



**From the SelectedWorks of Ali Simon Yusufu
Bagaji**

January 2012

Boko Haram and the Recurring Bomb Attacks in Nigeria: Attempt to Impose

Contact
Author

Start Your Own
SelectedWorks

Notify Me
of New Work

Available at: <http://works.bepress.com/alibagaji/5>



Boko Haram and the Recurring Bomb Attacks in Nigeria: Attempt to Impose Religious Ideology through Terrorism?

BOKO HARAM ET LES ATTENTATS A LA BOMBE AU NIGERIA : TENTER D'IMPOSER LES IDEOLOGIES RELIGIEUSE A TRAVERS LE TERRORISME ?

Ali S. Yusufu Bagaji^{1,*}; Moses Shaibu Etila²; Elijah E. Ogbadu³; Jafa'aru Garba Sule⁴

¹ Exeter Centre for Ethno-Political Studies, IAIS Building, Stocker Road, EX4 4ND, University of Exeter, United Kingdom.

² Department of Public Administration, Kogi State Polytechnic, Lokoja, Kogi State, Nigeria.

³ Department of Business Administration, Kogi State University, Anyigba, Kogi State, Nigeria.

⁴ Department of Business Administration, Kogi State University, Anyigba, Kogi State, Nigeria.

* Corresponding author.

Received 13 December 2011; accepted 22 February 2012.

Abstract

Attempt to forcefully impose religious ideology and or belief on Nigeria's secular society is not new. The leader of the Maitatsine sectarian group attempted it in 1981 and eventually led to large scale uprisings. Since the early 1980s and 2012, Nigeria has witnessed other uncountable religious related crises. Beginning from 2009, the country once again, has been stormed by large scale and unimaginable bomb attacks by the Boko Haram movement. Although Boko Haram can be compared in terms of philosophy and objectives to the Maitatsine sectarian group, its organisational planning, armed resistance, and modus operandi is Taliban and attacks executed by the groups so far the most ferocious and devastating. To arrest terrorism related offences, the Nigerian National Assembly on 17th February, 2011 passed a bill on Anti-Terrorism. Even with the Bill in place, and the invitation to negotiate by President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan, Boko Haram attacks which initially was confined to North-Eastern Nigeria, like cancer has infected the North-Central and is spreading to Southern Nigeria. Given the inherent unsettled political and economic environment, the menace caused by Boko Haram attacks has cashed in to compound an already chaotic situation. A fall-out of the Boko Haram saga for example, is the re-awakening of the acrimonious call for a Sovereign National Conference- by implication; the so called 'One Nigeria' is being questioned. On the

basis of this background, for the motives and intention of Boko haram, it can no longer be ignored, trivialised or abandoned. Apparently, the dynamics of terrorism in the context of Boko Haram attacks in Nigeria remains insufficiently explored. This article aims to narrow such a gap by analysing the concept of terrorism in light of the philosophy and objectives, spectrum of strategies, dimensions and networking of Boko Haram movement in Nigeria.

Key words: Boko Haram; Bomb Attack; Ideology; Nigeria; Religion; Terrorism.

Résumé

La Tentative d'imposer par la force l'idéologie religieuse ou de conviction et sur la société laïque du Nigeria n'est pas nouvelle. Le leader du groupe sectaire Maitatsine il a tenté en 1981 et a finalement conduit à des soulèvements de grande envergure. Depuis le début des années 1980 et 2012, le Nigeria a connu d'autres crises innombrables religieuses liées. A partir de 2009, le pays encore une fois, a été pris d'assaut par grande échelle et attentats à la bombe inimaginables par le mouvement Boko Haram. Bien que Boko Haram peut être comparé en termes de philosophie et les objectifs pour le groupe Maitatsine sectaire, sa planification organisationnelle, la résistance armée, et le modus operandi est talibans et les attaques exécutées par les groupes de loin la plus féroce et dévastatrice. Pour arrêter infractions liées au terrorisme, l'Assemblée nationale nigériane le 17 Février, 2011 a adopté un projet de loi sur la lutte contre le terrorisme. Même avec le projet de loi en place, et l'invitation à négocier par le président Goodluck Jonathan Ebele, Boko Haram attaques qui, initialement, a été confinée au nord-est du Nigeria, comme le cancer a infecté le Centre-Nord et se propage vers le sud du Nigeria. Compte tenu de la inhérente environnement politique instable et économique, la menace causée par les attaques Boko Haram a encaissé à aggraver une situation déjà chaotique. Une chute-de la

saga Boko Haram par exemple, est le réveil de l'appel acrimonieux pour une conférence nationale souveraine par l'implication, la soi-disant «Un Nigeria est remise en question. Sur la base de ce contexte, pour les motifs et l'intention de Boko haram, il ne peut plus être ignoré, banalisé ou abandonnés. Apparemment, la dynamique du terrorisme dans le contexte des attaques Boko Haram au Nigeria reste insuffisamment exploré. Cet article vise à combler une telle lacune, en analysant le concept de terrorisme à la lumière de la philosophie et les objectifs, le spectre de stratégies, les dimensions et mise en réseau des Boko Haram mouvement au Nigeria.

Mots clés: Boko Haram; Attentat à la bombe; L'idéologie; Le Nigeria; La religion; Le terrorisme.

Ali S. Yusufu Bagaji, Moses Shaibu Etila, Elijah E. Ogbadu, Jafa'aru Garba Sule (2012). Boko Haram and the Recurring Bomb Attacks in Nigeria: Attempt to Impose Religious Ideology through Terrorism?. *Cross-Cultural Communication*, 8(1),33 -44 Available from: URL: <http://www.cscanada.net/index.php/ccc/article/view/j.ccc.1923670020120801.1370> DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.3968/j.ccc.1923670020120801.1370>.

