Mutation (variation) is not required for evolution
Tianran Chen
for evolution. copying, mutation, and selection are always listed as the
three required condition. however, i really doubt this idea. i think the
mutation do not HAVE to take part in evolution process. and i think i am
able to show that.
1Z
> mutation do not HAVE to take part in evolution process. and i think i am
> able to show that.
We are waiting.
neepy
Go on then... show us. It's going to be difficult though, since
"evolution" describes the long-term changes in a population that
result from the accumulation of short-term inheritable changes
("mutations") in individuals.
Immortalist
"Tianran Chen" <li...@chentianran.net> wrote in message
news:87b4d040feced60f...@news.teranews.com...
Compression - Cellular Automata to Developmental Biology
Here I am testing the theory that data compression and it's isolation within
the system it guides to completion through replication, duplication and
iteration, is really like the directions we might give to someone lost by
describing landmarks and turns along the way without having to create an
entire map. This agument goes from something about algorithms, through
simple rules leading to vast complexity and how we do this normally when
communicating, and then how cellular automata or particular computer
programs may have found the secret to such highly complex developmental
processes guided by a few rules; how the 100 trillion cells in body are
guided in assembly by a few [30,000] genes giving directions on a far from
straight route.
This post is really about the section on "The John Muir Trail" where
dividing replicators can find any route by reading "directions about
landmarks and turns" contained within the information package replicating
and growing in populations with each of the replicants containing all the
directions for any stage, turn, or landmarking along the way. These
directions move out in all directions with the expanding spread or growth of
the population of these virus like algorithms.
[A dictionary definition of algorithm is:
A method of computation by pre-arranged steps
designed to solve a specific type of problem.]
---------------------------------
What Is an Algorithm?
An algorithm is nothing more than a finite list of instructions on how to
perform a task. It is analogous to a cooking recipe a chef might use for
preparing a food.
There are five basic classifications of algorithms:
(Number 3) Rule Based
A rule based system consists of a set of rules that are applied to an input
to generate an output. A rule consists of a condition and an action. If the
input (or part of it) satisfies the condition, the action is performed. The
output of the algorithm is the product of all the actions that resulted.
http://www.tjhsst.edu/~pkirlin/techlab/paper/node2.html
-----------------------------------
What is a computer algorithm?
To make a computer do anything, you have to write a computer program. To
write a computer program, you have to tell the computer, step by step,
exactly what you want it to do. The computer then "executes" the program,
following each step mechanically, to accomplish the end goal.
When you are telling the computer what to do, you also get to choose how
it's going to do it. That's where computer algorithms come in. The algorithm
is the basic technique used to get the job done. Let's follow an example to
help get an understanding of the algorithm concept.
Let's say that you have a friend arriving at the airport, and your friend
needs to get from the airport to your house. Here are four different
algorithms that you might give your friend for getting to your home:
- The taxi algorithm:
Go to the taxi stand.
Get in a taxi.
Give the driver my address.
- The call-me algorithm:
When your plane arrives, call my cell phone.
Meet me outside baggage claim.
- The rent-a-car algorithm:
Take the shuttle to the rental car place.
Rent a car.
Follow the directions to get to my house.
- The bus algorithm:
Outside baggage claim, catch bus number 70.
Transfer to bus 14 on Main Street.
Get off on Elm street.
Walk two blocks north to my house.
All four of these algorithms accomplish exactly the same goal, but each
algorithm does it in completely different way. Each algorithm also has a
different cost and a different travel time. Taking a taxi, for example, is
probably the fastest way, but also the most expensive. Taking the bus is
definitely less expensive, but a whole lot slower. You choose the algorithm
based on the circumstances.
http://www.howstuffworks.com/question717.htm
---------------------------------
What the Genetic Algorithm is useful for
The Genetic Algorithm can solve problems that do not have a
precisely-defined solving method, or if they do, when following the exact
solving method would take far too much time. There are many such problems;
actually, all still-open, interesting problems are like that.
Such problems are often characterised by multiple and complex, sometimes
even contradictory constraints, that must be all satisfied at the same time.
Examples are crew and team planning, delivery itineraries, finding the most
beneficial locations for stores or warehouses, building statistical models,
etc.
How the Genetic Algorithm works
The Genetic Algorithm works by creating many random "solutions" to the
problem at hand. Being random, these starting "solutions" are not very good:
schedules overlap and itineraries do not traverse every necessary location.
This "population" of many solutions will then be subjected to an imitation
of the evolution of species.
http://www.pmsi.fr/gainita.htm
-------------------------------------
The most famous icon of chaos, the Mandelbrot set, is a dramatic instance of
a fractal basin boundary. It results from a rule not noticeably more
complicated that that for extracting the digits from (pie*)-namely, "Square
the number and add a constant"-though the way the rule is used is slightly
different...
- Compressing an Structure With Infinite Detail Into an Simple Rule,
Unfolding
There are two ways to tell a computer how to draw a Mandelbrot set-or...
1. One is to copy what fax machines do: Scan the picture along a series of
parallel lines, sending out a signal whenever you encounter the set and no
signal when you don't. This produces a huge quantity of electronic bleeps or
nonbleeps, and the computer receiving this message can reconstitute the set,
dot by dot.
2. Alternatively, you can just send the rule that generates the Mandelbrot
set; it's short and simple, a few hundred bleeps at most. If you measure
complexity by the number of bleeps-the traditional measure of
information-then a description of the picture, the thing you actually see
when you look at a Mandelbrot set in a book, requires huge amounts of
information.
The picture is complicated. The rule that prescribes the set's shape,
however, requires very few bleeps; it is simple. We have compressed the huge
quantity of data required to describe the Mandelbrot set into the much
smaller quantity of data needed to define the rule that generates it.
- Giving Directions to Location with Entire Map or a Few Landmarks & Turning
Rules
It's a bit like trying to give directions to a friend who is coming to
visit. You can fax her the entire map of Philadelphia; or you can send a
much shorter message: "First road on the left after Burger King and second
on the right; park under the third streetlight and it's the house with the
stupid gnome in the front garden." But for the Mandelbrot set, there's a
twist: Given the second message alone (the rule) she can reconstruct the
entire map of the town (the Mandelbrot set). There is no equally simple rule
to reconstruct Philadelphia.
- 2 Ways to Interpret Complex Effects, Initial Rules vs All Rules, Patterns
Inbetween
As we briefly mentioned in chapter 1, there are two ways to interpret this.
The first is that the Mandelbrot set isn't really complicated at all. It's
just as simple as the rule that generates it. It only looks complicated
because you don't know what the rule is. One cliche describes it as "the
most complicated object in the whole of mathematics." That's not really
true, but you can see why the cliche gained currency. (A map of Philadelphia
is actually far more complicated than the Mandelbrot set, because the roads
and their names are arbitrary and "random" data cannot be compressed. Note
how this all depends upon a key distinction between truly random data and
the pseudo-random data produced by deterministic chaos.)
The second interpretation is that simple rules can produce complex results.
It may look like a map of Philadelphia but it might be the consequence of
simple rules. Indeed, according to the Theory of Everything, it is. So are
Philadelphia, Burger King, and the stupid gnome in the front garden. To
transmit the map of Philadelphia by telephone, send the equations of the
Theory of Everything and the initial conditions for the universe. After that
it's purely a matter of calculation.
In interpretation one, complexity is conserved between cause and effect. The
snag is that now you can't work out the complexity of anything without
considering all the things that might be causing it. You don't know how
complex a map of Philadelphia is. In interpretation two, complexity is easy
to calculate, but it's not conserved. It may be easier to send the map by
phone than you think-but it won't be easy to find out how, because you have
to contemplate all possible rules that might generate it.
The business of science is to infer the nature of rules from observations of
their consequences. Either interpretation carries a very similar message for
science. Interpretation one: Your observations may look complicated, but
perhaps they're really simple. You just don't know the simple rule that lies
behind them. Interpretation two: Just because what you observe is
complicated, that doesn't mean it has to arise from a complicated set of
rules. There is little real difference in the two interpretations, as they
affect science, because science doesn't have the luxury of knowing the rules
in advance. Both encourage us to seek simplicity within apparently complex
data.
The Collapse of Chaos: Discovering Simplicity in a Complex World
Jack Cohen and Ian Stewart / 1994
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0140178740/
--------------------------------
- Iterating Fittest, Tracker & The John Muir Trail, Evolution Writes the
Program
Once the reproduction process was complete, the new population was again
exposed to the environment. The program was run once more, and each new
string was graded for its ability to perform the task. The process was
repeated.
It seemed an almost absurdly simple recipe for optimization: take a string
of random numbers and treat them as computer programs. Grade them according
to how well they do at executing the work of a custom-designed computer
program, and then reward them to the extent of their excellence by allowing
them to reproduce to that degree. Then take the revised population, pair the
strings, and have each marriage partner swap a part of itself with its mate.
Change a few bits for mutation, and do it again. One would intuitively
expect this process to take a very long time to match the results of a
computer program specially written for a task-in fact, it might be difficult
to envision something that good ever resulting from this elementary process.
As Holland and Goldberg once wrote, "genetic algorithms . . . have often
been attacked on the grounds that natural evolution is simply too slow to
accomplish anything useful in an artificial learning system; three billion
years is longer than most people care to wait for a solution to a problem."
But computer muscle telescoped millions of generations worth of evolution
into a lunch hour, and the GA turned out to be a stunningly powerful tool.
Indeed, it seemed to deliver on Holland's original perceptions of the
benefits of evolution: "perpetual novelty" and "something out of nothing."
Take as an example the artificial ants constructed by David Jefferson
working with a group of UCLA researchers. The immediate goal of Jefferson
and his colleagues was to use evolution to develop trail-following behavior
in an insect made of information. The task they selected, called Tracker,
was following a specific trail of eighty-nine squares on a
thirty-two-by-thirty-two-square toroidal grid. (To say a grid was toroidal
was to treat it as a map representing a doughnut: the squares on the right
edge effectively touched the corresponding squares on the left edge.
Similarly, the top squares were assumed to neighbor the bottom squares.
Nothing could walk off the grid.) Inspired by actual pheromone trails used
by ants to aid each other in foraging, the trail twisted and turned, and
became increasingly difficult to follow as it progressed. It suffered gaps
at several points, and, by the last segment of the trail, there were more
missing squares than actual "scented" ones.
It would be a mild challenge for any computer hacker to write a computer
program for an artificial creature to follow this trail, which the UCLA team
nicknamed "The John Muir Trail." But Jefferson and his colleagues hoped to
get something from nothing-they were counting on evolution to write the
program.
- Each Ant a Seperate Computer, Create Goal, After Each Generation Select
Top 10%
The ants actually were computer programs, strings of 450 binary bits. These
bits were interpreted by the computer as finite state machines. Each
internal state, along with the conditions in the environment, provided the
conditions for behavior in the next move. The ant was assumed to have
sensory input only in the cell directly in front of the single cell that the
ant occupied. After determining whether that cell was on or off and looking
at its own state (which provided the rules), it executed one of several
possible responses: move forward one step, turn right without moving, turn
left without moving, or do nothing. The rules also determined which state it
should assume in the next time step.
Fig 05 - 02.jpg
The first generation of ants was given totally random genotypes- they were
strings of ones and zeros selected by chance. A population of 64 K, or
65,536, of these "random" ants was created. (The number was chosen because
it was a multiple of the 16 K processing elements on the large computer at
UCLA.) In this first generation, it was common for ants not to move at all,
or to move haphazardly, or to continue stubbornly in a single direction.
This behavior resulted in a low score, as determined by points assigned to
ants who completed designated portions of the trail. But some ants, in the
two hundred time steps in which the program was run, managed to complete
four or more squares and got higher scores. After each ant was scored, the
top 10% was selected for reproduction in the next generation. (This was a
streamlined variation of standard genetic algorithm practice, which selects
"winners" in direct proportion to their scores.) They were copied so that
their numbers equaled a full population and paired off. Then crossover was
performed, and a small number of bits were inverted to produce mutations.
Within twenty generations, evolution had already made a remarkable
difference. The average ant in the population could properly make the turns,
twists, and jumps of almost thirty squares. Even more impressive than that
average was the most frequent score attained by ants in that
population-these ants could navigate the trail to sixty squares! At seventy
generations, the population was loaded with smart ants. The average
individual was completing around fifty-six squares. But even this impressive
number was held down by being averaged with some utter failures caused by
the inevitable glitches of mutation. A significant percentage of the
population had managed to complete the trail successfully, all eighty-nine
squares. In fact, this was the most frequent score in generation 70. There
it was-a population of ants who were born to traverse the John Muir Trail,
fulfilling their birthright perfectly.
- Raising Average Fittness & Champ 100, Compiling Environment In Organisms
Structure
It was important to emphasize that the genetic algorithm was not only
pulling the fitness of the population up to the level of the "best" ant in
the initial population but also creating super-ants who used novel
combinations of genes to attack cleverly the pitfalls of the John Muir
Trail. Of thousands of ants in the many seed populations attempted, in which
the genotypes were randomly assigned, the very best of these was able to
follow the trail for an amazing fifty-eight steps, until it got flummoxed by
a double gap in the trail and ran out of time. That ant was sort of an idiot
savant, a chance occurrence, the equivalent of getting dealt four aces in a
poker hand. But the GA delivered something better than the best ant that one
could have ever expected by chance. It sought the equivalent of four aces
for ten consecutive hands-something with a degree of organization that would
never be associated with a chance distribution. Just like the products of
natural evolution.
A good example was an organism dubbed "Champ 100," one of the well-evolved
artificial ants who successfully traversed the John Muir Trail. The product
of one hundred generations of evolution, it inherited behavior that made it
act as though it knew the trail, and its confidence in negotiating the trail
was a strong indication that a force more powerful than chance shaped its
character. At times its responses seemed as though a virtuoso programmer had
been at work. Evolutionary biologists were familiar with this effect and
referred to it as Paley's Watch, in honor of Rev. William Paley (1743-1805),
who complained that, like a well-crafted watch, the products of natural
selection were too intricate to have come about without the hand of a
presumably supernatural outside designer.
That watchmaker's deft hand seemed responsible for some of Champ 100's
approaches to the John Muir Trail. Champ 100 had a bias toward right-hand
turns, a feature encouraged by the trails's use of three right-hand turns
before the first left-hand turn. This enabled it to zip through the early
undulations of the trail. Later, when the trail wiggled right and left,
Champ 100 set itself into a more cautious state. Champ 100 also had in its
arsenal of trail-following tricks an ingenious combination of three states
that enabled it to handle several different challenges: making a left turn
when a corner was missing, negotiating a two-square gap, and making a
right-hand jump similar to a chess knight and then picking up the trail from
there. Champ 100 also devised a devilishly efficient series of state changes
to negotiate the final "stepping stone" segment of the trail. "Such
efficient logic," wrote the UCLA team, "suggests that evolution has had the
effect of 'compiling' knowledge of this environment into the structure of
the organism."
Champ 100 was an impressive creature, even more so because no one programmed
it. Its code was arrived at by the incremental wisdom of natural selection.
It was only a single example of a myriad selection of novel responses
yielded by the genetic algorithm. Each one of them seemed to counteract the
common-sense intuition that something cannot come out of nothing.
- Crossover vs Mutation, Distance Between Traits Before Splitting, True
Behavior
Interestingly, the UCLA team found that their startling results-ants that
perfectly navigated the trail after only a few generations-were attainable
by a mutation rate of only one bit in a hundred. Decreasing that rate
tenfold, to one in a thousand, made very little difference. Those who used
GAs often observed similar effects-mutations introduced into the population
seemed to have only a minor effect in improving adaptation. This phenomenon
was strikingly, if unintentionally, illustrated by Larry Yaeger in his Poly
World model. Several weeks into his labor he discovered, while debugging
some code, that he had forgotten to implement mutation. Yet PolyWorld, using
crossover alone, had already evolved lifelike behaviors from initially
random genotypes and had even yielded speciation among the organisms.
This corresponded to the suspicion held by Holland when he first began work
on the genetic algorithm. Rather heretically at the time, he wondered
whether the degree to which mutation drove evolution had not been
exaggerated. Holland suspected that recombination, or crossover, was
consistently underrated by biologists. "Even the wet biologists, those who
are really dealing with those systems, put much, much more emphasis on
mutation than recombination," says Holland. "Mutation is a process that's
anywhere between eight to ten magnitudes less frequent than crossover. [It
is estimated that approximately one in about ten million genes experience
mutation in the reproductive process.] Any physicist worth his salt is going
to see it as funny that the one, overwhelmingly important process is so much
rarer than the one regarded as unimportant."
The problem as Holland saw it was not that biologists were blind, but they
were not using the right tools to see. "Very few field studies can show
these effects," he says. Still, the accepted doctrine in biology that
mutation was much more important than recombination might have daunted any
mathematician or computer scientist trying to construct a model of
evolution. Previous efforts, in fact, had bowed to that standard and omitted
crossover. "It's a little surprising to me that someone astute wouldn't
have, at least from sheer curiosity, thrown in crossover. Because the
programming cost is small. But they didn't." Holland did, because of his
faith that running a biological model that supposedly tapped the same force
active in natural evolution might provide hitherto-unavailable insights into
the process.
In Holland's scheme, crossover allowed important building blocks of high
fitness to carry over into the next generation. These formed a base from
which the genome could more successfully evolve. As these blocks met up with
other successful building blocks, the result could be new and innovative
approaches to the difficulties offered by the environment. Thus the process
delivered what Holland thought of as evolution's greatest virtue: its
perpetual novelty in its approaches to maintaining fitness.
"The broad idea that these local patterns might form something larger was
already in cellular automata," he says. "But then there was the question of
how you could get something that was more like a child's building
block-something that could be used in a lot of contexts that fit together in
different ways. This precise notion came when I looked at Fisher's theorem,
which applies only to individual genes. I wanted to extend it to apply to
groups of genes."
This desire led to what Holland calls his "schema theorem," which explained
how building blocks exerted their powers in GAS and indicated what might be
a basis for populationwide retention of genes in natural biology. The word
"schema" referred to a similarity template used to describe all strings that
contained a given building block or set of building blocks. Each string that
contained those building blocks was an example of that schema, no matter
which numbers were located elsewhere on the string.
For example, if a building block was the two-digit subset of a string, 10,
and it was located in the first two places in a string of eight digits, all
possible strings beginning with the numerals 10 would be said to be examples
of that schema. It would be notationally represented as 10******, with an
asterisk signifying "don't care."
Thus examples of strings that fit the schema 10****** would include
10111111
10000000
10010010
but not
01111111
11000000.
A schema need not be contiguous. For instance, one could postulate schemata
such as 1******0, or 10**0000, or even *******1. The point was that a schema
represented every possible example that matched up exactly, once the don't
cares were ignored.
The key principle of the schema theorem was proximity. In building blocks,
proximity was power. Consider a GA "organism" with a particular combination
of "genes" that generated a relatively fit phenotype. During the process of
crossover, the metaphorical chromosome was split at a given point, and some
of the alleles were replaced by the alleles of the mate. The likelihood that
any combination of alleles were lost was directly proportional to the
distance between them on the chromosome. If in a given schema one digit
began a string and the other completed it, it was virtually certain that the
combination of these two genes would not be transmitted to the offspring;
the point at which the string was split was bound to come between their
respective loci. But if the points of the schema were direct neighbors, the
opposite was true; in the vast majority of reproductions the combination
would persist in the next generation. Only in the case where the crossover
split occurred on that single point between the two would they be separated.
The more compact the building block the less likely it was to be split.
Thus if a particular building block of a very few neighboring bits generated
a behavior that increased fitness, it was highly likely that the particular
behavior could proliferate in the gene pool. For instance, if in the Tracker
simulation of ants, a four-gene building block caused the ant to proceed
forward as long as it detected a part of the trail in front of it (given
that the trail began with a straightaway, this was an optimal response),
that block was very likely to persist. First of all, it greatly enhanced
fitness so it was likely to be found in the winning percentage of organisms
chosen to reproduce in the next generation. Second, when crossover was
imposed on the population, the compact size of the block enabled it in most
of the matings to persist in the next generation, where it again enhanced
fitness and made the organisms in which it appeared strong candidates for
subsequent reproductions. It was reasonable to assume that after several
generations such a powerful building block would find itself proliferating
in the gene pool. Any offspring that violated the integrity of the block, by
splitting it or mutating one of its genes, did not have that desirable
behavior and was less fit and not selected for reproduction.
If in any given experiment there were a number of combinations that led to a
piece of clever behavior, the schema theorem explained how, once those
combinations were first discovered by a chance crossover or mutation, they
stuck. During the experiment itself it was possible to examine the strings
of a given generation and sort out individual approaches to the environment,
or ideas, by isolating the building blocks. By tracking schemata, and by
seeing how the building blocks proliferated and interacted, one could see
how, over a period of generations, the entire population adapted to its
environment.
Did groups of actual genes work by the same- rules as Holland's schema
theorem? Was crossover insufficiently recognized as a driving force in
genetic evolution? Answers were slow in coming, mainly because biologists
were loath to examine the question. After all, the indicators came from a
mathematical model and not from experiments in wet matter. Biologists were
particularly reluctant to entertain the idea that GAs were not simulations
of evolution but examples of it, just as, in Langton's view, the artificial
mechanism by which Craig Reynolds's boids flocked led to true flocking
behavior.
- Biomorphs; 9 Genes With 19 Alleles, From Stick Figures to Plants & Insects
One exception to this rule was the noted evolutionary biologist Richard
Dawkins. The Oxford professor viewed artificial life as "a generator of
insight in our understanding of real life." Dawkins acquired this high
regard for a-life, and particularly simulated evolution, in the preparation
of his book The Blind Watchmaker. The book was intended to show how
evolution, proceeding by subtle gradations, could achieve the dazzling order
and complexity of contemporary life-forms. Besides describing the process,
Dawkins wanted to illustrate it dynamically. A user of the Macintosh, he
wrote a computer program that made use of some of evolution's properties.
The result surprised even such an enthusiastic evolutionist as Dawkins.
Invoking the whimsical term that biologist Desmond Morris called animal-like
shapes in his paintings, Dawkins named the computer-graphics organisms
"biomorphs." These creatures were nothing but line drawings in the form of
primitive trees. Their visual properties were controlled by nine parameters,
which controlled characteristics such as branching, segmentation, and
symmetry. He referred to these parameters as genes. Each gene was subject to
mutation, which would create a variation in the biomorph in the next
generation.
As with GAs, biomorphs would evolve by unnatural selection. Fitness was to
be determined solely by a subjective outsider, the person working the
computer. Dawkins compared the process to the sort of artificial selection
that occurs in cattle breeding. At the onset of the biomorph reproductive
process, the selector was given a choice of several biomorph offspring of
the current genetic champion, each representing a single mutation of one of
the champion's nine genes. The selector picked, for whatever reason, the one
that suited his or her fancy. As Dawkins put it, the human eye was the
selecting agent. Organisms who survived were likely to have qualities as
amorphous as "interesting" or "pretty" or "different from the last few" or
"gee, this looks a lot like a peach tree." A reproduction and mutation
algorithm generated offspring from that survivor, and then the process was
repeated. The idea of the experiment was to see how far, in a reasonable
number of generations, the biomorphs could evolve to something quite
different from an original random form-presumably into something the
individual selector would like very much.
Starting with simple botanic stick figures, Dawkins hoped the tree
structures would evolve into more complex stick figures. This was massive
understatement. Dawkins's simple system was capable of producing a wide
bandwidth of images that quickly leapt from the plant kingdom to the insect
world. The biologist was astonished:
When I wrote the program I never thought that it would evolve anything more
than a variety of tree-like shapes. . . . Nothing in my biologist's
intuition, nothing in my 20 years' experience in programming computers, and
nothing in my wildest dreams, prepared me for what actually emerged on the
screen. I can't remember exactly when in the sequence it first began to dawn
on me that an evolved resemblance to something like an insect was possible.
With a wild surmise, I began to breed, generation after generation, from
whichever child looked most like an insect. My incredulity grew in parallel
with the evolving resemblance. ... I still cannot conceal to you my feeling
of exultation as I first watched those exquisite creatures emerging before
my eyes. I distincdy heard the triumphal opening chords of Also sprach
Zarathustra (the "2001 theme") in my mind. I couldn't eat, and that night
"my" insects swarmed behind my eyelids as I tried to sleep.
The "lost chord of Zarathustra" insect had begun with a single pixel. In a
mere twenty-nine generations it evolved into something resembling a critter
one might find under a leaf. Nature had consumed a few billion years to
create its critters. Dawkins compressed this' time into a few keystrokes of
a Macintosh.
Fig 05 - 03.jpg
The insect was soon joined by other visual life-forms. Biomorph Land, as
Dawkins called it, was a repository of diversity that rivaled the Burgess
Shale, the location in British Columbia teeming with unusual fauna from the
dawn of Cambrian Era. Not only could creatures like scorpions and bees be
evolved but also creatures resembling spiders, bats, frogs, and birds. The
forms could also resemble artifacts: Spitfire airplanes, lunar landers,
letters of the alphabet. (Dawkins spelled out his name.) The range seemed
limitless. "On my wanderings through the backwaters of Biomorph Land,"
Dawkins wrote, "I have encountered fairy shrimps, Aztec temples, Gothic
church windows, aboriginal drawings of kangaroos, and, on one memorable but
unrecapturable occasion, a passable caricature of the Wykeham Professor of
Logic."
- Problem Space of All Possible Solutions & Artificial Selection Towards
Goals
Although the experiment played like a game, it followed the same rules that
nature did. In evolving creatures, Dawkins noted, one was not creating them
but discovering them. They already existed, in a sense, as possible
permutations of a given set of genes and of a finite number of mutations.
This was what biologists referred to as "genetic space," a mathematical
atlas that geographically located all possible life-forms. Those of
identical genetic composition shared a location, those varying by a single
mutation rested alongside, and those differing only by a few changes resided
in the same neighborhood. The more differences in the genotype, the farther
away an organism was in genetic space. Dawkins's Zarathustra insect, having
evolved by twenty-nine mutations from its single-pixel ancestor, therefore
resided twenty-nine spaces away in genetic space. But considering that for
each single mutation there were approximately half a trillion possible
variations (each of the nine genes had nineteen possible alleles), the
number of possible biomorphs after twenty-nine steps was almost beyond
comprehension. This was a key lesson of Biomorph Land-simulated evolution
was a powerful mechanism to search through genetic space. By using visual
attractiveness as an indicator of fitness, one could bypass trillions of
uninteresting biomorphs and get directly to the good ones.
This same principle was at work in the genetic algorithm. Instead of
exploring natural genetic space, the GA used evolution to search what was
called "problem space," all the possible solutions to a given problem. When
the UCLA team created Champ 100, they were using natural selection to
"discover" an ant who could successfully negotiate the John Muir Trail in a
cunning manner. When David Goldberg found a particularly economic means of
allocating gas pipeline flow, he was also using GAs to search the problem
space for that dilemma. So powerful was the GA in that capacity that
Goldberg wrote, "If we were, for example, to search for the best person
among the world's 4.5 billion people as rapidly as the GA, we would only
need to talk to four or five people before making our near optimal
selection."
- A.I. Politics, Generating Computer Programs with GA's, Combining
Subroutines
The evidence seemed clear: Genetic algorithms could generate robust programs
and artificial adaptive phenomena by utilizing the power of evolution. Yet
the lords of computer science were slow to bestow their blessings on it. The
GA stood outside the standard dogma and ran afoul of a cultural bias. In
artificial intelligence the standard method of creating adaptive systems was
associated with coding wizardry. The star hackers of AI could not respect,
let alone adopt, a programming system where the innovation was applied by an
outside force-nature...
ARTIFICIAL LIFE - The Quest for a New Creation
Copyright © 1992 by Steven Levy
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0679743898/
http://www.solver.com/gabasics.htm
http://www.aic.nrl.navy.mil/galist/src/
http://ncca.bournemouth.ac.uk/CourseInfo/MAVisAn/LANGUAGE/Algorithm.html
http://cgm.cs.mcgill.ca/~soss/cs644/projects/marko/introduction.html
Which part of this comes close to your idea, replicant?
