fault, never a doubt, but that person
cannot be sued for that. You the taxpayer pick up the tab.
Pete Zaitcev
> an innocent and respected civilian pilot is consistent with someone
> who wishes to conceal the true facts. It is aligned with the
> military's euphemistic use of the word "mishap" to describe this
> midair collision which splattered the Cessna pilot's remains over 4
> acres of the Rosedale Golf Course.)
LD's saliva spitting at its finest - is there any evidence
of body fragmentation? Further, would not it be less painful
to be splattered as LD's warped imagination depicts rather
than ride it down with broken emphenage?
BTW, it does seem that the F-16 flight lead was at fault indeed,
but quite regardless of LD's bullshit rhethoric.
-- Pete
S. Ramirez
> The only way to get me is if I deliberately try and run two airplanes
together
> and succeed. That's a whole 'nuther ballgame. Never happened by the way.
The
> types of mistakes that happen everyday, even negligence, is not actionable
> against me. Look at a prime example. When that 737 ran over a Metroliner
in
> California some years back. The controller put the Metro in position and
hols
> at an intersection at night. Then promptly forgot about him while the 737
ran
> him right over. Clearly the controllers fault, never a doubt, but that
person
> cannot be sued for that. You the taxpayer pick up the tab.
Thanks for the clarification.
Larry Dighera
outage, but it doesn't seem to have made it, so here it is again.]
On Fri, 28 Dec 2001 09:15:05 -0600, "Steven P. McNicoll"
<ronca...@writeme.com> wrote in Message ID
<u2p3fqm...@corp.supernews.com>:
>"Larry Dighera" <LDig...@att.net> wrote in message
>news:5pso2uce9iu1bkcsb...@4ax.com...
>>
>> Now the military wants to fly its aircraft at night UNLIGHTED at
>> speeds in excess of FAR 91.117(a)'s maximum 250 knot mandate below
>> 10,000 feet!
>>
>
>But only in MOAs, where the speed limit does not apply anyway.
Can you cite the regulation that exempts speed limits in Military
Operations Areas? Is only the military exempt, or can a Glassair also
exceed 250 knots below 10,000' in a MOA?
>The only change requested is operating without lights.
Do think that would be safe?
>> I wonder what's taking the NTSB so long in finalizing their report?
>> Perhaps the delay is a result of having to propose changes in the
>> military's high-speed low-level operations in civil airspace. We can
>> hope.
>>
>
>The applicable rules were not followed, this incident does not indicate any
>changes are needed to the existing rules.
(The use of the word "incident" to describe the military's killing of
an innocent and respected civilian pilot is consistent with someone
who wishes to conceal the true facts. It is aligned with the
military's euphemistic use of the word "mishap" to describe this
midair collision which splattered the Cessna pilot's remains over 4
acres of the Rosedale Golf Course.)
Just because the FARs were violated by the military in this "mishap,"
Steven P. McNicoll
"S. Ramirez" <sram...@cfl.rr.com> wrote in message
news:UQ3X7.210081$Ga5.36...@typhoon.tampabay.rr.com...
>
> Are you saying that controllers are exempt from any legal action?
Assuming
> that the controller(s) was negligent in this case (which may or may not be
> true), there is no way that a controller can be found guilty of negligence
> or some other liability? Hmm, I thought the legal system could get to
> anyone.
>
Why would the "legal system" pursue the controller? His pockets aren't very
deep.
PV
> viewing military pilots as irresponsible and out of control?
Regardless of where the fault lies, this is utterly ridiculous hyperbole.
Hey, I just read about a bunch of black guys who beat up a white kid in
front of his school, none will be charged with a hate crime. In light of
this, how can anyone help but view blacks as irresponsible and out of
control?
John R. Weiss
FAA Order 7400.2E gives guidance on the establishment of Special Use Airspace,
including MOAs, and for requesting specific exemptions and waivers for SUA.
FAA Order 7610.4 gives more specific guidance for establishment of MOAs.
---------------------
John R. Weiss
"Larry Dighera" <LDig...@worldnet.att.net> wrote in message
news:Pq3X7.200935$WW.11...@bgtnsc05-news.ops.worldnet.att.net...
Larry Dighera
On 28 Dec 2001 20:42:38 GMT, zai...@yahoo.com (Pete Zaitcev) wrote in
Message ID <slrna2pm9t....@devserv.devel.redhat.com>:
>> (The use of the word "incident" to describe the military's killing of
>> an innocent and respected civilian pilot is consistent with someone
>> who wishes to conceal the true facts. It is aligned with the
>> military's euphemistic use of the word "mishap" to describe this
>> midair collision which splattered the Cessna pilot's remains over 4
>> acres of the Rosedale Golf Course.)
>
>LD's saliva spitting at its finest
The definitions for accident and incident are available here:
http://www.ntsb.gov/aviation/report.htm
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/DBSearch.cgi?DBSearchDB=ecfr&DB=1&ACTION=View&QUERY=1.1&RGN=BSEC&OP=and&QUERY=14&RGN=BTI&QUERY=46346&RGN=BSECCT&SUBSET=SUBSET&FROM=1&ITEM=1
>- is there any evidence of body fragmentation?
So, you don't have any INFORMATION to add to this thread. You're just
incredulous at the thought of the late Cessna pilot being splattered
by the midair collision. This is your way of requesting more
information and citations which corroborate my statements, because you
apparently find it unbelievable that the pilot of a Cessna 172 could
be splattered as a result of a midair collision with an F-16 with a
Maximum Takeoff Weight of 37,500 pounds traveling at a closing speed
of 480 knots.
Captain Kreuder, the pilot of the F-16 which hit the Cessna, said the
whole episode happened so fast, he initially thought he had hit a
bird. That's how minor it was for him and his heavy F-16. Kreuder
walked away without a scratch.
Can you answer these questions?
1. What was the kinetic energy of each aircraft before
impact?
2. Do you think that that much energy has the potential to
splatter a largely gelatinous human body?
>Further, would not it be less painful
>to be splattered as LD's warped imagination depicts rather
>than ride it down with broken emphenage?
I have no idea. Do you? (Please provide citations to substantiate
your response.)
>BTW, it does seem that the F-16 flight lead was at fault indeed,
I believe the military flight lead, Lt. Col. Parker, while exceeding
the maximum speed permitted under FAR 91.117(d) by ~30% deliberately
chose to descend into congested Tampa Class B airspace without the
required ATC clearance and without regard for the safety of those with
whom he shared the airspace. This resulted in the endangerment of his
wingman and those on the ground, loss of a $34.3 million (2000
dollars) aircraft for which I as a taxpayer contributed, the loss of a
Cessna 172, and the death of an Airline Transport Pilot rated pilot
and respected president of the Rotary Club of Inverness.
For his recklessness Lt. Col. Parker received no loss of rank nor pay.
That is unjust.
>but quite regardless of LD's bullshit rhethoric.
>
>-- Pete
Here are some citations:
From ABC News.com:
Cessna ‘Disintegrated’
At the Rosedale Golf and Country Club, witness Bob
Morrow, a golf instructor, saw two military jets
flying one behind the other while he was giving a lesson.
“They flew overhead. Then all of a sudden, boom,”
said Morrow. “Debris started falling,” he said, describing seeing
parts of the fuselage, motor and wings scattering over three or
four acres and hitting some homes.
Witness Don McIlwain said he saw two F-16s flying south and a
smaller plane heading east that looked as if it would cross the
military jets’ path. McIlwain said he remembered thinking, “I
hope it’s high enough.”
“Just as I said that, he went right through it,” McIlwain told the
Sarasota Herald Tribune. “The small plane just disintegrated.”
Saturday, March 31, 2001
Associated Press
Olivier died instantly in the crash, his Cessna scattered over a
Bradenton country club.
http://www.cnn.com/2000/US/11/16/florida.planes.crash/
Sean Grosso, a pro-shop assistant at the Rosedale Golf and Country
Club in Bradenton, said he witnessed the collision. "We have debris
all over the course," he said.
Saturday, March 31, 2001
Associated Press
BRADENTON — The lead F-16 pilot involved in a crash that killed a
civilian pilot was cleared of criminal wrongdoing Friday and will
retire Saturday.
Air Force officials said the mistakes Lt. Col. Parker made leading
up to the crash over Manatee County deserved only "administrative
action" — a written or verbal reprimand. He will also retain his
officer's pension.
Citing confidentiality laws, Air Force officials would not
elaborate on what form of administrative action was taken. They
also would not say which of the mistakes he made the day of the
crash led to the reprimand, the Sarasota Herald-Tribune reported
for Saturday editions.
You could be next:
http://www.airdisaster.com/news/0500/24/news3.shtml
Close call between AA jet, F-16s.
The Associated Press May 24, 2000
Two U.S. Air Force F-16 fighter jets returning from an air show came
too close to an American Airlines jet and a small private plane this
week outside Washington, authorities said on Tuesday. The incidents
occurred on Monday shortly after the Thunderbirds display team left
Andrews Air Force Base in Maryland for their home base in Nevada.
William Shumann, a spokesman for the Federal Aviation Administration,
said two of the eight Thunderbirds came within 700 feet vertically and
0.9 miles horizontally from an American Airlines (AMR.N) MD-80 flight
from Dallas to Dulles airport in northern Virginia.
``We have filed pilot deviations against the two pilots'' of
Thunderbird aircraft, Shumann said. The same F-16 aircraft also came
within 100 feet vertically and 1.8 miles horizontally of a privately
operated four-seat Mooney. FAA regulations generally call for a
minimum three miles horizontally or 1,000 feet vertically between
planes in airspace near airports.
The agency said it took the incidents seriously but any disciplinary
action would be up to the Air Force. ``All we do is tell the Air Force
'we think your pilots screwed up here,' then it's up to them to deal
with it,'' Shumann said. Air Force spokesman Maj. Jon Anderson said
close passes were inadvertent and occurred as an air traffic
controller helped guide the planes back into their formation after
losing visibility in low clouds. Speaking of the American Airlines
encounter, Anderson agreed the distance was below FAA minimums but
said: ``It wasn't right outside the window.'' The Air Force was
investigating, he said.
Larry Dighera
wrote in Message ID
<Za%W7.206034$Ga5.36...@typhoon.tampabay.rr.com>:
Your follow up prompted me to do a little more research into this.
Here's what I found:
http://www.naplesnews.com/01/08/florida/d669110a.htm
Probe reports trainee was at radar screen during air collision
Saturday, August 11, 2001
Associated Press
BRADENTON — A trainee was at the radar screen when an Air Force jet
collided with a private plane in November, said a Federal Aviation
Administration report made public Friday.
The Sarasota Herald-Tribune reported that documents obtained from the
agency said the trainee was at the screen at a Tampa air control tower
at the same time controllers in Miami were trying to warn the pilots
off their collision course.
The civilian pilot of the Cessna, Jacques Olivier of Hernando, was
killed in the collision. The Air Force F-16 pilot parachuted to
safety, but the jet was destroyed when it crashed into a wooded area.
Two Air Force pilots were flying 480 mph — 180 mph faster than federal
and Air Force guidelines allow in that urban area — on a practice
bombing run to rural Avon Park.
Out of radar contact, the jet pilots were miles off course when the
jet sliced through Olivier's Cessna near Interstate 75.
The FAA documents said the trainer for the unidentified novice
controller was on the telephone to the Miami controllers at the time
of the collision over Manatee County.
The FAA's report includes signed statements by the trainer and trainee
assigned to Tampa's south satellite, known as "S" position on Nov. 16.
The two F-16s over Manatee County were designated Ninja 1 and Ninja 2.
"I was working the 'S' position. The traffic was moderate to heavy. I
took the automated hand-off on Ninja 1. My trainee plugged in, to
train, at about this time," wrote air traffic controller Mark Allen.
Miami controllers had directed the F-16s to an outdated radio
frequency and they were unable to initiate contact with Tampa.
"I answered a phone call from MIA regarding Ninja 1's altitude. I saw
a fast moving target, southbound, and figured it was Ninja. I pointed
to the radar scope and told my trainee to issue traffic to N829
(Olivier)," he continued.
"I saw the fast moving target and N829 merge. When N829 did not
respond, I took the position from the trainee," Allen wrote.
The trainee, whose name has not been released, wrote that when Miami
controllers called, he "didn't know what they were talking about."
After hearing a "Mayday" call, he wrote he was ordered to leave the
controls.
According to Allen's report, Miami controllers or an Air Force radar
man telephoned to ask for the proper Tampa frequency. By that time, it
was too late to save Olivier.
The FAA report details the contact between controllers in Miami and
Tampa in the moments before and after the crash.
"Can you tell me what the altitude is on that Ninja 1? I lost the
target on him," asked one Miami controller.
"Ahh. Hang on. I see him down at 2,000 (feet)," responded the Tampa
trainee.
Nine seconds later, the trainee attempted to make a radio call to
Olivier: "Traffic off your left side. Ahh. Two thousand."
There was no response. After Allen took back the controls and made
three more attempts to contact Olivier, Ninja 1 sent out a distress
signal.
Ten minutes after the crash, the Air Force pilots and Tampa
controllers were still trying to figure out what happened, the report
shows.
http://www.naplesnews.com/01/03/florida/d608794a.htm
Tampa air controllers denounce military investigation of crash
Friday, March 9, 2001
Associated Press
TAMPA — Air traffic controllers could not have prevented a deadly
collision between an Air Force fighter and a Cessna, say local
officials who say the military is completely at fault.
An Air Force report said the controllers were partly at fault.
"If the F-16s had called us and talked to us and gotten permission to
be in our airspace ... those two planes never would have gotten
together," said Joe Formoso, president of the Tampa local of the
National Air Traffic Controllers Association.
Killed in the Nov. 16 crash near Bradenton was Cessna pilot Jacques
Olivier.
F-16 pilot Capt Greg. Kreuder ejected safely before his met crashed
into a wooded area.
A second F-16 [whose pilot led the flight] on the training mission was
not involved in the collision.
An Air Force investigation released earlier this week partially blames
its own pilots and air traffic controllers. The Air Force said that
air traffic controllers had time to move the Cessna out of the way
when they received a 30-second warning that the aircraft were on a
collision course.
Air traffic controllers refused to cooperate with the Air Force in its
review, but are cooperating with a National Transportation Safety
Board investigation.
Formoso disputed the conclusion that controllers could have warned
Olivier of the approaching war jets. Formoso said the alarm sounded
only 19 seconds before the crash and the F-16 was traveling at 550
mph.
An Air Force spokesman said he was unaware there was a dispute over
when controllers were alerted and said the military's investigation of
the crash was thorough.
Meanwhile, documents released by the Air Force indicate that Kreuder
had concerns about flying a training mission that ventured so close to
where civilian planes might be flying. The two pilots had not before
flown that route from Moody Air Force Base in Georgia to a bombing
range in Avon Park in south-central Florida.
Well into their flight, both pilots began suspecting that Miami and
Tampa air traffic controllers were miscommunication about where the
pilots were and where they were heading, the documents said.
Kreuder told investigators he started to feel uncertain after the two
jets came within 10 miles of a low-flying Beechcraft south of
Gainesville and after Miami air-route controllers asked where and why
they were flying.
When the F-16 pilots neared the range covered by Tampa controllers,
the two were directed by Miami to set their radios to a frequency that
had not been used by Tampa controllers for more than a year.
When the pilots could not reach Tampa controllers, they switched their
frequencies back to Miami.
To add to the problems, the military report said the two F-16 pilots
had no idea they were only miles away from Sarasota-Bradenton Airport.
Lead pilot Lt. Col. James Parker's on-board computer led the F-16s off
course, about nine to 11 miles south of where they should have been.
[This last statement means that Parker had intended to descend into
Tampa Class Bravo airspace (without the required ATC clearance) closer
to its center rather than near its southern boundary as occurred.]
Larry Dighera
<deepth...@hotmail.com> wrote in Message ID
<a0hrtn$1o3$1...@iac5.navix.net>:
>Short story .. chapter 2 .. The Air Force will never admit it and will
>sheild the pilots form legal action.
Agreed.
But, the USAF has taken some action as a result of the F-16/Cessna 172
midair collision:
http://www.naplesnews.com/01/06/florida/d647425a.htm
Air Force orders lower speeds after Manatee County crash
Thursday, June 21, 2001
Associated Press
BRADENTON — Military aircraft on low-level training missions in
civilian air space should fly at the slowest possible speed, the Air
Force says following an F-16 crash that killed a civilian pilot.
The Air Force has updated flight manuals and safety procedures on
high-speed, low-altitude flights after reviewing the collision of the
F-16 Fighting Falcon and a Cessna 172 over Manatee County on Nov. 16,
military officials said Tuesday.
Pilots on training maneuvers in civilian air space now are required to
fly at the slowest possible speed although not less than 250 knots, or
287.5 miles per hour.
In an official review of the crash, released in March, the Air Force
downplayed the F-16's 480 mph speed as a factor. The pilot was flying
180 mph faster than federal and Air Force guidelines then allowed for
military jets in air space near Sarasota-Bradenton International
Airport.
The updates are written in general terms and refer to slowing the
aircraft and reviewing training routes near congested flying areas.
The report, overseen and released by Air Force Chief of Staff Gen.
Michael Ryan, comes more than seven months after the F-16, flown by
Capt. Greg Kreuder, collided with the Cessna, killing its pilot,
Jacques Olivier, 57, a flight instructor from Hernando County.
"We can't speculate on whether these recommendations would have
affected the outcome of the crash had they already been in place,"
said Air Force spokeswoman Maj. Cheryl Law. "We always consider safety
as our highest priority."
Kreuder was following Lt. Col. James Parker on his way from Moody Air
Force Base, Ga., to a bombing range at Avon Park in central Florida.
Navigational problems led the pilots out of their military flight
zone.
The pilots were performing a G-force stress check, maneuvers to see
how well their bodies responded to rapid acceleration, just before the
crash.
"It didn't create the accident, but this is just something we can
improve on," said Neil Planzer, an Air Force associate for civil
aviation.
The training route the military pilots were about to enter before the
crash was within 12 miles of the Sarasota-Bradenton airport.
Air Force officials said they probably would continue flying the
training route but may alter the way it is used.
"We are just trying to give stronger safety reviews," Planzer said. "I
think that route can be handled correctly."
Dave Stadt
any and all responsibility. What makes it really bad is this is only one of
many cases.
Larry Dighera <LDig...@att.net> wrote in message
news:pnn63ukhb36ij9vhd...@4ax.com...
> BRADENTON - A trainee was at the radar screen when an Air Force jet
> collided with a private plane in November, said a Federal Aviation
> Administration report made public Friday.
>
> The Sarasota Herald-Tribune reported that documents obtained from the
> agency said the trainee was at the screen at a Tampa air control tower
> at the same time controllers in Miami were trying to warn the pilots
> off their collision course.
>
> The civilian pilot of the Cessna, Jacques Olivier of Hernando, was
> killed in the collision. The Air Force F-16 pilot parachuted to
> safety, but the jet was destroyed when it crashed into a wooded area.
>
> Two Air Force pilots were flying 480 mph - 180 mph faster than federal
> and Air Force guidelines allow in that urban area - on a practice
> TAMPA - Air traffic controllers could not have prevented a deadly
Larry Dighera
Message ID <68eX7.8347$NC1.1...@news1.elcjn1.sdca.home.com>:
>> In light of this "mishap," how can one help but
>> viewing military pilots as irresponsible and out of control?
>
>Regardless of where the fault lies, this is utterly ridiculous hyperbole.
While my statement may be a bit of an overstatement with regard to
Parker's deliberate decision to irresponsibly lead his flight into
Tampa Class Bravo airspace without the required ATC clearance well in
excess of the speed restriction mandated by Federal Aviation
Regulation 91.117(d) resulting in the death of a civilian pilot,
Brigadier General John W. Rosa's decision to limit Parkers punishment
to a written or verbal reprimand (no loss of rank nor pay) is
indicative of the USAF's unwillingness to discipline its ranks. I
would characterize undisciplined troops as out of control.
Here's a familiar example which corroborates that opinion:
http://www.crm-devel.org/resources/paper/darkblue/darkblue.htm
Dave Stadt
accident in Italy. Almost got us kicked out of the country due to their
obnoxious attitude.
Larry Dighera <LDig...@att.net> wrote in message
news:i6q63usbfrsehhvt7...@4ax.com...
Steven P. McNicoll
"Dave Stadt" <dhs...@ameritech.net> wrote in message
news:uvKY7.1238$58.11...@newssrv26.news.prodigy.com...
>
> And let's not forget what they tried to get away with after the gondola
> accident in Italy. Almost got us kicked out of the country due to their
> obnoxious attitude.
>
That wasn't the USAF.
Ron Natalie
"Steven P. McNicoll" wrote:
>
> "Dave Stadt" ?dhs...@ameritech.net? wrote in message
> news:uvKY7.1238$58.11...@newssrv26.news.prodigy.com...
> ?
> ? And let's not forget what they tried to get away with after the gondola
> ? accident in Italy. Almost got us kicked out of the country due to their
> ? obnoxious attitude.
> ?
>
> That wasn't the USAF.
>
Marines, and the pilot (Ashby) did get 6 months (albeit for obstruction of
justice for destroying the videotape of the flight).
However, the official excuses "bad altimeter", "poor charting", etc... seem
to be a cover-up of extremely unsafe flying at low altitudes in mountainous
areas.
Dave Stadt
Steven P. McNicoll <ronca...@writeme.com> wrote in message
news:u36un2c...@corp.supernews.com...
>
> "Dave Stadt" <dhs...@ameritech.net> wrote in message
> news:uvKY7.1238$58.11...@newssrv26.news.prodigy.com...
> >
> > And let's not forget what they tried to get away with after the gondola
> > accident in Italy. Almost got us kicked out of the country due to their
> > obnoxious attitude.
> >
>
> That wasn't the USAF.
Same attitude different uniform.
Tom Fenton
Italians. The USAF may or may not, depending upon what source you read, have
told the Marines about the current altitude rules. One or more of the Marine
operation types were formally reprimanded effectively ending their careers.
"Ron Natalie" <r...@sensor.com> wrote in message
news:3C3380FE...@sensor.com...
Newps
Larry Dighera wrote:
> On Fri, 28 Dec 2001 07:29:51 -0600, "OtisPWinslow"
> <deepth...@hotmail.com> wrote in Message ID
> <a0hrtn$1o3$1...@iac5.navix.net>:
>
> >Short story .. chapter 2 .. The Air Force will never admit it and will
> >sheild the pilots form legal action.
The pilots cannot be sued, period. Has nothing to do with whether or not
the Air Force is covering stuff up.
Ian
learn to Use the Falcon for High Speed Dogfights and interceptions . . . . .
Thats what the Aircraft was Designed for.
"Newps" <scn...@attbi.com> wrote in message
news:3C338BF9...@attbi.com...
Wizard of Draws
>
> Thats BS, those Pilots can't train properly at Low Speeds. They have to
> learn to Use the Falcon for High Speed Dogfights and interceptions . . . . .
> Thats what the Aircraft was Designed for.
>
Dogfights are prohibited in Class B airspace.
--
Jeff 'The Wizard of Draws' Bucchino
"Cartoons with a Touch of Magic"™
http://www.wizardofdraws.com
http://www.cartoonclipart.com
Drew Daglish
wrote:
>Thats BS, those Pilots can't train properly at Low Speeds. They have to
>learn to Use the Falcon for High Speed Dogfights and interceptions . . . . .
>Thats what the Aircraft was Designed for.
>
and thats why they have MOAs
Drew
Steven P. McNicoll
"Ian" <Slickn...@nyc.rr.com> wrote in message
news:ibOY7.222475$n5.32...@typhoon.nyc.rr.com...
>
> Thats BS, those Pilots can't train properly at Low Speeds. They have to
> learn to Use the Falcon for High Speed Dogfights and interceptions . . . .
.
> Thats what the Aircraft was Designed for.
>
Yes, and that's why we have MOAs, ATCAAs, Military Training Routes, etc.,
set aside for those purposes. The problem is this incident did not occur in
any of those areas.
Dave Stadt
Ian <Slickn...@nyc.rr.com> wrote in message
news:ibOY7.222475$n5.32...@typhoon.nyc.rr.com...
Tamas Feher
172
>midair collision:
Did the family of killed civilian pilot get proper compensation, I
mean in the range of a few million USD?
Larry Dighera
wrote in Message ID <a11hef$e87$1...@athena.euroweb.hu>:
I haven't been able to find an article on the verdict of the $10
million dollar civil suit brought against the FAA and USAF by the
family of Jaques Olivier, the late Cessna pilot, in the Florida
newspapers with searchable issues on-line.
http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/sptimes/main/advancedsearch.html
http://www.naplesnews.com/site_search.html
http://www.tcpalm.com/archives/search.shtml
http://www.newslibrary.com/nlsite/
http://www.heraldtribune.com/sitesearch/searchresults.cfm
http://cgi.jacksonville.com/search/iaquery?NS-search-set=/3c348/aaaa14790348c2b&&NS-query-pat=/NS-advquery-jax.pat&
THE FLORIDA LAW WEEKLY: http://www.floridalawweekly.com/
The December 4, 2000 issue of AVflash mentioned, "The wife of Cessna
172 pilot Jacques Olivier has filed wrongful-death claims ... The
military and FAA have six months to investigate the charges and issue
a response."
The St. Petersburg Times reported March 7, 2001, that [Florida Bar
President and partner in law firm of Coker, Myers, Schickel, Sorenson,
& Higginbotham (Phone: 904-356-6071; Web: http://www.cokerlaw.com/]
Howard Coker, an attorney for Olivier's widow, Danielle, would file a
$10-million lawsuit against the Air Force in May, and if reports of
the conflict alert proved true, would include the FAA in the suit.
Coker also said the National Transportation Safety Board would issue
its findings next month.
We're still waiting for the final NTSB report (File: MIA01FA028A)
Captain Wubba
> learn to Use the Falcon for High Speed Dogfights and interceptions . . . . .
> Thats what the Aircraft was Designed for.
>
>
You mean "Altanta Approach, Air Force 1669...are we cleared to enter
Bravo for dogfight at Mach 1.5?" "Roger Air Force 1669...cleared for
bravo for dogfight...traffic 4 miles at 10 O'Clock..Delta 767 heavy
inbound...descend and maintain 4500 and slow to mach 1' ?
You think this would help?
FiPe
>Dogfights are prohibited in Class B airspace.
I'd bet you meant Air Combat Maneuvers are prohibited in CBA. Dogfights are not
federally regulated :-E~~~
Fidel
Wizard of Draws
Assuming that most pilots are smarter than the average bear, I don't use
smileys when the sarcasm is blatant.
Mike Echo Mike
>It's been over a year, ant there is still no FINAL NTSB report posted.
Sue. Get a lawyer. Bring them to trial. You do not need to show that they
broke a law. You just need to show that they were at fault in the death.
... of course, that would mean hiring a lawyer...
FiPe
>Assuming that most pilots are smarter than the average bear, I don't use
>smileys when the sarcasm is blatant.
Dangerous assumption! Specially in this forum. Do you remember ELMCFI? Anyways,
sorry if I seem denser than the average bear. I've been told that I'm AT LEAST
as smart as the average bear.
Fidel (sarcasm impaired -- apparently)
Alan K. Gideon
less than 250 kts. Though I'm not an F-16 pilot, I have to think that
smells a bit. It also gives rise to some interesting visions of what
the landings must be like. 250+ kts at touchdown. ;-)
Alan
Michael Williamson
> This story would imply that the Air Force thinks the F-16 cannot fly at
> less than 250 kts. Though I'm not an F-16 pilot, I have to think that
> smells a bit. It also gives rise to some interesting visions of what
> the landings must be like. 250+ kts at touchdown. ;-)
250 knots is the general flight speed limitation below 10,000 ft in most
instances, so there is no reason to lower it beyond that.
Mike Williamson
Randy Haskin
> This story would imply that the Air Force thinks the F-16 cannot fly at
> less than 250 kts. Though I'm not an F-16 pilot, I have to think that
> smells a bit. It also gives rise to some interesting visions of what
> the landings must be like. 250+ kts at touchdown.