INTRODUCTION

Reverend Father Matthew Hassan Kukah, a Priest of the Roman Catholic Church, and indeed many renowned observers of politics and religion in Nigerian were not wrong when they observed a long time ago that, Nigerians are very religious people. In their opinion, religion plays a very vital and influential role in the society that it has manifested itself as a potent force in the political development of the Nigerian state from pre-independence to post-independence. By implication, hardly can the Nigerian state be talked about without reference to religion (Kukah, 1994; Falola, 1998; Kenny, 2006; International IDEA, 2001; Suberu, 2009; Danjibo, 2009). For instance, going about Nigerian towns and villages, it is not uncommon to hear Muslim call to prayers every now and then. Similarly, it is common to hear toll of bell bellowing over Nigerian town and villages inviting Christian adherents to assemble for blessings. It is also very common to see public buildings converted to places of worships. Fridays and Sundays in the eyes of ordinary Nigerian public are strictly days devoted to worshipping Allah and God respectively. In Nigeria therefore, it is very difficult to separate the state from religion- voting behaviour, and many a times ascension to political offices are calculated on the basis of religious affiliation.

A religious country expectedly, is supposed to be at peace with itself and all those living within its sovereign territory. Apparently, although Nigerians are very religious people, recent studies on the historical roles of religion in the country in the past two decades reveal the role of religion in negative light, than its positive contribution to

the Nigerian state (Danjibo, 2009). For instance, in the last two decades, Nigeria has been engulfed in uncountable religious crises, among which are; the first attempts at imposing a religious ideology on a secular, independent Nigeria that resulted in the Maitatsine uprisings of 1980 in Kano, 1982 in Kaduna and Bulunkutu (Maiduguri), 1984, in Jimeta (Yola), and 1985 in Bauchi, (Isichei, 1987. 194-208; Ibrahim, 1997. 511-512; Adesoji, 2010. 96-97). Following the Maitatsine crises, there was the Kano metropolitan riot of October 1982, the Ilorin riot of March 1986, the University of Ibadan crisis of May 1986, the nationwide crisis over Nigeria's membership in the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) in January/February 1986, the Zangon-Kataf, Kafanchan, Kaduna, Zaria and Funtua religious riots of March 1987, the Kaduna Polytechnic riot of March 1988, the acrimonious, nationwide debate on Sharia law at the Constituent Assembly in October/November 1988, the Bayero University crisis of 1989, the Bauchi and Katsina riots of March/April 1991, the Kano riot of October 1991, the Zangon-Kataf riot of May 1992, the Kano civil disturbance of December 1991 and the Jos crisis of April 1994 (Imo, 1995.21-23; Ibrahim, 1997. 512-516; Enwerem, 1999. 124; Adesoji, 2010. 96-97).

In addition to the above, between 1999 and 2012, many ethno-religious hostilities were reported, and some such as the Boko Haram crisis is on-going. These hostilities include the Shagamu conflict of July 1999, the recurring Jos crises of 2001, 2002, 2004, 2008 to 2011, and the Boko Haram crises between 1992 and 2012. (Omipidan, 2009a. 5-6; Akaeze, 2009; Adesoji, 2010. 96-98; Danjibo, 2009). Given the ferocity and frequency of Nigeria's ethno-religious crises, and the Boko Haram attacks in particular, the socio-economic, security and political stability of the country is constantly under threat. Amidst all the crises, many have thus challenged the capability of the Nigerian state to defend its own citizens and territorial integrity, and are therefore once again calling for a Sovereign National Conference. In a modest article of this nature with page and word limitation, it is not possible to examine all of the above mentioned crises that had engulfed Nigeria in the recent past. To this end, this article shall specifically discuss the Boko Haram crises in the country. This is because, given the spate of boko Haram attacks in the recent time, the need to have its background knowledge should therefore not be ignored, trivialised or abandoned. In this context therefore, in order to achieve the essence of this article, it is divided into four sections. The first section introduces the article. The second section on the other hand discusses the theoretical framework that would be used to analyse/explain the rationale behind Boko Haram activities. To achieve this aim, the section reviewed the concept of terrorism. The third section discusses and analysis what we need to know- the origin, ideology and activities of Boko Haram

movement in the country. The section also discussed the factors that have been given to explain rationale behind the Boko Haram movement in Nigeria bearing in mind the major elements of the concept of terrorism. The final section is the summary and conclusion.

AN OVERVIEW OF THE CONCEPT OF TERRORISM

The term terrorism is not entirely new in politics and international relations vocabulary. However it gained more enquiry and attention after the September 11 attacks of the United States of America. Since then, it has been variously defined, explained and or described. For example, it has been either described as tactic and strategy; a crime, a justified reaction to oppression and an inexcusable abomination (Adesoji, 2010; Ojukwu, 2011). As a term, it has become increasingly popular among individual such as a 32 year old Norwegian-Anders Behring Breivik and an organisation such Al-Qaeda and Taliban that pursue extreme goals against their own country or western countries. The immediate aim and strategy of most terrorist(s) is to commit acts of violence that draws the attention of the local populace, the government and the world to their cause. Attacks are planned and executed to obtain the greatest publicity, choosing targets that that symbolises what they oppose. For instance, in 1972, at the Munich Olympics, the Black September Organisation struck and killed 11 Israelis. Though they were the immediate victims, the main target was the estimated 1 billion people that were watching the televised event. This being the case, terrorism is like a dangling monster, everyone and any nation is a potential target, and be it advanced or a developing nation.

