

ACTIVITIES OF BOKO HARAM AND INSECURITY QUESTION IN NIGERIA

Professor Adagba Okpaga¹, Ugwu Sam Chijioke², Eme, Okechukwu Innocent³

¹Benue State University, Markudi

²Department of Political Science, Enugu State University of Science and Technology

³Department of Public Administration and Local Government Studies University of Nigeria, Nsukka

ABSTRACT

The cycle of violence being unleashed on Nigerians by the fundamentalist group, Boko Haram has heightened fears among the populace and the international community that the hostility has gone beyond religions or political colouration. Going by the latest report from the Human Rights Watch (HRW), about 935 has been killed since 2009 when the sect began its onslaught on the country. The dangerous dimension the insecurity challenge has become a great source of worry as security experts affirm that what is on ground has shifted to the realm of terrorism, a global phenomenon where no one is safe. It is lamentable, however, that the security organizations have failed to tackle the challenges, even as they have become the target of terrorists who have never hidden their disdain for the intelligence and law enforcement community. By seemingly clueless, but promises are not enough. The populace demands a respite from this state of fear and insecurity. The coordinated assaults from the Boko Haram sect in the northern part of the country, besides making life miserable for Nigerians, is a danger to the unity and corporate existence of Nigeria. A multidimensional approach to tackle their threat must be urgently launched by the government.

Keywords: Insecurity, Violence, Violent Crimes, Crime Wave, Security and law Enforcement

Agencies

INTRODUCTION

With at least 250 persons so far reported dead in the January 20, 2012 bomb attacks in Kano, indications are that the attempts to rein in the Islamic fundamentalists are inadequate or ineffectual, or both. According to reports, multiple explosives went off one after the other in Kano, in the usual manners of similar attacks by the members of Boko Haram sect in Maiduguri, Damaturu, Potiskum, Gombe, Abuja, and Madalla in Niger State.

It is axiomatic to posit that there is a large consensus of opinion that government must find a quick-fix solution to the problem, and then a lasting solution. This is because there is no way government will continue to spend the huge chunk of money it had been spending on security without providing security to Nigerians. Some Nigeria and groups have been so incensed with the rising insecurity in the polity that they are calling for Jonathan's resignation. There is also the belief that such calls will continue to rise until there is remarkable improvement in the maintenance of security in the land, as there is a rising impatience among the populace.

The dangerous trend in insecurity came with Boko Haram, the Muslim fundamentalist sect, bombing everything within reach. It had no qualms bombing innocent people, even women and children who had inkling of what it is fighting about.

The atmosphere of insecurity currently pervading the nation is now worsened by the allegation of complicity among high-ranking security personnel. The Jury is still out as to whether terror suspect, Kabiru Sokoto, actually escaped but the manner in which the drama unfolded has given Nigerians cause for fear about the competence of those charged with the nation's security. Unfortunately, if there is a cadre of officers specifically trained to deal with espionage and counter-intelligence, Nigeria are yet to see any evidence of that in the management of the current ugly situation.

Only last two years during the Independence Day Celebration on October 1, bombs were detonated in Abuja, claiming lives and destroying properties. Curiously, the Nigerian security agencies had been forewarned of the bomb blasts the movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), which later claimed responsibility for the heinous act. Precedent to last years Independence Days Celebration, the same group posted on its website a threat to detonate bombs at the revenue of the celebration. That probably explained the government's decision to relocate the venue of the celebration to the Aso Rock Villa where it was held in a low key manner.

The security situation is worsened by the spate of bombings by the Jama'atu Ahlis-Sunnah Lidda' Awati Wal.Jihad otherwise called Boko Haram (Western Education is sinful in House language). Not to be soon forgotten is the August 26, 2011 suicide bombing of the United Nations secretariat in Abuja, coming not long after a similar attack on the Nigeria police force headquarters on June 16, both claimed by the Boko Haram.

Presidential assurances would amount to nothing if all Nigerians see are deadlier attacks by Boko Haram after the president had assumed that perpetrators of previous attacks would be apprehended and prosecuted. It does the government no credit to learn that arrested members of the sect escaped or set freed by the challenges and the best the President will do is throw his hands up in frustration, lamenting that the sect has infiltrated even his security agencies.

It is against this background this paper seeks to address the challenges Boko Haram is posing to our National security and ways of containing their siege on the polity. To attain this objective, the first section of the paper addresses conceptual issues. The next explores the Boko Haram menace and their implications on the nation's stability. The third section examines the way forward and concludes the paper.

CLARIFICATION OF CONCEPTS

Theorising Insecurity Question in Nigeria

The piece by an erstwhile head of the State, Abdulsalami Abubakar, on *the challenges of security in Nigeria* (2004) which came from an address given at NIPSS in 2004 clearly shows that the greatest threat to the current civilian dispensation is insecurity. As he rightly observes, in addressing the challenge to the survival of democracy in Nigeria, it is pertinent to consider security issues and problems that have affected the attitude, confidence and cooperation of all groups and segments that make up the Nigerian federation. Akin Oyebo (2011) seems to echo this position of Abubakar in his piece on *the imperative of insecurity*. He declares: "it is self-evident that without security, hardly is anything possible." He nevertheless counsels that "security should go beyond law and order by encompassing meaningful existence for the generality of the populace" (Akinbode, 2011:27). Putting it more succinctly, S.L. Ezeoha (2011:38) in *Causes and effects of insecurity in Nigeria* declares that "Security means stability and continually of livelihood, predictability of relationships, feeling safe and belonging to a social group. In the same token, John Oshodi (2011) argues that one sure way of tackling the insecurity situation in Nigeria is to accord the field of psychology a pride of place in policy formulation and implementation to promote national cohesion and integration.

Many other contributors take critical look at the possibilities and difficulties of achieving sustainable peace in our embattled nation. S.B. Jegede's *Back to state of nature?* (2011) and Rose Adahis *What hope for the common man?* (2011) Put the Nigerian ruling class to task on its competence to get us out of the woods. To Jegede, the insecurity situation in the country has led many to wonder if Nigeria has not returned to the state of nature where, according to Thomas Hobbes, life was solitary, nasty, brutish and short. Adahi compliments Jegede's position with her observation that

public functions are now held amidst tight security and that the Nigerian government has failed to secure itself not to talk of securing the "common man" as enshrined in section 14 (2c) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

Our sense of security by Biodun Ogunyemi (2011) attempts to refocus issues of insecurity from the prehistoric times. He draws from Frantz Fanon's dimensions of violence to argue that explaining the emergent security problems in Nigeria must recognize the physical, structural and psychological violence unleashed on the people over the years by a tiny class of oppressive and manipulative rulers of the Nigerian state. While agreeing with Oyebode and others that security goes beyond maintaining law and order, Ogunyemi argues that the strength, wealth and security of our nation reside in "expanding people's choices in every relevant way" (Ogunyemi 2011:34).

The *This Day* Newspaper's editorial (2011), titled *Soldiers as security men* observes that the current state of insecurity in Nigeria has left the Federal Government to deploy troops in such a manner that all our roads are littered with soldiers in combat ready fashion. The impression one gets is that security can be created by merely posting soldiers on the roads. But given the temperament of soldiers, many have questioned the wisdom of such a large scale deployment. As noted by *This Day*, the menace of terrorism no doubt calls for a new approach that will be founded on credible intelligence gathering". Nevertheless, the deployment of policemen to guard political office holders, private homes and individuals who have the financial muscle and influence in government circles has led to a situation such that there are very few left to fight crimes in the street.

Insecurity: Consequences for investment and employment, Ike Okorie Laments that Nigeria would not be able to tap into about \$1. 4tr investment capital which circulates around the world for as long as the insecurity situation persists, his main concern is the need to examine what the rising insecurity portends for the country particularly in the areas of foreign investment and employment generation. Insecurity is a risk factor which investors the world over dread and makes them to move elsewhere .Okorie argues that the severe security threat to life and property all over the country sends wrong signals to the international community; stating that "Economic globalization is not just an historical evolution but also a process (Okorie, 2011:26).

Will there be peace in our time? This is the question pointedly raised and addressed by Rotimi Fasan (2011), in his piece culled from the *Vanguard* newspaper. His thesis is that, going by the magnitude of the social and political upheavals around the world, one will not be far from the truth to assert that there is never a period in human history more turbulent than today. He posits that peace couldn't have been farther from our doorstep.

Apart from the economic and social problems, we are bedeviled constantly today with fears of one attack or the other by one extremists group or another. Hostage taking, bomb throwing and violent crimes are now part of our daily life that we only shake our heads to acknowledge the events and move on as if nothing has happened. He concludes: with all these troubles of daily living, finding food to eat and paying bills in the midst of direct attacks by those propagating one extremist view or another, there is no word for it but that we are in troubled times"(Fasan, 2011:36).

