F-16/cessna crash near sarasota
rfishe...@tampabay.rr.com
The St.Petersburg times (http://www.sptimes.com) has a front page
article in today's paper about the investigation of the crash of an
air force F-16 and a Cessna 172 flown by a Frenchman named Jacques
Olivier. The planes collided on nov. 16, 2000.
According to the St. Pete times, the Air Force accepts most of the
blame for the crash. The F-16s went thru controlled airspace without
talking to Tampa Approach while travelling at up to 550 mph
The ariticle said they were off course by 11 miles
The FAA had a traffic alert 30 seconds before the accident but by the
time they said something, more than 15 seconds had gone by and Jacques
had no time to react.
The airforce said Jacques should have used "see and avoid" techniques
to miss the airforce plane.
My question is this: Is it possible to see an aircraft travelling over
500 mpg in time to avoid an accident if you're in a cessna? Even if
you saw an F-16 travelling at that speed, could you act quick enough
to avoid a collision?
550 mph is 806 feet per second. I don't see how you could see and
avoid another object going that fast.
ralph, tampa pilot of a 172
C J Campbell
Force officer in charge of the investigation, not exactly an independent
opinion.
<rfishe...@tampabay.rr.com> wrote in message
news:3aa6dee3.12559601@news-server...
> Dear fellow pilots:
<snip>
newsman
At 30 seconds it was 4.5 miles from Jacques position.
To expect anyone in another plane to expect or see
anything going that fast is absurd. The military lately
has been getting away with a lot of things. That disaster
in Italy comes to mind (with the gondola cable), the ridiculous
crash of the sub into the boat (they had the boat on passive sonar!)
The F-16 in this case was clearly wrong and the report should
say that and then they should make the proper restitution to the
pilot's family. The air force's contention that Jacques was partly to blame
is so arrogant that it makes me angry and ashamed. That General
will have to answer to the court.
What's the message from the Air force? Same as it is if you're
a professional athlete do what you want we'll cover your ass!
Rest in peace Jacques.
Dean Wilkinson
capability with its targeting radar. The pilots had it switched off at
the time of the collision according to the preliminary NTSB report I read.
This was a simple case of arrogance on the part of the F16 pilots IMHO.
RT
Because of the speed difference the 172 would've been stationary in the
windscreen less than 10 degrees off the nose of the F16, even if they
were tracking at right angles to each other, so obviously they weren't
using eyeballs either.
Pete Zaitcev
> 500 mpg in time to avoid an accident if you're in a cessna? Even if
> you saw an F-16 travelling at that speed, could you act quick enough
> to avoid a collision?
IMHO, short answers are: 1. Yes, 2. Yes. But, there are certain
problems with that scenario, which make it impossible to see
and avoid. A pilot of 172 _may_ be able to detect a hazardous
situation. But he/she has not enough information to predict
if an actual collision would happen or a near miss. A collision
avoidance maneuver may only help a collision. According to
the lead F-16 pilot, Mr. Oliver was turning at the moment
of the collision (or, at least, was in a steep bank).
Perhaps he tried to execute an avoidance maneuver.
The group consensus was that the only chance is to bank and
turn in such a way as to attract the incoming fighter's pilot
attention.
If we talk about the particular case, an unhappy chance had it
that F-16's executed an S-turn before the impact. The lead
turned his head to find the wingman (who changed his position),
and the wingman was fixated on the lead. Therefore neither
of them looked ahead. The NTSB report does not infer anything,
but I think they had a chance to maneuver around otherwise.
-- Pete
newsman
Yeah and they were'nt using their brains either, must have had them
switched
off.
Rest in peace Jacques.
Taildragger
> My question is this: Is it possible to see an aircraft travelling over
> 500 mpg in time to avoid an accident if you're in cessna? Even if you
> saw an F-16 travelling at that speed, could you act quick enough to
> avoid a collision? 550 mph is 806 feet per second. I don't see how you
> could see and avoid another object going that fast.
>
This is one of the reasons you aren't supposed to top 250 knots below
10,000 feet unless you are in an MOA on a mission. Although it seems that
of late, if you work for the people who make the rules, you don't need to
follow them. We get a lot of traffic through our area when there are
exercises. The local military pilots don't cause much in the way of
problems, but when we get a bunch of visitors from the lower 48 who figure
they are in the middle of nowhere it can get interesting. In exchange for
swiping nearly all of the airspace in interior Alaska, the gummint put in
a pretty extensive radar and communication coverage for the MOA's called
the Special Use Airspace Information System and I must say that it works
well and helps a lot. You cannot avoid flying in a hot MOA around here if
you want to go anywhere. Virtually the entire eastern third of Alaska is
either an MOA or an R. Alaska is part of the US on April 15th, when some
politician is grinding an environmental axe, when the government wants
more land for its employees to play with, or when some foreign company
with a buddy in Washington or Juneau wants something. There is kind of an
us and them thing that makes it very difficult to communicate with some of
these folks. It took repeated calls, registering the strip, and the
intervention of a US senator to get the army to stop running UH-60's
across the business end the our strip at low altitude. I have yet to have
an incursion, or even an annoyance, by a civil pilot. Funny how having to
follow the rules makes a difference.
George R. Patterson III
>
> The airforce said Jacques should have used "see and avoid" techniques
> to miss the airforce plane.
The Air Force is full of crap.
> My question is this: Is it possible to see an aircraft travelling over
> 500 mpg in time to avoid an accident if you're in a cessna? Even if
> you saw an F-16 travelling at that speed, could you act quick enough
> to avoid a collision?
> 550 mph is 806 feet per second. I don't see how you could see and
> avoid another object going that fast.
You're correct. It takes roughly 7 seconds to see, recognize, and react.
Then the plane has to react. He would have had to see the planes when
they were at least two miles away to have a snowball's chance of staying
alive, and these aircraft are deliberately painted in a color that is
difficult to see. The fighters were approaching him from the side - he
was directly in front of them. The onus for collision avoidance in this
situation is completely on the fighter pilots.
George Patterson, N3162Q.
Robert M. Gary
who also had TCAS aboard.
John Godwin
news:3AA7BA3E...@home.com...
> rfishe...@tampabay.rr.com wrote:
> >
> > The airforce said Jacques should have used "see and avoid" techniques
> > to miss the airforce plane.
>
> The Air Force is full of crap.
Actually, it's not limited to the Air Force. It seems that shifting blame
is the norm throughout DOD; remember the Navy and the USS Iowa incident?
Larry Dighera
I don't know how many Military Training Routes there are on the east
coast, but here in the west the charts are a spider web of MTRs. It
is my understanding that military fighters, freighters, and unarmed
cruise missiles conduct low-level training between 500' and 10,000'
AGL at speeds up to 580 knots on these routes.
The military must issue a Environmental Impact Statement when
proposing a MTR. The FAA has traditionally allowed the military to be
responsible for its own environmental assessments and has not been
involved in substantially reviewing or evaluating the assessments. As
a result the military "owns" over 50% of the continental US airspace!
It is unclear how the EIS overcomes the issue of VFR "see and avoid"
requirements. Exercises on VFR MTRs may only be conducted when flight
visibility is 5 miles or greater. At the worst case of 5 miles
visibility and 580 knots, the pilots have 27.3 seconds to "see and
avoid". This means that pilots are expected to scan the entire sky
twice a minute to "see and avoid". Personally, I find that
unreasonable and dangerous.
It is clear to reasonable minds that the onus of responsibility to
"see and avoid" is squarely on the shoulders of the military, because
it is they who are creating the hazard by operating their aircraft in
excess of twice the speed limit imposed on other aircraft. It is
military aircraft flown by military pilots flying below 10,000 feet in
excess of 250 knots who are creating the hazardous situation. These
military aircraft are equipped with RADAR capable of targeting
aircraft in their path, and should be REQUIRED to use it for collision
avoidance.
REF:
The third sentence of the second paragraph of this FAA MTR document
does not contain a verb:
http://www.faa.gov/ats/afss/newyork/miltrng.htm . It is indicative of
the care the FAA and military exercised in creating the MTR structure.
http://www.rama-usa.org/mtr.htm
http://www.aopa.org/whatsnew/newsitems/2000/00-4-066x.html
At least the Rural Alliance for Military Accountability and the Center
for Biological Diversity are trying to make the military assume
responsibility for the threats their MTRs pose:
http://npweb.craigslist.org/cpeo/lists/military/2000/msg00349.html
According to a 1988 GAO report, Airspace Use: FAA Needs to Improve Its
Management of Special Use Airspace. The FAA does not have adequate
utilization data for special use airspace nor has it established
guidelines to help eliminate special use airspace that is
inefficiently or inappropriately used.
Military Training Routes and Formation Flight: For an MTR pilot's-eye
view of what (s)he sees when flying an MTR click this link:
http://www.abqafss.jccbi.gov/VRrteAvi.htm
Here is some information on MTR Environmental Impact Statements:
http://www.pecos.net/news/arch99/040799o.htm
"Although the Environmental Impact Statement Draft acknowledges that a
B-1 creates a decibel level of 117 at 300 feet and a B-52 creates
decibel level of 110 at the same altitude above ground level, it
creates a methodology defined by the Defense Dept. that devalues that
effect. "The cumulative metric, DNL ... Is a 24-hour average
A-weighted sound level measure. DNL sums the individual noise events
and averages the resulting level over a specified length of time. It
is a composite metric accounting for the maximum and the number of
events." The methodology averages noise events over a week and a
month, which I think tends to create an interpretation that avoids
focus on the peak intensity of the moment of loudest decibels, and I
assume includes periods when no planes are present. "L dmnr is the
monthly average of the Onset-Rate Adjusted Day-Night AVerage sound
Level (DNL).
For this EIS, all noise levels were calculated using L dmnr." The
executive summary states that "Noise levels would not exceed levels
likely to damage structures," but residents underlying the flight path
are best qualified to report actual experience.
The Draft states that DNL will not exceed 62 on Military Training
Route 178 and defines a 65 DNL as the ]threshold for an adverse
finding."
Recurring military buz jobs within 100 yards of a private residense:
http://www.mcn.org/c/irapilgrim/war12.html
National Imaging and Mapping Agency MTR database:
http://164.214.2.62/products/webchum/QryChoice.cfm
AIR WARS:
http://www.cdi.org/adm/801/transcript.html
"But low level training in this country is no less intrusive and
dangerous than it is anywhere else. And for the same reasons the
German citizens rose up against this kind of training, Americans
across the country are contesting these acquisition attempts."
In this document the Air Force tells how to avoid colisions:
http://www.mcguire.af.mil/wingstaff/safety/MACAPAM1.htm#sect5
Unfortunately, there is inadiquate time left to do anything else but
scan the sky using their guide lines.
Bill Geddes
respectfully turned at a lower than the standard crosswind altitude to avoid
and respect the restricted space. We all have to dodge and dance around
military space and God forbid you are 11 miles (!0 off course and wander
into one. These guys are in one of the most capable aircraft EVER built to
date. Not a tube and fabric, you need fuel when it hits the fuel cap type
plane. Can't we get enough respect for our piece of the sky to have these
guys pay the same attention to where they are? Is this to much to ask ?
<rfishe...@tampabay.rr.com> wrote in message
news:3aa6dee3.12559601@news-server...
Ron Natalie
Larry Dighera wrote:
>
> I don't know how many Military Training Routes there are on the east
> coast, but here in the west the charts are a spider web of MTRs. It
> is my understanding that military fighters, freighters, and unarmed
> cruise missiles conduct low-level training between 500' and 10,000'
> AGL at speeds up to 580 knots on these routes.
Yeah but this clown wasn't in the MTR.
> The military must issue a Environmental Impact Statement when
> proposing a MTR. The FAA has traditionally allowed the military to be
> responsible for its own environmental assessments and has not been
> involved in substantially reviewing or evaluating the assessments. As
> a result the military "owns" over 50% of the continental US airspace!
Well that's nice, the FAA doesn't have any jurisdiction over what the
military does. They can only gripe about it.
rfishe...@tampabay.rr.com
Thanks for all the input.
In a follow up article in the st.pete times on March 8 the head of the
air traffic controller's union in Tampa said the traffic alert occured
15 seconds before the impact, not 30. He gave a scathing assessment of
the airforce investigation.
Also, the lawyer for Jacques family was outraged at the air force
report. Unfortunately, the poor ATC guys may get drawn into the
lawsuit because of their purported failure to warn Jacques and give me
proper vectors for the "traffice alert".
According to the president of the controller's union, there was no
way his people had time to give Jacques the vectors to clear the
incoming F-15.
Lastly, a lawyer I know in Tampa who handles air crash liablity cases
says that the 10 million dollar lawsuit against the u.s. government
could well be met with a counter-claim for the loss of the F-16! Now
that's brazen.
Yesterday I got a flyer in the mail about a new FAA program to educate
private pilots about military ops. in the McDill area.
In the end, the consensus of the group seems to be that it's
impossible for the average pilot to avoid an imminent collision with
aircraft travelling at 48,400 feet per minute!
Thank god the sky is so big, otherwise there'd probably be alot more
collisions like the one that took a fine man's life last nov. 16 in
Sarasota. Let's all hope that the airforce learns a constuctive
lesson from this tragedy.
ralph
Larry Dighera
wrote:
>Larry Dighera wrote:
>>
>> I don't know how many Military Training Routes there are on the east
>> coast, but here in the west the charts are a spider web of MTRs. It
>> is my understanding that military fighters, freighters, and unarmed
>> cruise missiles conduct low-level training between 500' and 10,000'
>> AGL at speeds up to 580 knots on these routes.
>
>Yeah but this clown wasn't in the MTR.
It is my understanding that the flight of two F-16s was about to enter
a MTR when the collision occurred.
>> The military must issue a Environmental Impact Statement when
>> proposing a MTR. The FAA has traditionally allowed the military to be
>> responsible for its own environmental assessments and has not been
>> involved in substantially reviewing or evaluating the assessments. As
>> a result the military "owns" over 50% of the continental US airspace!
>
>Well that's nice, the FAA doesn't have any jurisdiction over what the
>military does.
What is the source of your above assertion? It is my understanding
that MTRs are supposed to be jointly created by the military and FAA.
But, the FAA has been criticized by DOT for "rubber stamping" the
military's MTR requests.
>They can only gripe about it.
You're saying that the only action FAA can take regarding proposed
military activity in the skies is a memo? Doubtful.
Ron Natalie
Larry Dighera wrote:
>
> It is my understanding that the flight of two F-16s was about to enter
> a MTR when the collision occurred.
Which is true (actually, they were trying to find the beginning of it).
Around here we have a word for "about to enter", we call it "outside."
Larry Dighera
>Gentlemen,
>Thanks for all the input.
>In a follow up article in the st.pete times on March 8 the head of the
>air traffic controller's union in Tampa said the traffic alert occured
>15 seconds before the impact, not 30.
(I was unable to locate that article on-line.)
Unfortunately, there seems to be considerable time lag in ATC's
alerting pilots to potential in-flight traffic conflicts. Often I
have received ATC traffic reports so late that the traffic has passed
while ATC is reporting it at 12 o-clock. There is the inherent delay
of RADAR sweep dependent on the rotational speed of the radar dish
(about 5 to 6 seconds typically). But, there seems to be some other
source of delay in the system that makes the controllers' picture of
the sky substantially less than real-time.
>He gave a scathing assessment of the airforce investigation.
Any intelligent person can discern the military's complete lack of
regard for GA flights in their statements. The military is "out of
control" with regard to their lack responsibility, not only in the
case of this accident, but in the hazard their operations pose to
civil flights, and the environment. It is time an outraged citizenry
exposes the military's reckless operations publicly in the news media.
>Also, the lawyer for Jacques family was outraged at the air force
>report. Unfortunately, the poor ATC guys may get drawn into the
>lawsuit because of their purported failure to warn Jacques and give me
>proper vectors for the "traffice alert".
> According to the president of the controller's union, there was no
>way his people had time to give Jacques the vectors to clear the
>incoming F-15.
How does the military defend the fact that their F-16s unlawfully
entered class B & C special use airspace without contacting ATC,
exceeded the 250 knot speed limit below 10,000 feet by over 100%, and
failed to "see and avoid" Jacques Cessna? This "accident" is truly a
second degree murder committed by lawless, renegade military pilots.
The military mind is a dangerous thing.
>Lastly, a lawyer I know in Tampa who handles air crash liablity cases
>says that the 10 million dollar lawsuit against the u.s. government
>could well be met with a counter-claim for the loss of the F-16! Now
>that's brazen.
The military's arrogance in this issue is likely to cause more public
outrage over their inept operations. Likely, the military's offensive
tenor is bolstered by the election of George W. Bush to the highest
office in the land (world?).
Perhaps the time is at hand for a Class Action suit against the
military's reckless and careless operations in the public skies.
>Yesterday I got a flyer in the mail about a new FAA program to educate
>private pilots about military ops. in the McDill area.
>In the end, the consensus of the group seems to be that it's
>impossible for the average pilot to avoid an imminent collision with
>aircraft travelling at 48,400 feet per minute!
So, what does the FAA propose be done about it? Perhaps it time the
NTSB make some recommendations for changes in military operations.
>Thank god the sky is so big, otherwise there'd probably be alot more
>collisions like the one that took a fine man's life last nov. 16 in
>Sarasota. Let's all hope that the airforce learns a constuctive
>lesson from this tragedy.
Hope and $3.50 will buy you a cup of Starbucks. :-)
The military is incapable of "learning" from it's mistakes. The
military's reign of terrorizing the skies will only change when public
outrage and legal damage suits are brought to bare against them (if
then).