As an anonymous observer once described it; 'in the hands of the modern terrorist(s), evil is distilled into a potent, living weapon'. And the phrase, 'one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter' is a view terrorists themselves would accept. They do not see their act as evil but fighting for what they believe in by whatever means possible- kidnapping, bombing, blackmail, genocide, ethnic cleansing etc. Thus, terrorist attacks in great countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom in 2001 and 2005 respectively brings to the fore a future in which our societies are among the battle fields and our people among the targets (Danjibo, 2009; Ojukwu, 2011). The September 11th terrorist attacks on the United States were not only tragic and horrific, but were also followed by other major attacks such as, the Bali tourist facilities bombing in 2002, the siege of a Middle School in Breslain, Russia, the rail station bombing in Madrid, Spain in 2004, the London transit systems attacks in 2005 (Lutz and Lutz, 2008; Ojukwu, 2011). These attacks resulted in major casualties, and as such have provided evidences that terrorism is a

continuing problem and ravaging fire for many societies around the world to take individual and collective action to fight against it.

The term terrorism at a general level is momentarily interpreted by many as a word that has a connotation of evil, indiscriminate violence or brutality. Thus, for many, it is assumed that, when actions of individual or group is labelled as terrorist, is to suggest that the actors or the violence is immoral, wrong or contrary to obvious basic ethical principles that any reasonable human being might hold. In some context, terrorism may be conceived as, freedom fighters, revolutionaries, rebels, resistance fighters, members of democratic opposition or national liberation soldiers (Enders and Sandler, 2006; Lutz and Lutz, 2006; Lutz and Lutz, 2008). On the basis of the above therefore, terrorism is considered a deliberate and systematic murder, maiming and menacing of the innocent to inspire fear for political ends. In the latter part of the 20th century, the phenomenon of terrorism became popular as one of the features of world politics and conflict. Hitherto, terrorism is used by individuals, single minded small groups, state agents and broad insurgent movements to seek some political and military results perhaps considered difficult or impossible to achieve in the usual political forum or on the battlefield against an army (Harmon, 2000; Ojukwu, 2011).

Terrorism is not only confined to anomalous circumstances or exotic systems; it is also a potential in ordinary institutions as well as in unusual situations. It has been variously described as both a tactic and strategy; a crime and a holy duty; a justified reaction to oppression and an inexcusable abomination. Reigns of terror are not properly understood if they are conceived exclusively as ephemeral states of crisis produced by adventurous events or as alien forms of control. Systems of terror usually defined as 'abnormal' by the conventions of Western social and political thought may be generated under certain conditions of stress by 'normal' political processes (Walter, 1972; Danjibo, 2009). It is within this mode of thought that Merari (1994) for instance, describes terrorism as the use of violence by sub-national groups or clandestine state agents for obtaining political- including social and religious goals especially when the violence is intended to intimidate or otherwise affect the emotions, attitudes and behaviour of a target audience considerably larger than the actual victims.

Wilkinson (1974) also holds that as a type of unconventional warfare, terrorism is designed to weaken or supplant existing political landscapes through capitulation, acquiescence or radicalisation as opposed to subversion or direct military action. On the basis of the above, terrorism is significantly considered as a compulsive strategy of the relatively disadvantaged, the weak who seeks reversal of authority, an efficacious use of force to achieve a desired policy, a theatrical warfare

whose drama involves the actors who actually carry out the violent act, the group against whom the violent act is targeted and the authority due to be influenced or compelled to act. Often times, those who are accused of being terrorists acts rarely identify themselves as such, instead, they use terms that represent their ideological or ethnic struggle such as activists, separatists, freedom fighters, guerrillas, Jihadists, revolutionaries (Harmon, 2000; Walter, 1972; Ojukwu, 2011).

Historically, the concept terrorism dates back to the first organised human interactions. At the minimum, it could be traced back to the period when Jewish zealots used terror to resist the Romans by killing many Roman soldiers and destroying Roman properties. It could also be traced to when Muslims used terrorism to fight each other (Shiites versus Sunni) and against the crusades. It was a period in the religious circle when dying in the service of god, dying while killing the assumed enemies of God (Allah) loomed large (Rapport 1984). The modern development of terrorism as a tool to achieve political and religious goals began during the French Revolution (1793-1794). During this period, Maximilien Robespierre of France introduced government sponsored terrorism in order to maintain power and suppress opposition to the government (Hoffman, 1998). Similarly, during the Soviet Revolution in 1917, Lenin and Stalin, evolved government sponsored terrorism as a useful tool to maintain government control. These personalities systematically used the act of terrorism to intimidate and frighten the entire society. To them, both terror and fear were veritable instruments for governmental operations (Danjibo, 2009; Ojukwu, 2011). Meanwhile, it was the 1966 Tri-continental Conference that took place in Cuba, and which was sponsored by the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) that marked the beginning of the internationalisation of terrorism. Terrorist and liberation groups from Europe, Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Latin America gathered at this conference to build alliances, and since then began to cooperating with another. For instance, the Red Army Faction (German group) allied itself with Black September (Palestinian group); Action Direct (French group) allied with the Red Army Faction and Red Army Brigade (Italian group); the Japanese Red Army allied with the popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (Padelford et al., 1976).