There are three major contending perspectives to the understanding of insecurity question. There is the armed robbery theory, wobble economy and opposition – ruling party theses. The Armed robbery theory posits that the high wave of armed robbery in Nigeria is primarily responsible for high level of insecurity in Nigeria. It also argues that in Nigeria, politics is extremely competitive and elections are perceived as zero-sum contests. The fallout is the increasing militarized nature of politics, the use of violence as an electoral tool, and the inculcation of a culture of violence in society. Again, this thesis recognizes the existence of armed groups of varying character and intent operating in Nigeria. However, today's armed groups are better armed and trained, and increasingly sophisticated in their actions compared to those of the past.

The armed robbery thesis concludes by arguing that as a result of zero-someness politics combined with the prevalence of armed groups provided an easy marriage between politics and violence. Armed groups have taken advantage of the opportunities presented by being hired hands, and have now developed their own bases of economic support (armed robbery) thereby freeing themselves from their political patrons.

The major proponents of this thesis include former President Obasanjo and other government apologists. They used this theory to explain the mindless murder of Bola Ige, Alfred Rewane, Dikibo, and Marshall Harry and other party chieftains sent to their early graves between 1999 and 2008. Keen observers and analysts of the polity have inflamed this thesis. They countered by positing that in all

these high profile killings, the assailants' drove away without taking a pin further weakens this conjuncture.

The proponents of this thesis stopped short of propounding the armed banditry thesis after the attack on former governors Akume, Ibori, Nnamani, Udenwa, Tinubu and Orji among others.

Closely related to the armed banditry thesis is the wobble economy thesis and the fallout it generates on the nation. This theory posits that as a result of the growing array of qualified and unqualified youths competing in the existing saturated labour market there is a tendency for them to be recruited and exploited as hired killers. It further argues that as a result of high level of poverty among Nigerians, the youths are adversely attracted to violent crime. These youths are lured and armed by "second-term politicians" who wanted to retain power no matter the cost arm them with guns. After these elections, none of these guns were recovered from these new merchants of death.

Ibrahim and Igbuzor (2002:12) add that while the poor people in Nigeria rate insecurity as a key cause of poverty, they do not necessarily see poverty as a cause of armed conflict. While we are not necessarily disputing the linkage between poverty and violent conflict, the nature of that linkage remains to be clarified. In the first place, if poverty exists and has apparently existed as a pervasive and structural feature of the Nigerian state, why has it not produced the sort of conflict that we have witnessed in recent years?

It would appear that the thesis for the above link might well lie in relative deprivation rather than absolute poverty. So set against the inability of the government to provide basic infrastructure and basic services for its populace, new conflicts have emerged through politicized agents who have used the conditions of the poor to address the responses or non-responses of the state to the lawful yearning of the citizens. This has led some groups to engage in and try to influence the political process themselves. These conflicts in Nigeria are purposeful in intent and directed at key targets, whether economic or political. Armed violence is about more than oil, ethnicity, or politics. In essence, such actions are about access to resources, whether through committing crimes, playing communal tension, stealing oil or winning elections.

The third thesis is the ruling-opposition party thesis. According to this perspective, the ruling PDP accuses to opposition parties and other branded anti-democratic forces of engaging in violent crimes to truncate democracy in Nigeria. According to the ruling party, the only way to get even with the government is to create crisis for it. This has supposed that it is far fetched but it is not possible. The ruling party cite the bomb blast in Osun, Ekiti and Ondo clashes, Jos and Bauchi ethno-religious conflicts to support their argument. Those who are opposed to this view accuse the ruling party of masterminding the "state-sponsored terrorism". A case index is probably the allegation of the Action Congress and, Conference of Nigerian political parties and former Governor Orji Uzor Kalu, that certain forces within the PDP are behind the blood letting in the country. The former chairman of the Board of Trustee of the PDP is at the centre of the accusation. This thesis reinforces Wole Soyinka's nest of killers' theory residing within the PDP thesis.

In view of the above theses, one can posit that Nigeria in recent times has witnessed an unprecedented level of insecurity. Inter and intra-communal and ethnic clashes, ethno-religious violence, armed robbery, assassination, murder, gender-based violence, and bomb explosion have been on the increase leading to enormous loss of life and property and a general atmosphere of siege and social tension for the populace (Ibrahim and Igbuzor, 2002:2). While communities and ethno-regional and religious groups fight each other, state agents and party officials have been involved in the perpetration of violence and destruction as reflected in the Odi, Benue, Jos and Rivers crises.

The state exists fundamentally for the protection of lives and property and ensuring the well-being of the citizens. As such, state-based institutions and agencies have responsibility for the security of the citizens. However, certain institutions and agencies are specifically charged with the responsibility for the security of life and property. They include the police, state security agencies, the military, immigration, and prison services.

For the purpose of this paper, insecurity refers to the breach of peace and security, whether historical, religious, ethno-regional, civil, social, economic and political that have contributed to recurring conflicts, which Nigeria has witnessed over the years resulting in wanton destruction and loss of lives and property.

MANIFESTATIONS OF INSECURITY IN NIGERIA

The underlisted are the various manifestations of conflict and insecurity in Nigeria:

Ethno-religious Conflict

Communal and societal conflicts according to Ibrahim and Igbuzor (2002) have emerged as a result of new and particularistic forms of political consciousness and identity often structured around ethno-religious identities. In all parts of Nigeria, ethno-religious conflicts have assumed alarming rates. It has occurred in places like Shagamu (Ogun State), Lagos, Abia, Kano, Bauchi, Nassarawa, Jos, Taraba, Ebonyi and Enugu State respectively. Groups and communities who had over the years lived together in peace and harmony now take up arms against each other in gruesome "war". The claim over scarce resources, power, land, chieftaincy, local government, councils, control of markets, "Osu caste system" and sharia among other trivial issues have resulted in large scale killings and violence amongst groups in Nigeria. In these conflicts, new logics of social separation and dichotomy have evolved in many communities in Nigeria. There is the classification of the "settler" and "indigene", "Christian" and "Moslem", and "osu" (slave) and "Nwadiala" (free born). These ethno-religious identities have become disintegrative and destructive social elements threatening the peace, stability and security in Nigeria.

Politically Based Violence

Politics in the current civil dispensation like the previous Republics have displayed politics of anxiety which has played down on dialogue, negotiation and consensus. The anxiety is as a result of perceived or real loss of power by an elite stratum. Put different the quest for political power is among those elites that won it before, those that lost it and those who want it back.

Currently, politicians are already strategizing about the control and retention of power come 2011 elections. To this end, inter and intra-political party conflicts have become rife in which politicians are deploying large resources to out-do each other, changing the rules and legislations of the political game, distorting laws and employing violence and political assassination to settle political scores. Party meeting, campaigns and conventions have become war threats where small and light weapons like guns, and cutlasses are freely displayed and used to rig elections, harass and intimidate electors. Also, a spate of politically motivated killing is rife. The most shocking of this killing is rife. The most shocking of this killings was the murder of Chief Bola Ige, Funsho Williams, Dikibo, Ogbonna Uche, and Marshall, among others Onyemaizu (2006:10) adds:

A resort to violence, including armed militancy, assassination, kidnap, et cetera, have somewhat suddenly become attractive to certain individuals in seeking to resolve issues that could have ordinarily been settled through due process. The end-products of such misadventures have often been catastrophic. They include the decimation of innocent lives, disruption of economic activities, destruction of properties among others.

The predilection of most of the politicians is not for election but selection. This lack of party internal democracy is already being revealed in the party primaries, and "selection" of national executive officers of the parties. Even politicians themselves are afraid of what the forthcoming general elections between 2010 and 2011 portend. An atmosphere of political insecurity is fast engulfing Nigeria's nascent Fourth Republic.

Economic-Based Violence

In a popular parlance, this thesis is also known as "political economy of violence". Recent writings in the mass media across the globe and across political divide have laid much emphasis on the role of resources in generating conflict which is a major cornerstone of economic-based violence. Cries of resource control and revenue sharing regularly rent the air between proponents and opponents.

Although by no means limited to oil in the Niger Delta, the most prevalent campaign about the link between resources and conflict focuses on oil and the Delta region. Put differently, there is evidence to suggest that oil has given rise to vertical and horizontal conflicts between National, State

and society or between dominant and subordinate geo-political zones, classes and groups across Nigeria, given the pivotal role that oil plays in the restructuring power relations in Nigeria.

It is however true that other types of resource driven conflicts have received less attention in the debate. Assets such as grazing and farming and water resource, have tended to give rise to horizontal conflicts that involve communities across the geo-political zones.

The other thesis is that conflict in Nigeria is poverty induced. This explanation is closely related to relative deprivation, rather than absolute poverty. As a result of the above, the inability of the state to provide basic services for the populace, generate new conflict or renew old ones manifested through politicized agents who have used the conditions of the poor to address, the responses or non-responses of the state to the legitimate yearnings of the people.