REF:
Speed cited as a factor in F-16 crash
St. Petersburg Times; St. Petersburg, Fla.; Nov 30, 2000; JEAN HELLER;
http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/sptimes/main/doc/000000064837187.html?QDesc=%5bsptimes%5d+Speed+cited+as+a+factor+in+F-16+crash&QCPP=http:%2f%2fpqasb.pqarchiver.com%2fsptimes%2fmain%2fresults.html%3fQryTxt%3dmidair&QVPID=&FrameName=doc&Args=site%3dsptimes%26QDesc%3d%255bsptimes%255d%2bSpeed%2bcited%2bas%2ba%2bfactor%2bin%2bF-16%2bcrash%26QVPID%3d%26ID%3dsptimes%26FMT%3dFT%26FMTS%3dFT&QProd=&QIID=000000064837187
Search St. Petersburg Times:
http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/sptimes/main/advancedsearch.html
Ron Natalie
Larry Dighera wrote:
> How does the military defend the fact that their F-16s unlawfully
> entered class B & C special use airspace without contacting ATC,
> exceeded the 250 knot speed limit below 10,000 feet by over 100%, and
> failed to "see and avoid" Jacques Cessna?
Which law is that? The 14 CFR does not apply to military aircraft
except by the grace of the military themselves that says they will
follow the civilian regs. The FAA has only civil authority.
> So, what does the FAA propose be done about it? Perhaps it time the
> NTSB make some recommendations for changes in military operations.
The military would ignore the NTSB, just like the FAA does.
Razor
apparently don't care about Jacques or his Cessna. They also obviously
have no respect for controlled airspace or the rules by which the civilian
aviation world operates. No civilian pilot could bust a Class B airspace
like these F-16s did and get away with it (not counting the collision).
Of course, the F-16 will come out of our taxes, so they probably don't
worry too much about it either.
Larry Dighera
wrote:
>Larry Dighera wrote:
How would the F-16s being "inside" the MTR have affected this mid-air
collision?
It is virtually impossible to "see and avoid" an F-16 painted the same
color as the background it is against presenting its minimal frontal
profile and traveling 580 knots.
Those military F-16 pilots should be tried/court martialed for second
degree murder.
The entire MTR structure is a blatant hazard to civil flight (not to
mention the environment) that the Germans recognized and ousted from
their country. The military is out-of-control in the skies over the
continental US. It's time this is rectified through legal action(s).
Robert M. Gary
Will the NTSB be involved because a civilian plane was involved?
Normally, if its just a military accident there is no NTSB.
Ron Natalie
Larry Dighera wrote:
>
> On Fri, 09 Mar 2001 12:10:00 -0500, Ron Natalie <r...@spamcop.net>
> wrote:
>
> >Larry Dighera wrote:
> >
> >> It is my understanding that the flight of two F-16s was about to enter
> >> a MTR when the collision occurred.
> >
> >Which is true (actually, they were trying to find the beginning of it).
> >Around here we have a word for "about to enter", we call it "outside."
>
> How would the F-16s being "inside" the MTR have affected this mid-air
> collision?
I didn't say it would. But your assertion was that th ey were on the MTR?
The nature of MTR's is inconsequential in this crash, the planes were not
even on the MTR.
Ron Natalie
"Robert M. Gary" wrote:
> >
> > The military would ignore the NTSB, just like the FAA does.
>
> Will the NTSB be involved because a civilian plane was involved?
> Normally, if its just a military accident there is no NTSB.
I would expect that they will for that reason (they are tasked with
investigating every civil aviation accident). I was just pointing
out that the FAA routinely ignores the NTSB recommendations, so it
would seem entirely plausible that the military would as well.
Larry Dighera
negligent military flight operations are sacrosanct? It is useless to
hold the military accountable for their negligence? We are all just
helpless to effect any change in the military's criminal abuse of the
skies? With George W. Bush in office, this may be true.
But, there is always the old fashion way to deal with despots. If the
military continues to spew arrogant rhetoric about its lack of
responsibility for the death of the late Mr. Jacques Olivier, they may
find their fighters punctured by ground fire irate citizens. After
all, that is the reason the Constitution provides the citizens of this
fair land the right to bear arms.
Fortunately, I believe that the military is only exempt from 14 CFR
when engaged in an actual military mission, as opposed to a training
exercise. (Where's Mr. McNicol when you need him?)
Again, can you cite a reference for your assertion that the military
is not required to comply with 14 CFR during peace time operations?
On Fri, 09 Mar 2001 13:07:51 -0500, Ron Natalie <r...@spamcop.net>
wrote:
>Larry Dighera wrote:
Ron Natalie
Larry Dighera wrote:
>
> So, in your opinion, the hazards to civil aviation created by
> negligent military flight operations are sacrosanct?
No, I think we're in violent agreement. I just was pointing out
that the FAA regularly ignores the NTSB recommediations, so why should
the military pay anymore attention to them?
> It is useless to hold the military accountable for their negligence?
I never said that, and I don't know how you can begin to extract that
from my statement. The issue is that by and large different rules
govern civilians, government officials, and the military. Yes, I believe
the military should be held responible. It is gross negligence that
lead to loss of life.
> Fortunately, I believe that the military is only exempt from 14 CFR
> when engaged in an actual military mission, as opposed to a training
> exercise. (Where's Mr. McNicol when you need him?)
>
> Again, can you cite a reference for your assertion that the military
> is not required to comply with 14 CFR during peace time operations?
You refuse to listen carefully to what I said. The FAR's do NOT have
any statutory influence over the military. Congress didn't grant that
authority to the FAA when they established it. Technically, the FAA
and the FAR's have no direct impact on the military.
As I pointed out, the military services themselves, in the name of public
policy has their own regulations that mandate compliance with the rules
in the FARs unless there is operational reason to do otherwise.
You're not going to find Rick Cremer out there ramp checking military
aircraft :-)
Larry Dighera
<rober...@agilent.com> wrote:
>Will the NTSB be involved because a civilian plane was involved?
>Normally, if its just a military accident there is no NTSB.
There are concurrent military and NTSB investigations occurring.
Here is the NTSB's preliminary report:
http://www.ntsb.gov/NTSB/brief.asp?ev_id=20001212X22313&key=1
NTSB Identification: MIA01FA028A
Accident occurred Thursday, November 16, 2000 at BRADENTON, FL
Aircraft:Lockheed-Martin F-16CG, registration: 2104
Injuries: 1 Fatal, 1 Uninjured.
This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain
errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the
final report has been completed.
On November 16, 2000, at about 1548 Eastern Standard Time, an F-16CG,
SN: 89-2104, operated by [Capt. John Kreuder of] the 347th Wing, Air
Combat Command, Moody Air Force Base (AFB), Valdosta, Georgia, and a
Cessna 172, N73829, registered to Crystal Aero Group, operating as a
14 CFR Part 91 personal flight [by Mr. Jacques Olivier], experienced a
midair collision in the vicinity of Bradenton, Florida. Visual flight
conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. The F-16 was one of
two airplanes operating on a low altitude training mission, and had
filed a composite military IFR/VFR flight plan. Flight lead call sign
was Ninja 1, the wingman's call sign was Ninja 2. No flight plan was
filed for the Cessna 172. The pilot of the F-16 (Ninja 2) successfully
ejected and the Cessna pilot (who was Airline Transport Pilot
qualified) was fatally injured. The two F-16s departed Moody AFB at
1513. The Cessna 172 departed Sarasota Bradenton International Airport
(SRQ) about 3 minutes before the accident.
According to ATC, the F-16 flight cancelled instrument flight rules
(IFR) and began a visual flight rules (VFR) descent to enter the low
altitude [MTR] route. The Cessna 172 departed SRQ VFR en route to the
Albert Whitted Airport (SPG), St. Petersburg, Florida. The Cessna 172
crashed in the Rosedale Golf and Country Club, Bradenton, Florida. The
F-16 crashed 4 miles south of the Cessna 172 in a wooded area about 5
mile east of Sarasota, Florida.
Ninja 1 stated they were assigned a block altitude between FL250 to
FL260 en route to the visual route (VR) entry point. Miami Center
cleared the flight to descend to the altitude block of 15,000 to
17,000 feet. They were subsequently cleared by Miami Center to 13,000
feet. Miami Center instructed Ninja 1 to contact Tampa Approach. Ninja
1 attempted contact with Tampa approach but was unsuccessful. He
reestablished contact with Miami Center and cancelled IFR. Miami
Center advised him of traffic, which was acquired on radar. He
informed Ninja 2 that they were going to perform a "G" check (G
awareness maneuver). They accelerated to 400 knots, made a right
90-degree turn followed by a left 90-degree turn back on course, and
continued their descent below 10,000 feet. He instructed Ninja 2 to
assume the "fighting wing" formation. They continued the descent to
about 5 to 6 miles north of the entry point for VR1098, between 5,000
to 3,000 feet trying to obtain a visual on the low-level entry point.
He glanced out the right side in an attempt to gain visual on Ninja 2.
He looked back to the left and observed Ninja 2 slightly below him at
the 7 o' clock position. He also observed a high wing white airplane
in a right turn estimated between 30 to 45 degrees. The high wing
airplane and Ninja 2 collided in a left-to-left impact at about the 10
o'clock position. After the collision, Ninja 2 was observed vaporizing
fuel off his right side. He informed Ninja 1 that he had experienced a
midair collision and that he was streaming fuel. There was no response
from Ninja 1. He then heard Ninja 2 state, "knock it off, knock it
off." He began an immediate left turn to keep Ninja 2 in sight. Ninja
2 continued straight ahead, started a right turn, followed by a left
turn. He saw Ninja 2's canopy depart, followed by a good chute and the
airplane colliding with the ground.
Ninja 2 stated that while he was maintaining visual formation with his
flight lead he saw a blur "like a sheet of white" instantly in front
of him at his 11 or 12 o'clock position. The airplane shuttered
violently and part of the canopy on the left side was missing. He
continued straight ahead, and his visor came off of his helmet. There
was a lot of wind, smoke, and a strong electrical smell in the
cockpit. He called Ninja 1 on VHF radio and informed him to "knock it
off" two times, but could not hear a reply. The airplane was still
flying so he thought he might be able to make it to Madill AFB and
initiated a right hand turn in that direction. The primary flight
instruments appeared shattered and he could not read them. The engine
started winding down, and he realized he would not be able to make the
airport. He turned the aircraft back left towards a wooded area away
from a residential area, and attempted an engine restart, which was
unsuccessful. He thought he had ingested something into the engine,
and performed his Critical Action Procedures for an air start. Once
the airplane cleared the residential area, it started an uncommanded
left roll. When the airplane went past the 90-degree point he
initiated a successful ejection. During his parachute descent, he
observed the airplane out of the corner of his eye, and saw it
"pancake" into the ground inverted, and a postcrash fire ensued.
Witnesses stated they heard the sound of approaching jets. They looked
up and observed the first jet flying towards the south followed by the
second jet located to the left and slightly lower than the first jet.
They also observed a small civilian airplane flying from west to east
perpendicular to the military jets. The second collided with the
civilian airplane and initially continued southbound. The airplane was
observed to make a right turn, and then it turned back to the left. A
parachute was observed, and the airplane entered into a flat spin to
the left and disappeared from view below the trees. An explosion was
heard, followed by heavy dark smoke rising above the terrain.
Review of transcripts between N73829 and Tampa approach, and
communication between Miami Center and Tampa approach revealed that
N73829 contacted Tampa approach at 15:45:19 (20:45:19Z), stating he
was off SRQ at 1,600 feet. Tampa approach informed N73829 that he was
radar contact and to maintain 1,600 feet at 20:45:23. N73829
acknowledged the transmission at 20:45:30. Tampa approach informed
N73829 to turn left to heading 320 and to follow the shoreline
northbound at 20:46:59. At 20:47:10, Tampa approach instructed N73829
to climb and maintain 3,500 feet, which was, acknowledged by N73829 at
20:47:15. Miami Center contacted Tampa approach at 20:47:55, and asked
if they could tell them what altitude Ninja 1 was at, that he had lost
the target. Tampa approach replied at 20:48:00, "ahh hang on I see him
down at two thousand." At 20:48:09, Tampa approach informed N73829,
that he had traffic off his left side at 2,000 feet. N73829 did not
respond. At 20:48:55, Ninja 1 stated, "mayday mayday." At 20:49:11,
Ninja 1 stated, "mayday mayday mayday F sixteen down." At 20:50:00,
Ninja 1 states, "yes this is Ninja one we have an F sixteen down there
is a light aircraft may have also gone down sir I am not sure."
------------------------------------------------------------------------
http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/sptimes/main/doc/000000064837187.html?QDesc=%5bsptimes%5d+Speed+cited+as+a+factor+in+F-16+crash&QCPP=http:%2f%2fpqasb.pqarchiver.com%2fsptimes%2fmain%2fresults.html%3fQryTxt%3dmidair&QVPID=&FrameName=doc&Args=site%3dsptimes%26QDesc%3d%255bsptimes%255d%2bSpeed%2bcited%2bas%2ba%2bfactor%2bin%2bF-16%2bcrash%26QVPID%3d%26ID%3dsptimes%26FMT%3dFT%26FMTS%3dFT&QProd=&QIID=000000064837187
Full Text:
Copyright Times Publishing Co. Nov 30, 2000
Several things contributed to the midair collision that killed a
Cessna pilot, the preliminary report says.
One of two F-16 fighter pilots involved in the Bradenton collision
with a private Cessna 172 saw the smaller plane before the
crash but not in time to warn his wingman, who hit it, the National
Transportation Safety Board says.
In a preliminary report released this week, the NTSB attributed the
excessive airspeed of the two F-16s at the time of the Nov.
16 collision to a maneuver called a G-check, in which the planes made
90- degree turns to the right, then identical turns to the
left.
The maneuver familiarizes pilots with the feeling of high gravity
forces and must be done at high speeds to create the G-force
effect.
The maneuver was done at 13,000 feet, where high speeds are allowable.
But for reasons not officially explained, the pilots
continued to fly at 480 mph or more as they descended below 10,000
feet, where aircraft may not exceed 300 mph unless they
are in an active military operations area. The F-16s were not.
Also critical was the inability of the lead pilot to contact approach
controllers at Tampa International Airport, who had been in
contact with the Cessna and might have been able to keep the planes
apart.
A combination of factors contributed to the crash, the NTSB said, but
the agency did not place blame.
The Cessna pilot, Jacques Olivier, 57, of Citrus County, died. The
pilot of the fighter, Capt. John Kreuder, 31, ejected and was
not hurt.
The preliminary report painted a graphic portrait of the accident.
The fighters, designated Ninja 1 and Ninja 2, left Moody Air Force
Base in Georgia and headed for the practice bombing range
at Avon Park at 3:15 p.m. They were under instrument flight rules,
which required them to be in contact with regional air traffic
controllers. Miami Center cleared them to descend to 13,000 feet as
they neared their destination.
As the F-16s closed in on Tampa International Airport, Miami
instructed the lead pilot, whose name has not been released, to
contact approach controllers there. Ninja 1 tried to make contact but
failed. So he reestablished contact with Miami Center.
He canceled his instrument flight plan and went to visual flight
rules, which require pilots to see and avoid other aircraft on their
own. Miami advised Ninja 1 of other air traffic in his area.
After performing the G-check, the F-16s continued to descend, looking
for the tower that marks the beginning of the low-level
run to Avon Park. Ninja 1 instructed Kreuder to assume the "fighting
wing" formation, which put Kreuder on the left side below
and behind Ninja 1. They continued to descend.
At 3:45, Olivier took off from Sarasota Bradenton International
Airport and advised controllers at TIA that he was en route to
Albert Whitted Airport in St. Petersburg at 1,600 feet. He was told to
fly up the shoreline. Two minutes later he was cleared to
3,500 feet.
Seconds later, Miami Center contacted Tampa approach to ask the
location of Ninja 1. He was gone from Miami radar.
Tampa approach replied, "Ah, hang on, I see him down at 2,000."
At 3:48, Tampa approach alerted Olivier to traffic on his left at
2,000 feet. There was no reply.
At the same moment, Ninja 1 looked back to check on his wingman and
saw the white Cessna, but not in time to issue a
warning. The two aircraft collided, left side to left side.
The NTSB report then says:
"Ninja 2 stated that while he was maintaining visual formation with
his flight lead, he saw a blur, 'like a sheet of white,' instantly in
front of him at his 11 or 12 o'clock position. The airplane shuttered
violently and part of the canopy on the left side was missing
. . . The visor came off his helmet. There was a lot of wind, smoke
and a strong electrical smell in the cockpit."
Kreuder radioed Ninja 1 to "Knock it off. Knock it off," a signal to
end the mission. He turned his crippled plane toward a
woods and ejected.
Investigators will want to determine what happened to prevent Ninja 1
from contacting TIA controllers. It is a critical piece of
the puzzle.
So is the high speed, although one former Air Force fighter pilot had
a possible explanation.
"You make real bombing runs at low altitude, to get in under radar,
and at high speed," said Fred Whitten of San Antonio, Fla.
"If you're going to do it that way, you have to practice it that way."
Whitten added that Kreuder might not have been in a position to see
the Cessna before the collision.
"In the fighting wing formation, he would have been to the left and
below his leader," Whitten said after reading the preliminary
NTSB report. "He would have been looking up and to his right. The
Cessna came in on his left. He never had a chance to see
it."
http://www.sptimes.com/News/113000/TampaBay/NTSB_report_notes_spe.shtml
http://www.sptimes.com/News/111700/TampaBay/Midair_crash_kills_1.shtml
After two news conferences Thursday night, Air Force officials refused
to release the name of the F-16's pilot, the altitude the planes were
flying and whether the pilots were in contact with air traffic
controllers. The Air Force, National Transportation Safety Board and
Federal Aviation Administration are investigating.