There are wide spectrums of strategies of terrorist groups. No one type of group has a monopoly on any particular technique or strategy. Thus, different strategies can be employed by different, unrelated groups of terrorist. Strategy in this context is the considered application of means to advance one's aims and objectives. The type of strategy to be adopted to accomplish an aim and objective depends largely on the circumstances and intentions of the terrorist(s) group. Harmon (2000) identifies some of the terrorists' strategies as; strategy to create or further a sense

of societal dislocation, fear and even anarchy; strategy to discredit, diminish, or destroy a particular government and replace it with another, economic strategy which is intended to directly harm the property owners and perhaps to vitiate the economic policies and programmes of government- particularly in the areas of bombings and sabotage of oil pipelines, bank robberies, and disrupting the export of manufactured goods in order to gain international effect. From the foregoing, the strategy of terrorist(s) group is essentially to commit acts of violence as mentioned above in order to draw the attention of the world to their cause. For instance, in October 1983, Middle Eastern terrorists bombed the Marine Battalion Landing Team Headquarters at Beirut International Airport. Their immediate victims were the 24 military personnel that were killed and over 100 others who were wounded. But their true target was the American people and government (Danjibo, 2009).

Basically, there are about three main trends in modern terrorism. The first trend in modern terrorism is loosely organised, self-financed and internationalised network of terrorists. Another trend in terrorism is that which is religiously or ideologically-motivated. For instance, radical and fundamentalist group, or groups use religion as platform to pose terrorist threats of varying kinds to many nations' interests (Ojukwu, 2011). A third trend in modern terrorism is the apparent growth of cross-national links among different terrorist organisations which may involve combinations of military training or funding, technology transfer or political advice. In fact, looming over the entire issue of international terrorism is a trend toward proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). For instance, Republic of Iran, seen as the most active state sponsor of terrorism, has been aggressively seeking a nuclear arms capability. Iraq under Saddam Hussein was thought to be stockpiling nuclear weapons-chemical and biological. North Korea recently admitted to having a clandestine program for uranium enrichment. Also, there are unconfirmed indications that the Al Qaeda organisation attempted to acquire chemical, biological, and radiological and nuclear weapons before the death of Osama Bin Laden.

It is pertinent to also examine some of the various dimensions of terrorism. Prominent among these include, state-bound; non-state terrorism and terrorism across national boundaries. By state-bound terrorism, is meant one being orchestrated and aided by states. State-bound terrorism can be in the form of intimidation, selective political assassination, abduction and kidnapping. Some striking illustration includes the ethnic cleansing and genocidal activities the Nazi regime carried out against the Jewish population between 1939 and 1945, and the Stalinist purge of the peasant class of Kulaks in Ukraine that caused the death of millions of civilians (Mulaj, 2008a; Mulaj, 2008b). The non-state terrorism is often

carried out by individuals or groups who feel it is no longer worth it to accomplish political objectives within the law, a law which to them represents the power of an immoral and or illegitimate regime or government. These individuals are contemptuous of the society's political institutions and practices (Slann, 1998). A good example of non-state terrorism was the Maitatsine activities in the 1980s and the on-going Boko Haram crisis in Nigeria. Some of the factors responsible for the non-state terrorism are tied to relative deprivation- asymmetrical allocation or distribution of public resources, poverty, and political frustration. It could also be due to religious intolerance or fanaticism (Adeniran, 1996; Adesopo, 2010; Ojukwu, 2011).

The last but not the least dimension is terrorism across national boundaries. This dimension of modern terrorism is one that has external and international connection. A vivid example of cross national dimension of terrorism is Al Qaeda whose activities are mostly drawn on external factors. Whereas at the national (territorial) level, the source and motives for violent acts such as kidnapping, abduction among others are identified and resolved, in the case of cross national (extra-territorial) terrorism, it does not easily subject itself to scrutiny and resolution. Hence, it is often difficult to identify the actual source of some terror across national boundaries, and some times, if identified, it can be pretty difficult to cope with it without the collaboration of other actors within the international system.

The essence of the above review is to provide a theoretical foundation for understanding the recent escalation in Boko Haram attacks in Nigeria, and the need to get to the bottom of the accompanying crisis that is threatening the country's peace and national security. In this context therefore, the utility of the conceptual overview for area and comparative studies remains undoubtedly substantial (Bagaji, 2011). Thus, taking into consideration the embedded conceptual clarifications in the review above, and which overly interpreted, appear to clearly explain the strategies, trends, dimension, and motives of Boko Haram for the renewed attacks in Nigeria, the proceeding sub head is intended to throw more specific and detailed light on the above issues as it relates to the Boko haram activities in Nigeria.

BOKO HARAM MOVEMENT: TALIBANS AND TALIBANISM IN NIGERIA? WHAT WE NEED TO KNOW

When people hear of the word Boko Haram, it sends waves of fear into their psyche, and it ends there. For many others, they are aware of its presence, yet have no much information about it. According to Adesoji (2010), it seems that the group- Boko Haram, 'might not have explicitly given the name *Boko Haram* to itself; rather

the name could (have) come from the external view of its basic beliefs' (pp. 100). Therefore, the best approach to understand the ideology and philosophy of the movement is by explicating the two words- *Boko* and *Haram*. In Hausa language, the word *boko* is an equivocal term which means either *book*, *Western* or *foreign*; while the word *haram* is an Arabic derivative meaning *forbidden*, *ungodly*, or *sinful* (Danjibo, 2009. 7; Adesoji, 2010. 100). If the words are literally Pieced together *boko haram* means book is sinful. But it's deeper meaning is that, forbid everything Western and Western education- Western education is sinful, sacrilegious or ungodly and should therefore be forbidden (Danjibo, 2009; Adesoji, 2010). The inference one can make from the above is that, the movement is not only characteristically opposed, but outrightly rejects Western education, Western culture and modern science. Alternatively, it embraces and advocates the propagation of and strict adherence to Islam by all and sundry regardless of anyone's personal wishes. In line with this objective, the movement seeks to impose Sharia across all Nigerian states (Bumah and Adelokun, 2009. 40; National Life, 2009).