No, but in the F-15 my *gear speed* is 250KCAS, if that tells you
anything. Approaches are in the 160-180 KCAS range.
There's no implication that the airplane *cannot fly* at less than
250, the AF is merely saying that the jet is *not safe* at that
airspeed. Flying the Eagle or Viper around close to the ground at 250
KCAS is not smart. Go back and read the thread that Larry D and I
were in about this 6 months ago if you want details, but the fact is
that the airplane is *not* safe to fly and maneuver at 250.
Randy Haskin
Strike Eagle Driver
John R Weiss
"high-speed, low-altitude flights," and "training maneuvers" equate to
landing speeds? It doesn't take an F-16 pilot (but it does take a modicum
of intelligence) to be aware of the difference between cruise speeds at
heavy weights in the cruise or "clean" configuration, and landing at light
weights in the landing or "dirty" configuration...
-----------------------
John R Weiss
www.tsca.net/puget
sent from home
<fr...@quimby.com> wrote in message
news:0rbj3uoceaobh5c0i...@4ax.com...
> From the USAF midair accident invistigation report, the Lockheed F-16
> flight manual apparently states that the minimum safe cruise speed is
> 300 knots.
>
> On Sat, 05 Jan 2002 19:24:36 -0500, "Alan K. Gideon"
> <akgi...@mindspring.com> wrote:
>
>This story would imply that the Air Force thinks the F-16 cannot fly at
>less than 250 kts. Though I'm not an F-16 pilot, I have to think that
>smells a bit. It also gives rise to some interesting visions of what
>the landings must be like. 250+ kts at touchdown. ;-)
>
> Air Force orders lower speeds after Manatee County crash
> Thursday, June 21, 2001
>
> BRADENTON - Military aircraft on low-level training missions in
Gord Beaman
Don't think so Alan, while I'm not very knowlegeable about the
F-16, 250 Kts at touchdown sounds ok, isn't it Mike?...
--
Gord Beaman
PEI, Canada
Steven P. McNicoll
"Larry Dighera" <LDig...@worldnet.att.net> wrote in message
news:Pq3X7.200935$WW.11...@bgtnsc05-news.ops.worldnet.att.net...
>
> Can you cite the regulation that exempts speed limits in Military
> Operations Areas?
>
Sure, it's FAR 91.117(a), in conjunction with the speed authorization
granted to DOD by FAA.
Sec. 91.117 Aircraft speed.
(a) Unless otherwise authorized by the Administrator, no person may
operate an aircraft below 10,000 feet MSL at an indicated airspeed of more
than 250 knots (288 m.p.h.).
SPEED AUTHORIZATION GRANTED TO DOD
May 18, 1978
Mr. Paul H. Riley
Alternate DOD Representative to FAA
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20330
Dear Mr. Riley:
Section 91.70(a) of the Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) provides that,
unless otherwise authorized by the Administrator of the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), no person may operate an aircraft below 10,000 feet
mean sea level (MSL) at an indicated airspeed of more than 250 knots.
The regulation grants an exception to aircraft having flight characteristics
which preclude safe operation at speeds below 250 knots by providing that if
the minimum safe airspeed for any particular operation is greater than the
maximum speed prescribed, the aircraft may be operated at that minimum safe
airspeed.
In recognition of the fact that certain military operational and training
requirements cannot be met under the terms of the regulation, the Department
of the Navy and the Department of the Air Force have been authorized since
November, 1967, to operate aircraft below 10,000 feet MSL at an indicated
airspeed of more than 250 knots to the extent such high-speed operations
were necessary in the accomplishment of air combat maneuvers and tactics,
low-level navigation, low-level reconnaissance and intercept, weapons
delivery tactics, flight test and evaluation, undergraduate pilot training,
actual or simulated alert missions, and other flight operations of a similar
nature.
Our authorization of November 1967, to each service, was rescinded and
reissued to the Department of Defense on June 8, 1976. The June 1976
authorization was rescinded and reissued on February 25, 1977. The
February 1977 authorization was rescinded and reissued on December
19,1977. Provisions are now needed to accommodate military requirements
while airspace actions are pending. Therefore, effective immediately, the
December 19, 1977, authorization is rescinded and reissued as follows:
Operations below 10,000 feet MSL at an indicated airspeed in excess of 250
knots, in noncompliance with FAR 91.70(a), are authorized for military
aircraft, including Reserve and Air National Guard components, only under
the following conditions:
a. Within restricted areas.
b. Within military operations areas.
c. When operating within large scale exercises or on short term special
missions. Coordination will be effected to insure awareness on the part of
the nonparticipating flying public.
d. When operating on DOD/FAA mutually developed and published IFR
routes. The military necessity for each route and for the extent of use of
each route is to be reviewed and approved by the appropriate military
headquarters.
e. When operating on DOD developed and published VFR routes. Such
routes shall be established for specific missions and used only by
designated units when the provisions of a. through d. above will not
accommodate the required national defense mission as determined by
appropriate military headquarters. Routes are to be developed and published
in accordance with DOD/FAA mutually developed criteria.
f. In the event provisions of a. through e. cannot be complied with,
the appropriate military headquarters may authorize flight operations within
defined airspace in noncompliance with FAR 91.70 as it considers necessary
to accomplish the national defense mission. This provision is intended to
accommodate speed requirements on an interim basis within a defined area for
which an area/route proposal has been coordinated and concurred in by
appropriate military/FAA regional authority but not yet published.
g. If the airspeed required or recommended in the airplane flight
manual to maintain safe maneuverability is greater than the maximum speed
described in FAR 91.70, the aircraft may be operated at that speed. Where
the required or recommended speed is given as range, the lower part of the
speed range should be used consistent with good operating practice. This
provision is primarily to accommodate climbs/descents and terminal area
operations.
This authorization is effective immediately. Operations along VFR low
altitude training routes (TR), which were established in accordance with FAA
Handbook 7610.4C, Part 10, and in existence at the time of this
authorization may be continued until January 1, 1979.
Sincerely,
(s) Raymond G. Belanger
RAYMOND G. BELANGER
Director, Air Traffic Service
>
> Is only the military exempt, or can a Glassair also
> exceed 250 knots below 10,000' in a MOA?
>
This authorization applies only to the military.
>
> Do think that would be safe?
>
As long as notice is made of the operation, yes.
>
> Just because the FARs were violated by the military in this "mishap,"
> it doesn't necessarily mean that the current FARs are just and/or
> workable in today's NAS environment.
>
True, but because the FARs were violated there's no evidence here that the
FARs are unjust and/or unworkable in today's NAS environment.
>
> The FAR 91.117(d) speed exemption fails to provide adequate time for
> pilots to comply with FAR 91.113(b) & (e) (as verified by military
> study: http://www.aopa.org/asf/publications/sa15.pdf) in its
> effectively permitting virtually unlimited speed below 10,000' in
> civil airspace.
>
Virtually unlimited speed? That's not the case at all.
>
> The lack of a requirement for increased conspicuity
> of those aircraft operating under FAR 19.117(d) is absurd. The
> failure to place responsibility for air traffic separation on the
> aircraft invoking the exemption and creating the hazard is inequitable
> and unjust. And, the failure of FARs to mandate the use of already
> on-board radar for separation is negligence.
>
It's my understanding that the military does mandate that.
Michael Williamson
Gord Beaman wrote:
I'd say 250 at touchdown would be too high in most circumstances,
although I've never flown the -16. The difference in clean maneuvering
speed and approach speed with flaps and gear would be fairly
significant. Even the T-38, for which the maximum FAA airspeed
requirement below 10,000 ft was waived to 300 KIAS, touched
down below 200 knots (can't find my -1 anymore for more precise
info though).
For what it's worth, the Falcon 4.0 simulation/game manual lists 200
knots at 10 miles (straight in), clean as an initial state for it's landing
training mission, with 160 or so configured and on glide path and a
touchdown speed of 130.
Mike
Brett Hay
If more than 12 miles off the coast...you can go as fast as you like. Miami
center will always ask you to keep the speed up and "they will call" when to
reduce your speed on the Atlantic Routes. We never trust then and just use
the radar.
- Brett
"Steven P. McNicoll" <ronca...@writeme.com> wrote in message
news:u4lknk6...@corp.supernews.com...
Gord Beaman
>
> For what it's worth, the Falcon 4.0 simulation/game manual lists 200
>knots at 10 miles (straight in), clean as an initial state for it's landing
>training mission, with 160 or so configured and on glide path and a
>touchdown speed of 130.
>
>Mike
>
I stand corrected...thanks Mike...
Herb Martin
for DEPARTING traffic at ATCs disrection/authorization.
This is apparently a TEST program to determine feasibility.
Herb Martin
(student pilot)
"Steven P. McNicoll" <ronca...@writeme.com> wrote in message
news:u4lknk6...@corp.supernews.com...
>
Randy Haskin
> significant. Even the T-38, for which the maximum FAA airspeed
> requirement below 10,000 ft was waived to 300 KIAS, touched
> down below 200 knots (can't find my -1 anymore for more precise
> info though).
The T-38 flies a hi-penetration at 300 KIAS, cruises the radar pattern
at 250, and flies final at 155 plus one knot per every hundred pounds
of on-board gas and/or external stores (e.g a SUU-20). Recovery fuels
are usually in the 800-1,200 pound range, so average approach speeds
are around 165 KIAS. With a good flare, touchdowns are in the 130-135
range.
The F-15E has nearly the identical speeds, except uses a diffrent
formula for computing landing speed.
Larry Dighera
<ronca...@writeme.com> wrote in Message ID
<u4lknk6...@corp.supernews.com>:
>
>"Larry Dighera" <LDig...@worldnet.att.net> wrote in message
>news:Pq3X7.200935$WW.11...@bgtnsc05-news.ops.worldnet.att.net...
[snip]
>> The FAR 91.117(d) speed exemption fails to provide adequate time for
>> pilots to comply with FAR 91.113(b) & (e) (as verified by military
>> study: http://www.aopa.org/asf/publications/sa15.pdf) in its
>> effectively permitting virtually unlimited speed below 10,000' in
>> civil airspace.
>>
>
>Virtually unlimited speed? That's not the case at all.
Okay. The maximum safe speed limit below 10,000' is being set by
Lockheed not the FAA. Is that reasonable?
This failure to quantify a maximum speed limit seems like an
abdication of the FAA's responsibility to provide air safety within
the NAS. Surely you must agree, at some high velocity, reliance on
visual separation is absurd; at a high enough speed, the time to
visually identify and avoid an aircraft on a collision course is
reduced to the point of human impossibility. That speed is dependent
on the laws of physics as well as external factors such as
meteorologic conditions and pilot workload...
But, here's the real SNAFU:
FAR 91.113 mandates see-and-avoid for separating VFR NAS users from
other NAS users, but FAR 91.117(d) effectively removes the NAS
_maximum_ safe speed limit below 10,000' feet. So, by virtue of the
conclusion stated in the paragraph above, compliance with FAR 91.113,
although required, is not always humanly possible, and at times, is
physically impossible as well. (It effectively provides the military
with a weasle-clause to shift responsibility from the military
aircraft creating the safety hazard to any other VFR aircraft it may
impact.) This exemplifies the "Catch-22" nature of the FARs as
currently written.
The FAA has effectively failed to quantify the maximum safe speed
below 10,000' feet. (If you don't agree, please state that number.)
That speed should be predicated on the tested ability of the human
pilots' visual acuity, meteorologic conditions, the conspicuity of the
high-speed aircraft, and typical pilot's workload expectations, and
not left to the aircraft manufacturer who prints the minimum safe
speed of the aircraft in the flight manual.
Further, the FAA does not _require_ NAS users, operating in excess of
250 knots below 10,000' under FAR 91.117(d)'s exemption, to increase
their conspicuity, to afford other VFR NAS users a greater chance of
complying with FAR 91.113's mandate to see-and-avoid their meteoric
path. That, and a lack of a requirement for the use of radar or TCAS,
if so equipped, to be employed for collision avoidance are deplorable.
Changes need to be made; the FARs need revision if safety and
justice are to be served.
>>
>> The lack of a requirement for increased conspicuity
>> of those aircraft operating under FAR 19.117(d) is absurd. The
>> failure to place responsibility for air traffic separation on the
>> aircraft invoking the exemption and creating the hazard is inequitable
>> and unjust. And, the failure of FARs to mandate the use of already
>> on-board radar for separation is negligence.
>>
>
>It's my understanding that the military does mandate that.
The USAF AIB report on the subject "mishap" makes no mention of such
use. If the pilots involved were monitoring their radar for targets
in their path, I've got to believe they wouldn't have smashed into
that Cessna.
Perhaps you can locate the section which supports your belief in one
of these publications:
AFI11-2H-60V3
AFPD 11-2, Aircraft Rules and Procedures
AFPD 11-4, Aviation Service
AFI 11-202V3, General Flight Rules.
http://afpubs.hq.af.mil/
Steven P. McNicoll
"Larry Dighera" <LDig...@att.net> wrote in message
news:g3835uspunfpqrl7l...@4ax.com...
>
> Okay. The maximum safe speed limit below 10,000' is being set by
> Lockheed not the FAA. Is that reasonable?
>
It would be unreasonable if it was true.
>
> The FAA has effectively failed to quantify the maximum safe speed
> below 10,000' feet. (If you don't agree, please state that number.)
>
250 KIAS, unless safety dictates a higher speed.
>
> Perhaps you can locate the section which supports your belief in one
> of these publications:
>
One does not need to support one's beliefs.
Larry Dighera
>"Larry Dighera" <LDig...@att.net> wrote in message
>news:g3835uspunfpqrl7l...@4ax.com...
>>
>> Okay. The maximum safe speed limit below 10,000' is being set by
>> Lockheed not the FAA. Is that reasonable?
>
>It would be unreasonable if it was true.
It appears to be true from the evidence available to me.
In FAR 91.117(d), the FAA tells pilots to look in the flight manual
for the maximum speed limit, and fails to set a specific numeric
limit. In the case of the F-16s involved in the subject "mishap",
Lockheed published the flight manual, not the FAA. So the FAA defers
its responsibility to establish a maximum safe speed limit to the
manufacturer, and fails to truly set a quantified maximum safe speed
limit which will reasonably permit adequate time for the pilots they
certify to comply with see-and-avoid provision of FAR 91.113(b).
Without a specific numeric maximum speed limit, it is impossible to
design a system of airspace control that can be reasonably expected
provide a safe environment for all users.
>> The FAA has effectively failed to quantify the maximum safe speed
>> below 10,000' feet. (If you don't agree, please state that number.)
>>
>
>250 KIAS, unless safety dictates a higher speed.
The question here is: whose safety? In VMC, the safety of the flight
invoking the exemption from the 250 knot maximum speed limit may be
enhanced, but the safety of the (perhaps, numerous) aircraft that
share the airspace environment with that flight is degraded by the
reduced time available to see-and-avoid that flight as required by FAR
91.113(b). So, the (probably military) flight invoking the FAR
91.117(d) speed exemption (probably equipped with an ejection seat, a
robust airframe, multiple radars, and a weight many times that of the
typical GA aircraft with which it shares the NAS environment) not only
potentially creates a safety hazard, but is virtually immune to the
consequences of the safety hazard it creates for other civil flights.
In the case of the subject fatal midair collision, the pilot of the
F-16 ejected and walked away from the "mishap" unscathed, and the
military pilot responsible for the "mishap" was not (yet) made to face
charges for the death he caused, nor face loss of rank nor pay.
And, this is apparently the typical government response in these
situations; the civil flight is (erroneously) found to have been
culpable in causing the mishap, while the flight creating the safety
hazard escapes responsibility.
If you disagree, please read the NTSB report (LAX86MA186A) of the
April 20, 1986 glider & A7 fighter midair collision:
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?ev_id=20001213X33340&key=1
You will note that the glider pilot was faulted with the probable
cause of the collision, but no causative factors were attributed to
the military pilot despite his failure to comply with FAR 91.113(b)s
requirement to see-and-avoid and FAR91.113(d2)s granting gliders
right-of-way over airplanes. Is that just?
>> Perhaps you can locate the section which supports your belief in one
>> of these publications:
>>
>One does not need to support one's beliefs.
(Oh oh. I hope you're not going to get metaphysical.)
A sane person seeks supporting empirical environmental evidence for
his beliefs, otherwise how is he to distinguish between
delusion/halucination and fact?
Steven P. McNicoll
>
> It appears to be true from the evidence available to me.
>
You've misinterpreted the "evidence".
>
> A sane person seeks supporting empirical environmental evidence for
> his beliefs, otherwise how is he to distinguish between
> delusion/halucination and fact?
>
Read the damn thread, I recall an F-16 driver supplied that information. I
have no reason to doubt him.
Aaron Hopper
> for the maximum speed limit, and fails to set a specific numeric
> limit. In the case of the F-16s involved in the subject "mishap",
> Lockheed published the flight manual, not the FAA.
The F-16 manual is published by the Air Force under the authority of the
Secretary of the Air Force in conjuction with Lockheed. It is not a
unilateral document.
> So the FAA defers
> its responsibility to establish a maximum safe speed limit to the
> manufacturer, and fails to truly set a quantified maximum safe speed
> limit which will reasonably permit adequate time for the pilots they
> certify to comply with see-and-avoid provision of FAR 91.113(b).
>
As it should be. The FAA did not design, build, and test the F-16 -- or any
other fighter -- and should not be in the business of determining safe
aircraft speeds.
> >> The FAA has effectively failed to quantify the maximum safe speed
> >> below 10,000' feet. (If you don't agree, please state that number.)
> >>
> >
> >250 KIAS, unless safety dictates a higher speed.
>
> The question here is: whose safety?
The safety of both aircraft involved. If I fly at 300 KIAS, it improves
your chances of surviving, because I have the maneuverability to get out of
your way. Flying at 250 KIAS decreases my ability to react.
Consider an F-16 merging head on with a C-172 at 5,000 MSL and 2 NM
separation. If the F-16 flies at 250 KIAS, and the C-172 at 100 KIAS, then
the two planes are closing at roughly 375 KTAS (adding 5 knots/1000 ft and
assuming standard tempuratures). Both pilots will have 19 seconds to react.
Take the same scenario, except the F-16 flies at 300 KIAS. Now the two
planes merge at 425 KTAS, and both pilots have 17 seconds to react.
If the F-16 flies at 300, then the two aircraft have 2 second less to react
(a 10% decrease). However, at 300 KIAS, the F-16 is much nearer its corner
velocity and can generate a significantly higher G-load, smaller turn
radius, and higher turn rate to get out of the way. The added
maneuverability more than makes up for the 2-second difference.
Cheers,
Grass
Dave Stadt
Aaron Hopper <aaron_...@worldnet.att.net> wrote in message
news:%nq58.7921$Ab1.4...@bgtnsc04-news.ops.worldnet.att.net...
Didn't work to well in Florida did it?
>
>
Larry Dighera
Steve,
I have no idea to which "evidence" you are referring.
The thread is over 200 articles which span over a year in time. To
which "information" supplied by the "F-16 driver" are you referring?
Without a little more information and context in your responses, they
have no meaning to me.
Thanks.
On Mon, 28 Jan 2002 22:15:40 -0600, "Steven P. McNicoll"
<ronca...@writeme.com> wrote in Message ID
<u5c8hv1...@corp.supernews.com>:
Larry Dighera
<aaron_...@worldnet.att.net> wrote in Message ID
<%nq58.7921$Ab1.4...@bgtnsc04-news.ops.worldnet.att.net>:
>> In FAR 91.117(d), the FAA tells pilots to look in the flight manual
>> for the maximum speed limit, and fails to set a specific numeric
>> limit. In the case of the F-16s involved in the subject "mishap",
>> Lockheed published the flight manual, not the FAA.
>
>The F-16 manual is published by the Air Force under the authority of the
>Secretary of the Air Force in conjuction with Lockheed. It is not a
>unilateral document.
Okay. The flight manual is a collaborative effort, but the FAA
abdicates their duty to provide safe skies by permitting other
entities to establish the maximum safe speed limit. The FAA is tasked
with making the skies safe, but it fails to provide a quantified
maximum speed limit. That is not only unreasonable, but absurd.
If the maximum limits engineered into the NAS system are exceeded, the
system will fail to provide the level of safety for which it was
designed, much as a highway system would.
You don't find responding emergency vehicles exceeding the maximum
speeds for which the highways were designed; in fact they don't even
exceed the posted limits. Someone in authority must feel that is
prudent on the ground. I think it is prudent in the air as well.
>> So the FAA defers
>> its responsibility to establish a maximum safe speed limit to the
>> manufacturer, and fails to truly set a quantified maximum safe speed
>> limit which will reasonably permit adequate time for the pilots they
>> certify to comply with see-and-avoid provision of FAR 91.113(b).
>>
>
>As it should be. The FAA did not design, build, and test the F-16 -- or any
>other fighter -- and should not be in the business of determining safe
>aircraft speeds.
I can see your point. But, your _point_ _of_ _view_ fails to address
the fact that F-16s _SHARE_ the NAS with many civil users. High speed
operation is the military's trade, but its conduct should be limited
to Restricted Areas where high-speed aircraft are separated from civil
flights. Other wise, what is the use of Restricted Areas?
Unless I'm mistaken, the military is ever increasingly taking control
of our skies. There are Restricted Areas where civil flight is
prohibited, joint-use Military Operations Areas without speed limits,
and now the military wants to conduct high-speed operation in civil
airspace too. Where will it end? Is there no limit to military
encroachment? It's time to reverse the trend.
>> >> The FAA has effectively failed to quantify the maximum safe speed
>> >> below 10,000' feet. (If you don't agree, please state that number.)
>> >>
>> >
>> >250 KIAS, unless safety dictates a higher speed.
>>
>> The question here is: whose safety?
>
>The safety of both aircraft involved.
I disagree.
>If I fly at 300 KIAS, it improves your chances of surviving, because
>I have the maneuverability to get out of your way.
If the onus of avoidance were placed exclusively on you, that would be
just; it isn't currently.
>Flying at 250 KIAS decreases my ability to react.
I'll accept your first-hand experience on that point.
It seems reasonable to me, that if the F-16 needs to exceed the 250
knot maximum safe speed limit established by the FAA, it should
exclusively shoulder the burden of see-and-avoid, not share that
responsibility with civil flights operating within the limits the FAA
deems safe. I realize that more eyes scanning for traffic is better,
but the _legal_ responsibility for avoidance should be placed squarely
on the aircraft creating the safety hazard.
>Consider an F-16 merging head on with a C-172 at 5,000 MSL and 2 NM
>separation. If the F-16 flies at 250 KIAS, and the C-172 at 100 KIAS, then
>the two planes are closing at roughly 375 KTAS (adding 5 knots/1000 ft and
>assuming standard tempuratures). Both pilots will have 19 seconds to react.
>
>Take the same scenario, except the F-16 flies at 300 KIAS. Now the two
>planes merge at 425 KTAS, and both pilots have 17 seconds to react.
>
>If the F-16 flies at 300, then the two aircraft have 2 second less to react
>(a 10% decrease). However, at 300 KIAS, the F-16 is much nearer its corner
>velocity and can generate a significantly higher G-load, smaller turn
>radius, and higher turn rate to get out of the way. The added
>maneuverability more than makes up for the 2-second difference.
>
>
>Cheers,
>Grass
You have provided an example that illustrates a reason for military
aircraft to exceed the 250 knot limit below 10,000', but the enhanced
maneuverability of the F-16 comes at a cost of precious seconds.
Again, I refer you to this study:
http://www.aopa.org/asf/publications/sa15.pdf
An experimental scan training course conducted with military
pilots found the average time needed to conduct the operations
essential to flying the airplane was 20 seconds – 17 seconds for
the outside scan, and three seconds for the panel scan. Without
the benefit of intensive military training, most pilots will need
more time than this. But as demonstrated by the military pilots,
considerably more time should be spent on the external scan than
the panel scan.
Considering the above information, your example illustrates that the
requisite 20 seconds necessary for _highly_trainied_ military pilots
(not saturated with duties other than scanning the windscreen) is
_not_ available for safety. Thank you for proving my point.
Bob Noel
<LDig...@att.net> wrote:
> Okay. The flight manual is a collaborative effort, but the FAA
> abdicates their duty to provide safe skies by permitting other
> entities to establish the maximum safe speed limit. The FAA is tasked
> with making the skies safe, but it fails to provide a quantified
> maximum speed limit. That is not only unreasonable, but absurd.
ok, define "safe"
and then tell the FAA how to determine the safety of the NAS.
--
Bob
(I think people can figure out how to email me... )
(replace ihatessppaamm with my name (rnoel) and hw1 with mediaone)
Steven P. McNicoll
"Dave Stadt" <dhs...@ameritech.net> wrote in message
news:jSw58.1823$HL4.3...@newssrv26.news.prodigy.com...
> >
> > Take the same scenario, except the F-16 flies at 300 KIAS. Now the two
> > planes merge at 425 KTAS, and both pilots have 17 seconds to react.
> >
> > If the F-16 flies at 300, then the two aircraft have 2 second less to
> > react (a 10% decrease). However, at 300 KIAS, the F-16 is much
> > nearer its corner velocity and can generate a significantly higher
G-load,
> > smaller turn radius, and higher turn rate to get out of the way. The
> > added maneuverability more than makes up for the 2-second difference.
> >
>
>
That wasn't done in Florida.
Steven P. McNicoll
>
> Steve,
>
> I have no idea to which "evidence" you are referring.
>
> The thread is over 200 articles which span over a year in time. To
> which "information" supplied by the "F-16 driver" are you referring?
>
> Without a little more information and context in your responses, they
> have no meaning to me.
>
Follow the thread.
Lego
Larry can't fathom that some A/C HAVE to fly above 250 knots for safety. An
F-16 is designed to go fast. It has extremely small wings when compared
with civilian A/C and there simply isn't enough lift at 250 knots to give an
F-16 a safe margin to maneuver in all configurations. If we are talking a
clean F-16 low on gas, 250 is no problem and can maneuver... However, a
fully loaded + fueled Viper with tanks, missiles, SUU's, TER's, Maverick,
HARM, inert or live ordnance, etc is a completely different animal. It can
weigh more than twice that of a clean Viper. You simply can't maneuver the
jet like you can at 300. On the extreme end, I've been in holding patters
that are speed limited to 250 knots in an extremely heavy viper and
literally couldn't maintain level flight in a 30 degree bank turn in mil
power because we're so far behind the power curve. That's why the flight
manual states 300 knots as the safe maneuvering airspeed. You can argue all
day long about the FAA should limit us to 250 but it's not going to happen.
The FAA waiver isn't just for F-16's... it's for any aircraft that the
flight manual gives a safe maneuvering speed. Granted the majority of these
are going to be military by the very nature of military aircraft design but
it also could apply to others as well. Skies are safer with us at 300.
Would you rather have us see the other aircraft 2 seconds earlier but be
unable to turn our plane? Your analogy about rescue vehicles just isn't
accurate.
Second:
You are mistaken about the military taking over airspace. In fact the exact
opposite is occurring. I've worked at scheduling and range ops at more than
one base now. Airspace a single base used to own is now shared between
multiple bases and even services. Also the letter of agreements between
bases and ATC has become somewhat more restrictive in my opinion. The
increase in general and civil aviation continually causes portions of our
airspace to be limited. This mostly occurs during bad weather but it can
occur with traffic congestion as well. That's not to say that the military
isn't creating any new airspace at all. In general they are trying to get
airspace in areas of the US that aren't congested. The airspace around
major cities has grown to proportions that MOA's around them have to
disappear, or in many cases, the bases as well as the MOA's themselves are
closed due to the traffic. With the airspace we have around our base, we
use it non-stop from sunrise to well after sunset almost non-stop. For many
missions there simply isn't the airspace to even train in. Your "Fact" that
the military controls 50% of the airspace is hardly a fact as well. That
"fact" comes from a 2... yes 2 dimensional representation of the U.S. with
every MOA, MTR, Restricted Area, Warning area etc drawn on it. It doesn't
include altitudes when often such as on an MTR we might only own up to 1500
feet, it doesn't include times that the airspace is active such as many
MOA's that may be scheduled for only a few hours a day or even less. It is
a 2-D drawing / representation that is inaccurate in context. As a civil
pilot myself I won't doubt that it is a pain to try to deconflict from the
airspace especially if it is around your home field. .