Immortalist
Here is a link to a couple of required image for this post:
http://reanimater.tripod.com/JohnMuirTrail.html
"Immortalist" <Reanima...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:100g9er...@corp.supernews.com...
Tianran Chen
of life, allow me start at the stage where bacteria already exist on this
planet. here the trait is gene, and the definition of gene here will be
any segment of genetic information that survive can be potentially pass
through MANY generations. so suppose suddenly some chemical change occur
on earth, one of the result is that all the DNA molecule will copied in
100% accuracy from now on. now, will evolution stop right there?
the answer to that question is very likely no. it will not just stop
there, and evolution WILL go on. in this special case, bacteria will
still EVOLVE BY AGGREGATION. unlike us, bacteria only have a thin wall
protecting them, and no immune system equiped. one can easily get into
or onto another's body. actually many bacteria eat by merge the food
(sometimes other bacteria) into its body, if the food did not digested
and survived, then the food will spend rest of the live inside it, and
perhaps reproduce inside it. also, one can easily stick onto another.
here we can say when bacteria stick with of get into each other, they
are forming a new aggragation. obviously most of these aggragation are
unstable, and survive no longer than its members. as soon as members die,
the aggregation die. however, there are some of them are stable and has
some advantage form all the members' trait. so such aggregations will
survive and perhaps propagate. suppose a photosynthesis bacteria
accidentally merged into a fast moving swimming bacteria, this aggeration
has great advantage for both of them, since for photosynthesis bacteria,
it got better chance of moving out of shade, and for the swimming
bacteria, it can get food for free. such aggeration will be stable, and
possiblly progate itself.
this is symbiosis, the well known and universal phenomenon. i assume most
people know it very well. the point i want to emphasis here is that in
such aggregation, the trait we just defined had not changed at all. the
DNA molecule stay the same for all members of the aggregation (since we
assumed 100% accuracy in copying). but new forms of life had created
though the way of aggregation.
in another word, the trait had not changed nor merged, but composition of
traits had occured in higher level. so even if mutation on individual
trait never occur, aggregation of traits still lead to evolution process.
here, one may argue that, traits changed, because by aggregation, new
traits created. yes, you are absolutely right here, new traits come to
existence when a aggregation is stable enought to be passed through for
many genenrations. however, the new traits are created in a higher level.
as in the previous example, the DNA of each bacteria had not change, so
in the level we defined before, there are really no mutation occured.
the existence of new traits will not be realized until one start to looked
at the higher level. also, mutation can be always considered as change in
aggregation of lower level. for instance, mutation occured on a trait
ABCD, and become AXCD, we can consider this mutation as B exit the
aggregation, and X enter the aggregation.
so my point is mutation on traits is not essential to evolution. instead,
aggregation of traits are essential, and in most cases, mutation is indeed
aggregation, but it just look like mutation if we ignore the levels.
aggregation is universal. in any complex systems (and adapt systems), i
bet one can easily spot the existence of aggregation. either in the
creation of the universe, and biology world, or human mind. so we can
safely ignore it from the list of required condition of evolution process.
therefore, selection and copying are the only condition evolution needed.
Craig Franck
> so my point is mutation on traits is not essential to evolution. instead,
> aggregation of traits are essential, and in most cases, mutation is indeed
> aggregation, but it just look like mutation if we ignore the levels.
>
> aggregation is universal. in any complex systems (and adapt systems), i
> bet one can easily spot the existence of aggregation. either in the
> creation of the universe, and biology world, or human mind. so we can
> safely ignore it from the list of required condition of evolution process.
> therefore, selection and copying are the only condition evolution needed.
That would be memetic evolution, not biological evolution. If X
number of organisms find they can form an ecological unit, that's not
covered under neo-Darwinism, even if it is true such a distinction is
arbitrary and purely definitional. Darwinistic evolution is driven by
random mutations.
To adapt a species can:
1) Have an individual born with a mutation which increase the chances
it lives to reproduce.
2) Learn some beneficial behavior that is taught to future generations.
3) Directly modify the environment in some positive way.
Only the first instance is biological evolution.
BTW, the best place to discuss this is in talk.origins. Be sure to trim
the newsgroups to less than four or your post will be bounced by the
moderator bot. Also, consider posting in ASCII text rather than
Unicode, if that's possible.
--
Craig Franck
craig....@verizon.net
Cortland, NY
Tianran Chen
this would be for evolution in general, however, it should
fit in well in all type of evolution.
> That would be memetic evolution, not biological evolution. If X
> number of organisms find they can form an ecological unit, that's not
> covered under neo-Darwinism, even if it is true such a distinction is
> arbitrary and purely definitional. Darwinistic evolution is driven by
> random mutations.
well, many people believe so, however, it is still not so
convincing that accumulation of random mutation alone drived
the biological evolution process. it is already proved that
the mitochondria in any plant and animal (as well as fungi...)
are contain its own gene, and reproduce inside the cell
quite independently. and most importantly, the gene they contain
is very similar to a certain kind of bacteria, and less similar
to the genes contained in the cell that they lived in. note that
this is just hypothesis. so technically, they are bacteria that
live inside us. many other organelles were suggested to originate
in similar way. many researchers (e.g. Lynn Margulis) suggest
except bacteria, all other species evolved through aggregation
with bacteria, and many hypothesis has very proved recent years.
so evolution by aggregation is pretty much proved in biology
world.
> BTW, the best place to discuss this is in talk.origins. Be sure to trim
> the newsgroups to less than four or your post will be bounced by the
> moderator bot. Also, consider posting in ASCII text rather than
> Unicode, if that's possible.
thanks, i will do better.
John Jones
JJ
Tianran Chen <li...@chentianran.net> wrote in message
news:87b4d040feced60f...@news.teranews.com...
Kamerynn
> "Tianran Chen" wrote
>
>
>>so my point is mutation on traits is not essential to evolution. instead,
>>aggregation of traits are essential, and in most cases, mutation is indeed
>>aggregation, but it just look like mutation if we ignore the levels.
>>
>>aggregation is universal. in any complex systems (and adapt systems), i
>>bet one can easily spot the existence of aggregation. either in the
>>creation of the universe, and biology world, or human mind. so we can
>>safely ignore it from the list of required condition of evolution process.
>>therefore, selection and copying are the only condition evolution needed.
>Craig Franck responded:
>
> That would be memetic evolution, not biological evolution. If X
> number of organisms find they can form an ecological unit, that's not
> covered under neo-Darwinism, even if it is true such a distinction is
> arbitrary and purely definitional. Darwinistic evolution is driven by
> random mutations.
<snip>
Kam:
If I throw a die, you might say that it randomly
comes up with the number 6. But, if I could then explain
the exact event(s) that lead up to the result on the die,
I could then say, "no, the die rolling event is exaustively
explained by antecedent events. The number 6 did not come
up at random."
The point is this: I only believe that evolution
is driven by random mutations if I believe that these
mutations are unexplain*able*, that is, if they have
no cause(s). There is no evidence that mutation isn't
driven by some mechanism. So, we must still search
for one, as we must assume that explaining mutation is
possible. We must do this sort of thing always, as
a rule of thumb, in case there is something to be
discovered.
Based on your account of it, I believe that
Darwinian Evolution is probably false, or is at least
a cop out when more investigation is required.
Keynes
I agree that randomness is not supportable.
But evolution produces sports of all sorts.
Most mutations are not adaptive. All living
things are over-specialized as far as meeting
changing conditions are concerned. We have
seen many species come and go.
Actually, they all never went but mutated into present forms.
The basic structures of insects, worms, fish and backboned
animals are fairly standard with variations. Most land animals
and birds have the same structure -- a head, body, four limbs
with digits. Chicken wings have our forearm's radius and ulna.
The legs of quadrupeds have a much shorter tibia and much longer
hands and feet. Horses stand on a single toe or finger.
The die out of dinosaurs didn't just leave room for mammals
and birds. Some of the dinosaurs became birds and mammals.
In the end, the only thing that makes life adaptive
is the presence of maladaptive sports at the time of
crisis. The last shall be first.
James Michael Howard
Kevin Aylward
It is according to quantum mechanics. Ultimately, the probability to
form any chemical bond is a function of the statistics of quantum
mechanics.
Kevin Aylward
salesE...@anasoft.co.uk
http://www.anasoft.co.uk
SuperSpice, a very affordable Mixed-Mode
Windows Simulator with Schematic Capture,
Waveform Display, FFT's and Filter Design.
"That which is mostly observed, is that which replicates the most"
http://www.anasoft.co.uk/replicators/index.html
"quotes with no meaning, are meaningless" - Kevin Aylward.
andy-k
news:101cvug...@corp.supernews.com...
>
> Kam:
> If I throw a die, you might say that it randomly
> comes up with the number 6. But, if I could then explain
> the exact event(s) that lead up to the result on the die,
> I could then say, "no, the die rolling event is exaustively
> explained by antecedent events. The number 6 did not come
> up at random."
> The point is this: I only believe that evolution
> is driven by random mutations if I believe that these
> mutations are unexplain*able*, that is, if they have
> no cause(s). There is no evidence that mutation isn't
> driven by some mechanism. So, we must still search
> for one, as we must assume that explaining mutation is
> possible. We must do this sort of thing always, as
> a rule of thumb, in case there is something to be
> discovered.
> Based on your account of it, I believe that
> Darwinian Evolution is probably false, or is at least
> a cop out when more investigation is required.
Two points Kam:
Firstly, I don't know how it can be shown that true random events don't
exist in nature. We call an event random if we are oblivious of any
associated event that we may call a cause -- e.g. the decay of an
unstable nucleus. Of course that doesn't mean to say that there isn't a
cause -- it just leaves us in the dark as to whether there is or there
isn't, so I regard true randomness as a metaphysical postulate. As you
say above, it remains fruitful to search for causes since this often
throws up spin-off discoveries even if it doesn't answer the question to
hand.
Secondly, if we dismiss true randomness in the process of evolution by
natural selection (and ignoring the much argued possibility of free will
in the domain of human affairs) what remains is strong causal
determinism. Even postulating a 'final cause' (teleology) implies an
absence of contingency. Are you arguing that it is premature to dismiss
the possibility that the natural world may be unfolding in a manner that
is completely devoid of contingency -- i.e. according to total
predestination?
1Z
> Kam:
> If I throw a die, you might say that it randomly
> comes up with the number 6. But, if I could then explain
> the exact event(s) that lead up to the result on the die,
> I could then say, "no, the die rolling event is exaustively
> explained by antecedent events. The number 6 did not come
> up at random."
> The point is this: I only believe that evolution
> is driven by random mutations if I believe that these
> mutations are unexplain*able*, that is, if they have
> no cause(s). There is no evidence that mutation isn't
> driven by some mechanism. So, we must still search
> for one, as we must assume that explaining mutation is
> possible. We must do this sort of thing always, as
> a rule of thumb, in case there is something to be
> discovered.
> Based on your account of it, I believe that
> Darwinian Evolution is probably false, or is at least
> a cop out when more investigation is required.
Darwinian evolution does not require mutaiton to be random
in an absolutely fundamental way, it only requires it to
be random in the sense of having no simple or predictable
relationship with the oranism or environment. Eg. if a fish
one dry land had some mechanism whereby it could selectlively mutate
itself a pair of lungs, you would have some kind of teleological theory,
not Darwinism. Darwinism is entirely compatible with strict causal
determinism. Furthermore, there are loads of mechanisms that
are known to trigger mutations, e.g radiation. The mutations are random
in the sense that they are not more likely make the organism fitter
for its environment than chance owuld predict.
1Z
> Firstly, I don't know how it can be shown that true random events don't
> exist in nature. We call an event random if we are oblivious of any
> associated event that we may call a cause -- e.g. the decay of an
> unstable nucleus. Of course that doesn't mean to say that there isn't a
> cause -- it just leaves us in the dark as to whether there is or there
> isn't, so I regard true randomness as a metaphysical postulate.
Well, it isn't because there is no associated entity. Randomness
is an absence of causality.
In fact it is the other way round: to say there are hidden causes
for events we cannot explain is to make a methaphysical posit.
True Randomness is the explanantion that fulfills Occam's razor.
> Secondly, if we dismiss true randomness in the process of evolution by
> natural selection
As noted in my reply to Kam, the distinction between true and apparent
randomness is not important to Darwinism.
Kevin Aylward
I don't agree. An extended definition of Darwinian evolution is simply
that traits are generated, replicated and selected. whether or not the
generated traits are random or not does not effect any main results.
Evolution will still occur.
http://www.anasoft.co.uk/replicators/replicatortheory.html
>Eg. if a fish
> one dry land had some mechanism whereby it could selectlively mutate
> itself a pair of lungs, you would have some kind of teleological
> theory, not Darwinism.
I would have to disagree with this. This may be a bit of a play on word
definitions, but Darwinian evolution is quite able to evolve algorithms
which, to all intents and purposes, have directed goals. The reality is
that, we can indeed make such selective "mutations". Scientists spend
much effort in devising ways to change gene makeup of humans. Either we
are the result of only a Darwinian process, or there is magic involved.
http://www.anasoft.co.uk/replicators/intelligence.html e.g. Darwinian
Purpose
James Michael Howard
1Z
> > Darwinian evolution does not require mutaiton to be random
> > in an absolutely fundamental way, it only requires it to
> > be random in the sense of having no simple or predictable
> > relationship with the oranism or environment.
>
> I don't agree. An extended definition of Darwinian evolution is simply
> that traits are generated, replicated and selected. whether or not the
> generated traits are random or not does not effect any main results.
Evolution as a biological theory needs to explain the appearance
of novel characteristics. Random mutation is the only non-magical,
non-teleological mechanism. I am not talking about evolution in contexts
other than biology. If generated traits did have a simple relationship
with organism or environment, the system as a whole would not be
able to generat novelty -- the same infomation would just churn
around in different combination. Deterministic systems always
contain the same information at every stage.
> Evolution will still occur.
> >Eg. if a fish
> > one dry land had some mechanism whereby it could selectlively mutate
> > itself a pair of lungs, you would have some kind of teleological
> > theory, not Darwinism.
>
> I would have to disagree with this. This may be a bit of a play on word
> definitions, but Darwinian evolution is quite able to evolve algorithms
> which, to all intents and purposes, have directed goals.
I am talking about teleology as metaphysics (final causes), not
teleology 'for all intents an purposes'.
>The reality is
> that, we can indeed make such selective "mutations".
That is irrelevant to the issue of whether and why Darwinian evolution
as a biological theory needs random mutation.
> Scientists spend
> much effort in devising ways to change gene makeup of humans. Either we
> are the result of only a Darwinian process, or there is magic involved.
That is in fact what was saying.
Kevin Aylward
> "Kevin Aylward" <kevindotayl...@anasoft.co.uk> wrote in
> message
>
>>> Darwinian evolution does not require mutaiton to be random
>>> in an absolutely fundamental way, it only requires it to
>>> be random in the sense of having no simple or predictable
>>> relationship with the oranism or environment.
>>
>> I don't agree. An extended definition of Darwinian evolution is
>> simply that traits are generated, replicated and selected. whether
>> or not the generated traits are random or not does not effect any
>> main results.
>
> Evolution as a biological theory needs to explain the appearance
> of novel characteristics. Random mutation is the only non-magical,
> non-teleological mechanism.
However, it is not clear whether or not Quantum Mechanics is significant
or not to the mutations that we do actually observe. To date, only QM
allows for true random behaviour, so if QM is not significant to
mutations, there is no random behaviour in evolution. Its all
classically deterministic from the knowledge of initial positions and
momentums of all particles.
>I am not talking about evolution in
> contexts other than biology. If generated traits did have a simple
> relationship with organism or environment, the system as a whole
> would not be able to generat novelty -- the same infomation would
> just churn around in different combination.
But different combinations of the same data lead to different results.
Deterministic systems
> always contain the same information at every stage.
In principle, I agree. In practise, new behaviour can occur in
deterministic systems
>
>> Evolution will still occur.
>
>>> Eg. if a fish
>>> one dry land had some mechanism whereby it could selectlively mutate
>>> itself a pair of lungs, you would have some kind of teleological
>>> theory, not Darwinism.
>>
>> I would have to disagree with this. This may be a bit of a play on
>> word definitions, but Darwinian evolution is quite able to evolve
>> algorithms which, to all intents and purposes, have directed goals.
>
> I am talking about teleology as metaphysics (final causes), not
> teleology 'for all intents an purposes'.
I don't understand your point. What I am saying is that under Darwinism
we observe traits that are most maximised. Therefore given a random
distribution of Darwinian algorithms that replicated its own algorithms,
one that evolved to specifically select traits that maximised its own
numbers would be observed over those that didn't. So, Darwinism does
allow for selectively of its Replicator traits.
>
>> The reality is
>> that, we can indeed make such selective "mutations".
>
> That is irrelevant to the issue of whether and why Darwinian evolution
> as a biological theory needs random mutation.
It was not in reponse to "Random Mutation" it was in reponse to:
>Eg. if a fish
> one dry land had some mechanism whereby it could selectlively mutate
So the answer was completely relevant to to statement.
1Z
PS In case you were wondering how my stipulation that randomness is
needed to explain novelty in evolutionary theory combines
with my statement that randomness can be deterministic pseudo-randomness...
the answer is that that the information content of a deterministic
biological system (eg an ecosphere) can increase by getting an input
(eg a radioactive particle causing a mutation) from outside the system.
1Z
1Z
> 1Z wrote:
> > "Kevin Aylward" <kevindotayl...@anasoft.co.uk> wrote in
> > message
> >
> >>> Darwinian evolution does not require mutaiton to be random
> >>> in an absolutely fundamental way, it only requires it to
> >>> be random in the sense of having no simple or predictable
> >>> relationship with the oranism or environment.
> >>
> >> I don't agree. An extended definition of Darwinian evolution is
> >> simply that traits are generated, replicated and selected. whether
> >> or not the generated traits are random or not does not effect any
> >> main results.
> >
> > Evolution as a biological theory needs to explain the appearance
> > of novel characteristics. Random mutation is the only non-magical,
> > non-teleological mechanism.
>
> However, it is not clear whether or not Quantum Mechanics is significant
> or not to the mutations that we do actually observe. To date, only QM
> allows for true random behaviour, so if QM is not significant to
> mutations, there is no random behaviour in evolution. Its all
> classically deterministic from the knowledge of initial positions and
> momentums of all particles.
I have already stated that for biological Darwinian evolution
it does not matter whether random mutation is 'real' QM-based
randomness or classical pseudo-randomness.
> >I am not talking about evolution in
> > contexts other than biology. If generated traits did have a simple
> > relationship with organism or environment, the system as a whole
> > would not be able to generat novelty -- the same infomation would
> > just churn around in different combination.
>
> But different combinations of the same data lead to different results.
Look, if a system is deterministic, one state is always predictable
from another (by the definition of determinism). If information about
state A tells you
all you everything about state B, there is not additional information
to
state B (by the definition of information), so all states contain the
same information. QED.
> Deterministic systems
> > always contain the same information at every stage.
>
> In principle, I agree. In practise, new behaviour can occur in
> deterministic systems
The only sense that can be made of that, is that the system has been
misidentified as deterministic, so the wrong theory is being applied.
> >> Evolution will still occur.
>
> >>> Eg. if a fish
> >>> one dry land had some mechanism whereby it could selectlively mutate
> >>> itself a pair of lungs, you would have some kind of teleological
> >>> theory, not Darwinism.
> >>
> >> I would have to disagree with this. This may be a bit of a play on
> >> word definitions, but Darwinian evolution is quite able to evolve
> >> algorithms which, to all intents and purposes, have directed goals.
> >
> > I am talking about teleology as metaphysics (final causes), not
> > teleology 'for all intents an purposes'.
>
> I don't understand your point. What I am saying is that under Darwinism
> we observe traits that are most maximised. Therefore given a random
> distribution of Darwinian algorithms that replicated its own algorithms,
> one that evolved to specifically select traits that maximised its own
> numbers would be observed over those that didn't. So, Darwinism does
> allow for selectively of its Replicator traits.
I find your point hard to follow as well. (selectively =
selectivity??).
All I am saying is that it muddies the waters to describe anything in
biological Darwinian evolution as goal-directed, even 'to all
intents and purposes'.
How algorithms came to feature in biology, I don't know.
> >> The reality is
> >> that, we can indeed make such selective "mutations".
> >
> > That is irrelevant to the issue of whether and why Darwinian evolution
> > as a biological theory needs random mutation.
>
> It was not in reponse to "Random Mutation" it was in reponse to:
>
> >Eg. if a fish
> > one dry land had some mechanism whereby it could selectlively mutat
A point I brought in to illustrate why Darwinian evolution
Kevin Aylward
> "Kevin Aylward" <kevindotayl...@anasoft.co.uk> wrote in
> message news:<zXaSb.431$UB6...@newsfep3-gui.server.ntli.net>...
>
> PS In case you were wondering how my stipulation that randomness is
> needed to explain novelty in evolutionary theory combines
> with my statement that randomness can be deterministic
> pseudo-randomness...
I agree that, absolutely true novelty requires true randomness. e.g.
http://www.anasoft.co.uk/replicators/intelligence.html
However, I am not convinced one way or the other whether or not
evolution has any relevant novelty at all. The fact that something looks
non derivable, dose not prove that is isn't.
>the answer is that that the information content
> of a deterministic biological system (eg an ecosphere) can increase
> by getting an input (eg a radioactive particle causing a mutation)
> from outside the system.
Yes, but is this significant or not. A mutation could occur simply by a
classical participle hitting DNA while it is copying itself.
Yes QM, will result is true randomness of mutations, but is it that
necessary to account for what is observed. Can classical induced
mutations be enough to explain observations.
Kevin Aylward
Either something is random or it is not. Period. This statement
contradicts what you write below about evolution *requiring* random
behaviour.
>
>
>>> I am not talking about evolution in
>>> contexts other than biology. If generated traits did have a simple
>>> relationship with organism or environment, the system as a whole
>>> would not be able to generat novelty -- the same infomation would
>>> just churn around in different combination.
>>
>> But different combinations of the same data lead to different
>> results.
>
> Look, if a system is deterministic, one state is always predictable
> from another (by the definition of determinism). If information about
> state A tells you
> all you everything about state B, there is not additional information
> to
> state B (by the definition of information), so all states contain the
> same information. QED.
So what? This is not relevant to what I stated. The fact that the
information content is the same does not mean that the entities are the
same. Therefore non random generation of traits can indeed have
different behaviour.
>
>
>> Deterministic systems
>>> always contain the same information at every stage.
>>
>> In principle, I agree. In practise, new behaviour can occur in
>> deterministic systems
>
> The only sense that can be made of that, is that the system has been
> misidentified as deterministic, so the wrong theory is being applied.
I don't mean intrinsically new. What is meant here is that given an
object with some information content has certain properties, another
object with the same information content can have different properties.
This is really addressing sub systems of a large system. Different, non
randomly generated objects, can evolve and be selected such that only
certain ones are observed. We know this is the case as pseudo-random
generation of life games show this to be the case.
>
>>>> Evolution will still occur.
>>
>>>>> Eg. if a fish
>>>>> one dry land had some mechanism whereby it could selectlively
>>>>> mutate itself a pair of lungs, you would have some kind of
>>>>> teleological theory, not Darwinism.
>>>>
>>>> I would have to disagree with this. This may be a bit of a play on
>>>> word definitions, but Darwinian evolution is quite able to evolve
>>>> algorithms which, to all intents and purposes, have directed goals.
>>>
>>> I am talking about teleology as metaphysics (final causes), not
>>> teleology 'for all intents an purposes'.
>>
>> I don't understand your point. What I am saying is that under
>> Darwinism we observe traits that are most maximised. Therefore given
>> a random distribution of Darwinian algorithms that replicated its
>> own algorithms, one that evolved to specifically select traits that
>> maximised its own numbers would be observed over those that didn't.
>> So, Darwinism does allow for selectively of its Replicator traits.
>
> I find your point hard to follow as well. (selectively =
> selectivity??).
> All I am saying is that it muddies the waters to describe anything in
> biological Darwinian evolution as goal-directed, even 'to all
> intents and purposes'.
But it doesn't when your actually explain behaviour. It helps
tremendously to identify a block that performs a specific function as a
building block of other functions. It gets too messy keep going down to
the basic for *every* explanation.
For example, simply noting that an algorithm, for example, specifically
acts to maximise a trait means we can ignore its details, only how it
acts in the bigger picture.
> How algorithms came to feature in biology, I don't know.
Its inherent. For example, we do indeed select mates. This selection is
*not* random. A random selection would mean that we all equally well
chose fat chicks over Pam Anderson. This is *clearly* false. The fact
that the underlying cause of such non random selection was by the
environmental selection of random algorithms is irrelevant.
It is key to understand that Darwinian evolution is about *non* random
selection of randomly selected traits. Selection is decidedly not
random. This means that what we observe after significant evolution is
indeed *non* random. Therefore there is indeed directed behaviour. The
fundamental reason for this directed behaviour is that the laws of
physics that make the selections are not random. For example, certain
chemical bonds are preferentially more likely to occur than others.
Directed behaviour does not require consciousness, and this may be where
the misconception arises about Darwinian evolution not having goals. The
laws of physics inherently prefer that objects exist in certain states
rather than others, there is no other rational way to describe this
except by the notion directed behaviour. Our behaviour is simply not
random.
I discuss this here
http://www.anasoft.co.uk/replicators/intelligence.html
>
>
>>>> The reality is
>>>> that, we can indeed make such selective "mutations".
>>>
>>> That is irrelevant to the issue of whether and why Darwinian
>>> evolution as a biological theory needs random mutation.
>>
>> It was not in reponse to "Random Mutation" it was in reponse to:
>>
>>> Eg. if a fish
>>> one dry land had some mechanism whereby it could selectlively mutat
>
> A point I brought in to illustrate why Darwinian evolution
> as a biological theory needs random mutation.
As noted above, this is in contradiction to what you say above.
Pseudo-randomness is not random. If only Pseudo-randomness is required,
than randomness is not required. Which is it?
Kevin Aylward
I'll have a look. The first thing I note is that the author is not
really acquainted with modern QM.
at http://www.surrey.ac.uk/qe/C7.htm, he states that a photon must pass
through two slits at once. This is provable false. See for example,
http://www.anasoft.co.uk/quantummechanics/index.html
I have only had a skim, but overall it looks all waffle. I certainly
don't buy this conscious electromagnetic field driving free will.
http://www.anasoft.co.uk/replicators/consciousness.html
Keynes
<kevindotayl...@anasoft.co.uk> wrote:
>
<snip>
>It is key to understand that Darwinian evolution is about *non* random
>selection of randomly selected traits. Selection is decidedly not
>random. This means that what we observe after significant evolution is
>indeed *non* random. Therefore there is indeed directed behaviour. The
Not 'magically' directed behavior, we hope.
Just physically directed behavior. 'Directed' behavior.
Directed 'behavior'. Hmmm. What could that mean?
>fundamental reason for this directed behaviour is that the laws of
>physics that make the selections are not random. For example, certain
>chemical bonds are preferentially more likely to occur than others.
>Directed behaviour does not require consciousness, and this may be where
>the misconception arises about Darwinian evolution not having goals. The
>laws of physics inherently prefer that objects exist in certain states
>rather than others, there is no other rational way to describe this
>except by the notion directed behaviour. Our behaviour is simply not
>random.
>
>I discuss this here
>http://www.anasoft.co.uk/replicators/intelligence.html
>
Do you realize what you are saying?
Your page is a complete refutaion of intelligence, since
you reduce it to aimless darwinian mechanism, and assert
that any creativity in nature or mind is a random event.
That's one way of looking at it if you have no respect
at all for intelligence or creativity, human or otherwise.
But if one does have respect for intelligence and creativity
(as most folks do) then you have to grant the same to darwinian
nature. But that would be the 'magic' that you abhor.
You deny purpose, and at the same time your whole argument
is that there is a natural direction toward complexity and
success due to natural selection. If that doesn't qualify as
purpose, what does? What is the purpose of your thesis
anyway? To deny the 'magic' that you insist on revealing
in excruciating detail?
You are actually claiming to be a 'bot' which nevertheless has
something interesting to say to other 'bots' (who should care?).