...
F-16s usually have a sophisticated radar system that tracks
nearby aircraft, but Air Force Master Sgt. Greg Bade said
the plane was not equipped with collision-avoidance radar.
...
Senior Airman Trevor Tiernan, an Air Force spokesman,
said the plane was an F-16C assigned to 69th Fighter
Squadron at Moody Air Force Base. Tiernan said the Air
Force follows FAA rules when flying over congested areas
such as the Tampa Bay area. The rules mandate that planes
stay at an altitude of at least 1,000 feet.
http://www.jetsafety.com/f16crash.htm
In response to the Nov 16, 2000 mid air between a Moody AFB F-16 and a
Cessna 172.
As I write this note on my web site, It is still difficult for me to
understand why the USAF is so hard headed about airspace issues with
civilians. Since 1993 I have written many articles in regard to
sharing the skies safely with civilians--(download copies of some of
my work below). As an F-16 pilot and safety officer I've worked to
educate the public and the USAF on issues relating to mid-air
collision avoidance. Every time we've had close calls, It has fueled
my desire to publish more. I created this web site as the primary
reason to distribute this information. I've worked with AOPA and even
got them an F-16 flight to witnesses first hand what it's like to fly
high performance jets in MOAs, restricted areas, and MTRs. Shortly
after Pete Bedell of AOPA flew in my back seat in an F-16D, I was
intercepted and "dusted off" at less than 500 feet by 4 F-16s from
Luke AFB, AZ while I was flying a Piper Warrior near VR 245 (a
military training route--MTR). At the time I was a wing safety
officer and F-16 instructor pilot. This was not a near miss but
inappropriate dangerous behavior by a few "cowboy" pilots. (Note:
most near misses are unintentional not intentional inappropriate
behavior). I attempted to file a report with the USAF but was
informed it was not in my best interest to do so. The tape from the
F-16 that intercepted me was erased soon after I began investigating
this near miss. 2 months after my encounter, a light twin was almost
hit in the Gladden Bagdad MOAs near Luke. Here are some comments I
received in regard to this near miss.
Cranium's up folks. This is not the first time this has happened and
it won't be the last...
According to the chief controller, the aircraft is legal to fly @
16,500 through the MOA.
As bad as it sounds, there is not much we can do about this one except
pilot education.
After 15 years as a fighter pilot in the USAF, I can say that the USAF
is concerned about mid-air collision with civilians--that is only on
paper they care. Deep down, a fighter pilot thinks he owns the skies
at his present position. And, in many ways he does--he is traveling
at high speeds with minimum time to clear and make decisions. I think
the USAF has failed in it's attempt to educated the public on where,
when and how they fly. I've attempted to get the USAF to spread the
word but I'm only a small voice snuffed out by poor leadership. My
only advice is to stay clear of MOAs and MTRs.
http://www.af.mil/news/Nov2000/n20001116_001724.shtml
Moody F-16 crashes near Sarasota, Fla.
11/16/00 -- MOODY AIR FORCE BASE, Ga. (AFPN) -- An Air Force F-16C
Fighting Falcon assigned to the 69th Fighter Squadron at Moody Air
Force Base, Ga. collided with a small civilian aircraft at
approximately 4 p.m. EST Nov. 16 near Sarasota, Fla.
The aircraft was on an air-to-ground training mission at the time of
the incident. The pilot on board the military jet ejected safely. The
condition of those on board the civilian aircraft is not known at this
time.
A board of officers will investigate the accident.
http://www.abcnews.go.com/sections/us/DailyNews/f16crash001116.html
http://www.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2000/11/17/80409.shtml
http://www.cnn.com/2000/US/11/16/florida.planes.crash/index.html
http://www.newscoast.com/headlinesstory2.cfm?ID=35379
http://www.nandotimes.com/24hour/fresnobee/nation/story/0,1740,500281170-500441687-502849833-0,00.html
Crash investigators say F-16 disobeyed procedures
The Associated Press
BRADENTON, Fla. (November 18, 2000 7:35 p.m. EST
http://www.nandotimes.com) - Federal authorities said Saturday that an
Air Force F-16 involved in a fatal collision with a small plane was
flying too fast and hadn't made contact with air traffic controllers.
Two F-16Cs descended quickly through controlled airspace east of Tampa
International Airport on Thursday but didn't notify air traffic
controllers as they should have, the National Transportation Safety
Board said Friday.
The pilot of a small private plane was killed when it was hit by one
of the F-16s. The fighter pilot maneuvered his plane away from
populated areas and parachuted to safety.
The Air Force pilots may have been using the wrong radio frequency or
may not have tried to make contact, federal investigators said.
Preliminary radar data shows the F-16 that hit the small plane was
flying faster than 480 mph. Planes flying below 10,000 feet are
limited to 300 mph. Although military planes are allowed to fly faster
in special areas, the planes were not in such an area, said Jorge
Prellezo, NTSB regional director.
Air Force officials said they would not comment until their
investigation is complete in a month or two.
This isn't the first time an F-16 has downed a private aircraft:
http://members.tripod.lycos.nl/LVTwenthe/twenthe.htm
Blame ATC:
http://www.uniontrib.com/news/military/20001129-1315-militarycras.html
http://www.aero-news.net/news/archive2000/1100news/111700a.htm
F-16, 172 Midair in Florida
ANN News Spy Herk Styles has told us from the scene that Thursday
afternoon, about 4PM, just east of I-75 on SR 70 in the Rosedale
subdivision of Bradenton (FL), one of a pair of F-16s from Moody AFB
near Valdosta (FL) went down, after a midair collision with a C-172
reportedly originating out of Crystal River (FL), which crashed and
burned on the golf course at Rosedale. The second F-16 circled until
the pilot of the wrecked plane had reached the ground under canopy.
The F-16s do not have TCAS onboard, and typically travel between 400
and 480 knots in that area, according to an Air Force source who
talked with our spy. A shot of the civilian altimeter showed about
1800 to 1900 feet.
The Cessna involved in this tragedy, a 1976 Cessna 172, N73829, had
been rented for the afternoon from Crystal River Airport's Crystal
Aero Group. The pilot, 57 year old Jacques Olivier, also of Crystal
River, indicated that he was going to use the aircraft from 1200 to
1800 for a trip to Tampa and Lakeland (FL). Mr. Olivier has left a
widow in Crystal River, and a married daughter, currently living in
Paris.
We do not know whether the F-16, for sure, was a single-place or
two-seater (likely a single-seater), but we have several eyewitness
reports of one ejection from it. A county source says the F-16 pilot
was recovered safely, and Herk says he was taken to Sarasota Memorial
hospital.
As he was being taken from the scene, he was conscious and coherent;
and adamant about people staying away from the ejection seat (which is
a nasty piece of equipment when it's on its own).
The Rosedale subdivision and golf course is on the east side of the
interstate, about 2 miles from where the F-16 went in (which, for
local reference, is near a Home Depot, about 5 miles east of
Sarasota-Bradenton airport, and slightly west of I-75).
There were no immediately-reported injuries on the ground. (ANN thanks
Rod Millington of the Sarasota Herald Tribune for the photo...)
http://www.flysouth.co.za/news/Archive/News%20Article%20Archive%2015-12-00.htm
http://www.af.mil/news/factsheets/F_16_Fighting_Falcon.html
Larry Dighera
wrote:
>Larry Dighera wrote:
>>
>> On Fri, 09 Mar 2001 12:10:00 -0500, Ron Natalie <r...@spamcop.net>
>> wrote:
>>
>> >Larry Dighera wrote:
>> >
>> >> It is my understanding that the flight of two F-16s was about to enter
>> >> a MTR when the collision occurred.
>> >
>> >Which is true (actually, they were trying to find the beginning of it).
>> >Around here we have a word for "about to enter", we call it "outside."
>>
>> How would the F-16s being "inside" the MTR have affected this mid-air
>> collision?
>
>I didn't say it would. But your assertion was that th ey were on the MTR?
If you'll re-read my assertion (that you quoted above) you'll see that
my words were, "about to enter a MTR."
Can you cite my "assertion was that th ey were on the MTR"?
Massey
Armed Forces to operate their assigned airspace. The FAA has not abdicated
jurisdiction over the operation of these forces during peace time. Unless
an exception is specifically stated in the United States Code or CFRs the
military must also comply with these statutory regulations.
Adrian Massey
James V. Blakely
probably too late. Also, remember that F-16 are painted to make them
hard to spot.
James V. Blakely
James V. Blakely
military.
Now, I agree, the Government has gone from being from, for, and of the
people to being over the people. The people of the US like to spout
freedom but in reality, the US Government is one of the most tyrannical
in the world.
This type of stuff happens all the time, not just in aviation. In the
state I live in police officers are not required to follow the rules of
the road, ever, even if they are off duty. And don't get me started
about the IRS.
So, what to do about it? WRITE YOUR REPRESENTATIVES PEOPLE! This
nonsense about legal action won't work. The only way to fix the system
is by using the power that the founding fathers gave us. Write your
representatives and give them clear action items you expect them to
accomplish on your behalf. If they don't succeed then actively work
against them in the next election. Believe me, if enough people start
writing letters and getting involved in elections this stuff will stop.
Unfortunately, in a country where barely 60% of the people bother to
vote in a presidential election, this type of activism will not happen.
rfishe...@tampabay.rr.com wrote:
>
> Dear fellow pilots:
> The St.Petersburg times (http://www.sptimes.com) has a front page
> article in today's paper about the investigation of the crash of an
> air force F-16 and a Cessna 172 flown by a Frenchman named Jacques
> Olivier. The planes collided on nov. 16, 2000.
> According to the St. Pete times, the Air Force accepts most of the
> blame for the crash. The F-16s went thru controlled airspace without
> talking to Tampa Approach while travelling at up to 550 mph
> The ariticle said they were off course by 11 miles
> The FAA had a traffic alert 30 seconds before the accident but by the
> time they said something, more than 15 seconds had gone by and Jacques
> had no time to react.
> The airforce said Jacques should have used "see and avoid" techniques
> to miss the airforce plane.
Steven P. McNicoll
"Larry Dighera" <LDig...@socal.rr.com> wrote in message
news:GsWp6.35318$LO3.4...@typhoon.we.rr.com...
>
> It is unclear how the EIS overcomes the issue of VFR "see and avoid"
> requirements. Exercises on VFR MTRs may only be conducted when flight
> visibility is 5 miles or greater. At the worst case of 5 miles
> visibility and 580 knots, the pilots have 27.3 seconds to "see and
> avoid". This means that pilots are expected to scan the entire sky
> twice a minute to "see and avoid". Personally, I find that
> unreasonable and dangerous.
>
I don't find it unreasonable or dangerous, as long as these high speed
operations below 10,000 MSL are confined to MTRs and MOAs. Then you don't
have to try to "see and avoid" the high speed traffic, you can just avoid
the areas where the high speed traffic is operating.
Steven P. McNicoll
"Ron Natalie" <r...@spamcop.net> wrote in message
news:3AA8D885...@spamcop.net...
>
> Well that's nice, the FAA doesn't have any jurisdiction over what the
> military does. They can only gripe about it.
>
The FAA has considerable jurisdiction over what the military does, the
military is subject to various Parts of the FARs just as civil operators
are.
Steven P. McNicoll
>
> It is my understanding that the flight of two F-16s was about to enter
> a MTR when the collision occurred.
>
They were enroute to an MTR, the collision occurred about ten miles from the
entry point.
Steven P. McNicoll
>
> How would the F-16s being "inside" the MTR have affected this mid-air
> collision?
>
I suppose it would have shifted the majority of the responsibility to the
Skyhawk pilot. The F-16s would have had every right to be operating at high
speed on the MTR, but not prior to entering it. MTRs are charted to warn
pilots of the possible presence of aircraft operating at high speeds.
>
> It is virtually impossible to "see and avoid" an F-16 painted the same
> color as the background it is against presenting its minimal frontal
> profile and traveling 580 knots.
>
True. That's why the areas where high speed operations are conducted are
charted, so that others can avoid these encounters. The problem in this
case was the F-16s were operating at high speed OUTSIDE of any charted area.
>
> Those military F-16 pilots should be tried/court martialed for second
> degree murder.
>
I'm no legal expert, but murder seems a bit excessive, the F-16 pilot
certainly wasn't trying to kill the guy. This looks like manslaughter to
me.
>
> The entire MTR structure is a blatant hazard to civil flight (not to
> mention the environment) that the Germans recognized and ousted from
> their country. The military is out-of-control in the skies over the
> continental US. It's time this is rectified through legal action(s).
>
I don't see how you can draw that conclusion from this case, the collision
didn't occur on an MTR.
Larry Dighera
Let's see what that means. If the military has a 10% utilization
factor for a given MTR (and that's probably a generous estimate), then
I need to stay out of it (it may be 100s of miles long) ALL the time.
Is that reasonable?
What if the military published the schedule of MTR use in advance, and
civil aviation might then regain some of the airspace the military
isn't using. Is that more reasonable?
Of course, the military, being military, wouldn't want to advertise
their operations. But, with 50% of the airspace in the continental
US "owned" by the military (and unusable by civil aviation, by your
own suggestion), is it reasonable for the military to adopt a policy
of, "it's hot all the time"? That makes it easier for the military,
but smacks of a certain arrogance which is not particularly endearing.
There has to be a better way. If the military (who are creating the
hazard due to their high speed and virtual invisibility) were to
assume responsibility for seeing and avoiding (which seems equatable),
they might be required to be TCAS equipped when flying MTRs. Does
that sound reasonable, and safer?
Larry Dighera
Agreed.
Steven P. McNicoll
>
> Which law is that? The 14 CFR does not apply to military aircraft
> except by the grace of the military themselves that says they will
> follow the civilian regs. The FAA has only civil authority.
>
Wrong. The FAA does have authority over military aviation. The Federal
Aviation Act of 1958 transferred the Civil Aeronautics Administration's
functions to a new independent body, the Federal Aviation Agency, and it
took safety rulemaking from the Civil Aeronautics Board and gave it to the
FAA. It also gave FAA sole responsibility for developing and maintaining a
common civil-military system of air navigation and air traffic control, a
responsibility CAA had shared with others.
FEDERAL AVIATION ACT OF 1958
TITLE I - GENERAL PROVISIONS
DECLARATION OF POLICY: THE ADMINISTRATOR
Sec. 103 [49 U.S. Code 1303]. In the exercise and performance of his
powers and duties under this Act the Administrator shall consider the
following, among other things, as being in the public interest:
(a) The regulation of air commerce in such manner as to best promote its
development and safety and fulfill the requirements of national defense;
(b) The promotion, encouragement, and development of civil aeronautics;
(c) The control of the use of the navigable airspace of the United
States and the regulation of both civil and military operations in such
airspace in the interest of the safety and efficiency of both;
(d) The consolidation of research and development with respect to air
navigation facilities, as well as the installation and operation thereof;
(e) The development and operation of a common system of air traffic
control and navigation for both military and civil aircraft.
The Federal Aviation Act contained an exception for military emergencies
and procedures for use in the event of war. Outside of those situations,
the military complies with applicable FARs because they are required to
do so by higher civilian authority.
Steven P. McNicoll
>
> You refuse to listen carefully to what I said. The FAR's do NOT have
> any statutory influence over the military. Congress didn't grant that
> authority to the FAA when they established it. Technically, the FAA
> and the FAR's have no direct impact on the military.
>
That's simply not the case. The FARs DO have statutory influence over
the military. Congress DID grant that authority to the FAA when they
established it. The FAA and applicable FARs DO have direct impact on
the military.
>
> As I pointed out, the military services themselves, in the name of public
> policy has their own regulations that mandate compliance with the rules
> in the FARs unless there is operational reason to do otherwise.
>
The military complies with applicable rules in the FARs because they are
required to do so by higher civilian authority, the President and Congress.
Larry Dighera
<ronca...@writeme.com> wrote:
>"Larry Dighera" <LDig...@socal.rr.com> wrote in message
>news:Jk9q6.40003$LO3.4...@typhoon.we.rr.com...
>>
>> How would the F-16s being "inside" the MTR have affected this mid-air
>> collision?
>
>I suppose it would have shifted the majority of the responsibility to the
>Skyhawk pilot.
So, it wouldn't have affected the collision.
>The F-16s would have had every right to be operating at high
>speed on the MTR, but not prior to entering it. MTRs are charted to warn
>pilots of the possible presence of aircraft operating at high speeds.
Under the present regulations military MTR operations are permitted
at speeds which preclude VFR "see and avoid" separation. That does
not relieve military pilots of the responsibility of seeing and
avoiding any more then it did the late Mr. Jacques Olivier (who, by
all accounts, was attempting to avoid the F-16 when he was killed).
I think it's time for a change in the regulations; this sort of hazard
is unacceptable even if it is charted.
>> It is virtually impossible to "see and avoid" an F-16 painted the same
>> color as the background it is against, presenting its minimal frontal
>> profile, and traveling 580 knots.
>
>True. That's why the areas where high speed operations are conducted are
>charted, so that others can avoid these encounters. The problem in this
>case was the F-16s were operating at high speed OUTSIDE of any charted area.
The fact that the F-16 "Ninja" pilots had penetrated the Class B and
Class C SUA without the mandatory clearances, at nearly 100% over the
speed limit, is indicative of the arrogant attitude of "Goose" and
"Maverick". If the facts as I understand them are correct, Ninja 1
should bear the responsibility for the carnage and monetary damages.
He was leading the flight. Has his name been released yet?
>> Those military F-16 pilots should be tried/court martialed for second
>> degree murder.