Third:
The military is trying to do lights out training at night in MOA's because
of a legitimate need for training. There aren't enough warning / restricted
areas of sufficient size for the bases to train the way they need to. Many
bases have adequate warning areas of sufficient size to train, but others do
not, and are looking for some way to train the pilots at night. Why is this
an issue vs 10 years ago. Because we are going towards an AF that fights at
night. We are moving to an AF where all fighters will be using NVGs and
other advances at night. And it is a BIG difference training with lights
out than having the ability to look outside and find other members of your
flight. It's like trying to train for instrument flight without having to
wear a hood or train in the weather.... It isn't irresponsible to make
requests to the FAA like you continually say, we are simply looking for
different ways to train the pilots in an Air Force that is continually
evolving.
Lego
F-16 Pilot
"Larry Dighera" <LDig...@att.net> wrote in message
news:67dd5us36qtmtd0dc...@4ax.com...
> essential to flying the airplane was 20 seconds - 17 seconds for
Aaron Hopper
> speeds for which the highways were designed; in fact they don't even
> exceed the posted limits. Someone in authority must feel that is
> prudent on the ground. I think it is prudent in the air as well.
>
I have not seen any evidence that higher fighter speeds in congested areas
(250-300 KIAS) increases the danger to civil traffic or anyone else. You
have referred to the Sarasota and glider incidents, but those deal with low
level operations in and around special use airspace. And there were many
other factors besides speed which led to the Sarasota incident.
In fact, in terms of mid-air collisions, the report you cited in the
previous post indicates that pilots with less than 100 hours of experience
are involved in the majority of midair collisions (MAC). The report goes
further and states "most midairs occur in the traffic pattern, with almost
half occuring on final approach". Experience, location, and phase of
flight -- not speed -- seem to be more significant factors in MAC.
In terms of near mid-air collisions (NMAC), FAA statistics show that from
1994-1999, 57% of NMACs involved GA aircraft, and 25% involved military
aircraft. Of the 805 NMACs involving GA aircraft, only 15% were between a
GA and military aircraft. The other 85% of NMACs that involved GA aircraft
were between GA aircraft and other operator categories (i.e. other GA
aircraft, commercial aircarriers, and so on). So, speeds in excess of 250
KIAS were probably not the significant factor in most (85% or more) of these
cases.
I've had more close calls while flying a C-172 than I have ever had in an
F-16 or T-38, and I have less flying time in a C-172. I see no reason to
believe that flying 300 KIAS in an F-16 or other fighter significantly
jeopardizes our safety.
>
> Again, I refer you to this study:
>
> http://www.aopa.org/asf/publications/sa15.pdf
Good report, by the way. Good information for all pilots.
> An experimental scan training course conducted with military
> pilots found the average time needed to conduct the operations
> essential to flying the airplane was 20 seconds - 17 seconds for
> the outside scan, and three seconds for the panel scan. Without
> the benefit of intensive military training, most pilots will need
> more time than this. But as demonstrated by the military pilots,
> considerably more time should be spent on the external scan than
> the panel scan.
>
> Considering the above information, your example illustrates that the
> requisite 20 seconds necessary for _highly_trainied_ military pilots
> (not saturated with duties other than scanning the windscreen) is
> _not_ available for safety. Thank you for proving my point.
>
How does this prove your point? If a pilot spends 17 out of 20 seconds
looking outside, he will definitely have time to spot another aircraft at
2NM. Like the example showed, he will have 17 seconds to react to a plane
at 2 NM if he is flying 300 KIAS. Even if a task-saturated pilot were to
stare at his instrument panel for 10 seconds straight, never looking
outside, he would have 7 seconds to look up, see the civil aircraft within
1-mile, and maneuver out of the way. Since the "highly trained" pilot in
the report spends only 15% (3 out of 20 seconds) of his time looking inside,
he will have at least 14 seconds to look outside and react.
Cheers,
Grass
Larry Dighera
<legof16@(remove)earthlink.net> wrote in Message ID
<XrL58.6434$By6.7...@newsread2.prod.itd.earthlink.net>:
>First:
>Larry can't fathom that some A/C HAVE to fly above 250 knots for safety.
Whose safety? Your safety, not mine.
I am required by federal regulation to see-and-avoid your high-speed
aircraft; I am not relieved of that responsibility when you exceed FAR
91.117(a)'s 250 knot maximum speed below 10,000'. That must change.
Today, it's 300 knots. By how much will future military aircraft need
to exceed the 250 knot speed limit the FAA saw fit to mandate below
10,000'? Will future fighters "need" to fly at a minimum 500 knots?
Where is the limit? Currently there is no _quantified_ maximum speed
limit due to FAR 91.117(d)'s exemption.
If you need to go fast, do it in Restricted Airspace; high-speed
compromises safety in civil and joint-use airspace.
>F-16 is designed to go fast. It has extremely small wings when compared
>with civilian A/C and there simply isn't enough lift at 250 knots to give an
>F-16 a safe margin to maneuver in all configurations. If we are talking a
>clean F-16 low on gas, 250 is no problem and can maneuver... However, a
>fully loaded + fueled Viper with tanks, missiles, SUU's, TER's, Maverick,
>HARM, inert or live ordnance, etc is a completely different animal. It can
>weigh more than twice that of a clean Viper. You simply can't maneuver the
>jet like you can at 300. On the extreme end, I've been in holding patters
>that are speed limited to 250 knots in an extremely heavy viper and
>literally couldn't maintain level flight in a 30 degree bank turn in mil
>power because we're so far behind the power curve. That's why the flight
>manual states 300 knots as the safe maneuvering airspeed.
Doubtless, that is the reason Lockheed has established the minimum
cruise speed at 300 knots. I don't dispute that. How could I? I
don't have access to the information the engineers had who established
that performance criterion.
>You can argue all day long about the FAA should limit us to 250
In this entire thread, I have not said that the FAA should limit
anyone to 250 knots. That would be contrary to the flight manual. It
is the FAA who chose that limit, not me.
Unless you are able to provide a citation of the Message-ID number
which contains such a statement by me, I will disregard it.
>but it's not going to happen.
>The FAA waiver isn't just for F-16's... it's for any aircraft that the
>flight manual gives a safe maneuvering speed. Granted the majority of these
>are going to be military by the very nature of military aircraft design but
>it also could apply to others as well.
While what you assert above may or may not be true, it certainly
doesn't corroborate your assertion below:
>Skies are safer with us at 300.
Safer for whom? Not safer for me.
Military fighter aircraft pilots have little physical harm to fear
from colliding with a typical GA aircraft due to the weight and speed
differential as well as a much more robust airframe and ejection seat
to provide them with a safe landing. The GA pilot is like a
fluttering moth poised hovering above the rush hour traffic in such a
situation. His chances of survival in a collision are slight at best.
>Would you rather have us see the other aircraft 2 seconds earlier but be
>unable to turn our plane?
I'd prefer to have enough time to see you, and get out of your way as
the FAA requires me to do in FAR 91.113.
High-speed military flights put me in a catch-22 situation. The study
below shows that I have limited time resources to comply with FAR
91.113's see-and-avoid requirement:
http://www.aopa.org/asf/publications/sa15.pdf
An experimental scan training course conducted with military
pilots found the average time needed to conduct the operations
essential to flying the airplane was 20 seconds - 17 seconds for
the outside scan, and three seconds for the panel scan. Without
the benefit of intensive military training, most pilots will need
more time than this. But as demonstrated by the military pilots,
considerably more time should be spent on the external scan than
the panel scan.
Either high-speed aircraft should be excluded from the civil traffic
mix, or the FAA should relieve me of the physical impossibility
imposed by FAR 91.113 that makes me responsible to see-and-avoid you,
and place that responsibility _solely_ on you who create the safety
hazard.
>Your analogy about rescue vehicles just isn't accurate.
Would you care to explain the _facts_ you used to reach that
conclusion?
>Second:
>You are mistaken about the military taking over airspace.
You are wrong. You only have to compare a chart from a decade or two
ago to a current one to see the fallacy in your statement. Please try
to be factual.
>In fact the exact opposite is occurring.
So, I'm not the only one who feels that the military control too much
airspace?
>I've worked at scheduling and range ops at more than
>one base now. Airspace a single base used to own is now shared between
>multiple bases and even services.
So, better utilization of military airspace is a practical
possibility. How is that bad?
>Also the letter of agreements between bases and ATC has become somewhat
>more restrictive in my opinion. The increase in general and civil
>aviation continually causes portions of our airspace to be limited.
As airspace congestion increases, sacrifices in the name of air safety
must be made. Airspace is a finite resource after all. Would you
prefer that a limit be set for the number of civil aircraft permitted
to fly? Or, can you propose a reasonable alternative solution?
It's easy for us to complain. It is considerably more difficult to
find a good solution.
>This mostly occurs during bad weather but it can
>occur with traffic congestion as well. That's not to say that the military
>isn't creating any new airspace at all.
Thank you for revealing that fact.
>In general they are trying to get airspace in areas of the US that
>aren't congested.
Have they considered airspace outside the US, or over wilderness
areas? There is VERY LITTLE airspace within the conterminous US that
is devoid of civil air traffic regardless of the lack of underlying
population density.
>The airspace around major cities has grown to proportions that MOA's
>around them have to disappear, or in many cases, the bases as well
>as the MOA's themselves are closed due to the traffic.
You say that like it's a bad thing®. It sounds reasonable to me.
>With the airspace we have around our base, we use it non-stop from
>sunrise to well after sunset almost non-stop. For many
>missions there simply isn't the airspace to even train in.
If you are attempting to get me to believe that the military has an
adequate number of aircraft to fill the skies of all the US airspace
they control 24 hours a day 7 days a week, I'm not buying it. The
military aviation fleet is many times smaller than the civil aviation
fleet.
>Your "Fact" that
>the military controls 50% of the airspace is hardly a fact as well. That
>"fact" comes from a 2... yes 2 dimensional representation of the U.S. with
>every MOA, MTR, Restricted Area, Warning area etc drawn on it. It doesn't
>include altitudes when often such as on an MTR we might only own up to 1500
>feet,
It is the low-level airspace which concerns me; how many military
areas have a floor above 10,000'? Most begin at or near the surface.
>it doesn't include times that the airspace is active such as many
>MOA's that may be scheduled for only a few hours a day or even less.
Above you were arguing that military airspace was active nearly all
the time. It seems that you are contradicting yourself. Which is
it?
>It is a 2-D drawing / representation that is inaccurate in context.
I'm happy to see you don't contest the fact that the military control
over 50% of the _2-dimentional_ conterminous US airspace. I have not
seen the document to which you refer, so I cannot reliably comment on
how the airspace is represented.
If it is as you assert, I find it shocking that such a small segment
of the flying community "owns" such a disproportionately large amount
of airspace.
>As a civil pilot myself I won't doubt that it is a pain to try to
>deconflict from the airspace especially if it is around your home field. .
It's not so much that it's a "pain" to deconflict. It's more of a
_physical_ impossibility, despite the FAA's requirement to do so, and
the resultant safety hazard, that concerns me.
>Third:
>The military is trying to do lights out training at night in MOA's because
>of a legitimate need for training.
I don't dispute the military _need_ to conduct lights-out training.
It is the conduct of that training in joint-use airspace that concerns
me.
Can you please explain to me how I'm supposed to comply with FAR
91.113's see-and-avoid requirement when the military aircraft are
invisible in the night sky? It's unreasonable and absurd.
>There aren't enough warning / restricted
>areas of sufficient size for the bases to train the way they need to.
In the face of failing to refute that the military "owns" over 50% of
the conterminous US airspace, you'll have to provide some data which
supports that statement before it becomes believable.
>Many bases have adequate warning areas of sufficient size to train,
>but others do not, and are looking for some way to train the pilots
>at night.
Perhaps, those training activities should be confined to those bases
with the requisite airspace. Is that unreasonable?
>Why is this an issue vs 10 years ago. Because we are going towards an
>AF that fights at night. We are moving to an AF where all fighters will
>be using NVGs and other advances at night. And it is a BIG difference
>training with lights out than having the ability to look outside and
>find other members of your flight. It's like trying to train for
>instrument flight without having to wear a hood or train in the weather....
Those are good reasons to train at night. But, they are not good
reasons to fly high-speed invisible military aircraft in airspace
occupied by civil aircraft.
>It isn't irresponsible to make requests to the FAA like you continually say,
I don't recall having said that filing a request is irresponsible.
Unless you are able to provide a citation of the Message-ID number
which contains such a statement by me, I will disregard it.
>we are simply looking for different ways to train the pilots in an
>Air Force that is continually evolving.
Thank you for the information you have provided. I think it points
out the fact that the conterminous US airspace is becoming ever
increasingly more congested by both military and civil flights.
That situation is only going to grow worse as time passes. Using old
regulations to provide safe skies is going to fail as the airspace
becomes saturated. But, I'm not the first one to come to that
conclusion.
I call your attention to
http://www.aopa.org/whatsnew/newsitems/gorerpt.html
=====================================================================
AOPA Online - Gore Commission final report
=====================================================================
White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security
Final Report to President Clinton Vice President Al Gore, Chairman
February 12, 1997
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Introduction
Change.
That one word sums up both the challenges in aviation safety and
security, and the means by which government and industry must respond.
Change is nothing new in this field. The first powered flight,
covering 120 feet in twelve seconds, took place just over ninety years
ago. Today, planes cross the Atlantic Ocean in a matter of hours, as
hundreds of passengers watch movies and dine. An industry that
essentially did not even exist before World War I now occupies a
central position in our economy. Today, commercial aviation generates
over $300 billion annually, and accounts for close to one million
American jobs.
The changes taking place in aviation today are as profound as any this
industry has seen before. Since 1992, sixty new airlines have started
service, opening up new markets, attracting new passengers, and
impacting the economics of the industry significantly. The number of
passengers flying in the United States over the last decade has grown
to more than half a billion. The FAA has certified twenty new aircraft
models in the last ten years, and plans are under consideration for a
new High-Speed Civil Transport.
As dramatic as these changes have been, even more significant change
looms on the horizon. Information technology presents opportunities
that will again revolutionize the industry, in ways as significant as
the introduction of the jet engine forty years ago. Air traffic today
is still controlled through ground-based radar, and on a
point-to-point basis. Satellite-based navigation will bring a
fundamental change in the way that air traffic is directed, and may
make the notion of "highway lanes in the sky" as obsolete as the
bonfires that used to guide early fliers. Digital technology will
replace analog systems, making communications with and among aircraft
dramatically faster, more efficient, and effective. These and other
new technologies offer tremendous opportunities for improved safety,
security and efficiency, and will transform aviation in the same way
that the Internet and World Wide Web are transforming the way the
world does business.
Other changes are even more imminent. By the end of the century, the
commercial fleet serving the United States will have been completely
overhauled, with aircraft that make a fraction of the old noise and
emit far less pollution. Continuing success in the United States'
efforts to open up foreign markets to competition by our airlines
likely will mean more airlines, serving more markets, carrying more
people. A continuation of the trend toward greater competition and
lower fares will make flying even more available to average Americans
than it is today. In fact, the FAA projects that, in 2007, more than
800 million passengers will fly in the United States --- three times
the number who flew in 1980.
This is a time of change for government, as well. President Clinton's
declaration that "the era of big government is over," coalesced a
bipartisan drive to make government work better and cost less. The
Administration's commitment to government reform resulted not just
from a desire to bring down government spending, but from a
recognition that the same types of changes facing industries such as
aviation face government, as well. Like the private sector, government
must change with the times. The question is, how?
Establishment of the Commission on Aviation Safety and Security
President Clinton created the White House Commission on Aviation
Safety and Security to address that question, and assigned it three
specific mandates: to look at the changing security threat, and how we
can address it; to examine changes in the aviation industry, and how
government should adapt its regulation of it; to look at the
technological changes coming to air traffic control, and what should
be done to take best advantage of them. In the wake of concerns over
the crash of Trans World Airlines Flight 800, President Clinton asked
the Commission to focus its attention first on the issue of security.
He asked for an initial report on aviation security in 45 days,
including an action plan to deploy new high technology machines to
detect the most sophisticated explosives.
On September 9, 1996, the Commission presented that initial report to
the President. It contained twenty recommendations for enhancing
aviation security which are presented again in Chapter 3 of this
report. The response to the initial report was unprecedented. In
October 1996, at the request of President Clinton, the Congress
appropriated over $400 million, in direct accord with the Commission's
recommendations, for the acquisition of new explosives detection
technology and other security enhancements. In the five months since
they were presented, implementation has begun on virtually all of the
initial recommendations.
From its inception, the Commission took a hands-on approach to its
work. President Clinton announced the formation of the Commission on
July 25, 1996. A few days later, Vice President Gore led a site visit
to Dulles International Airport, where he and other Commissioners saw
airport and airline operations first-hand, and discussed issues with
front line workers. This was the first of dozens of such visits. Over
the next six months, the Commission visited facilities throughout the
United States and in various locations abroad. Seeking to reach the
broadest possible audience, the Commission established a homepage on
the Internet (http://www.aviationcommission.dot.gov), both to make the
Commission's work available and to receive input. The web site has had
almost 7,000 contacts, many providing valuable insights. The
Commission held six public meetings, hearing from over fifty witnesses
representing a cross section of the aviation industry and the public,
including families of victims of air disasters. Recognizing the
increasingly global nature of aviation, the Commission co-sponsored an
International Conference on Aviation Safety and Security with the
George Washington University, attended by over 700 representatives
from sixty-one countries.
Out of this extensive process, the Commission compiled the
recommendations presented in this final report.
A Vision for the Future
To compete in the global economy of the 21st Century, America needs a
healthy, vibrant aviation industry. In turn, the health and vibrancy
of aviation depend on improved levels of safety, security and
modernization. For the last fifty years, the United States has led the
field of aviation. But, that position is being challenged, both by
competition from abroad and by weaknesses in our own systems.
These weaknesses can be overcome. The Commission believes that it
should be a national priority to do so. This report outlines steps
that can set government and industry on a course to achieve that goal
together. Heading into the next century, our activities, programs, and
results should define aviation safety and security for the rest of the
world.
Leadership in aviation goes far beyond having strong, competitive
airlines. It means assuring leadership in communications, satellite,
aerospace, and other technologies that increasingly are defining the
global economy. It means more than the highest possible levels of
safety and security for travelers.
The Commission's report reflects a focus on this vision: to ensure
greater safety and security for passengers; to restructure the
relationships between government and industry into partnerships for
progress; and to maintain global leadership in the aviation industry.
Key Recommendations
In the area of safety, the Commission believes that the principal
focus should be on reducing the rate of accidents by a factor of five
within a decade, and recommends a re-engineering of the FAA's
regulatory and certification programs to achieve that goal.
In the area of air traffic control, the Commission believes that the
safety and efficiency improvements that will come with a modernized
system should not be delayed, and recommends that the program be
accelerated for to achieve full operational capability by the year
2005. In addition, a more effective system must be established to
finance modernization of the National Airspace System and enhancements
in safety and security.
In the area of security, the Commission believes that the threat
against civil aviation is changing and growing, and that the federal
government must lead the fight against it. The Commission recommends
that the federal government commit greater resources to improving
aviation security, and work more cooperatively with the private sector
and local authorities in carrying out security responsibilities.
Although not specifically directed to do so, the Commission also took
up the issue of responding to aviation disasters. In this area, the
Commission believes that a better coordinated and more compassionate
response is necessary, and that the responsibility for coordinating
the response needs to be placed with a single entity. The Commission
is pleased with the progress made to date in this area, including the
designation of the National Transportation Safety Board as that single
entity.
Many of the Commission's recommendations apply equally to each of the
three major areas of focus, including those relating to regulation and
certification. Primary among these recommendations is the call for
greater use of partnerships in meeting goals. Regulatory and
enforcement agencies such as the Customs Service, the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration, and the Food and Drug Administration
have put new emphasis on partnerships with industries, and are
achieving tremendous results: seizing more drugs while expediting
travel for legitimate travelers; reducing workplace accidents while
increasing productivity; and getting important new AIDS and
cancer-fighting drugs to market in a fraction of the time it used to
take.
The premise behind these partnerships is that government can set
goals, and then work with industry in the most effective way to
achieve them. Partnership does not mean that government gives up its
authorities or responsibilities. Not all industry members are willing
to be partners. In those cases, government must use its full authority
to enforce the law. But, through partnerships, government works with
industry to find better ways to achieve its goals, seeking to replace
confrontation with cooperation. Such partnerships hold tremendous
promise for improving aviation safety and security. A shift away from
prescriptive regulations will allow companies to take advantage of
incentives and reach goals more quickly.
Transportation Secretary Peña's cooperative program with airlines to
establish a single level of safety is an example of innovative
government-industry partnership. Another is Vice President Gore's
January 15, 1997 announcement that Boeing, in concert with government
agencies, had developed a plan to modify the rudders on hundreds of
its 737 aircraft. By acting without waiting for a government mandate,
Boeing will complete many of these safety-enhancing modifications
before the government could complete a rule requiring the action.
Partnership must extend not only to regulated entities, but also to
the various federal agencies involved with aviation safety and
security. A number of agencies outside the Department of
Transportation have expertise and resources that can have a direct
impact on improving safety and security. The Commission urges the
Administration to continue to work to expand and improve these
intergovernmental relationships.
In the last few years, the FAA has begun to recognize and respond to
the tremendous changes it faces. Reviews such as the Challenge 2000
report examined ways of improving the way the FAA regulates operators
and manufacturers. Now is the time for the FAA to build on that work,
and aggressively reengineer itself to adapt to the demands of the 21st
Century.
It is important to note that the FAA, alone among federal agencies,
has been given some critical new tools to help shape its own future. A
new Management Advisory Council will provide valuable input to the
agency's decision-making process. In 1995, the Congress granted the
Clinton Administration's request for unprecedented reforms of the
FAA's personnel and procurement systems. These reforms give the FAA
almost unlimited latitude to design new systems to meet the agency's
unique and particular needs. The first phases of these reforms were
implemented in April 1996, and are already producing dividends. The
FAA used to have 233 procurement documents, and today there are less
than 50. Using its streamlined process, the FAA recently completed a
billion dollar procurement in six months, with no protests. Under the
old system, it would have taken three times as long, and likely would
have been delayed by costly protests. A stack of personnel rules that
used to be one-foot high has been reduced to 41 pages, and will allow
the agency to hire people where they're needed and when they're
needed.
This flexibility will be critical to meeting the challenges of the
next century. As former FAA Administrator David Hinson recently noted,
this type of reform is "the seed for what needs to happen at the FAA."
The incoming leadership at the Department of Transportation and the
FAA must utilize fully the flexibilities that have been granted if the
agency is to keep pace with the rapidly changing industry it
regulates.
Responsibility for Implementing Change
The Commission's goal for aviation in the next century may be summed
up by the words of Robert Crandall, Chairman of American Airlines,
when he said, "We would like the public to take safety and security as
a given. If that is going to happen, change is necessary."
The responsibility for achieving that change lies with all the
partners in aviation. The Administration, the Congress, the entire
aviation industry and its employees must work together to make the
changes that are necessary to keep pace with the challenges facing
them. Commitments must be made at the highest levels of every
organization, in government and in the private sector.
To ensure that the government remains focused on the goals established
in this report, the Commission recommends three steps:
(1) that the Secretary of Transportation report publicly each year on
the implementation status of these recommendations;
(2) that the President assign the incoming leadership at the
Department of Transportation and the FAA the clear mission of leading
their agencies through the necessary transition to re-engineered
safety and security programs; and
(3) that the performance agreements for these positions, which the
documents that senior managers sign with the President outlining their
goals and specific means of measuring progress, include implementation
of these recommendations.
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Chapter One:
Improving Aviation Safety
"The FAA, despite its professionalism and many accomplishments, was
simply never created to deal with the environment that has been
produced by deregulation of the air transport industry."
Stuart Matthews, President and CEO, Flight Safety Foundation.
Commercial aviation is the safest mode of transportation. That record
has been established not just through government regulation, but
through the work of everyone involved in aviation -- manufacturers,
airlines, airport operators, and a highly-skilled and dedicated
workforce. Their combined efforts have produced a fatal accident rate
of 0.3 per million departures in the United States. The accident rate
for commercial aviation declined dramatically between 1950 and 1970.
But, over the last two decades, that rate has remained low, but flat.
Heading into the next century, the overall goal of aviation safety
programs is clear: to bring that rate down even lower.
Focusing on the accident rate is critical because of the projected
increases in traffic. Unless that rate is reduced, the actual number
of accidents will grow as traffic increases. Given the international
nature of aviation, cutting the accident rate is an imperative not
just for the United States, but for all countries involved in
aviation. Accident rates in some areas of the world exceed those in
the U.S. by a factor of ten or more. Boeing projects that unless the
global accident rate is reduced, by the year 2015, an airliner will
crash somewhere in the world almost weekly.
While fatality rates in general aviation are higher than in commercial
operations, the principal causes of general aviation accidents are
similar to commercial aviation accidents. The Commission's
recommendations will help address the safety of general aviation as
well.
Lessons from reinventing government must be applied to aviation
programs. Improvements in safety and security will result from a focus
on several key areas: expanded use of partnerships; reengineering of
the FAA's regulatory and certification processes; greater focus on
human factors and training; and, the faster introduction of proven new
technologies. These technologies are enabling the introduction of
increasingly sophisticated automation into virtually every aspect of
aviation operations. They offer opportunities for improved safety,
security, and efficiency, and are driving the aviation industry toward
an integrated system that will alter many of the things that have
remained unchanged in aviation for decades.
Adapting to these changes will require renewed commitments from all
partners, and a willingness to re-engineer long-standing practices and
procedures. This change also calls for a cultural transformation of
the FAA to improve its ability to regulate and lead the development of
the integrated aviation system on the horizon. In the areas of
regulation and certification, the Challenge 2000 report represents a
good first step. However, it and other internal reviews have not
provided a comprehensive, agency-wide assessment of the need for
change. That is what is needed.
A strong government-industry partnership is needed to develop and
integrate the research, standards, regulations, procedures, and
infrastructure needed to support the aviation system of the future.
The FAA has applied this approach successfully to cooperative research
projects with NASA in the development of advanced air traffic
technologies. The Commission encourages these agencies and others to
expand their cooperative efforts in aviation safety research and
development.
Regular and random inspection of airlines and facilities should remain
an important part of the FAA's safety and security oversight programs.
However, given the tremendous growth and globalization in the
industry, it is neither realistic nor desirable to expect the FAA to
rely on hands-on inspections to ensure safety. It is critical that
industry be given the incentives and flexibility to be full partners
in this effort, and be encouraged to monitor and improve their own
performance. This will not only produce better focus on results, but
will also allow the FAA to deploy its resources more effectively.
Recommendations
1.1 Government and industry should establish a national goal to reduce
the aviation fatal accident rate by a factor of five within ten years
and conduct safety research to support that goal.
Historically, major advances in aviation safety have been driven by
technological improvements in airframes, engines, communications,
radar and other areas. Today, information technology can help aviation
make the next leap forward in safety.
Aviation safety experts at the FAA and at NASA are confident that a
five-fold reduction in the fatal accident rate could be achieved in
the next decade given the right resources and focus. The Commission
urges the FAA, NASA and industry to step up to this challenge.
Achieving this goal will require the combined efforts of government
and industry focused on three objectives: preventing equipment
malfunctions; reducing human-caused mishaps; and ensuring separation
between aircraft and other air or ground hazards. Government can play
a strong role in research and development, but it must be in
partnership with industry, which ultimately is responsible for
operating safely. The Commission urges NASA, which has considerable
expertise and resources in the area of safety research, to expand its
involvement in the promotion of aviation safety.
1.2. The FAA should develop standards for continuous safety
improvement, and should target its regulatory resources based on
performance against those standards.