Organized Violent Groups

Organized violent groups take varying dimension and forms. These include: ethnic militia, vigilantes, secret cults in tertiary institutions and political thugs. Various reasons and circumstances account for their emergence. The causes of the manifestations include the culture of militarism that has its antecedents in military rule, the failure of the state and its institutions, economic disempowerment, the structure of the state and Nigeria's federalism, non-separation of state and religion, politics of exclusion, culture of patriarchy and gerontocracy and ignorance and poor political consciousness (Ibrahim and Igbuzor, 2002:7).

Boko Haram: History, modes of operation and litany of attacks

The Nigerian militant group Boko Haram conducted a series of bombing attacks and armed assaults on January 20 in the northern city of Kano, the capital of Kano State and second-largest city in Nigeria. The attacks, which reportedly included the employment of at least two suicide Vehicle-Born Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIEDs), targeted a series of police facilities in Kano. These included the regional police headquarters, which directs police operations in Kano, Kastina and Jigawa States, as well as the State Security Service Office and the Nigerian Immigration Service Office. At least 250 people died in the Kano attacks, according to media reports. The group carried out a second wave of attacks in Bauchi State on January 22, bombing two unoccupied churches in the Bauchi metropolitan area and attacking a police station in the Tafawa Balewa local government area. Militants reportedly also tried to rob a bank in Tafawa Balewata the same day. Though security forces thwarted the robbery attempt, 10 people reportedly died in the clash, including two soldiers and a deputy police superintendent. In a third attack, Boko Haram militants attacked a police sub-station in Kano on January 24 with small arms and improvised hand grenades. A tally of casualties in the assault, which reportedly lasted some 25 minutes, was not available. This armed assault stands out tactically from the January 20 suicide attacks against police stations in Kano. The operation could have been an attempt to liberate some of the Boko Haram militants the government arrested following the January 20 and January 22 attacks. Stratford has followed Boko Haram carefully to assess its intent and ability to become more transnational (Stewart 2012). As Stewart noted after the U.S State Department issued warning in early November 2011 about Boko Haram's alleged plans to strike Western-owned hotels in Abuja, Nigeria's capital, the group made significant leaps in its operational capability during 2011. During that time, it transitioned from very simple attacks to successfully employing suicide VBIEDS. An examination of the recent attacks in Kano and Bauchi States, however, does not reveal further advances in the group's operational tradecraft and does not display any new ability or intent to project power beyond its traditional areas of operation.

The group's official name is Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati Wal Jihad, meaning 'People Comitted to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad.' It earned its nickname from the teachings of its founder Mohammed Yussuf in the early 2000s., in the restive northeastern city of Maiduguri, the capital of Borno state.

Usuf argued that Western education, or 'boko,' had brought nothing but poverty and suffering to the region and was therefore for bidden, or 'haram,' in Islam. He began peacefully mostly preaching and quickly gained a following among disaffected young men in the northeast. But his anti

establishment rhetoric and hints that Boko Haram was building an arsenal of weapons also caught the attention of the authorities.

In 2009, the police clamped down on sect members who were ignoring a law requiring motorcyclists to wear helmets. That sparked a furious backlash. Police stations and government offices in Borno were burned to the ground, and hundreds of the ground, and hundreds of criminals released in a prison break, as the violence spread across northern Nigeria.

The government and army reacted with force: Yusuf was captured and short dead in police custody. Five days of fighting left some 800 people dead.

Boko Haram leaders still cite Yusuf's death as one of the main factors driving the insurgency. The group remains fiercely anti government and anti authority and resentful of the decades of corrupt, poor governance that have impoverished its home region.

At first, Boko Haram was involved mostly in fermenting sectarian violence. Its adherents participated in simple attacks on Christians using clubs, machetes and small arms. Boko Haram came to international attention following serious outbreaks of inter-communal violence in 2008 and 2009 that resulted in thousand of deaths. By late 2010, Boko Haram had added Molotov cocktails and simple Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) to its tactical repertoire. This tactical advancement was reflected in the series of small IEDs deployed against Christian targets in Jos, Plateau State, on Christmas Eve 2010. Boko Haram conducted a number of other armed assaults and small IED attacks in early 2011. The IEDs involved in these attacks were either improvised grenades constructed by filling soft drink cans with explosive - which were frequently explosive-which were frequently thrown from motorcycles or slightly larger devices left at the target. This attack paradigm was shattered June 16, 2011, when Boko Haram launched a suicide VBIED attack against the headquarters of the Nigerian National Police in Abuja. Though not overly spectacular (security measures kept the device away from the headquarters building and it exploded in a parking lot), the successful deployment of a large VBIED and a suicide operative represented a dramatic leap in Boko Haram's capability. An organization does not normally develop such a capability internally without some signs of progressive advancement in its bomb making capability. For example, a group could be expected to employ medium sized IEDs before it employed large VBIEDs. That is skipped a step prompted (Stewart 2012) to believe reports of Boko Haram members receiving training from al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb in northern Africa or from Al Shabaab in Somalia (or some other outside group). Boko Haram conducted its second suicide VBIED attacks in Abuja in August 26, 2011, this time targeting a U. N Compound in the city's diplomatic district. This attack proved far more deadly because the driver was able to enter the compound and reach a parking garage before detonating his device near the building's entrance. The attack against the U.N compound also marked a break from Boko Haram's traditional target set of government and Christian facilities. If the intelligence that triggered the warnings of hotel attacks in November 2011 is accurate, it appears the group may also have considered transnational targets at least to the extent of seeking to eliminate involvement by the international community in Nigerian in order to undercut Abuja. This shift in targeting raised concerns that the group's contacts with al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and / or al Shabaab had influenced it.

According to the *Guardian of London* (2012:12), for militant groups, claims of al-Qaida membership bring the temporary boost of credibility and kudos, and therefore of funds and recruits. But we should be wary of taking the supposed links to al-Qaida too seriously. Claims that Boko Haram leaders met al-Qaida in Saudi Arabia during the pilgrimage to Mecca should not be dismissed outright. But it is unclear whether it was an encounter with Saudi Arabian militant – of whom there are very few these days – or with figures from “al-Qaida Central”, who would have taken an enormous risk by traveling. Both scenarios are theoretically possible.

The conventional wisdom in intelligence circles is that Boko Haram has received cash, possibly large sums of euros paid to criminal “jihadi” factions in the Sahel, from the al-Qaida affiliate al-Qaida in the Maghreb. The latter group is fragmented but tenacious, and is also believed to have provided Boko Haram with training in contemporary urban terrorism, particularly suicide attacks. However, the Nigerian group remains a local phenomenon that does not pose an international threat, British and other officials say.

The fact that it appears to be boasting of links with al-Qaida – which has suffered significant losses in recent years – does, however, indicate that the brand created by the late Osama bin Laden may remain more attractive and durable than some analysts have thought.

It also raised fears that due to its rapidly involving attacked capability, Boko Haram now was on a trajectory to become the next jihads franchise group to become a transnational terrorist threat,

following in the steps of al- Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, the Yemen-based al-Qaeda franchise group. The January attacks provide us an opportunity to evaluate the theory.

For instance, according to the new Boko Haram leader in Nigeria, (Abu Qaqa) said in a recent interview that the group's members were spiritual followers of al-Qaida, and met senior figures in the network during visits to Saudi Arabia. He goes on to posit that the group recruits from neighboring Chad, Cameroon and Niger Republic (Adeyemi, 2012a:1, 4)

From the indices above, (Stewart, 2012) captured this al-Qaida linkage analysis in the following thematic forms:

First, the group appears to have no shortage of explosive material. In addition to the devices the group employed in the attacks, the police reportedly seized some 300 improvised grenades and 10 VBIEDs (Adeyemi, 2012b:1). It also appears Boko Haram has access to large quantities of commercial explosive, rather than being forced to rely on less reliable and less stable improvised explosive mixtures. A good deal of mining occurs in central Nigeria, and it appears that the group is either stealing commercial explosive from mining companies, extorting mainlining companies for explosives or has somehow been able to purchase commercial explosive using a front company or companies. The Nigerian government has sought to tighten control on commercial explosives in response, but its efforts so far do not seem to have affected the group's ability to procure large quantities of explosives. Boko Haram also appears to have competent bomb makers. While the improvised hand grenades the group is issuing are quite rudimentary, being made by inserting a non-electric detonator with a short piece of time fuse in a soda can filled with high explosive their devices are functioning as designed. The same can be said for their suicide vests and VBIEDs: They are simply yet functional. This stands out, since IEDs commonly malfunction. Bomb making is an art that normally follows significant learning curve absent outside instruction from a more experienced bomb maker. Boko Haram's proficiency suggests the group's bomb maker(s) indeed received training from experienced militants elsewhere. The group also appears to have had no problems recruiting militants, including suicide bombers. The January 20 attacks alone involved dozens of militants. Two people served as suicide bombers for the VBIEDs while perhaps two other suicide bombers worked on foot; others threw IEDs from motorcycles and conducted armed assaults (Adeyemi, 2012c:4).