>
>I'm no legal expert, but murder seems a bit excessive, the F-16 pilot
>certainly wasn't trying to kill the guy. This looks like manslaughter to
>me.
In your opinion, what was he trying to do without a clearance in
highly congested airspace at 100% over the speed limit? The flight
leader certainly demonstrated a deliberate recklessness toward human
lives.
>> The entire MTR structure is such a blatant hazard to civil flight (not to
>> mention the environment) that the Germans recognized and ousted it from
>> their country. The military is out-of-control in the skies over the
>> continental US. It's time this is rectified through legal action(s).
>
>I don't see how you can draw that conclusion from this case, the collision
>didn't occur on an MTR.
To which conclusion are you referring? The out of control part? I
have read of many instances of similar recklessness among military
fighter pilots. It is legend in the ranks. See what an F-16
instructor pilot and safety officer has to say about, "inappropriate
dangerous behavior by a few "cowboy" pilots":
http://www.jetsafety.com/f16crash.htm
Or, are you referring to the hazard to human life posed by the MTR
structure? I know, "just avoid the military airspace." Bull!
Let's design a safe MTR structure with TCAS equipped military
aircraft, and collision avoidance responsibility on the shoulders of
the military pilots creating the hazard. Anything less is a travesty
in this technologically advanced 21st century.
George R Patterson
Larry Dighera wrote:
>
> On Fri, 9 Mar 2001 23:28:50 -0600, "Steven P. McNicoll"
> <ronca...@writeme.com> wrote:
>
> >"Larry Dighera" <LDig...@socal.rr.com> wrote in message
> >news:Jk9q6.40003$LO3.4...@typhoon.we.rr.com...
> >>
> >> How would the F-16s being "inside" the MTR have affected this mid-air
> >> collision?
> >
> >I suppose it would have shifted the majority of the responsibility to the
> >Skyhawk pilot.
>
> So, it wouldn't have affected the collision.
It certainly would have. The Skyhawk was outside the MTR. There would
have been no collision if the fighters had been inside.
I suppose, however, that your point is that, had all the aircraft been
in the MTR, the collision would still have occurred. Probably so. Then
we would have had a suicidally stupid Cessna pilot instead of a
criminally negligent military one. As it is, we have a homicide which
was directly caused by the carelessness and disregard for regulation of
a member of the Air Force.
George Patterson, N3162Q.
Steven P. McNicoll
>
> Let's see what that means. If the military has a 10% utilization
> factor for a given MTR (and that's probably a generous estimate), then
> I need to stay out of it (it may be 100s of miles long) ALL the time.
> Is that reasonable?
>
No, that's not reasonable.
>
> What if the military published the schedule of MTR use in advance, and
> civil aviation might then regain some of the airspace the military
> isn't using. Is that more reasonable?
>
Yes, that's reasonable. That's also how it is done now.
>
> Of course, the military, being military, wouldn't want to advertise
> their operations.
>
They are already required to do just that.
>
> But, with 50% of the airspace in the continental US "owned" by the
> military (and unusable by civil aviation, by your own suggestion), is
> it reasonable for the military to adopt a policy of, "it's hot all the
time"?
> That makes it easier for the military, but smacks of a certain arrogance
> which is not particularly endearing.
>
The military "owns" half the airspace in the continental US? Where did you
find that little gem?
>
> There has to be a better way. If the military (who are creating the
> hazard due to their high speed and virtual invisibility) were to
> assume responsibility for seeing and avoiding (which seems equatable),
> they might be required to be TCAS equipped when flying MTRs. Does
> that sound reasonable, and safer?
>
No, it doesn't. See and avoid just doesn't work well at these speeds.
That's why the routes are charted, so that other aircraft can avoid these
areas when they are in use. TCAS is useless with non-transponder aircraft.
Steven P. McNicoll
>
> So, it wouldn't have affected the collision.
>
Well, no. Since it was your premise that the collision occurred "inside"
the MTR, how could it?
>
> Under the present regulations military MTR operations are permitted
> at speeds which preclude VFR "see and avoid" separation. That does
> not relieve military pilots of the responsibility of seeing and
> avoiding any more then it did the late Mr. Jacques Olivier (who, by
> all accounts, was attempting to avoid the F-16 when he was killed).
>
> I think it's time for a change in the regulations; this sort of hazard
> is unacceptable even if it is charted.
>
What change do you propose? Eliminate MTRs and MOAs below 10,000 MSL?
>
> The fact that the F-16 "Ninja" pilots had penetrated the Class B and
> Class C SUA without the mandatory clearances, at nearly 100% over the
> speed limit, is indicative of the arrogant attitude of "Goose" and
> "Maverick". If the facts as I understand them are correct, Ninja 1
> should bear the responsibility for the carnage and monetary damages.
> He was leading the flight. Has his name been released yet?
>
Class B and Class C airspace are classes of controlled airspace, not Special
Use Airspace. That they penetrated Class B and C airspace without
authorization had nothing to do with the collision, they were in neither at
the point of impact.
>
> In your opinion, what was he trying to do without a clearance in
> highly congested airspace at 100% over the speed limit? The flight
> leader certainly demonstrated a deliberate recklessness toward human
> lives.
>
Yes, it was reckless, that's why I think manslaughter is an appropriate
charge. Murder would be appropriate if he had intentionally rammed the
Skyhawk.
>
> To which conclusion are you referring? The out of control part?
>
No, "the entire MTR structure is such a blatant hazard to civil flight"
part.
>
> Or, are you referring to the hazard to human life posed by the MTR
> structure? I know, "just avoid the military airspace." Bull!
>
Why? It isn't that hard to avoid it.
>
> Let's design a safe MTR structure with TCAS equipped military
> aircraft, and collision avoidance responsibility on the shoulders of
> the military pilots creating the hazard. Anything less is a travesty
> in this technologically advanced 21st century.
>
That's a great idea. Let's mix high and low speed aircraft together and
require the high speed aircraft to avoid the low speed. Let's require all
aircraft to have transponders and encoders, effectively grounding all
aircraft without electrical systems. (Like mine!) Now, since the military
aircraft all have TCAS and all aircraft have transponders and encoders, and
that eliminates the possibility of collisions, we can remove MTRs from the
charts entirely! After all, since the collision threat has been eliminated
there's no reason to confine military aircraft to these routes, they can go
anywhere!
Andrew Stanley-Jones
> I suppose, however, that your point is that, had all the aircraft been
> in the MTR, the collision would still have occurred. Probably so. Then
> we would have had a suicidally stupid Cessna pilot instead of a
> criminally negligent military one. As it is, we have a homicide which
> was directly caused by the carelessness and disregard for regulation of
> a member of the Air Force.
MTR's give me the willies. Now around where I fly there aren't that many.
But southern california/nevda looks like a spiders web. Take IR203 I only
fly along it every few weeks, and it's IFR to boot. It goes though a pass
with a freeway down it. I can avoid it by flying over the "mountains"
north and south of it and be a suicidal pilot who crashed into a mountain
when he could have followed the road. Or I can get sliced in half by a jet
going (and it has every right too) 450 knots.
Can I avoid a fighter at those speeds? No, it's silly to expect any small
plane too.
Example, flying a few nights ago I was staring down a landing light of some
plane. A minute or so latter I noticed it wasn't moving, completly
stationary, hmmm. I was in CBAS on assigned heading and altitude and it
was a good distance off still so I wasn't too worried. A minute or so
latter atc calls up and informs me the brazillia's going to pass 500 feet
overhead. For the longest time he just stood still out front. If this was
a fighter what should I do? And probably the only reason I ever saw the
brazillia so early was because it was night time.
My 2 cents.
-Andrew
Steven P. McNicoll
"Andrew Stanley-Jones" <asj-n...@cpluck.com> wrote in message
news:98ear...@news1.newsguy.com...
>
> Example, flying a few nights ago I was staring down a landing light of
some
> plane. A minute or so latter I noticed it wasn't moving, completly
> stationary, hmmm. I was in CBAS on assigned heading and altitude and it
> was a good distance off still so I wasn't too worried. A minute or so
> latter atc calls up and informs me the brazillia's going to pass 500 feet
> overhead. For the longest time he just stood still out front. If this
was
> a fighter what should I do?
>
Had it been a fighter you should have held the assigned heading and
altitude, and it would have passed 500 feet overhead.
Andrew Stanley-Jones
> was
>> a fighter what should I do?
>>
>
> Had it been a fighter you should have held the assigned heading and
> altitude, and it would have passed 500 feet overhead.
>
Pbbbht, ok, let me rephrase. Say I'm in the middle of nowhere, no I take
that back. Say I'm crossing an MTR in the middle of no where. I see a dot
that's not moving. Should I go up, or down? In my case down would have
been safer, but say the brazillia would have been 500 feet below? It would
have made things worse. Now make that dot move at 450 knots... Oh, let's
assume I see it too ;)
-Andrew
Steven P. McNicoll
>
> Pbbbht, ok, let me rephrase. Say I'm in the middle of nowhere, no I take
> that back. Say I'm crossing an MTR in the middle of no where. I see a
dot
> that's not moving. Should I go up, or down? In my case down would have
> been safer, but say the brazillia would have been 500 feet below? It
would
> have made things worse. Now make that dot move at 450 knots... Oh, let's
> assume I see it too ;)
>
Okay, different scenario entirely
Don't put yourself in that position. Call FSS and see if the MTR is in use
before crossing or cross above it.
George R Patterson
"Steven P. McNicoll" wrote:
>
> Don't put yourself in that position. Call FSS and see if the MTR is in use
> before crossing or cross above it.
Yes!!!!!
George Patterson, N3162Q.
George R Patterson
Andrew Stanley-Jones wrote:
>
> Say I'm crossing an MTR in the middle of no where. I see a dot
> that's not moving. Should I go up, or down?
I was taught to go down. Granted, that's probably a coin toss chance.
I believe my CFI's reasoning was that the plane changes direction a lot
faster when you point the nose down than when you point it up.
George Patterson, N3162Q.
Henry Bibb
"George R Patterson" <grpp...@home.com> wrote in message
news:3AAAE792...@home.com...
Granted, that's what to book says to do. But, I've asked about 'em, and
gotten
"I don't think so", or "I don't know" for responses. Granted, it wasn't an
on-the-air
call; maybe you get better answers when the recorder is on...
Also, where I fly, there doesn't appear to be much airspace left that isn't
covered
by them, and it's difficult to get the details of what each route's airspace
is. Some
nice gent did recently put that stuff up on the 'Net; I don't have the
bookmark on
this new machine. 'Twas eye-opening, to say the least.
Henry Bibb, N3542G
Larry Dighera
<ronca...@writeme.com> wrote:
>"Larry Dighera" <LDig...@socal.rr.com> wrote in message
>news:Fnjq6.40588$LO3.4...@typhoon.we.rr.com...
>>
>> Let's see what that means. If the military has a 10% utilization
>> factor for a given MTR (and that's probably a generous estimate), then
>> I need to stay out of it (it may be 100s of miles long) ALL the time.
>> Is that reasonable?
>
>No, that's not reasonable.
>
>> What if the military published the schedule of MTR use in advance, and
>> civil aviation might then regain some of the airspace the military
>> isn't using. Is that more reasonable?
>
>Yes, that's reasonable. That's also how it is done now.
Where may I obtain a copy of that schedule which provides times of
ACTUAL USE of MTRs?
>> Of course, the military, being military, wouldn't want to advertise
>> their operations.
>
>They are already required to do just that.
Can you provide a reference to that regulation?
Can you tell me where I can locate a publication which contains the
_times_ when I can expect a given MTR to _actually_ be active?
My experience with MOAs is that the military just says it's active
during _all_ the time published on the chart. Now, we know that isn't
true. They just don't want to go through the trouble of publishing
its _true_ schedule, or they want to have the option to use the MOA on
a moment's notice, I suppose.
>> But, with 50% of the airspace in the continental US "owned" by the
>> military (and unusable by civil aviation, by your own suggestion), is
>> it reasonable for the military to adopt a policy of, "it's hot all the
>time"?
>> That makes it easier for the military, but smacks of a certain arrogance
>> which is not particularly endearing.
>
>The military "owns" half the airspace in the continental US? Where did you
>find that little gem?
You'll find the supporting argument here:
http://www.cdi.org/adm/801/transcript.html
"The U.S. military uses nearly 50% of American airspace and wants to
use more. A war is being waged between citizens and the Pentagon over
the impact of military overflights on quality of life and the
environment."
http://www.cdi.org/adm/801/index.html
"ED THORNTON: The military owns a little over 50 percent of the
airspace over the continental United States already."
>> There has to be a better way. If the military (who are creating the
>> hazard due to their high speed and virtual invisibility) were to
>> assume responsibility for seeing and avoiding (which seems equatable),
>> they might be required to be TCAS equipped when flying MTRs. Does
>> that sound reasonable, and safer?
>
>No, it doesn't. See and avoid just doesn't work well at these speeds.
Above, I am suggesting augmenting the military pilot's ability to
"see" other air traffic in his/her vicinity by equipping military
aircraft flying MTRs with RADAR which is capable of "painting" targets
long before they are visible to human acuity. So, I'm not advocating
"see and avoid" at MTR speeds. I thought I had made that clear by
characterizing military aircraft operating at high speed as "virtually
invisible". At 500 knots it is unreasonable to rely on "see and
avoid", as you imply.
If we both agree that "see and avoid" is unsafe under current MTR
conditions, why aren't civil aircraft prohibited from entering MTRs?
(That's a rhetorical question; believe me, I don't advocate more
restricted areas.)
>That's why the routes are charted, so that other aircraft can avoid these
>areas when they are in use.
So, you're saying that RADAR is useless in alerting military pilots on
MTRs to the potential collision posed by aircraft in their vicinity?
I understand the "logic" behind the charting of MTRs. But I find it
arrogant to grab all that airspace allotted to MTRs, label it highly
hazardous--enter at your perel--when it is used by the military less
than 10% of the time. Sure, the military may need to use that
airspace, but when they're not using it, I'd like to be able to fly
low over the desert and see the sights.
>TCAS is useless with non-transponder [equipped] aircraft.
True, but a spurious argument.
As a percentage of the entire US aircraft fleet, how many would you
estimate are _not_ equipped with a transponder? My estimate would be
a fraction of 1% (mostly gliders, baboons, and the odd Champ or Cub).
If the military aircraft using MTRs were equipped with TCAS (or some
other suitable form of RADAR), then only those aircraft which are not
transponder equipped would have to avoid MTRs.
These folks have the right idea: http://www.rama-usa.org/
Larry Dighera
<ronca...@writeme.com> wrote:
>"Larry Dighera" <LDig...@socal.rr.com> wrote in message
>news:G5kq6.40613$LO3.4...@typhoon.we.rr.com...
>> Under the present regulations military MTR operations are permitted
>> at speeds which preclude VFR "see and avoid" separation. That does
>> not relieve military pilots of the responsibility of seeing and
>> avoiding any more then it did the late Mr. Jacques Olivier (who, by
>> all accounts, was attempting to avoid the F-16 when he was killed).
>>
>> I think it's time for a change in the regulations; this sort of hazard
>> is unacceptable even if it is charted.
>
>What change do you propose? Eliminate MTRs and MOAs below 10,000 MSL?
I propose that the military aircraft flying MTRs (who are creating the
hazard due to their high speed and virtual invisibility) assume
responsibility for the hazard they are creating by assuming
responsibility for seeing and avoiding while flying MTRs. Further, I
propose that those military aircraft be required to be TCAS equipped
when flying MTRs.
This would be preferable to the present situation which permits the
military to create a hazard to air safety, but fails to put the onus
of responsibility for that hazard squarely on military shoulders. It
would also free an enormous amount of airspace for safe civil use.
>> The fact that the F-16 "Ninja" pilots had penetrated the Class B and
>> Class C SUA without the mandatory clearances, at nearly 100% over the
>> speed limit, is indicative of the arrogant attitude of "Goose" and
>> "Maverick". If the facts as I understand them are correct, Ninja 1
>> should bear the responsibility for the carnage and monetary damages.
>> He was leading the flight. Has his name been released yet?
>
>Class B and Class C airspace are classes of controlled airspace, not Special
>Use Airspace.
Thank you for the correction.
>That they penetrated Class B and C airspace without
>authorization had nothing to do with the collision, they were in neither at
>the point of impact.
That they penetrated Class B and C airspace without authorization is
indicative of the reckless, unprofessional, and arrogant attitude of
"Ninja 1."
>> In your opinion, what was he trying to do without a clearance in
>> highly congested airspace at 100% over the speed limit? The flight
>> leader certainly demonstrated a deliberate recklessness toward human
>> lives.
>
>Yes, it was reckless, that's why I think manslaughter is an appropriate
>charge. Murder would be appropriate if he had intentionally rammed the
>Skyhawk.
So, you don't perceive "Ninja 1's" deliberate violation of FARs in
this case to be so negligent as to virtually insure carnage?
>> To which conclusion are you referring? The out of control part?
>
>No, "the entire MTR structure is such a blatant hazard to civil flight"
>part.
>
>> Or, are you referring to the hazard to human life posed by the MTR
>> structure? I know, "just avoid the military airspace." Bull!
>
>Why? It isn't that hard to avoid it.
Why should the low-tech MTR "solution" jointly adopted by the DOD and
FAA relieve the military of responsibility for the hazard to air
safety they cause, and preclude my safe use of so much low level
airspace?
It should be incumbent on the user causing the hazard to air safety to
shoulder the responsibility for the hazard it creates.
>> Let's design a safe MTR structure with TCAS equipped military
>> aircraft, and collision avoidance responsibility on the shoulders of
>> the military pilots creating the hazard. Anything less is a travesty
>> in this technologically advanced 21st century.