The FAA should promote aviation safety and security by setting high
standards, requiring aviation businesses to monitor and improve their
own safety performance, and by developing objective methods of
measuring the ability of companies to monitor and improve its own
safety. Significant efforts have already been made in this direction.
Current regulations, for example, require commercial air carriers to
implement a Continuing Analysis and Surveillance Program to evaluate
the effectiveness of their maintenance and inspection processes.
Significant investment and effort have been put into developing the
Safety Performance Analysis System, which will allow safety inspectors
to compare the performance of similar operators to identify trends
that could lead to reduced levels of safety. Such approaches to
aviation safety oversight should be broadened. Operators should be
encouraged to implement systems that ensure their continued compliance
with regulations and that promote continuous improvements in aviation
safety and security.
Last year, the FAA undertook an independent review of its regulatory
and certification programs. That effort, known as Challenge 2000,
recommended in part that the agency move toward implementing rules
that establish performance standards where possible, and that the
rulemaking process be streamlined and reengineered. Further, the
report urged that the regulatory process be restructured to provide
compelling technical and business incentives for industry to develop
and certify products that help fulfill priority safety needs.
The Commission recognizes the value of the Challenge 2000 report, and
urges the FAA and industry to work together to develop standards for
continuous safety and security improvement that recognize variations
in company maturity and best industry practices. These standards
should serve as the basis for certification, regulation and oversight
of the aviation industry. Objective criteria should be developed that
enable the FAA to assess each organization's safety improvement
processes and performance, and use this assessment to improve
performance throughout the industry. As an incentive to implement
effective safety and security improvement programs, FAA oversight
should be adjusted to recognize the maturity and actual performance of
individual operators and manufacturers. Such an approach will allow
the FAA to target its inspector resources on those operators
demonstrating the greatest risk, while allowing mature operators and
manufacturers to manage their organizations without unproductive FAA
involvement. The FAA should adjust its internal classifications and
rankings of inspectors to reflect this change.
1.3 The DOT and the FAA should be more vigorous in the application of
high standards for certification of aviation businesses.
In the past, both the FAA and the DOT have devoted significant
resources to helping new companies meet regulatory requirements and
manage their operations. The recent 90 Day Safety Review conducted by
the DOT and the FAA determined that this is an inappropriate role for
the government and recommended many actions that will improve the
certification process. The Commission agrees. While the government
should assist companies in improving the safety and security of their
operations, it should not use its resources to compensate for lack of
experience, technical expertise or judgment in a company's day-to-day
operations.
In some cases, the FAA's certification standards and processes have
not kept up with the changing needs of civil aviation. For example,
current standards for hiring security personnel do not take into
account changes in explosives detection technology. And the
certification of engines and airframes still reflects a time when
these systems were produced as completely independent systems. Today,
engine and airframe development is integrated, so the certification
process must take into account the entire system rather than its
individual parts. In the future, as the airplane becomes an integral
component of the air traffic management system, the certification of
the aircraft, as part of an integrated aviation system, will become
even more important.
The FAA demonstrated its ability to integrate these processes and work
effectively with industry in the certification of the Boeing 777
airplane. Lessons from the 777 certification should be applied to the
way the FAA certificates airplanes in the future. Additional
certification tools and processes should be developed to encourage the
introduction of new technologies.
Considerable attention has been given to the issue of outsourcing of
maintenance and other work, particularly in the wake of the Valujet
crash. The Commission does not believe that outsourcing, in and of
itself, presents a problem -- if it is performed by qualified
companies and individuals. The proper focus of concern should be on
the FAA's certification and oversight of any and all companies
performing aviation safety functions, including repair stations
certificated by the FAA but located outside of the United States,.
1.4. The Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs) should be simplified and,
as appropriate, rewritten as plain English, performance-based
regulations.
The Commission believes that government can achieve better regulatory
compliance if its objectives are stated clearly and its focus is on
goals, not process. While that sounds simple, the FAA's rules too
often do not meet those criteria.
The Commission urges the FAA to take two steps to address this
problem. First, as appropriate, all new rules should be rewritten as
performance-based regulations, and in plain English. Second, within 18
months, a bottom-up review of existing regulations should be conducted
to identify those in need of rewriting as performance-based, plain
English regulations. Such clarifications would improve compliance and
help the FAA resolve serious problems created by differences in
interpretation of regulations by FAA officials across the country.
The current FARs and supporting Handbooks, Technical Standards Orders,
Security Directives, and Advisory Circulars have become too
prescriptive and complex and are increasingly open to
misinterpretation. Sometimes they provide conflicting policy or
procedural guidance. They often stifle the creativity of those who
would do more than the rules require. In many cases, the FARs do not
allow for advances in technology that increase security, safety or
efficiency. For example, the FARs currently have no provisions for
design criteria to protect aircraft from high intensity
electromagnetic fields such as those emanating from TV antennas,
radars, cellular phones, portable stereos, and laptop computers. These
electromagnetic fields are potentially hazardous to aircraft using
digital communications, avionics and flight controls. The FAA has been
working for more than eight years to develop standard certification
requirements to address these hazards, but today each certification is
handled through the use of special conditions. Mandating performance
rather than dictating procedures will break the regulatory logjam.
1.5. Cost alone should not become dispositive in deciding aviation
safety and security rulemaking issues.
As noted earlier, the rate of fatal accidents in commercial aviation
in the U.S. is less than 0.3 per million departures. The rarity of
accidents can make it difficult to justify safety and security
improvements under benefitcost criteria applied to regulatory
activities. Nevertheless, benefitcost analysis can enlighten the
regulatory decisionmaking process. For example, such analysis can help
identify the most costeffective way to achieve a safety or security
objective. Cost considerations and mathematical formulas, however,
should never be dispositive in making policy determinations regarding
aviation safety they are one input for decisionmaking. Further,
non-quantifiable safety and security benefits should be included in
the analysis of proposals.
1.6. Government and industry aviation safety research should emphasize
human factors and training.
Over the past ten years, flight crew error accounted for over 60% of
all aviation accidents world-wide. And over the past five years, two
types of flight crew error, loss of control in flight and controlled
flight into terrain, accounted for over 70% of all airline fatalities.
Moreover, recent airport testing of explosive detection systems
revealed significant deficiencies in the performance of security
personnel. Research, technology, training and sharing of safety data
can reduce human error. Aviation safety and security have always
depended upon a talented and dedicated workforce. Today, changes in
technology are presenting that workforce -- flight crews, ground and
air traffic controllers, maintenance technicians -- with new
challenges. The aviation system will continue to rely on these highly
skilled people to be responsible for all aspects of operations, and it
is critical to assess and address issues relating to human interaction
with changing technologies.
The FAA, NASA, the DoD, and the aviation industry jointly developed a
National Aviation Human Factors Plan that describes a strategic
approach to solving the problem of human-caused mishaps. Two
additional studies, one by the FAA dealing with flight deck human
factors and the other published by representatives from government,
industry, and union organizations as their 1997 Aviation Safety Plan,
identify a wide range of safety issues, including human factors. The
Commission acknowledges the importance of all three of these reports
and urges the immediate development of an implementation plan.
1.7. Enhanced ground proximity warning systems should be installed in
all commercial and military passenger aircraft.
The introduction of ground proximity warning systems (GPWS) in
commercial aircraft in the late-1970s led to significant reductions in
controlled flight into terrain, the second-leading cause of aviation
accidents. These accidents occur when pilots cannot reconcile their
positions with changing terrain. Current GPWS systems are not
predictive, however, and only warn pilots when ground impact is
imminent. Several recent incidents indicate the need for a
forward-looking system that can provide better situational awareness
and advanced warning to pilots when they are approaching hazardous
terrain. Digital terrain elevation data developed for military
purposes can help provide this capability.
On January 15, 1997, Vice President Gore announced that the Department
of Defense is releasing a version of its global digital terrain
elevation database for use in the civilian sector. Combined with
advanced navigation systems, this will provide pilots with the tools
that they need to reduce, and maybe even eliminate, these kinds of
accidents in the future.
The Commission applauds the voluntary introduction of advanced ground
proximity warning systems in commercial aircraft, and urges all
segments of the aviation community to install this vital safety
system. To achieve this goal, the Commission urges the FAA to work
with industry to develop and promote the use of such equipment in
general aviation aircraft.
1.8. The FAA should work with the aviation community to develop and
protect the integrity of standard safety databases that can be shared
in accident prevention programs.
The identification of deviations from normal operations, adverse
trends, and other incidents can be a valuable tool in preventing
accidents. The most effective way to identify incidents and problems
in aviation is for the people who operate in the system (pilots,
mechanics, controllers, dispatchers, etc.) to self-disclose the
information. There are a number of separate safety data collection
efforts ongoing within government and industry. Many of these efforts
either duplicate existing data, report the same information, or are
not interconnected or integrated. The FAA should work with the
aviation community to develop standard databases of safety information
that can be shared openly and encompass operations within the aviation
industry as well as those within the FAA, such as air traffic control.
People and companies will not provide or assemble safety data or
information if the information will disclose trade secrets, if it can
threaten a person's job or be used in an enforcement action against a
person or company, or if it can in any way cause them a liability.
Data protection is the key to self-disclosure. The Flight Safety
Foundation has studied this issue and concluded that legislation is
the only way to guarantee protection of safety data. The joint
industry/DOT Aviation Safety Plan cites data protection as a key to
achieving Zero Accidents. The Congress, at the request of the
Administration, recently enacted legislation providing for the
protection from public disclosure of certain safety and security data
voluntarily provided to the FAA. The FAA needs to expeditiously
complete its rulemaking to implement this legislation. Since adequate
legislative protection is key to building the trust necessary for self
disclosure and safety monitoring, the FAA should assess the adequacy
of the new legislative authority and implementing regulations one year
after the regulations take effect. Any necessary regulatory or
legislative modifications identified at that time should be promptly
addressed.
1.9. In cooperation with airlines and manufacturers, the FAA's Aging
Aircraft program should be expanded to cover non-structural systems.
The average age of commercial airline fleets is continuing to
increase. In 1975, few large commercial aircraft were in service
beyond their original design life, typically twenty years. But with
increased competition and growth in passenger and cargo traffic
brought on by deregulation, service lives of dependable aircraft
models were extended through expanded maintenance and overhaul
programs. By the year 2000, more than 2,500 commercial aircraft in the
United States may be flying beyond their original design life.
In 1988, a Boeing 737 in Hawaii suffered severe structural failure of
its forward fuselage sections due to corrosion not visible during
normal maintenance inspections. As a direct result of this accident,
the FAA greatly expanded its structural integrity inspection program
and formed the Airworthiness Assurance Working Group (AAWG). Its focus
has been almost exclusively on structural integrity, and the effects
of structural corrosion and fatigue. The programs in existence under
the AAWG have been effective and are considered adequate to deal
proactively with the structural problems associated with aging
commercial aircraft.
However, much less is known about the potential effects of age on
non-structural components of commercial aircraft. Non-structural
components include electrical wiring; connectors, wiring harnesses,
and cables; fuel, hydraulic and pneumatic lines; and
electro-mechanical systems such as pumps, sensors, and actuators.
Neither the manufacturers nor the commercial airlines consider the
aging of non-structural components to pose serious safety problems
primarily because they consider their redundancy, replacement upon
failure, and periodic, programmed maintenance to be sufficient to
assure aircraft safety.
The Commission is concerned that existing procedures, directives,
quality assurance, and inspections may not be sufficient to prevent
safety related problems caused by the corrosive and deteriorating
effects of non-structural components of commercial aircraft as they
age. To address this, the Commission recommends that the FAA work with
airlines and manufacturers to expand the aging aircraft program to
include non-structural components, through steps including: full and
complete tear-downs of selected aircraft scheduled to go out of
service; the establishment of a lead-the-fleet research program; an
expansion of the FAA-DoD-NASA cooperative aging aircraft program; an
expansion of programs of the Airworthiness Assurance Working Group to
include non-structural components; and encouraging the development of
modern technical means to ensure and predict the continued
airworthiness of aging non-structural components and systems.
1.10. The FAA should develop better quantitative models and analytic
techniques to inform management decision-making.
The FAA is called upon to evaluate many proposals for safety and
security improvements and capacity enhancements as part of its NAS
modernization, and other programs. The FAA does not have a developed
model for the air traffic control system that permits the systematic
evaluation and comparison of these proposals with respect to their
life-cycle cost and their likely effects on the operation of the air
traffic control system. If available, such analysis would be of great
assistance to support decision-making by the FAA and the DOT
leadership.
The Commission urges the FAA to strengthen its analytic and planning
tools, especially through the development of models that give insight
into the system-wide consequences of alternative courses of action and
the development of a credible cost accounting system, as mandated in
the Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996.
1.11. The DOT should work with the Department of Justice to ensure
that airline crew members performing their duties are protected from
passenger misconduct.
Passenger behavior that amounts to criminal conduct is a matter of
growing concern to U.S. airlines. When crew members are called upon to
enforce in-flight safety and security rules and regulations, they are
working to ensure that our aviation system remains safe and secure.
Their responsibilities at times require them to confront passengers
who are unwilling to comply with lawful instructions and become
abusive. Such conduct by passengers threatens the well-being of all
those on the plane, and is subject to federal prosecution. The
Commission urges the DOT to work with the Department of Justice and
the United States Attorneys to ensure that priority is given the
prosecution of offending passengers to the fullest extent of the law
for interfering with airline crew members in the performance of their
duties.
1.12. Legislation should be enacted to protect aviation industry
employees who report safety or security violations.
In a number of important industries, statutory protection is provided
to "whistleblowers" who report violations of safety procedures. The
Commission believes that aviation safety and security will be enhanced
if employees, who are a critical link in safety and security, are able
to report unsafe conditions to the FAA without fear of retribution
from their employers. Some aviation employees are provided protections
through contractual agreements. However, the Commission believes that
statutory protection, such as that provided to workers under the
Occupational Health and Safety Act, would provide uniformity within
the industry and provide coverage to those not already protected.
1.13. The FAA should eliminate the exemptions in the Federal Aviation
Regulations that allow passengers under the age of two to travel
without the benefit of FAA-approved restraints.
Current regulations require that all passengers over the age of two
have their own seats, and that those seats are equipped with
FAA-approved restraints. The Commission believes that it is
inappropriate for infants to be afforded a lesser degree of protection
than older passengers. The FAA should revise its regulations to
require that all occupants be restrained during takeoff, landing, and
turbulent conditions, and that all infants and small children below
the weight of 40 pounds and under the height of 40 inches be
restrained in an appropriate child restraint system, such as child
safety seats, appropriate to their height and weight. The Commission
also notes and commends the FAA's ongoing efforts in collaboration
with major airframe and seat manufacturers to develop standards for
integrated child safety seats.
1.14. The Commission commends the joint government-industry initiative
to equip the cargo holds of all passenger aircraft with smoke
detectors, and urges expeditious implementation of the rules and other
steps necessary to achieve the goal of both detection and suppression
in all cargo holds.
In December 1996, most of the nation's major airlines announced a
voluntary action to install smoke detection systems in the cargo holds
of commercial airplanes and to study additional measures for fire
suppression. This announcement broke a deadlock that had existed for
most of the last decade. The Commission commends this initiative as an
example of the partnership that will be necessary to enhance safety
and security.
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Chapter Two:
Making Air Traffic Control
Safer and More Efficient
"While the airlines are posting record traffic figures and profits,
the ground-based air traffic control infrastructure is outdated and
unable to keep pace with expansion."
Barry Krasner, President of the National Air Traffic Controllers
Association
It is essential that the air traffic system of the United States be
modernized. Although the current system remains safe, it is showing
signs of aging. System outages, brownouts, inefficiencies in air
traffic control, and capacity limitations on the ground add costs to
the FAA and to users of the airspace system. The Air Transport
Association estimates that inefficiencies in the system cost airlines
in excess of $3 billion in 1995 -- costs ultimately paid by passengers
and anyone who purchases goods shipped by air.
In 1996, a government-industry task force defined a future operational
concept known as Free Flight. Under this concept, national airspace
system (NAS) operations will transition from ground-based air traffic
control (using analog radios, navigational beacons and radar) to more
collaborative air traffic management based on digital communication,
satellite navigation, and computer-aided decision support tools for
controllers and pilots. This proposed new system offers significant
benefits for users of the NAS, for the safety and convenience of the
traveling public, and for greater FAA operational efficiency.
The FAA's proposed technical approach and schedule for NAS
modernization are documented in its recently published National
Airspace System Architecture. The proposed NAS architecture is
generally consistent with industry's vision for the future of air
traffic management, but the proposed schedule for modernization is too
slow to meet projected demands and funding issues are not adequately
addressed. Unless the schedule is accelerated, the United States may
lose its position of global leadership in civil aviation.
The technology needed to modernize the ATC system by and large exists,
and is available off-the-shelf. The challenge is completing the
transition to the new system in a timely and cost-effective manner,
and ensuring that all users participate in the upgrade. Unfortunately,
the FAA has encountered serious problems in its modernization program.
Before major changes were made in 1994, the centerpiece of the FAA's
modernization program had, according to the General Accounting Office,
fallen eight years behind schedule, and was $5 billion over budget.
Cost overruns in five other key programs ranged from 50 to more than
500%, and delays averaged close to four years.
These problems have been traced to inadequate user input, poor
management and contractor performance, and inadequate oversight.
Although availability of funds does not appear to have been a problem
in the past, the capital needs of the future could well outstrip the
ability to fund them through the traditional budget process,
particularly as capital improvements are accelerated, as recommended
by the Commission.
Traditionally, the FAA has seen it necessary to design, own and
operate its air traffic control system, in cooperation with the
Department of Defense. Current off-the-shelf technology allows the FAA
to consider its needs differently, particularly in areas such as the
acquisition of communications systems. In other critical areas of
government, including Defense, the private sector has proved its
ability to provide critical services with increased quality and lower
costs. A number of major U.S. manufacturers are producing new ATC
systems for deployment in other countries. The FAA should seek
collaborative opportunities with the private sector in order to
accelerate the transition to a new NAS.
There have been several important changes that should allow the
modernization program to move forward more effectively. The Commission
notes, in particular, the following factors which should help avoid
problems of the past: the redefinition of the modernization program;
the personnel and procurement reforms granted the FAA, which give it
unprecedented ability to hold managers accountable for results and to
streamline procurement processes; and the creation of the new
Management Advisory Committee by the Congress, which will give users a
more effective voice in decision-making. However, the Commission
believes that a new long-term financing mechanism is also necessary to
ensure that modernization occurs on an acceptable schedule, and that
the resulting safety and efficiency benefits are realized faster.
The FAA must take advantage of personnel, procurement, and other
reforms to ensure that it is spending existing resources more
effectively in order to gain approval of innovative funding proposals
from the Administration and the Congress. Additionally, the Commission
believes that it is critical that the senior management at the DOT and
the FAA take additional steps to ensure that past problems are being
dealt with, and that an accelerated modernization schedule can
proceed.
Recommendations
2.1. The FAA should develop a revised NAS modernization plan within
six months that will set a goal of the modernized system being fully
operational nationwide by the year 2005; and the Congress, the
Administration, and users should develop innovative means of financing
this acceleration.
Modernization of our aging airspace system is critical to the safety
of the traveling public, to maintaining our world leadership in
aviation, and to our economic interests. The FAA's current plan calls
for the modernized system to be operational after 2012. That is simply
too long to postpone the safety and economic benefits that will derive
from the modernized system. Therefore, the Commission recommends that
2005 be set as the date when all elements of the communication,
navigation, and surveillance and air traffic management capabilities
defined in the NAS architecture should be fully operational. This
accelerated implementation must be coordinated with the Department of
Defense, which is a major user and provider of air traffic control
services. Implementation of the initiative announced by Vice President
Gore on January 15, 1997 to demonstrate these systems in Hawaii and
Alaska is an important step toward full operational status.
Achieving this goal depends on the availability of several tools, as
discussed in the following recommendations. Chief among these tools is
the need to find non-traditional means of financing the capital
improvements. Innovative approaches to federal financing of major
infrastructure projects have been proposed in the past, including
leveraging the revenues coming into the FAA, multi-year appropriations
and non-traditional budget scoring. Non-federal financing approaches
have also been proposed, such as the creation of private
infrastructure banks. The Commission expects that the National Civil
Aviation Review Commission (NCARC), established in the Federal
Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996 by Congress to explore funding
options for the FAA, will consider these options. Whatever the funding
mechanism selected, the Commission believes it is critical to our
global leadership in civil aviation to finance an accelerated
modernization of the NAS.
2.2. The FAA should develop plans to ensure that operational and
airport capacity needs are integrated into the modernization of the
NAS.
The FAA's current NAS modernization program focuses on equipment and
infrastructure. However, there is no clear plan for how the people who
operate the system will make the transition, and what their roles and
responsibilities will be under the new systems. The FAA should develop
immediately a NAS Operational Plan to address these issues.
The FAA should also develop a National Airport System Modernization
Plan that presents a strategic vision, plan and schedule for
modernization of U.S. airports that is consistent with modernization
of the NAS. This plan, produced in collaboration with local airport
officials, should identify critical system capacity enhancement needs
and should address major safety issues at airports. These plans, when
incorporated into the revised NAS implementation plan called for in
recommendation 2.1, would provide a balanced strategic plan for
aviation in the United States.
2.3. The FAA should explore innovative means to accelerate the
installation of advanced avionics in general aviation aircraft.
The safety and efficiency benefits of the modernized NAS will not be
realized fully until all users have incorporated its features. Delays
in the installation of the equipment needed to operate in the future
NAS will put off the benefits for all system users. Therefore, it is
essential that the FAA, as it accelerates its modernization, works
with users to ensure that they keep pace.
Savings from more efficient operations provide significant incentive
for commercial carriers to install the required digital radios, GPS
receivers, and automatic dependent surveillance equipment. But it is
essential to find ways to ensure general aviation users are equipped
for future NAS operations.
2.4. The U.S. government should ensure the accuracy, availability and
reliability of the GPS system to accelerate its use in NAS
modernization and to encourage its acceptance as an international
standard for aviation.
Satellite-based navigation and positioning is a core element of our
NAS modernization plans, and is critical to achieving a seamless,
efficient global aviation system in the future. The U.S. Global
Positioning System (GPS), which is a dual civil-military system
operated by the U.S. Air Force, is the current and foreseeable
backbone for any global navigation satellite system. Full acceptance
of GPS as an international standard for aviation is dependent on
greater assurance to the user community -- both foreign and domestic
-- of its accuracy, availability and reliability. As part of its NAS
modernization plans, the FAA is currently developing a Wide Area
Augmentation System (WAAS) that will enhance the basic GPS civil
service to meet the requirements of civil aviation users. Many other
nations, including Europe and Japan, are planning similar
augmentations, but are still somewhat reluctant to base their own
airspace management on a GPS system which they perceive to be
controlled by the U.S. military.
The recent U.S. GPS policy made considerable progress in addressing
these international concerns by assuring the continued availability of
basic civil GPS services worldwide, free of direct user fees. This new
policy also established a joint civil-military Executive Board to
manage GPS and its augmentations, and initiated formal international
discussions aimed at developing agreements on the provision and use of
GPS services. But, there are still a number of important technical and
policy issues that must be resolved if GPS is to become the system of
choice for global aviation navigation and positioning.
First, the U.S. must provide stronger strategic leadership for civil
users of GPS. The acceptance of GPS as an international standard is
key to continued U.S. leadership in aviation, and can only be achieved
through strong civilian participation in GPS planning and
decision-making. A number of working groups and advisory committees
currently exist throughout the Federal government and the private
sector to coordinate and represent the needs of civil users of GPS.
The Commission recommends that civilian leadership be strengthened by
establishing a Civil GPS Users Advisory Council, with representatives
from both the users and providers of GPS equipment and services,
reporting to the GPS Executive Board. The Commission also encourages
the Administration to work rapidly on the development of international
guidelines on the provision and use of GPS services called for in the
President's recent GPS policy directive.
Second, greater redundancy is needed to enhance the ability of users
to cross-check GPS accuracy and to verify the system's reliability.
The most effective means of achieving this redundancy is to provide
additional civil GPS precision ranging signals in space. Studies have
shown that additional precision ranging capability can be achieved at
relatively little cost while providing enormous benefits to all civil
GPS users. The Commission recommends that this capability be added to
the FAA's WAAS system. This action will result in a more robust and
inherently more reliable system and will provide a major boost to the
international acceptance of GPS as a standard for aviation navigation
and positioning.
Third, the GPS Executive Board should resolve the remaining issues
over funding and frequency assignment for a second civil frequency as
quickly as possible so that this needed improvement can be included in
the next generation of GPS satellites. The GPS Executive Board is
considering enhancements to future GPS satellites that would include
an additional broadcast frequency. This additional frequency would
expand the base of civil GPS users worldwide and would send a strong
message to the international community that the U.S. intends to
maintain a long-term commitment to providing civil GPS services.
Moreover, the FAA's WAAS system requires two frequencies to meet the
accuracy needs of civil aviation users, and the additional frequency
would allow for complete independence of civil and military GPS
services in the future.
Fourth, the GPS system must be protected from both intentional and
unintentional interference. The GPS system will be a core,
safety-critical component of the future global aviation information
system. The security of GPS should be a major consideration in
carrying out Recommendation 3.6 for protecting all aviation
information systems.
2.5. The users of the NAS should fund its development and operation.
The current system of funding the ATC system provides little direct
connection between the excise taxes paid and services provided or the
amount made available to the FAA through the budget and appropriations
process. Replacing the traditional system of excise taxes with user
fees offers the potential to correlate revenues and spending more
closely.* Importantly, a financing system would not only help ensure
adequate availability of funding , but would also build incentives for
efficiency and safety into the system -- both for the users and for
the FAA. The National Civil Aviation Review Commission is the proper
venue for resolving the details of a new user fee system, and the
Commission expects that it will be formed and begin its work in the
very near future. The Commission urges the NCARC, in designing a new
financing system, to ensure that any changes in the relative amount of
revenues generated from any segment of the aviation industry do not
result in undue economic disruption within any segment of the
industry, and that the fees are not discriminatory or anti-competitive
among carriers. In addition, non-business general aviation users of
the NAS should not be adversely impacted by any new financing system.
This will help ensure that general aviation users will be full and
willing participants in the modernized NAS.
* Commissioner. Coleman takes no position with respect to the first
two sentences of recommendation 2.5 as he feels this is among the
issues NCARC is to resolve.
2.6. The FAA should identify and justify by July 1997 the frequency
spectrum necessary for the transition to a modernized air traffic
control system.
Expansion of telecommunications and other industries is creating
greater competition for frequency spectrum. The FAA has indicated a
need to retain large segments of its current spectrum allocation, but
has provided insufficient justification for doing so. To ensure that
the FAA's spectrum needs during modernization are not compromised the
Commission recommends that the FAA complete a full justification, as
well as a plan for freeing up spectrum as older systems are modernized
or decommissioned. This process must be completed not later than July,
1997, and the results included by the DOT in the Federal Radio
Navigation Plan and the RTCA 185 Report: Aeronautical Spectrum
Planning for the Years 1997-2010.
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Chapter Three:
Improving Security for Travelers
"We know we can't make the world risk-free, but we can reduce the
risks we face and we have to take the fight to the terrorists. If we
have the will, we can find the means."
President Clinton
The Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency,
and other intelligence sources have been warning that the threat of
terrorism is changing in two important ways. First, it is no longer
just an overseas threat from foreign terrorists. People and places in
the United States have joined the list of targets, and Americans have
joined the ranks of terrorists. The bombings of the World Trade Center
in New York and the Federal Building in Oklahoma City are clear
examples of the shift, as is the conviction of Ramzi Yousef for
attempting to bomb twelve American airliners out of the sky over the
Pacific Ocean. The second change is that in addition to well-known,
established terrorist groups, it is becoming more common to find
terrorists working alone or in ad-hoc groups, some of whom are not
afraid to die in carrying out their designs.