From the foregoing, the intent of the movement is aimed at replacing modern state formation with the traditional Islamic state, because Western values run contrary to Islamic values. *Umma Mahammadiya*- Muslim faithful and *Dar-ul-Islam*- Islamic community cannot be compromised in the face of Western influence in the Nigerian secular society. Thus, the moral decadence and evil in the society is as a result of the embrace of Western civilisation, and in order to curb such evil, an Islamic society must be entrenched by destroying modern political institutions and infrastructures. The philosophy goes hand in hand with the entrenchment of the *Shari'a* law in the society. The embedded philosophy of the Boko Haram movement can be inferred to explain the reason why police and armed forces formations, government establishments and properties are the target of destruction by the movement. In addition, it is also an ideological belief of the movement that, any member who fight and die- either by suicide bombing in the process of establishing a Sharia state by destroying modern state formation and government establishment would automatically go to *Aljanna*- paradise or heaven (Danjibo, 2009; Adelokun, 2009). It is no wonder; the movement has a large and committed following among the *Almajiris*- Qur'an trainees who depend on their *Mallam*- teacher for knowledge, inspiration and their daily survival. This is not to say that, Boko Haram has not got influential members that are high and mighty. That is probably why Boko Haram looms large, but the Nigerian government has not got the courage to name and shame the cabals behind the movement.

In sum, the ideology and philosophy of Boko Haram movement was aptly captured by Tell Magazine thus:

The mission of the sect was to establish an Islamic state where

orthodox Islam is practised. Orthodox Islam according to him (Yusuf Mohammed, leader of the sect) frowns at Western education and working in the civil service because it is sinful. Hence, for their aim to be achieved, all institutions represented by government including security agencies like police, military and other uniformed personnel should be crushed (Tell, August 10, 2009, p. 34).

The next big question is, how did the Boko Haram movement emerge, and how is behind it? According to Danjibo (2009), the leader of the Boko Haram movement, 'Yusuf Mohammed, was a secondary school drop-out who went to Chad and Niger Republic to study the Qur'an' (pp. 6). While Yusuf Mohammed was in the two countries, he developed radical views that were abhorrent to Westernisation and modernisation. Like the late leader of the Maitatsine sectarian group, Yusuf Mohammed got back to Nigeria and settled in Maiduguri- the capital of Borno State in the North-Eastern Nigeria and established a sectarian group in 2001 known as the *Yusufiyya*- a named derived after him. The sectarian movement was able to attract large members across Northern Nigeria as well as in Chad and Niger Republics. The membership of the Boko Haram movement cut across the broad spectrum of society, but a preponderant number of members come from the poorest groups in the above mentioned countries. Thus, beyond former university lecturers, students, bankers, a former commissioner and other officers of Borno State, membership extended to drug addicts, vagabonds, and generally lawless people. Although the common denominator among all members is their desire to overthrow the secular government and to propagate Islamic law, the oratory prowess of Yusuf Mohammed arguably contributed to the ease of mobilisation and participation (Michael and Bwala, 2009. 3; Omipidan, 2009a. 43-44; Olu, 2009. 9).

While predominantly based in the Lake Chad Basin and Maiduguri in particular, Yusuf Mohammed engaged in radical and provocative preaching in the first instance, against other well known and respected Islamic scholars such as Jafar Adam, Abba Aji and Yahaya Jingir and against established political institutions. There is a claim among scholars that, Yusuf Mohammed's revolutionary transformation and oratory prowess was borne out of his long-term dream of reforming society. The argument behind this claim is that, it explains the quick radicalisation of the group under his leadership, the group having assumed a hard-line position after its erstwhile leader, Abubakar Lawal, left to study at the University of Medina, Saudi Arabia (Oyegbile and Lawal, 2009. 68; Adesoji, 2010. 99). A different claim was that Yusuf Mohammed left the Taliban because of its extremist tendencies but vowed that his group would not relent until an 'independent and a just State devoid of anything haram (ungodly or sinful) had been established' (Omipidan, 2009a. 43-44). On the basis of the above background, it would appear that Yusuf Mohammed prepared himself for

the leadership role that he later played in the Boko Haram movement with his membership in other fundamentalist groups.

Although there is yet conclusive evidence to link Boko Haram with jihadist movements outside Nigeria, it is also not impossible that the Boko Haram movement was just one facet of the multifaceted and well-linked fundamentalist movement, the true extent of which has yet to be fully determined. There is an account that linked the leader of Boko Haram to the Taliban of Afghanistan, but he severed the relationship. Well, the reason why Yusuf Mohammed may have decided to sever his ties with the Taliban- if in fact, he actually did- could have been informed not by his opposition to their extremist tendencies, but rather by his desire to realise his long-term dream of reform, which, perhaps, was being slowed down by others who were not as passionate as he was (Adesoji, 2010. 99). But on the other hand, the *modus operandi* of the Boko Haram movement, fashioned after the Taliban in Afghanistan, has generated some curiosities. Given its large following and the claim that it had sent members to Afghanistan, Lebanon, Pakistan, Iraq, Mauritania and Algeria for training, it could be that the Boko Haram modelled itself after the Taliban simply to acknowledge its source of inspiration. It could also be that it was meant to attract sympathy and support from the Taliban or related groups. Viewed from another perspective, it could also be that the links actually exist. For instance, the *Operation Sawdust* that carried out in 2005 by the military and the police and which covered North-Eastern States- Borno, Bauchi and Yobe, led to the arrest of some Islamic fundamentalists whose activities posed a threat to the security of the Nigerian state. Among those arrested were Yusuf Mohammed the leader of the Boko Haram movement. These arrests provided the first clues about the links between Boko Haram and the Al-Qaeda terrorist group as those arrested along with Yusuf Mohammed revealed they had been trained in the act of terrorism in Afghanistan, Lebanon, Pakistan and Iraq. Items recovered during the operation included maps and diagrams of government establishments and of some directions to specific government buildings in Abuja (Tell, August 17, 2009, p. 69; Danjibo, 2009. 15). However, what we are to bear in mind is that, even though the above claims from the Operation Sawdust have not been conclusively proven, the loud speculation in the Nigerian and foreign press about the activities of such groups as the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) in Algeria, Tablighi clerics from Pakistan, and Wahabist missionaries from Saudi Arabia in Northern Nigeria, as well as the reported training of some fundamentalists in Al-Qaeda camps in some foreign countries, offer proof of Boko Haram's links with fundamentalist groups around the world, however tenuous (Alli, 2009. 1, 8; Oyegbile and Lawal, 2009. 69; Soboyede, 2009. 14; Clayton, 2010; Adesoji, 2010. 101).