Sort of a contradiction. Alakazam!
Kevin Aylward
> On Fri, 30 Jan 2004 12:54:37 -0000, "Kevin Aylward"
> <kevindotayl...@anasoft.co.uk> wrote:
>>
> <snip>
>
>> It is key to understand that Darwinian evolution is about *non*
>> random selection of randomly selected traits. Selection is decidedly
>> not random. This means that what we observe after significant
>> evolution is indeed *non* random. Therefore there is indeed directed
>> behaviour. The
>
> Not 'magically' directed behavior, we hope.
> Just physically directed behavior.
Yep. Consciousness is not required for directed behaviour.
>'Directed' behavior.
> Directed 'behavior'. Hmmm. What could that mean?
Simply that we can make a scientific definition of a goal that can be
experimentally verified. If an event occurs that is statistical more
likely to occur than another event we can just declare it as a goal.
>
>> fundamental reason for this directed behaviour is that the laws of
>> physics that make the selections are not random. For example, certain
>> chemical bonds are preferentially more likely to occur than others.
>> Directed behaviour does not require consciousness, and this may be
>> where the misconception arises about Darwinian evolution not having
>> goals. The laws of physics inherently prefer that objects exist in
>> certain states rather than others, there is no other rational way to
>> describe this except by the notion directed behaviour. Our behaviour
>> is simply not random.
>>
>> I discuss this here
>> http://www.anasoft.co.uk/replicators/intelligence.html
>>
>
> Do you realize what you are saying?
>
Yep.
> Your page is a complete refutaion of intelligence,
Yes, essentially, in the traditional sense, this seems to be the case.
>since
> you reduce it to aimless darwinian mechanism, and assert
> that any creativity in nature or mind is a random event.
I don't see any escape from that conclusion. Its what logic dictates
with we don't believe in magic.
> That's one way of looking at it if you have no respect
> at all for intelligence or creativity, human or otherwise.
>
Respect is irrelevent to science. If the facts led to a certain
conclusion, than that conclusion is what I accept. I don't colour my
judgement as to what I want to believe, as do religious individuals.
> But if one does have respect for intelligence and creativity
> (as most folks do) then you have to grant the same to darwinian
> nature. But that would be the 'magic' that you abhor.
>
> You deny purpose, and at the same time your whole argument
> is that there is a natural direction toward complexity and
> success due to natural selection. If that doesn't qualify as
> purpose, what does?
Well, its all context based. There is no purpose in the big scheme of
things, like some supreme creator telling us that we should be doing
this for some hidden deeper meaning. Purpose is relative, and simply
*defined*. There is no deep reason as to why things should maximise
themselves, its just something that has evolved due to the laws of
physics. After all the generations, it is directed.
>What is the purpose of your thesis
> anyway?
Err... to shag as many women as possible. Hace you seen the nice bit of
stuff Richard Dawkins got to shack up with. That tasty bit from Dr. Who.
>To deny the 'magic' that you insist on revealing
> in excruciating detail?
Well, its to clarify just what is really going on. Its quite staggering
really. What we think we are/were, is all illusion. I don't know why its
taken so long since Darwin for it to sink in that we are Robots. Its an
inescapable conclusion in my view.
>
> You are actually claiming to be a 'bot' which nevertheless has
> something interesting to say to other 'bots' (who should care?).
Yes. Indeed. This is of course quite explainable by the theory:-)
> Sort of a contradiction. Alakazam!
Only an apparant one.
Kamerynn
Kam:
Nor do I, and I do not argue that such a thing
can be shown, if by "shown" you mean "display
empirical evidence in favor of." But, by the same reasoning,
we cannot show that random events in fact occur. All we can do
is continue to search for causes, and perhaps not find
them.
I do believe, however, that there is no such thing
as an uncaused event.
"The postulate on which we think about the universe
is that there is a fixed quantitative relation between
every phenomenon and its antecedents and consequents.
If there is such a thing as a phenomenon without these
fixed quantitative relations, it is a miracle. It is
outside the law of cause and effect, and as such
transcends our power of thought, or at least is
something to or from which we cannot reason."
--Oliver Wendell Holmes
Essentially, I believe that the universe is
reasonable. I also believe in Ex Nihilo Nihil Fit
(from nothing, nothing can become).
It's hard to argue for such fundamental principles.
All I can really say is that I cannot concieve of an
event arising from nothing at all (such a thing, in
the words of Holmes, "transcends our power of thought").
> We call an event random if we are oblivious of any
> associated event that we may call a cause -- e.g. the decay of an
> unstable nucleus. Of course that doesn't mean to say that there isn't a
> cause -- it just leaves us in the dark as to whether there is or there
> isn't, so I regard true randomness as a metaphysical postulate.
Kam:
Despite 1Z's objection, the question of whether or
not there is such a thing as an uncaused event is
definitely a metaphysical question.
> As you
> say above, it remains fruitful to search for causes since this often
> throws up spin-off discoveries even if it doesn't answer the question to
> hand.
>
> Secondly, if we dismiss true randomness in the process of evolution by
> natural selection (and ignoring the much argued possibility of free will
> in the domain of human affairs) what remains is strong causal
> determinism. Even postulating a 'final cause' (teleology) implies an
> absence of contingency.
> Are you arguing that it is premature to dismiss
> the possibility that the natural world may be unfolding in a manner that
> is completely devoid of contingency -- i.e. according to total
> predestination?
Kam:
Considering how you are using the term "contingent,"
then yes, I suppose I am (with qualifications).
To split a hair: any contingent event is contingent
upon some other event that causes it. So, to reword
the assertion: it is possible that every event is contingent
on another event.
This use of "contingent" better fits the history
of philosophy, as far as I can tell.
"A necessary truth is one that could not have
been otherwise. It would have been true *under all circumstances.*
[my emphasis] A contingent truth is one that is true
as it happens, or as things are."
--Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy
In other words, any event, even though it
is necessarily caused by another event (because
all causation proceeds necessarily, in this sense)
is still contingent unless, in Leibniz's words,
it must have occurred in all possible worlds.
I'll consider this hair split.
I would not argue that the universe unfolds in a
predestined manner because that implies teleology or
*purpose*. It may simply be the case that all events
in the history of time are caused by their antecedents.
The universe may be going nowhere in particular (no
teleology) because events have no end (or beginning).
Kamerynn
1Z wrote:
<snip>
> Well, it isn't because there is no associated entity. Randomness
> is an absence of causality.
> In fact it is the other way round: to say there are hidden causes
> for events we cannot explain is to make a methaphysical posit.
> True Randomness is the explanantion that fulfills Occam's razor.
Kam:
I emphatically disagree with that last point.
Occam's razor tells us not to needlessly multiply
entities. That is, we should only keep those
entities which are not superfluous to a given
explanation (as demons are superfluous to an
explanation of disease - disease is fully explained
by entities such as bacteria). Since randomness is
not an explanation, but a lack of explanation, it
doesn't adhere to Occam's razor. After all, we
do not explain an event by asserting that it has
no cause. We can only explain it by discovering its
cause - and Occam's razor is most certainly an axiom
meant to guide (scientific) explanation.
Kevin Aylward
> 1Z wrote:
> <snip>
>> Well, it isn't because there is no associated entity. Randomness
>> is an absence of causality.
>> In fact it is the other way round: to say there are hidden causes
>> for events we cannot explain is to make a methaphysical posit.
>> True Randomness is the explanantion that fulfills Occam's razor.
>
> Kam:
> I emphatically disagree with that last point.
> Occam's razor tells us not to needlessly multiply
> entities. That is, we should only keep those
> entities which are not superfluous to a given
> explanation (as demons are superfluous to an
> explanation of disease - disease is fully explained
> by entities such as bacteria). Since randomness is
> not an explanation, but a lack of explanation,
No it isnt.
< it
> doesn't adhere to Occam's razor.
Yes is does.
> After all, we
> do not explain an event by asserting that it has
> no cause.
> We can only explain it by discovering its
> cause - and Occam's razor is most certainly an axiom
> meant to guide (scientific) explanation.
I emphatically disagree. There needs to be a reason why something
*should* be in a pattern, not an explanation as to why there is no
pattern. A pattern requires some sort of principle to exist. Why would
this principle exist? This principle needs an explanation, therefore
does not satisfy occams razor.
The default position is that there are no principles, hence randomness
must be considered the default axiom from which departures from such
random behaviour must be explained. We don't require a reason for
randomness, because by axiomatic assumption, there is none, therefore it
is the simpler solution.
andy-k
I wonder what Mr. Wendell Holmes would have had to say on the issue of
radioactive decay. It is certainly the case that there are events with
which we can as yet associate no antecedent events, and to postulate the
existence of such events that are hidden from us seems just as
metaphysical as to postulate that there are none. We fall back on
prejudice, I think, but such prejudices are often grounded in the very
driving force that gave rise to our rational faculty -- their utility in
aiding our survival and reproduction.
That the universe is reasonable goes without saying if we take the word
'reasonable' to refer to the presence of order (the natural laws). And
regarding the idea of an event arising from nothing at all, there never
is 'nothing at all' -- there's always the whole rest of the universe,
and it's a pretty big claim to say that there's nothing in the whole
history of the whole universe that may be associated with a particular
(seemingly random) event.
I would use the word 'contingent' in this application to mean that an
event could have been otherwise, given precisely the same conditions.
Let's say we observe a radioactive decay event at a particular time
't1'. If we could run time backwards and repeat that very same scenario,
then would the event necessarily happen again at 't1', or could it
happen at a different time 't2'? Only in the latter case would I refer
to it as being contingent (i.e. it could have been otherwise), and only
in the latter case can I see the avoidance of predestination. Of course,
since we can't run time backwards and have another go, we will never
know the answer to this question.
Incidentally, I don't regard predestination as synonymous with
teleology -- rather it is synonymous with pure determinism. Given a set
of starting conditions, and given rules for the unfolding of a system,
then the state of the system may be calculated for any time in that
unfolding -- i.e. it is predestined. The only thing that would prevent
such a calculation would be contingent factors in the system, and if
such factors are truly contingent, then they are truly random. Thus, as
far as I can see, in order to avoid predestination we must postulate the
existence of true randomness.
Sur
Użytkownik "Kevin Aylward" <kevindotayl...@anasoft.co.uk> napisał w
wiadomości news:1ZKSb.57$4p2...@newsfep3-gui.server.ntli.net...
> Kamerynn wrote:
> > 1Z wrote:
> > <snip>
> > Kam:
Where does it say it is an axiom that randomness has no explanation? That we
do not fully understand the reason for randomness, we may not be able to
fully explore it using "hard" epistemological tools, we cannot even emulate
it on machines, does not allow us to get over it. Then we could just close
our books on thermodynamics, information theory, quantum physics and,
prominently, complexity theory, and go home, because randomness and
probability is what they all end up with in the explanation of things that
really matter. And I think that's pretty basic.
But randomness is a product of vital processes of this world, and orderly
entities *emerge* from it some way or another. If we say it's just about
throwing dice, and send it to that barber shop you mentioned, it may even be
offended, and you don't want that :) Just kidding.
I've been searching for meaningful, in-depth explanations of randomness and
probability (in their ontologically different forms), but I have yet to find
one. Please help if you have. What appears, though, is that there is a
metabolism of randomness and order, and that probability is in a strict, if
not yet explored relation to the Observer. The logic, therefore, gravitates
towards: the world is built on probability, probability is a measure of the
observer's uncertainty, hence there is a strong relationship between the
world and the observer's uncertainty. But that takes us to an NTG area.
What I was aiming at was to suggest, that probability is indeed a
philosopher's goldmine, not a shaving on Ockham's floor. It is of utmost
importance to be able to draw a line of how far we can reasonably go in our
thinking process, so we don't go on pointless ramblings on ages about
whether or not there is a Creator, or how does it feel to be the last atom
at the edge of the universe. It is of equal importance, however, to push
that line forward once we have done what we could in the envelope that we
had chosen (sorry for the tense, I'm not a native speaker of English).
Piotr
Piotr
Sur
101 once again here:
- it was established quite a while ago that it is a day-to-day business for
predictable processes to reach a point where they become unpredictable by
any means conceivable. They remain *deterministic* in principle, but it is
theoretically and practically impossible for us to draw the line of
causality beyond such point, even in the simplest laboratory cases, not to
mention the complexity of the real world.
- due to its basically deterministic nature, the *chaos* thus created, while
obscure to us, holds information about the causalities which lead to it, and
therefore certain logical principles which we observe in the "islands" of
predictability (as the world is fundamentally made of so-called
"conservative" chaos), can be observed *emerging* from it. We can,
therefore, say that the acute economic downturn in Timbuktu was caused by
the sudden decrease of consumers' confidence in the market, even though
actually it was because of someone, having had a bad sleep last night,
successfully if unintendedly spreading the rumour that the Timbuktu
government intends to import cheap grains from Xanadu.
For more information, see anything about chaos theory.
That is exactly the reason why strict science lives side-by-side with
humanities. Any "philosopher" who stubbornly sticks to the strict side of
the fence, is trying to be more papal than the pope, as the strict-strict
science itself admits deterministic unpredictability.
Considering such basics, we can easily use Occam's razor to cut off "out of
the blue" (non-deterministic) randomness, because it would be unjustified by
any observation or logic, and even it it were there, it would not take us
any further than sticking to the notion of a tangle of deterministic chaos,
which we know to bear trace of predictable developments.
From such premise, my own observations lead me to (subjectively) thinking
that such obscure information is subject to processes of mutual
amplification, resonance, statistical accumulation and, most importantly,
filtering by multiple observers (be it human or not - even an atom or a
sociological phenomenon can be an observer) who have evolved in (or out of)
such chaotic environment so as to have a "skill" of tackling with it, and
creating orderly new values, attractors and entities (take this as a
Christian-stylee three-in-one) out of it. Which is why humans will never be
replaced by computers.
Regards,
Piotr
Użytkownik "andy-k" <spam.free@last> napisał w wiadomości
news:PzMSb.169$qY1.1...@newsfep2-gui.server.ntli.net...
Kevin Aylward
Please produce an explanation for the generation of any truly random
event. Pick any example you like.
> That we do not fully understand the reason for randomness, we may not
> be able to fully explore it using "hard" epistemological tools, we
> cannot even emulate it on machines, does not allow us to get over it.
> Then we could just close our books on thermodynamics, information
> theory, quantum physics and, prominently, complexity theory, and go
> home, because randomness and probability is what they all end up with
> in the explanation of things that really matter. And I think that's
> pretty basic.
>
I think you miss the point. We don't have to "understand" why something
is random. We can accept that something is random as a basis to explain
any other something.
> But randomness is a product of vital processes of this world, and
> orderly entities *emerge* from it some way or another.
Yes, but not by randomness. Order from randomness only comes about
because selection is non-random. The laws of physic are non random, that
is there are laws of physics, even if the laws are statistical laws, the
laws themselves exist. Why is this?
> If we say it's
> just about throwing dice, and send it to that barber shop you
> mentioned, it may even be offended, and you don't want that :) Just
> kidding.
Its not just throwing dice, randomness is just one aspect of the
universe.
>
> I've been searching for meaningful, in-depth explanations of
> randomness and probability (in their ontologically different forms),
> but I have yet to find one.
Not everything can be explained, i.e. reduced to an absolute truth.
Everything is relative. We can only explain something in terms of
something else. At some point we have to accept something as is.
Craig Franck
> Well, it isn't because there is no associated entity. Randomness
> is an absence of causality.
> In fact it is the other way round: to say there are hidden causes
> for events we cannot explain is to make a methaphysical posit.
> True Randomness is the explanantion that fulfills Occam's razor.
I agree with this to an extent, but I think the bogey man is in the term
"event" not "randomness." Uncaused events are in a different logical
category than caused events. What this means in randomness in
uncaused events (Qevents) refers to the distribution of outcomes,
not causes.
This is similar to the issue of how you can punish a person for bad
behavior if everything is strictly determined. The premise of the
question contradicts what it is asserting. Once you use the term event
(in the normal sense) you are asserting it has a cause. This is what
pulls in the pixies.
A huge problem with true randomness fulfilling Ocams razor, is prior
to the 20th century saying the sun was power by randomness seems to
be the best formulation. That can't be right.
> > Secondly, if we dismiss true randomness in the process of evolution by
> > natural selection
>
> As noted in my reply to Kam, the distinction between true and apparent
> randomness is not important to Darwinism.
It's only important if you feel directed evolution isn't Darwinism. Most
people think it is Darwinistic and would agree with you.
--
Craig Franck
craig....@verizon.net
Cortland, NY
Craig Franck
> "Kevin Aylward" wrote
> > 1Z wrote:
> > >I am not talking about evolution in
> > > contexts other than biology. If generated traits did have a simple
> > > relationship with organism or environment, the system as a whole
> > > would not be able to generat novelty -- the same infomation would
> > > just churn around in different combination.
> >
> > But different combinations of the same data lead to different results.
>
> Look, if a system is deterministic, one state is always predictable
> from another (by the definition of determinism). If information about
> state A tells you
> all you everything about state B, there is not additional information
> to
> state B (by the definition of information), so all states contain the
> same information. QED.
If you consider consciousness part of biological evolution (I think
you must since it's arguably one of evolution's best novelties), then
you appear to be claiming the contents of my subjective psychological
experiences are totally determinable to an observer other than myself.
It might be that this is not true in principle (and therefore not covered
under the notion that "all information" is what could in theory be
gathered, even if it were practically impossible), yet I am part of a
totally determined system. I think this is important to point out
because it's common for people to think that consciousness is some
miracle cure for determinism and blind evolution.
It might be you mean "all information" is all that can be gathered plus
anything that might be unavailable for one reason or another, but that
expressly forbids any real novelty or emerging properties. Nothing is
then really novel, it's just a different combination of non-novel elements.
> > > Deterministic systems
> > > always contain the same information at every stage.
> >
> > In principle, I agree. In practise, new behaviour can occur in
> > deterministic systems
>
> The only sense that can be made of that, is that the system has been
> misidentified as deterministic, so the wrong theory is being applied.
What about emergent properties? Unconscious organismic drives
seem like novelties.
> > > I am talking about teleology as metaphysics (final causes), not
> > > teleology 'for all intents an purposes'.
> >
> > I don't understand your point. What I am saying is that under Darwinism
> > we observe traits that are most maximised. Therefore given a random
> > distribution of Darwinian algorithms that replicated its own algorithms,
> > one that evolved to specifically select traits that maximised its own
> > numbers would be observed over those that didn't. So, Darwinism does
> > allow for selectively of its Replicator traits.
>
> I find your point hard to follow as well. (selectively =
> selectivity??).
> All I am saying is that it muddies the waters to describe anything in
> biological Darwinian evolution as goal-directed, even 'to all
> intents and purposes'.
> How algorithms came to feature in biology, I don't know.
I probably should reread this part of the thread. It seems "maintaining
your difference against the environment so that you have a higher
chance of living to reproduce" is goal oriented. This is what drives
evolution even from a strictly ecological point of view.
I think you do need to make distinctions between "goals" and "laws"
and what might be termed "statistical fallout." The 2nd Law of
Thermodynamics exists purely for statistical reasons. Novelty in
nature arises for purely statistical reason. In that sense, the sorting
that occurs via NS is directed by the environment. Once an organism
accumulates enough small changes it can become qualitatively different
in ways that never existed before.
tg
If only there were a _simple_ interpretation of Occam's Razor...
If I say about an event "this was caused", and you say "this was
uncaused", does your explanation of the event contain fewer untested
assumptions than mine?
You seem to imply that the simplicity of an explanation is composed of
the simplicity of the elements of the explanation---a theory validated
by a measurement with a ruler is preferred to one validated by
measurement with a mass spectrometer, for example.
But each measurement is equally valuable, if you believe in physics
and the ability of the instrument-makers. If you believe that there
are both random and non-random events, there is no preference or
"default" in how you design your research program, at least by the
Occam test.
-tg
Keynes
Too late for that. It's happening all over the world.
We used to fear some gigantic computer mind taking over
society or dumping us unexpectedly into armageddon.
In fact, the computer invasion has been a bit by bit replacement
of humans in their own economy. It's as great a disaster as
the dreaded computer super-mind.
The crash of 1987 was blamed on 'program trading' between
computer systems that fed back on each other, a major error
overlooked by individual programs. Now money can feed
or starve a nation in the blink of an eye as traders shift their
hopes and greed electronically from one nation to the next.
Unfortunately humans are being replaced by computers as fast
as we can accomplish it. So-called human intelligence such
as decision making, mathematics, organization, expert systems,
and interlocking systems of communication (that run whole businesses),
etc, have all been automated pretty easily. The hell of it is that
competition forces all business to replace people with machines.
(Which says something about so-called human 'intelligence'.
First, that we were smart enough to duplicate our powers
mechanically, because they were basically trivial. Second,
that we were dumb enough to make ourselves economically
obsolete, with no system to replace the protestant work ethic.
Humans are tactically sly, but strategically clueless.)
Manufacturing and medical research have been automated.
Auto engines are computer controled. Calculators are part
of school classroom study, as well as 'computer literacy',
(mainly rote data entry). Before store scanners, there used
to be cash registers with lots of buttons for semi-skilled to push.
Now, fast food and store computers even make change.
There are no more steno pools or armies of file clerks
or bookkeepers. Accounting, payroll, files - all automated.
The search for AI has aleady made strides in voice recognition,
pattern-facial recognition, graphic to text translation, and even
creative intelligence using genetic algorithms. Sorts and searches
of super-human quantities of memory-information are commonplace.
Computers fly jets, keep our accounts, make our spread-sheet
decisions, and just about out-think us at our own game easily,
and at a tiny fraction of the cost of fallible humans.
These were the means many humans used to justify their economic
existence. Now they have no means, and no further economic justification.
Humans have the ability to experience and to feel, but there's no money in that.
Cows, chickens, and pigs can do feeling but nobody will pay them for it either.
In the last quarter of 2003, US productivity rose at an astonishing 8%,
while employment continued it's long decline.
In the world of commerce, humans have very little to offer anymore.
Then What are they good for?
Sur
> Sur wrote:
> > Użytkownik "Kevin Aylward" <kevindotayl...@anasoft.co.uk>
> > napisał w wiadomości
> > news:1ZKSb.57$4p2...@newsfep3-gui.server.ntli.net...
> >> Kamerynn wrote:
> >>> 1Z wrote:
> >>> <snip>
I may be departing from the essence of the original thread, but here goes.
> >> The default position is that there are no principles, hence
> >> randomness must be considered the default axiom from which
> >> departures from such random behaviour must be explained. We don't
> >> require a reason for randomness, because by axiomatic assumption,
> >> there is none, therefore it is the simpler solution.
> >>
> > Where does it say it is an axiom that randomness has no explanation?
>
> Please produce an explanation for the generation of any truly random
> event. Pick any example you like.
I thought you meant randomness, not random events. What I meant is that by
saying "random is random full stop" we deprive ourselves of a chance to ever
discover "laws" that exist in the ocean of randomness. Computers may be able
to deal with hydrodynamics one day, as well as thinkers may be able to touch
upon the chaotic tangle, even if only because intuitive humans can (in their
own, not-yet-scientific way). No one will (probably) ever explain why it was
two sixes on the dice this turn. Someone may be able to tell why more boys
are born before the war. Bad example, even if I don't believe it's the other
way round (war because of more boys), but maybe it'll show what I mean. I
mean, we can hope to go beyond statistics in explaining how meaningful
attractors (in other words, existence) arise from randomness. Someone just
may be able to shed light on how chaotic probability is connected with the
observer, as probability is essentially the measure of *the observer's*
uncertainty.
>
> > That we do not fully understand the reason for randomness, we may not
> > be able to fully explore it using "hard" epistemological tools, we
> > cannot even emulate it on machines, does not allow us to get over it.
> > Then we could just close our books on thermodynamics, information
> > theory, quantum physics and, prominently, complexity theory, and go
> > home, because randomness and probability is what they all end up with
> > in the explanation of things that really matter. And I think that's
> > pretty basic.
> >
>
> I think you miss the point. We don't have to "understand" why something
> is random. We can accept that something is random as a basis to explain
> any other something.
>
We can, but I refuse to find that satisfactory. This is, however, a good
point where to apply a *provisional* Occam's razor, just as we can very well
ignore theory of relativity in most of our calculations. But remember, we
are living in the age of the GPS, Einstein eventually becoming meaningful in
everyday life. And at the time when value is less and less attached to
predictable "mechanical" devices, and more and more to creation of
information (abstract) value, which is, I believe, exclusively done by
extracting bits of order from "the other end" of chaos. In a non-statistical
way, too.
> > But randomness is a product of vital processes of this world, and
> > orderly entities *emerge* from it some way or another.
>
> Yes, but not by randomness. Order from randomness only comes about
> because selection is non-random.
Not true. Situations are common in nature where, in a bifurcation, one
outcome leads into chaos, and the other, which may be *equally probable*,
leads to spontaneous organisation, order. Without being chosen by any
criteria, but at random. It is another thing that, in order to thrive or
have "value" (i.e. to be not only improbable (non-chaotic) but also
meaningful), such order must pass further selection that is non-random.
> The laws of physic are non random, that
> is there are laws of physics, even if the laws are statistical laws, the
> laws themselves exist. Why is this?
>
> > If we say it's
> > just about throwing dice, and send it to that barber shop you
> > mentioned, it may even be offended, and you don't want that :) Just
> > kidding.
>
> Its not just throwing dice, randomness is just one aspect of the
> universe.
Oh is it :) WHAT aspect of universe, will anyone tell me?
>
> >
> > I've been searching for meaningful, in-depth explanations of
> > randomness and probability (in their ontologically different forms),
> > but I have yet to find one.
>
> Not everything can be explained, i.e. reduced to an absolute truth.
> Everything is relative. We can only explain something in terms of
> something else. At some point we have to accept something as is.
Provisionally.
And I completely agree with the relativism bit. But that is the point I was
trying to make with probability vs. Observer. How we choose to define
Observer for the purpose of probability. Great playground.
Regards,
Piotr
Kevin Aylward
> "1Z" wrote
>
>> "Kevin Aylward" wrote
>
>>> 1Z wrote:
>
>>>> I am not talking about evolution in
>>>> contexts other than biology. If generated traits did have a simple
>>>> relationship with organism or environment, the system as a whole
>>>> would not be able to generat novelty -- the same infomation would
>>>> just churn around in different combination.
>>>
>>> But different combinations of the same data lead to different
>>> results.
>>
>> Look, if a system is deterministic, one state is always predictable
>> from another (by the definition of determinism). If information about
>> state A tells you
>> all you everything about state B, there is not additional information
>> to
>> state B (by the definition of information), so all states contain the
>> same information. QED.
>
> If you consider consciousness part of biological evolution (I think
> you must since it's arguably one of evolution's best novelties),
It exists, but it doesn't appear to do anything.
>then
> you appear to be claiming the contents of my subjective psychological
> experiences are totally determinable to an observer other than myself.
This is not the case in principle, as even if quantum mechanical effects
were negligible, some events must still occur that are unpredicable
under QM.
However, the essentials, ignoring QM, are that we are indeed a robot
determined by our meme and gene programming. Free will is an illusion.
It is an inescapable conclusion if we reject magic. Even allowing for QM
doesn't save as, if an event is truly random, than there is no "I" that
has any control over them, since they are random!
>
> It might be that this is not true in principle (and therefore not
> covered under the notion that "all information" is what could in
> theory be gathered, even if it were practically impossible), yet I am
> part of a totally determined system. I think this is important to
> point out because it's common for people to think that consciousness
> is some miracle cure for determinism and blind evolution.
There are two issues here. The physics and consciousness. If the laws of
physics are correct, it is, in principle, *not* possible in a
deterministic system to take any physical action that is not mandated by
its elementary parts. That is, there are no physical effective emergent
properties possible. Period. So "might" is a definite no.
http://www.anasoft.co.uk/replicators/intelligence.html
http://www.anasoft.co.uk/replicators/consciousness.html
However, consciousness, is indeed an emergent propertie that is not a
result of knowledge of its parts
(http://www.anasoft.co.uk/replicators/thehardproblem.html). By the above
statement, it follows that consciousness must be an observer, incapable
of taking any physical action, and indeed, rational evaluations show
that this appears to be the case. For example, the time delays actually
measured show that actions are performed before they get reported to the
consciousness, i.e. delays between the event and feeling pain, delays
between signals indicting finger movement as to when the finger moves,
even though we consciously think we move the finger immediately.