Although the threat of terrorism is increasing, the danger of an
individual becoming a victim of a terrorist attack -- let alone an
aircraft bombing -- will doubtless remain very small. But terrorism
isn't merely a matter of statistics. We fear a plane crash far more
than we fear something like a car accident. One might survive a car
accident, but there's no chance in a plane at 30,000 feet. This fear
is one of the reasons that terrorists see airplanes as attractive
targets. And, they know that airlines are often seen as national
symbols.
When terrorists attack an American airliner, they are attacking the
United States. They have so little respect for our values -- so little
regard for human life or the principles of justice that are the
foundation of American society -- that they would destroy innocent
children and devoted mothers and fathers completely at random. This
cannot be tolerated, or allowed to intimidate free societies. There
must be a concerted national will to fight terrorism. There must be a
willingness to apply sustained economic, political and commercial
pressure on countries sponsoring terrorists. There must be an
unwavering commitment to pursuing terrorists and bringing them to
justice. There must be the resolve to punish those who would violate
sanctions imposed against terrorist states.
Today's aviation security is based in part on the defenses erected in
the 1970s against hijackers and on recommendations made by the
Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism, which was formed in the
wake of the bombing of Pan Am 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland.
Improvements in aviation security have been complicated because
government and industry often found themselves at odds, unable to
resolve disputes over financing, effectiveness, technology, and
potential impacts on operations and passengers.
Americans should not have to choose between enhanced security and
efficient and affordable air travel. Both goals are achievable if the
federal government, airlines, airports, aviation employees, local law
enforcement agencies, and passengers work together to achieve them.
Accordingly, the Commission recommends a new partnership that will
marshal resources more effectively, and focus all parties on achieving
the ultimate goal: enhancing the security of air travel for Americans.
The Commission considered the question of whether or not the FAA is
the appropriate government agency to have the primary responsibility
for regulating aviation security. The Commission believes that,
because of its extensive interactions with airlines and airports, the
FAA is the appropriate agency, with the following qualifications:
first, that the FAA must improve the way it carries out its mission;
and second, that the roles of intelligence and law enforcement
agencies in supporting the FAA must be more clearly defined and
coordinated. The Commission's recommendations address those
conditions.
The terrorist threat is changing and growing. Therefore, it is
important to improve security not just against familiar threats, such
as explosives in checked baggage, but also to explore means of
assessing and countering emerging threats, such as the use of
biological or chemical agents, or the use of missiles. While these do
not present significant threats at present, it would be short-sighted
not to plan for their possible use and take prudent steps to counter
them.
The Commission believes that aviation security should be a system of
systems, layered, integrated, and working together to produce the
highest possible levels of protection. Each of the Commission's
recommendations should be looked upon as a part of a whole, and not in
isolation. It should be noted that a number of the Commission's
recommendations outlined in the previous chapter, particularly those
relating to certification and regulation, apply to the FAA's security
programs, as well.
Recommendations
3.1. The federal government should consider aviation security as a
national security issue, and provide substantial funding for capital
improvements.
The Commission believes that terrorist attacks on civil aviation are
directed at the United States, and that there should be an ongoing
federal commitment to reducing the threats that they pose. In its
initial report, the Commission called for approximately $160 million
in federal funds for capital costs associated with improving security,
and Congress agreed. As part of its ongoing commitment, the federal
government should devote significant resources, of approximately $100
million annually, to meet capital requirements identified by airport
consortia and the FAA. The Commission recognizes that more is needed.
The Commission expects the National Civil Aviation Review Commission
to consider a variety of options for additional user fees that could
be used to pay for security measures including, among others, an
aviation user security surcharge, the imposition of local security
fees, tax incentives and other means.
3.2. The FAA should establish federally mandated standards for
security enhancements.
These enhancements should include standards for use of Explosive
Detection System (EDS) machines, training programs for security
personnel, use of automated bag match technology, development of
profiling programs (manual and automated), and deployment of explosive
detection canine teams.
3.3. The Postal Service should advise customers that all packages
weighing over 16 ounces will be subject to examination for explosives
and other threat objects in order to move by air.
The Postal Service now requires that packages weighing over 16 ounces
must be brought to a post office, rather than be placed in a mailbox.
To improve security further, the Postal Service should mandate that
all mail weighing over 16 ounces contain a written release that allows
it to be examined by explosive detection systems in order to be
shipped by air. The Postal Service should develop and implement
procedures to randomly screen such packages for explosives and other
threat objects. If necessary, the Postal Service should seek
appropriate legislation to accomplish this.
3.4. Current law should be amended to clarify the U.S. Customs
Service's authority to search outbound international mail.
Currently, the Customs Service searches for explosives and other
threat objects on inbound mail and cargo. This recommended legislative
enhancement parallels the Customs Service's existing border search
authority.
3.5. The FAA should implement a comprehensive plan to address the
threat of explosives and other threat objects in cargo and work with
industry to develop new initiatives in this area.
The FAA should place greater emphasis on the work of teams, such as
the Aviation Security Advisory Committee and the Baseline Cargo
Working Group, to address cargo issues. The Commission believes that
the FAA should implement the Baseline Group's recommendation with
regard to profiling by "known" and "unknown" shippers. In addition,
unaccompanied express shipments on commercial passenger aircraft
should be subject to examination by explosives detection systems; the
FAA should work with industry to develop a computer assisted cargo
profiling system that can be integrated into airlines' and forwarders'
reservation and operating systems; requirements should be implemented
requiring that trucks delivering cargo for loading on planes be sealed
and locked; the FAA should develop and distribute air cargo security
training materials; and enhanced forwarder and shipper employee
screening procedures should be developed.
3.6. The FAA should establish a security system that will provide a
high level of protection for all aviation information systems.
In addition to improving the physical security of the traveling
public, information systems critical to aircraft, air traffic control
and airports should also be protected. Although government is
responsible for a great number of aviation related information
systems, a partnership must be formed in order to create integrated
protection among these and related private sector systems. Some
protective measures will become the responsibility of airlines, some
that of the airports and others of the aircraft and air traffic
control systems manufacturers and maintenance providers. The National
Security Agency must play a role in coordinating information security
measures, setting standards and providing oversight of system security
to ensure protection against outside interference, disruption and
corruption. Specific legislation should be reviewed that makes willful
interference with information systems a federal crime with substantial
penalties to provide a clear deterrent.
3.7. The FAA should work with airlines and airport consortia to ensure
that all passengers are positively identified and subjected to
security procedures before they board aircraft.
Curb-side check-in, electronic ticketing, advance boarding passes, and
other initiatives are affecting the way passengers enter the air
transportation system. As improved security procedures are put into
place, it is essential that all passengers be accounted for in that
system, properly identified and subject to the same level of scrutiny.
The Commission urges the FAA to work with airlines and airport
consortia to ensure that necessary changes are made to accomplish that
goal.
3.8. Submit a proposed resolution, through the U.S. Representative,
that the International Civil Aviation Organization begin a program to
verify and improve compliance with international security standards.
Although 185 nations have ratified the International Civil Aviation
Organization convention, and the security standards contained in it,
compliance is not uniform. This creates the potential for security
vulnerabilities on connecting flights throughout the world. To help
raise levels of security throughout the world, the International Civil
Aviation Organization needs greater authority to determine whether
nations are in compliance. Strong U.S. sponsorship for adding
verification and compliance capabilities to the International Civil
Aviation Organization could lead to enhanced worldwide aviation
security.
3.9. Assess the possible use of chemical and biological weapons as
tools of terrorism.
FAA should work with the Department of Defense and the Department of
Energy on programs to anticipate and plan for changing threats, such
as chemical and biological agents.
3.10. The FAA should work with industry to develop a national program
to increase the professionalism of the aviation security workforce,
including screening personnel.
The Commission believes it's critical to ensure that those charged
with providing security for over 500 million passengers a year in the
United States are the best qualified and trained in the industry. One
proposal that could accomplish this goal is the creation of a
nationwide non-profit security corporation, funded by the airlines, to
handle airport security. This concept, under consideration by the
major airlines, merits further review.
The Commission recommends that the FAA work with the private sector
and other federal agencies to promote the professionalism of security
personnel through a program that could include: licensing and
performance standards that reflect best practices; adequate, common
and recurrent training that considers human factors; emphasis on
reducing turnover rates; rewards for performance; opportunities for
advancement; a national rank and grade structure to permit employees
to find opportunities in other areas; regional and national
competitions to identify highly skilled teams; and, an agreement among
users to hire based on performance, not just cost.
3.11 Access to airport controlled areas must be secured and the
physical security of aircraft must be ensured.
Air carriers and airport authorities, working with FAA, must develop
comprehensive and effective means by which to secure aircraft and
other controlled areas from unauthorized access and intrusion. Use of
radio frequency transponders to track the location of people and
objects in airport controlled areas, including aircraft, offers
significant advantages over the current security measures commonly
used today. Where adequate airport controlled area and aircraft
security are not assured by other means, this technology should be
considered for use at both international and domestic airports.
---------------------------------------------------------------------
The Following Recommendations Were Presented to President Clinton on
September 9, 1996
3.12. Establish consortia at all commercial airports to implement
enhancements to aviation safety and security.
Recommendation from Initial Report dated September 9, 1996
Establish consortia at all commercial airports to implement
enhancements to aviation safety and security. The Commission is
convinced that safety, security, efficiency, and affordability can go
hand in hand if all parties work as partners. The FAA should direct
its officials responsible for oversight of security procedures at the
nation's 450 commercial airports to convene relevant aviation and law
enforcement entities for the purpose of implementing the Commission's
recommendations and further improving aviation safety and security. At
each airport, these partners will: (1) immediately conduct a
vulnerability assessment; and (2) based on that assessment, develop an
action plan that includes the deployment of new technology and
processes to enhance aviation safety and security.
The FAA will approve these action plans on an expedited basis; procure
and allocate, based on availability, new equipment; and test airports
to ensure that the plans are being implemented properly.
Status
Forty-one major airport consortia have submitted action plans for FAA
review.
The Commission's most important recommendation in its initial report
was that local consortia be convened to identify vulnerabilities and
propose action plans. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) called
for initial consortia meetings by September 27, 1996, at 41 major U.S.
airports where FAA personnel are permanently deployed. By December 2,
1996, all consortia action plans or reports from these airports had
been presented to the FAA for review. The consortia action plans
defined local security threat conditions based on input from FAA and
the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Consortia also assessed other
areas such as personnel training, passenger screening, access control
measures, and equipment and technology needs.
Augmenting Recommendation
The FAA should formalize the establishment of consortia at all
Category X through Category III airports by September 30, 1997, and,
after consultation with industry, issue guidance on the future of
consortia.
3.13. Conduct airport vulnerability assessments and develop action
plans.
Recommendation from Initial Report dated September 9, 1996
Conduct airport vulnerability assessments and develop action plans.
Using models already developed by Sandia National Laboratory, periodic
vulnerability assessments of the nation's commercial airports should
be conducted. Based on the results, action plans tailored to each
airport will be developed for expedited approval by the FAA.
Status
Law enforcement agencies are conducting assessments and addressing
problems.
The FAA Authorization Act of 1996 required the FAA and FBI to conduct
joint threat and vulnerability assessments on security every three
years, or more frequently if necessary, at each airport determined to
be high risk.
In November 1996, officials from the FBI, FAA and Department of
Transportation (DOT) established a working group to define "high risk"
airports. Discussions have been held on the criteria to be used to
identify an airport facility as high risk, methodology to use in
conducting joint FAA/FBI vulnerability assessments, and which airports
should be assessed on a priority basis. The target date for completing
the procedures for conducting vulnerability assessments is April 30,
1997, and initial assessments are to begin by late June, 1997.
3.14. Require criminal background checks and FBI fingerprint checks
for all screeners, and all airport and airline employees with access
to secure areas.
Recommendation from Initial Report dated September 9, 1996
Require criminal background checks and FBI fingerprint checks for all
screeners, and all airport and airline employees with access to secure
areas.
Currently, employees, including those with unescorted access to secure
areas of airports, are not subject to such review. Given the risks
associated with the potential introduction of explosives into these
areas, the Commission recommends that screeners and employees with
access to secure areas be subject to criminal background checks and
FBI fingerprint checks.
Status
The FBI has reduced fingerprint check turnaround time to at most seven
days.
The FBI has expedited the processing of aviation related fingerprint
submissions. The FBI will accelerate its efforts to make software
modifications and purchase additional computer hardware to adapt its
Electronic Fingerprinting Image Print Server (EFIPS) system to accept
civil fingerprint cards.
Augmenting Recommendation
The Commission reiterates that the overall goal is FBI fingerprint
checks of all airport and airline employees with access to secure
areas, no later than mid-1999.
3.15 Deploy existing technology.
Recommendation from Initial Report dated September 9, 1996
Deploy existing technology. The Commission has reviewed numerous
machines designed to detect explosives in cargo, checked baggage,
carry-on bags, and on passengers. There is no silver bullet. No single
machine offers a solution to the challenges we face. Each machine has
its own advantages and its own limitations. Even machines that work
fairly well in the laboratory need to be tested in actual use at busy
airports. We recognize that the FAA has certified only one technology
for baggage screening, but we believe we must get a variety of
machines, including some in use in other countries, into the field.
There day-to-day operators can figure out which equipment works best
in what situations and combinations, and what features need to be
improved. Finding the strengths and weakness of existing technology
will spur industry's creativity, leading to the invention of better
and better instruments. Ultimately, the goal should be to deploy
equipment that can be certified by the FAA to detect explosives likely
to be used by terrorists.
The Commission recommends the government purchase significant numbers
of computed tomography detection systems, upgraded x-rays, and other
innovative systems. By deploying equipment widely, passengers
throughout the aviation system will receive the benefits of the
enhancements. The Commission strongly believes it would be improper to
discuss the details of such deployment, as to do so would serve only
to compromise the integrity of an enhanced security system.
The Commission recommends that this initial equipment purchase be paid
for with appropriated funds. This recommendation does not settle the
issue of how security costs will be financed in the long run. That
will be dealt with in our final report.
Status
Congress funded the purchase of commercially available advanced
security screening equipment.
The FAA has ordered 54 advanced explosives detection systems.
In November and December 1996, FAA awarded six fixed priced contracts
to various manufacturers of explosives trace detection technologies.
Augmenting Recommendation
The Commission recognizes that deployed technology for examining
carry-on baggage may be outdated. New developments such as
computerized systems with high resolution digital displays, innovative
use of color to highlight threat objects, and ability to accommodate
technologies such as threat image projection to maintain screener
performance, can provide enhanced security. The FAA should review
available technology for screening carry on items, regularly update
minimum standards for new installations, and develop programs for
upgrading deployed technology.
Cross Reference to Related Recommendations
This recommendation is related to recommendation 3.2.
3.16. Establish a joint government-industry research and development
program.
Recommendation from Initial Report dated September 9, 1996
Establish a joint government-industry research and development
program. The Commission recommends the establishment of a new joint
government - industry partnership whose mission will be to accelerate
research and development to enhance the security of air travel.
This could be modeled on the Partnership For A New Generation Vehicle
(PNGV), in which the federal government and auto makers are combining
resources to develop automobiles with significantly enhanced fuel
economy, safety, and reduced emissions. We propose to increase federal
funding and to ask the private sector to contribute.
Status
The FAA is working with industry to develop agreements and award
research grants.
Congress increased the federal funding of R&D as required.
The FAA is moving in the direction of interacting more closely with
industry, having set up advisory mechanisms such as the Aviation
Security Advisory Committee; participating in individual Cooperative
Research and Development Agreements with individual firms; giving
grants to airlines and airports to conduct demonstrations and
otherwise involve themselves in security technology development;
entering into cost-sharing arrangements with firms to develop security
technology.
Augmenting Recommendation
The FAA received additional funding and has aggressively accelerated
systems to (1) improve screener performance, (2) reduce aircraft
vulnerability, (3) screen cargo, and (4) to develop options for
dealing with threats other than explosives. The FAA is encouraged to
use the best technology available to solve security and safety
challenges throughout the air transportation system.
3.17. Establish an interagency task force to assess the potential use
of surface-to-air missiles against commercial aircraft.
Recommendation from Initial Report dated September 9, 1996
Assess the viability of anti-missile defense systems.. Whether or not
the explosion of TWA 800 turns out to have been due to a
surface-to-air missile attack, as some eye-witness accounts suggest,
missile attacks have downed passenger planes in other countries, and
it is a risk that should be evaluated. The Commission will continue to
analyze this problem in cooperation with the Department of Defense and
other government agencies.
Status
DoD will convene an interagency task force to examine the threat to
civil aircraft.
Initial analyses of both the missile threat and electronic systems
available to counter it support a decision to take positive steps.
Experts from the Department of Defense (DoD), the intelligence
community, defense contractors and research scientists contributed to
analysis of the viability of anti-missile defense systems for civil
aviation.
Augmenting Recommendation
Within ninety days, the Department of Defense should convene an
interagency task force including the DOT, the FAA and the intelligence
community to address the potential threat from surface-to-air missiles
against commercial aviation. Working with airport consortia, this task
force should develop plans to provide increased surveillance, and, if
necessary, the deployment of countermeasures. The task force should
make recommendations to the DOT regarding the testing, evaluation and
preparation for deployment of measures to protect civil aircraft
against an increased threat from surface-to-air missiles.
Appropriate steps should be taken by the intelligence community and
through international diplomacy to reduce the possibility that
terrorists could obtain or use surface-to-air missiles. The State
Department should study the expansion of conventional arms agreements
to include man-portable surface-to-air missiles, and the U.S.
Representative to the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)
should propose a new convention addressing these weapons.
3.18. Significantly expand the use of bomb-sniffing dogs.
Recommendation from Initial Report dated September 9, 1996
Significantly expand the use of bomb-sniffing dogs. Canines are used
to detect explosives in many important areas, but only sparingly in
airport security. The Commission is convinced that an increase in the
number of well-trained dogs and handlers can make a significant and
rapid improvement in security, and recommends the deployment of 114
additional teams.
Status
The FAA received funding for 114 new dog teams and training has begun.
Augmenting Recommendation
Additionally, the Commission recommends that ATF continue to work to
develop government-wide standards for canine teams.
3.19. Complement technology with automated passenger profiling.
Recommendation from Initial Report dated September 9, 1996
Complement technology with automated passenger profiling. Profiling
can leverage an investment in technology and trained people. Based on
information that is already in computer databases, passengers could be
separated into a very large majority who present little or no risk,
and a small minority who merit additional attention.
Such systems are employed successfully by other agencies, including
the Customs Service. By utilizing this process Customs is better able
to focus its resources and attention. As a result, many legitimate
travelers never see a customs agent anymore -- and drug busts are way
up.
The FAA and Northwest Airlines are developing an automated profiling
system tailored to aviation security, and the Commission supports the
continued development and implementation of such a system.
To improve and promote passenger profiling, the Commission recommends
three steps. First, FBI, CIA, and BATF should evaluate and expand the
research into known terrorists, hijackers, and bombers needed to
develop the best possible profiling system. They should keep in mind
that such a profile would be most useful to the airlines if it could
be matched against automated passenger information which the airlines
maintain.
Second, the FBI and CIA should develop a system that would allow
important intelligence information on known or suspected terrorists to
be used in passenger profiling without compromising the integrity of
the intelligence or its sources. Similar systems have been developed
to give environmental scientists access to sensitive data collected by
satellites.
Third, the Commission will establish an advisory board on civil
liberties questions that arise from the development and use of
profiling systems.
Status
Profiling systems are being developed.
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and Northwest Airlines are
completing final programming changes to an automated profiling system.
A tentative completion date for programming changes and implementation
of Computer Assisted Passenger Screening (CAPS) on Northwest flights
is April, 1997. Additional programming will begin for use of CAPS on
other airline reservations systems, with a tentative completion date
of August, 1997.
On January 17, 1997, a Civil Liberties Advisory Board met with
Commissioners to discuss civil liberties concerns pertaining to
profiling. The Board submitted recommendations to the Commission.
(Appendix A)
Augmenting Recommendation
The Commission believes that profiling is one part of a comprehensive,
layered security program. As with other measures, it becomes less
necessary with the introduction of efficient screening technology.
Based on readily-available information, passengers could be separated
into a very large majority about whom we know enough to conclude that
they present little or no risk, and a small minority about whom we do
not know enough and who merit additional attention. The Customs
Service uses this approach successfully to better focus its resources
and attention. As a result, many legitimate travelers never see a
customs agent anymore -- and drug busts are way up.
The Commission supports the development and implementation of manual
and automated profiling systems, such as the one under development by
the FAA and Northwest Airlines. The Commission strongly believes the
civil liberties that are so fundamentally American should not, and
need not, be compromised by a profiling system. Consistent with this
viewpoint, the Commission sought the counsel of leading experts in the
civil liberties field. Those experts provided a series of
recommendations found in Appendix A. The Commission recommends the
following safeguards:
1. No profile should contain or be based on material of a
constitutionally suspect nature - e.g., race, religion, national
origin of U.S. citizens. The Commission recommends that the elements
of a profiling system be developed in consultation with the Department
of Justice and other appropriate experts to ensure that selection is
not impermissibly based on national origin, racial, ethnic, religious
or gender characteristics.
2. Factors to be considered for elements of the profile should be
based on measurable, verifiable data indicating that the factors
chosen are reasonable predictors of risk, not stereotypes or
generalizations. A relationship must be demonstrated between the
factors chosen and the risk of illegal activity.
3. Passengers should be informed of airlines security procedures and
of their right to avoid any search of their person or luggage by
electing not to board the aircraft.
4. Searches arising from the use of an automated profiling system
should be no more intrusive than search procedures that could be
applied to all passengers. Procedures for searching the person or
luggage of, or for questioning, a person who is selected by the
automated profiling system should be premised on insuring respectful,
non-stigmatizing, and efficient treatment of all passengers.
5. Neither the airlines or the government should maintain permanent
databases on selectees. Reasonable restrictions on the maintenance of
records and strict limitations on the dissemination of records should
be developed.
6. Periodic independent reviews of profiling procedures should be
made. The Commission considered whether an independent panel be
appointed to monitor implementation and recommends at a minimum that
the DOJ, in consultation with the DOT and FAA, periodically review the
profiling standards and create an outside panel should that, in their
judgment, be necessary.
7. The Commission reiterates that profiling should last only until
Explosive Detection Systems are reliable and fully deployed.
8. The Commission urges that these elements be embodied in FAA
standards that must be strictly observed.
3.20. Certify screening companies and improve screener performance.
Recommendation from Initial Report dated September 9, 1996
Certify screening companies and improve screener performance. Better
selection, training, and testing of the people who work at airport
x-ray machines would result in a significant boost in security. The
Commission recommends development of uniform performance standards for
the selection, training, certification, and recertification of
screening companies and their employees. The Commission further
recommends that in developing these standards, the FAA give serious
consideration to implementing the National Research Council
recommendations. The Commission also recommends the purchase and
deployment of SPEARS, a computerized training and testing system.
Status
The FAA has begun rulemaking procedures to require new certifications.
The Federal Aviation Administration is developing an Advanced Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM) which will establish the requirement
for screening companies to be certified in order to provide screening
services to air carriers. The rule will include requirements to
improve the training and testing of security screeners through
development of uniform performance standards for providing security
screening services. Congress gave FAA authority to certify screening
companies, but did not provide FAA authority to certify individual
screeners. This Commission urges Congress to provide that additional
authority.
Augmenting Recommendation
The Commission also recommends that the purchase and deployment of
SPEARS, a computerized training and testing system, be completed at
all major airports by the end of 1997.
3.21. Aggressively test existing security systems.
Recommendation from Initial Report dated September 9, 1996
Aggressively test existing security systems. "Red team" (adversary)
type testing should also be increased by the FAA, and incorporated as
a regular part of airport security action plans. Frequent,
sophisticated attempts by these red teams to find ways to dodge
security measures are an important part of finding weaknesses in the
system and anticipating what sophisticated adversaries of our nation
might attempt. An aggressive red team strategy will require
significant increases in the number of FAA personnel currently
assigned to these tasks.
Status
The FAA is hiring 300 new special agents to test airport security.
3.22. Use the Customs Service to enhance security.
Recommendation from Initial Report dated September 9, 1996
Use the Customs Service to enhance security. The Customs Service has
many responsibilities that are parallel to the FAA's in dealing with
airlines and contraband. As a law enforcement agency, Customs has
authorities and tools not available to the FAA. Further, it has
developed successful partnership programs with the airlines. By using
the Customs Service to complement the FAA, FBI, and other agencies,
the Commission believes that aviation security would be significantly
enhanced.
The Customs Service has thousands of agents currently stationed at US
international airports. Customs has statutory authority to search
people and cargo to stop contraband from coming in or going out of the
country. Customs has arrangements with most airlines to receive
automated passenger and cargo manifests. These arrangements could be
adapted for use in security procedures. Customs, as a law enforcement
agency, has access to automated law enforcement databases that could
be an invaluable tool in fighting not just drugs but terrorism. The
Commission recommends that Customs upgrade and adapt its computer
systems to take on this additional responsibility.
Status
The Customs Service is deploying 140 inspectors and investigators to
critical airports.
The U.S. Customs Service is in the process of deploying 140
inspectors, intelligence analysts, and criminal investigators (special
agents) to critical airports, for aviation security; anti-terrorism
efforts, and to perform increased searches of passengers, baggage, and
cargo departing the United States. Customs is purchasing and deploying
additional x-ray vans, tool trucks and radiation detector pagers at
critical airports to assist in these searches.
The Customs Service and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) are
working with an FAA contractor to study the technical issues
associated with converting Customs' Automated Targeting System (ATS),
which is designed for sea cargo analysis, to air cargo analysis.
Although ATS is designed for contraband analysis and detection in the
sea cargo environment, the plan would be to add anti-terrorism
criteria to the system and convert it to an air cargo environment. The
study should be completed in the Spring of 1997.
3.23. Give properly cleared airline and airport security personnel
access to the classified information they need to know.
Recommendation from Initial Report dated September 9, 1996
Give properly cleared airline and airport security personnel access to
the classified information they need to know. The red tape of
classification is getting in the way of security. There are two
problems that must be solved. The first involves intelligence
information about specific terrorist threats. The CIA or FBI pass the
threat information to the FAA, which in turn alerts the airlines. But
the information gets progressively "sanitized" to avoid jeopardizing
the source. Often, airlines are just told what to do but not why they
are to do it. If airlines were provided more information about the
threat, they could help design more effective responses.
Corporate personnel are often cleared to know the most secret
information when national security is at stake. Defense contractors
with access to highly classified intelligence information are far from
rare. For that matter, airline personnel were cleared to know highly
classified information during Operation Desert Storm, when commercial
aircraft transported 80% of our troops to Saudi Arabia.
The other classified information problem involves the airport
vulnerability assessments in recommendation number 2. These
assessments become classified information if they conclude that a high
degree of vulnerability exists. Some people responsible for security
at the airports are not cleared to receive classified information.
The Commission recommends that the FAA arrange for appropriate airline
and airport security personnel to be cleared to address this problem.
Status
The FAA is arranging for adequate clearance levels at airports and
airlines.
The FAA has agreed to collaborate more closely with airlines and
airports in developing responses to threat information, and has agreed
to disseminate vulnerability assessments to properly cleared
officials.
3.24. Begin implementation of full bag-passenger match.
Recommendation from Initial Report dated September 9, 1996
Begin implementation of full bag-passenger match. Matching bags to
passengers ensures that the baggage of anyone who does not board the
plane is removed. Full bag match ensures that no unaccompanied bag
remains on board a flight.
Manual and automated systems to conduct full bag match have been
employed in international aviation for several years, but need
additional work to ensure they can be phased into domestic airline
operations. The Commission recommends implementing full bag match at
selected airports, including at least one hub, within sixty days to
determine the best means of implementing the process system-wide.
Status
The Commission remains committed to baggage match as a component of a
comprehensive, layered security program aimed at keeping bombs and
explosive devices off airlines. New technologies are available which
facilitate positive and automated identification of the bag as it is
tracked through the system. Automatic bag tracking systems can also
facilitate the removal of bags from aircraft if required by security
concerns. The Commission feels that these technologies can be combined
with the development of a passenger manifest to implement a
passenger-bag matching system as one component of a layered approach
to aviation security.