Other than the desire to ideologically impose Sharia in Nigeria's secular, and also, replacing modern state formation with the traditional Islamic values, there are combination of factors which have been identified to justify or explain the motives behind Boko Haram movement and the use of terrorism to achieve the aims. One of such factors is the impact of the success of the 1979 Ayatollah Khomeini revolution in Iran (Hickey, 1984. 251-256; Lubeck, 1985. 369-390; Hiskett, 1987. 209-223; Usman, 1987. 11-25; Isichei, 1987. 194-208; Clarke, 1987. 93- 115; Kastfelt, 1989. 83-90; Ibrahim, 1997. 509-534; Albert, 1997. 285-325; Falola, 1998. 137-162; Albert, 1999a. 274-309; 1999b. 19-36; Stock, 2004. 415- 417; Adesoji, 2010, 97-98). Some have gone as far as linking the renewed Boko Haram attacks, especially in the late part of 2011 and early part of 2012 to the boomerang effects of the Arab spring, and the subsequent winning sprees recorded by Islamic parties in Tunisia and Egypt. In some other cases, although almost all the attacks have been subsumed under Boko Haram, and explained by even some scholars as religious, it is apparent that other extraneous and underlying factors such as economic disequilibrium/inequality, envy, poverty among youths- who easily become willing tools in the hand of patrons to have played parts (Ibrahim, 1997. 521-524; Human Rights Watch 2005. 48; Sulaiman 2008. 20-26). Finally, it has been observed by some people that the unhealthy contest for political offices and manipulation of the youths have all played parts (Usman, 1987). For instance, accusing fingers are pointed at political juggernauts that lost their relevance in the scramble for the Aso Rock- Nigerian Presidential House in 2009. Those who share this view are saying that, the losers cannot continue to wait until their own time comes. Hence, the Boko Haram attacks are manipulations by the political class to wreck vengeance in order to destabilise the political system.

Overall, when the philosophy and objectives, organisational planning and armed resistance, and modus operandi of Boko Haram are analytically compared in terms of the broad spectrum of tactics, strategies, trends and dimension to the concept of terrorism reviewed in this article, one may not struggle to place Boko Haram on the league table of terrorist organisations. There is no gain-saying the fact that, terrorism or terrorist activities have increasingly become widespread criminal violence. The terrain and strategy of perpetrating terrorism may be different- while some groups take to suicide bombing and hijacking of airlines, some device the use of air missiles, and while some settle with hostage taking, abduction, kidnapping and bombings of multinational oil pipelines etc. But the motive and intention is to cause outcry and agony for innocent people purportedly to be heard. Although, Nigeria had in the past witnessed series of crises, the Boko Haram movement is deep rooted than it appears, and the most dreaded and destabilising. That

is probably why many Nigerians are disappointed with government handling of the menace post by Boko Haram. For instance, many patriotic Nigerians are accusing President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan for trivialising the security and wellbeing of Nigerians by choosing to remove the subsidy on oil on 1st January, 2012, when infact, Nigerians were mourning the death of those that lost their lives in the Boko haram bombing of the Catholic Church in Madalla on 25th December, 2011.

There is no doubt; the Nigerian government had adopted series of approaches- military and Commission of Inquiry without any positive result. In most case, the military approach led to extra-judicial killing of Yusuf Mohammed and core leaders of the movement, and probably innocent people. Sometime, even the reports of the Commission are not released to the public. It is on this note it was observed that, it would not be surprising for the Boko Haram Commission of Inquiry to add up yet another file to the governmental mortuary of unattended reports (Danjibo, 2009). From the foregoing, it is obvious that, Boko Haram movement and its massive bombing attack strategies pose great danger to Nigerian state and global peace and security. Given the serious response by nations around the world to terrorism related events, the Nigerian government also need to embark on comprehensive and drastic measures that aim to address the remote and immediate causes of the renewed Boko Haram attacks. Nigeria need to enter into international collaboration with those countries such as United States of America, United Kingdom, France, Italy and Israel and among others, that have first hand experience of terrorism and have thus over the years devised to a reasonable extent, credible and scientific means of reducing terrorism in their respective countries, and by no means, globally. Finally, Nigeria needs to embark on grassroots education that target youths- that easily become willing tools in the hand of Boko Haram patrons. Although the youth and grassroots education is by no means a gradual process, properly packaged and delivered, Nigerians may go to bed with their eyes closed, and also recover from its negative headlines to that of 'one nation, good people'.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

This article sets out to examine the dynamics of terrorism in the context of Boko Haram attacks in Nigeria which remains insufficiently explored. It started by observing that religion is a reckoning force in Nigeria, but more potent is the negative headlines it has attracted due to series of religious violence. The article narrowed the knowledge gap of Boko Haram movement by reviewing the concept of terrorism- in light of the philosophy and objectives, spectrum of strategies, dimensions and networking of Boko Haram movement in Nigeria. A detailed analysis and linkage of the concept of terrorism

to the organisation, elaborate plans, the intensity, spread and gallantry, and remarkable commitment of the members of the Boko Haram to their cause, leaves no one in doubt that, Boko Haram movement is deep-rooted than previously thought.