That said, the group's operational planners do not appear to be as advanced as their bomb makers and recruiters. Though they have proved fairly successful in attacking soft targets, they have not had much success in their attacks against harder targets. For example, the attacker in the January 20 strike on the State Security Service Office in Kano was shot and killed before he could approach the building. Likewise, security forces were able to repel the attackers in the January 22 attempted bank robbery in Tafawa Belewa (Lister, 2012:14). All three January attacks also occurred in Boko Haram's traditional central regions of Nigeria. These areas are both familiar and accessible to the group and it has strong support there. (It also has significant support in the area around Abuja). Joe Bavier, a writer who is a frequent visitor to the region, told CNN that the

Federal government has completely lost control of the north-east, despite deploying thousands of troops and establishing a Joint Task Force. Now, he says, it looks like this insurgency has broken out of the north-east". And what's worrying, he says, is that there's "not a whole lot of visible effort from the federal government to calm things down (Lister, 2012:14).

Philippe de Pontet, Africa analyst at the Eurasia Group, says that Boko Haram's main aim appears to be humiliating Jonathan's government, tapping into an existing sense of grievance among Muslims in the north. He and other analysts say the government's heavy-handed response has played into Boko Haram's hands (Thomas and Kujenya, 2012:12).

"The impulse is to hit back hard and there are political pressures for a crackdown," de Pontet argues, "but Jonathan is so weak in the north that he needs to be careful not to alienate people there further" (Lister, 2012:14).

Among the poorer part of Nigeria, the north lacks infrastructure such as reliable power. Since the end of military rule, much of the region has felt excluded from the system of patronage that fuels Nigerian politics. When he ascended to the presidency in April last year, Jonathan broke the unofficial rotation of Christian and Muslim as head of state.

Bavier, who is with the Pulitzer center on Crisis Reporting, says poverty has fed Boko Haram's ranks. It is no longer a sect of Islamic fanatics but has the support of disgruntled politicians and their paid thugs (Lister, 2012:14).

The group has yet to display any ability to project power outside its traditional operational area into less familiar and more hostile environments. Some ask whether Boko Haram is merely a political tool used by northern politicians to pressure the Nigerian Federal government in much the same way politicians from the Niger Delta have used militant groups such as the movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta to ensure what they believe is their fair share of Nigeria's oil revenue. While undoubtedly some northern politicians and Boko Haram exist, it would be simplistic to suggest such politicians completely control Boko Haram.

According to report, in major newspapers recently, which was culled from an online publication, 247 ureports.com, a senior official of Boko Haram allegedly granted an interview detailing how the sect had been on the payroll of a few governors of the North. The unnamed official had claimed that the stoppage of the financial support by the new government in Kano had warranted the massive bomb attacks on the state. "Most of them pay us monthly to leave their state alone," he was quoted to have said.

The two state governments specifically mentioned in the report (Kano and Bauchi) have however, denied the allegation. The spokesman of the Bauchi State governor described it as a "very strange allegation because, Isa Yuguda (the governor) cannot be involved in such ...we in Bauchi have been living in peace. We are not involved in that," His Kano counterpart spoke in the same vein.

However, the Boko Haram official let on that way back in 2004, the sect reached an agreement with former Kano State governor, Ibrahim Shekarau's government to receive a monthly payment of N5 million which was later increased to N10million in 2009. The agreement, just as in the one reached in Bauchi State, also included 'infrastructural support'. However, both agreements were said to have been broken by the state governors in 2011 and the payments were stopped. This, according to the sect's spokesman, warranted the recent bombings in the two states.

These allegations are in line with the long-held opinion of security operatives and keen watchers of the emergent situation that the Boko Haram was the creation of politicians, especially some governors who needed them to win elections, to intimidate opponents, score political points and extract relevance at the national level. These groups, over time, became larger, unwieldy and difficult to control by their sponsors. In fact, it had become an open secret that the former governors of Borno and Yobe states who held sway in the Northwest zone for eight years were the grand conspirators in the Boko Haram saga.

Sometime last year, these two governors had to tender unreserved public apologies to members of the Boko Haram sect, and they have since remained largely in hiding in Abuja, not venturing into their states for fear of being harmed. Such was the level of open admittance of guilt and complicity by politicians at such high levels. It would therefore, not be surprising if there are other governors and politicians who have been secretly funneling state and private funds to the Boko Haram sect or a coterie of other sects in the North.

A sitting Senator of the Federal Republic is currently undergoing trial for allegedly funding the group; so is a high court judge. Recently, the alleged mastermind of the Christmas Day Madalla Catholic Church bombing, Kabiru Sokoto, took refuge in his state's Abuja Governor's Lodge en route to escaping abroad. A serving Air Force officer was featured in the plot to spirit him abroad and when he was finally arrested, his escape from police detention in very suspicious circumstances has presented Nigerians with a classic case of official collusion of a most dirigitible kind albeit, traceable high up the police hierarchy.

All these evidences, though largely circumstantial, point clearly to the fact that the Boko Haram sect is a Frankenstein monster created by some elite of the North.

At the very least, however, these recent attacks tell us that before the group can become an existential threat to the Nigerian government – or legitimate transnational threat – it will need to develop the ability to deploy its IEDs and suicide operatives to the point that it successfully can attack hardened targets. It will also need to develop the ability to work beyond its traditional areas of operation. Until it can master those skills (and display an intent to use such skills), it will remain a regional, albeit deadly, threat.

Recent treats by the group to attack Sokoto and the recent arrest of some of the suspected Boko Haram members in Enugu, Anambra and the recent arrest of some of her members in Cameroon have gradually rendered the above thesis irrelevant. This is because, the recent security alert by the

Cameroonian authority and the Nigerian Government decision to close temporarily her borders with Chad, Niger Republic and Cameroon have made the threat a serious one. Moreover, most of the recruits are from these areas.

The table bellow captures a litany of Boko Haram attacks in Nigeria from July 27, 2009 to February 17, 2012.

Table 1: A litany of Boko Haram attacks in Nigeria from July 27, 2009 to February 17, 2012

S/N	DATE OF ATTACK	STATE	LOCATION OF ATTACK AND NUMBER OF DEATH
1	July 27, 2009	Yobe State	Attack on Potiskum, Yobe State Divisional Police Headquarters, three Policemen and one fire service officer died.
2	September 8, 2010	Bauchi State	Bauchi Central prison was set Ablaze and members of the sect freed
3	March 13, 2010	Plateau state	Another sect operation in the northern part of Jose Plateau State led to the death of 300 people.
4	October 1 2010	Abuja	Explosions near the Eagle Square, Abuja claimed 12 lives, leaving many injured.
5	December 24 2010	Plateau State	A bomb attack, in Barkin Ladi, Jos, plateau State, killed eight people
6	December 31 2010	Abuja	Explosions at Mogadishu Mammy Market, Abuja, claimed about 10 lives.
7	January 21, 2011	Borno State	The Borno state Governorship candidate of all Nigeria Peoples Party ANPP, for the 2011 election, Alhaji Modu Gubio, brother to former governor of the state, Modu Sheriff, killed by sect members alongside six others in Maiduguri, Borno State.
8	March 2 2011	Kaduna State	Boko Haram killed two policemen attached to the residence of the Divisional police Officer, Mustapha Sandamu, at Rigasa area of Kaduna State
9	March 30, 2011	Yobe State	Bomb planted by Boko Haram in Damaturu, Yobe State, exploded and injured a police officer
1.0	April 8, 2011	Niger State	Bomb at INEC office in Suleja, Niger State, Claimed lives of eight corps members and a suicide bomber respectively.
11	April 9 2011	Borno State	Bomb explosion occurred at a polling unit in Unguwar Doki Maiduguri, Borno State, killing the suicide bomber

			respectively.
12	April 26, 2011		Three people killed and scores injured in bomb attack
13	April 29 2011	Bauchi state	Army Barracks in Bauchi bombed.
14	May 19, 2011		Three policemen killed and two soldiers injured in bomb attack
15	May 29, 2011	Bauchi State	Explosion at mammy market of Shandawanka barracks in Bauchi State claimed lives and left many injured.
16	May 30 2011	Borno State	Bombs exploded early morning on Baga road in Maiduguri, Borno State 13 dead and 40 injured.
16	June 7, 2011	Borno State	Series of bomb blasts occurred in Maiduguri, Borno State, claiming five lives and leaving several others injured
17	June 16, 2011	Abuja	Nigerian Police Headquarters, Abuja, Bombed by a suspected suicide bomber, three killed and many vehicles damaged
18	June 16, 2011	Borno State	Four children killed in a bomb blast at Damboa town, Maiduguri, Borno State.
19	June 20, 2011	Katsina State	Seven policemen killed when Boko Haram stormed Kankara Police station in Kastina state. two of the security men guarding a band opposite the state were also killed.
20	July 9, 2011	Borno State	A clash between Boko Haram and the military left about 31 people dead in Maiduguri, Borno State, also in Suleja, Niger Delta state, a bomb targeted at a church killed four and injured many others.
21	July 11 2011	Kaduna State	Tragic explosion at a relaxation joint in Fokados street, Kaduna
22	July 12, 2011	Borno State	Boko Haram threw an explosive device on a moving military patrol vehicle, which claimed five lives
23	July 15, 2011	Borno State	Explosion in Maiduguri injured five people.
24	July 23, 2011	Borno State	An explosion close to the palace of the Shehu of Borno, Abubakar Garbai Elkanem, injured three soldiers.
25	July 25, 2011	Maiduguri State	Bomb explosion near the palace of traditional ruler in Maiduguri claimed eight lives.
26	August 25, 2011		Sect members killed four policemen, one solder and seven civilians and carted away undisclosed sum of money in a bank robbery by the sect.
27	August 26, 2011	Abuja	A Suicide Bomber Drove Into The United Nations building in Abuja, 25 killed and 60 injured.
28	September 12, 2011	Bauchi State	Seven people, including four policemen, killed during a bomb attack on a police station in Misau, Bauchi State.