The Commission urges the industry and the FAA to work together to
hasten the development of sophisticated technology for determining the
presence of explosives in checked baggage. Until such machines are
widely available, the Commission believes that bag match, initially
based on profiling, should be implemented no later than December 31,
1997. The Commission's recommendation is consistent with that of the
Baseline Working Group's recommendation in this contentious and
difficult area.
By that date, the bags of those selected either at random or through
the use of automated profiling must either be screened or matched to a
boarded passenger. No unaccompanied bag should be transported on a
passenger aircraft unless (1) it has been screened by a screening
method that meets the FAA standard, or (2) it belongs to a passenger
who at the time of check in was neither randomly selected for security
review nor selected by the profile for further review. This approach
is the most effective methodology available now. It would allow the
aviation industry to remove the unaccompanied bag or bags which
represent the greatest threat.
3.25. Provide more compassionate and effective assistance to families
of victims.
Recommendation from Initial Report dated September 9, 1996
Providing more compassionate and effective assistance to families of
victims. The tragedy of losing a loved one in an aviation disaster can
be unnecessarily and cruelly compounded by disjointed or incomplete
information in the aftermath of the incident. At the Commission's
urging, the President is directing the National Transportation Safety
Board to take the lead in coordinating provision of services to
families of victims. The NTSB will work with the Departments of State,
Defense, Transportation, Health and Human Services, the Federal
Emergency Management Agency, and private organizations like the Red
Cross.
Status
The NTSB was given responsibility to coordinate response.
On October 9, 1996, Congress passed the Aviation Family Disaster Act
of 1996 giving the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) the
responsibility for aiding families of aircraft accident victims and
coordinating the federal response to major domestic aviation
accidents.
Since the signing of the law, NTSB has completed the initial phase of
coordinating the federal response to a major domestic aviation
accident. The NTSB is in the process of finalizing existing interim
Memoranda of Understanding with the Department of State, Department of
Defense, Department of Health and Human Services, Department of
Justice, Department of Transportation, Federal Emergency Management
Agency, and the American Red Cross (ARC). The NTSB has been vigorously
assisting the airline industry to develop a model plan to address the
needs of aviation disaster victims and their families. Letters from
Chairman Jim Hall and DOT Secretary Federico Peña went out in
November, 1996, to airlines informing them of their responsibility for
producing an emergency response plan as specified in section 703 of
the Aviation Disaster Family Assistance Act of 1996.
An interim federal response has been developed by the NTSB that
assigns responsibilities to the airlines and participating federal
agencies. The ARC will be responsible for family care and mental
health; the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) will be
responsible for identification and preparation of human remains (with
support by the Department of Defense, as needed); and the Department
of State will assist the airlines and NTSB when foreign passengers are
involved in an aviation accident. The Federal Emergency Management
Agency will provide the NTSB with communications equipment and
additional public affairs personnel. If the aviation disaster is
officially determined to be a criminal act, the Department of Justice
will provide information to families on entitlements and benefits
under the Victims of Crime Act. Many elements of the interim NTSB plan
were successfully implemented and tested following the United Express
Flight 5925/5926 accident in Quincy, Illinois on November 19, 1996.
The Department of Transportation and the NTSB have formed a task force
to provide recommendations on the issues elaborated in section 704 of
the Aviation Disaster Family Assistance Act of 1996. The task force
includes officials from the NTSB, Federal Emergency Management Agency,
American Red Cross, airlines, family groups, and organizations
considered appropriate by the Secretary of Transportation. Airlines
are required by the Act to submit their plans to the Secretary of
Transportation and to the Chairman of the NTSB by April 9, 1996.
Cross Reference to Related Recommendations
This recommendation is related to recommendations 4.2 and 4.3.
3.26. Improve passenger manifests.
Recommendation from Initial Report dated September 9, 1996
Improve passenger manifests. The Commission believes that Section 203
of the 1990 Aviation Security Improvement Act, which requires airlines
to keep a comprehensive passenger manifest for international flights,
should be implemented as quickly as possible. While Section 203 does
not apply to domestic flights, the Commission urges the Department of
Transportation to explore immediately the costs and effects of a
similar requirement on the domestic aviation system.
Status
The DOT is proceeding with rulemaking to require international and
domestic manifests.
The DOT has developed a draft rule covering domestic flight
manifesting, and an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM),
should be issued in early 1997. The DOT anticipates an extensive
comment period for the ANPRM, because no data exist related to
domestic flights. The final rule for domestic manifesting is likely to
be published in 1998.
3.27. Significantly increase the number of FBI agents assigned to
counterterrorism investigations, to improve intelligence, and to
crisis response.
Recommendation from Initial Report dated September 9, 1996
Significantly increase the number of FBI agents assigned to
counter-terrorism investigations, to improve intelligence, and to
crisis response. The Commission recognizes the vital role that the FBI
plays in fighting terrorism against Americans, and recommends that the
agency's ability to assess vulnerabilities, gather and analyze
intelligence, and conduct forensic investigations be augmented.
3.28 Provide anti-terrorism assistance in the form of airport security
training to countries where there are airports served by airlines
flying to the US.
Recommendation from Initial Report dated September 9, 1996
Provide anti-terrorism assistance in the form of airport security
training to countries where there are airports served by airlines
flying to the US. The Commission believes that it is important to
raise the level of security at all airports serving Americans.
Assisting foreign countries through training in explosive detection,
post-blast investigation, VIP protection, hostage negotiation, and
incident management is an important means of achieving this goal.
Status
The State Department and the FAA are sponsoring domestic and foreign
courses.
The Department of State and the FAA continue to jointly sponsor
Anti-Terrorism Assistance Training Programs. In FY 1997, six domestic
law enforcement classes and six international/foreign classes will be
held.
3.29. Resolve outstanding issues relating to explosive taggants and
require their use.
Recommendation from Initial Report dated September 9, 1996
Resolve outstanding issues relating to explosive taggants and require
their use. The use of taggants can be a critical aid when
investigating explosions on aircraft and in bringing terrorists to
justice. The Commission recommends that remaining issues relating to
the use of these taggants, including the analysis of black and
smokeless powder, be resolved as quickly as possible, and that
requirements for the use of taggants then be put into place.
Status
Studies by the ATF have been initiated, with results expected in
April, 1997.
ATF has contracted with the National Academy of Sciences/National
Research Council to conduct an independent study. The International
Fertilizer Development Center is under contract with ATF to conduct a
study on the economic and agronomic effects of tagging ammonium
nitrate fertilizer. A report is due to Congress on the study findings
late in April, 1997.
3.30. Provide regular, comprehensive explosives detection training
programs for foreign, federal, state, and local law enforcement, as
well as FAA and airline personnel.
Recommendation from Initial Report dated September 9, 1996
Provide regular, comprehensive explosives detection training programs
for foreign, federal, state, and local law enforcement, as well as FAA
and airline personnel. The Commission believes that law enforcement
agencies with expertise in explosives detection can provide valuable
training to those involved in aviation security.
Status
The ATF and FAA are preparing a training course for airport law
enforcement agencies.
The ATF is developing a curriculum on Improvised Explosive Devices.
The pilot program is planned for Spring, 1997. In addition to ongoing
explosives training for ATF personnel, three states and local Advanced
Explosives Investigative Techniques classes are scheduled at the
Federal Law Enforcement Training Center in Glynco, Georgia. Finally,
post blast and improvised explosive device recognition training will
be conducted by 198 ATF certified explosive specialists for State and
Local law enforcement personnel throughout the United States.
3.31. Create a central clearinghouse within government to provide
information on explosives crime.
Recommendation from Initial Report dated September 9, 1996
Create a central clearinghouse within government to provide
information on explosives crime. The Commission recommends that a
central clearinghouse be established to compile and distribute
important information relating to previously encountered explosive
devices, both foreign and domestic.
Status
The Secretary of the Treasury has established a national repository at
the ATF.
The Secretary of the Treasury was authorized to establish a national
repository of information on incidents involving arson and the
suspected criminal misuse of explosives. All Federal agencies having
information concerning such incidents report the information to the
Secretary. The ATF National Repository committee, has established a
target date of October 1, 1997, for the implementation of the pilot
project, with full implementation by the end of FY 1998. The system
will be designed and constructed in incremental stages providing
varying levels of service as early as April, 1997.
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Chapter Four:
Responding to Aviation Disasters
"I am testifying today to give a sense of purpose to the death of my
daughter and the others who lost their lives on TWA flight 800. I
believe that by identifying areas in need of improvement, we can
successfully generate a change in policy and action for the future. We
will create a living memorial to their death."
Aurlie Becker.
The Commission's recommendations included setting a goal of reducing
the rate of fatal accidents by a factor of five over the next ten
years, and outlined a course of action that would help achieve that
goal. Additionally, the Commission has recommended specific steps to
reduce the threat of terrorism against commercial aircraft. However,
it must be recognized that, in spite of the strongest efforts of all
involved, disasters may still occur. While government and industry
must do everything possible to prevent them, they must also be
prepared to respond quickly and compassionately when one does take
place. The tragedy of losing a loved one in a plane crash can be
cruelly and needlessly compounded by an uncoordinated, ineffective, or
uninformed response to family members.
The infrequency of commercial aviation accidents has complicated the
response to such disasters. For example, when TWA Flight 800 crashed
on July 17, 1996, it had been over twenty years since that airline's
last fatal accident. Most crashes simply overwhelm state and local
response teams, and take a tremendous toll on airline employees, who
must immediately begin addressing the concerns of family members at
the same time that they are coping with the loss of their own
colleagues.
Responding to the frustrations and complaints of family members over
the treatment they received after accidents, President Clinton signed
an executive memorandum giving the National Transportation Safety
Board (NTSB) the responsibility for coordinating federal services to
families after aviation disasters. Congress subsequently passed
legislation further expanding and clarifying the NTSB's new
responsibilities.
Since its creation in 1967, the NTSB is the one entity that has been
on the site of every transportation disaster. The Commission applauds
the designation of the NTSB as the coordinating agency after aviation
disasters, and commends the agency for its diligence in carrying out
its new responsibilities.
Recommendations
4.1. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) should finalize
by April, 1997, its coordinated federal response plan to aviation
disasters, and Congress should provide the NTSB with increased funding
to address its new responsibilities.
The NTSB has developed an interim plan for a coordinated federal
response to aviation disasters, which should be finalized as quickly
as possible. That interim plan was put to the test in two recent
disasters involving commuter aircraft, and resulted in clear
improvements in service. The Commission commends the work of the NTSB
and believes that only through a coordinated effort, and establishment
of a standard protocol, can effective support be provided to local
governments and airlines to meet the needs of family members. The
Commission recommends that Congress provide such additional funds
necessary to allow the NTSB to carry out the new responsibilities
described in the Aviation Disaster Family Assistance Act of 1996.
4.2. The Department of Transportation should coordinate the
development of plans for responding to aviation disasters involving
civilians on government aircraft.
The families of civilians killed while traveling on government
aircraft face the same traumas and challenges as those whose loved
ones were killed on commercial flights. However, the response to such
disasters is covered under different laws and procedures. Those
differences, and a clear statement regarding their rights and benefits
in the event of an aviation disaster, should be provided to passengers
on government aircraft prior to boarding. The Commission believes that
it is essential that those families receive assistance comparable to
that provided after commercial disasters through the enhanced role of
the NTSB. The Commission urges the DOT to work with the NTSB, DoD,
other agencies, and family members to develop plans to accomplish that
goal by September 1997 and to evaluate the need to revise existing
laws and regulations governing the rights and benefits of civilians on
government aircraft.
4.3. The Department of Transportation and the NTSB should implement
key provisions of the Aviation Disaster Family Assistance Act of 1996
by March 31, 1997.
This Act authorized the formation of a task force to study the need
for modifications to laws or regulations that would result in
improvements to the treatment of family members of victims of aviation
disasters. This task force will consider, among other things, issues
relating to treatment of families by the media and legal community.
Additionally, the Commission urges the task force to consider the
development of uniform guidelines for notification, autopsies and DNA
testing and other issues raised by family members, including rights
and treatment of foreign citizens and non-traditional families,
securing crash sites, availability of cockpit voice recorder
transcripts, and the composition of accident investigation teams. The
Commission expects that establishment of the task force will be one of
the first priorities for the new Secretary of Transportation, and that
it will be accomplished without delay.
In November 1996, the Chairman of the NTSB and the Secretary of
Transportation (DOT) sent a joint letter to airlines to underscore the
importance of this Act and to advise on the responsibilities of
airlines to formulate disaster response plans. Those plans are due to
the DOT and the NTSB by early April 1997.
In addition, the NTSB should work with the State Department through
Memoranda of Understanding or other mechanisms to provide direct
services to the families of U.S. citizens who are victims of disasters
on U.S. carriers abroad.
4.4. The United States Government should ensure that family members of
victims of international aviation disasters receive just compensation
and equitable treatment through the application of federal laws and
international treaties.
Certain statutes and international treaties, established over 50 years
ago, historically have not provided equitable treatment for families
of passengers involved in international aviation disasters.
Specifically, the Death on the High Seas Act of 1920 (Act) and the
Warsaw Convention of 1929 (Convention), although designed to aid
families of victims of maritime and aviation disasters, have inhibited
the ability of family members of international aviation disasters from
obtaining fair compensation. An recent agreement by U.S. airlines
waived the liability limits of the Warsaw Convention from the current
$75,000 to about $143,000. However, the Death on the High Seas Act may
still limit recoveries available after certain aviation disasters to
$2,300.
Congress passed the Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act of 1996 as a
first step to remedy this situation. The Commission urges the
Administration and the Congress to take additional steps necessary to
ensure fairer and more equitable treatment of families of victims of
international aviation disasters, including the establishment of an
advisory board, pursuant to section 211 of the Aviation Security
Improvement Act of 1990, to develop a plan for equitable compensation
of victims of aviation disasters.
4.5 Provisions should be made to ensure the availability of funding
for extraordinary costs associated with accident response.
The NTSB and other federal, state, and local government agencies can
incur significant costs in the course of an accident response. Those
costs cannot be anticipated nor budgeted for in advance, and their
recovery has been made on an ad hoc basis, further complicating an
already difficult situation. The Commission urges the Administration
and Congress to address this issue, through the consideration of
measures such as requirements for increased insurance coverage for
companies involved in air transportation.
4.6. Federal agencies should establish peer support programs to assist
rescue, investigative, law enforcement, counseling and other personnel
involved in aviation disaster response.
The men and women who respond on the scene of aviation disasters can
suffer from considerable trauma and emotional impact. Specially
trained peer support counselors, who are themselves investigators who
have had similar experiences, should be dispatched to the scene of a
disaster to help those involved in the response effort. The Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF), because of its frequent
investigations of arson and bombings, has developed such a program for
its agents. The NTSB, the FAA, and other agencies should work with the
ATF to develop programs for their personnel within existing budgets.
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Conclusions
The Commission believes that each of its recommendations is
achievable. But, the Commission has no authority to implement its
recommendations. That responsibility lies with government and
industry. Many of the proposals will require additional funding. Some
of them will require legislation. Each of them requires sustained
attention. We now urge the President to make these recommendations his
own. We urge Congress to provide the necessary legislation and
funding. We urge the incoming leadership of the DOT and the FAA to
make fulfillment of these recommendations a cornerstone of their work.
We urge the commercial aviation industry to take up the technical and
organizational challenges. We urge the thousands of private pilots
across the nation to convert their enthusiasm for flying into a
commitment make the changes necessary to enhance safety for everyone
flying. And, we urge the American people to demand that this country
take the steps now to do what is needed.
By virtually any measure, the aviation system in the United States is
the best in the world. But, every system can be improved; made safer,
more secure, and more efficient. Every crash is a stark reminder of
that reality.
The world is changing, and so, too, must our aviation policies and
practices. They should challenge everyone involved in aviation to
improve. They should serve as the model for the rest of the world, and
lead to improvements that will make passengers safer, regardless of
where they board their flight.
There are few areas in which the public so uniformly believes that
government should play a strong role as in aviation safety and
security. Aviation is an area over which the average person can exert
little control; therefore, it becomes government's responsibility to
work with industry to make sure that Americans enjoy the highest
levels of safety and security when flying. Problems in these areas
contribute to an erosion of public faith in aviation, and in
government itself. The Commission has laid out an aggressive agenda to
help address those concerns, and believes that the implementation of
this course of action must be the top priority for all those involved
in aviation.
The Commission expresses its appreciation to: President Clinton, for
his heartfelt interest and his strong support for this work; to the
104th Congress, for its decisive action in response to the initial
report; to the men and women in numerous government agencies, for
their work in identifying issues and in implementing recommendations;
and to the representatives of airlines, airports, labor, and general
aviation who provided invaluable input.
Finally, and especially, the Commission thanks the families of those
who have lost loved ones in crashes, for their commitment and their
insights, and for ensuring that the Commission always kept its focus
on the ultimate goals.
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APPENDICES
A. Civil Liberties Advisory Board Recommendations
B. List of FAA Implementation Responsibilities
C. The White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security
Membership
D. Executive Order
E. Public Meetings of the Commission
F. Commission Staff
G. Special Acknowledgments
H. Commissioner Special Acknowledgments
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Appendix A
Recommendations of the Members of the Civil Liberties Advisory Panel
to the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security
The members of the civil liberties advisory panel were invited to meet
with the Commission on January 17, 1997, to pose questions and offer
their thoughts on the draft proposal to "implement an automated
profiling system for all passengers on all flights." Draft Proposal
II.8. In the absence of any specific information about the profiling
system that is being considered, our individual comments at the
meeting, and our collective statements set forth below are, of
necessity, general in nature. In addition, those comments and these
recommendations are limited to the general proposal to finalize and
deploy an automated profiling system on a system-wide basis. They do
not address the civil liberties implications of other elements of
Draft Proposal II.8 (dealing with "watch lists," "real time" feedback
to airlines, and the creation of a permanent consortium for sharing
strategic aviation intelligence), or any other proposals considered by
the Commission.
In light of the serious civil liberties issues raised by any profiling
system, we urge the Commission and the President to consider carefully
whether any profiling system is appropriate.
Should the Commission decide to recommend an automated profiling
system, we urge the Commission to include the following principles
among its recommendations (without suggesting that this exhausts the
possible civil liberties concerns):
1. Any profile should not contain or be based on material of a
constitutionally suspect nature -- e.g., race, religion, national
origin of U.S. citizens -- and should be consistent with the
constitutional right of freedom to travel.
2. Factors to be considered for elements of the profile should be
based on measurable, verifiable data indicating that the factors
chosen are reasonable predictors of risk, not stereotypes or
generalizations. Efforts should be made to avoid using characteristics
that impose a disproportionate burden of inconvenience, embarrassment,
or invasion of privacy of members of minority racial, religious or
ethnic groups. Law enforcement data should be used with caution and
only to the extent that the data used is a reasonable predictor of
risk, because these data may be incomplete or inaccurate and may not
be directly relevant to the goal of enhancing aviation security.
3. Passengers should be informed of the airlines' security procedures
and of their right to avoid any search of their person or luggage by
electing not to board the aircraft. When the use of an automated
profiling system leads to a request to open luggage or to submit to a
personal search, an explicit reminder of the option not to board the
aircraft should be given.
4. Searches arising from the use of an automated profiling system
should be no more intrusive than search procedures that could be
applied to all passengers. For example, imaging devices which project
an image of a passenger's body underneath his or her clothing should
not be used on a passenger solely because the passenger fits the
profile or has been selected at random. The procedures applied to
those who fit the profile should also be applied on a random basis to
some percentage of passengers who do not fit the profile.
5. Procedures for searching the person or luggage of, or for
questioning, a person who is selected by the automated profiling
system should be premised on insuring respectful, non-stigmatizing,
and efficient treatment of all passengers.
6. The panel is concerned that the maintenance or dissemination of
records compiled in connection with an automated profiling system may
invade the privacy of passengers. Reasonable restrictions on the
maintenance of records and strict limitations on the dissemination of
records should be developed. To the extent that records are
maintained, there should be means for passengers to challenge the
accuracy of personally identifiable information.
7. An independent panel should be appointed and given appropriate
authority to monitor implementation of airport security procedures to
insure that they do not unduly limit the exercise of civil liberties
of the traveling public and do not unduly require augmented searches
of the person or baggage of any particular group or groups.
8. Any profiling system should have a sunset provision which requires
it to be terminated by a date certain unless an affirmative decision
is made to continue use of the system. The assessment of the system
should take account of its efficacy and necessity in light of
improvements in detection technology as well as the civil liberties
impact of the program.
9. Air carrier security plans submitted for approval by the Federal
Aviation Administration to implement an automated profiling system
should be consistent with these guidelines.
Floyd Abrams, Esq., Cahill Gordon & Reindel
Nihad Awad, Council on American-Islamic Relations
Kevin T. Baine, Esq., Williams & Connolly
David J. Bodney, Esq., Steptoe & Johnson LLP
Dr. Morton H. Halperin, Council on Foreign Relations
Professor David A. Harris, Univ. of Toledo College of Law
Professor Gerard E. Lynch, Columbia Univ. School of Law
Gregory T. Nojeim, American Civil Liberties Union
Robert Ellis Smith, Privacy Journal
- Affiliation of each member listed for purposes of identification
only
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Appendix B
Chart of Recommendations to be Implemented by the FAA
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Appendix C
White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security Membership
Lieutenant General James A. Abrahamson, USAF (Ret), is the founder of
International Air Safety, LLC., and Air Safety Consultants, Inc. He
has a global reputation in the fields of technical program management,
international business, and Air Traffic Management. He served as
Chairman of the Board of Oracle Corporation and President of Hughes'
Transportation Sector.
Jesse (Jack) Beauchamp. B.S., California Institute of Technology,
1964; Ph.D. Harvard University, 1967; Professor of Chemistry,
California Institute of Technology, 1967 - Present; member, National
Academy of Sciences. He has served on numerous scientific advisory
committees and panels of the NRC and the Department of Defense. He has
expertise in the identification of chemical species using a wide range
of instrumental methods. His current research activities include the
development of new methods for the detection of explosives.
In 1973 Dr. Franklin R. Chang-Diaz became involved in the United
States' controlled fusion program and in the design and operation of
fusion reactors. As a visiting scientist with the M.I.T. Plasma Fusion
Center from October 1983 to December 1993, he led the plasma
propulsion program there to develop this technology for future human
missions to Mars. In December 1993, he was appointed Director of the
Advanced Space Propulsion Laboratory at the NASA Johnson Space Center.
Dr. Chang-Diaz became an astronaut in August 1981 and is a veteran of
five space flights. He has logged over 1,033 hours in space. Dr.
Chang-Diaz received a bachelor of science degree in mechanical
engineering from the University of Connecticut in 1973 and a doctorate
in applied plasma physics from the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology in 1977.
Antonia Handler Chayes is a Senior Advisor and Board Member of
Conflict Management Group (CMG), a non-profit conflict resolution
consulting firm, and a Senior Consultant to JAMS/Endispute, a firm
that provides cost-effective alternatives to traditional litigation.
Ms. Chayes is also an Adjunct Lecturer at the Kennedy School of
Government at Harvard Law School. Previously she served as Assistant
Secretary and as Under Secretary of the United States Air Force. Ms.
Chayes served as a Commissioner with the Commission on Roles and
Missions of the United States Armed Forces and the DOD-CIA Joint
Security Commission. She has been a director of United Technologies
since 1981, and is a member of the American Law Institute and the
Council on Foreign Relations. Ms. Chayes serves on Advisory Boards of
Columbia University School for International and Public Affairs and
the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations.
William T. Coleman, Jr. - Senior Partner, O'Melveny & Myers; former
U.S. Secretary of Transportation in the Ford Administration; Chairman,
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.; Officer of the French
Legion of Honor; Recipient of the Presidential Medal of Freedom
conferred by President Clinton in September, 1995.
Mrs. Victoria Cummock is President of Families of Pan Am 103/Lockerbie
and a member of the FAA Security Baseline Work Group. As a disaster
victims advocate, she has worked with hundreds of victims families
including Oklahoma City, Valujet 592 and TWA 800. Her work in Disaster
Crisis Management, Aviation Security and Counter-terrorism, has
brought about many legislative changes including the "1990 Aviation
Security Improvement Act", the "1996 Iran-Libyan Sanctions Act", the
"1996 Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act" and the
"Aviation Disaster Family Assistance Act of 1996."
John M. Deutch, professor at Massachusetts Institute of Technology
(MIT); government assignments include former Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition and Technology, Director of Energy Research
and Acting Assistant Secretary for Energy Technology at the Department
of Energy. Born in Brussels, Belgium, Mr. Deutch became a US citizen
in 1945; B.A. in history and economics from Amherst College, a B.S. in
chemical engineering and a Ph.D. in physical chemistry from MIT;
married, three sons.
Kathleen Flynn is the mother of four children and is an educator by
profession. She is currently the Director of Development at the
Academy of Saint Elizabeth, Convent Station NJ. Mrs. Flynn graduated
from Marymount College in Tarrytown, NY with a Bachelor of Arts degree
in Political Science and has done graduate studies at the University
of Rochester. An anti-terrorism/airport security and safety advocate,
Mrs. Flynn's activism was triggered by the murder of her oldest child
on Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland on December 21, 1988.
Mrs. Flynn is committed to the fight for justice and truth in the
bombing of Flight 103 and is dedicated to: increased safety/security
for all airline passengers and the obliteration of terrorism
throughout the world.
Louis J. Freeh served as an FBI Special Agent from 1975 to 1981 in the
New York City Field Office and at FBI Headquarters in Washington, DC.
In 1981, he joined the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern
District of New York as an Assistant U.S. Attorney. Subsequently, he
held positions there as Chief of the Organized Crime Unit, Deputy U.S.
Attorney, and Associate U.S. Attorney. In July 1991, former President
George Bush appointed Director Freeh a United States District Court
Judge for the Southern District of New York. He was serving in this
position when nominated to be Director of the FBI by President Bill
Clinton on July 20, 1993. He was confirmed by the U.S. Senate on
August 6, 1993, and was sworn in as Director of the FBI on September
1, 1993.
James Evan Hall has been Chairman of the National Transportation
Safety Board since June 1994. In June 1996, he was presented an
Aviation Laurel by Aviation Week and Space Technology magazine for his
efforts to resolve what happened to USAir flight 427. Mr. Hall chaired
the Board's hearings into the flight 427 disaster, the 1994 runway
collision in St. Louis, and air safety in Alaska.
Brian Jenkins is Deputy Chairman of Kroll Associates, an international
investigative and consulting firm, and one of the world's leading
authorities on international terrorism. From 1972 to 1989 he directed
RAND Corporation's research on political violence and international
crime and was also Chairman of RAND's Political Science Department for
four years.
As Under Secretary of the Treasury for Enforcement, Raymond W. Kelly
supervises Treasury's law enforcement bureaus, including the Customs
Service, the Secret Service, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and
Firearms, the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, FinCEN, and the
IRS Criminal Investigation Division. Mr. Kelly has over 30 years of
law enforcement experience, including serving as New York City Police
Commissioner during the World Trade Center bombing investigation. As
the Director of the International Police Monitors of the Multinational
Force, Mr. Kelly helped establish an interim security force in Haiti.
Additionally, Mr. Kelly is the United States' representative on the
Executive Committee of Interpol.
General John Michael Loh, USAF (retired) concluded his thirty five
year Air Force career in 1995 as the first commander of Air Combat
Command, the command responsible for providing all U.S. based Air
Force combat and support forces for action worldwide. He has extensive
experience leading large organizations toward greater levels of
quality and productivity improvement and his organization was cited by
the Vice- President as the model for reinventing government and
understanding the principles of quality improvement. General Loh is a
consultant for defense companies and specializes in strategic
requirements planning, business development, proposal preparation and
evaluation, program management support, quality improvement, and
congressional relations. General Loh is a graduate of the U.S. Air
Force Academy and holds a Master's degree in aero engineering from
M.I.T.