In view of the ideology and philosophy of Boko Haram therefore- especially its abhorrence of Western civilisation and its strong commitment to impose Sharia in the secular Nigerian state, it became obvious that terrorism perpetuated by Boko Haram in all its ramifications is a serious threat to the national interest of the Nigerian state. However, given the serious response by countries around the world to tackling terrorism related offences, the Nigerian government in line with what goes on in most advanced countries passed Anti-Terrorism Bill on the 17th February, 2011. However given the unabated suicide bombing being executed by Boko Haram, Nigeria must further demonstrate her strong commitment to addressing the remote and immediate causes of the renewed Boko Haram attacks by joining hands with the international community. In addition, Nigeria must embark on grassroots education by targeting youths who easily become willing tools in the hand of Boko Haram patrons. Boko Haram attacks just as the Al Qaeda's September 11 attacks of the United States of America are one of the passing phases of Nigeria's chaotic history. With commitment of the ruling elites and intelligence support of the international community, 'Our Own Dear Native Land Must Survive' the negative headlines occasioned by the recurring horrendous attacks of Boko Haram.

REFERENCES

- Adeniran, T. (1996). Terrorism and National Security. *Staff Seminar Series*. Department of Political Science, University of Ibadan.
- Adesoji, A. (2010). The Boko Haram Uprising and Islamic Revivalism in Nigeria. *Africa Spectrum*, 45(2), 95-108.
- Akazeze, A. (2009, October 28). From Maitatsine to Boko Haram. *NewsWatch*, 13.
- Albert, I.O. (1997). Kano: Religious Fundamentalism and Violence. In H. Georges & P. Adesanmi (Eds.), *Jeunes, Culture de la Rue et Violence Urbaine en Afrique* (pp. 385-325). Ibadan: IFRA & African Books Builders Ltd.
- Albert, I.O. (1999a). Ethnic and Religious Conflicts in Kano. In O. Otite & I.O. Albert (Eds.), *Community Conflicts in Nigeria: Management, Resolution and Transformation* (pp. 274-309). Ibadan: Spectrum Books Ltd.
- Albert, I.O. (1999b). The Role of Communication in the Escalation of Ethnic and Religious Conflicts. In E.E Uwazie., I.O. Albert., & G.N. Uzoigwe (Eds.), *Inter-Ethnic and Religious Conflict Resolution in Nigeria* (19-36). Maryland, (U.S.A): Lexington Books Ltd.
- Alli, Y. (2009, August 2). Revealed: Boko Haram Leaders Trained in Afghanistan, Algeria. *The Nation*, Lagos, 1
- Anonymous. (2009, August 5). Nigeria on the Brink. *The London Times*, 5.
- Anonymous. (2009, August 2). Who or What is Boko Haram? *Sunday Tribune*, 3.
- Bagaji, A.S.Y. (2011). Explaining the Violent Conflicts in Nigeria's Niger Delta: Is the Rentier State Theory and the Resource-curse Thesis Relevant? *Canadian Social Sciences*, 7(4), 34-43.
- Bumah, J., & Abimbola, A. (2009, August 6). The Boko Haram Tragedy and Other Issues. *The Punch*, Lagos, 40.
- Clarke, P. (1987). The Maitatsine Movement in Northern Nigeria in Historical and Current Perspective. In I.J.H. Rosalind (Ed.), *New Religious Movement in Nigeria* (pp. 93-115). Lewiston/Queenston: The Edwin Mellen Press.
- Clayton, J. (2010, April 2). Nigeria Forced to Deal with Revival of Islamist Group Boko Haram. *The London Times*, 12.
- Danjibo, N.D. (2009). Islamic Fundamentalism and Sectarian Violence: The 'Maitatsine' and 'Boko Haram' Crises in Northern Nigeria. *Peace and Conflict Studies Paper Series*, Institute of African Studies, University of Ibadan, 1-21.
- Enders, W.S., & Sandler, T. (2006). The impact of Transnational Terrorism on U.S. Foreign Direct Investment. *Political Research Quarterly*, 59(4), 517-531.
- Enwerem, I. (1999). An Assessment of Government's Formal Responses to Ethnic/Religious Riots, 1980-1990s. In E.E. Uwazie., I.O. Albert., & G.N. Uzoigwe (Eds.), *Inter-Ethnic and Religious Conflict Resolution in Nigeria* (pp. 121-125). Maryland, (U.S.A): Lexington Books Ltd.
- Falola, T. (1998). *Violence in Nigeria: The Crisis of Religious Politics and Secular Ideologies*. Rochester: University of Rochester Press.
- Harmon. C.C. (2000). *Terrorism Today* (2nd ed). London and New York: Routledge.
- Hickey, R. (1984). The 1982 Uprisings in Nigeria: A Note. *African Affairs*, 83(331), 251-256.
- Hiskett, M. (1987). The Maitatsine Riots in Kano: An Assessment. *Journal of Religion in Africa*, xvii (3), 209-223.
- Human Rights Watch. (2005). Revenge in the Name of Religion: The Cycle of Violence in Plateau and Kano States. *Human Rights Watch Report*, 17(8a), 7-10.
- Ibrahim, J. (1998). The State and Religion in Nigeria: Forces and Dynamics. *Afrika Zamani*, 5 & 6, 39-66.
- Ibrahim, O.F. (1997). Religion and Politics: A View from the North. In L. Diamond., A. Kirk-Greene & O. Oyediran (eds.), *Transition Without End: Nigerian Politics and Civil Society Under Babangida*, Ibadan: Vantage Publishers.
- Ilesanmi, S. (2001). Constitutional Treatment of Religion and the Politics of Human Rights in Nigeria. *African Affairs*, 100, 529-554.
- International IDEA. (2001). *Democracy in Nigeria: Continuing Dialogue(s) for Nation-Building*. Sweden: Stockholm.
- Imo, C. (1995). *Religion and the Unity of Nigeria*. Uppsala Research Reports in the History of Religions, No.6. Uppsala: Almqvist and Wiksell International.
- Isichei, E. (1987). Assessment of the Maitatsine Religious