>
> It might be you mean "all information" is all that can be gathered
> plus anything that might be unavailable for one reason or another,
> but that expressly forbids any real novelty or emerging properties.
> Nothing is then really novel, it's just a different combination of
> non-novel elements.
Essentially, yes.
>
>>>> Deterministic systems
>>>> always contain the same information at every stage.
>>>
>>> In principle, I agree. In practise, new behaviour can occur in
>>> deterministic systems
>>
>> The only sense that can be made of that, is that the system has been
>> misidentified as deterministic, so the wrong theory is being applied.
>
> What about emergent properties? Unconscious organismic drives
> seem like novelties.
There is no reason to suggest that unconscious calculations are
emergent. Quite the opposite in fact. Unconscious events, e.g. automatic
responses to light heat etc, are all explainable from its parts.
>
>>>> I am talking about teleology as metaphysics (final causes), not
>>>> teleology 'for all intents an purposes'.
>>>
>>> I don't understand your point. What I am saying is that under
>>> Darwinism we observe traits that are most maximised. Therefore
>>> given a random distribution of Darwinian algorithms that replicated
>>> its own algorithms, one that evolved to specifically select traits
>>> that maximised its own numbers would be observed over those that
>>> didn't. So, Darwinism does allow for selectively of its Replicator
>>> traits.
>>
>> I find your point hard to follow as well. (selectively =
>> selectivity??).
>> All I am saying is that it muddies the waters to describe anything in
>> biological Darwinian evolution as goal-directed, even 'to all
>> intents and purposes'.
>> How algorithms came to feature in biology, I don't know.
>
> I probably should reread this part of the thread. It seems
> "maintaining your difference against the environment so that you have
> a higher chance of living to reproduce" is goal oriented. This is
> what drives evolution even from a strictly ecological point of view.
>
> I think you do need to make distinctions between "goals" and "laws"
There is a distinction, but it is the laws that "cause" the goals. Laws
of physics themselves are *all* non random, even if *some* of them
*describe* random behaviour. For example, the shrodinger equation is a
completely deterministic equation. It is the laws of physics that
ultimately dictate that one course of action is more likely than
another. If one course of action is more likely, then that action is not
strictly random.
Kevin Aylward
> "Kevin Aylward" <kevindotayl...@anasoft.co.uk> wrote in
> message news:<1ZKSb.57$4p2...@newsfep3-gui.server.ntli.net>...
>> Kamerynn wrote:
>>> 1Z wrote:
>>
>> I emphatically disagree. There needs to be a reason why something
>> *should* be in a pattern, not an explanation as to why there is no
>> pattern. A pattern requires some sort of principle to exist. Why
>> would this principle exist? This principle needs an explanation,
>> therefore does not satisfy occams razor.
>>
>> The default position is that there are no principles, hence
>> randomness must be considered the default axiom from which
>> departures from such random behaviour must be explained. We don't
>> require a reason for randomness, because by axiomatic assumption,
>> there is none, therefore it is the simpler solution.
>>
>
> If only there were a _simple_ interpretation of Occam's Razor...
>
> If I say about an event "this was caused", and you say "this was
> uncaused", does your explanation of the event contain fewer untested
> assumptions than mine?
>
> You seem to imply that the simplicity of an explanation is composed of
> the simplicity of the elements of the explanation
Maybe. I will have to think on this one.
>---a theory validated
> by a measurement with a ruler is preferred to one validated by
> measurement with a mass spectrometer, for example.
Tecnically, all measurement inherently resolve to a measurement with a
ruler. All measurements are fundamentally resolved to one of position.
>
> But each measurement is equally valuable, if you believe in physics
> and the ability of the instrument-makers. If you believe that there
> are both random and non-random events, there is no preference or
> "default" in how you design your research program, at least by the
> Occam test.
But there is by past experience of what works.
I agree that this might be a glass is half empty or half full scenery in
principle. However...A non-random effect, immediately begs the question,
what makes it non random. Why is there a pattern. If something is truly
random, we just don't bother to ask the question. I agree, that this is
probably a somewhat arbitrary culture position, but it is one that does
exist.
If we see patterns we can often come up with some sort of reason that
satisfies us. e.g. planetary motion and Newton's laws. If we have true
randomness, we *never* come up with an explanation. This is pretty much
how it is in reality. This can't be ignored. So the sensible and
practical choice is simply to declare that such an apparent unsolvable
situation is the default.
Kevin Aylward
Ok, I see the issue here. This is about the definition of random. The
above is not what I was referring to. I was referring to random in its
purest sense. That's in, absolute randomness, e.g. quantum mechanics.
The above, although usually called random, is not random, just very
complicated such that as a practical matter it is a very good
approximation to true randomness.
> No one will (probably) ever explain why it was two sixes on the dice
> this turn. Someone may be able to tell why more boys are born before
> the war. Bad example, even if I don't believe it's the other way
> round (war because of more boys), but maybe it'll show what I mean. I
> mean, we can hope to go beyond statistics in explaining how
> meaningful attractors (in other words, existence) arise from
> randomness. Someone just may be able to shed light on how chaotic
> probability is connected with the observer, as probability is
> essentially the measure of *the observer's* uncertainty.
I was not suggesting that deeper understanding of phenomena like chaos
is not attempted. Chaos, is not strictly random, therefore a better
understanding should be possible in principle.
>
>>
>>> That we do not fully understand the reason for randomness, we may
>>> not be able to fully explore it using "hard" epistemological tools,
>>> we cannot even emulate it on machines, does not allow us to get
>>> over it. Then we could just close our books on thermodynamics,
>>> information theory, quantum physics and, prominently, complexity
>>> theory, and go home, because randomness and probability is what
>>> they all end up with in the explanation of things that really
>>> matter. And I think that's pretty basic.
>>>
>>
>> I think you miss the point. We don't have to "understand" why
>> something is random. We can accept that something is random as a
>> basis to explain any other something.
>>
> We can, but I refuse to find that satisfactory. This is, however, a
> good point where to apply a *provisional* Occam's razor,
Again, my comment is about truly random phenomena, not approximately
random phenomena.
>
>>> But randomness is a product of vital processes of this world, and
>>> orderly entities *emerge* from it some way or another.
>>
>> Yes, but not by randomness. Order from randomness only comes about
>> because selection is non-random.
>
> Not true.
Yep true, as far as true randomness is concerned.
>Situations are common in nature where, in a bifurcation, one
> outcome leads into chaos, and the other, which may be *equally
> probable*, leads to spontaneous organisation, order.
Again, chaos is not random in the sense that I am using it. Chaos
contains order precisely because it is not random, only apparently so as
a first approximation. I am referring to quantum mechanical, true
randomness. In such a case, order is intrinsically prohibited.
tg
But 101 is the most important, so it is good to be reminded of it.
The difficulty is one of language. Replace random with uncaused, and
there is less confusion and more utility.
Uncaused events are necessarily unpredictable; the term "true
randomness" is unfortunate and leads to pointless argument.
You are asserting that there are no uncaused events, but you would be
contradicted by physicists. The utility of the concept is that it
allows for other elements of the theory to be retained. This is true
for all of the concepts in any theory.
Using Occam's razor should be delicate surgery, not the extension of
a waved hand.
-tg
tg
> On Sat, 31 Jan 2004 14:50:50 +0100, "Sur" <piot...@plusnet.pl> wrote:
>
> In the world of commerce, humans have very little to offer anymore.
> Then What are they good for?
We observe that, for a while at least, cannon fodder will still be in demand.
-tg
Sur
Uzytkownik "Keynes" <Key...@earthlink.net> napisal w wiadomosci
news:vh5o10te54skoreq0...@4ax.com...
> On Sat, 31 Jan 2004 14:50:50 +0100, "Sur" <piot...@plusnet.pl> wrote:
>
>
> "Which is why humans will never be replaced by computers."
> Too late for that. It's happening all over the world.
Naah, I don't subscribe to this point of view. Of course, most of what
you're saying is true, but it's all not making Us obsolete at all. Rather,
the line is shifting closer towards Us, which is a great opportunity to
clearly see what we really are all about. In Poland, where I am at, things
may not seem as acute as you see them, but I do read Wired Mag, so I get the
picture.
As a deChardinist (?) in principle, I am worried that human beings are
becoming merely a functional part in a larger organism, just as some
bacteria are alleged to have become mitochondria in our bodies at some point
in the evolution. But that's anti-globalist, transhumanist stuff that's out
of the point here.
As for today's relation between humans and the computers, the near future
seems rosey to me, because all the chores, the obvious stuff (all your
examples falling in that category) are taken care of, so humans can
concentrate on what they have developed for - making choices in chaotic,
unpredictable, "artistic" situations. I believe it takes millions and
millions of years of evolution, and thousands of year of culture to get
where We have got. We are amphibians accustomed to living at the edge of the
elements of chaos and order, which is where value that we can conceive is
created. That truly is what people were *always* appreciated and liked for
by peers and the opposite sex - the ability to transcend apparent reason, to
tell a surprising joke, to find or create order where all logic ended up
with pure chaos. Not for being able to translate a picture into words, read
barcodes or crunch numbers in financial statements of their companies.
Whining about the economic uselessness of people reminds me of
post-communist countries like Poland, where old-industy people complain how
good it was for them in the old system. Sorry, life is about adaptation or
dying. Actually, there are concepts out there to the effect that in the
future work may be an obsolete thing. It is one possible scenario that we
may all just be making choices for a living. As I look at the TV, some (if
pungent) air of that seems to emerge - viewers are increasingly encouraged
to make pseudo-choices to win awards, and everybody wants to participate -
sending SMS's like crazy to vote for who is to go from this season's reality
show. That is the bottom part of it, but I think it is good to bear in mind,
and thence to project the whole image of the possible future.
In short, your examples go no way towards showing that humans as such are
being replaced by machines. And we need not search for the justification
four our life vis-a-vis machines - they know no value other than what we
define as value for them. What is value for us we are sometimes unaware of,
but it is in a realm where any "AI" supercomputer is a disposable
calculator.
I would be happy to go on forever, but I'm off to bed now,
Piotr
Sur
this group, that much as I respect methodological philosophical thinking, I
am myself not a learned master, or devotee thereof. I will occasionally
write posts in this great forum, because I crave communication with truly
philosophical minds represented here so well. I will appreciate any
feedback, and I encourage you to bear in mind, as you provide it, that I am
that naive, unscientific type who lives on his grandiose visions with
questionable water-holding properties. I am here to try to do the sealing,
and to meet some thinking people. And excuse my limited English.
Now, back to the thread...
Uzytkownik "tg" <tgde...@earthlink.net> napisal w wiadomosci
news:9e39ba1.04020...@posting.google.com...
Less confusion and more utility perhaps. But what I was doing above was
trying to "prove" the opposite. Especially so as the utility of today will
become dead wood tomorrow.
>
> Uncaused events are necessarily unpredictable
...but not necessarily the other way round
>... the term "true
> randomness" is unfortunate and leads to pointless argument.
It is unfortunate in that it suggests the existence of non-deterministic
chaos. The reason why computers, try as they might, fail at creating "true
randomness" is because they are isolated from the ocean of "conservative"
deterministic chaos out there. Because they are designed to produce
sequences as meaningless as possible, which is a fundamentally flawed
approach. For me this *suggests* that perhaps there is no real-world (I'll
skip explanation of this word here) randomness without all the innumerable
butterfly-wing-flaps leading to it.
I think we should allow the qualification that perhaps concentrating on
randomness as merely an equal distribution of unpredictable outcomes, is
barking on the wrong tree, in ontology at least.
In other words, there are grounds to believe that the chaos, which our
measuring apparatus sees as what you call "true randomness" is in fact an
ocean of nourishing juice. See metabolism of waste. You know, cow, manure
(exported entropy), plant, dead plant, dead cow, soil, plant again, cow
again.
> You are asserting that there are no uncaused events, but you would be
> contradicted by physicists.
Here we go again :) The word *deterministic* (as used by physicists) is
conceptually opposite to *uncaused*. It is easy to conceive (even if
impossible to draw) the line of causality in a simple laboratory chaotic
experiment, such as the waterwheel with pivot buckets, which begin to act
chaotic at a certain speed. Or that simple mathematic equation which leads
to chaotic results (ready to quote it if you wish). It is unfeasible (but
not theoretically impossible, if that's good English) to do the same in
real-world "butterfly-causes-tornado" chaos, but in principle they are the
same, deterministic chaos. Therefore I believe that refutation of any
"strange" (to borrow from the description of the fractal attractor)
causality in principle rather than just in practice, is wrong.
Regards,
Piotr
Sur
> Sur wrote:
> > Użytkownik "Kevin Aylward" <kevindotayl...@anasoft.co.uk>
> > napisał w wiadomości
> > news:9yQSb.155$4p2...@newsfep3-gui.server.ntli.net...
> >> Sur wrote:
> >>> Użytkownik "Kevin Aylward" <kevindotayl...@anasoft.co.uk>
> >>> napisał w wiadomości
> >>> news:1ZKSb.57$4p2...@newsfep3-gui.server.ntli.net...
> >>>> Kamerynn wrote:
> >>>>> 1Z wrote:
> >>>>> <snip>
> Ok, I see the issue here. This is about the definition of random. The
> above is not what I was referring to. I was referring to random in its
> purest sense. That's in, absolute randomness, e.g. quantum mechanics.
> The above, although usually called random, is not random, just very
> complicated such that as a practical matter it is a very good
> approximation to true randomness.
QM is one of the points why randomness doesn't let me sleep at night (the
other ones being thermodynamics and information theory, together a trio to
define reality and value). Einstein said he didn't believe God played dice,
and I can only concur. Randomness full stop is a deus ex machina for me, and
it vehemently pushes itself into wherever other thinkers look for God. As I
said before, it is good to know where we need not go - for example not to
try to logicise about what there was before the creation of our Universe.
But understanding, or even getting a roughest idea of, or even being able to
logically push the "do not cross" (axiomacity) line of probability is of key
importance to human thought, both ontologically, and practically.
If you are able to draw a distinct line for the illiterate me between
subatomic randomness and macro-world randomness, and to show that these are
thoroughly different animals that happen to give the same reading on our
radars, you'll make me a happy man for a few days to come. That is, for
until I see how un-elegant world turns out to be this way.
<snip>
Regards,
Piotr
Keynes
>
>Uzytkownik "Keynes" <Key...@earthlink.net> napisal w wiadomosci
>news:vh5o10te54skoreq0...@4ax.com...
>> On Sat, 31 Jan 2004 14:50:50 +0100, "Sur" <piot...@plusnet.pl> wrote:
>>
>>
>> "Which is why humans will never be replaced by computers."
>> Too late for that. It's happening all over the world.
>
>Naah, I don't subscribe to this point of view. Of course, most of what
>you're saying is true, but it's all not making Us obsolete at all. Rather,
>the line is shifting closer towards Us, which is a great opportunity to
>clearly see what we really are all about. In Poland, where I am at, things
>may not seem as acute as you see them, but I do read Wired Mag, so I get the
>picture.
>
>As a deChardinist (?) in principle, I am worried that human beings are
>becoming merely a functional part in a larger organism, just as some
>bacteria are alleged to have become mitochondria in our bodies at some point
>in the evolution. But that's anti-globalist, transhumanist stuff that's out
>of the point here.
>
Humanity IS a super-organism.
No one can survive independently.
>As for today's relation between humans and the computers, the near future
>seems rosey to me, because all the chores, the obvious stuff (all your
>examples falling in that category) are taken care of, so humans can
>concentrate on what they have developed for - making choices in chaotic,
BS. Computers will do it faster and cheaper.
>unpredictable, "artistic" situations. I believe it takes millions and
>millions of years of evolution, and thousands of year of culture to get
>where We have got. We are amphibians accustomed to living at the edge of the
>elements of chaos and order, which is where value that we can conceive is
>created. That truly is what people were *always* appreciated and liked for
>by peers and the opposite sex - the ability to transcend apparent reason, to
>tell a surprising joke, to find or create order where all logic ended up
>with pure chaos. Not for being able to translate a picture into words, read
>barcodes or crunch numbers in financial statements of their companies.
>
Dreamer.
Of course folks each believe they have a value in and for themselves,
but without an income, a person is despised and useless.
I don't make these rules, you know.
>Whining about the economic uselessness of people reminds me of
>post-communist countries like Poland, where old-industy people complain how
>good it was for them in the old system. Sorry, life is about adaptation or
>dying.
Very market oriented. I hope you can sell yourself at a profit.
If you can't adapt, then you have my permission to die,
"and decrease the surplus population", in the immortal
words of Ebenezer Scrooge. May the doomed 'whine', sir?
>Actually, there are concepts out there to the effect that in the
>future work may be an obsolete thing. It is one possible scenario that we
>may all just be making choices for a living. As I look at the TV, some (if
>pungent) air of that seems to emerge - viewers are increasingly encouraged
Do you get paid for watching TV, and writing on the net?
Good for you.
>to make pseudo-choices to win awards, and everybody wants to participate -
>sending SMS's like crazy to vote for who is to go from this season's reality
>show. That is the bottom part of it, but I think it is good to bear in mind,
>and thence to project the whole image of the possible future.
>
"Whining" is my forte. You have a very polyanna-ish view of human value.
So do I, but we are living in an efficiency driven economic system that
has no use for people as such, only those people who are currently 'useful'.
The US economy is being devastated. If it falls, the whole world suffers.
Since WWII the US economy has been based on luxury consumption
in order to provide fullest employment. This has led to one of the highest
standards of living in the world. The USA is THE major consumer.
Now we are suffering unemployment at about 1930's great depression
levels, and no new jobs are being created in the USA. In fact there
is a continuing drain on decent jobs, and jobs of any kind at all.
We have been able to provide excellent infrastructure, roads, schools,
courts, police, firemen, parks, environmental cleanup, good wages,
immense military, etc. But the 3rd world has none of those expenses.
They get the jobs not yet automated, and americans get cheap products.
However, our tax structure has been destroyed, making the maintenance
of our standard of living impossible. Wages decline, taxes decline, the
dollar declines, national debt and the trade imbalances increase,
and we are in no position to even keep our bridges from falling down
and our schools open.
First it was the blue collar folks left to downsize themselves out of the
middle class. Now it's highly skilled IT folks and managers who can't
pay their mortgages and keep their SUVs running. The USA has painted
itself into a corner, where luxury living can't be maintained, and the whole
nation is turning into a shabby slum of folks who can't meet expenses.
All this because the market system has no use for people as such.
How long we will sink into decline depends entirely on whether
we can find a REASON for people to exist besides having some
sort of a job. The current USA power structure ignores the
problem, and their media ignores it as well. How long will
the people be fooled? Not all that long. But what then?
Military suppression of the masses no doubt.
It has happened before.
>In short, your examples go no way towards showing that humans as such are
>being replaced by machines.
They certainly do, Dr.Pangloss.
>And we need not search for the justification
>four our life vis-a-vis machines -
What is the value of anyone without a job?
Nothing but a drain on the economy, say the powers that be.
The plan is to deny them food, shelter, and health care.
That ought to fix everything.
>they know no value other than what we
>define as value for them. What is value for us we are sometimes unaware of,
>but it is in a realm where any "AI" supercomputer is a disposable
>calculator.
>
>I would be happy to go on forever, but I'm off to bed now,
>
Sweet dreams, young prince.
Sur
> On Sun, 1 Feb 2004 05:57:35 +0100, "Sur" <piot...@plusnet.pl> wrote:
>
> >
> >Uzytkownik "Keynes" <Key...@earthlink.net> napisal w wiadomosci
> >news:vh5o10te54skoreq0...@4ax.com...
> >> On Sat, 31 Jan 2004 14:50:50 +0100, "Sur" <piot...@plusnet.pl> wrote:
<snip sad man's agressive-defeatist whining>
> Sweet dreams, young prince.
>
I think you should consider drinking heavily. It won't make things any worse
than you say they are, and it just may give your mind some rest from too
much "thinking big". You may find that more effective in making your or
anyone else's day than your thinking. People may even begin to like you!
Consider that. And you will be harder to exploit for the power-greedy
coalition of your car's active suspension, your internet-wired
fridge-freezer and the worst of them all, the vicious traffic light control
system. And that is a good thing, too.
Before you do, you can contemplate what machines will do with all that
wealth they will have obtained by exploiting "the gooeys", as they will soon
call us. How will they define 'value' for themselves? What will be the token
in their thriving economy?
"Matrix" is a good, insightful film, but you should try something else for a
change. Ask at your local library.
Piotr
andy-k
news:9e39ba1.04020...@posting.google.com...
>
> But 101 is the most important, so it is good to be reminded of it.
>
> The difficulty is one of language. Replace random with uncaused, and
> there is less confusion and more utility.
>
> Uncaused events are necessarily unpredictable; the term "true
> randomness" is unfortunate and leads to pointless argument.
I'm not sure where the obfuscation lies here -- I consider the terms
'true randomness' as opposed to 'apparent randomness' to be synonymous
with the terms 'uncaused events' as opposed to 'caused events for which
no cause is yet known'. Could you explain why you think there is some
confusion here, or grounds for pointless argument?
1Z
>
> Kam:
> I emphatically disagree with that last point.
> Occam's razor tells us not to needlessly multiply
> entities. That is, we should only keep those
> entities which are not superfluous to a given
> explanation (as demons are superfluous to an
> explanation of disease - disease is fully explained
> by entities such as bacteria). Since randomness is
> not an explanation, but a lack of explanation, it
> doesn't adhere to Occam's razor. After all, we
> do not explain an event by asserting that it has
> no cause.
We do not explain it by asserting that it has unknown causes either.
I am not suggesting we should substitute randomness for causes
where we actually have known, cognised causes.
I am saying
that in the case of a phenomenon where no causality
can be uncovered, we should adopt as a working hypothesis
the simplest (non-explanatory) account, that it is random, rather
than the more complex non-explanatory account that it has some
mysteruious, unknown cause.
(We might subseqeuntly have reason to revise our belief, of course).
1Z
> However, the essentials, ignoring QM, are that we are indeed a robot
> determined by our meme and gene programming. Free will is an illusion.
> It is an inescapable conclusion if we reject magic. Even allowing for QM
> doesn't save as, if an event is truly random, than there is no "I" that
> has any control over them, since they are random!
There is no need for a separate, homuncular 'I'.
The contention is that a human being, as a total system,
can produce different responses, even under identical
circumstances (the 'free' bit) and do so in a purposive, rational
(the 'will' bit) way.
Ironically , the evolutionary model
gives a good insight into how free will can be achieved, via
quantum indeterminacy, without engedering erratic, irrational
behaviour.
What you need is one part of the brain to randomly generate
ideas and another part to select out the sensible ones.
>
> >
> > It might be that this is not true in principle (and therefore not
> > covered under the notion that "all information" is what could in
> > theory be gathered, even if it were practically impossible), yet I am
> > part of a totally determined system. I think this is important to
> > point out because it's common for people to think that consciousness
> > is some miracle cure for determinism and blind evolution.
>
> There are two issues here. The physics and consciousness. If the laws of
> physics are correct,
Are correct, and the only kind of laws or causality operating.
Since the laws of microphysics only give probabilites, there
is an opening for higher level laws (or causality) to close
the causal gap and add the extra weighting as to what the actual outcome is.
In order to exclude emergence you need deterministic micro-physics
(or a good reason to believe in the completness of indeterministic physics).
> However, consciousness, is indeed an emergent propertie that is not a
> result of knowledge of its parts
> (http://www.anasoft.co.uk/replicators/thehardproblem.html). By the above
> statement, it follows that consciousness must be an observer, incapable
> of taking any physical action, and indeed, rational evaluations show
> that this appears to be the case. For example, the time delays actually
> measured show that actions are performed before they get reported to the
> consciousness, i.e. delays between the event and feeling pain, delays
> between signals indicting finger movement as to when the finger moves,
> even though we consciously think we move the finger immediately.
That evidence is far from univocal. The original experimentor
thinks they do not disprove FW (because you can have the readiness potential
without the action). See also the detailed rebuttal in Dennett's Freedom Evolves.
> There is a distinction, but it is the laws that "cause" the goals. Laws
> of physics themselves are *all* non random, even if *some* of them
> *describe* random behaviour. For example, the shrodinger equation is a
> completely deterministic equation.
SE is not the whole story or we would see half-dead and half-alive cats.
1Z
1Z
> This is similar to the issue of how you can punish a person for bad
> behavior if everything is strictly determined. The premise of the
> question contradicts what it is asserting. Once you use the term event
> (in the normal sense) you are asserting it has a cause.
No, when use the term effect you are implying a cause.
>This is what
> pulls in the pixies.
>
> A huge problem with true randomness fulfilling Ocams razor, is prior
> to the 20th century saying the sun was power by randomness seems to
> be the best formulation. That can't be right.
Randomness fulfills Oi's R for events with no obvious cause or
pattern only. So the Sun analogy doesn't work.
Kevin Aylward
> "Kevin Aylward" <kevindotayl...@anasoft.co.uk> wrote in
> message
>
>> However, the essentials, ignoring QM, are that we are indeed a robot
>> determined by our meme and gene programming. Free will is an
>> illusion. It is an inescapable conclusion if we reject magic. Even
>> allowing for QM doesn't save as, if an event is truly random, than
>> there is no "I" that has any control over them, since they are
>> random!
>
> There is no need for a separate, homuncular 'I'.
The effective actions of an "I" can be duplicated without an "I" but
this is not an "I" by assumption, only an impostor.
>
> The contention is that a human being, as a total system,
> can produce different responses, even under identical
> circumstances (the 'free' bit) and do so in a purposive, rational
> (the 'will' bit) way.
>
> Ironically , the evolutionary model
> gives a good insight into how free will can be achieved, via
> quantum indeterminacy, without engedering erratic, irrational
> behaviour.
> What you need is one part of the brain to randomly generate
> ideas and another part to select out the sensible ones.
>
Well, yes, I already address this specifically at
http://www.anasoft.co.uk/replicators/specialreplicators.html followed up
at http://www.anasoft.co.uk/replicators/intelligence.html.
The brain is a Darwinian machine. End of story.
>
>
>
>> However, consciousness, is indeed an emergent propertie that is not a
>> result of knowledge of its parts
>> (http://www.anasoft.co.uk/replicators/thehardproblem.html). By the
>> above statement, it follows that consciousness must be an observer,
>> incapable of taking any physical action, and indeed, rational
>> evaluations show that this appears to be the case. For example, the
>> time delays actually measured show that actions are performed before
>> they get reported to the consciousness, i.e. delays between the
>> event and feeling pain, delays between signals indicting finger
>> movement as to when the finger moves, even though we consciously
>> think we move the finger immediately.
>
> That evidence is far from univocal. The original experimentor
> thinks they do not disprove FW (because you can have the readiness
> potential without the action). See also the detailed rebuttal in
> Dennett's Freedom Evolves.
I only came acquainted with these experiments after the fact. Simple
logic dictates that there is not a true "I". The only way to get a true
"I" that is non deterministic and has actualy control over its own
actions, is to simply declare that to be the case. I don't see the issue
as debatable whatsoever. We are a mechanical machine running under the
laws of physics. There is no independent control possible of the laws of
physics. Period.
>
>> There is a distinction, but it is the laws that "cause" the goals.
>> Laws of physics themselves are *all* non random, even if *some* of
>> them *describe* random behaviour. For example, the shrodinger
>> equation is a completely deterministic equation.
>
> SE is not the whole story or we would see half-dead and half-alive
> cats.
Not at all. The shrodinger cat is an old, discredited and false
interpretation of QM. Many have moved on from such a daft notion. e.g.
see http://www.anasoft.co.uk/quantummechanics/index.html
Craig Franck
> Craig Franck wrote:
>
> > "1Z" wrote
> >> Look, if a system is deterministic, one state is always predictable
> >> from another (by the definition of determinism). If information about
> >> state A tells you
> >> all you everything about state B, there is not additional information
> >> to
> >> state B (by the definition of information), so all states contain the
> >> same information. QED.