Bradford Parkinson of Stanford University, the original Department of
Defense (DoD) Global Positioning System (GPS) Program Director, has a
broad background in management, modern control, astrodynamics,
simulation, avionics, and navigation. He manages the NASA/Stanford
Relativity Mission, Gravity Probe B (GPB) and also directs Stanford
research on innovative uses of GPS. He is Chair of the NASA Advisory
Council and a member of the Presidential Commission on Air Safety and
Security. Dr. Parkinson is a member of the AIAA, AAS, IEEE, ION, and
Royal Institute of Navigation (RION). He has received many
distinguished awards and authored more than 80 papers on Guidance,
Navigation and Control. He is a fellow of the AIAA and the RION, and a
member of the National Academy of Engineering.
Federico Peña is currently the 12th US Secretary of Transportation.
From 1983-91, Secretary Peña was Mayor of Denver leading an urban and
economic renaissance. He also has served as a Colorado legislator and
a civil rights lawyer. Mr. Peña did his undergraduate work at the
University of Texas where he also received his law degree. Born in
Laredo, Texas, in 1947, Secretary Peña is the third of six children of
a cotton broker. He and his wife, world-class marathon runner and
attorney Ellen Hart-Peña, live with their two children in Northern
Virginia.
Franklin D. Raines is the Director of the Office of Management and
Budget
Patrick A. Shea is President of Patrick A. Shea, PC. He currently
practices law in Utah and Washington, DC and is an Adjunct Professor
of Political Science at the University of Utah. He serves as President
of the Franklin Quest Championship and is a member of the Board of
Advisors, Huntsman Center for Global Competition and Innovation,
Wharton School of Business, University of Pennsylvania. He served as
Counsel to the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee and as
Assistant Staff Director to the U.S. Senate Intelligence Committee. He
is past President of the Stanford Alumni Association. He is past Chair
of the Utah Democratic Party and Chair of the Credential Committee to
the Democratic National Committee.
Laura D'Andrea Tyson is the former Chair of the Council of Economic
Advisors.
Carl W. Vogt - Senior partner, Fulbright & Jaworski, L.L.P.; Chairman
of the National Transportation Safety Board (1992-94); member, FAA
Aviation System Capacity Advisory Committee (1990) and Ninety Day
Safety Review Committee (1996); Governor, Flight Safety Foundation;
Fellow, Royal Aeronautical Society; former Marine, carrier based, jet
fighter pilot; licensed commercial pilot.
Born in Baltimore, Maryland, George H. Williams, a retired real estate
broker, served in the Korean War from 1951-52 as a Scout-sniper in the
US Marine Corps. Mr. Williams' son and only child, George Watterson
Williams was killed on Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland on
Dec 21, 1988. Since that day, Mr. Williams has dedicated his life to
the cause of justice for all victims of terrorism. He has served on
the Board and is now President of The Victims of Pan Am 103, Inc., a
proactive group instrumental in the passage of the Airline Safety and
Security Improvement Act of 1990 and several subsequent anti-terrorist
legislative initiatives.
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Appendix D
Executive Order 13015 of August 22, 1996
White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security
By the authority vested in me as President by the constitution and the
laws of the United States, including
section 301 of title 3, United States Code, it is hereby ordered as
follows:
Section 1. Establishment. There is established the White House
Commission on Aviation Safety and Security
(the "Commission"). The Commission shall be of not more than 25
members, to be appointed by the President
from the public and private sectors, each of whom shall have
experience or expertise in some aspect of safety
or security. The Vice President shall serve as Chair of the
Commission.
Section 2. Functions.
(a) The Commission shall advise the President on matters involving
aviation safety and security, including air
traffic control.
(b) The Commission shall develop and recommend to the President a
strategy designed to improve aviation
safety and security, both domestically and internationally.
(c) The Chair may, from time to time, invite experts to submit
information to the Commission; hold hearings on
relevant issues; and form committees and teams to assist the
Commission in accomplishing its objectives and
duties, which may include individuals other than members of the
Commission.
Sec. 3. Administration.
(a) The heads of executive departments and agencies shall, to the
extent permitted by law, provide the
Commission such information with respect to aviation safety and
security as the Commission requires to fulfill
its functions.
(b) The Commission shall be supported, both administratively and
financially, by the Department of
Transportation and such other sources (including other Federal
agencies) as may lawfully contribute to
Commission activities.
Sec. 4. General.
(a) I have determined that the Commission shall be established in
compliance with the Federal Advisory
Committee Act, as amended (5.U.S.C. App.2). Notwithstanding any other
Executive Order, the functions of the
President under the Federal Advisory Committee Act, as amended, shall
be performed by the Secretary of
Transportation in accordance with the guidelines and procedures
established by the Administrator of General
Services, except that of reporting to the Congress.
(b) The Commission shall exist for a period of 6 months from the date
of this order, unless extended by the
President.
William Jefferson Clinton The White House August 22, 1996
(FR Doc. 96-21996)
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Appendix E
List of White House Commission Hearings with Agendas
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Appendix F
White House Commission Staff
Gerald B. Kauvar, Staff Director
Audrey Adams, U.S. Customs Service
Nancy Best, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
William R. Boesch, Consultant (ret. American Airlines)
Patricia R. Burgess, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms
James Chapek, Sandia Laboratories
Mary Ellen Cole, Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Counterterrorism
Center
Lt Col Rick Dugan, HQ USAF/LGMY
Gerald L. Epstein
U.S. Department of Energy/White House Office of Science and Technology
Policy
Doug Farbrother, National Performance Review
Carolina E. Forrester, Federal Aviation Administration
D. Lynn Gordon, U.S. Customs Service
Eric Johnson, U.S. Department of Transportation
Lisa A. Jung, Office of the Secretary of Defense
Charles E. Keegan, Federal Aviation Administration
John F. Hennigan Jr., Federal Aviation Administration
Charles H. Huettner, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Doug Lambert, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms
John F. Lenihan, U.S. Customs Service
Howard W. Luker II, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Laurie Lyons, National Performance Review
Major Diana R. Malone, United States Air Force
Jeff Morales, National Performance Review
Stephen G. Moran, Office of Science Technology and Policy
Major Steve Moss, USAF; National Performance Review
Max D. Payne, Federal Aviation Administration
Richard K. Pemberton, U. S. Department of Transportation
Michael Perron, U.S. Customs Service
Christina Quash, Office of the Secretary of Defense
Armen A. Sahagian, Federal Aviation Administration
Daniel P. Salvano, Federal Aviation Administration
Herb Schlickenmaier, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Dr. Russell D. Shaver, The MITRE Corporation
Lisa T. Simmons, U.S. Department of Transportation
Bob Stone, National Performance Review
H. Lee Tucker, Federal Aviation Administration
Greg Woods, National Performance Review
Edwin L. Worthington, Federal Bureau of Investigation
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Appendix G
We wish to extend our thanks to the following people who provided
special assistance to the Commission
Mr. James J. Aldo, Vivid Technologies
Ms. Evie Burch, Department of Transportation, Directorate of Security
Ms. Carol Carmody, U.S. Representative to the International Civil
Aviation Organization
Ms. Linda Hess, Department of Commerce
Mr. John Klinkenberg, Northwest Airlines
Mr. James Lytle, GSA, Office of the Chief Information Officer
Mr. Douglas L. McMakin, Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratories
Ms. Kathy Montgomery, General Services Administration Security Office
Mr. James F. Padgett, Federal Aviation Administration
Lt Col Jim Pennock, Office of Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for
Acquisition
Mr. Paul Pillar, Central Intelligence Agency Counterterrorism Center
RADM. Paul J. Pluta, Office of Intelligence & Security, Dept. of
Transportation
Mr. Allan Rivlin, Department of Health and Human Services
Mr. Ron Smith, Georgia Tech Research, Inc.
Ms. Karen Wehner, Senior Advisor to the Under Secretary of the
Treasury
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Appendix H
Special Acknowledgments from the Commissioners
Each of the Commissioners wish to express our thanks to President
Clinton for giving us the opportunity to serve on the White House
Commission on Aviation Safety and Security and thereby to contribute
to these important issues.
We wish to especially thank Vice President Gore, our chairman, for his
strong personal leadership and in-depth involvement with us throughout
our effort.
Finally, we wish to salute Dr Gerry Kauvar and all of the members of
the Commission staff. They worked tirelessly and made extraordinary
efforts to ensure that every issue was fully researched and that
individual Commissioners had every opportunity to personally talk to
many experts with opinions on all sides of the issues before us. We
are grateful to the staff members for their dedication and wish to
acknowledge that the success of the Commissioners efforts rest in a
large part on the quality and effectiveness of this superb staff.
Lego
Yes, yours as well. You've even made a point in previous posts that we are
more likely to see the civilian a/c than the civilian is to see us. Would
you like us to see an a/c on our nose for a mile and be unable to maneuver
our jet to get out of the way. The difference between 250 and 300 knots
when we are going to an area can make a big deal in maneuverability with a
small sacrifice in reaction time.
> I am required by federal regulation to see-and-avoid your high-speed
> aircraft; I am not relieved of that responsibility when you exceed FAR
> 91.117(a)'s 250 knot maximum speed below 10,000'. That must change.
So you just want to be relieved of the responsibility of see and avoid
putting it all on us. It's always going to be everyone's responsibility to
see and avoid. It would be irresponsible to totally absolve one party from
requiring one party to look outside. This sounds completely like a
legalistic approach, and not one to enhance safety. I know you have
heartburn about the AIB finding reports of who was at fault... Not counting
that incident, taking the responsibility of one party to see and avoid isn't
going to help safety in my mind.
> Today, it's 300 knots. By how much will future military aircraft need
> to exceed the 250 knot speed limit the FAA saw fit to mandate below
> 10,000'? Will future fighters "need" to fly at a minimum 500 knots?
> Where is the limit? Currently there is no _quantified_ maximum speed
> limit due to FAR 91.117(d)'s exemption.
You can speculate all you want, but right now neither the JSF nor the F-22
require more than 300 knots (AFAIK) . By just looking at previous a/c
(F-15, 16, 4), I haven't heard of an A/C flights manual that requires more
than 300. Seems to be the sweet spot for military aircraft to have adequate
maneuvering. If someone has contrary please let me know that I'm talking
out of my butt.
> If you need to go fast, do it in Restricted Airspace; high-speed
> compromises safety in civil and joint-use airspace.
> In this entire thread, I have not said that the FAA should limit
> anyone to 250 knots. That would be contrary to the flight manual. It
> is the FAA who chose that limit, not me.
> >Skies are safer with us at 300.
> Safer for whom? Not safer for me.
See above.
> Military fighter aircraft pilots have little physical harm to fear
> from colliding with a typical GA aircraft due to the weight and speed
> differential as well as a much more robust airframe and ejection seat
> to provide them with a safe landing. The GA pilot is like a
> fluttering moth poised hovering above the rush hour traffic in such a
> situation. His chances of survival in a collision are slight at best.
Really... that is completely wrong. I can't believe you would think that.
You think because we have an ejection seat that I don't fear hitting a
civilian. If my cockpit hits the other airframe, it's going to kill me just
like the civilian a/c, If you are going to say I have a higher chance of
survival... I'd buy that, but come on "little physical harm to fear". I
feel the threat of hitting a civil aircraft is one of the most high threats
I'd face in peactime or combat... and it is briefed as such before every
ride.
> >Would you rather have us see the other aircraft 2 seconds earlier but be
> >unable to turn our plane?
>
> I'd prefer to have enough time to see you, and get out of your way as
> the FAA requires me to do in FAR 91.113.
So you say that you do want to limit us to 250 vs 300... yet you repeatedly
make comments like this throughout this entire thread. If this isn't
implying that you want us at 250, then tell me what you mean.
> High-speed military flights put me in a catch-22 situation. The study
> below shows that I have limited time resources to comply with FAR
> 91.113's see-and-avoid requirement:
>
> http://www.aopa.org/asf/publications/sa15.pdf
>
> An experimental scan training course conducted with military
> pilots found the average time needed to conduct the operations
> essential to flying the airplane was 20 seconds - 17 seconds for
> the outside scan, and three seconds for the panel scan. Without
> the benefit of intensive military training, most pilots will need
> more time than this. But as demonstrated by the military pilots,
> considerably more time should be spent on the external scan than
> the panel scan.
I couldn't find this quote in there... am I just missing it?
> Either high-speed aircraft should be excluded from the civil traffic
> mix, or the FAA should relieve me of the physical impossibility
> imposed by FAR 91.113 that makes me responsible to see-and-avoid you,
> and place that responsibility _solely_ on you who create the safety
> hazard.
You can't exclude us from civil traffic. We have to fly to / from our
areas. The AF requires us to fly to the max extent possible IFR, meaning if
we can fly IFR we do. Would making the FAR's relieve you from the
responsibility make the skies safer?
> >Your analogy about rescue vehicles just isn't accurate.
>
> Would you care to explain the _facts_ you used to reach that
> conclusion?
Yes...Fact... you state rescue vehicles don't exceed speed limits... Cars
are different from planes. A car going above the speed limit has less time
to react, less maneuverable, bigger turn radius, less of a chance to avoid a
collision. A viper going 300 vs 250 has less time to react .yes , but is
much more maneuverable, in some cases a significantly smaller turn radius,
more of a chance to avoid a collision.
> >Second:
> >You are mistaken about the military taking over airspace.
>
> You are wrong. You only have to compare a chart from a decade or two
> ago to a current one to see the fallacy in your statement. Please try
> to be factual.
First of all, don't have a chart of the entire US comparing the ENTIRE U.S.
in front of me so I'm talking about airspace around the bases I've been
stationed at, so I'm not going to admit that there is more now then then
unless I saw some more evidence.
With that being said, unless you look at (1) Altitudes of the airspace, and
(2) Hours of operation, and (3) Letters of agreement between ATC and the
controling military base you don't get nearly the entire picture. There are
MOAs still on charts that have very little traffic. They are normally
around closed bases. There are MOA's that have their altitude changed from
the past. There are MOA's that ATC has the right to take away whenever
there is weather or traffic requirements. That's the Facts.
> >In fact the exact opposite is occurring.
>
> So, I'm not the only one who feels that the military control too much
> airspace?
Give me a break... that's not what I said at all.
> >I've worked at scheduling and range ops at more than
> >one base now. Airspace a single base used to own is now shared between
> >multiple bases and even services.
> So, better utilization of military airspace is a practical
> possibility. How is that bad?
That's not the point I was making at all... what I was saying is that there
is airspace that isn't used much and others that are used extensively. The
airspace still on charts but not in service is generally around closed bases
or where bases have re-aligned and no longer require the same type airspace
(going from ftrs to transports...etc.) That airspace is generally too far
to fly to to get adequate training.
As far as better utilization... That's one way of saying it, less training
ability for us is the other. When we share airspace between services there
is generally less time. A four ship may only get 30 minutes vs 40 min or an
hour, also no slip capability now. This can result in getting less
engagements and having us burn down excessive gas that so we can land
instead of training. It also results in units flying much greater distances
to get to airspace. Again less training. I'm not arguing there doesn't
need to be a compromise, just saying it's not all good.
> Have they considered airspace outside the US, or over wilderness
> areas? There is VERY LITTLE airspace within the conterminous US that
> is devoid of civil air traffic regardless of the lack of underlying
> population density.
We could make an entire thread on this. Most bases near the coast use
airspace over the ocean outside the ADIZ. Outside of that requires host
nation coordination and is controlled by them and paid for by us. Without
going into too much detail the simple fact that we need a base near it and
our overseas bases are so limited now, and we have to abide by their rules
doesn't prevent too many new opportunities for airspace.
Widerness airspace generates all other kinds of problems such as endangered
species, plants etc. We currently do have areas over wilderness areas, but
we can't go below certain altitudes due to endangering the wildlide.
> >The airspace around major cities has grown to proportions that MOA's
> >around them have to disappear, or in many cases, the bases as well
> >as the MOA's themselves are closed due to the traffic.
>
> You say that like it's a bad thing®. It sounds reasonable to me.
Not a bad thing... a fact of life. Unfortunately the places where the
cities are growing is where the better airspace as far as weather is.
> >With the airspace we have around our base, we use it non-stop from
> >sunrise to well after sunset almost non-stop. For many
> >missions there simply isn't the airspace to even train in.
> If you are attempting to get me to believe that the military has an
> adequate number of aircraft to fill the skies of all the US airspace
> they control 24 hours a day 7 days a week, I'm not buying it. The
> military aviation fleet is many times smaller than the civil aviation
> fleet.
Not what I said at all. My point was that while there may be airspace on
charts, it doesn't tell the entire picture. I pointed out that there is
airspace on charts that is rarely used. In my experience, the airspace
around the bases is being used more and more, because due to all I said
above it is the A/S that is truely available to us. Do we control it 24/7.
Of course not. But in many cases we do have airplanes that don't have
airspace to do optimal training, and there is airspace we own that is used
almost nonstop from sunrise until night flying is complete around 10-12 pm.
As far as us being smaller than the civil fleet doesn't have anything to do
with it. It hasto do entirely with training. Our A/F is the best in the
world primarily due to training. While we are very technologically
advanced, the technology is a double edged sword... It is much more
effective but requires training to be able to use effectively. As far as
this requiring airspace, it's hard to relay what we need to train to someone
unfamiliar. Looking only at Air to Air. A 2 ship intercept ride would
require about a 30-40 mile by 15 mile. With both Ftr / Bdt going 500 knots
this dispropotionally large piece of a/s as you call it goes from 35 mile
seperation to the merge in about 1 min 30 seconds. That's a 2 ship, for
about 40 minutes minimum. 4 Ship / 8 ship require even more airspace.
These missions can't go on at the same time. A/G and more complex
integrated sorties require even more.
> It is the low-level airspace which concerns me; how many military
> areas have a floor above 10,000'? Most begin at or near the surface.
I don't know how to qualify this. I wouldn't use the word Most. Of about
10 MOA's I can think of off the top of my nugget. 2 start at the surface.
One at 3k, Many at 7-8K and a couple at 10-12. So I wouldn't say most
begin at or near the surface, but definitly some do.
> >it doesn't include times that the airspace is active such as many
> >MOA's that may be scheduled for only a few hours a day or even less.
>
> Above you were arguing that military airspace was active nearly all
> the time. It seems that you are contradicting yourself. Which is
> it?
No... I'm pointing out that not all airspace is used. While some is used
quite extensively.
> >It is a 2-D drawing / representation that is inaccurate in context.
>
> I'm happy to see you don't contest the fact that the military control
> over 50% of the _2-dimentional_ conterminous US airspace. I have not
> seen the document to which you refer, so I cannot reliably comment on
> how the airspace is represented.
Yes... I am contesting it. The 50% drawing isn't airspace the military
"controls". A better term would be has available, as dictated by letters of
agreement between the military and ATC. And it is totally deceiving. It
includes everything from Warning / Restricted areas to MOA's, VR, IR routes,
Air refueling tracks. And like I said, it doesn't include time, altitude
etc. For just one example there are Air Refueling tracks on that chart that
are almost 80 nm long, and 20 nm wide. They are from 18-23k, and they may
be used as little as a few times a year for a couple hours at a time. MTR's
and MOA's are mutual use... Do we own a substantial portion of A/S. I
completely agree that we have a great deal of airspace. But if you are so
concerned about safety, then don't fly through a MOA that is active if you
can avoid it, and if you can't contact the controlling agency to let them
know you are entering an your intentions.
> If it is as you assert, I find it shocking that such a small segment
> of the flying community "owns" such a disproportionately large amount
> of airspace.
See above. When you take into account the amount of airspace for even a
simple 2 ship ride the word "ownes" and disproportionate can be argued.
> Can you please explain to me how I'm supposed to comply with FAR
> 91.113's see-and-avoid requirement when the military aircraft are
> invisible in the night sky? It's unreasonable and absurd.
Have you read the Military proposals. I have, or at least the draft of what
was being submitted... I have not read the final proposal or what was
submitted, but ideas being submitted was to effectively NOTAM out the
airspace to civil aircraft. At any time a civil aircraft penetrated (so to
speak) the airspace, lighting was to be required to be turned back on.
Again, it was an early draft of a letter at a single base outlining options,
so It may not even have anything to do with what was submitted and if there
is nothing in there like that in the proposal, then I would completely agree
it would be unreasonable and absurd.
You have to remember that the AOPA is a lobbying group for civil aircraft.
They are going to fight tooth and nail not to give the military anymore
airspace as it hurts their cause, and this includes giving up anything at
night. Not saying this is bad, just saying that what they say as fact in
their articles is completely slanted to their side of the argument to rally
people to their cause... just as in other political arguments.
> >There aren't enough warning / restricted
> >areas of sufficient size for the bases to train the way they need to.
>
> In the face of failing to refute that the military "owns" over 50% of
> the conterminous US airspace, you'll have to provide some data which
> supports that statement before it becomes believable.
>
> >Many bases have adequate warning areas of sufficient size to train,
> >but others do not, and are looking for some way to train the pilots
> >at night.
> Perhaps, those training activities should be confined to those bases
> with the requisite airspace. Is that unreasonable?
If you only want an Airforce that only half of us can fly at night then yes.
Over the past years it's been bad enough Ops tempo for the CAF that limiting
the training of several bases is unreasonable.
> >Why is this an issue vs 10 years ago. Because we are going towards an
> >AF that fights at night. We are moving to an AF where all fighters will
> >be using NVGs and other advances at night. And it is a BIG difference
> >training with lights out than having the ability to look outside and
> >find other members of your flight. It's like trying to train for
> >instrument flight without having to wear a hood or train in the
weather....
>
> Those are good reasons to train at night. But, they are not good
> reasons to fly high-speed invisible military aircraft in airspace
> occupied by civil aircraft.
>
> >It isn't irresponsible to make requests to the FAA like you continually
say,
>
> I don't recall having said that filing a request is irresponsible.
> Unless you are able to provide a citation of the Message-ID number
> which contains such a statement by me, I will disregard it.
It's not that you said that the filing is irresponsible, but you do use that
word in addition to "military intelligence" and use capital letters
completely inferring that what they are asking for is rediculous.
Corky Scott
<legof16@(remove)earthlink.net> wrote:
>> I am required by federal regulation to see-and-avoid your high-speed
>> aircraft; I am not relieved of that responsibility when you exceed FAR
>> 91.117(a)'s 250 knot maximum speed below 10,000'. That must change.
>
>So you just want to be relieved of the responsibility of see and avoid
>putting it all on us. It's always going to be everyone's responsibility to
>see and avoid. It would be irresponsible to totally absolve one party from
>requiring one party to look outside. This sounds completely like a
>legalistic approach, and not one to enhance safety. I know you have
>heartburn about the AIB finding reports of who was at fault... Not counting
>that incident, taking the responsibility of one party to see and avoid isn't
>going to help safety in my mind.
>
Is it known that the F-16 hit the Cessna from the front? In
otherwords, did the pilot of the 172 have the incoming F-16 within a
physically possible scan?
With that kind of speed differential, the 172 pilot could be looking
out front and be in danger from everything approaching him from the
sides and behind. He would be unable to see anything overtaking him
from fully 200 to 230 degrees of the visual sweep.
Corky Scott
Larry Dighera
>> Whose safety? Your safety, not mine.
>
>Yes, yours as well. You've even made a point in previous posts that we are
>more likely to see the civilian a/c than the civilian is to see us.
I'm not aware of having said that either. At 300 knots I believe that
there is precious little time for either pilot to see-and-avoid.
>Would you like us to see an a/c on our nose for a mile and be unable
>to maneuver our jet to get out of the way.
Nope. I'd prefer that aircraft in excess of 250 knots were restricted
above 10,000' as the FAA originally saw fit to mandate.
>The difference between 250 and 300 knots when we are going to an area
>can make a big deal in maneuverability with a small sacrifice in reaction time.
I'll have to accept your word for that based on your first-hand
experience.
>> I am required by federal regulation to see-and-avoid your high-speed
>> aircraft; I am not relieved of that responsibility when you exceed FAR
>> 91.117(a)'s 250 knot maximum speed below 10,000'. That must change.
>
>So you just want to be relieved of the responsibility of see and avoid
>putting it all on us. It's always going to be everyone's responsibility to
>see and avoid. It would be irresponsible to totally absolve one party from
>requiring one party to look outside. This sounds completely like a
>legalistic approach, and not one to enhance safety. I know you have
>heartburn about the AIB finding reports of who was at fault...
You are is correct. I believe it is unreasonable to fault the 100
knot aircraft for failing to maneuver quickly enough out of the path
of the high-speed aircraft invoking the exemption to the 250 knot
maximum speed limit below 10,000' of FAR 91.117(a). I find it unjust
and offensive. I'm sure the surviving wife and child of the late
Cessna pilot, Jacques Olivier, share my view. Do you think it is
just?
>Not counting that incident, taking the responsibility of one party to
>see and avoid isn't going to help safety in my mind.
I agree. Each pilot has a duty to see-and-avoid others, but it is the
finding of fault/cause that is unjust. If the second set of eyes sees
you, but is unable to do anything about it, how has that second set of
eyes help enhance safety?
>> Today, it's 300 knots. By how much will future military aircraft need
>> to exceed the 250 knot speed limit the FAA saw fit to mandate below
>> 10,000'? Will future fighters "need" to fly at a minimum 500 knots?
>> Where is the limit? Currently there is no _quantified_ maximum speed
>> limit due to FAR 91.117(d)'s exemption.
>
>You can speculate all you want, but right now neither the JSF nor the F-22
>require more than 300 knots (AFAIK) . By just looking at previous a/c
>(F-15, 16, 4), I haven't heard of an A/C flights manual that requires more
>than 300. Seems to be the sweet spot for military aircraft to have adequate
>maneuvering. If someone has contrary please let me know that I'm talking
>out of my butt.
While current aircraft may not have to fly in excess of 300 knots,
there is no current regulation which prohibits faster speeds was my
point. That is frightening.
Isn't NASA doing scram-jet research. What is the target minimum safe
speed of that aircraft?
[...[
>> Military fighter aircraft pilots have little physical harm to fear
>> from colliding with a typical GA aircraft due to the weight and speed
>> differential as well as a much more robust airframe and ejection seat
>> to provide them with a safe landing. The GA pilot is like a
>> fluttering moth poised hovering above the rush hour traffic in such a
>> situation. His chances of survival in a collision are slight at best.
>
>Really... that is completely wrong. I can't believe you would think that.
Why can't you believe it? In both military/civil MACs I cited the
military pilots escaped unscathed.
>You think because we have an ejection seat that I don't fear hitting a
>civilian. If my cockpit hits the other airframe, it's going to kill me just
>like the civilian a/c,
The F-16 windscreen was broken in the Florida "mishap," but the
military pilot was unharmed. The Cessna was _disintegrated_! At
least, that's how eye witnesses described the damage to the Cessna.
The F-16 was still maneuverable enough to find a suitable spot to
ditch. That's a very large difference in sustained damage.
>If you are going to say I have a higher chance of
>survival... I'd buy that, but come on "little physical harm to fear".
Okay. That's reasonable. Pilots of military aircraft have a higher
chance of survival in a MAC with a typical GA aircraft , and little
chance of meaningful reprimand.
>I feel the threat of hitting a civil aircraft is one of the most high
>threats I'd face in peactime or combat... and it is briefed as such
>before every ride.
That is telling. I'm not the only one who feels there is a
substantial threat of a military/civil MAC.
>> >Would you rather have us see the other aircraft 2 seconds earlier but be
>> >unable to turn our plane?
>>
>> I'd prefer to have enough time to see you, and get out of your way as
>> the FAA requires me to do in FAR 91.113.
>
>So you say that you do [not] want to limit us to 250 vs 300... yet you repeatedly
>make comments like this throughout this entire thread. If this isn't
>implying that you want us at 250, then tell me what you mean.
If you need to fly fast, do it in airspace which is not populated with
civil aircraft. That is what I mean.