29	September 13, 2011	Borno State	Sect members shot and injured four solders in an attack in Maiduguri, shortly after the arrest of 15 sect members, during military raids on Boko Haram hideouts in Bauchi State
30	September 17, 2011	Borno State	Brother in-law of Mohammed Yusuf, the slain leader of Boko Haram, Babakura Fugu, shot dead in front of his house in Maiduguri by two members of the sect two days after he was visited by former President Olusegun Obsanjo
31	October 3, 2011	Borno State	Book Haram attacked Baga Market in Maiduguri and killed three people
31	November 4, 2011	Yobe state	About 150 people killed by Boko Haram in Damaturu, Yobe state
32	November 27, 2011	Yobe State	Seven people killed in attacks in Geidam. Yobe State
33	December 18, 2011	Borno State	Three members of Boko Haram were killed when their bomb detonated in Shuwari, Maiduguri, Borno State.
34	December 22, 2011	Borno State	Explosive and gunshots killed four people and left several others injured.
35	December 24, 2011	plateau State	About 80 people killed in bombing in Jos, plateau State
36	December 25	Niger State	About 50 people died on Christmas Day bombing in Madalla, Niger State
37	December 30, 2011	Borno State	Seven people killed in Maiduguri, Borno State
38	January 5, 2012	Gombe state	About six people died in a church attack in Gombe state
39	January 6, 2012	Adamawa State	17 people died in a Christ Apostolic Church, Yola, Adamawa State while 20 Igbo people were also killed in Mubi in the same state.
40	January 20, 2012	Kano State	About 250 people killed in multiple attacks in Kano
41	January 22, 2012	Bauchi State	Two churches destroyed in Bauchi State. two military personnel, a DPO and eight civilian also killed by gunmen at the headquarters of Tafawa Balewa Local Government Area in the state.
42	January 26, 2012	Kano State	The Sabon Gari of Kano State witnessed another explosion, which caused another pandemonium in the state. Many injured and some luxury buses were damaged in the explosion.
43	January 28, 2012	Gambiru Ngala, (Borno)	One Killed
44	January 29, 2012	Gambiru Ngala, (Borno)	Two killed
43	January 30, 2012	Borno State	Six people killed in Maiduguri, environs including two Air force officers

44	February 4, 2012	Borno State	Two people killed in Damboa
45	February 5, 2012	Yobe	SS man killed
46	February 07, 2012	Kaduna (Kano Market, Military Barrack)	5 killed
47	February 07, 2012	Kano	10 killed in Kano
47	February 10, 2012	Maidugri, Borno State	4 killed in Boko Haram, Soldier shot-out in Maidugri, Borno State
48	February 10, 2012	Kano	Boko Haram sect attacked Police Station and engaged the police in gun duel in Shagari Quarters, Kano
49	February 12, 2012	Borno State	Boko Haram members killed in Maidugri
50	February 15, 2012	Kogi State	Jail Break in Koton Karji Prisons, Kogi State. A warder killed and 199 prisoners released.
51	February 15, 2012	Minna, Niger State	2 police men killed and injured in Minna, Niger State
52	February 17, 2012	Yobe	2 People killed in Geidam, Yobe State
53	February 17, 2012	Maidugri, Borno State	5 people killed in Maidugri metropolis, Borno State

Source: Compiled by the Authors

Implications of Boko Haram Activities

One of the most dreaded fallouts of Boko Haram bombings and killing is the fear that the feeling of hatred it has so far fueled of hatred it has so far fueled may ultimately endanger the polity and the nation state. Already, million of non indigenes in the North, especially Igbo's, who have been the worst hit, are desperate to return to their home states before they are killed.

Soon after the multiples exploitations, the Kano State Chapter of Ohanaeze Ndigbo, the apex Socio-Cultural Organization, in a press statement signed by the President, Hon, Tobias Michael Idika, called on the governors of south east and south geo-political zones to come to the aid of their citizens stranded in Kano State.

Part of the statement read:

The Igbos resident in Kano are living with naked fear and apprehension. Though there are few of us who like to stay and defend ourselves, the majority of us, particularly, women and children, numbering over three million are jostling to leave the North (Kano), because unfolding events indicate that the North (Kano) is no longer safe for easterners... Ohanaeze Ndigbo Kano, hereby calls on the governors of the eastern states in the South-South to provide means of transportation with adequate security to evacuate our brethren who would want to leave because human life is precious and should be protected as such (Phillip, 2012:16)

Since that call for help, there has been divided opinion on what should be the response of both the affected non indigenes still at the flash points and that of their governors. While some are blaming the governors for dragging feet in saving stranded citizens, others are accusing the citizens for remaining where they do not feel secured

Viewed from whatever angle, it is generally acknowledged that the ugly development has not only threatened the polity but also the very existence of the Nigerian nation.

In Adamawa State, the situation is also so critical that many indigenes have fled. At the middle of last week of January, about 22,000 Igbo's and Yoruba's residing in the state had left due to the current security situation, although leaders of the Igbo and Yoruba communities in the state have been calling on their people to return to the state.

The Eze ndi Igbo in the state, Igwe (Chief) Solomon Ebis, who confirmed the development, also said the mass exodus of Igbo's should stop because there was no ethno-religious crisis in Adamawa State, Corroborating Eze Ndi Igbo, the National Coordinator of Global Initiative for African Development, a civil society organization, Rev, Dr. Onwubuya Breakforth, said the rumor of way targeting non- indigenes was baseless and unfounded (Amiboye 2012:12)

The socio-political implication of this development can only be imagined, given the risks and agonies survivors are currently going through. According to Miss Agnes Agwuocha:

We are afraid of Boko Haram. Daddy and Mummy keep awake all night in case the attackers decide to invade our home. They would lock all the doors tightly, pray all Night and ask us to sleep. But we never can, for we don't know what will happen next... They said we would soon go home, so we are waiting (Egburonu et al, 2012:20).

That was how Miss Agnes Agwuocha, a 17-Year old student in Kano, described the terror she and the members of her family, still stranded at Sabon Gari, have been passing through since the terrorist group had given the affected non indigenes a mere three-day ultimatum, and since after the expiration, had followed it up with pockets of attacks and killings in Yobe, Niger, and Borno states.

But though these previous Boko Haram attacks in several cities across the north have affected mainly Igbos and other Christians and southerners, it was not certain if the affected citizen some of the have lived all their lives.

Sunday Nation investigation however showed that this changed radically after the January, 20, 2012 Bomb blasts in about ten locations in Kano, which left hundreds of people dead and severally wounded.

Since then, most easterners and westerners living in the north have shown more desperation to flee the area and return to their states of origin.

Also following some counter warnings from some youths, the Ogbunigwe Ndigbo, in the eastern part of the country. It has been observed that many northerners in the areas are hurriedly fleeing the area with their family members (Johnson 2012:16).

The socio-political implications of this development can only be imagined. Although the General Officer Commanding 82 Division of the Nigerian Army, Major General Sunday Idoko, responded to Ogbunigwe's counter warning by assuring that the military was ready to counter any unrest in the area, many highly placed Nigerians have urged the government to the something fast before it would be too late.

The President General of Ohanaeze Ndigbo, the apex Igbo socio-cultural organization, Ambassador, Ralph Uwaechue, while recalling various bombings and killings targeted at Christians and Igbo Said, " it is now clear that unpatriotic political and religious elements are bent on making our country ungovernable" (Oji, 2012: 2)

Such reassurances outwitting standing, many non indigenes; especially youth corps members, have left the state to avoid being caught up in the feared crossfire. For example, out of the 4, 171 NYSC members trained for the ADHOC electioneering in Adamawa State by the Independent National Electoral Commission (NEC), about 1.041 have reportedly fled the state due to the security situation (Egburonu et al, 2012:21)

Beyond Adamawa state we also gathered that NYSC members, during the week, besieged the commission's headquarters in Abuja, seeking redeployment from state in the North. Reports confirmed that those posted to Kano, in particular, requested to be posted to state outside of the north. Some of them specially asked the authorities to stop further posting of youth corps members to Adamawa, Kano Kaduna, Bauchi and Niger until the insecurity in the region is overcome (Egburonu et al, 2012: 21).