> >
> > If you consider consciousness part of biological evolution (I think
> > you must since it's arguably one of evolution's best novelties),
>
> It exists, but it doesn't appear to do anything.
I can't agree with that. At a bare minimum, you could argue that
consciousness is a global orientation response to novel situations.
The value of consciousness is it's an "all hands on deck" mode
that allows different parts of the system to communicate with one
another. When unconscious blind processes can't solve a problem,
the brain calls everyone together for a meeting so the different parts
can work together.
I admit that subjective awareness shouldn't be absolutely necessary
for this to occur. In fact, we unconsciously process vastly more than
we do consciously. But consciousness helps in the same way saying
a difficult passage in a book out loud to yourself or writing a math
problem down on paper does. Even if we are total automatons,
consciousness has this function.
> However, the essentials, ignoring QM, are that we are indeed a robot
> determined by our meme and gene programming. Free will is an illusion.
> It is an inescapable conclusion if we reject magic. Even allowing for QM
> doesn't save as, if an event is truly random, than there is no "I" that
> has any control over them, since they are random!
My view on the self is similar to Dennett's narrative center of gravity.
"I" am a semi-fictional abstract social construct spun together to make
sense of my experiences.
I agree that, in the end, the only logically coherent way to view free will
might be that I'm free to the extend that my actions are not coerced
externally. Every other way of looking at it has a great many problems.
I don't really have a problem with calling free will an illusion since
consciousness itself is a type of illusion. Free will is as real as solid
objects: They appear so phenomenologically, which is the realm
us conscious creatures inhabit.
> There are two issues here. The physics and consciousness. If the laws of
> physics are correct, it is, in principle, *not* possible in a
> deterministic system to take any physical action that is not mandated by
> its elementary parts. That is, there are no physical effective emergent
> properties possible. Period. So "might" is a definite no.
I understand this position, but the problem I have is people can be
viewed as representational beings that are driven by unconscious
processes that are largely symbolic in nature. This has enormous
implications when it comes to behavior, free or determined.
I had a dream last night that I was shopping for shoes in a mall with
Helen Hunt. Saying I was determined by the laws of physics to do this
is probably the least interesting comment one could make. That particular
actress, the setting in a mall, and shoes mean something. It could be my
brain was just unconsciously processing residue of the day's events when
the "spotlight" of consciousness got thrown onto those mental images.
(I tend not to believe this because dreams contain common narratives
that repeat themselves in various, personality-specific ways. So dreams
are thoughts similar to daytime thoughts.)
But from a logical point of view, it makes sense to say that my genetic
makeup, my personal experiences, and my environment determine what I
do. You have to deal with things on the level in which you hope to explain
them unless you have some way of translating one level of explanation onto
the one above it. I understand you believe consciousness is emergent,
but most mental process are unconscious. How they occur when we
are conscious of them might be exactly how they occur when we are not.
This is why dreams are weird. But they must be explained at the mental
level. A first shot at AI will probably be an unconscious system that
occasionally breaks out in a dream. So that should be explainable without
having to deal with consciousness itself, which you consider an insolvable
problem
> http://www.anasoft.co.uk/replicators/intelligence.html
> http://www.anasoft.co.uk/replicators/consciousness.html
>
> However, consciousness, is indeed an emergent propertie that is not a
> result of knowledge of its parts
> (http://www.anasoft.co.uk/replicators/thehardproblem.html). By the above
> statement, it follows that consciousness must be an observer, incapable
> of taking any physical action, and indeed, rational evaluations show
> that this appears to be the case. For example, the time delays actually
> measured show that actions are performed before they get reported to the
> consciousness, i.e. delays between the event and feeling pain, delays
> between signals indicting finger movement as to when the finger moves,
> even though we consciously think we move the finger immediately.
I'll have to address this further in another post. I take this to be
consistent with the notion that our actions are to a large degree
determined subconsciously, and the body is part of the subconscious.
Kevin Aylward
> "Kevin Aylward" wrote
>
>> Craig Franck wrote:
>>
>>> "1Z" wrote
>
>>>> Look, if a system is deterministic, one state is always predictable
>>>> from another (by the definition of determinism). If information
>>>> about state A tells you
>>>> all you everything about state B, there is not additional
>>>> information to
>>>> state B (by the definition of information), so all states contain
>>>> the same information. QED.
>>>
>>> If you consider consciousness part of biological evolution (I think
>>> you must since it's arguably one of evolution's best novelties),
>>
>> It exists, but it doesn't appear to do anything.
>
> I can't agree with that.
Oh?
>At a bare minimum, you could argue that
> consciousness is a global orientation response to novel situations.
> The value of consciousness is it's an "all hands on deck" mode
> that allows different parts of the system to communicate with one
> another. When unconscious blind processes can't solve a problem,
> the brain calls everyone together for a meeting so the different parts
> can work together.
This really has nothing to do with consciousness. By consciousness I am
specifically referring the the aspect that we are actually *aware*. We
feel pain etc. There appears no need for this aspect. Awareness is
simple a VDU. Any and all processes that is nominally attributed to
consciousness would appear to be all achievable by non-conscious
processes.
>
> I admit that subjective awareness shouldn't be absolutely necessary
> for this to occur.
Indeed. For this to be the case, physics as we know it, would be
fundamentally wrong, imo.
>In fact, we unconsciously process vastly more than
> we do consciously. But consciousness helps in the same way saying
> a difficult passage in a book out loud to yourself or writing a math
> problem down on paper does.
Don't buy this in the least. Consciousness is the result of the
mass-energy physical electro chemical construct of the brain. Anything
that consciousness achieves is only achieved by actions of a physical
machine. There is no physical mechanism that allows "awareness" to take
any direct physical action, so how can it be an aid?
>Even if we are total automatons,
> consciousness has this function.
Nothing in physics indicates that that the physical electro chemical
construct of the brain requires that we be *aware* of anything in order
to take any physical action whatsoever.
http://www.anasoft.co.uk/replicators/consciousness.html
http://www.anasoft.co.uk/replicators/thehardproblem.html
>
>> However, the essentials, ignoring QM, are that we are indeed a robot
>> determined by our meme and gene programming. Free will is an
>> illusion. It is an inescapable conclusion if we reject magic. Even
>> allowing for QM doesn't save as, if an event is truly random, than
>> there is no "I" that has any control over them, since they are
>> random!
>
> My view on the self is similar to Dennett's narrative center of
> gravity. "I" am a semi-fictional abstract social construct spun
> together to make sense of my experiences.
I have very little credibility in philosophers. If they don't have any
credentials in a hard science, their views are pretty much aimless
bedroom meanderings. To understand consciousness and the human brain one
needs to understand the details of hardware and software controlled
machines, as that is what a brain is. Philosophers simply don't have the
background to make useful contributions in this area.
The above quote is meaningless waffle.
Conscious awareness is simply something that arises when very
complicated interacting systems get together.
>
> I agree that, in the end, the only logically coherent way to view
> free will might be that I'm free to the extend that my actions are
> not coerced externally.
This is simply not true. If we ignore the random generation
complication, everything you know think do and say is a *direct* result
of your gene (nature) and meme (nurture) programming. Its that simple.
We only have an illusion of free will because of the complexity of
actually identifying this direct control.
If you "decide" to go to the pub. Why did you do this? well, because, I
was in the way of my wife. Why was this...etc...
>Every other way of looking at it has a great
> many problems.
*All* ways of bringing in a true "I" are flawed. The laws of physics
tell us what to do. End of story.
"But I canna change the laws of physics, Captain!" - Scotty, Star trek.
>
> I don't really have a problem with calling free will an illusion since
> consciousness itself is a type of illusion.
Frew will is an illusion, consciousness is not. A kick in the balls is
usually adequate proff of this true, but unprovable fact.
>Free will is as real as
> solid objects: They appear so phenomenologically, which is the realm
> us conscious creatures inhabit.
I disagree. I am so aware now that my decisions are not free will. I can
trace the essentials of all of my decisions to a cause. You should try
this sometime.
"That which is mostly observed, is that which replicates the most"
http://www.anasoft.co.uk/replicators/index.html
>
>> There are two issues here. The physics and consciousness. If the
>> laws of physics are correct, it is, in principle, *not* possible in a
>> deterministic system to take any physical action that is not
>> mandated by its elementary parts. That is, there are no physical
>> effective emergent properties possible. Period. So "might" is a
>> definite no.
>
> I understand this position, but the problem I have is people can be
> viewed as representational beings that are driven by unconscious
> processes that are largely symbolic in nature. This has enormous
> implications when it comes to behavior, free or determined.
>
> I had a dream last night that I was shopping for shoes in a mall with
> Helen Hunt. Saying I was determined by the laws of physics to do this
> is probably the least interesting comment one could make.
Well, yes I agree with the intent here. A determination "in principle",
often has no practical relevance.
> That particular actress, the setting in a mall, and shoes mean
something.
> It could be my brain was just unconsciously processing residue of the
> day's events when the "spotlight" of consciousness got thrown onto
> those mental images. (I tend not to believe this because dreams
> contain common narratives that repeat themselves in various,
> personality-specific ways. So dreams are thoughts similar to daytime
> thoughts.)
>
> But from a logical point of view, it makes sense to say that my
> genetic makeup, my personal experiences, and my environment determine
> what I do.
Yes.
>You have to deal with things on the level in which you
> hope to explain them unless you have some way of translating one
> level of explanation onto the one above it. I understand you believe
> consciousness is emergent, but most mental process are unconscious.
> How they occur when we are conscious of them might be exactly how
> they occur when we are not.
Yes.
>
> This is why dreams are weird. But they must be explained at the mental
> level. A first shot at AI will probably be an unconscious system that
> occasionally breaks out in a dream. So that should be explainable
> without having to deal with consciousness itself, which you consider
> an insolvable problem.
Note that the insolvability bit is *only* that we are aware. That is, We
*feel* pain. There is no physical action, that can't, in principle be
explained by unconscious processes. That is, there are no unsolvable
physical processes, in principle.
So, although there is a gap in physics in accounting for consciousness,
the gap has no physical consequences or meaning. Consciousness is simply
irrelevant in explaining physical behaviour.
>
>> http://www.anasoft.co.uk/replicators/intelligence.html
>> http://www.anasoft.co.uk/replicators/consciousness.html
>>
>> However, consciousness, is indeed an emergent propertie that is not a
>> result of knowledge of its parts
>> (http://www.anasoft.co.uk/replicators/thehardproblem.html). By the
>> above statement, it follows that consciousness must be an observer,
>> incapable of taking any physical action, and indeed, rational
>> evaluations show that this appears to be the case. For example, the
>> time delays actually measured show that actions are performed before
>> they get reported to the consciousness, i.e. delays between the
>> event and feeling pain, delays between signals indicting finger
>> movement as to when the finger moves, even though we consciously
>> think we move the finger immediately.
>
> I'll have to address this further in another post. I take this to be
> consistent with the notion that our actions are to a large degree
> determined subconsciously, and the body is part of the subconscious.
Almost all of what we do is unconscious or subconscious. Consciousness
is just the tip of the proverbial iceberg.
1Z
> >At a bare minimum, you could argue that
> > consciousness is a global orientation response to novel situations.
> > The value of consciousness is it's an "all hands on deck" mode
> > that allows different parts of the system to communicate with one
> > another. When unconscious blind processes can't solve a problem,
> > the brain calls everyone together for a meeting so the different parts
> > can work together.
>
> This really has nothing to do with consciousness. By consciousness I am
> specifically referring the the aspect that we are actually *aware*. We
> feel pain etc. There appears no need for this aspect. Awareness is
> simple a VDU.
With a little man watching it ??
> Any and all processes that is nominally attributed to
> consciousness would appear to be all achievable by non-conscious
> processes.
Simpyl not true. Consciousness is connected with the abilty to
verbalise, recall, learn think and so forth. All of these
things are much less effective, if possible at all, in their
unconscious forms. as hard evidence from psychology demonstrates.
> >
> > I admit that subjective awareness shouldn't be absolutely necessary
> > for this to occur.
>
> Indeed. For this to be the case, physics as we know it, would be
> fundamentally wrong, imo.
> >In fact, we unconsciously process vastly more than
> > we do consciously. But consciousness helps in the same way saying
> > a difficult passage in a book out loud to yourself or writing a math
> > problem down on paper does.
>
> Don't buy this in the least. Consciousness is the result of the
> mass-energy physical electro chemical construct of the brain.
"Digestion is the result of the
mass-energy physical electro chemical construct of the stomach and intestines. "
>Anything
> that consciousness achieves is only achieved by actions of a physical
> machine.
"Anything
that digestion achieves is only achieved by actions of a physical
machine."
>There is no physical mechanism that allows "awareness" to take
> any direct physical action, so how can it be an aid?
"There is no physical mechanism that allows "digestion" to take
any direct physical action, so how can it be an aid?"
But..of course, it is precisely the fact that digestion is
physical that allows it to have physical effects. Somehow
you must be assuming that awareness is a NON-PHYSICAL effect of
the physical brain. But I can see nothing to support that
assumption.
> >Even if we are total automatons,
> > consciousness has this function.
>
> Nothing in physics indicates that that the physical electro chemical
> construct of the brain requires that we be *aware* of anything in order
> to take any physical action whatsoever.
As explained, consciousness does not enable us to
perform any individual action, it rather makes everything
else more effective, like the conductor of an orchestra.
> I have very little credibility in philosophers.
credibility = credulity ?
>If they don't have any
> credentials in a hard science, their views are pretty much aimless
> bedroom meanderings. To understand consciousness and the human brain one
> needs to understand the details of hardware and software controlled
> machines, as that is what a brain is. Philosophers simply don't have the
> background to make useful contributions in this area.
But Dennett is involved in hands-on AI research.
> The above quote is meaningless waffle.
Given that Dennett sells a lot of books, whereas you are a bit
'challenged' in the English department, it might behove you to keep quiet
about that.
> This is simply not true. If we ignore the random generation
> complication, everything you know think do and say is a *direct* result
> of your gene (nature) and meme (nurture) programming. Its that simple.
AI's can alter their own programming, why can't humans ?
And what happens if we don't ignore the random number complication.
Oh, and your answer doesn't contradict anythign Craig said.
As you would have understood if you read up on the philosphy of FW.
> We only have an illusion of free will because of the complexity of
> actually identifying this direct control.
> If you "decide" to go to the pub. Why did you do this? well, because, I
> was in the way of my wife. Why was this...etc...
So there are no inexplicable, spontaneous or creative decisions.
1Z
> 1Z wrote:
> > "Kevin Aylward" <kevindotayl...@anasoft.co.uk> wrote in
> > message
> >
> >> However, the essentials, ignoring QM, are that we are indeed a robot
> >> determined by our meme and gene programming. Free will is an
> >> illusion. It is an inescapable conclusion if we reject magic. Even
> >> allowing for QM doesn't save as, if an event is truly random, than
> >> there is no "I" that has any control over them, since they are
> >> random!
> >
> > There is no need for a separate, homuncular 'I'.
>
> The effective actions of an "I" can be duplicated without an "I" but
> this is not an "I" by assumption, only an impostor.
When I say 'I' I mean my brain and body, and I certainly can't act without
them. Do you know what 'homunculus' means ?
> > Ironically , the evolutionary model
> > gives a good insight into how free will can be achieved, via
> > quantum indeterminacy, without engedering erratic, irrational
> > behaviour.
> > What you need is one part of the brain to randomly generate
> > ideas and another part to select out the sensible ones.
> >
>
> Well, yes, I already address this specifically at
> http://www.anasoft.co.uk/replicators/specialreplicators.html followed up
> at http://www.anasoft.co.uk/replicators/intelligence.html.
>
> The brain is a Darwinian machine. End of story.
That does not address the issue, which is why you think an
'I' separate from the mind and body is needed for free will.
> >
> > That evidence is far from univocal. The original experimentor
> > thinks they do not disprove FW (because you can have the readiness
> > potential without the action). See also the detailed rebuttal in
> > Dennett's Freedom Evolves.
>
> I only came acquainted with these experiments after the fact. Simple
> logic dictates that there is not a true "I".
What simple logic is that ?
>The only way to get a true
> "I" that is non deterministic and has actualy control over its own
> actions, is to simply declare that to be the case.
The laws of physics allow both indeterminism and self-control (eg
cybernetics). I fail to see your objection.
> I don't see the issue
> as debatable whatsoever. We are a mechanical machine running under the
> laws of physics. There is no independent control possible of the laws of
> physics. Period.
Who said anything about controlling the laws of physics?
The question is whether a system can both control itself and behave
indeterminisitically. It would only be necessary to override
physics, if it were impossible within physics, which you have assumed
rather than demonstrated.
> >
> >> There is a distinction, but it is the laws that "cause" the goals.
> >> Laws of physics themselves are *all* non random, even if *some* of
> >> them *describe* random behaviour. For example, the shrodinger
> >> equation is a completely deterministic equation.
> >
> > SE is not the whole story or we would see half-dead and half-alive
> > cats.
>
> Not at all. The shrodinger cat is an old, discredited and false
> interpretation of QM.
It's not an interpretation, it is a parable intended to
demonstrate the problems with an interpretation.
>Many have moved on from such a daft notion. e.g.
> see http://www.anasoft.co.uk/quantummechanics/index.html
The ensemble interpretation is itself obsolete, since
all the puzzling aspects of physics can be demonstrated
with single-particle experiments.
Your views on QM contain more fallacies than I can easily
catalogue at the moment.
Kevin Aylward
> "Kevin Aylward" <kevindotayl...@anasoft.co.uk> wrote in
> message
>
>>> At a bare minimum, you could argue that
>>> consciousness is a global orientation response to novel situations.
>>> The value of consciousness is it's an "all hands on deck" mode
>>> that allows different parts of the system to communicate with one
>>> another. When unconscious blind processes can't solve a problem,
>>> the brain calls everyone together for a meeting so the different
>>> parts can work together.
>>
>> This really has nothing to do with consciousness. By consciousness I
>> am specifically referring the the aspect that we are actually
>> *aware*. We feel pain etc. There appears no need for this aspect.
>> Awareness is simple a VDU.
>
> With a little man watching it ??
>
>> Any and all processes that is nominally attributed to
>> consciousness would appear to be all achievable by non-conscious
>> processes.
>
> Simpyl not true.
Of course it is.
>Consciousness is connected with the abilty to
> verbalise, recall, learn think and so forth.
Yes, it is connected with such things, however, there is no reason to
believe that being consciously *aware* of such aspects makes a
difference in the slightest.
Maybe you are misinterpreting how I am referring to consciousness. I
mean conscious awareness.
All of these
> things are much less effective, if possible at all, in their
> unconscious forms. as hard evidence from psychology demonstrates.
You are simply looking at this from a too naive point of view.
Of course when people are "conscious", as usually understood by that
term, their behaviour is different than when unconscious, but this is
besides the point. The fact that one is *aware* that they are aware is
the bit that is redundant.
You don't seem to be able to distinguish the electro-chemical workings
of the brain and its manifestations. Please explain exactly how
"consciousness" can *physically* make your finger move.
>
>
>
>>>
>>> I admit that subjective awareness shouldn't be absolutely necessary
>>> for this to occur.
>>
>> Indeed. For this to be the case, physics as we know it, would be
>> fundamentally wrong, imo.
>
>
>
>>> In fact, we unconsciously process vastly more than
>>> we do consciously. But consciousness helps in the same way saying
>>> a difficult passage in a book out loud to yourself or writing a math
>>> problem down on paper does.
>>
>> Don't buy this in the least. Consciousness is the result of the
>> mass-energy physical electro chemical construct of the brain.
>
>
> "Digestion is the result of the
> mass-energy physical electro chemical construct of the stomach and
> intestines. "
>
>> Anything
>> that consciousness achieves is only achieved by actions of a physical
>> machine.
>
> "Anything
> that digestion achieves is only achieved by actions of a physical
> machine."
>
>> There is no physical mechanism that allows "awareness" to take
>> any direct physical action, so how can it be an aid?
>
> "There is no physical mechanism that allows "digestion" to take
> any direct physical action, so how can it be an aid?"
Of course there is. The stomach contains acids and enzymes that act by
quantum mechanical processes, principally by the electronic forces
between molecules. Reactions take place between molecules by these
electric forces. "Consciences" is just a word used to describe a
condition that is not derivable by physics.
>
> But..of course, it is precisely the fact that digestion is
> physical that allows it to have physical effects. Somehow
> you must be assuming that awareness is a NON-PHYSICAL effect of
> the physical brain.
Nonsense. I have been excruciating clear that awareness is absolutely
nothing more than a result of the electro-chemical processes of the
brain. However, it is not derivable from such processes by the laws of
physics. Look up Godel, statements can be true, but non provable.
>But I can see nothing to support that
> assumption.
You can't even read. However, please explain the physical process that
"awareness" can take real physical action.
>
>
>>> Even if we are total automatons,
>>> consciousness has this function.
>>
>> Nothing in physics indicates that that the physical electro chemical
>> construct of the brain requires that we be *aware* of anything in
>> order to take any physical action whatsoever.
>
> As explained, consciousness does not enable us to
> perform any individual action, it rather makes everything
> else more effective, like the conductor of an orchestra.
Please explain in what way being "aware" actively effects physical
processes.
You seem to be confusing the physical mechanism that results in what we
declare to be conscious, with consciousness itself. There is no logical
requirement that the physical mechanism that results in conscious
awareness, requires that that we be consciously aware. Of course we do
different things when we are conscious, but there is no reason that
there should be anything like an awareness to it. I can make a computer
go, "it hurts" when I kick it in its metal balls. As I keep stating, in
principle, there does not seem to be any physical action a machine can
take that requires conscious awareness. Any and all physical behaviour
that coinsides with the general state named "conscious", does not seem
to require consciousness itself, i.e. awareness of that state.
>
>
>> I have very little credibility in philosophers.
>
> credibility = credulity ?
>
>> If they don't have any
>> credentials in a hard science, their views are pretty much aimless
>> bedroom meanderings. To understand consciousness and the human brain
>> one needs to understand the details of hardware and software
>> controlled machines, as that is what a brain is. Philosophers simply
>> don't have the background to make useful contributions in this area.
>
> But Dennett is involved in hands-on AI research.
I don't know his background. He might well be involved in AI research.
All that matters, In my book, is whether or not he has significant
training in software controlled hardware machines. A mathematician just
don't pull the mustard. I have read some of his stuff, and it was
blatantly false.
>
>> The above quote is meaningless waffle.
>
> Given that Dennett sells a lot of books, whereas you are a bit
> 'challenged' in the English department,
Get real dude. You might do well to spell "Simpyl" correctly. Do you
not know how to use a spell checker?
>it might behove you to keep
> quiet about that.
Selling books means nothing whatsoever. Maybe you are suckered by memes.
Evolution has ensured that we preferentially select (e.g. agree with)
the most popular traits, that is, the most maximised traits. People who
don't philosophise don't write much on philosophy, so we tend not to
agree with them, irrespective of their value.
Secondly, writing a bit of prose is irrelevant to someone's skills as an
engineer and a scientist. Feel free to download my software which
demonstrates actual real world abilities. Talk is cheap. Show me some
evidence that a philosopher has any real value to society.
>
>
>> This is simply not true. If we ignore the random generation
>> complication, everything you know think do and say is a *direct*
>> result of your gene (nature) and meme (nurture) programming. Its
>> that simple.
>
> AI's can alter their own programming, why can't humans ?
You are still missing the point. You are arguing on 101 stuff. This sort
of control is not the sort of control we identify with the proverbial
soul.
> And what happens if we don't ignore the random number complication.
I have already explained.
> Oh, and your answer doesn't contradict anythign Craig said.
Oh?
> As you would have understood if you read up on the philosphy of FW.
I am well versed in what free will is, thank you very much.
>
>> We only have an illusion of free will because of the complexity of
>> actually identifying this direct control.
>
>
>
>> If you "decide" to go to the pub. Why did you do this? well,
>> because, I was in the way of my wife. Why was this...etc...
>
> So there are no inexplicable, spontaneous or creative decisions.
Ho hummm.
I explained, in detail, that yes, there is a random trait generator in
the brain, possible a quantum mechanical one. The brain is a darwinian
machine, generation, selection and replication of traits. However!!!! a
truly randam event is something that no "I" has any control over, becuse
its hey randam dude!!!. All we have is deterministic processes, the sole
result of *prior* genetic and memetic programming, selecting *random*
outputs of a generator. None of this is consistent with their being a
true "I" that has any *independent* control of what it does. Something
new is required. Only a soul can produce a *true* "I".
Kevin Aylward
> "Kevin Aylward" <kevindotayl...@anasoft.co.uk> wrote in
> message news:<8JxTb.486$Sa5...@newsfep3-gui.server.ntli.net>...
>> 1Z wrote:
>>> "Kevin Aylward" <kevindotayl...@anasoft.co.uk> wrote in
>>> message
>>>
>>>> However, the essentials, ignoring QM, are that we are indeed a
>>>> robot determined by our meme and gene programming. Free will is an
>>>> illusion. It is an inescapable conclusion if we reject magic. Even
>>>> allowing for QM doesn't save as, if an event is truly random, than
>>>> there is no "I" that has any control over them, since they are
>>>> random!
>>>
>>> There is no need for a separate, homuncular 'I'.
>>
>> The effective actions of an "I" can be duplicated without an "I" but
>> this is not an "I" by assumption, only an impostor.
>
> When I say 'I' I mean my brain and body, and I certainly can't act
> without them. Do you know what 'homunculus' means ?
In this context it would appear to be a little man inside your head.
>
>>> Ironically , the evolutionary model
>>> gives a good insight into how free will can be achieved, via
>>> quantum indeterminacy, without engedering erratic, irrational
>>> behaviour.
>>> What you need is one part of the brain to randomly generate
>>> ideas and another part to select out the sensible ones.
>>>
>>
>> Well, yes, I already address this specifically at
>> http://www.anasoft.co.uk/replicators/specialreplicators.html
>> followed up at
>> http://www.anasoft.co.uk/replicators/intelligence.html.
>>
>> The brain is a Darwinian machine. End of story.
>
> That does not address the issue, which is why you think an
> 'I' separate from the mind and body is needed for free will.
If we first ignore Quantum Mechanical randomness, then the mind and body
is totally deterministic by the laws of classical physics. In this case
there is no "I" that can control anything, i.e. no free will is
possible. Therefore they would have to be something outside of physics
that could override such deterministic physics.
If we introduce Quantum Mechanical randomness the issue of a controlling
"I" is moot, as "I" can not have control over a random process as the
process is random.!
>
>
>>>
>>> That evidence is far from univocal. The original experimentor
>>> thinks they do not disprove FW (because you can have the readiness
>>> potential without the action). See also the detailed rebuttal in
>>> Dennett's Freedom Evolves.
>>
>> I only came acquainted with these experiments after the fact. Simple
>> logic dictates that there is not a true "I".
>
> What simple logic is that ?
See above. Its pretty trivial really. Unless there is a soul, *true*
free will can not exist.
>
>> The only way to get a true
>> "I" that is non deterministic and has actualy control over its own
>> actions, is to simply declare that to be the case.
>
> The laws of physics allow both indeterminism and self-control (eg
> cybernetics). I fail to see your objection.
This is a complete misunderstanding of self-control. The concept is
being used in a different context. Robots/cybernetics don't have self
control in the sense that they can truly take independent action. They
can only do what they are programmed to do, which includes taking action
based on a random generator.
>
>> I don't see the issue
>> as debatable whatsoever. We are a mechanical machine running under
>> the laws of physics. There is no independent control possible of the
>> laws of physics. Period.
>
> Who said anything about controlling the laws of physics?
> The question is whether a system can both control itself and behave
> indeterminisitically.
Again, this concept of self-control is not the same as in what is
proposed that a human might have if it had free will, due to a soul for
example. The same phrase is being used with different meanings. In fact,
in is only this weaker sense of self-control that is all that is
achievable by humans.
Again, having a non deterministic output, by itself, is irrelevant to
whether there is a true "I".