>
>That's a great idea.
I'm happy to see that you agree. :-)
>Let's mix high and low speed aircraft together and
>require the high speed aircraft to avoid the low speed.
Am I to infer that you would rather that the low-speed aircraft had
the responsibility to avoid the high-speed aircraft which is creating
the hazard? Do you think that is equitable?
If so, the next time an out of control car traveling over the speed
limit collides with yours, you pay for the damages.
>Let's require all
>aircraft to have transponders and encoders, effectively grounding all
>aircraft without electrical systems. (Like mine!)
Rather, let's require _only_ those aircraft without electrical systems
to avoid MTRs. Then only a small fraction of the civil aviation fleet
would be impacted by MTR avoidance, instead of _all_ civil aircraft.
>Now, since the military
>aircraft all have TCAS and all aircraft have transponders and encoders, and
>that eliminates the possibility of collisions, we can remove MTRs from the
>charts entirely! After all, since the collision threat has been eliminated
>there's no reason to confine military aircraft to these routes, they can go
>anywhere!
Hmmm.... If the military rightfully assumed responsibility for their
hazardous activities, and were able to assure the safety of civilian
flights, that might be reasonable today.
Ron Natalie
Larry Dighera wrote:
>
>
> My experience with MOAs is that the military just says it's active
> during _all_ the time published on the chart. Now, we know that isn't
> true. They just don't want to go through the trouble of publishing
> its _true_ schedule, or they want to have the option to use the MOA on
> a moment's notice, I suppose.
Publish, no. Available, yes. ATC knows when the MOA's are hot.
They can't route IFR traffic through an active MOA. Washington Center
has a big board on one end of the aisle with the MOA status for the
sectors in that area. The local towers here have a grease pencil
status board conveying similar information. All you have to do is
call the ATC unit providing radar services.
Of course, flight following is a big help (of course, as we saw in
Florida not fool proof).
larly endearing.
> >
> >The military "owns" half the airspace in the continental US? Where did you
> >find that little gem?
>
> You'll find the supporting argument here:
>
> http://www.cdi.org/adm/801/transcript.html
> "The U.S. military uses nearly 50% of American airspace and wants to
> use more. A war is being waged between citizens and the Pentagon over
> the impact of military overflights on quality of life and the
> environment."
This is not proof. It says "uses" not "owns".
I have a map on my wall in the office with the entire US and the restricted/
prohibited/ and MOA's are drawn in. It doesn't even approach 50% of the US
surface area (and the surface area would be an over estimation of the area since
the the area doesn't encompass all altitudes).
Points would be better made without the hysteria and exaggerations.
Larry Dighera
<ronca...@writeme.com> wrote:
>Call FSS and see if the MTR is in use before crossing [...]
Have you personally ever had any success in getting useful MTR
information from a FSS?
Larry Dighera
wrote with regard to MTRs:
>Some nice gent did recently put that stuff up on the 'Net;...
If you can post the URL, we would all be grateful.
Henry Bibb
Mac to a PC.
Its http://lairds.org/Kyler/flying/data/ATA-100
The MTR.txt file has the MTR info - other files have navaids, airports, etc.
The description link beside each file tells what the file is. It's all
extracted
from some government tapes, and put up by this Kyler fellow. Hats off
to him. I've learned quite a bit from sniffing around in here.
Henry Bibb
"Larry Dighera" <LDig...@socal.rr.com> wrote in message
news:sVvr6.50087$LO3.6...@typhoon.we.rr.com...
res0b8qr
"Larry Dighera" <LDig...@socal.rr.com> wrote in message
news:VLvr6.50032$LO3.6...@typhoon.we.rr.com...
Larry Dighera
wrote:
>I'd have done that the first time, but I'm in the middle of moving from a
>Mac to a PC.
>
>Its http://lairds.org/Kyler/flying/data/ATA-100
Hats off to you, Mr. Bibb. Many thanks. Indeed, the data are there.
Steven P. McNicoll
>
> Where may I obtain a copy of that schedule which provides times of
> ACTUAL USE of MTRs?
>
The tie-in FSS should have the planned utilization information not less than
two hours prior to use.
>
> Can you provide a reference to that regulation?
>
Order 7610.4J Special Military Operations
Chapter 11. MILITARY TRAINING ROUTES (MTR)
Section 9. VR ROUTE USE
11-9-1. SCHEDULING
a. Each VR route shall have a designated military unit responsible for
scheduling all military flights intending to use the VR route. If the
designated military unit does not have a continuous point of contact; i.e.,
a unit subject to deployment or a unit not available during normal work days
(ANG unit working Wednesday-Sunday), then an alternate scheduling agency
shall be designated. All flights on the VR route will be scheduled through
the primary or alternate scheduling agency.
b. The scheduling activity shall confirm on a daily basis (to the extent
practicable, prior to 2400 hours) with the tie-in AFSS/FSS of the planned
utilization of the route. Unless otherwise agreed, such scheduling shall be
accomplished at least 2 hours prior to use. Scheduling agencies shall
provide an hourly schedule for each route which includes route number,
aircraft type and number, proposed entry/exit time, and altitude.
Scheduling agencies should make every effort to pass changes as soon as
possible to the tie-in AFSS/FSS when a particular route is closed or a
scheduled aircraft cancels.
EXAMPLE-
VR101 0900-1000 2/F-14
0915-1000
SFC B-50 MSL
1000-1100 None
1100-1200 4/F-14
1105-1150
20 MSL-40 MSL
VR102 0900-1000 1/T-38
0902-0944
30 MSL-40 MSL
1000-1100 1/F-14
1000-1015
SFC B-50 MSL
1100-1200 None
>
> Can you tell me where I can locate a publication which contains the
> _times_ when I can expect a given MTR to _actually_ be active?
>
Area Planning Chart AP/1B and the DOD Flight Information Publication (FLIP)
are available at FSSs.
>
> My experience with MOAs is that the military just says it's active
> during _all_ the time published on the chart. Now, we know that isn't
> true. They just don't want to go through the trouble of publishing
> its _true_ schedule, or they want to have the option to use the MOA on
> a moment's notice, I suppose.
>
Most of the MOAs around these parts have "intermittent by NOTAM" as the time
of use.
>
> You'll find the supporting argument here:
>
> http://www.cdi.org/adm/801/transcript.html
> "The U.S. military uses nearly 50% of American airspace and wants to
> use more. A war is being waged between citizens and the Pentagon over
> the impact of military overflights on quality of life and the
> environment."
>
> http://www.cdi.org/adm/801/index.html
> "ED THORNTON: The military owns a little over 50 percent of the
> airspace over the continental United States already."
>
Mr. Thornton appears to be a homeowner near an MTR, not an expert on Special
Use Airspace. The narrator had this to say:
"Estimates of the airspace in use by the military range from one-third to
one-half of all the airspace in the country. The military itself has no idea
of how much airspace it currently controls because no intra-service,
comprehensive inventory of military airspace has ever been conducted."
Your assertion is not supported.
>
> Above, I am suggesting augmenting the military pilot's ability to
> "see" other air traffic in his/her vicinity by equipping military
> aircraft flying MTRs with RADAR which is capable of "painting" targets
> long before they are visible to human acuity.
>
No, you're advocating equipping military aircraft with TCAS. Most aircraft
on these routes already have radar.
>
> So, I'm not advocating "see and avoid" at MTR speeds. I thought I had
> made that clear by characterizing military aircraft operating at high
speed
> as "virtually invisible".
>
You made it clear that you were advocating "see and avoid" at MTR speeds
when you wrote, "If the military (who are creating the hazard due to their
high speed and virtual invisibility) were to assume responsibility for
seeing and avoiding (which seems equatable), they might be required to be
TCAS equipped when flying MTRs."
>
> At 500 knots it is unreasonable to rely on "see and avoid", as you imply.
>
I didn't imply it, I said it outright.
>
> So, you're saying that RADAR is useless in alerting military pilots on
> MTRs to the potential collision posed by aircraft in their vicinity?
>
No, I'm saying the routes are charted so that other aircraft can avoid these
areas when they are in use.
>
> I understand the "logic" behind the charting of MTRs. But I find it
> arrogant to grab all that airspace allotted to MTRs, label it highly
> hazardous--enter at your perel--when it is used by the military less
> than 10% of the time. Sure, the military may need to use that
> airspace, but when they're not using it, I'd like to be able to fly
> low over the desert and see the sights.
>
They aren't hazardous when they're not in use, the times of use are readily
available, and they're easily avoided when they are in use.
>
> True, but a spurious argument.
>
You introduced it.
>
> As a percentage of the entire US aircraft fleet, how many would you
> estimate are _not_ equipped with a transponder? My estimate would be
> a fraction of 1% (mostly gliders, baboons, and the odd Champ or Cub).
>
It's significantly higher than 1%, I'd guess about 15%. But I've never seen
a baboon with a transponder.
>
> If the military aircraft using MTRs were equipped with TCAS (or some
> other suitable form of RADAR), then only those aircraft which are not
> transponder equipped would have to avoid MTRs.
>
Most of the aircraft using these routes are equipped with radar, radar which
will paint a primary target and interrogate a transponder.
>
> These folks have the right idea: http://www.rama-usa.org/
>
If their ideas are similar to yours, they have the wrong idea.
Steven P. McNicoll
>
> I propose that the military aircraft flying MTRs (who are creating the
> hazard due to their high speed and virtual invisibility) assume
> responsibility for the hazard they are creating by assuming
> responsibility for seeing and avoiding while flying MTRs. Further, I
> propose that those military aircraft be required to be TCAS equipped
> when flying MTRs.
>
> This would be preferable to the present situation which permits the
> military to create a hazard to air safety, but fails to put the onus
> of responsibility for that hazard squarely on military shoulders. It
> would also free an enormous amount of airspace for safe civil use.
>
Bad idea. Better to avoid the areas when they are in use.
>
> That they penetrated Class B and C airspace without authorization is
> indicative of the reckless, unprofessional, and arrogant attitude of
> "Ninja 1."
>
That may be, but it had nothing to do with the collision.
>
> So, you don't perceive "Ninja 1's" deliberate violation of FARs in
> this case to be so negligent as to virtually insure carnage?
>
Do you want to be taken seriously in these forums?
>
> Why should the low-tech MTR "solution" jointly adopted by the DOD and
> FAA relieve the military of responsibility for the hazard to air
> safety they cause, and preclude my safe use of so much low level
> airspace?
>
It doesn't, active MTRs are easily avoided by nonusers and that's the
simplest and safest way to go.
>
> It should be incumbent on the user causing the hazard to air safety to
> shoulder the responsibility for the hazard it creates.
>
They did that when they established the MTR.
>
> Am I to infer that you would rather that the low-speed aircraft had
> the responsibility to avoid the high-speed aircraft which is creating
> the hazard? Do you think that is equitable?
>
No, I advocate the low-speed aircraft avoid MTRs when they're in use.
>
> If so, the next time an out of control car traveling over the speed
> limit collides with yours, you pay for the damages.
>
Bad analogy.
>
> Rather, let's require _only_ those aircraft without electrical systems
> to avoid MTRs. Then only a small fraction of the civil aviation fleet
> would be impacted by MTR avoidance, instead of _all_ civil aircraft.
>
Better yet, let's require all aircraft using or crossing active MTRs to be
equipped with TCAS. Or are you so arrogant to believe only the military
should be responsible for collision avoidance?
>
> Hmmm.... If the military rightfully assumed responsibility for their
> hazardous activities, and were able to assure the safety of civilian
> flights, that might be reasonable today.
>
Well, that answers that question!
Steven P. McNicoll
>
> Have you personally ever had any success in getting useful MTR
> information from a FSS?
>
I don't recall ever inquiring about one.
Before this discussion, were you aware that FSSs had useful MTR information?
Larry Dighera
wrote:
>They already have air-to-air radar, how is TCAS or TCAS II going to help?
Do you know if "Ninja 1" or Ninja 2" had air-to-air radar?
I presume it is capable of making see and avoid practical at high
speed; is that correct?
Given the technology to "see" (via radar) and avoid is already
installed in MTR aircraft, do you feel that it would be appropriate
that it be required that the military employ it for collision
avoidance during MTR activity?
Would anything less be reasonable?
Chris
from an air-to-air training scenario it seems like an intelligent
presumption. It seems to me that neither TCAS no RADAR would have alone
prevented this accident. The nature of the system is what probably needs to
be changed, not the equipment on the a/c. According to media releases ATC
had a close proximity warning on the set of a/c and no warning was made to
the 172 PIC. While VFR pilots should maintain see and avoid in MOAs and any
other airspace one has to wonder how a 110 knot airplane properly avoids a
500+ knot airplane with such a high rate of closure. Sadly, this accident
seems to have occurred because several conditions were just right all at the
same time...MOA, high speeds, no radar advisory, F16s not on freq., etc.
Just my opinion, I could be wrong......
--
"Larry Dighera" <LDig...@socal.rr.com> wrote in message
news:X8Er6.52096$LO3.6...@typhoon.we.rr.com...
Steven P. McNicoll
>
> Do you know if "Ninja 1" or Ninja 2" had air-to-air radar?
>
They were F-16s, F-16s have air-to-air radar.
>
> I presume it is capable of making see and avoid practical at high
> speed; is that correct?
>
> Given the technology to "see" (via radar) and avoid is already
> installed in MTR aircraft, do you feel that it would be appropriate
> that it be required that the military employ it for collision
> avoidance during MTR activity?
>
> Would anything less be reasonable?
>
The reasonable thing is to avoid active MTRs.
Steven P. McNicoll
"Chris" <baron...@tamu.edu> wrote in message
news:QREr6.2016$Wg7.4...@dfiatx1-snr1.gtei.net...
>
> I don't know for a fact on these two, but if a pair of F-16s are returning
> from an air-to-air training scenario it seems like an intelligent
> presumption. It seems to me that neither TCAS no RADAR would have
> alone prevented this accident. The nature of the system is what
> probably needs to be changed, not the equipment on the a/c.
>
How can you conclude "the nature of the system is what probably needs to be
changed"? The system was not adhered to.
>
> According to media releases ATC had a close proximity warning on
> the set of a/c and no warning was made to the 172 PIC.
>
According to the preliminary NTSB report the Skyhawk was issued a traffic
advisory just prior to the collision, the pilot did not acknowledge it.
>
> While VFR pilots should maintain see and avoid in MOAs and any other
> airspace one has to wonder how a 110 knot airplane properly avoids a
> 500+ knot airplane with such a high rate of closure.
>
Perhaps then the prudent thing to do would be to avoid the MOA entirely.
>
> Sadly, this accident seems to have occurred because several conditions
> were just right all at the same time...MOA, high speeds, no radar
advisory,
> F16s not on freq., etc.
>
This accident did not happen in a MOA. It happened about ten miles from the
entry point of an MTR.
Ron Natalie
"Steven P. McNicoll" wrote:
>
> >
> > Why should the low-tech MTR "solution" jointly adopted by the DOD and
> > FAA relieve the military of responsibility for the hazard to air
> > safety they cause, and preclude my safe use of so much low level
> > airspace?
> >
>
> It doesn't, active MTRs are easily avoided by nonusers and that's the
> simplest and safest way to go.
And also immaterial to this crash, they weren't in the MTR either.
>
> >
> > Am I to infer that you would rather that the low-speed aircraft had
> > the responsibility to avoid the high-speed aircraft which is creating
> > the hazard? Do you think that is equitable?
> >
>
> No, I advocate the low-speed aircraft avoid MTRs when they're in use.
High speed aircraft fair better?
>
> >
Steven P. McNicoll
"Ron Natalie" <r...@spamcop.net> wrote in message
news:3AAF821A...@spamcop.net...
>
> High speed aircraft fair better?
>
Mr. Dighera's question referred to low-speed aircraft.
No, high speed aircraft don't fare any better, but in most cases the only
high speed aircraft would be those using the MTR as nonusers would be
subject to the 250 kias rule.
Larry Dighera
<ronca...@writeme.com> wrote:
>"Larry Dighera" <LDig...@socal.rr.com> wrote in message
>news:n5vr6.49786$LO3.6...@typhoon.we.rr.com...
>>
>> Where may I obtain a copy of that schedule which provides times of
>> ACTUAL USE of MTRs?
>
>The tie-in FSS should have the planned utilization information not less than
>two hours prior to use.
Have you ever examined this data? Others in this thread have reported
that the FSS lacked definitive information on MTRs.
This is welcome information, indeed. Thank you for providing the text
of this regulation as well as the order reference. It seems that I
have some reading to do, but from a preliminary perusal of paragraph
b, it appears that the military may be failing to comply with the
"hourly" requirement with regard to reporting activity to the tie-in
FSS a minimum of 2 hours before MTR use.
>> Can you tell me where I can locate a publication which contains the
>> _times_ when I can expect a given MTR to _actually_ be active?
>
>Area Planning Chart AP/1B and the DOD Flight Information Publication (FLIP)
>are available at FSSs.
For research purposes the on-line MTR database mentioned by "Henry
Bibb" <hqb...@earthlink.net> in Message-ID:
<U7Oq6.5156$R_6.5...@newsread2.prod.itd.earthlink.net>
http://lairds.org/Kyler/flying/data/ATA-100 is adequate to reveal what
MTR information the military is currently providing.
>> My experience with MOAs is that the military just says it's active
>> during _all_ the time published on the chart. Now, we know that isn't
>> true. They just don't want to go through the trouble of publishing
>> its _true_ schedule, or they want to have the option to use the MOA on
>> a moment's notice, I suppose.
>
>Most of the MOAs around these parts have "intermittent by NOTAM" as the time
>of use.