>> High-speed military flights put me in a catch-22 situation. The study
>> below shows that I have limited time resources to comply with FAR
>> 91.113's see-and-avoid requirement:
>>
>> http://www.aopa.org/asf/publications/sa15.pdf
>>
>> An experimental scan training course conducted with military
>> pilots found the average time needed to conduct the operations
>> essential to flying the airplane was 20 seconds - 17 seconds for
>> the outside scan, and three seconds for the panel scan. Without
>> the benefit of intensive military training, most pilots will need
>> more time than this. But as demonstrated by the military pilots,
>> considerably more time should be spent on the external scan than
>> the panel scan.
>
>I couldn't find this quote in there... am I just missing it?
See page 7 of that document under Cockpit Resource Management.
>> Either high-speed aircraft should be excluded from the civil traffic
>> mix, or the FAA should relieve me of the physical impossibility
>> imposed by FAR 91.113 that makes me responsible to see-and-avoid you,
>> and place that responsibility _solely_ on you who create the safety
>> hazard.
>
>You can't exclude us from civil traffic. We have to fly to / from our
>areas. The AF requires us to fly to the max extent possible IFR, meaning if
>we can fly IFR we do. Would making the FAR's relieve you from the
>responsibility make the skies safer?
It would probably have little effect on air safety. But, it would be
more reasonable and just. If I'm unable to maneuver out of your way
in time to avoid a MAC anyway, having the responsibility to do so
doesn't really enhance air safety, it just provides my family reason
to doubt my competence, and the military an opportunity to point the
finger of guilt elsewhere.
>> >Your analogy about rescue vehicles just isn't accurate.
>>
>> Would you care to explain the _facts_ you used to reach that
>> conclusion?
>
>Yes...Fact... you state rescue vehicles don't exceed speed limits... Cars
>are different from planes. A car going above the speed limit has less time
>to react,
Perhaps.
>less maneuverable,
An automobile doesn't need miles in which to turn. That seems to be
_more_ maneuverable to me.
>bigger turn radius,
Bigger than what? Not an F-16.
>less of a chance to avoid a collision.
Perhaps. Automobiles are limited to 2 dimensions after all.
> A viper going 300 vs 250 has less time to react .yes , but is
>much more maneuverable, in some cases a significantly smaller turn radius,
>more of a chance to avoid a collision.
Are you attempting to get me to believe that an F-16 at 300 knots can
turn inside an automobile traveling over 65 mph? Intuition tells me
differently.
>> >Second:
>> >You are mistaken about the military taking over airspace.
>>
>> You are wrong. You only have to compare a chart from a decade or two
>> ago to a current one to see the fallacy in your statement. Please try
>> to be factual.
>
>First of all, [I] don't have a chart of the entire US comparing the ENTIRE U.S.
>in front of me so I'm talking about airspace around the bases I've been
>stationed at, so I'm not going to admit that there is more now then then
>unless I saw some more evidence.
I'm holding a 1976 Los Angeles sectional chart in from of me. There
are _NO_ MTRs depicted on it anywhere; there isn't even a symbol for
MTRs in the legend. The current chart is covered with MTRs. Many
MTRs (VR 1262, VR 249, IR 203, IR 1257, VR 1265, VR 288, VR 1299 1211,
...) pass very near cities depicted in yellow on the chart. Others
(VR 1265, VR 289, VR 1225, ...) are routed DIRECTLY over airports.
On the 1976 chart, the combined Restricted areas, MOAs, Warning areas,
etc. only cover about 20%. On the current chart, those SUA have grown
to about 60%. There is NO DOUBT that military airspace has grown.
Where will this expansion end?
>With that being said, unless you look at (1) Altitudes of the airspace, and
>(2) Hours of operation, and (3) Letters of agreement between ATC and the
>controling military base you don't get nearly the entire picture.
True, but it is evident to any reasonable person that the amount of
military airspace has grown over the years.
>There are MOAs still on charts that have very little traffic. They are
>normally around closed bases. There are MOA's that have their altitude
>changed from the past. There are MOA's that ATC has the right to take
>away whenever there is weather or traffic requirements. That's the Facts.
See above.
>> >In fact the exact opposite is occurring.
>>
>> So, I'm not the only one who feels that the military control too much
>> airspace?
>
>Give me a break... that's not what I said at all.
Your statement implies that military airspace is shrinking. That lead
me to infer that the military found it reasonable to surrender
airspace to civil use. If they didn't have too much airspace, why did
they give it up?
>> >I've worked at scheduling and range ops at more than
>> >one base now. Airspace a single base used to own is now shared between
>> >multiple bases and even services.
>
>> So, better utilization of military airspace is a practical
>> possibility. How is that bad?
>
>That's not the point I was making at all...
True. But, your statement supports that inference.
>what I was saying is that there
>is airspace that isn't used much and others that are used extensively. The
>airspace still on charts but not in service is generally around closed bases
>or where bases have re-aligned and no longer require the same type airspace
>(going from ftrs to transports...etc.) That airspace is generally too far
>to fly to to get adequate training.
>
>As far as better utilization... That's one way of saying it, less training
>ability for us is the other. When we share airspace between services there
>is generally less time. A four ship may only get 30 minutes vs 40 min or an
>hour, also no slip capability now. This can result in getting less
>engagements and having us burn down excessive gas that so we can land
>instead of training. It also results in units flying much greater distances
>to get to airspace. Again less training. I'm not arguing there doesn't
>need to be a compromise, just saying it's not all good.
I would suggest that the whole of military airspace needs review and
reform. Cities have grown where there were none when the airspace was
originally charted. What was once "uninhabited" is now populated. To
quote one poet/singer, "The times they are a changn'." Who is
responsible for updating the EIRs and airspace boundries/routes?
>> Have they considered airspace outside the US, or over wilderness
>> areas? There is VERY LITTLE airspace within the conterminous US that
>> is devoid of civil air traffic regardless of the lack of underlying
>> population density.
>
>We could make an entire thread on this. Most bases near the coast use
>airspace over the ocean outside the ADIZ.
There are currently many Restricted areas, MOAs, and MTRs along the
coast north of Santa Barbara. Camp Pendleton, located between Los
Angeles and San Diego, has Restricted areas and MOAs which straddle
the coastline. Just the facts....
>Outside of that requires host
>nation coordination and is controlled by them and paid for by us. Without
>going into too much detail the simple fact that we need a base near it and
>our overseas bases are so limited now, and we have to abide by their rules
>doesn't prevent [present(?)] too many new opportunities for airspace.
Yep, the foreign governments don't want military aviation training in
their countries either. But, I'll bet there are some (non-europiean)
who would welcome it. Just a thought...
>Widerness airspace generates all other kinds of problems such as endangered
>species, plants etc. We currently do have areas over wilderness areas, but
>we can't go below certain altitudes due to endangering the wildlide.
Hey, we're going to be oil drilling in the wilderness soon (thanks to
baby Bush and his puppeteers), perhaps they'll let you fly lower too.
:-)
>> >The airspace around major cities has grown to proportions that MOA's
>> >around them have to disappear, or in many cases, the bases as well
>> >as the MOA's themselves are closed due to the traffic.
>>
>> You say that like it's a bad thing®. It sounds reasonable to me.
>
>Not a bad thing... a fact of life. Unfortunately the places where the
>cities are growing is where the better airspace as far as weather is.
Were you aware of this:
"Nearly 6 billion people now inhabit the Earth--almost twice as
many as in 1960. At some point in the course of the next century
[21st], the world's population could double again. But we don't
have anything like a century to prevent that next doubling; we
probably have less than a decade." -- Jennifer D. Mitchell; World
Watch 1998.
More people mean more restrictions. Finite resources become
overcrowded. It's the future (unless we figure out what's causing it.
:-)).
>> >With the airspace we have around our base, we use it non-stop from
>> >sunrise to well after sunset almost non-stop. For many
>> >missions there simply isn't the airspace to even train in.
>
>> If you are attempting to get me to believe that the military has an
>> adequate number of aircraft to fill the skies of all the US airspace
>> they control 24 hours a day 7 days a week, I'm not buying it. The
>> military aviation fleet is many times smaller than the civil aviation
>> fleet.
>
>Not what I said at all.
It sounded like that was what you might be implying. It would be
interesting to know what the _true_ utilization factor for military
airspace is within the conterminous US.
>My point was that while there may be airspace on
>charts, it doesn't tell the entire picture. I pointed out that there is
>airspace on charts that is rarely used. In my experience, the airspace
>around the bases is being used more and more, because due to all I said
>above it is the A/S that is truely available to us. Do we control it 24/7.
>Of course not. But in many cases we do have airplanes that don't have
>airspace to do optimal training, and there is airspace we own that is used
>almost nonstop from sunrise until night flying is complete around 10-12 pm.
It sounds like civil aviation should surrender all the airspace within
the conterminous US for military operations. I wonder if that would
be enough. :-)
>As far as us being smaller than the civil fleet doesn't have anything to do
>with it. It hasto do entirely with training.
It would seem reasonable to me to have the amount of airspace
available proportionate to the size of the fleet. But, I'm just
trying to be reasonable.
>Our A/F is the best in the
>world primarily due to training. While we are very technologically
>advanced, the technology is a double edged sword... It is much more
>effective but requires training to be able to use effectively. As far as
>this requiring airspace, it's hard to relay what we need to train to someone
>unfamiliar.
So, as technology advances, the military is going to require even more
airspace in which to train.
I've got an idea, on alternate days/weeks the military and civil
flights will have exclusive use of ALL the airspace within the
conterminous US. It's a solution, but probably not acceptable to
either group. :-) Perhaps, some clever genius can envision a
workable solution to the dilemma.
>Looking only at Air to Air. A 2 ship intercept ride would
>require about a 30-40 mile by 15 mile. With both Ftr / Bdt going 500 knots
>this dispropotionally large piece of a/s as you call it goes from 35 mile
>seperation to the merge in about 1 min 30 seconds. That's a 2 ship, for
>about 40 minutes minimum. 4 Ship / 8 ship require even more airspace.
>These missions can't go on at the same time. A/G and more complex
>integrated sorties require even more.
Perhaps the US isn't large enough for military training operations.
Certainly it is going to become more congested as time passes.
Where's the limit?
>> It is the low-level airspace which concerns me; how many military
>> areas have a floor above 10,000'? Most begin at or near the surface.
>
>I don't know how to qualify this. I wouldn't use the word Most. Of about
>10 MOA's I can think of off the top of my nugget. 2 start at the surface.
>One at 3k, Many at 7-8K and a couple at 10-12. So I wouldn't say most
>begin at or near the surface, but definitly some do.
So, you do agree that most of the 10 MOAs have floors below 10,000'.
>> >it doesn't include times that the airspace is active such as many
>> >MOA's that may be scheduled for only a few hours a day or even less.
>>
>> Above you were arguing that military airspace was active nearly all
>> the time. It seems that you are contradicting yourself. Which is
>> it?
>
>No... I'm pointing out that not all airspace is used. While some is used
>quite extensively.
You know, I think the airspace situation has gotten a little too
complex for mortals to rapidly interpret. If all the requisite
information were contained in a real-time database accessible by
on-board computers it might make the system workable. I wonder if the
FAA's Capstone project can be made ready in time...
CAPSTONE PROJECT MOVES INTO SECOND PHASE
The FAA is moving forward on the second phase of the Capstone
project in Alaska that will generate real-time three-dimensional
terrain information on primary flight displays. ..
>> >It is a 2-D drawing / representation that is inaccurate in context.
>>
>> I'm happy to see you don't contest the fact that the military control
>> over 50% of the _2-dimentional_ conterminous US airspace. I have not
>> seen the document to which you refer, so I cannot reliably comment on
>> how the airspace is represented.
>
>Yes... I am contesting it. The 50% drawing isn't airspace the military
>"controls". A better term would be has available, as dictated by letters of
>agreement between the military and ATC.
Thank you for correcting me and making that clear. I should have
said, the charted military airspace exceeds 50% of the _2-dimentional_
conterminous US airspace.
>And it is totally deceiving. It
>includes everything from Warning / Restricted areas to MOA's, VR, IR routes,
>Air refueling tracks. And like I said, it doesn't include time, altitude
>etc. For just one example there are Air Refueling tracks on that chart that
>are almost 80 nm long, and 20 nm wide. They are from 18-23k, and they may
>be used as little as a few times a year for a couple hours at a time. MTR's
>and MOA's are mutual use... Do we own a substantial portion of A/S. I
>completely agree that we have a great deal of airspace.
Thank you.
>But if you are so
>concerned about safety, then don't fly through a MOA that is active if you
>can avoid it, and if you can't contact the controlling agency to let them
>know you are entering an your intentions.
I don't. I'm either in contact with the controlling authority of hot
MOAs, or I stay outside. But, I'm not sure that is enough to assure
my safety. It seems that the military routinely flies at high-speed
outside the airspace they control, as illustrated by the two
military/civil MOCs referenced in this thread.
>> If it is as you assert, I find it shocking that such a small segment
>> of the flying community "owns" such a disproportionately large amount
>> of airspace.
>
>See above. When you take into account the amount of airspace for even a
>simple 2 ship ride the word "ownes" and disproportionate can be argued.
Exclusive of MTR operations, in your opinion what percentage of
military flight training could be moved above 10,000'?
If the problem is not solvable in 2 dimensions, perhaps the 3rd (or
4th) will provide a solution. Would it be too inconvenient to train
while the civil aircraft are asleep? Just a thought... It might
provide a truer simulation of combat conditions, and enhance civil
safety.
>> Can you please explain to me how I'm supposed to comply with FAR
>> 91.113's see-and-avoid requirement when the military aircraft are
>> invisible in the night sky? It's unreasonable and absurd.
>
>Have you read the Military proposals. I have, or at least the draft of what
>was being submitted... I have not read the final proposal or what was
>submitted, but ideas being submitted was to effectively NOTAM out the
>airspace to civil aircraft.
So, while the military has their lights off, civil aircraft would no
longer be able to use the airspace within the MOA? Hmmmm....
>At any time a civil aircraft penetrated (so to
>speak) the airspace, lighting was to be required to be turned back on.
>Again, it was an early draft of a letter at a single base outlining options,
>so It may not even have anything to do with what was submitted and if there
>is nothing in there like that in the proposal, then I would completely agree
>it would be unreasonable and absurd.
Here's the latest:
AOPA COMMENTS ON MILITARY TRAINING
The FAA this week granted an Air Force petition to conduct
night flight training operations at or above 18,000 feet msl
in aircraft without lighted position lights. This activity
will occur in Class A airspace where ATC can ensure an equivalent
level of safety for nonparticipating aircraft.
But that is only one of the military's lights-out petitions.
Many AOPA members are familiar with a related Air Force petition,
still under review by the FAA, that requests similar relief for
lights-out operations in some MOA airspace. Currently lights-out
training is conducted within restricted areas. In November 2001,
AOPA submitted comments to the pending proposal, and is working
with Department of Defense officials in the Pentagon to ensure
safety for nonparticipating GA operators. "AOPA's goal is to make
sure radar coverage is provided in all MOAs where the activity
occurs and that training is terminated anytime a nonparticipating
aircraft enters the MOA," said AOPA Senior Vice President
Andrew V. Cebula. "AOPA also recommends a combination of VHF
communications, toll-free hotlines, and Web sites be used to
give pilots scheduled and 'real-time' activity. These measures
are necessary to ensure an equivalent measure of safety,"
he added.
>You have to remember that the AOPA is a lobbying group for civil aircraft.
Yes. Unfortunately, the AOPA does not enjoy the preferential status
of that conferred on a federal department.
>They are going to fight tooth and nail not to give the military anymore
>airspace as it hurts their cause, and this includes giving up anything at
>night. Not saying this is bad, just saying that what they say as fact in
>their articles is completely slanted to their side of the argument to rally
>people to their cause... just as in other political arguments.
Perhaps...
>> >There aren't enough warning / restricted
>> >areas of sufficient size for the bases to train the way they need to.
>>
>> In the face of failing to refute that the military "owns" over 50% of
>> the conterminous US airspace, you'll have to provide some data which
>> supports that statement before it becomes believable.
>>
>> >Many bases have adequate warning areas of sufficient size to train,
>> >but others do not, and are looking for some way to train the pilots
>> >at night.
>
>> Perhaps, those training activities should be confined to those bases
>> with the requisite airspace. Is that unreasonable?
>
>If you only want an Airforce that only half of us can fly at night then yes.
>Over the past years it's been bad enough Ops tempo for the CAF that limiting
>the training of several bases is unreasonable.
Wasn't it wonderful when the entire civil/GA fleet was grounded after
9-11? I'll bet, that if the military tried real hard, they could get
that established permanently. Hey, we need protection, right. :-)
>> >Why is this an issue vs 10 years ago. Because we are going towards an
>> >AF that fights at night. We are moving to an AF where all fighters will
>> >be using NVGs and other advances at night. And it is a BIG difference
>> >training with lights out than having the ability to look outside and
>> >find other members of your flight. It's like trying to train for
>> >instrument flight without having to wear a hood or train in the
>weather....
>>
>> Those are good reasons to train at night. But, they are not good
>> reasons to fly high-speed invisible military aircraft in airspace
>> occupied by civil aircraft.
>>
>> >It isn't irresponsible to make requests to the FAA like you continually
>say,
>>
>> I don't recall having said that filing a request is irresponsible.
>> Unless you are able to provide a citation of the Message-ID number
>> which contains such a statement by me, I will disregard it.
>
>It's not that you said that the filing is irresponsible, but you do use that
>word in addition to "military intelligence" and use capital letters
>completely inferring that what they are asking for is rediculous.
I may be making implications, but it is you who does the inferring.
Thanks for making my point.
>> >we are simply looking for different ways to train the pilots in an
>> >Air Force that is continually evolving.
>>
>> Thank you for the information you have provided. I think it points
>> out the fact that the conterminous US airspace is becoming ever
>> increasingly more congested by both military and civil flights.
I appreciate this opportunity to learn more about the issues we have
discussed. I can see that it's not an easy issue to resolve. But,
reform seems closer with each MAC.
Steven P. McNicoll
>
> Nope. I'd prefer that aircraft in excess of 250 knots were restricted
> above 10,000' as the FAA originally saw fit to mandate.
>
What are you going to do, consolidate all airbases and MTRs in Colorado?
Lego
> above 10,000' as the FAA originally saw fit to mandate.
If I had the option I'd fly above 10k as much as possible. Safer and better
fuel economy. Unfortunately our departures and arrivals are under Class B
airspace, and flying IFR keeps us below 10k for the most part.
> You are is correct. I believe it is unreasonable to fault the 100
> knot aircraft for failing to maneuver quickly enough out of the path
> of the high-speed aircraft invoking the exemption to the 250 knot
> maximum speed limit below 10,000' of FAR 91.117(a). I find it unjust
> and offensive. I'm sure the surviving wife and child of the late
> Cessna pilot, Jacques Olivier, share my view. Do you think it is
> just?
I actually won't comment on a specific incident. Too many people take what
you say out of context and take what someone in the AF says as the view of
the AF. Sorry.
> >> Military fighter aircraft pilots have little physical harm to fear
> >> from colliding with a typical GA aircraft due to the weight and speed
> >> differential as well as a much more robust airframe and ejection seat
> >> to provide them with a safe landing. The GA pilot is like a
> >> fluttering moth poised hovering above the rush hour traffic in such a
> >> situation. His chances of survival in a collision are slight at best.
> >
> >Really... that is completely wrong. I can't believe you would think that.
>
> Why can't you believe it? In both military/civil MACs I cited the
> military pilots escaped unscathed.
Because saying "little physical harm is rediculous". I can also cite
examples where military / bird MAC's and the military pilot didn't come out
unscathed but was killed. (Incedently so was the bird.) Saying that we
have little to fear even in your examples where loss of control and ejection
is absurd.
> If you need to fly fast, do it in airspace which is not populated with
> civil aircraft. That is what I mean.
>
> >> High-speed military flights put me in a catch-22 situation. The study
> >> below shows that I have limited time resources to comply with FAR
> >> 91.113's see-and-avoid requirement:
> >>
> >> http://www.aopa.org/asf/publications/sa15.pdf
> >>
> >> An experimental scan training course conducted with military
> >> pilots found the average time needed to conduct the operations
> >> essential to flying the airplane was 20 seconds - 17 seconds for
> >> the outside scan, and three seconds for the panel scan. Without
> >> the benefit of intensive military training, most pilots will need
> >> more time than this. But as demonstrated by the military pilots,
> >> considerably more time should be spent on the external scan than
> >> the panel scan.
> >
> >I couldn't find this quote in there... am I just missing it?
>
> See page 7 of that document under Cockpit Resource Management.
Found it. Good article, but points out a lot of stuff repeated in this
thread about midair collisions
Things like
16-18 per year.
Most occur on weekends, 5 miles from an airport. 49% occur below 500', with
pilots less than 100 hours. 1/4 have a flight instructor aboard, 45% in the
traffic pattern, 66% in approach to landings.
Not throwing spears here but it doesn't seem to be the military that is the
primary problem here.
Every mishap is tragic. But having us go 250 vs 300 would not have changed
the outcomes of either of these mishaps.
> >> >Your analogy about rescue vehicles just isn't accurate.
> >>
> >> Would you care to explain the _facts_ you used to reach that
> >> conclusion?
> >
> >Yes...Fact... you state rescue vehicles don't exceed speed limits... Cars
> >are different from planes. A car going above the speed limit has less
time
> >to react,
>
> Perhaps.
>
> >less maneuverable,
>
> An automobile doesn't need miles in which to turn. That seems to be
> _more_ maneuverable to me.
>
> >bigger turn radius,
>
> Bigger than what? Not an F-16.
>
> >less of a chance to avoid a collision.
>
> Perhaps. Automobiles are limited to 2 dimensions after all.
>
> > A viper going 300 vs 250 has less time to react .yes , but is
> >much more maneuverable, in some cases a significantly smaller turn
radius,
> >more of a chance to avoid a collision.
>
> Are you attempting to get me to believe that an F-16 at 300 knots can
> turn inside an automobile traveling over 65 mph? Intuition tells me
> differently.
If you truely think that's what I was saying reread the post. I was stating
that your ANALOGY is flawed. Let me be more simple. Car Faster = bigger
turn radius = less maneuverable = more chance of collision. Viper Faster
(300 vs 250) = smaller turn radius = more maneuverable = less chance of
collision. I'm not comparing a car turn radius to a viper but a faster car
to a slower car and a faster viper to a slower viper.
> >> >Second:
> >> >You are mistaken about the military taking over airspace.
> >>
> >> You are wrong. You only have to compare a chart from a decade or two
> >> ago to a current one to see the fallacy in your statement. Please try
> >> to be factual.
> >
> >First of all, [I] don't have a chart of the entire US comparing the
ENTIRE U.S.
> >in front of me so I'm talking about airspace around the bases I've been
> >stationed at, so I'm not going to admit that there is more now then then
> >unless I saw some more evidence.
>
> I'm holding a 1976 Los Angeles sectional chart in from of me. There
> are _NO_ MTRs depicted on it anywhere; there isn't even a symbol for
> MTRs in the legend. The current chart is covered with MTRs. Many
> MTRs (VR 1262, VR 249, IR 203, IR 1257, VR 1265, VR 288, VR 1299 1211,
> ...) pass very near cities depicted in yellow on the chart. Others
> (VR 1265, VR 289, VR 1225, ...) are routed DIRECTLY over airports.
So do you think that there were absolutely no MTR's back then given they
weren't even in the legend or is it possible they weren't charted on
sectionals back then.
> On the 1976 chart, the combined Restricted areas, MOAs, Warning areas,
> etc. only cover about 20%. On the current chart, those SUA have grown
> to about 60%. There is NO DOUBT that military airspace has grown.
> Where will this expansion end?
I won't argue one specific sectional of the country. But you still need to
look at (1) Altitudes, (2) Hours of Operation. (3) Letters of agreement.
Also realize that many times restricted airspace isn't for the Airforce /
Navy. I've seen them for weather monitoring stations, Scientific research,
Artilerary firing for the army (o.k. still military, but it's not the
militrary taking airspace), environmental concerns, etc.
>
> I would suggest that the whole of military airspace needs review and
> reform. Cities have grown where there were none when the airspace was
> originally charted. What was once "uninhabited" is now populated. To
> quote one poet/singer, "The times they are a changn'." Who is
> responsible for updating the EIRs and airspace boundries/routes?
>
> >> Have they considered airspace outside the US, or over wilderness
> >> areas? There is VERY LITTLE airspace within the conterminous US that
> >> is devoid of civil air traffic regardless of the lack of underlying
> >> population density.
> >
> >We could make an entire thread on this. Most bases near the coast use
> >airspace over the ocean outside the ADIZ.
>
> There are currently many Restricted areas, MOAs, and MTRs along the
> coast north of Santa Barbara. Camp Pendleton, located between Los
> Angeles and San Diego, has Restricted areas and MOAs which straddle
> the coastline. Just the facts....
> Yep, the foreign governments don't want military aviation training in
> their countries either. But, I'll bet there are some (non-europiean)
> who would welcome it. Just a thought...
> It sounds like civil aviation should surrender all the airspace within
> the conterminous US for military operations. I wonder if that would
> be enough. :-)
Not saying anyting like that. Just pointing out why we do need / use
airspace.
> >As far as us being smaller than the civil fleet doesn't have anything to
do
> >with it. It hasto do entirely with training.
>
> It would seem reasonable to me to have the amount of airspace
> available proportionate to the size of the fleet. But, I'm just
> trying to be reasonable.
>
> >Our A/F is the best in the
> >world primarily due to training. While we are very technologically
> >advanced, the technology is a double edged sword... It is much more
> >effective but requires training to be able to use effectively. As far as
> >this requiring airspace, it's hard to relay what we need to train to
someone
> >unfamiliar.
> So, as technology advances, the military is going to require even more
> airspace in which to train.
In many cases yes. Hence the petitions to fly light out ops at night.
> I've got an idea, on alternate days/weeks the military and civil
> flights will have exclusive use of ALL the airspace within the
> conterminous US. It's a solution, but probably not acceptable to
> either group. :-) Perhaps, some clever genius can envision a
> workable solution to the dilemma.
I'd love having every other day off.
> Perhaps the US isn't large enough for military training operations.
> Certainly it is going to become more congested as time passes.
> Where's the limit?
Don't know... not in my pay grade to make those decisions, definitely going
to be more and more of a problem.
> So, you do agree that most of the 10 MOAs have floors below 10,000'.
Like I said... wouldn't say most. Definitly a lot though. Around the UPT
bases I knew they all started at 10k and there were a lot of them.
> Exclusive of MTR operations, in your opinion what percentage of
> military flight training could be moved above 10,000'?
It's difficult to say. Every time you move the floor up there is some
reduction in training. In some missions it might only be a mild reduction,
while others it can prevent you from even accomplishing the mission. It
depends not only on the mission, but what objectives you are trying to
achieve and what you are training for. If I had to pull a number out of my
butt I'd say about half.. Most bases don't have all their airspace go to the
surface so they try to fit the mission to the best airspace they have.
> So, while the military has their lights off, civil aircraft would no
> longer be able to use the airspace within the MOA? Hmmmm....
Yep... Or at least portions of it limited by altitudes, but yes a section of
the MOA would effectively be notamed to be like a restricted zone.
> >You have to remember that the AOPA is a lobbying group for civil
aircraft.
>
> Yes. Unfortunately, the AOPA does not enjoy the preferential status
> of that conferred on a federal department.
And the military doesn't enjoy the preferential status of the liberal media.
Steven P. McNicoll
"Lego" <legof16@(remove)earthlink.net> wrote in message
news:IgM68.1141$3E5.1...@newsread2.prod.itd.earthlink.net...
>
> Every mishap is tragic. But having us go 250 vs 300 would not have
changed
> the outcomes of either of these mishaps.
>
I believe the preliminary report of the Sarasota mishap indicated the F-16s
were operating in excess of 400 KIAS at the time of impact.
Lego
"Steven P. McNicoll" <ronca...@writeme.com> wrote in message
news:u5npf5p...@corp.supernews.com...
Agreed. Has nothing to do with the waiver to fly 300 vs 250. Completely
different issue.
Lego