> It would only be necessary to override
> physics, if it were impossible within physics, which you have assumed
> rather than demonstrated.
I agree, I have assumed that physics is king. I base my arguments on an
axiom of "there is no magic". If this axiom is proven incorrect, than my
arguments would fail. Do you have any proof in magic?
>
>
>>>
>>>> There is a distinction, but it is the laws that "cause" the goals.
>>>> Laws of physics themselves are *all* non random, even if *some* of
>>>> them *describe* random behaviour. For example, the shrodinger
>>>> equation is a completely deterministic equation.
>>>
>>> SE is not the whole story or we would see half-dead and half-alive
>>> cats.
>>
>> Not at all. The shrodinger cat is an old, discredited and false
>> interpretation of QM.
>
> It's not an interpretation, it is a parable intended to
> demonstrate the problems with an interpretation.
>
>> Many have moved on from such a daft notion. e.g.
>> see http://www.anasoft.co.uk/quantummechanics/index.html
>
> The ensemble interpretation is itself obsolete,
You don't know what your talking about.
>since
> all the puzzling aspects of physics can be demonstrated
> with single-particle experiments.
That's correct, and this is exactly what the quantum ensemble approaches
tells us is the case. You appear to misunderstand the ensemble approach.
The ensemble is about an ensemble of *systems* not an ensemble of
particles. This is the most basic aspect of the ensemble approach.
>
> Your views on QM contain more fallacies than I can easily
> catalogue at the moment.
Not at all. The view is held by *experts* in quantum mechanics, as I
noted on my web page. You might do well to check them out. It was also
held as correct by Einstein. Unfortunately, in my graduate quantum
mechanics physics classes I was initially introduced to the old,
erroneous interpretation and suffered many misconceptions due to this.
Fortunately, it was certainly an eye opener to obtain a graduate text
book that explained in detail what a correct account of QM is.
It is clear that it is you that is clueless on QM. If you understood
even the basics of what I presented, you should have realised that the
Ensemble approach is trivially compatible with all known experiments.
For example, it would make no sense if a practising universtity
professor of physics, an expert in his field of Quantum Mechanics, if he
were teaching a theory known to be experimentally false. Get real dude.
Kamerynn
andy-k wrote:
> "Kamerynn" <idon'tdoe...@sorry.com> wrote in message
> news:101m19k...@corp.supernews.com...
>
>>andy-k wrote:
>>
>>>Two points Kam:
>>>
>>>Firstly, I don't know how it can be shown that true random events
>>>don't exist in nature.
>>
>>Kam:
>> Nor do I, and I do not argue that such a thing
>>can be shown, if by "shown" you mean "display
>>empirical evidence in favor of." But, by the same reasoning,
>>we cannot show that random events in fact occur. All we can do
>>is continue to search for causes, and perhaps not find
>>them.
>> I do believe, however, that there is no such thing
>>as an uncaused event.
>> "The postulate on which we think about the universe
>>is that there is a fixed quantitative relation between
>>every phenomenon and its antecedents and consequents.
>>If there is such a thing as a phenomenon without these
>>fixed quantitative relations, it is a miracle. It is
>>outside the law of cause and effect, and as such
>>transcends our power of thought, or at least is
>>something to or from which we cannot reason."
>> --Oliver Wendell Holmes
>>
>> Essentially, I believe that the universe is
>>reasonable. I also believe in Ex Nihilo Nihil Fit
>>(from nothing, nothing can become).
>> It's hard to argue for such fundamental principles.
>>All I can really say is that I cannot concieve of an
>>event arising from nothing at all (such a thing, in
>>the words of Holmes, "transcends our power of thought").
>
>
> I wonder what Mr. Wendell Holmes would have had to say on the issue of
> radioactive decay.
Kam:
He would likely say that there is a reason for it.
And, furthermore, that any assertion to the contrary
is a cop-out - is a manifestation of laziness... an
unwillingness to search for that reason.
> It is certainly the case that there are events with
> which we can as yet associate no antecedent events, and to postulate the
> existence of such events that are hidden from us seems just as
> metaphysical as to postulate that there are none.
Kam:
Both are equally metaphysical, but one is, none the less,
a preferable position. We ought to assume that every event
has a cause if for no other reason than to keep searching
for those causes.
To postulate an event that arose without any antecedents
is to postulate an event "to or from which we cannot reason."
After all, if an event is nomologically disconnected to any
antecedents, then why should we think that it is not a
nomological dangler? That is, why should we believe that
such an event would still adhere to our cause/effect notions,
preceeding other events in a normal causal (law-like) manner?
If an event is disconnected from the universe inasmuch as it
has no causal events attached to it, then why should it be
reconnected to the world so that it can have causes of its
own? It seems that we must give up that world view if we are to
postulate an event without a fixed, quantitative realtion
to its antecedents.
A related question: how exaustive must a search for
antecedents be before we *ought* to conclude that there
aren't any (for a given event)? Is there such a thing
as a search that is that exaustive?
> We fall back on
> prejudice, I think, but such prejudices are often grounded in the very
> driving force that gave rise to our rational faculty -- their utility in
> aiding our survival and reproduction.
Kam:
Exactly. The points I'm making all add up to the
notion that continuing to search for antecedents is the
only *practical* behavior available to us.
>
> That the universe is reasonable goes without saying if we take the word
> 'reasonable' to refer to the presence of order (the natural laws). And
> regarding the idea of an event arising from nothing at all, there never
> is 'nothing at all' -- there's always the whole rest of the universe,
> and it's a pretty big claim to say that there's nothing in the whole
> history of the whole universe that may be associated with a particular
> (seemingly random) event.
Kam:
Yes - it's a huge leap to believe that an event
arose without any antecedents - that is, out of nothing.
Because an uncaused event surely arises out of nothing;
no matter how many things there are in the universe, none
of them would be connected to an uncaused event.
<snip>
>>>As you
>>>say above, it remains fruitful to search for causes since this often
>>>throws up spin-off discoveries even if it doesn't answer the
>>>question to hand.
>>>
>>>Secondly, if we dismiss true randomness in the process of evolution
>>>by natural selection (and ignoring the much argued possibility of
>>>free will in the domain of human affairs) what remains is strong
>>>causal determinism. Even postulating a 'final cause' (teleology)
>>>implies an absence of contingency.
>>>Are you arguing that it is premature to dismiss
>>>the possibility that the natural world may be unfolding in a manner
>>>that is completely devoid of contingency -- i.e. according to total
>>>predestination?
>
>
>>Kam:
>> Considering how you are using the term "contingent,"
>>then yes, I suppose I am (with qualifications).
>> To split a hair: any contingent event is contingent
>>upon some other event that causes it. So, to reword
>>the assertion: it is possible that every event is contingent
>>on another event.
>> This use of "contingent" better fits the history
>>of philosophy, as far as I can tell.
>> "A necessary truth is one that could not have
>>been otherwise. It would have been true *under all circumstances.*
>>[my emphasis] A contingent truth is one that is true
>>as it happens, or as things are."
>> --Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy
>> In other words, any event, even though it
>>is necessarily caused by another event (because
>>all causation proceeds necessarily, in this sense)
>>is still contingent unless, in Leibniz's words,
>>it must have occurred in all possible worlds.
>>I'll consider this hair split.
>> I would not argue that the universe unfolds in a
>>predestined manner because that implies teleology or
>>*purpose*. It may simply be the case that all events
>>in the history of time are caused by their antecedents.
>>The universe may be going nowhere in particular (no
>>teleology) because events have no end (or beginning).
>
>
> I would use the word 'contingent' in this application to mean that an
> event could have been otherwise, given precisely the same conditions.
> Let's say we observe a radioactive decay event at a particular time
> 't1'. If we could run time backwards and repeat that very same scenario,
> then would the event necessarily happen again at 't1', or could it
> happen at a different time 't2'? Only in the latter case would I refer
> to it as being contingent (i.e. it could have been otherwise), and only
> in the latter case can I see the avoidance of predestination. Of course,
> since we can't run time backwards and have another go, we will never
> know the answer to this question.
>
> Incidentally, I don't regard predestination as synonymous with
> teleology -- rather it is synonymous with pure determinism. Given a set
> of starting conditions, and given rules for the unfolding of a system,
> then the state of the system may be calculated for any time in that
> unfolding -- i.e. it is predestined. The only thing that would prevent
> such a calculation would be contingent factors in the system, and if
> such factors are truly contingent, then they are truly random. Thus, as
> far as I can see, in order to avoid predestination we must postulate the
> existence of true randomness.
Kam:
Given your explanation of the words you're using,
I agree.
But, I do not think that the question of randomness
vs. determinism is important. If there is such a thing
as a truely random event, we will never know it. As I've
stated elsewhere, we can only continue to search for causes
and perhaps not find them. So, we will never be able to
definitively decide on the question of randomness vs.
determinism.
Question: is there anything wrong with the idea
of predestination... with the idea of determinism?
I must, at this point, remind myself of my ignorance
of QM. I'm not so sure that probability denies cause,
but if it does, then I'm not very fond of it.
Keynes
>
>Uzytkownik "Keynes" <Key...@earthlink.net> napisal w wiadomosci
>news:eiqq1056kb3572gr7...@4ax.com...
>> On Sun, 1 Feb 2004 05:57:35 +0100, "Sur" <piot...@plusnet.pl> wrote:
>>
>> >
>> >Uzytkownik "Keynes" <Key...@earthlink.net> napisal w wiadomosci
>> >news:vh5o10te54skoreq0...@4ax.com...
>> >> On Sat, 31 Jan 2004 14:50:50 +0100, "Sur" <piot...@plusnet.pl> wrote:
>
><snip sad man's agressive-defeatist whining>
>> Sweet dreams, young prince.
>>
<Begin 'non-aggressive' pointless flame from outer space, or Poland>
>I think you should consider drinking heavily. It won't make things any worse
>than you say they are, and it just may give your mind some rest from too
>much "thinking big". You may find that more effective in making your or
>anyone else's day than your thinking. People may even begin to like you!
Physician, heal thyself.
>Consider that. And you will be harder to exploit for the power-greedy
>coalition of your car's active suspension, your internet-wired
>fridge-freezer and the worst of them all, the vicious traffic light control
>system. And that is a good thing, too.
>
>Before you do, you can contemplate what machines will do with all that
>wealth they will have obtained by exploiting "the gooeys", as they will soon
>call us. How will they define 'value' for themselves? What will be the token
>in their thriving economy?
>
Too cute.
>"Matrix" is a good, insightful film, but you should try something else for a
>change. Ask at your local library.
>
I guess those movies have warped somebody's mind.
>Piotr
>
I haven't seen the matrix I, II,or III.
Assuming you are not as stupid as you appear,
here is some advice that you can take or leave.
(HA! We know what you'll do already, but sail on.)
This is al.philospophy, not alt.flame.
Flames are fun for the immature, but they don't cut it here.
If you disagree with a post, then you should address the points
that you disagree with, and not ignore them and go ad hominem.
If you do lose your mind, then you will be ignored by folks who
still have theirs. This group is for discussion, not for rabid dogs
fond of the sound of their own barking.
To reiterate my point. So-called human intelligence is easily
simulated by computers. Computers are replacing humans not by
their own power, but by human preference for computers over
more expensive and troublesome humans. In the current thinking
of the world, 'useless' humans deserve to die by inches, if not
sooner. This could be a problem for humans. Ignoring or
denying this fact will get you nowhere, even before you know it.
<And now, a few words from the Polish ham.>
Kamerynn
Kevin Aylward wrote:
> Kamerynn wrote:
>
>>1Z wrote:
>><snip>
>>
>>>Well, it isn't because there is no associated entity. Randomness
>>>is an absence of causality.
>>>In fact it is the other way round: to say there are hidden causes
>>>for events we cannot explain is to make a methaphysical posit.
>>>True Randomness is the explanantion that fulfills Occam's razor.
>>
>>Kam:
>> I emphatically disagree with that last point.
>>Occam's razor tells us not to needlessly multiply
>>entities. That is, we should only keep those
>>entities which are not superfluous to a given
>>explanation (as demons are superfluous to an
>>explanation of disease - disease is fully explained
>>by entities such as bacteria). Since randomness is
>>not an explanation, but a lack of explanation,
>
>
> No it isnt.
Kam:
Yes it is :-)
>
> < it
>
>>doesn't adhere to Occam's razor.
>
>
> Yes is does.
Kam:
No, it doesn't.
I suppose that we both give reasons for these mere
assertions, below.
>
>
>>After all, we
>>do not explain an event by asserting that it has
>>no cause.
>>We can only explain it by discovering its
>>cause - and Occam's razor is most certainly an axiom
>>meant to guide (scientific) explanation.
>
>
> I emphatically disagree. There needs to be a reason why something
> *should* be in a pattern, not an explanation as to why there is no
> pattern. A pattern requires some sort of principle to exist. Why would
> this principle exist?
Kam:
My point isn't that such patterns must exist.
My point is that asserting that an event is uncaused
does not explain that event. More below.
> This principle needs an explanation, therefore
> does not satisfy occams razor.
>
> The default position is that there are no principles, hence randomness
> must be considered the default axiom from which departures from such
> random behaviour must be explained. We don't require a reason for
> randomness, because by axiomatic assumption, there is none, therefore it
> is the simpler solution.
Kam:
Despite popular belief, Occam's razor is not about
simplicity. According to Occam, "Pluralitas non est
ponenda sine neccesitate" or "plurality should not be
posited without necessity." In order to *explain* an
event, we *absolutely must* provide a reason - a cause -
for its being so. If we say that an event has no
cause - no reason for being so - then we do not explain
it. We are saying, in such a case, that there is no
cause/reason/explanation.
Just think: if we ask "why" (asking for an
explanation), we are asking for a reason or a cause.
If we say that there is no cause - no reason - then we
*are not answering the question.* We are saying that it has
no answer. Again, Occam's point is clearly about explanation.
We *must*, for example, posit the existence of *something*
in order to explain disease. We have posited the existence
of bacteria. *That* doesn't defy Occam's razor (you state
that asserting randomness would adhere to Occam's razor,
and by contraposition, then, the positing of a cause
would defy Occam's razor). What would defy Occam's razor
is the positing of *something additional and superfluous*
like the existence of demons. We do not need demons to
explain disease - bacteria does this already. Positing
demons in order to explain disease is "positing plurality
without necessity." Positing bacteria instead of randomness
(or lack of cause/reason/explanation) is not.
Craig Franck
> Craig Franck wrote:
> > At a bare minimum, you could argue that
> > consciousness is a global orientation response to novel situations.
> > The value of consciousness is it's an "all hands on deck" mode
> > that allows different parts of the system to communicate with one
> > another. When unconscious blind processes can't solve a problem,
> > the brain calls everyone together for a meeting so the different parts
> > can work together.
>
> This really has nothing to do with consciousness. By consciousness I am
> specifically referring the the aspect that we are actually *aware*. We
> feel pain etc. There appears no need for this aspect. Awareness is
> simple a VDU. Any and all processes that is nominally attributed to
> consciousness would appear to be all achievable by non-conscious
> processes.
I'm willing to stipulate that is the case. There could be a planet filled
with creatures much like ourselves whom "it is not like anything to be."
Just as you can build any digital circuit, up to and including the most
sophisticated microprocessors available today, using just NAND gates,
you could hardwire any behavior. However, from an evolutionary POV,
conscious creatures can much more readily deal with novel situations.
I address the issue of the function of awareness a little further down.
> > In fact, we unconsciously process vastly more than
> > we do consciously. But consciousness helps in the same way saying
> > a difficult passage in a book out loud to yourself or writing a math
> > problem down on paper does.
>
> Don't buy this in the least. Consciousness is the result of the
> mass-energy physical electro chemical construct of the brain. Anything
> that consciousness achieves is only achieved by actions of a physical
> machine. There is no physical mechanism that allows "awareness" to take
> any direct physical action, so how can it be an aid?
It's an aid in that, when a system has certain characteristics that result
in awareness, it can deal much better with novel situations than an
equally complex non-conscious system.
What I am saying is that consciousness is something that arises when a
species' nervous system develops a certain kind of complexity. A spider's
brain is probably the transitional point, and they may or may not be
sentient creatures.
I understand your point about awareness, but I would say it's mostly a
question of semantics. The main difference between me and a philosophical
zombie is I'm aware my experiences, and the zombie isn't. But I'd also say
that we have different nervous systems because mine has a conscious
mental work space and his doesn't.
You could make the argument that my consciousness is "just along for the
ride" and doesn't do anything: When I make a conscious decision, all I'm
doing is observing my mental mechanisms at work. I don't see this as a
major problem because I'm of the school that most of your personality
is the result of the functioning of your unconscious, a person being just
sort of tossed around by the waves, so to speak, with well-adjusted people
traveling on much calmer seas.
In this sense, the center of our being is generally inaccessible to us. To
say I did something due to unconscious drives of whatever nature as
opposed to total metaphysical free will and reason doesn't bother me.
> > My view on the self is similar to Dennett's narrative center of
> > gravity. "I" am a semi-fictional abstract social construct spun
> > together to make sense of my experiences.
>
> I have very little credibility in philosophers. If they don't have any
> credentials in a hard science, their views are pretty much aimless
> bedroom meanderings.
This is a common reaction to him. He's a philosopher to the cog-sci folks,
and a cog-sci person to the philosophers. I'd say that puts him pretty much
in the middle. To the extent he lacks some credentials, his ideas do get
a thorough working over by both sides.
> > I agree that, in the end, the only logically coherent way to view
> > free will might be that I'm free to the extend that my actions are
> > not coerced externally.
>
> This is simply not true.
I was referring to the William James formulation of free will. Even if we
are totally determined internally, we are considered free moral agents as
long as we act under our own steam. This comes from the observation
that no normal individual under normal circumstances is so determined
that they MUST run a red light. They might be totally determined to
decide to run it, but they COULD have stopped if they were MORE law
abiding. Get enough tickets and the threat of losing their license suddenly
makes them predetermined to stop next time.
> So, although there is a gap in physics in accounting for consciousness,
> the gap has no physical consequences or meaning. Consciousness is simply
> irrelevant in explaining physical behaviour.
I remember an interesting discussion I had with a behaviorist. If the
behaviorist view of human psychology is mostly correct, could that
theory account for all the other theories being able to be generated?
The most extreme situation would be an unconscious zombie arguing
vehemently that it's simply obvious to him he's conscious. What is
different about the experience of the zombie who thinks he has this
incredibly rich internal existence and the one who thinks he doesn't?
andy-k
> andy-k wrote:
>
> > I wonder what Mr. Wendell Holmes would have had to say on the issue
> > of radioactive decay.
>
> Kam:
> He would likely say that there is a reason for it.
> And, furthermore, that any assertion to the contrary
> is a cop-out - is a manifestation of laziness... an
> unwillingness to search for that reason.
I'm not suggesting that the postulation of uncaused events should
relieve us of the task of searching for causes Kam -- just saying that
we may only dismiss the postulate on grounds of prejudice.
When a cause can be associated with an event then that event can be put
to bed. Until then, the issue must remain open.
> > We fall back on
> > prejudice, I think, but such prejudices are often grounded in the
> > very driving force that gave rise to our rational faculty -- their
> > utility in aiding our survival and reproduction.
>
> Kam:
> Exactly. The points I'm making all add up to the
> notion that continuing to search for antecedents is the
> only *practical* behavior available to us.
> > That the universe is reasonable goes without saying if we take the
> > word 'reasonable' to refer to the presence of order (the natural
> > laws). And regarding the idea of an event arising from nothing at
> > all, there never is 'nothing at all' -- there's always the whole
> > rest of the universe, and it's a pretty big claim to say that
> > there's nothing in the whole history of the whole universe that may
> > be associated with a particular (seemingly random) event.
>
> Kam:
> Yes - it's a huge leap to believe that an event
> arose without any antecedents - that is, out of nothing.
> Because an uncaused event surely arises out of nothing;
> no matter how many things there are in the universe, none
> of them would be connected to an uncaused event.
Predestination and determinism are anathema to supporters of the
metaphysical postulate of freedom of the will and it seems that they
will go to any lengths to keep the issue alive. In order to remain
neutral I feel I must concede the point that there is no water-tight
argument against uncaused events. However, even granting such things,
it still leaves me in the dark as to how this possibility helps the
libertarian position: the will is an ordered process, not a random
process, so now they have to show how it is possible to have non-random
uncaused events. I haven't come across a convincing account of such
things yet.
Sur
> On Mon, 2 Feb 2004 01:04:54 +0100, "Sur" <piot...@plusnet.pl> wrote:
>
> >
> >Uzytkownik "Keynes" <Key...@earthlink.net> napisal w wiadomosci
> >news:eiqq1056kb3572gr7...@4ax.com...
> >> On Sun, 1 Feb 2004 05:57:35 +0100, "Sur" <piot...@plusnet.pl> wrote:
> >>
> >> >
> >> >Uzytkownik "Keynes" <Key...@earthlink.net> napisal w wiadomosci
> >> >news:vh5o10te54skoreq0...@4ax.com...
> >> >> On Sat, 31 Jan 2004 14:50:50 +0100, "Sur" <piot...@plusnet.pl>
wrote:
> >
> ><snip sad man's agressive-defeatist whining>
> >> Sweet dreams, young prince.
> >>
>
> <Begin 'non-aggressive' pointless flame from outer space, or Poland>
Oh, sorry, something must have gone wrong with my star-trek translating
device, which prevented me from seeing how your posting was not untoward,
and free of personal sneers just because I was not enough of a headlong
fatalist for you.
> >Before you do, you can contemplate what machines will do with all that
> >wealth they will have obtained by exploiting "the gooeys", as they will
soon
> >call us. How will they define 'value' for themselves? What will be the
token
> >in their thriving economy?
> >
>
> Too cute.
Hmm, my pocket translator throwing out garbage again. So again, what was the
rational, unbiased and thoroughly referenced comment you were making?
> >"Matrix" is a good, insightful film, but you should try something else
for a
> >change. Ask at your local library.
> >
>
> I guess those movies have warped somebody's mind.
>
> >Piotr
> >
>
> I haven't seen the matrix I, II,or III.
> Assuming you are not as stupid as you appear,
> here is some advice that you can take or leave.
> (HA! We know what you'll do already, but sail on.)
>
> This is al.philospophy, not alt.flame.
I didn't realize you were an entity from an alt. group
> Flames are fun for the immature, but they don't cut it here.
> If you disagree with a post, then you should address the points
> that you disagree with, and not ignore them and go ad hominem.
> If you do lose your mind, then you will be ignored by folks who
> still have theirs. This group is for discussion, not for rabid dogs
> fond of the sound of their own barking.
<spit wiped off, proceed>
>
> To reiterate my point. So-called human intelligence is easily
> simulated by computers.
The examples you have mentioned are not examples of human intelligence, not
by any definition of intelligence other than those devised by marketeers of
the "smart" contraptions. Unless of course you refer to intelligence as the
ability to collate a few ominous WIRED Magazine headlines. Yes, I believe
computers could do that. In fact, that can be referred to as "simulation" of
human intelligence, as you put it.
> Computers are replacing humans not by
> their own power, but by human preference for computers over
> more expensive and troublesome humans.
But so was human musle and simple skill replaced by machines in the
industrial revolution! You could make a point that you don't like
industrialis(z?)ation, and would prefer to live in a bucolic paradise, say a
word or two about Thoreau etc., and I could accept that sympathetically.
The sad truth is that time necessitates progress towards consolidation and
specialization, which is easy to demonstrate on examples, and to explain
logically. Every once in a while the process becomes abrupt enough to
replace the old with the new, which is aptly described by the theory of
catastrophes. Mind you, there are certain premises to think that maybe, just
maybe, humanity can keep moving after this turnaround, just as it did after
the previous ones.
As you say, it is humans who choose to use computers over humans in certain
tasks. So I now understand that you understand we are here to stay. OK. And
tell you what, I wouldn't like to be a person who does the kind of job a
computer can do just as well. Such as typing dictated text (BTW computer
programs have stalled at the level of hardly acceptable 98% accuracy a few
years ago). Such jobs are a disgrace for humanity anyway.
Of course preference for computers has a dramatic impact on the labour
market, but this is not an alt.what.to.do.with.all.these.people group.
> In the current thinking
> of the world, 'useless' humans deserve to die by inches, if not
> sooner. This could be a problem for humans. Ignoring or
> denying this fact will get you nowhere, even before you know it.
>
There is a difference between understanding threats and difficulties which
go hand-in-hand with any change, and going hysterical about them. Mother
Teresa, personally I am the kind of person who does not find a need for
people who can only think mechanically. No matter if you are a lavatory
attendant or a financial analyst, people with human minds can tell if you
are essentially a robot, or a persona with flair, empathy, instincts (ever
heard of "soft" skills and how they are considered more and more important
by employers), the kind of things that computers will *never* be able to
mimic, for reasons that are easy to explain to anyone <witticism deleted>.
You don't blow against the wind to save mankind. You have to open your eyes
and see humans for what they are, and what they are for each other, what new
interactions can be expected, how the interactions can be helped to proceed
away from (ubiquitous indeed) fossilizing mechanization, etc.
Quite obviously, concerns related with the transformation we are currently
undergoing, are a topic for a very inspiring intellectual debate, in which I
would be more than happy to humbly indulge with you, as soon as I get my
translator repaired to understand your language. Thing is, the nearest
dealership is in Klingon or something like that.
> <And now, a few words from the Polish ham.>
If that's not a flame, then it's just because your matches have lost their
heads. Held in a damp box for too long.
1Z
> To reiterate my point. So-called human intelligence is easily
> simulated by computers.
Poppycock.
1Z
> Despite popular belief, Occam's razor is not about
> simplicity. According to Occam, "Pluralitas non est
> ponenda sine neccesitate" or "plurality should not be
> posited without necessity." In order to *explain* an
> event, we *absolutely must* provide a reason - a cause -
> for its being so.
OK, but it remains the case that saying "X has hidden
causes that no-on knows about" explains nothing. And
postulates and entity, a hidden cause, that the equally
non-explanatory "X has no cause" does not.
Kevin Aylward
> Uzytkownik "Keynes" <Key...@earthlink.net> napisal w wiadomosci
> news:tu0020h7oqgl5m7uj...@4ax.com...
>> On Mon, 2 Feb 2004 01:04:54 +0100, "Sur" <piot...@plusnet.pl> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> Uzytkownik "Keynes" <Key...@earthlink.net> napisal w wiadomosci
>>> news:eiqq1056kb3572gr7...@4ax.com...
>> In the current thinking
>> of the world, 'useless' humans deserve to die by inches, if not
>> sooner. This could be a problem for humans. Ignoring or
>> denying this fact will get you nowhere, even before you know it.
>>
> There is a difference between understanding threats and difficulties
> which go hand-in-hand with any change, and going hysterical about
> them. Mother Teresa, personally I am the kind of person who does not
> find a need for people who can only think mechanically. No matter if
> you are a lavatory attendant or a financial analyst, people with
> human minds can tell if you are essentially a robot, or a persona
> with flair, empathy, instincts (ever heard of "soft" skills and how
> they are considered more and more important by employers), the kind
> of things that computers will *never* be able to mimic,
Of course computers might well be able to have these features, in
principle. The brain is essentially a computer based on Darwinian
algorithms. We will simply constract direct *physical* analogies of the
brain, and by the laws of physics, they will behave identically if the
analogies are exact. We might even do this by artificially creating
neurons and such like. You seem to be under the illusion that "man made
computer" is restricted to digital computers of the von Newman type. It
isn't.
for reasons
> that are easy to explain to anyone <witticism deleted>. You don't
> blow against the wind to save mankind. You have to open your eyes and
> see humans for what they are, and what they are for each other, what
> new interactions can be expected, how the interactions can be helped
> to proceed away from (ubiquitous indeed) fossilizing mechanization,
> etc.
Indeed, you need to open your eyes and see what a human really is. It is
a physical construct of mass-energy, implemented by electro-chemical
actions under the laws of physics, as such, there is no reason, in
principle, why such human intelligence can not be artificially created.
It has already been created by nature.
Kevin Aylward
> Kevin Aylward wrote:
>
>> This principle needs an explanation, therefore
>> does not satisfy occams razor.