A search of the above mention MTR database failed to find the word
"intermittent". There are many instances of the word "Continous",
however.
>> You'll find the supporting argument here:
>>
>> http://www.cdi.org/adm/801/transcript.html
>> "The U.S. military uses nearly 50% of American airspace and wants to
>> use more. A war is being waged between citizens and the Pentagon over
>> the impact of military overflights on quality of life and the
>> environment."
>>
>> http://www.cdi.org/adm/801/index.html
>> "ED THORNTON: The military owns a little over 50 percent of the
>> airspace over the continental United States already."
>
>Mr. Thornton appears to be a homeowner near an MTR, not an expert on Special
>Use Airspace. The narrator had this to say:
>
>"Estimates of the airspace in use by the military range from one-third to
>one-half of all the airspace in the country. The military itself has no idea
>of how much airspace it currently controls because no intra-service,
>comprehensive inventory of military airspace has ever been conducted."
>
>Your assertion is not supported.
One could as easily say that my assertion is not unsupported either.
:-)
From the information provided by the narrator, it would appear that
whether the amount of airspace currently controlled by the military is
1/3 or 1/2 of _all_ the airspace in the country, it is too much.
>> Above, I am suggesting augmenting the military pilot's ability to
>> "see" other air traffic in his/her vicinity by equipping military
>> aircraft flying MTRs with RADAR which is capable of "painting" targets
>> long before they are visible to human acuity.
>
>No, you're advocating equipping military aircraft with TCAS. Most aircraft
>on these routes already have radar.
Truly, what I am advocating is a requirement for the military aircraft
operating at high-speed below 10,000 feet to be required to employ
RADAR (be it TCAs or any other competent technology) in assuming its
responsibility to avoid collision with other aircraft. I don't
pretend to be an expert in collision avoidance technology, but I'm
willing to bet that there is a system available that, if required,
would reduce the hazard posed by high-speed, low-level military
operations.
>> So, you're saying that RADAR is useless in alerting military pilots on
>> MTRs to the potential collision posed by aircraft in their vicinity?
>
>No, I'm saying the routes are charted so that other aircraft can avoid these
>areas when they are in use.
Because the MTRs in your vicinity are either few or not in use, you do
not appreciate just how much airspace is charted for military use in
the west and elsewhere in the nation.
You are advocating no change in the existing MTR
proceedures/requirements. I am advocating evolving those
proceedures/requirements with the advances in technology which, if
employed along with more accurate reporting of the MTR times of use,
could make a significant amount of airspace available to civil
aircraft, as well as making the skies safer for all in the air and on
the ground.
>> I understand the "logic" behind the charting of MTRs. But I find it
>> arrogant to grab all that airspace allotted to MTRs, label it highly
>> hazardous--enter at your perel--when it is used by the military less
>> than 10% of the time. Sure, the military may need to use that
>> airspace, but when they're not using it, I'd like to be able to fly
>> low over the desert and see the sights.
>
>They aren't hazardous when they're not in use, the times of use are readily
>available, and they're easily avoided when they are in use.
Although I have not yet completely analyzed the MTR database, its
preliminary perusal indicates an abundance of "Continuous" and time
ranges in excess of 12 hours for military MTR activity. If the
military were actually flying aircraft during _all_ that time, the
world oil supply would be depleted shortly. The MTR active times
provided by the military are obviously padded . To be required to
avoid airspace because the military is too lazy to provide accurate
times of use, or too tyrannical to provide accurate times of use, is
unreasonable.
Because you are not affected in your location, you are content with
the current outdated, dangerous system of MTR management.
>> As a percentage of the entire US aircraft fleet, how many would you
>> estimate are _not_ equipped with a transponder? My estimate would be
>> a fraction of 1% (mostly gliders, baboons, and the odd Champ or Cub).
>
>It's significantly higher than 1%, I'd guess about 15%. But I've never seen
>a baboon with a transponder.
So, you would prefer that the entire civil aviation fleet avoid MTRs,
because 15% of them lack modern technology? Surely you jest.
I would prefer to see only those which lack transponders be denied
access to MTRs where that lack makes them a hazard to aerial
navigation. It seems more reasonable.
>> If the military aircraft using MTRs were equipped with TCAS (or some
>> other suitable form of RADAR), then only those aircraft which are not
>> transponder equipped would have to avoid MTRs.
>
>Most of the aircraft using these routes are equipped with radar, radar which
>will paint a primary target and interrogate a transponder.
If the technology to assist high-speed, low-level military pilots in
avoiding collision with civil aircraft is currently deployed on the
aircraft concerned, why shouldn't the pilots be _required_ to use it?
Is there some inherent virtue in deliberately ignoring the benefits of
existing, on-board, life saving technology while exercising what
amounts to a waver of the prudent safety standards adopted by the FAA?
That seems reckless, imprudent, irresponsible, and negligent to me.
Couldn't the military be viewed as negligent for failing to _require_
RADAR, for collision avoidance use by pilots flying high-speed,
low-level MTRs, independently of any formal order? Couldn't the FAA
be viewed as negligent for failing to _require_ the military to use
the RADAR already installed on-board the aircraft flying the hazardous
MTRs it has authorized?
>> These folks have the right idea: http://www.rama-usa.org/
>
>If their ideas are similar to yours, they have the wrong idea.
They advocate a responsible military. I see no harm in that, do you?
Perhaps you should be marched through radioactive ground zero shortly
after an atomic detonation (as the military did to its Infantry troops
in the '50s). That might give you a little insight into the lack of
regard evidently manifest by past military action.
Larry Dighera
<ronca...@writeme.com> wrote:
>"Larry Dighera" <LDig...@socal.rr.com> wrote in message
>news:VLvr6.50032$LO3.6...@typhoon.we.rr.com...
>> So, you don't perceive "Ninja 1's" deliberate violation of FARs in
>> this case to be so negligent as to virtually insure carnage?
>
>Do you want to be taken seriously in these forums?
Do you want to be seen as advocating unsafe practices?
>> Why should the low-tech MTR "solution" jointly adopted by the DOD and
>> FAA relieve the military of responsibility for the hazard to air
>> safety they cause, and preclude my safe use of so much low level
>> airspace?
>
>It doesn't, active MTRs are easily avoided by nonusers and that's the
>simplest and safest way to go.
Your position of "shut out civil aviation in the name of simplicity"
is ridiculous.
>> It should be incumbent on the user causing the hazard to air safety to
>> shoulder the responsibility for the hazard it creates.
>
>They did that when they established the MTR.
They didn't do it well enough for today's world.
>> Am I to infer that you would rather that the low-speed aircraft had
>> the responsibility to avoid the high-speed aircraft which is creating
>> the hazard? Do you think that is equitable?
>
>No, I advocate the low-speed aircraft avoid MTRs when they're in use.
That is not possible, because the _true_ usage of MTRs is not provided
by the military.
>> Rather, let's require _only_ those aircraft without electrical systems
>> to avoid MTRs. Then only a small fraction of the civil aviation fleet
>> would be impacted by MTR avoidance, instead of _all_ civil aircraft.
>
>Better yet, let's require all aircraft using or crossing active MTRs to be
>equipped with TCAS. Or are you so arrogant to believe only the military
>should be responsible for collision avoidance?
I believe the entity creating the hazard, by operating outside the
prudent safety standards adopted by the FAA, should be held
responsible for employing _all_ means at its disposal for reducing the
threat to air safety that it creates. I don't believe that is
arrogant; it seems prudent and equitable, if not outright logical.
>> Hmmm.... If the military rightfully assumed responsibility for their
>> hazardous activities, and were able to assure the safety of civilian
>> flights, that might be reasonable today.
>
>Well, that answers that question!
Ah, spoken like a true man of vision. :-)
Larry Dighera
<ronca...@writeme.com> wrote:
>"Larry Dighera" <LDig...@socal.rr.com> wrote in message
>news:BTvr6.50075$LO3.6...@typhoon.we.rr.com...
>>
>> Have you personally ever had any success in getting useful MTR
>> information from a FSS?
>
>I don't recall ever inquiring about one.
So, you are mouthing the information in the AIM with no first hand
experience.
>Before this discussion, were you aware that FSSs had useful MTR information?
Yes. In 1998 I began research for establishing an interpretive sky
trail over the vast WWII Desert Training Center whose remains today
grace the Mojave and Colorado deserts in three western states. In the
course of that investigation, I became aware of MTR references in the
Aeronautical Information Manual (see below).
I do not believe the information the military makes available to FSSs
is as "useful" as you intimate, and certainly not as accurate as it
could/should be in terms of times of use. It appears to be written
from a military point of view for military use, and _incidently_
copied for FSS use; it is certainly not specifically created for FSSs.
The MTR information provided by the military fails to display any
regard for civil use MTR airspace. Further, it smacks of a
commandeering military attitude. Clearly, the FAA needs to take a
leadership role in the matter of MTRs, and cease to abdicate its
responsibility for providing air safety. FAA could accomplish this
by mandating that the military assume _all_ responsibility for the
hazards it creates while exercising its sanctioned violation of FARs,
and _require_ the use of on-board RADAR for collision avoidance by
military pilots.
AIM 3-5-2 (b) ... The routes at 1,500 feet AGL and below are generally
developed to be flown under VFR.
(c) Generally, MTR's are established below 10,000 feet MSL for
operations at speeds in excess of 250 knots.
(2) VFR Military Training Routes (VR): Operations on these routes are
conducted in accordance with VFR except flight visibility shall be 5
miles or more; and flights shall not be conducted below a ceiling of
less than 3,000 feet AGL.
d. Military training routes will be identified and charted as follows:
1. Route Identification.
(a) MTR's with no segment above 1,500 feet AGL shall be identified by
four number characters; e.g., IR1206, VR1207.
(b) MTR's that include one or more segments above 1,500 feet AGL shall
be identified by three number characters; e.g., IR206, VR207.
2. (f) Nonparticipating aircraft are not prohibited from flying within
an MTR; however, extreme vigilance should be exercised when conducting
flight through or near these routes. Pilots should contact FSS's
within 100 NM of a particular MTR to obtain current information or
route usage in their vicinity. Information available includes times of
scheduled activity, altitudes in use on each route segment, and actual
route width. Route width varies for each MTR and can extend several
miles on either side of the charted MTR centerline. Route width
information for IR and VR MTR's is also available in the FLIP AP/1B
along with additional MTR (SR/AR) information. When requesting MTR
information, pilots should give the FSS their position, route of
flight, and destination in order to reduce frequency congestion and
permit the FSS specialist to identify the MTR which could be a factor.
Larry Dighera
<ronca...@writeme.com> wrote:
>"Chris" <baron...@tamu.edu> wrote in message
>news:QREr6.2016$Wg7.4...@dfiatx1-snr1.gtei.net...
>>
>> I don't know for a fact on these two, but if a pair of F-16s are returning
>> from an air-to-air training scenario it seems like an intelligent
>> presumption. It seems to me that neither TCAS no RADAR would have
>> alone prevented this accident. The nature of the system is what
>> probably needs to be changed, not the equipment on the a/c.
>
>How can you conclude "the nature of the system is what probably needs to be
>changed"? The system was not adhered to.
It's intuitive.
The current system was unreasonable when initially instituted, because
the responsibility for collision avoidance is _shared_ by all
aircraft, not solely the responsibility of the aircraft creating the
hazard by operating contrary to the safety standards promulgated by
the FAA.
>> According to media releases ATC had a close proximity warning on
>> the set of a/c and no warning was made to the 172 PIC.
>>
>According to the preliminary NTSB report the Skyhawk was issued a traffic
>advisory just prior to the collision, the pilot did not acknowledge it.
It is likely that the pilot of the C-172, the late Mr. Jacques
Olivier, too was busy avoiding the high-speed, low-level, military
F-16 traffic to acknowledge the ATC transmission, or that he received
it too late for it to be of use. The preliminary NTSB report (if I'm
not mistaken) indicates that Mr. Oliver's aircraft was in a banked
turn away from the military aircraft which killed him.
>> While VFR pilots should maintain see and avoid in MOAs and any other
>> airspace one has to wonder how a 110 knot airplane properly avoids a
>> 500+ knot airplane with such a high rate of closure.
>
>Perhaps then the prudent thing to do would be to avoid the MOA entirely.
For civil aircraft to avoid MOAs when they are active is most prudent.
However, to avoid MOAs when they are not actually in use, but reported
as active by the military, is unreasonable. The western US is
blanketed with Restricted areas, MOAs, and MTRs. And, the military is
seeking even more airspace. Where is the limit on the impact the
military will be permitted to inflect on civil aviation and the
environment? Is there a limit? Should there be a limit?
Ron Natalie
the types of operations that MTR's are used for all together
to some exclusive (restricted) airspace, how would have any
of the publication/dissemation/etc... have had any affect on
this crash. These guys weren't even on the MTR. They were
flying around being a hazard, busting controlled airspace,
etc... and collided with the 172 even before they started on
the MTR.
Larry Dighera
<asj-n...@cpluck.com> wrote:
>Here's the Military report:
>http://www2.acc.af.mil/accnews/mar01/01080.html
Actually, it is only a summary of the military report written by the
Air Combat Command Public Affairs Bureau (text below).
>Air Combat Command Public Affairs, United States Air Force, ACC/PAB
>
>Released: March 6, 2001
>
> F-16 accident report released
>
> LANGLEY AIR FORCE BASE, Va. (ACCNS) -- Air Combat Command determined that a critical combination of avionics anomalies, procedural errors and individual mistakes -- on the ground and in the air -- led to the Nov. 16, 2000, midair collision between an F-16 and a Cessna 172 near Bradenton, Fla.
All of the above cited factors in this fatal mid-air collision can be
attributed to personnel receiving pay checks from the federal
government.
The _true_ cause of the fatal collision was the illegal high-speed
low-level operation of military aircraft in the proximity of civil
aircraft operations. However, the Air Force has failed to mention the
F-16s HIGH-SPEED in this summary of their accident report.
> The Cessna pilot [the late Mr. Jacques Olivier], call sign Cessna 829, was killed in the accident. The F-16 pilot, call sign Ninja 2 [Capt. John Kreuder of the 347th Wing, Air Combat Command, Moody Air Force Base (AFB), Valdosta, Georgia], ejected and sustained minor injuries. Both aircraft were destroyed in the accident.
This is the first mention to date of _any_ injuries to the "Ninja 2"
military pilot, Capt. John Kreuder.
Shortly after the collision, Manatee County Sheriff spokesman Dave
Bristow stated, “He’s fine. He doesn’t have any scratches.”
Gerald Rivera was working on a construction site nearby. "We asked the
pilot if he was OK and he said, 'Yeah,'" Rivera told the Sarasota
Herald Tribune.
All other reports indicate that he was calm, and unhurt immediately
following the collision, and ejection. It would be interesting to
know the nature of his alleged injuries.
> At the time of the accident, Ninja 2 was part of a two-ship formation preparing to begin a surface-attack training mission at the Avon Park Air Force Range. The Cessna had taken off from Sarasota-Bradenton International Airport. The other F-16, call sign Ninja 1, was not damaged in the accident and returned safely to Moody Air Force Base, Ga.
The identity of the pilot of the Flight Lead aircraft, Ninja 1, has
not been released to date. This pilot is unquestionably responsible
for this mid-air collision.
> Air Force investigators identified two causes of the mishap. First, Ninja 2 and Cessna 829 failed to "see and avoid" each other in sufficient time to prevent the mishap.
It is unreasonable to expect a pilot to "see and avoid" at a speed of
500 knots unless he is _required_ to use RADAR to augment his
detection of conflicting traffic.
>According to the accident investigation report, Ninja 2 expected Ninja 1 to make a sharp left turn onto a low-level military training route [VR1098] at any moment. His immediate focus was to see and avoid Ninja 1. Just prior to the collision, Ninja 2 saw a white flash, but didn't realize it was another aircraft. There was conflicting testimony as to whether Cessna 829 saw the F-16 and attempted to maneuver his aircraft prior to the collision.
From the preliminary NTSB report, Ninja 1 stated, "He also observed a
high wing white airplane in a right turn estimated between 30 to 45
degrees." If the late Mr. Jacques Olivier's Cessna 172 was banked
right 30 to 45 degrees, there is no reason to believe that he was not
attempting to avoid the Ninja 2 F-16 aircraft traveling in excess of
400 knots.
From this summary it is impossible to know whose testimony conflicted
with Flight Lead Ninja 1's testimony regarding Mr. Olivier's attempt
to avoid the collision.
> Second, Tampa air traffic controllers failed to transmit a safety alert to Cessna 829 when their radar system generated "Conflict Alert" warnings, indicating that two aircraft were in danger of a collision. Investigators determined that if the controllers had issued a safety alert to the Cessna when the first Conflict Alert began, it is likely the pilot would have had time to maneuver to avoid the collision.
Although the preliminary NTSB report does not mention a Conflict Alert
warning, it does offer this transcript of the voice communications
between Miami Center and Tampa Approach:
"Tampa approach instructed N73829 to climb and maintain 3,500 feet,
which was, acknowledged by N73829 at 20:47:15. Miami Center contacted
Tampa approach at 20:47:55, and asked if they could tell them what
altitude Ninja 1 was at, that he had lost the target. Tampa approach
replied at 20:48:00, "ahh hang on I see him down at two thousand." At
20:48:09, Tampa approach informed N73829, that he had traffic off his
left side at 2,000 feet."
From this exchange it is clear that Tampa Approach did issue a traffic
advisory to Mr. Oliver a few seconds before the collision.
Of course, because the F-16s failed to contact Tampa Approach, it was
not possible to issue a traffic warning to them.