Dr. Breakforth called on politicians to temper the use of language during election campaigns, pointing out that efforts should be made by all and sundry to return the state to its former reputation as the most peaceful state (Johnson, 2012:15).

He also commended the proactive measures taken by the state Government to patrol the streets of Adamawa and praised the activities of Journalist during and after the crisis especially in reporting the level of damage and the dimension the crises took.

The chief of the Yoruba Community in Adamawa State. Alhaji Abduganiyu also revealed that he has setup a high powered committee to calm many people who had contempORIZED leaving the

state. The Chief of Yorobas then called on his people to return back to Adamawa State as the state is a peaceful one and the rumours of crisis were far from the truth (Nmeribeh, 2012:19).

Findings revealed that most shops in Mubi North, Mubi South, Jimeta, Yola South Numan, Mayo-Belwa, Ganye, Guyuk and Michka have remained locked despite the assurance given by the community leaders. Commenting on the matter, the President of Tiv Community in Adamawa, Chief Terkimbir Tyona, commended Governor Murtala Nyako for making adequate arrangement to safeguard the life of all Tiv people resident in Adamawa State and called all Tiv people to remain clam and not to panic over unfounded rumour to ethno-religious crisis (Egburonu et al, 2012:21).

He also commended the Lamido Adamawa, Alhaji (Dr.) Barkindo Aliyu Mustapha, for meeting with all stakeholders in Adamawa state to ensure peaceful coexistence of all shades of people in Adamawa state since the unfortunate incidence took place in Mubi and Jimeta. Tyona revealed that Adamawa State has been a peaceful place until peace was shattered by agents of darkness who are desperate to mire the name of the state by killing innocent citizens (Abimboye, 2012: 15).

Others that have condemned the development include the Network of Civil Society Organizations. Assessing the political and security challenges in the state, the organizations have dispelled the rumour of ethno-religious crisis in Adamawa State while assuring the people fleeing away from the state to return back to Adamawa as the rumour is unfounded.

The civil society network, made up of about 125 organizations, led by two principal INEC accredited organizations, Global Initiative for African Development. (GIFAD) and Centre for Strategic Conflict Management, (CSCM) and six others arrived the state capital recently and had gone through the 21 local Government Areas with a view to making detailed assessment of the political and security challenges facing the state (Egburonu et al, 2012: 21).

Speaking to newsmen after conducting their assessment, the National Coordinator of the group, Rev Dr. Onwubuya Breakforth and General Secretary, Dr. I. E. Onyike, said the team while conducting the assessment with various stakeholders including the Adamawa State Independence National Electoral Commission INEC, political Parties, security agencies, trade unions, market women, public servants private bodies, Emirs and Chiefs.

According to Breakforth, the team visited all the flash points, namely, Numan, Guyuk, Mubi North, Mubi South, Jimeta, Ganye, Mayo-Belwa, Jada Demsa, Yola North, Yola South, Gombi, Hong, Song, Maiha and Michika LGAs.

The group note that Adamawa is a heterogeneous society with high social diffusion, made up of over seventy different tribes, ethnic compositions and languages and Adamawa was one of the most peaceful states in the North East until the recent bombings and killing particularly in a church in Jimeta Township.

He said that in Adamawa, most families have links with both Muslim and Christian relatives. So, it is likely that the killings were not perpetrated by people from Adamawa state but by outsiders, especially outsiders involved in international cattle markets in Mubi, Ganye, Ngurore.

In Kaduna State however movement of non indigenes is not so pronounced. At the various motor parks in Kaduna Newswatch Magazine Reporters reported that there was no clear sign that the non indigenes found traveling away from the state were leaving for fear of attack by the Boko Haram group. Sources said the atmosphere remained under control because the state governor, Patrick Ibrahim, held a close door meeting with non indigenes at the Government House, where he assured them of their safety in the state, adding that the government was doing everything humanly possible to ensure the safety of lives and property. The governor has also inaugurated a peace and reconciliation committee to work with the state government in bringing about peace and development in the state.

However, most of the people seen at the parks were traveling light, giving the impression that they were not running away from the State. but some others told the Nation that they were tired of living in the state and that they were currently making arrangement to relocate to other parts of the country.

A civil servant from one of the southern state who would not want his name mentioned told the Nation that "my family members at home have been putting pressure on me to bring my family home and if possible, relocate. But I cannot go because I am working here and my wife too is working. What are we going to eat if we have to go? (Abimboye, 2012: 15) Another civil servant with one of the parastatals under the Federal Ministry of Education said that he has started working on his transfer to his home state. I am working on my transfer and very soon it will materialize. I know some of my colleagues in the office that have also indicated their intention to move. My Uncle works in Kaduna

also and he is looking for ways of leaving the state. He is also working on his transfer so that he can join his family at Abuja. But his office has not accepted and our parents back home wants him to resign and come home if that is what it will take.

Following the counter threat from a militant youth group from the South-East, Ogbunigwe Ndigbo, warning Hausas living in the South-East, Ogbunigwe Ndigbo, warning Hausas living in the South-East to flee within 14 days or face the risk of being attacked, it has been observed that many Hausas, non Hausas from the north and Muslim are fleeing some areas suspected to be targets of the youths, thirsty for revenge.

For example, in Lokpanta, along Enugu-Aba Port Harcourt Express road, and Ugwuoba, an artisan Hausa community, all in Enugu state, non indigenes were seen leaving, aboard over-loaded Lorries (Suleiman, 2012: 43).

But those of them born in Enugu and those who have lived all their lives in the town are staying behind. Those leaving are mostly cobblers, Okada operators, textile hawkers and cattle rearers.

Reacting to the said mass relocation of some Northern Moslems in Enugu state to their home states, following the threat by Boko Haram sect that Southerners living in the Northern part of Nigeria should relocate to their states of origin, Dan Tiv stressed that as far as they were concerned they have no problem since Governor Sullivan Chime had earlier given them the assurance that their safety and security were guaranteed in the state. We don't have any problem here but then you can't stop people from traveling moreover, we living like brothers and sisters here in Enugu" (Oji, 2012:2)

Also, leader of the Hausa traders at the popular New Artisan Market, Enugu, Alhaji Murtala Ahmed said people are no longer leaving, adding that "even right now, we are having a meeting". He said the governor has deployed security men to the necessary places to avert any breakdown law and order in the state.

Enugu is a home of peace. No tribalism. The security men are even here with us even though no single Hausa person has been assaulted or insulted by anybody in the entire Enugu State. The governor even visited to assure us of our security and we are going about our normal business, Ahmed said.

Mohammed, a lad who sells water at the Garki area of Awkunanaw in Enugu South Local Government Area of the State, said he is going about his business without fear because nobody is molesting me.

But the situations in Anambra and Imo State are slightly different. Sunday Nation in Abia observed that the areas where Hausas used to stay have been deserted as at the time of writing his report

The deadline given to people from the southern part of the country by the members of the dreaded Islamic sect, the Boko Haram to leave the Northern part of the country may have forced some people from the South Eastern part of the country to leave that part of the country in their numbers.

However, the threat to the lives of non northerners do not have any direct implication to non Igbo people living in the state, except for law Hausa shoe cobblers and barbecues as Suya who have moved to Lokpanta cattle market where their people live.

The inability of the people from the northern part of the country to leave the state as a result of the deadline may be as a result of the assurance given to them by the state governor, Theodore Orji who assured them of their security in the state.

Abia State Governor Theodore Orji has assured the Hausa community and other tribes living in the state of their safety and urged them to feel free to go about their normal businesses without any fear of molestation.

This assurance was given by Governor Orji through his chief press secretary; Ugochukwu Emezue who said it was necessary following speculations that there will be reprisal attack in Abia State, as a result of the spate of killings against Ndigbo.

Orji, who spoke in Umuahia shortly after his arrival from Abuja declared that there is not iota of truth in the speculation which he described as the handiwork of mischief makers, as all been placed on red alert. The governor said the security has been beefed up in the State to ensure that life, property and to ensure that life, property and security of the people are secured at all times, stressing that the state cannot afford to go back to the dark of criminality.

He said security agencies have been placed on red alert to maintain law and order on red alert to maintain law and order in the state. Orji used the opportunity to condemn the killings of Ndigbo in

Mubi, Yola and other parts of the country recently and prayed for the repose of the souls of those who lost their lives during the series of bombings.

The governor said that nobody has the right to take the life of another, no matter the grudge, pointing out that the two major religions being practiced in the country and other religions do not support the killing of one and another. He said life is sacred and should be treated as such and called on those involved in these ugly acts to change.