>>
>> The default position is that there are no principles, hence
>> randomness must be considered the default axiom from which
>> departures from such random behaviour must be explained. We don't
>> require a reason for randomness, because by axiomatic assumption,
>> there is none, therefore it is the simpler solution.
>
> Kam:
> Despite popular belief, Occam's razor is not about
> simplicity. According to Occam, "Pluralitas non est
> ponenda sine neccesitate" or "plurality should not be
> posited without necessity." In order to *explain* an
> event, we *absolutely must* provide a reason - a cause -
> for its being so. If we say that an event has no
> cause - no reason for being so - then we do not explain
> it. We are saying, in such a case, that there is no
> cause/reason/explanation.
You miss the basic point. *All* explanations *always* resolve to an
axiom that we take as a given. There is no absolute truth, i.e. absolute
explanations. So, we do not *have* to explain *all* events, because this
is inherently *impossible* to do in *principle*. Everything is relative,
so we resolve all explanations to an arbitrary agreed starting point.
Science has "decided" that random behaviour is unexplainable at any
deeper level. No one has ever been able to artificially generate a
*true* random sequence. We only use pseudo random sequences, so to try
and find an explanation for something that is truly random is like
herding cats.
"Physical concepts are free creations of the human mind, and are not,
however it may seem, uniquely determined by the external world." -
Einstein.
There are no absolute explanations.
> Just think: if we ask "why" (asking for an
> explanation), we are asking for a reason or a cause.
> If we say that there is no cause - no reason - then we
> *are not answering the question.* We are saying that it has
> no answer.
So what, this is the nature of the beast. As Godel shows us, statements
can be true, but not provable.
1Z
> Predestination and determinism are anathema to supporters of the
> metaphysical postulate of freedom of the will and it seems that they
> will go to any lengths to keep the issue alive. In order to remain
> neutral I feel I must concede the point that there is no water-tight
> argument against uncaused events. However, even granting such things,
> it still leaves me in the dark as to how this possibility helps the
> libertarian position: the will is an ordered process, not a random
> process, so now they have to show how it is possible to have non-random
> uncaused events.
There is no problem there at all. A sequence of events, or rather actions,
is non-random if it displays an intelligible pattern. (Man steps out of
car. Buys newspaper. Notices date. Rushes into florist..).
But the fact that the sequence of events displays an intelligble pattern
is logically quite independent of its having an overall, external
cause. In fact, not only is it the case that we make sense of
each others actions in terms of aims and goals they are aiming towards,rather
than causes they are stemming from, we are rather more likely to advert
to external, prior causes in the case of erratic, irrational behaviour
(Is he on drugs?)
Sur
Użytkownik "Kevin Aylward" <kevindotayl...@anasoft.co.uk> napisał w
wiadomości news:U13Ub.60$_D...@newsfep3-gui.server.ntli.net...
I haven't read). Can human personality (as in reasoning+emotions+intuition)
exist without such primal emotions embedded in them? Of course, you may say
that they are of no use, but they are a part of a "richness" which we
recognise as humaneness (sorry for my English). A computer based on
Darwinian algorithms alright, but what about the millenia of input into
billions and billions of people with millions of millions brain cells each,
sieving the input through gazillions of interactions over centuries,
survivals and extinctions, each instance of choice between the two guided by
complex relationships between brains more complex than we can hope to
construct in centuries to come. We are now allegedly close to mimicking the
intelligence of a single cat on machines. But the real brain is the brain of
the entire civilisation, our individual complex brains being but individual
neurons therein. Want to try recreate entire civilisation as described
above? Good luck.
>
> for reasons
> > that are easy to explain to anyone <witticism deleted>. You don't
> > blow against the wind to save mankind. You have to open your eyes and
> > see humans for what they are, and what they are for each other, what
> > new interactions can be expected, how the interactions can be helped
> > to proceed away from (ubiquitous indeed) fossilizing mechanization,
> > etc.
>
> Indeed, you need to open your eyes and see what a human really is. It is
> a physical construct of mass-energy, implemented by electro-chemical
> actions under the laws of physics, as such, there is no reason, in
> principle, why such human intelligence can not be artificially created.
> It has already been created by nature.
Well, personally I basically believe in Gurjiev's (see P. Uspenski) view on
what it is to be human, but that's hardly ground for a
philosophical-in-the-western-sense debate. For a more logically founded
explanation, see above.
Piotr
andy-k
news:fd762132.04020...@posting.google.com...
>
> There is no problem there at all. A sequence of events, or rather
actions, is non-random if it displays an intelligible pattern. (Man
steps out of car. Buys newspaper. Notices date. Rushes into florist..).
But the fact that the sequence of events displays an intelligble pattern
is logically quite independent of its having an overall, external cause.
In fact, not only is it the case that we make sense of each others
actions in terms of aims and goals they are aiming towards,rather than
causes they are stemming from, we are rather more likely to advert to
external, prior causes in the case of erratic, irrational behaviour (Is
he on drugs?)
As humans we have a faculty that allows us to foresee possible
consequences of our actions, and to tailor our actions in accordance
with those consequences. This doesn't make such an act an uncaused
event -- it remains a caused event, and exhibits order. An uncaused
event is an event that has neither 'external' nor 'internal' causes, and
I'm still left with the question of how it is possible to have
non-random uncaused events.
tg
In this, and in earlier comments involving Occam's Razor, both sides
seem to ignore the functioning of science. In principle, at least, we
don't "stop looking". If I think that there is a cause, I will look
for it, and if I think there is no cause, someone else will look for
it. There is neither parsimony nor prejudice involved.
> >
> > That the universe is reasonable goes without saying if we take the word
> > 'reasonable' to refer to the presence of order (the natural laws). And
> > regarding the idea of an event arising from nothing at all, there never
> > is 'nothing at all' -- there's always the whole rest of the universe,
> > and it's a pretty big claim to say that there's nothing in the whole
> > history of the whole universe that may be associated with a particular
> > (seemingly random) event.
>
> Kam:
> Yes - it's a huge leap to believe that an event
> arose without any antecedents - that is, out of nothing.
> Because an uncaused event surely arises out of nothing;
> no matter how many things there are in the universe, none
> of them would be connected to an uncaused event.
The argument about connectedness is nice, but isn't it just a form of
tree-in-the-forest with time reversed? All events qualify as an
antecedent cause for our detection of them. So if we are bound by
physics---which is internally consistent and useful, but only admits
to phenomena which it has already detected---then we can say that no
cause _can_ exist for some events, because we have eliminated all
"existing" phenomena.
Of course, our thoughts are free from the bounds of physics, and we
can create internally consistent and useful constructs and call them
philosophy. The problem arises when either physics or philosophy is
misapplied to the other.
The area where neither discipline is clear is in our understanding or
conception of time, and time is central to the issue of causality.
-tg
tg
> "tg" <tgde...@earthlink.net> wrote in message
> news:9e39ba1.04020...@posting.google.com...
> >
> > But 101 is the most important, so it is good to be reminded of it.
> >
> > The difficulty is one of language. Replace random with uncaused, and
> > there is less confusion and more utility.
> >
> > Uncaused events are necessarily unpredictable; the term "true
> > randomness" is unfortunate and leads to pointless argument.
>
> I'm not sure where the obfuscation lies here -- I consider the terms
> 'true randomness' as opposed to 'apparent randomness' to be synonymous
> with the terms 'uncaused events' as opposed to 'caused events for which
> no cause is yet known'. Could you explain why you think there is some
> confusion here, or grounds for pointless argument?
Well, on principle, use of terms like "true" and "real" and "apparent"
kicks my bs alert level into the red. It is usually the sign of an
attempt to appropriate the definition of a word for one's own
purposes. It is not subject to objective verification.
I don't think there are ever grounds for pointless argument.;-)
The confusion is the result of departing from traditional usage of
the words "random" (unpredictable, pattern-less) and "caused"
(preceded by a requisite event.)
It is reasonable in that usage to suggest that an event might have a
cause and still be unpredictable. Is that what you disagree with?
"Caused events for which no cause is yet known" of course begs the
question, since it assumes a cause when none is known. (????)
-tg
andy-k
news:9e39ba1.04020...@posting.google.com...
> "andy-k" <spam.free@last> wrote in message
news:<uGoTb.57$Sa5...@newsfep3-gui.server.ntli.net>...
> > >
> > > But 101 is the most important, so it is good to be reminded of it.
> > >
> > > The difficulty is one of language. Replace random with uncaused,
> > > and there is less confusion and more utility.
> > >
> > > Uncaused events are necessarily unpredictable; the term "true
> > > randomness" is unfortunate and leads to pointless argument.
> >
> > I'm not sure where the obfuscation lies here -- I consider the terms
> > 'true randomness' as opposed to 'apparent randomness' to be
> > synonymous with the terms 'uncaused events' as opposed to 'caused
> > events for which no cause is yet known'. Could you explain why you
> > think there is some confusion here, or grounds for pointless
> > argument?
>
> Well, on principle, use of terms like "true" and "real" and "apparent"
> kicks my bs alert level into the red. It is usually the sign of an
> attempt to appropriate the definition of a word for one's own
> purposes. It is not subject to objective verification.
Then it's nothing more than personal preference in the use of words?
> I don't think there are ever grounds for pointless argument.;-)
Me neither -- that's why I'd like to know why you think that this
particular use of words conduces to that.
> The confusion is the result of departing from traditional usage of
> the words "random" (unpredictable, pattern-less) and "caused"
> (preceded by a requisite event.)
> It is reasonable in that usage to suggest that an event might have a
> cause and still be unpredictable.
Non-linear systems are often characterized by deterministic but
unpredictable behavior (what I would refer to as 'apparent randomness').
> Is that what you disagree with?
I'm not disagreeing with anything here -- I'm merely requesting a better
understanding of why you object to my use of English in this respect.
> "Caused events for which no cause is yet known" of course begs the
> question, since it assumes a cause when none is known. (????)
Now I am disagreeing :-)
To say that there is no known cause is not to postulate that there *is*
a cause that we don't know, but rather to state that we don't know if
there is or isn't a cause.
andy-k
> seem to ignore the functioning of science. In principle, at least, we
> don't "stop looking". If I think that there is a cause, I will look
> for it, and if I think there is no cause, someone else will look for
> it. There is neither parsimony nor prejudice involved.
Surely to think there is (or is not) a cause when none is known, is to
prejudge the issue?
> The argument about connectedness is nice, but isn't it just a form of
> tree-in-the-forest with time reversed? All events qualify as an
> antecedent cause for our detection of them. So if we are bound by
> physics---which is internally consistent and useful, but only admits
> to phenomena which it has already detected---then we can say that no
> cause _can_ exist for some events, because we have eliminated all
> "existing" phenomena.
Surely we only refer to an event the "cause" of a subsequent event if
it arises in regular conjunction with that subsequent event? Are we
merely quibbling over semantics here?
Craig Franck
> "Kevin Aylward" wrote
> > Of course computers might well be able to have these features, in
> > principle. The brain is essentially a computer based on Darwinian
> > algorithms. We will simply constract direct *physical* analogies of the
> > brain, and by the laws of physics, they will behave identically if the
> > analogies are exact. We might even do this by artificially creating
> > neurons and such like. You seem to be under the illusion that "man made
> > computer" is restricted to digital computers of the von Newman type. It
> > isn't.
>
> Will a computer have dreams of snakes? (To paraphrase a title of a PKD book
> I haven't read). Can human personality (as in reasoning+emotions+intuition)
> exist without such primal emotions embedded in them? Of course, you may say
> that they are of no use, but they are a part of a "richness" which we
> recognise as humaneness (sorry for my English).
I don't see why emotion and intuition can't be present in AI. It is true
that a large part of what it is to be human comes from the fact that
we are biological in nature; our experiences are what it is like to be a
brain inside a body. So the dream of downloading yourself into a
computer for silicon immortality seems far fetched.
The argument is made that the experience of our bodies is actually a
representation inside the brain, so your body feel and emotions are
similar in nature to your visual field. That may be true, but I can't
believe the qualia we experience can be recreated inside a computer.
The subjective state of a neural net running inside a computer will be
something totally unique to that system.
> A computer based on
> Darwinian algorithms alright, but what about the millenia of input into
> billions and billions of people with millions of millions brain cells each,
> sieving the input through gazillions of interactions over centuries,
> survivals and extinctions, each instance of choice between the two guided by
> complex relationships between brains more complex than we can hope to
> construct in centuries to come. We are now allegedly close to mimicking the
> intelligence of a single cat on machines. But the real brain is the brain of
> the entire civilisation, our individual complex brains being but individual
> neurons therein.
This is why some people take the position that computers can be
intelligent and aware, but never conscious the way we are. To them,
consciousness emerges from the peculiar qualities of our nervous
systems in the same way the tonal qualities of a Stradivarius violin
comes from the wood. In this analogy, computer-based intelligence
would be equivalent to a plastic violin.
Craig Franck
> Predestination and determinism are anathema to supporters of the
> metaphysical postulate of freedom of the will and it seems that they
> will go to any lengths to keep the issue alive. In order to remain
> neutral I feel I must concede the point that there is no water-tight
> argument against uncaused events. However, even granting such things,
> it still leaves me in the dark as to how this possibility helps the
> libertarian position: the will is an ordered process, not a random
> process, so now they have to show how it is possible to have non-random
> uncaused events. I haven't come across a convincing account of such
> things yet.
Absolute free will seems to seems to require that mental states
are directly transformable from one to another with no underlying
causes other than the will itself. So consciousness would have to
direct the brain as much as the brain directs consciousness. This
wag-the-dog situation is impossible if consciousness is in fact
brain states.
One way around this is if conscious state CS can correspond to
brain states BS1 - n, n being a very large number. For example,
the color yellow can be reproduced by a large number of
combinations of primary colors. The brain generalizes even
more thru color constancy, so grass appears green in the shadow
of a tree even though it's really a shade of black.
What this means is if I'm in a particular conscious state, and that
state determines a decision, there are possibly a huge number of
actual brain states I might be in. So if 80% of the brain states
will have me decide A (say, call in sick to work to go and the
beach) and 15% will have me decide B (go to work) there may
be 5% which are borderline; any "random noise" ("quantum
jiggling" in my neurons) in the system will push me one way or
the other.
Here I'm not behaving randomly (drive to NY for no reason), but
rather my decision matrix is fuzzy when it comes to the probability
of doing a particular thing or another, those particular things being
fairly obvious choices because a small degree of randomness can't
budge very far the statistical averaging of my mostly determined
brain states.
This takes care of the being totally determined part. If people
consider not necessarily being determined to do something, and
not knowing what they will do next until they decide as having "free
will," it's hard to imagine what more they would require, short of
being a mystical soul of one sort or another.
Kamerynn
Kevin Aylward wrote:
> Kamerynn wrote:
>
>>Kevin Aylward wrote:
>
>
>>>This principle needs an explanation, therefore
>>>does not satisfy occams razor.
>>>
>>>The default position is that there are no principles, hence
>>>randomness must be considered the default axiom from which
>>>departures from such random behaviour must be explained. We don't
>>>require a reason for randomness, because by axiomatic assumption,
>>>there is none, therefore it is the simpler solution.
>>
>>Kam:
>> Despite popular belief, Occam's razor is not about
>>simplicity. According to Occam, "Pluralitas non est
>>ponenda sine neccesitate" or "plurality should not be
>>posited without necessity." In order to *explain* an
>>event, we *absolutely must* provide a reason - a cause -
>>for its being so. If we say that an event has no
>>cause - no reason for being so - then we do not explain
>>it. We are saying, in such a case, that there is no
>>cause/reason/explanation.
>
>
> You miss the basic point. *All* explanations *always* resolve to an
> axiom that we take as a given. There is no absolute truth, i.e. absolute
> explanations. So, we do not *have* to explain *all* events, because this
> is inherently *impossible* to do in *principle*.
Kam:
Why? And, shouldn't we try to explain each event
anyway, just in case we succeed? Which events are
unexplain*able*? Are they unexplainable because of
short-sightedness, or are they really unexplainable
in principle?
You're idea that we should just give up on
some things, but perhaps not give up on other things,
is rather odd. Why not just follow your idea always
and never search for an explanation? Heck, everything
happens by random chance. Why bother searching at all?
Really - tell me, which things are worth trying
to explain and which aren't in principle?
> Everything is relative,
> so we resolve all explanations to an arbitrary agreed starting point.
Kam:
What does this mean? An explanation is itself a
resolution. How do we "resolve an explanation?"
So, we explained disease using bacteria; how did we
"resolve that explanation to an arbitrary agreed starting
point?"
If anything, discovery is a moving away from the
agreed starting point.
> Science has "decided" that random behaviour is unexplainable at any
> deeper level. No one has ever been able to artificially generate a
> *true* random sequence.
Kam:
Of course - that's analytic/tautological. No one can *generate*
(cause) randomness by definition.
> We only use pseudo random sequences, so to try
> and find an explanation for something that is truly random is like
> herding cats.
Kam:
What is this mysterious truely random event?
How do we Know (capital K know - certainty) that
it has no cause?
>
> "Physical concepts are free creations of the human mind, and are not,
> however it may seem, uniquely determined by the external world." -
> Einstein.
Kam:
Einstein may be a great thinker, but referring
to the assertions of a great thinker as evidence of
one's position is only a valid move (i.e. not an
appeal to authority) when the subject in question
is not disagreed upon by other great thinkers. Hume
disagrees with Einstein, and so did Kant. In fact,
all empiricists disagree with that statement (not that
Kant is an empiricist).
So, empiricists are wrong, end of story?
Where's Einstein's justification?
>
> There are no absolute explanations.
>
>
>
>> Just think: if we ask "why" (asking for an
>>explanation), we are asking for a reason or a cause.
>>If we say that there is no cause - no reason - then we
>>*are not answering the question.* We are saying that it has
>>no answer.
>
>
> So what, this is the nature of the beast. As Godel shows us, statements
> can be true, but not provable.
Kam:
Proof is not required, and I'm not asking
for it. But, we should try to explain all the
events we encounter. All we can do is try to
explain an event and perhaps not succeed.
As you stated, we cannot prove statements,
and that applies equally to the assertion that
there is a truely random (uncaused) event. So,
like I stated, we can only continue trying, and
perhaps not succeed.
Sur
Uzytkownik "Kamerynn" <idon'tdoe...@sorry.com> napisal w wiadomosci
news:1022edl...@corp.supernews.com...
Just like myself (sorry for the comparison, Kam), I suppose Kam has a
problem telling between what philosophers choose as an axiom, and what they
resolve to cut of with Occam's razor, and what they simply don't stoop (or
are too conservative) to touch. Maybe, if Godel, like Occam, had managed to
coin a cute saying, apart from his magnum opus, it would make work easier
for the thinkers?
Don't know much about philosophy (it is like the opposite sex to me - I am
as attracted to Sophie as I am ignorant about her inner workings), but the
superficial knowledge I have suggests to me, that thanks to all its axioms,
philosophy is a giant on legs of clay, just like religion. Change the
meaning of randomness (which I believe possible, as I have postulated
before) to vitally represent deterministic chaos, demonstrate that
non-Aristotelean dualities and "the middle" exist like quantum
superpositions, and it all cracks like the Catholic Church in America.
>
> > Everything is relative,
> > so we resolve all explanations to an arbitrary agreed starting point.
>
> Kam:
> What does this mean? An explanation is itself a
> resolution. How do we "resolve an explanation?"
> So, we explained disease using bacteria; how did we
> "resolve that explanation to an arbitrary agreed starting
> point?"
> If anything, discovery is a moving away from the
> agreed starting point.
Is that perhaps like checking an equation backwards? We make a theorem on
the basis of some fragmentary high-level knowledge, and to prove it we have
trace it back to basics, step by step, until we necessarily reach an axiom,
or an "an arbitrary agreed starting point".
Thus, in the example of disease and bacteria, we can explain, that yes, this
rash is caused by these little vicious things. To resolve it properly, the
way I see it, is to make a differential diagnosis to say it's not an
allergy, then to demonstrate that skin cells can be irritated by
microorganisms of this strain, then ..., then we get to the point how simple
organisms could possibly have evolved from the primordial soup, and we get
to a point which has no practical significance for the development of
medicine, so we cut it off, if we have not done so a few pages before.
The problem is, that hardly any disease is caused by microscopic organisms
only, just like jet direction mechanisms don't exist on jet fighters just
because engineers didn't have much else to do. Whatever we try to explain,
or resolve, in the *real* world, rather than in the world of tokens and
logical equilibristics, must take a true thinker to the core, without which
nothing is really explained. That is, how diseases are an inalienable part
of life, how it emerges from the evolutionary mechanisms that in a certain
large-scale layout of forces, ages and characteristics of populations,
certain organisms find their way to the bodies of others more easily than
they would otherwise, and do more harm. Similarly, increasingly new
contraptions on weapons are in essence expressions of competition between
groups of people, manifestation of certain layouts of immaterial pawns on
the gameboard.
So, it is useless for an aircraft engineer, or for the Chief Commander of
the Forces to know the history of wars, and the true explanation of war. If,
however, we strive at creating a precise, helpful system for describing
reality, one that could pretend to the name of philosophy, disconnecting the
ubiquitous multiple aspects will take us nowhere, we will keep describing
shadows on the wall. We will be 2-D entities which look at a photograph of a
man pretending to push the Tower of Pisa, and say yes, his hand is touching
the upper floors, his feet are touching the ground, he is leaning forward,
exerting force, and thus pushing the tower. What's that "perspective" thing
again?
And there is no way from A to B within the system as I know it - what lies
between the two facets of every real object is the Styx of chaos and (with
axiomatic shores on both sides), where the logical notions won't work.
High-level statistical analysis and a (hopefully to be developed) complexity
science would have to be an integral part of any system so ambitious. Even
if they only allow us to wade along the shores, they can, from that
perspectve, allow us to make useful extrapolations into the depth, that
could, just could allow philosophy to make ends meet.
>
> > Science has "decided" that random behaviour is unexplainable at any
> > deeper level. No one has ever been able to artificially generate a
> > *true* random sequence.
>
> Kam:
> Of course - that's analytic/tautological. No one can *generate*
> (cause) randomness by definition.
Erm, so what happens if I throw dice? But I won't go deeper, I like this
topic too much :)
>
> > We only use pseudo random sequences, so to try
> > and find an explanation for something that is truly random is like
> > herding cats.
>
> Kam:
> What is this mysterious truely random event?
> How do we Know (capital K know - certainty) that
> it has no cause?
Yeah, exactly.
>
> >
> > "Physical concepts are free creations of the human mind, and are not,
> > however it may seem, uniquely determined by the external world." -
> > Einstein.
>
> Kam:
> Einstein may be a great thinker, but referring
> to the assertions of a great thinker as evidence of
> one's position is only a valid move (i.e. not an
> appeal to authority) when the subject in question
> is not disagreed upon by other great thinkers. Hume
> disagrees with Einstein, and so did Kant. In fact,
> all empiricists disagree with that statement (not that
> Kant is an empiricist).
> So, empiricists are wrong, end of story?
> Where's Einstein's justification?
Personally, I trust him more, for he took the bull (of physical concepts) by
the horns, felt his breath on his face, learned to recognize his moves in
his own muscles, rather than sit back and consider. Of course, every athlete
needs a coach who sits backs and analyses his action. And importantly for
your line of thinking, he said he didn't believe God play dice with the
universe. The way I read it, God's dice (wood, ivory, plastic?) are
definitely an axiom Al doesn't buy ;)
>
> >
> > There are no absolute explanations.
> >
> >
> >
> >> Just think: if we ask "why" (asking for an
> >>explanation), we are asking for a reason or a cause.
> >>If we say that there is no cause - no reason - then we
> >>*are not answering the question.* We are saying that it has
> >>no answer.
> >
> >
> > So what, this is the nature of the beast. As Godel shows us, statements
> > can be true, but not provable.
>
> Kam:
> Proof is not required, and I'm not asking
> for it. But, we should try to explain all the
> events we encounter. All we can do is try to
> explain an event and perhaps not succeed.
> As you stated, we cannot prove statements,
> and that applies equally to the assertion that
> there is a truely random (uncaused) event. So,
> like I stated, we can only continue trying, and
> perhaps not succeed.
>
Regards,
Piotr
andy-k
that you may correct any misunderstandings.
---------------
"Craig Franck" <craig....@verizon.net> wrote in message
news:1waUb.14212$KV5....@nwrdny01.gnilink.net...
> "andy-k" wrote
>
> > Predestination and determinism are anathema to supporters of the
> > metaphysical postulate of freedom of the will and it seems that they
> > will go to any lengths to keep the issue alive. In order to remain
> > neutral I feel I must concede the point that there is no water-tight
> > argument against uncaused events. However, even granting such
> > things, it still leaves me in the dark as to how this possibility
> > helps the libertarian position: the will is an ordered process, not
> > a random process, so now they have to show how it is possible to
> > have non-random uncaused events. I haven't come across a convincing
> > account of such things yet.
>
> Absolute free will seems to seems to require that mental states
> are directly transformable from one to another with no underlying
> causes other than the will itself. So consciousness would have to
> direct the brain as much as the brain directs consciousness. This
> wag-the-dog situation is impossible if consciousness is in fact
> brain states.
Translation: free will demands a one-to-one correspondence between brain
states and states of consciousness. If we subscribe to a materialistic
metaphysic then this reduces to a one-to-one correspondence between
brains states and brain states -- a meaningless tautology that allows no
room for free will.
> One way around this is if conscious state CS can correspond to
> brain states BS1 - n, n being a very large number. For example,
> the color yellow can be reproduced by a large number of
> combinations of primary colors. The brain generalizes even
> more thru color constancy, so grass appears green in the shadow
> of a tree even though it's really a shade of black.
Translation: but we can subscribe to a materialist metaphysic AND free
will if we assume a one-to-many correspondence between states of
consciousness and brain states respectively.
> What this means is if I'm in a particular conscious state, and that
> state determines a decision, there are possibly a huge number of
> actual brain states I might be in. So if 80% of the brain states
> will have me decide A (say, call in sick to work to go and the
> beach) and 15% will have me decide B (go to work) there may
> be 5% which are borderline; any "random noise" ("quantum
> jiggling" in my neurons) in the system will push me one way or
> the other.
Translation: a minority of brain states may be threshold as regards a
particular decision, and such threshold states would be decided by
random processes occurring in the brain (i.e. not obviously determined
by antecedent events).
> Here I'm not behaving randomly (drive to NY for no reason), but
> rather my decision matrix is fuzzy when it comes to the probability
> of doing a particular thing or another, those particular things being
> fairly obvious choices because a small degree of randomness can't
> budge very far the statistical averaging of my mostly determined
> brain states.
Translation: so some brain events are clearly determined by antecedent
events, and others are not clearly determined by antecedent events.
> This takes care of the being totally determined part. If people
> consider not necessarily being determined to do something, and
> not knowing what they will do next until they decide as having "free
> will," it's hard to imagine what more they would require, short of
> being a mystical soul of one sort or another.
Translation: So brain events are partly determined and partly random
(either true or apparent randomness). It is the random part that confers
upon us the impression of not knowing what we will choose until it is
chosen, and this mechanism provides an account of why it seems to us
that we enter brain states without the influence of antecedent events.
-----------------------
It seems from this argument that rather than consciousness deciding what
brain state to enter (free will), the brain enters a state either
deterministically or at random, and then consciousness is informed of
that change of state. I still see no room for free will.
Craig Franck
> Craig -- I've attempted some translations from your language to mine so
> that you may correct any misunderstandings.
From the translations, I can see we are on the same page here.
> It seems from this argument that rather than consciousness deciding what
> brain state to enter (free will), the brain enters a state either
> deterministically or at random, and then consciousness is informed of
> that change of state. I still see no room for free will.
You are correct there is no room for free will unless one can to shift the
perspective of the "I" who does the willing down to the unconscious
and into the body itself. Conscious thought or action itself has no free
will component. We both agree on that.
I read one article today that took the point of view that a "person" has
free will because a person is a mind and a body. The ego differentiated
itself from out of the id, and is now neurotically insisting it's the one who
is really in charge, when in fact the organism as a whole is the smallest unit
that can claim control. (Some have wondered about even this because we
are basically running our "cultural software" in the form of memes.)