> In addition, investigators identified three factors that substantially contributed to the accident. First, the F-16 flight lead, Ninja 1, lost situational awareness and descended under Visual Flight Rules into Tampa Class B airspace without proper clearance from Tampa Approach. Ninja 1 was required to either avoid entry into Class B airspace or request permission from Tampa Approach to enter.
>
> Second, Ninja 1's aircraft developed a position error in its navigation system that the pilot failed to recognize. The aircraft was actually nine to 11 miles south of where the pilot believed it to be, based on his INS reading. As a result, Ninja 1 unknowingly navigated his flight into Sarasota Class C airspace without the required communications with air traffic controllers.
>
> Finally, investigators determined that Ninja 1 had made an inadvertent cursor input to his navigation system during the mission. The pilot failed to recognize the error when he switched into ground attack steering mode. As a result, he unknowingly navigated the flight further off course. If Ninja 1 had noticed the error when he switched to the ground attack steering mode and corrected it, investigators believe the collision could have been avoided.
It is interesting to note that the Air Force does not find the _speed_
of the F-16s, operating in civilian airspace below 10,000 feet at
speeds nearly double that permitted, to have been a contributing
factor, let alone a cause of this tragedy. For the Air Force to omit
from their investigation report the fact that their pilots were
responsible for illegally creating a hazard to civil air safety by
their low-level high-speed operations belies this attempt to obfuscate
the facts by the Air Force.
It is also interesting to note that the Air Force fails to mention
that their F-16s were not employing RADAR to assist them in "seeing
and avoiding" other aircraft in their path.
===================================================================
Additional information:
http://www.cnn.com/2000/US/12/13/air.force.crash.cause/
Air Force determines hot dogging was cause of fatal F-16 crash
--------------------
http://www.cnn.com/2001/US/03/06/pilot.crash/index.html
Air Force pilot made a series of errors leading to mid-air crash
March 6, 2001
Web posted at: 6:55 p.m. EST (2355 GMT)
From CNN National Security Producer Chris Plante
WASHINGTON (CNN) -- An Air Force fighter pilot committed a series of
errors that "substantially contributed" to a fatal mid-air collision
between an Air Force F-16 and a privately owned Cessna airplane over a
Florida golf course last November, according to investigators.
The Air Force investigation also found that Tampa air traffic
controllers "failed to transmit a safety alert to (the Cessna) when
their radar system generated 'conflict alert' warnings, indicating
that two aircraft were in danger of a collision," according to an Air
Force statement. Had the warning gone out, the civilian pilot probably
would have had time to avoid the collision, the Air Force said.
The civilian pilot of the Cessna 172 passenger aircraft was killed
when the F-16 Fighting Falcon slammed into it, largely as a result of
the mistakes made by the other pilot in the two airplane formation.
The Air Force pilot involved in the collision ejected safely from the
single-seat airplane, suffering only minor injuries. The second
fighter jet landed safely.
Investigators say the lead Air Force pilot, known only as "Ninja 1" in
the Air Force statement, committed a navigational error that put the
two jets "nine to 11 miles south" of where he believed they were. He
also inappropriately entered Tampa "Class B airspace without proper
clearance from Tampa" air traffic controllers, the statement says.
Additionally, "Ninja 1 unknowingly navigated his flight into Sarasota
Class C airspace without the required communications with air traffic
controllers," it says.
Ninja 1 also "made an inadvertent cursor input to his navigation
system during the mission. The pilot failed to recognize the error.
... As a result, he unknowingly navigated the flight further off
course," the investigators found
-----------------------------------------
http://www.jetsafety.com/hiddenairways.doc
CHAPTER VIII
RECOMMENDATIONS
Department of Defense (DOD)
1. Expose “Hidden Military Airways” by creating “low fly areas”,
not to interfere with civilian operations, to be located in
uninhabited/desert areas or locations where multiple routes cause
airspace congestion.
2. Expose “Hidden Military Airways” by depicting MTRs on
aeronautical charts with more detailed information.
3. Complete a formal study in regards to restructuring the MTR
system.
4. Develop a computerized booking system which deconflicts all
routes.
5. Improve military MACA programs by conducting more civilian
fly-ins and local briefings to increase MTR awareness and knowledge.
Decrease the number of VR routes in congested areas where many routes
cross.
Update: if the VR route near Tampa and Sarasota had been
restructured, the November 2000 accident would not have occurred.
7. Increase coordination between the military services in regards
to utilization, scheduling of routes and deconfliction.
8. Increase use of corridors where more than two routes cross and
utilize reporting points in areas where multiple routes crisscross
each other such as in the middle of South Carolina.
9. Require military pilots to contact FSS when flying a route
that is not booked or if not entering the route during the scheduled
time period.
10. Standardize and publish holding procedures for MTR routes.
11. Standardize route booking procedures and operations.
12. Require letters of agreements for bases that share routes or
have multiple route crossings.
13. Create VHF frequencies for areas where military and civilian
traffic conflicts occur regularly so pilots can obtain real-time,
in-flight advisories on military activities on MTRs.
14. Create and publish toll-free numbers for MOAs/MTRs and depict
the information on aeronautical charts.
Request military pilots utilize NOAA sectional charts to plan their
missions so the location of conflicting routes will be annotated
accurately. This would also decrease flight-planning time since
plotting of the conflicting routes would not have to be accomplished
since the charts already depict the information. In addition, pilots
would have more SA on Class B, C, and D airspace. Update: if the
F-16 pilots in the November 2000 accident would have been using a
sectional chart, this accident may not have occurred.
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
1. Educate civilian and military pilots through the use of
Internet pages disseminating route information and schedules, safety
flashes and advisory circulars.
2. Require MTR information as a mandatory briefing item during
civilian FSS pilot briefs.
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
1. Revise MTR information on aeronautical charts by listing: the
route name, owning organization, phone numbers, type aircraft and
average speed utilizing the route plus the width and altitude limit of
the route.
2. Depict on the chart the width and altitude next to the route
number on all charts. The current charts only depict the route name.
Instead of “VR87”, the new chart would depict the route as “VR87 100’
to 8000’ +-10 NM.” Refer to Appendix C for an example of the writer’s
proposed depiction of MTR routes.
3. Place a warning on the charts informing pilots that military
pilots operating at high speeds and low altitudes can be off the
centerline of the route up to the route boundary.
4. Note: A proposal to show MTRs in greater detail on sectionals
was rejected by NOAA cartographers, because it would clutter up the
charts even more (De Brauwer, 1995b).
Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA)
1. Publish frequent articles related to MTRs and what pilots need
to know about flying near special use airspace such as MTRs.
2. Recommend to pilots to utilize “flight following” with ATC
when flying near MTRs.
3. Conduct research to determine if low fly areas or
restructuring the MTR system would benefit aviation safety.
4. Request to fly in the rear cockpit of a fighter jet while
flying a MTR to witness the procedures used by military pilots.
United States Air Force (USAF)
1. Republish “Close Call in the Dark”, a 1985 Tac Attack article,
in Flying Safety Magazine.
2. Require all USAF bases comply with AFI 91-202 instruction to
deconflict routes.
3. Develop a test “low fly area” in the Carolinas.
4. Create WWW page to disseminate information about MTR activity.
---------------------------------------------
"Our thoughts and prayers go out to all the families involved in this
unfortunate incident," said Brigadier General John Rosa, 347th Wing
Commander.
Jeffrey W. Eggenberger
yet the results would have been the same. Air wrecks have more spectacular
responses by the news media.
"newsman" <new...@noone.C0M> wrote in message
news:3AA70CE3...@noone.C0M...
> rfishe...@tampabay.rr.com wrote:
> >
> > Dear fellow pilots:
> > The St.Petersburg times (http://www.sptimes.com) has a front page
> > article in today's paper about the investigation of the crash of an
> > air force F-16 and a Cessna 172 flown by a Frenchman named Jacques
> > Olivier. The planes collided on nov. 16, 2000.
> > According to the St. Pete times, the Air Force accepts most of the
> > blame for the crash. The F-16s went thru controlled airspace without
> > talking to Tampa Approach while travelling at up to 550 mph
> > The ariticle said they were off course by 11 miles
> > The FAA had a traffic alert 30 seconds before the accident but by the
> > time they said something, more than 15 seconds had gone by and Jacques
> > had no time to react.
> > The airforce said Jacques should have used "see and avoid" techniques
> > to miss the airforce plane.
> > My question is this: Is it possible to see an aircraft travelling over
> > 500 mpg in time to avoid an accident if you're in a cessna? Even if
> > you saw an F-16 travelling at that speed, could you act quick enough
> > to avoid a collision?
> > 550 mph is 806 feet per second. I don't see how you could see and
> > avoid another object going that fast.
> > ralph, tampa pilot of a 172
>
> At 30 seconds it was 4.5 miles from Jacques position.
> To expect anyone in another plane to expect or see
> anything going that fast is absurd. The military lately
> has been getting away with a lot of things. That disaster
> in Italy comes to mind (with the gondola cable), the ridiculous
> crash of the sub into the boat (they had the boat on passive sonar!)
> The F-16 in this case was clearly wrong and the report should
> say that and then they should make the proper restitution to the
> pilot's family. The air force's contention that Jacques was partly to
blame
> is so arrogant that it makes me angry and ashamed. That General
> will have to answer to the court.
>
> What's the message from the Air force? Same as it is if you're
> a professional athlete do what you want we'll cover your ass!
>
> Rest in peace Jacques.
Larry Dighera
The cost of a civilian Semi and a military F-15 differ considerably.
Andrew Stanley-Jones
Lou Sanchez-Chopitea
"Steven P. McNicoll" wrote:
> "Ron Natalie" <r...@spamcop.net> wrote in message
> news:3AAF821A...@spamcop.net...
> >
> > High speed aircraft fair better?
> >
>
> Mr. Dighera's question referred to low-speed aircraft.
>
> No, high speed aircraft don't fare any better,
But they actually do, don't they? Not if any paint swapping takes place,
but see and avoid is much more feasible. In the case of a 90 degree
intersection,
what is the angle off for the slow and the fast plane? The larger the speed
difference, the larger the angle for the slow, and the smaller the angle for
the
fast. How much time will the average pilot spend looking for traffic at +-80
relative bearing?
> but in most cases the only
> high speed aircraft would be those using the MTR as nonusers would be
> subject to the 250 kias rule.
Cheers
Lou
--
Lou Sanchez-Chopitea EMail: lou.sanche...@xilinx.com
Senior Software Engineer SnailMail: 2100 Logic Drive
SpeakMail: (408) 879-5059 San Jose, CA 95124
FaxMail: (408) 377-3259 #include <disclaimer.h>
Lou Sanchez-Chopitea
"Steven P. McNicoll" wrote:
While this is reasonable, it has no bearing on the accident per se,
does it? In another post you state that the accident took place 10nm
from the entrance to an MTR (presumably on the outside, not the
inside). As I see most of this discussion has to do with degree of
culpability (since procedures external to the MTR were no followed)
and on the MTR system in general.
Larry Dighera
The story below shows that the military are at least aware of the
problem:
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
AVflash Vol. 7, Issue 12b Thursday, March 22, 2001
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
...AND PENTAGON INVESTIGATES COLLISION AVOIDANCE SYSTEM
The Pentagon is now investigating B.F. Goodrich for its role in
supplying the Air Force and Navy with a collision-avoidance system
that (allegedly) doesn't work. The Naval Aviation Collision Warning
System is supposed to give an onboard warning to students and their
instructor pilots when a collision is possible and was to be used
later this year in the T-6A turboprop trainer. However, Air Force and
Navy test pilots say the system gives "false warnings, wrong warnings
or no warnings" at all and the Defense Criminal Investigative Service
is now looking into allegations of fraud.
Larry Dighera
This has got to be a misstatement:
http://avweb.com/n/?12b&otf
F-16 fighter pilot cleared of wrongdoing in midair collision with a
smaller plane near Bradenton, Fla., that killed a flight instructor.
Navigational errors blamed for the accident...
Richard Kowalski
Nope. That's the Air Force explaination and they have cleared their
pilot of any wrong doing. Came out over a month ago.
The NTSB is still investigating and the priliminary report is
available on their website at:
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?ev_id=20001212X22313&key=1
It's always easier to blame the dead man. He can't defend himself,
even though he was doing everything right, except maybe checking the
NOTAMS to see if the VR was hot at that time.
Richard Kowalski
Steven P. McNicoll
"Richard Kowalski" <spamb...@bitnik.com> wrote in message
news:3ae8321f...@news.earthlink.net...
>
> It's always easier to blame the dead man. He can't defend himself,
> even though he was doing everything right, except maybe checking the
> NOTAMS to see if the VR was hot at that time.
>
The collision occurred about 10 miles from the MTR. There's little reason
to see if the route is in use if you don't plan on crossing it.
Larry Dighera
Kowalski) wrote:
>On Tue, 24 Apr 2001 16:06:35 GMT, Larry Dighera
><LDig...@socal.rr.com> wrote:
>
>>This has got to be a misstatement:
>>
>>http://avweb.com/n/?12b&otf
>>F-16 fighter pilot cleared of wrongdoing in midair collision with a
>>smaller plane near Bradenton, Fla., that killed a flight instructor.
>>Navigational errors blamed for the accident...
>
>Nope. That's the Air Force explaination and they have cleared their
>pilot of any wrong doing. Came out over a month ago.
Do you have a URL for the actual Air Force report, as opposed to a
summary, for this tragedy?
I'm wondering how the Air Force could have overlooked the ~400kt speed
of the F-16s below 10,000 feet. The proof of the lead pilot's illegal
speed is contained in the Air Traffic Control recording of the radar
track.
>The NTSB is still investigating and the priliminary report is
>available on their website at:
>
>http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?ev_id=20001212X22313&key=1
>
>It's always easier to blame the dead man. He can't defend himself,
>even though he was doing everything right, except maybe checking the
>NOTAMS to see if the VR was hot at that time.
MTRs aren't NOTAMed, and the F-16s weren't yet on the MTR at the time
they killed the Cessna pilot.
From the summary of the Air Force report (
http://www2.acc.af.mil/accnews/mar01/01080.html )it appears that the
Air Force found the Cessna pilot at fault for not seeing and avoiding
despite reports from the Air Force flight lead, Ninja 1, that the
Cessna was in a 30 to 45 degree banked turn at the time of impact. It
is my understanding that the Air Force had the audacity to attempt to
recover the cost of the downed F-16 from the estate of the civilian
pilot they killed.
If this is in fact the Air Force position in this case, their impudent
hubris casts a disgraceful shadow of audacious effrontery over a once
proud military service. This type timorous insolence and brazenfaced
arrogant disregard for its responsibility to civil aviation in
peace-time skies is adequately repugnant to spark another Timothy
McViegh into action.
Please tell me that justice will prevail.
Aviv Hod
> I'm wondering how the Air Force could have overlooked the ~400kt speed
> of the F-16s below 10,000 feet. The proof of the lead pilot's illegal
> speed is contained in the Air Traffic Control recording of the radar
> track.
>
Larry,
Flying that fast and that low is what the military does- it's not illegal
as far as I know. The nav error is what sticks out in my mind as a possible
point of grievance, since usually the military uses low level VR's and IR's
to do this sort of thing, so we spamcanners can at least try to avoid them.
I was surprised that this didn't come up against the fighter pilot, but the
military pilots really do have lots of legal discretion to fly in what
otherwise would be considered reckless.
-Aviv
PS No one is blaming the dead guy of any wrong doing as far as I know
either.
Larry Dighera
wrote:
>> I'm wondering how the Air Force could have overlooked the ~400kt speed
>> of the F-16s below 10,000 feet. The proof of the lead pilot's illegal
>> speed is contained in the Air Traffic Control recording of the radar
>> track.
>
>Larry,
> Flying that fast and that low is what the military does- it's not illegal
>as far as I know.
The FAA Administrator granted the DOD authorization to exceed 250
knots below 10,000 feet (contrary to FAR 91.70(a)(now FAR 91.117))
under several _specific_ conditions. That DOD authorization is
viewable here:
http://www.faa.gov/ATPubs/MIL/Apdices/milapd18.html#Appendix 18
(Due the space-character at the end of this URL, you may need to 'cut
& paste' it rather than attempting to launch it by double clicking in
your news-reading program.)
From the limited facts that I have, it does not appear that the F-16s
were operating under _any_ of those conditions, and were thus in
violation of FAR 91.117 at the time of their midair collision with the
Cessna.
If the ~400 knot speed of the F-16 pilots was not illegal, please
enlighten me as to which specific condition contained in the DOD Speed
Authorization prevailed at the time of the midair collision which
killed the Cessna pilot.
>The nav error is what sticks out in my mind as a possible
>point of grievance, since usually the military uses low level VR's and IR's
>to do this sort of thing, so we spamcanners can at least try to avoid them.
There is no question in my mind (as I currently understand the facts
of this case), that the Air Force is completely responsible for the
death of this civil aviator.
If I tried to get an acquittal by telling the judge that I lost
situational awareness which caused me to collide with a bus-load of
school children, the judge would instantly find me guilty. How can
the Air Force successfully use this defense to avoid responsibility
for their blatant transgression?
If the Air Force is guiltless, why hasn't the Air Force publicly
released the name of Flight Lead, 'Ninja 1'? What are they trying to
cover up?
>I was surprised that this didn't come up against the fighter pilot, but the
>military pilots really do have lots of legal discretion to fly in what
>otherwise would be considered reckless.
Are you able to cite any specific references which support your
assertion, that "military pilots really do have lots of legal
discretion", or are you just mouthing the military propaganda foisted
on the civil public?
>PS No one is blaming the dead guy of any wrong doing as far as I know
>either.