Latest on the state of the Nigerian nation as at Thursday, January 26, was that the Federal Government had made a *volte-face*, and was prepared to dialogue with Boko Haram, the mass-murdering Islamic fundamentalist sect.

President Goodluck Jonathan, in stating his government's current position, explained that government would only be able to find a basis for dialogue with the sect, if its leadership was ready to unveil its face to government. Until last week when the group revealed Abubakar Shekau as its new leaders, through a Youtube video, and declared war on Jonathan, security agencies and Christians, the group had continued to kill, maim and destroy lives and property without any known leaders (Shekau, 2012: 17). Its first leader, Mohammed Yusuf, was killed in Nigerian Police Custody in 2009 after a confrontation with the police.

However, the President speaking during an interview at Aso Rock said, government would dialogue with the sect if its leadership would "clearly identify themselves now and say this is the reason we are resisting, this is the reason we are confronting government or this is the reason we destroy some innocent people and their properties... then there will be a basis for dialogue (Brock, 2012:2).

Aligning with arguments in certain quarters that military confrontations alone would not solve the problems represented by the sect, the President said that providing an enabling environment for young people to find jobs would rather be an important aspect of keeping youths away from mischief and militancy.

He then made a direct appeal to the sect; "We will dialogue. Let us know your problems and we will solve your problem. But if they don't identify themselves, who will you dialogue with?(Johnson, 2012:14)

However, he cautioned that it would not be easy dealing with the problem since it did not have the same coloration with that of Niger Delta Militancy.

Surprisingly, this current stance by government seems to suggest that it has heeded the advice of a lot of Nigerians that judging by the way confrontations between the sect and government was going, the use of force would not be a successful strategy in curtailing its menace.

One of such Nigerians was Patrick Agbambu, a security expert, who has always held the opinion that the priority of government should always be in preserving lives and property of citizens, and not of displaying its powers and might (Agbro, 2012:24).

He claimed that there was nothing the security agencies and their personnel had done to indicate ability in containing the sect. for that reason, he counseled that for the sake of innocent citizens who were losing their lives on a daily basis in the Northern part of the country, government should, as a matter of urgency, re-consider instance against discussing with the sect.

In a recent interview, he had said: Any country which values the lives of its citizen will always do anything to protect them. But as it is, everything government has put in place to confront the group has not worked. Government even declared a state of emergency in some states, but the killing has not stopped; instead, it is spreading to more states.

He argued further that dialoguing with the sect would not be anything new since government had done it the past with Niger Delta Militants.

Contrary to Nigerians in support of Agbambu's position, other Nigerians cautioned against such a dialogue, especially with a group that has remained faceless and which the President sometime claimed to have infiltrated his government. Another reason advanced by those who hold contrary views was that group has not been able to articulate and advanced the reasons for which it had been carrying out attacks.

At one moment, it had claimed that it was fighting to entrench *Sharia* law in Nigeria, at other times it has claimed to be fighting against economic deprivations which western education has caused the country and yet at other times, it has claimed to have declared a war on the President, his

government and Christians. As a matter of fact, the sect had been unable to articulate its agenda or demands. However, just as it has been unable to articulate its agenda or demands government has not been able to stop its decimation of the Nigerian population (Abimboye, 2012:12).

Shettima Yerima, leader of Arewa Youths Consultative Forum (AYCE), is among Nigerians that have counseled against dialoging with the sect. According to him, it would be impossible to discuss with the sect for the fact that it had no clear leader.

Also, the Arewa Youth leader stood with Nigerians who said the sect had not given a clear-cut indication of what its agenda or demands were.

According to him, government is a legitimate body; only when they claim that the sect has defeated them, they can dialogue. But since government is still in control, it does not see why they should dialogue with the group. Otherwise how do you justify it that some people are bombing churches and mosques, government's family houses and killing innocent people (Egburonu, 2012:23)

Before this current volte-face, Jonathan had always talked tough on every issue concerning violence and Boko Haram. In January 2010, after one of the violent attacks on Christians in Jos, Plateau State, Jonathan as Vice President set the tone of his government's attitude towards Boko Haram's insurgency.

Then he has boasted: what is happening in Jos has taken on the coloration of sheer wickedness and man's inhumanity to man, and there is absolutely no justification for this. The federal Government will not fold its arms while fellow citizens are brutalized and murdered at will.

"such acts in a plural society such as ours are sinful, both in the eyes of God and man. We shall not condone them. The Federal Government will confront these ugly developments with all the might and resources at its disposal. Of this, there must be no doubt"(Agbro, 2012:24).

Subsequent attacks were also met with such tough stand by the presidency. For instance, after the October 1 bomb blast in Abuja, he boasted: "I will find the perpetrators and deal with them."(Suleiman, 2012: 43).

Nigerians rejoiced. And after a suicide bomber hit the "Louis Edet" building which houses police Headquarters in Abuja on June 17, 2011, he again boasted: "we will leave no stone unturned till we get those behind this act." (Adeyemi, 2012:44)

Nothing happened, though Nigerians had started losing hope in his ability to deliver on his promises.

Then came December 25, 2011, when the sect bombed St. Theresa Catholic Church at Madalla in Niger State, the President had roared: "I can assured every Nigerian that those behind this act will be apprehended and dealt with" (Nmeribeh, 2012: 18).

A ray of hope appeared. Kabiru Sokoto, suspected to be the mastermind of the bombing was arrested. But few days later, Nigerians were told that he had absconded from police custody.

This was the situation before his threat during his visit to Emir Ado Bayero, to commiserate with him on the Kano bombings. Then waxing strong on his government's uncompromising stance, the President had said: A terrorist attack on one person is an attack on all of us... Those who perpetrate this dastardly act are not spirits; they live freely with us in the society and the security challenges they pose have now made it incumbent on us to be extra vigilant on what our next door neighbour does, and by so doing we will overcome the evil forces (Apekhade, 2012:25).

Perhaps, the last of government's tough-talk, Chief of Army Staff (COAS) Azubuike Ihejirka, on Tuesday, January 24, in Abuja while speaking at the opening ceremony of this years seminar on national security with the theme, 'National Building and National Orientation: Imperative for National Security, had said the government would not dialogue with the sect.

The seminar was organized by Alumni Association of National Defence College (AANDEC), which was done in collaboration with National Defence College (NDC). They explained that solutions to the menace of the sect did not lie in dialoguing with them, as was being suggested by some Nigerians because, according to him, such dialogue has never been antidote to terrorism anywhere in the world. According to him:

No matter and whatever the measure you put in place, we would not get the best result, and fast enough, unless the society as a whole rejects terrorism without any justification. Those who try to justify acts of terrorism inadvertently support terrorists, market it (and) fuelled the terrorists, and some do only to discover later that terrorism is not a matter to be renegotiated and win (Ogunwale, 2012:5).

However, for many observers, government's *volte-face* was a major fall out of Boko Haram's recent bombing of Kano, the capital of Kano State, which led to the death of nearly 250 Nigerians and thousands of others injured. Added to it was the escape from custody of Sokoto from police custody. The attack was unprecedented in the history of the country, and coupled with the escape of Sokoto, it

attracted so much outrage both at home and abroad, with many declaring the country to be under siege.

Another major fall-out was the sack of Hafiz Ringim as Inspector General of Police (IGP). Reports showed that not less than 935 Nigerians and foreigners lost their lives to bombs detonated in churches, mosques and government building by Boko Haram since 2009, and that a substantial part of that number lost their lives under Ringim's watch as IGP. The group had detonated multiple bombs across Kano on Friday, January 20. And reports indicated that while the operation lasted, the people who bombs could not kill were finished off with guns, machetes and clubs by the bloodcurdling sect members. In the end, nothing less that 1865 people, including women and children, lost their lives, according to the government of Kano (Ezea, 2012:49). Thousands were injured that hospitals in the state were overburdened.

As a result of the high collateral damage on Nigerians, the President was forced to visit Kano the influential North Western State of the country hit by multiple bomb explosions by Boko Haram. He went to commiserate with the governor, Rabiun Kwankwaso, and Alhaji Bayero.

Ringim as the first major official casualty of Boko Haram's insurrection lost his job on Wednesday, January 25, following the fall of many Nigerian that he should either resign his appointment or be sacked.

President of Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) Pastor Ayo Oritsejafar, who several times in the past has reasons to criticize police inability to protect Nigerians, said the escape of Sokoto was a said reflection of what the leadership of CAN had been drawing attention to. Oritsejafar had said, "It's sad that those in charge of the nation's security are making a mockery of the nation and inadvertently brining the entire nation to disrepute among comity of nation. It's shame! It's sad"(Maduabuchi, 2012:16).

He commented that it was unfortunate that when they (Christian leaders) speak against such developments, they were accused of heating up the polity.