This way of looking at the problem has a great many merits, one of which
is many non-Western cultures have this as the default view of themselves,
as did much of Western Europe prior to the 14th century. So free will, as
a philosophical problem, is really a cultural artifact (Berman and Dennett
have hit on this before.)
A problem is there seems to be a useful distinction between "voluntary"
actions, like raising my hand, and involuntary actions, like the aperture of
my pupils changing size. But it could be that the Autonomic Nervous
System is to the body what the unconscious is to the mind. (Freud had
the unconscious half in the body and half in the mind, which would pull
everything together.)
Another potential problem is it's just the flip side of having no free will:
either everything is really involuntary or voluntary, and the middle ground
is logically incoherent. The fact that I can prove two opposite things based
on definitional changes renders it pure philosophy, and all the science
demonstrating we have no free will is basically inapplicable to the problem.
(Although, you can still use it to disprove the part-free-will/part-involuntary
position, which is what most people seem to hold anyway, so it has good
uses.)
1Z
> "1Z" <peter...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
> news:fd762132.04020...@posting.google.com...
> >
> > There is no problem there at all. A sequence of events, or rather
> > actions, is non-random if it displays an intelligible pattern. (Man
> > steps out of car. Buys newspaper. Notices date. Rushes into florist..).
> > But the fact that the sequence of events displays an intelligble pattern
> > is logically quite independent of its having an overall, external cause.
> > In fact, not only is it the case that we make sense of each others
> > actions in terms of aims and goals they are aiming towards,rather than
> > causes they are stemming from, we are rather more likely to advert to
> > external, prior causes in the case of erratic, irrational behaviour (Is
> > he on drugs?)
>
> As humans we have a faculty that allows us to foresee possible
> consequences of our actions, and to tailor our actions in accordance
> with those consequences.
>This doesn't make such an act an uncaused
> event -- it remains a caused event, and exhibits order.
I am not arguing that rationally comprehensible pattens of behaviour
are necessarily uncaused, I am arguing that they are not necessarily
caused.
(ie rationality an dlack of external cause are compatible).
Your comment that "it remains a caused event", if referring to an
extenal cause
of the whole sequenc of behaviour, assumes determinims without proving
it.
>An uncaused
> event is an event that has neither 'external' nor 'internal' causes,
The issue relevant to FW is external caues -- whether I am being
determined
by something outside myself. There is no point to FW if I cannot exert
internal causality regarding my own behaviour.
>and
> I'm still left with the question of how it is possible to have
> non-random uncaused events.
Possibility divides into logical and physical possibility.
Logical possibility is non-contradiction. As I have shown,
there is no contradiction in the idea of non-externally caused,
rationally-structured behaviour. So that is your logical
possibility. Is it physically possible to have an ordered
series of events ? Well, the universe as a whole fulfils that
criterion. By definition there is nothing outside it to cause it,
and yet it displays order. That is your physical possibility.
(Note that physical possibility always needs the assumption of
a contingent and refutable set of physical laws which need
a-posteriori justification. Determinists
typically assume that physcal laws must be deterministic without
regard to the scientific evidence ie, when they ask "how is it
possible?"
they mean "how is it compatible with determinism ?").
andy-k
news:fd762132.04020...@posting.google.com...
> "andy-k" <spam.free@last> wrote in message
news:<rH5Ub.102$_D....@newsfep3-gui.server.ntli.net>...
> >
consequences of our actions, and to tailor our actions in accordance
with those consequences. This doesn't make such an act an uncaused
event -- it remains a caused event, and exhibits order.
>
> I am not arguing that rationally comprehensible pattens of behaviour
are necessarily uncaused, I am arguing that they are not necessarily
caused. (ie rationality an dlack of external cause are compatible).
If by "not necessarily caused" you meant to add "by external causes"
then that's okay. That just leaves 'internal causes' to consider.
> Your comment that "it remains a caused event", if referring to an
extenal cause of the whole sequenc of behaviour, assumes determinims
without proving it.
I disagree: the statement that an imagined scenario is the cause of an
action is not an assumption of determinism -- it is merely a statement
that a preceding antecedent event can be associated in this particular
type of action.
> >An uncaused event is an event that has neither 'external' nor
'internal' causes,
>
> The issue relevant to FW is external caues -- whether I am being
determined by something outside myself. There is no point to FW if I
cannot exert internal causality regarding my own behaviour.
The remaining question, then, is whether 'internal causes' are
determined by antecedent events (internal and/or external), or whether
they are uncaused. If the former then there is no "I" to exert internal
causality regarding ones own behavior -- it is just as determined as it
would have been if external causes alone were responsible. If the
latter, then again there is no "I" to exert internal causality regarding
ones own behavior -- internal causes would simply contribute a random
element to that behavior. If you insist that there is an "I" that exerts
internal causality regarding ones own behavior, then you have Cartesian
dualism and all its concomitant problems.
tg
Sorry, I don't understand what you don't understand.
It appears that you are trying to make some point, but it would be
clearer if you didn't use terms which are themselves subject to
debate.
Why would you use _anything_ as a synonym for "uncaused", much less a
made-up term (true randomness) involving the subjective "true", except
as a rhetorical device?
I have no problem with terms of art used within a discipline where
everyone agrees to them, but they have no place in a general
discussion.
>
> > "Caused events for which no cause is yet known" of course begs the
> > question, since it assumes a cause when none is known. (????)
>
> Now I am disagreeing :-)
> To say that there is no known cause is not to postulate that there *is*
> a cause that we don't know, but rather to state that we don't know if
> there is or isn't a cause.
"Yet" implies that a cause exists and will be found. Why incorporate
objectively unnecessary language. If you like Occam so much, apply his
advice to writing.
-tg
1Z
> Craig -- I've attempted some translations from your language to mine so
> that you may correct any misunderstandings.
>
> ---------------
>
> "Craig Franck" <craig....@verizon.net> wrote in message
> news:1waUb.14212$KV5....@nwrdny01.gnilink.net...
> > "andy-k" wrote
> >
> > > Predestination and determinism are anathema to supporters of the
> > > metaphysical postulate of freedom of the will and it seems that they
> > > will go to any lengths to keep the issue alive. In order to remain
> > > neutral I feel I must concede the point that there is no water-tight
> > > argument against uncaused events. However, even granting such
> > > things, it still leaves me in the dark as to how this possibility
> > > helps the libertarian position: the will is an ordered process, not
> > > a random process, so now they have to show how it is possible to
> > > have non-random uncaused events. I haven't come across a convincing
> > > account of such things yet.
> >
> > Absolute free will seems to seems to require that mental states
> > are directly transformable from one to another with no underlying
> > causes other than the will itself.
Realistic FW requires that consciousness has some level of influence
on
the (rest of) the brain.
> > So consciousness would have to
> > direct the brain as much as the brain directs consciousness. This
> > wag-the-dog situation is impossible if consciousness is in fact
> > brain states.
>
> Translation: free will demands a one-to-one correspondence between brain
> states and states of consciousness.
> If we subscribe to a materialistic
> metaphysic then this reduces to a one-to-one correspondence between
> brains states and brain states -- a meaningless tautology that allows no
> room for free will.
Only assuming that brain states cannot by themselves implement
consciousness or FW. If they can then the requirement
of of one-to-one corresponce is perfectly met: identity
always impies 1:1.
> It seems from this argument that rather than consciousness deciding what
> brain state to enter (free will), the brain enters a state either
> deterministically or at random, and then consciousness is informed of
> that change of state. I still see no room for free will.
If consciousness is identical to (one of a set of) rain states, where
does the time lag come from ? If the brain causes the action, and if
the brain-state
is identical to a conscious state, how can consciousness not be
causally
involved ? identity is identity.
andy-k
news:9e39ba1.04020...@posting.google.com...
> "andy-k" <spam.free@last> wrote in message
>
> Sorry, I don't understand what you don't understand.
>
> It appears that you are trying to make some point, but it would be
> clearer if you didn't use terms which are themselves subject to
> debate.
No, not trying to make some point but rather trying to decide whether or
not you have a valid point. If there is a genuine obfuscation in my use
of English then I should change it, so I'd like to find out.
> Why would you use _anything_ as a synonym for "uncaused", much less a
> made-up term (true randomness) involving the subjective "true", except
> as a rhetorical device?
>
> I have no problem with terms of art used within a discipline where
> everyone agrees to them, but they have no place in a general
> discussion.
I'm still failing to understand why terms like 'real and apparent' or
'true and false' should be considered an obfuscation -- they seem to be
a perfectly understandable mode of speech when applied to other issues
(e.g. real and apparent parallelism in computer science; true and false
readings in telemetry, etc.) Admittedly I've mixed the terms and
arguably should have stuck to one set or the other.
> > > "Caused events for which no cause is yet known" of course begs the
> > > question, since it assumes a cause when none is known. (????)
> >
> > Now I am disagreeing :-)
> > To say that there is no known cause is not to postulate that there
> > *is* a cause that we don't know, but rather to state that we don't
> > know if there is or isn't a cause.
>
> "Yet" implies that a cause exists and will be found. Why incorporate
> objectively unnecessary language. If you like Occam so much, apply his
> advice to writing.
If a cause has not yet been found, it may be because there is no
cause -- the statement does not commit me to either view. The reason I
prefer to retain the 'yet' is that it gives a sense of continued
searching, rather than one of having given up on the search.
andy-k
I was just checking whether I'd correctly understood Craig's ideas.
Craig Franck
> "andy-k" wrote
> > It seems from this argument that rather than consciousness deciding what
> > brain state to enter (free will), the brain enters a state either
> > deterministically or at random, and then consciousness is informed of
> > that change of state. I still see no room for free will.
>
> If consciousness is identical to (one of a set of) rain states, where
> does the time lag come from ? If the brain causes the action, and if
> the brain-state
> is identical to a conscious state, how can consciousness not be
> causally
> involved ? identity is identity.
That's a good question. This intuitive notion probably represents the
biggest block in understanding the issue of free will.
The answer, I believe, is that it's not consciousness that causes things
to happen in your brain, but the underlying representation of that
conscious state.
Say I remember the time as a kid a vicious dog jumped out at me, and
now I feel anxious. How can a simple idea, in the form of a remembrance,
have any affect? Clearly the memory trace and its association with fear are
somehow "wired" into my brain. (An analogy might be a binary opcode
that's placed into the instruction register of a microprocessor: the 1's and
0's pattern literally modifies the internal state of the chip, enabling it to
perform an instruction.)
The current idea is our thoughts occur inside our brains in a sort of
"brainese" language. My experience of the memory of my first day at school
occurs in this language. But it appears to me to be a simple memory. The
case of deciding to do something must have some representation as well.
That representation is formed and you either consciously experience it or
you don't.
Also, it rarely occurs to people, but if willing is an act in itself, does one
have to will to will? In order to stop an endless regression, at some point
something must simply spontaneously occur that we interpret as the idea to
do something.
1Z
> If we first ignore Quantum Mechanical randomness, then the mind and body
> is totally deterministic by the laws of classical physics. In this case
> there is no "I" that can control anything, i.e. no free will is
> possible. Therefore they would have to be something outside of physics
> that could override such deterministic physics.
>
> If we introduce Quantum Mechanical randomness the issue of a controlling
> "I" is moot, as "I" can not have control over a random process as the
> process is random.!
That is like a creationist claiming that random mutation cannot
produce
the Order of nature.
The selecting part of the process exerts control by
...err...selecting.
> See above. Its pretty trivial really. Unless there is a soul, *true*
> free will can not exist.
The 'simple logic' seems to be based on muisunderstanding evolutionary
theory and ignoring the possibility that the brain, like a cybernetic
system, cna control itself.
> > The laws of physics allow both indeterminism and self-control (eg
> > cybernetics). I fail to see your objection.
>
> This is a complete misunderstanding of self-control. The concept is
> being used in a different context. Robots/cybernetics don't have self
> control in the sense that they can truly take independent action. They
> can only do what they are programmed to do, which includes taking action
> based on a random generator.
What you call 'true independent action' is a straw-man.
> > Who said anything about controlling the laws of physics?
> > The question is whether a system can both control itself and behave
> > indeterminisitically.
>
> Again, this concept of self-control is not the same as in what is
> proposed that a human might have if it had free will, due to a soul for
> example. The same phrase is being used with different meanings. In fact,
> in is only this weaker sense of self-control that is all that is
> achievable by humans.
What you call the 'weaker sense' is all anyone ever means by it.
> > It would only be necessary to override
> > physics, if it were impossible within physics, which you have assumed
> > rather than demonstrated.
>
> I agree, I have assumed that physics is king.
The assumption in question is that self-control is physically
impossible.
>I base my arguments on an
> axiom of "there is no magic". If this axiom is proven incorrect, than my
> arguments would fail. Do you have any proof in magic?
Actually, you base your arguments on the magic words "It is held
that..."
> > The ensemble interpretation is itself obsolete,
>
> You don't know what your talking about.
>
> >since
> > all the puzzling aspects of physics can be demonstrated
> > with single-particle experiments.
>
> That's correct, and this is exactly what the quantum ensemble approaches
> tells us is the case. You appear to misunderstand the ensemble approach.
> The ensemble is about an ensemble of *systems* not an ensemble of
> particles. This is the most basic aspect of the ensemble approach.
Einstein's version of the ensemble approach says that every particle
has a maximal set of well-defined observables at all times.
This is now known to be wrong.
Muynck's version remains silent about what individual
particles are supposed to be doing.
So you have a bunch of experiments with single particles which
can't be explained by the ensemble approach becasue it doesn't deal
with individual particles.
> >
> > Your views on QM contain more fallacies than I can easily
> > catalogue at the moment.
>
> Not at all. The view is held by *experts* in quantum mechanics, as I
> noted on my web page.
All the other interpretations of QM are or were held by experts, too.
Heisenberg, Bohr, Bohm, Everett, Cramer...
> You might do well to check them out. It was also
> held as correct by Einstein. Unfortunately, in my graduate quantum
> mechanics physics classes I was initially introduced to the old,
> erroneous interpretation and suffered many misconceptions due to this.
> Fortunately, it was certainly an eye opener to obtain a graduate text
> book that explained in detail what a correct account of QM is.
If you look into it more deeply you will find that there are
about 6 major interpretations of all of whose protagonists
will do their best to perusade you that all other views are erroneous.
> It is clear that it is you that is clueless on QM. If you understood
> even the basics of what I presented, you should have realised that the
> Ensemble approach is trivially compatible with all known experiments.
All interpretations claim to be compatible with experiments.
One is not automatically obliged to beleive the claim.
> For example, it would make no sense if a practising universtity
> professor of physics, an expert in his field of Quantum Mechanics, if he
> were teaching a theory known to be experimentally false. Get real dude.
Yet the rival claims, which according to you are erroneous, are also
held by Professors. Old chap.
> Of course when people are "conscious", as usually understood by that
> term, their behaviour is different than when unconscious, but this is
> besides the point. The fact that one is *aware* that they are aware is
> the bit that is redundant.
>
> You don't seem to be able to distinguish the electro-chemical workings
> of the brain and its manifestations.
You have not established that the manifestation differs from
the workings.
> Please explain exactly how
> "consciousness" can *physically* make your finger move.
The problem does not even arise unless you have good reason to
believe consciousness is non-physical.
> >> There is no physical mechanism that allows "awareness" to take
> >> any direct physical action, so how can it be an aid?
> >
> > "There is no physical mechanism that allows "digestion" to take
> > any direct physical action, so how can it be an aid?"
>
> Of course there is. The stomach contains acids and enzymes that act by
> quantum mechanical processes, principally by the electronic forces
> between molecules. Reactions take place between molecules by these
> electric forces. "Consciences"
[ Consciences = consciousness ? ]
>is just a word used to describe a
> condition that is not derivable by physics.
Botany is not derivable from physics.
> > As explained, consciousness does not enable us to
> > perform any individual action, it rather makes everything
> > else more effective, like the conductor of an orchestra.
>
> Please explain in what way being "aware" actively effects physical
> processes.
>
> You seem to be confusing the physical mechanism that results in what we
> declare to be conscious, with consciousness itself. There is no logical
> requirement that the physical mechanism that results in conscious
> awareness, requires that that we be consciously aware. Of course we do
> different things when we are conscious, but there is no reason that
> there should be anything like an awareness to it. I can make a computer
> go, "it hurts" when I kick it in its metal balls. As I keep stating, in
> principle, there does not seem to be any physical action a machine can
> take that requires conscious awareness. Any and all physical behaviour
> that coinsides with the general state named "conscious", does not seem
> to require consciousness itself, i.e. awareness of that state.
I am not saying that consciousness is responsible for any particular
little bit of behaviour, I am saying that it is responsible for the
overall co-ordination. Remember the conductor ? In principle
a parrot could pronounce every word in English, but it still
cannot speak. There is no fact of the matter about
whether the overall co-ordination that makes human like behaviour out
of all the individual bits and pieces can be achived by an unconscious
automoton, since there is no such thing as a human-like AI.
Restricting consciousness to emotions (or qualia) : they certainly
appear to have effects. I prefer chocolate to vanilla because of the
taste, the quale. To say that my behaviour in choosing the chocolate
has nothing
to do with how things seem to me is an extroadinary claim in need of
strong evidence.
Does the self-referentiallity of consciousness mean it is causally
idle ? It is hard to see how this is remotely possible, since self
referentiallity is an epistemic, logical issue, and causal idleness
is a (meta)physical one. Just because consciousness suposedly
can't be comprehended doesn't mean it isn't doing anything.
(The self-referentiallity claim is dubious anyway. Just because
some puzzling statements , sucha s Goedel's paradox are
self-referential
does not mean anything self-referential is paradoxical.
The sentence 'this sentence is six words long' is comprehensible,
true, and self - referential).
Does the supposed non-physicality of consciousness mean it is causally
idle ?
If the non-physical claim is simply that consc. is not practically
deriveable from the science of physics,
the conculsion does not arise. The problem may be simply one of
compexity --
economics and geology aren't pratically deriveable from physics, but
things
happen for economic and geological reasons (which are ultimately
physical
in the sense of material and natural).
If the non-physical claim that consciousness is not
ultimately physical in the sense of material and natural,
that might well indicate that it is causally idle,
but it is an extrardinary claim at odds with you commitment to
physicalism.
If the non-physical claim is that consc. is not deriveable in
principle from the science of physics,
then, so long as it is not regarded as immaterial or supernatural, it
has causal
powers, and the correct conclusion is that the science of physics does
not
capture causally everything that is going on (ie the philosophical
position
called reducitionism is wrong). How disastrous would that be ?
Is reductionism a proven scientific fact ? No, it is a philosophical
principle.
if physics gave a complete description of what absolutely must happen
in a
given situation, the causal powers of consciousness would have to
override the laws of physics.
But it doesn't: it gives only probabilities for certain outcomes.
There is
therefore built-in elbow-room for a consciousness which is natural
but ontologically distinct form the fundamental particles making up
the
brain -- a sort of consciousness field -- to have physical effects.
> Secondly, writing a bit of prose is irrelevant to someone's skills as an
> engineer and a scientist. Feel free to download my software which
> demonstrates actual real world abilities. Talk is cheap. Show me some
> evidence that a philosopher has any real value to society.
What value is , is a philosophical question...
> > AI's can alter their own programming, why can't humans ?
>
> You are still missing the point. You are arguing on 101 stuff. This sort
> of control is not the sort of control we identify with the proverbial
> soul.
But I don't associate FW with the soul. That is not what I am talking
about.
> > And what happens if we don't ignore the random number complication.
>
> I have already explained.
You have given an answer about souls to a question about FW.
> I explained, in detail, that yes, there is a random trait generator in
> the brain, possible a quantum mechanical one. The brain is a darwinian
> machine, generation, selection and replication of traits. However!!!! a
> truly randam event is something that no "I" has any control over, becuse
> its hey randam dude!!!. All we have is deterministic processes, the sole
> result of *prior* genetic and memetic programming, selecting *random*
> outputs of a generator. None of this is consistent with their being a
> true "I" that has any *independent* control of what it does. Something
> new is required. Only a soul can produce a *true* "I".
According to your straw-man defintions.
tg
> "tg" <tgde...@earthlink.net> wrote in message
> news:9e39ba1.04020...@posting.google.com...
> > "andy-k" <spam.free@last> wrote in message
> news:<Yf9Ub.186$_D....@newsfep3-gui.server.ntli.net>...
> >
> > Sorry, I don't understand what you don't understand.
> >
> > It appears that you are trying to make some point, but it would be
> > clearer if you didn't use terms which are themselves subject to
> > debate.
>
> No, not trying to make some point but rather trying to decide whether or
> not you have a valid point. If there is a genuine obfuscation in my use
> of English then I should change it, so I'd like to find out.
>
>
>
> > Why would you use _anything_ as a synonym for "uncaused", much less a
> > made-up term (true randomness) involving the subjective "true", except
> > as a rhetorical device?
> >
> > I have no problem with terms of art used within a discipline where
> > everyone agrees to them, but they have no place in a general
> > discussion.
>
> I'm still failing to understand why terms like 'real and apparent' or
> 'true and false' should be considered an obfuscation -- they seem to be
> a perfectly understandable mode of speech when applied to other issues
> (e.g. real and apparent parallelism in computer science; true and false
> readings in telemetry, etc.)
Either you are pulling my leg, or you don't know the meaning of "term of art".
andy-k
> > > everyone agrees to them, but they have no place in a general
> > > discussion.
> >
> > I'm still failing to understand why terms like 'real and apparent'
> > or 'true and false' should be considered an obfuscation -- they seem
> > to be a perfectly understandable mode of speech when applied to
> > other issues (e.g. real and apparent parallelism in computer
> > science; true and false readings in telemetry, etc.)
>
> Either you are pulling my leg, or you don't know the meaning of "term
> of art".
I'm not pulling your leg, and I do have an idea of what you mean by a
'term of art', but I'm still not following your objection yet. As far as
I can see there is a clear synonymity between a genuinely uncaused event
and true (or real) randomness, and a clear synonymity between a
determined but unpredictable event and false (or apparent) randomness.
Otherwise why would we call computer-generated sequences
'pseudo-random'? I would appreciate your guidance in this matter so that
I may amend my use of English if it is called for.
tg
Synonym, according to my dictionary, is "a word having _nearly_ the
same meaning as another _in the same language_."
Term of art is synonymous (applied to individual terms) with jargon.
Jargon is "a vocabulary specific to some particular trade, profession
or group," that is, a different language.
If you have a case to make about caused and uncaused things, why don't
you just use the terms caused and uncaused? Why use terms with
"nearly" the same meaning?
-tg
andy-k
> > I'm not pulling your leg, and I do have an idea of what you mean by
a 'term of art', but I'm still not following your objection yet. As far
as I can see there is a clear synonymity between a genuinely uncaused
event and true (or real) randomness, and a clear synonymity between a
determined but unpredictable event and false (or apparent) randomness.
Otherwise why would we call computer-generated sequences
'pseudo-random'? I would appreciate your guidance in this matter so that
I may amend my use of English if it is called for.
tg replied:
> Synonym, according to my dictionary, is "a word having _nearly_ the
> same meaning as another _in the same language_."
>
> Term of art is synonymous (applied to individual terms) with jargon.
> Jargon is "a vocabulary specific to some particular trade, profession
> or group," that is, a different language.
>
> If you have a case to make about caused and uncaused things, why don't
> you just use the terms caused and uncaused? Why use terms with
> "nearly" the same meaning?
The Webster definition of synonym is "one of two or more words or
expressions of the same language that have the same or nearly the same
meaning in some or all senses".
The Oxford definition of synonym is "a word or phrase that means exactly
or nearly the same as another in the same language".
All languages have in-built redundancy. Where two or more words or
phrases have exactly the same meaning, why should any criticism be due
when people differ on which of these synonymous words or phrases they
use?
Peter F.
news:buf6fo$9uq$1...@sparta.btinternet.com...
> Fuck off now or punctuate.
> JJ
Go easy! He only tried to express the idea of non-punctuated equilibrium.
P
>
>
> Tianran Chen <li...@chentianran.net> wrote in message
> news:87b4d040feced60f...@news.teranews.com...
> > i have seen many people who emphasis that mutation is essential
condition
> > for evolution. copying, mutation, and selection are always listed as the
> > three required condition. however, i really doubt this idea. i think the
> > mutation do not HAVE to take part in evolution process. and i think i am
> > able to show that.
> >
>
>
1Z
> "1Z" wrote
>
> > "andy-k" wrote
>
> > > It seems from this argument that rather than consciousness deciding what
> > > brain state to enter (free will), the brain enters a state either
> > > deterministically or at random, and then consciousness is informed of
> > > that change of state. I still see no room for free will.
> >
> > If consciousness is identical to (one of a set of) rain states, where
> > does the time lag come from ? If the brain causes the action, and if
> > the brain-state
> > is identical to a conscious state, how can consciousness not be
> > causally
> > involved ? identity is identity.
>
> That's a good question. This intuitive notion probably represents the
> biggest block in understanding the issue of free will.
>
> The answer, I believe, is that it's not consciousness that causes things
> to happen in your brain, but the underlying representation of that
> conscious state.
A brain-state can only cause things INSTEAD of a conscious state if
it is something different from a conscious state. You are assuming dualism.
What are your reasons for that ?
> Also, it rarely occurs to people, but if willing is an act in itself, does one
> have to will to will? In order to stop an endless regression, at some point
> something must simply spontaneously occur that we interpret as the idea to
> do something.
Is that a problem ?
Craig Franck
> "Craig Franck" wrote
>
> > "1Z" wrote
> > > If consciousness is identical to (one of a set of) rain states, where
> > > does the time lag come from ? If the brain causes the action, and if
> > > the brain-state
> > > is identical to a conscious state, how can consciousness not be
> > > causally
> > > involved ? identity is identity.
> >
> > That's a good question. This intuitive notion probably represents the
> > biggest block in understanding the issue of free will.
> >
> > The answer, I believe, is that it's not consciousness that causes things
> > to happen in your brain, but the underlying representation of that
> > conscious state.
>
> A brain-state can only cause things INSTEAD of a conscious state if
> it is something different from a conscious state. You are assuming dualism.
> What are your reasons for that ?
It's not so much dualism as cause and effect. I addressed this in another
thread. It comes down to how you view supervenience WRT physicalism.
This is what I wrote:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
If brain state BS1 is identical
to mental state MS1, then a change in one is a change in the other.
One could therefore just as easily say the mental state is driving
the brain state. So MS1 changing to MS2 drives BS1 into BS2.
The problem with this logic comes down to a confusion of cause
and effect. The brain states generate the mental states in a loosely
analogous way that a monitor generates a picture. If you change a
pixel, the image changes, and to change the picture, you must alter
a pixel. (check out http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physicalism/#2 ).
But it does not follow that images can alter themselves.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
I would only add that even with total identity, this still holds. For
example, if I'm speaking into a phone, one would not hold that the
microphone itself was forming the words, but rather my voice caused
the cone to vibrate in a fashion, even though the two were (depending
on the fidelity of the system) identical. (Although, if the microphone
were conscious, it might feel as if it was indeed doing the talking.)
Also, if I take a drug because I'm having a panic attack, and this
causes me to calm down, it's pretty hard to imagine any other
explanation than my brain chemistry controlled my mental state
(placebo effects notwithstanding), even though the resulting brain
state and my mental state are identical.
It is not a form of dualism to hold that subjectively experienced mental
states do not have atomic weights or valences, even if the underlying
chemical processes do. If that were the case, semiotics would be
impossible because signs could not be extracted from the medium that
was used to convey them.
> > Also, it rarely occurs to people, but if willing is an act in itself, does one
> > have to will to will? In order to stop an endless regression, at some point
> > something must simply spontaneously occur that we interpret as the idea to
> > do something.
>
> Is that a problem ?
Endless regression is always a problem. If deciding to decide requires
a conscious decision, there is no end to it. At some point a lower-
order decision must spontaneously occur. This must happen in the
unconscious or the body. I don't personally have a problem with this
because I have identified free will as belonging to an organism as a whole,
and every person has a body.