You failed to read the Air Force summary at the URL I provided in the
message you are following up:
http://www2.acc.af.mil/accnews/mar01/01080.html
I am specifically referring to this passage:
"Air Force investigators identified two causes of the mishap.
First, Ninja 2 and Cessna 829 failed to "see and avoid" each
other in sufficient time to prevent the mishap"
I infer from this, that the Air Force expected the Cessna pilot to see
the minuscule frontal profile of the F-16s traveling ~400 knots in
time to maneuver out of their way. That is a totally unreasonable
expectation IMO. The Air Force is totally responsible for this
killing, and should pay restitution for the actions of its reckless
pilots.
The Air Force summary goes on to state:
"There was conflicting testimony as to whether Cessna 829 saw
the F-16 and attempted to maneuver his aircraft prior to the
collision."
despite the NTSB's preliminary report which paraphrases these words of
the F-16 Flight Lead, "Ninja 1":
"He also observed a high wing white airplane in a right turn
estimated between 30 to 45 degrees."
You've got to believe that the Cessna pilot was attempting to avoid
the F-16s if he was attempting to turn with such a steep bank angle;
after all, ATC called the traffic out to him.
Hopefully, the NTSB will set the record straight with an enlightened
and _impartial_ investigation.
Steven P. McNicoll
"Aviv Hod" <ah.sp...@avivhod.com> wrote in message
news:0vZF6.4888$3c6.1...@news1.elmhst1.il.home.com...
>
> Flying that fast and that low is what the military does- it's not illegal
> as far as I know.
>
The military is subject to FAR 91.117 just as civil users are. The military
does have authorization to exceed 250 KIAS below 10,000 MSL under certain
conditions, but none of those conditions applied at the time of the
collision.
Sec. 91.117 Aircraft speed.
(a) Unless otherwise authorized by the Administrator, no person may
operate an aircraft below 10,000 feet MSL at an indicated airspeed of more
than 250 knots (288 m.p.h.).
(b) Unless otherwise authorized or required by ATC, no person may
operate an aircraft at or below 2,500 feet above the surface within 4
nautical miles of the primary airport of a Class C or Class D airspace
area at an indicated airspeed of more than 200 knots (230 mph). This
paragraph (b) does not apply to any operations within a Class B
airspace area. Such operations shall comply with paragraph (a) of this
section.
(c) No person may operate an aircraft in the airspace underlying a Class
B airspace area designated for an airport or in a VFR corridor designated
through such a Class B airspace area, at an indicated airspeed of more
than 200 knots (230 mph).
(d) If the minimum safe airspeed for any particular operation is greater
than the maximum speed prescribed in this section, the aircraft may be
operated at that minimum speed.
SPEED AUTHORIZATION GRANTED TO DOD
May 18, 1978
Mr. Paul H. Riley
Alternate DOD Representative to FAA
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20330
Dear Mr. Riley:
Section 91.70(a) of the Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) provides that,
unless otherwise authorized by the Administrator of the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), no person may operate an aircraft below 10,000 feet
mean sea level (MSL) at an indicated airspeed of more than 250 knots.
The regulation grants an exception to aircraft having flight characteristics
which preclude safe operation at speeds below 250 knots by providing that if
the minimum safe airspeed for any particular operation is greater than the
maximum speed prescribed, the aircraft may be operated at that minimum safe
airspeed.
In recognition of the fact that certain military operational and training
requirements cannot be met under the terms of the regulation, the Department
of the Navy and the Department of the Air Force have been authorized since
November, 1967, to operate aircraft below 10,000 feet MSL at an indicated
airspeed of more than 250 knots to the extent such high-speed operations
were necessary in the accomplishment of air combat maneuvers and tactics,
low-level navigation, low-level reconnaissance and intercept, weapons
delivery tactics, flight test and evaluation, undergraduate pilot training,
actual or simulated alert missions, and other flight operations of a similar
nature.
Our authorization of November 1967, to each service, was rescinded and
reissued to the Department of Defense on June 8, 1976. The June 1976
authorization was rescinded and reissued on February 25, 1977. The
February 1977 authorization was rescinded and reissued on December
19,1977. Provisions are now needed to accommodate military requirements
while airspace actions are pending. Therefore, effective immediately, the
December 19, 1977, authorization is rescinded and reissued as follows:
Operations below 10,000 feet MSL at an indicated airspeed in excess of 250
knots, in noncompliance with FAR 91.70(a), are authorized for military
aircraft, including Reserve and Air National Guard components, only under
the following conditions:
a. Within restricted areas.
b. Within military operations areas.
c. When operating within large scale exercises or on short term special
missions. Coordination will be effected to insure awareness on the part of
the nonparticipating flying public.
d. When operating on DOD/FAA mutually developed and published IFR
routes. The military necessity for each route and for the extent of use of
each route is to be reviewed and approved by the appropriate military
headquarters.
e. When operating on DOD developed and published VFR routes. Such
routes shall be established for specific missions and used only by
designated units when the provisions of a. through d. above will not
accommodate the required national defense mission as determined by
appropriate military headquarters. Routes are to be developed and published
in accordance with DOD/FAA mutually developed criteria.
f. In the event provisions of a. through e. cannot be complied with,
the appropriate military headquarters may authorize flight operations within
defined airspace in noncompliance with FAR 91.70 as it considers necessary
to accomplish the national defense mission. This provision is intended to
accommodate speed requirements on an interim basis within a defined area for
which an area/route proposal has been coordinated and concurred in by
appropriate military/FAA regional authority but not yet published.
g. If the airspeed required or recommended in the airplane flight
manual to maintain safe maneuverability is greater than the maximum speed
described in FAR 91.70, the aircraft may be operated at that speed. Where
the required or recommended speed is given as range, the lower part of the
speed range should be used consistent with good operating practice. This
provision is primarily to accommodate climbs/descents and terminal area
operations.
This authorization is effective immediately. Operations along VFR low
altitude training routes (TR), which were established in accordance with FAA
Handbook 7610.4C, Part 10, and in existence at the time of this
authorization may be continued until January 1, 1979.
Sincerely,
(s) Raymond G. Belanger
RAYMOND G. BELANGER
Director, Air Traffic Service
>
> The nav error is what sticks out in my mind as a possible point of
> grievance, since usually the military uses low level VR's and IR's
> to do this sort of thing, so we spamcanners can at least try to avoid
> them. I was surprised that this didn't come up against the fighter
> pilot, but the military pilots really do have lots of legal discretion to
> fly in what otherwise would be considered reckless.
>
They have discretion for that in airspace set aside for it, but they were
not in any such airspace at the time of the collision.
>
> PS No one is blaming the dead guy of any wrong doing as far as I know
> either.
>
I believe the Air Force is, didn't they say the Cessna failed to see and
avoid the F-16 in their report?
Aviv Hod
Ugh... I didn't read the link, and I mouthed off... You're right that
the whole thing stinks up to high heaven. What I said about the legality
was based on my primary training instructor, not anything I looked up-
that's why I stated "as far as I know". I know more now, which is why I
hang out in this newsgroup- I'm still a newbie (81 hours since June 00).
From the link, it looks like the AF could try to argue that the pilot's nav
error was based on a problem with the INS, but of course that's just
hogwash.
> Hopefully, the NTSB will set the record straight with an enlightened
> and _impartial_ investigation.
>
I really do hope, as you do, that the NTSB will get to the bottom of this.
Blue skies,
Aviv Hod
Richard Tilton
fighter through the little used basic fighter maneuver called straight and level
! I know, Ninja 1 said he saw a white flash which indicated the cessna was
turning, but it wasn't the cessna's sudden turn which caused the collision -
just as it wasn't a sudden turn that caused the P3 to collide with the chinese
fighter.
As to military speeds, I asked a former F/A-18 driver about that, and he said
the planes which couldn't safely fly an approach at less than 250 knots had
waivers for the speed limits. He said his F-4 had a waiver, but his F/A-18 (and
the F-16 by the same reasoning) did not. I believe this is consistent with both
FAR 91.117 a,d and the letter of authorization quoted by Steven McNicoll.
If I were to "inadvertantly" bust class B airspace and cause a collision with
another aircraft, I would bear full responsibility (legal and moral) for the
collision. For that reason, a lot of time is spent in making certain student
pilots know the visual landmarks surrounding DFW's class B. It seems to me,
basic pilotage could have kept Ninja 1 and 2 out of the class B, (even with the
INS errors) or at least had them in contact with Tampa Approach, where both the
cessna and the F-16s would have had traffic alerts which may have prevented this
tragedy.
Richard
PP-ASEL
Razor
the NTSB does not. It happened on their watch, and they weren't too happy about
it. They will probably file some sort of formal complaint against the Air Force
for violating Class B airspace without clearance and violating the speed limit
within that Class B airspace.
Larry Dighera
<rwti...@swbell.net> wrote:
>I know, Ninja 1 said he saw a white flash which indicated the cessna was
>turning,
Actually, the preliminary NTSB report credits "Ninja 2" with this:
"Ninja 2 stated that while he was maintaining visual formation
with his flight lead he saw a blur "like a sheet of white"
instantly in front of him at his 11 or 12 o'clock position."
REF: http://www.ntsb.gov/NTSB/brief.asp?ev_id=20001212X22313&key=1
>As to military speeds, I asked a former F/A-18 driver about that, and he said
>the planes which couldn't safely fly an approach at less than 250 knots had
>waivers for the speed limits.
The "Ninja" flight was _not_ flying an approach (to a landing), they
were descending at ~400 knots. Presumably, an F-16 flight manual does
not contain an airspeed recommendation or requirement for descending
flight at 400 knots.
>He said his F-4 had a waiver, but his F/A-18 (and the F-16 by the same
>reasoning) did not.
Perhaps a crosspost to rec.aviation.military will produce some more
information on this.
>I believe this is consistent with both FAR 91.117 a,d
Only FAR 91.117(a) states:
"(a) Unless otherwise authorized by the Administrator, no
person may operate an aircraft below 10,000 feet MSL at an
indicated airspeed of more than 250 knots (288 m.p.h.)."
So, the "Ninja" flight was clearly operating in violation of FAR
91.117(a).
FAR 91.117(d) states:
"(d) If the minimum safe airspeed for any particular operation
is greater than the maximum speed prescribed in this section,
the aircraft may be operated at that minimum speed."
I find it difficult to believe that the F-16 flight manual states that
the F-16 is incapable of safely flying a descent at less than 250
knots, but who knows what the manufacture did to win a military
contract.
>and the letter of authorization quoted by Steven McNicoll.
To which particular condition of the SPEED AUTHORIZATION GRANTED TO
DOD are you referring?
Larry Dighera
wrote:
>I suspect that the air traffic controllers union will probably take action if
>the NTSB does not.
To what sort of action are you referring, filing a Pilot Deviation
Report?
>It happened on their watch, and they weren't too happy about
>it.
Actually, the way I read the Air Force position, they are _blaming_
ATC for not issuing a timely traffic alert to the Cessna pilot:
"Second, Tampa air traffic controllers failed to transmit a
safety alert to Cessna 829 when their radar system generated
"Conflict Alert" warnings, indicating that two aircraft were
in danger of a collision. Investigators determined that if the
controllers had issued a safety alert to the Cessna when the
first Conflict Alert began, it is likely the pilot would have
had time to maneuver to avoid the collision."
>They will probably file some sort of formal complaint against the Air Force
>for violating Class B airspace without clearance
>and violating the speed limit within that Class B airspace.
One can only hope.
Steven P. McNicoll
"Razor" <NOS...@razorsedgesoft.com> wrote in message
news:3AE8A149...@razorsedgesoft.com...
>
> I suspect that the air traffic controllers union will probably take action
> if the NTSB does not. It happened on their watch, and they weren't too
> happy about it.
>
What sort of action?
>
> They will probably file some sort of formal complaint against the Air
Force
> for violating Class B airspace without clearance and violating the speed
> limit within that Class B airspace.
>
Enforcement of the FARs is not in the purview of the National Air Traffic
Controllers Association.
While the possible FAR violations within Class B airspace should be
addressed, they don't seem to have a great deal to do with the collision
itself.
Steven P. McNicoll
"Richard Tilton" <rwti...@swbell.net> wrote in message
news:3AE90AA4...@swbell.net...
>
> If I were to "inadvertantly" bust class B airspace and cause a collision
> with another aircraft, I would bear full responsibility (legal and moral)
for
> the collision. For that reason, a lot of time is spent in making certain
> student pilots know the visual landmarks surrounding DFW's class B.
> It seems to me, basic pilotage could have kept Ninja 1 and 2 out of the
> class B, (even with the INS errors) or at least had them in contact with
> Tampa Approach, where both the cessna and the F-16s would have had
> traffic alerts which may have prevented this tragedy.
>
The collision did not occur in the Tampa Class B airspace, it occurred in
Class E airspace beneath the 10 NM ring of the Sarasota Class C airspace.
Dean Wilkinson
prior to the impact. Had they followed the rules, they would have been warned
about the traffic in the class E (which was on frequency with the class B
controllers).
Larry Dighera
<ronca...@writeme.com> wrote:
>The collision did not occur in the Tampa Class B airspace, it occurred in
>Class E airspace beneath the 10 NM ring of the Sarasota Class C airspace.
The Air Force differs with your Class E airspace assertion above:
"(3) At the time of the mishap [sic], Cessna 829 was
operating in the Sarasota Class C airspace under the control
of Tampa Approach [at ~2,000 feet]."
I have no charts of the Florida area. Can you confirm the Air Force's
assertion of the location of the "mishap"?
Steven P. McNicoll
>
> The Air Force differs with your Class E airspace assertion above:
>
> "(3) At the time of the mishap [sic], Cessna 829 was
> operating in the Sarasota Class C airspace under the control
> of Tampa Approach [at ~2,000 feet]."
>
> I have no charts of the Florida area. Can you confirm the Air Force's
> assertion of the location of the "mishap"?
>
I based the location of the collision on the reported location of the Cessna
wreckage, assuming it couldn't have gone far in the shape it was in. I was
relying on memory for the altitude, I thought the preliminary NTSB report
put him at about 1000'. The wreckage was located on a golf course about 1
1/2 miles outside the 5 NM ring of the Sarasota Class C airspace, the
airspace is Class E from the surface to 1200 MSL, Class C from 1200 to 4000
MSL, and Class E up to FL180.
Andrew Stanley-Jones
> The collision did not occur in the Tampa Class B airspace, it occurred in
> Class E airspace beneath the 10 NM ring of the Sarasota Class C airspace.
>
>
>
Ok who's right? I don't have the sectional:
From the military report:
(12) At 1548:09, Ninja 2 and Cessna 829 collided near
Bradenton, Florida (Tabs U-5.1,CC-3.5). The collision happened
approximately 6 NM from the Sarasota-Bradenton International Airport at
approximately 2000 ft, within the confines of the Sarasota Class C airspace
(Tabs J-36, J-37, J-40, R-2, BB-7.2, CC-2, CC-5.1).
-Andrew
--
Andrew Stanley-Jones | "It's kind of fun to do the impossible."
PP-ASEL, EE, LongEz 87KJ | -- Walt Disney
Larry Dighera
<ronca...@writeme.com> wrote:
>
>"Larry Dighera" <LDig...@socal.rr.com> wrote in message
>news:d9hG6.151$gD1.1...@typhoon.we.rr.com...
>>
>> The Air Force differs with your Class E airspace assertion above:
>>
>> "(3) At the time of the mishap [sic], Cessna 829 was
>> operating in the Sarasota Class C airspace under the control
>> of Tampa Approach [at ~2,000 feet]."
>>
>> I have no charts of the Florida area. Can you confirm the Air Force's
>> assertion of the location of the "mishap"?
>>
>
>I based the location of the collision on the reported location of the Cessna
>wreckage, assuming it couldn't have gone far in the shape it was in. I was
>relying on memory for the altitude, I thought the preliminary NTSB report
>put him at about 1000'.
The preliminary NTSB report has them at 2,000 feet too:
Miami Center contacted Tampa approach at 20:47:55, and asked
if they could tell them what altitude Ninja 1 was at, that he
had lost the target. Tampa approach replied at 20:48:00, "ahh
hang on I see him down at two thousand." At 20:48:09, Tampa
approach informed N73829, that he had traffic off his left
side at 2,000 feet. N73829 did not respond. At 20:48:55, Ninja
1 stated, "mayday mayday."
>The wreckage was located on a golf course about 1
>1/2 miles outside the 5 NM ring of the Sarasota Class C airspace, the
>airspace is Class E from the surface to 1200 MSL, Class C from 1200 to 4000
>MSL, and Class E up to FL180.
Thank you for that information.
So, the Class C speed limit is 200 knots, and the F-16s were between
440 and 390 knots, or about 100% over the limit for civil aircraft.
Given the 5-6 second latency of ATC radar, how far behind the actual
position of the F-16s would the scope paint them (max error)? My
guess would be about one nautical mile.
Can you confirm the Air Force's assertion about the change in Tampa
approach UHF frequency?
"(5) Miami Center cleared Ninja flight to 13,000 ft and
directed them to contact Tampa Approach on radio frequency
362.3. The use of this frequency for Tampa Approach was
discontinued in August 2000. Ninja 1 thought he was given
frequency 362.35 and attempted contact there. In either case,
Ninja 1 would have been on the wrong frequency for Tampa
Approach."
RT
Larry Dighera <LDig...@socal.rr.com> wrote in message news:bPiG6.1302
> Given the 5-6 second latency of ATC radar, how far behind the actual
> position of the F-16s would the scope paint them (max error)? My
> guess would be about one nautical mile.
That correlates well with the AF report you posted - the warning was issued
when Ninja 1 was already past the Cessna.