- Crisis 1980-1985: A Revolt of the Disinherited. *Journal of Religion in Africa*, xvii(3), 194-208.
- Kukah, M.H. (1994). *Religion, Power and Politics in Northern Nigeria*. Ibadan: Spectrum Books.
- Kastfelt, N. (1989). Rumours of Maitatsine: A Note on the Political Culture in Northern Nigeria. *African Affairs*, 88 (350), 83-90.
- Ladan, M.T. (1999). The Role of the Youth in Inter-Ethnic and Religious Conflicts: The Kaduna/Kano Case Study. In E.E. Uwazie., I.O. Albert., & G.N Uzoigwe (Eds.), *Inter-Ethnic and Religious Conflict Resolution in Nigeria* (pp. 97-111). Maryland, (U.S.A): Lexington Books Ltd.
- Lubeck, P.M. (1985). Islamic Protest Under Semi-Industrial Capitalism: Yan Tatsine Explained. In J.D.
- Y. Peel., & C.C Stewart (Eds.), *Popular Islam South of the Sahara* (pp. 369-390). Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Lutz, J.M., & Lutz, B.J. (2006). Terrorism as Economic Warfare. *Global Economy Journal*, 6(2), 1-20.
- Lutz, J.M., & Lutz, B.J. (2008). *Global Terrorism*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Michael, I., & James, B. (2009, August 1). End of the Road for Boko Haram Leader - How He Attracted Young Fanatics. *Saturday Tribune*, 3.
- Mulaj, K. (2008a). Forced Displacement in Darfur, Sudan: Dilemmas of Classifying the Crimes. *International Migration*, 46(2), 26-48.
- Mulaj, K. (2008b). *Politics of Ethnic Cleansing (Nation-State Building and Provision of In/Security in Twentieth Century Balkans)*. Lanham (MD): Lexington Books.
- National Life*. (2009, August 8). The Boko Haram Massacre (Editorial), 8.
- Nwankwo C., & Francis, F. (2009, August 3). Boko Haram: Another 140 Kids, Women Rescued, 780 Killed in Maiduguri Alone-Red Cross, Victims Given Mass Burial. *The Punch*, 2.
- Ojukwu, C.C. (2011). Terrorism, Foreign Policy and Human Rights Concerns in Nigeria. *Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa*, 13(4), 371-384.
- Olu, F. (2009, August 9). The Psychology of Boko Haram. *The Nation*, 9.
- Omididan, I. (2009a, August 2). Why North is on Fire. *The Sunday Sun*, 5-6.
- Omididan, I. (2009b, September 26). Revealed! How Yusuf's Father Began Boko Haram Ideology in the 1960s. *The Saturday Sun*, 48.
- Oyegbile, O., & Abdulrafiu, L. (2009, August 17). Shielding Patrons of Boko Haram. *Tell*, 67-71.
- Padelford, N. J. et al. (1976). *The Dynamics of International Politics*. New York: Macmillan Publishing Co.
- Rapport, D. (1984). Fear and Trembling Terrorism in Three Religious Traditions. *American Political Science Review*, 78 (3), 658-677.
- Slann, M. (1998). *Introduction to Politics. Governments, and Nations in Post-Cold War Era*. Boston: McGraw-Hill.
- Stock, R.F. (2004). *Africa South of the Sahara: A Geographical Interpretation* (2nd ed). New York: The Guilford Press.
- Soboyede, A. (2009, August 13). The Boko Haram in All of Them. *The Punch*, 14.
- Suberu, R.T. (2009). Religion and Institutions: Federalism and the Management of Conflict Over Sharia in Nigeria. *Journal of International Development*, 21(4), 547- 560.
- Sulaiman, T. (2008, December 15). The Fire this Time. *Tell*, 20-26.
- Sulaiman, T. (2009, November 30). The Plot to Islamise Nigeria. *Tell*, 19-23.
- Tell Newsmagazine. (2009, August 10). *Tell*, p. 34.
- Tell Newsmagazine. (2009, August 17). *Tell*, p. 69.
- Uchendu, E. (2004) Religion and Nation-Building in Nigeria. *Nigeria Heritage*, 13, 132-144.
- Usman, Y.B. (1987). *The Manipulation of Religion in Nigeria, 197-1987*. Kaduna: Vanguard Printers and Publishers Ltd.
- Walter, E. V. (1972). *Terror and Resistance: A Study of Political Violence*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Wilkinson, P. (1974). *Political Terrorism*. New York: Macmillan Press.
- Williams, P.A.T. (1997). Religion, Violence and Displacement in Nigeria. *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, xxxii, (1-2), 33-49.