Chairman of House of Representative Committee on Legislative Budget and Research, Opeyemi Bambidele, considered it an embarrassment to the country that the man escaped, and saw it as having negative implications on investment in the country. His words:

This escape of the suspect came to me as shocking news. It is an embarrassment to the nation. It is an embarrassment of Nigerians at home and in the Diaspora... it is a negative signal to the international community. It is an indictment on the government and on those who manage our security as a nation (Maduabuchi, 2012:15).

On their reaction on Ringim's overall handling of security in the country at the same time, as well as the escape of Sokoto, a pan Igbo Socio-Economic and Polticial group, Olu Ndigbo, was among those that called for the immediate resignation of Ringim outright. The group also urged the President to sack and prosecute him if he failed to resign.

The group claimed amazement that despite the level of negligence and incompetence displayed by Ringim, especially in handling security threats as presented by Boko Haram, the President had refused to sack him. It threatened to take the Federal Government and the IGP to International Criminal Court (ICC) in Hague for human right abuses and genocide, if the President continued to keep him.

In the release, signed by coordinator of the group, Chris Nwandu, the group stated that Ndigbo over the years had continued to believe in the "no victor, no vanquished" agreement reached after the civil war and had continued to contribute their quota to the socio-economic development of Nigeria, but would not continue to fold their arms while they were being slaughtered daily in the Northern part of the country (Ololade, 2012:20).

Boko Haram has overwhelmed country's security agencies that it has becomes so feared. Things have got to a point where a little threat from it sends fears down the spines of Nigerians, even government relocated the ceremonies from the usual venue at Eagle Square in Abuja to the inner recesses of Aso Rock, because Boko Haram (together with movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) threatened to bomb Eagle Square during the ceremonies.

On Monday, January 23, the entire office complex of Nigeria Labour Congress (NLC) was deserted as the sect circulated letters of intention to bomb the building for what it claimed was the leadership's betrayal of Nigeria on the fuel subsidy removal protests.

By August last year, the sect circulated written materials where it threatened attacks on Kano. It was reported that the sect wrote the governor and Bayero, threatening attacks on the city. But after

some months and without much happening, officials of government had relaxed, and therefore did not anticipate the January, 20 bombing.

The enormity of destruction and carnage caused by that round of attacks by the sect were unparalleled by any other attack that had been carried out in the history of the sect. The sect has been a thorn in the flesh of governments, both Federal and States and security agencies. It employs all manner of war tactics in prosecuting its agenda even propaganda, that many Nigerians have found it difficult to decipher between facts and propaganda.

In one of its circulated statements after the Kano bombing, the sect claimed some state governments were funding its operations. But all the governors have denied the allegations. It equally claimed that the reason it attacked Christians was because they (Christians) eat human flesh—probably referring to the body of Christ. And it is a claim that is completely not backed by any fact whatsoever.

Executive director of Civil Liberties Organization (CLO) Izuchukwu Ezike, said he was not moved by anything the government of Jonathan said because it had been an inconsistent and unreliable government that says one thing and does another. According to Him:

The Struggle we had with his so-called petrol subsidy removal has exposed them as liars. They say one thing and do another. The same government that told us that they have crushed *Boko Haram*, and that *Boko Haram* is no more, is the same government telling us that they want to dialogue with *Boko Haram* (Maduabuchi, 2012:17).

RECOMMENDATION

After carefully analyses of the Challenges confronting the country today, there is a great consensus among analysts that the country is currently in a state of siege, not by acts being perpetrated by *Boko Haram*, but also by other issues and developments. Those who hold this view have called on government to be very careful and tactful in dealing with these issues and developments in the country, so that things do not spiral out of control. They contended that so many issues tackled by government rather than assuage the hurt of Nigerian increased it, citing the fuel subsidy removal strike and protests which they claimed government mismanaged.

A cardinal responsibility of any government properly so-called is the control of the instruments of coercion and provision of security. With regard to the *Boko Haram* and the menace of criminal generally in many part of the polity, the government has not been able to proffer any effective solution. We have had more promises to arrest the situation than we have seen effective actions. Even in the case of the Kano bombings, what we have heard from the seat of government is the usual homily: we will wipe out *Boko Haram*. We need to move from this stage to the stage where the government would do less of talking and Nigerians would see more of action that indeed, the crime wave, including the terror attacks is falling.

In order to achieve this, there is the need for Nigeria to modernize her security agencies with the help of advanced countries of the United States of America, European Union members and China. This effort will enhance the operational capabilities of the Nigeria security agencies by identifying avenues that would enable them respond appropriately to internal security challenges and other threats. Prominent areas of collaboration may include training, intelligence sharing, modernization of the security services, logistics and other requirements.

Nigerian government must address socio-economic deprivation and the severe wealth inequality among its people.

Today, ill-equipped and clearly confounded young soldiers are deployed all over the country to deal with civil policing duties that fall outside their charge. Worse still, they are too far and spread too thin by a military establishment that is constrained to deal with a wider terrain and spree activity, with corresponding increase in overall staff strength. There is also an embarrassing dearth of pre-emptive intelligence, leading to a consistent pattern of post damage responses to national security.

In order to address these challenges, development of professional capacity, the building of trust and a crack team of equipment-led intelligence officers are critical for success.

Yet, one issue that has come up in the course of managing the current *Boko Haram* saga is the public display of incompetence, apparently driven by an incoherent strategy, by security agencies pretending to be searching for bombs in moving and stationing vehicles. Major highway and street

corners are now taken over by checkpoints, manned by Sundry uniform personnel. In every case their task is simple; to stop all motor vehicles and search them for bombs. At least that is what they claim when motorists are stopped. But how many of them know what a contemporary bomb looks like when anything, from the head lamp of a car to the knob of the gear lever, could be a bomb?

As Eme (2009, 2010 and 2011) have consistently argued, this is the 21st century. Technology works for the rest of the world in the matter of detecting, and even detonating bombs of all hues. The manual search, ever so incompetently done, and with unpardonable waste of man hours, is out of date, out of time with the efficiency needs of today's world; and totally limited in its ability to deal with the matter at hand. There is nothing to choose between the manual, time-wasting fondling of personal effects by security personnel at checkpoints and the shopping trolley performance of hotel gatekeepers who have no training whatsoever in these matters.

At its current cross roads, Nigerians has gone beyond the present structure of the police and other security agencies. a complete overhand of the security agencies should be undertaken. If President Goodluck Jonathan's appointment of Acting Inspector General of police, Mohammed Dikko Abubakar is the beginning of the cleaning process, the move should be consolidated.

So much went wrong, landing the government and its agencies in the present quagmire. Mistakes have been made from past official approach to issues. There is a culture of alienation of the people: government is doing nothing to properly understand the people, or restore their lost confidence on government's capability. There is a Yawning gap in the long years of Neglect and failure to consciously and deliberately build effective and operational capacities in the security agencies to combat or prevent crime. Strategies adopted in confronting the preventing threats have not worked as they ought to. A linked understanding of the scope of problem in all too clear utterances of key government functionaries and security chiefs give them out as helpless, at best, just as some of the pronouncements could aggravate the situation. The authorities can do with more strategies thinking.

In constructing a strategies agenda to tackle general security problems, the president should try wider consultations through leveraging political and cultural establishments. The presidency does not seem to be reaching out enough for advice. It is not too late for him to quietly seek credible elders and leaders of the right who understand the problems on the ground; and deploy them appropriately.

It is perhaps time the federal government took bold steps towards streamlining the rations security agencies and making them more attune to serious intelligence gathering. Without that, foreign direct investment, faith in Nigeria's' democracy and commitment to core national values will be permanently jeopardized by a state of insecurity. The time for the government to act is now.

CONCLUSION

Recent occurrences in Nigeria clearly show that the state of insecurity in the polity has assumed a frightening dimension. While it may be posited that insecurity is a global problem, what looks rather strange is our situation is the seeming inability of our government to tackle the challenge head-long. The cliché of 'security threat' has almost transformed to 'security collapse'.

Book Haram and gun attacks on innocent Nigerians have become almost a daily routine. Recently, the group added another dimension to the campaign. It ordered Northern Muslims and resident in the South to return to the North and indigenes of the Southern States living in the North to go home. Many people have chosen to obey the other rather than the government to disregard the order. Now, there is an exodus of people from the North and South.

President Jonathan has a duly to restore security and maintain the country's unity. He should borrow a leaf from the strategy his predecessor, President Umaru Musa Yar'Adua, used to deal with the Nigeria Delta Insurgency. He should seek out competent persons and if necessary, set up new security strategies to deal with the current attacks. He should also exercise caution in dealing with foreign interests, to avoid being drawn into a terror orbit far greater than our present predicament. He should deal with the Boko Haram attacks as peculiar problems deserving of appropriate home grown remedy; without courting the physical presence of foreigners.

REFERENCES

Abimboye, A, (2012), " Nigeria's Threatened Federation," Newswatch, February 6, pp 12-21.

- Abubakar, A. (2004), "The Challenges of Security in Nigeria", A Page presented at the NIPSS, Kuru on November 26.
- Adah, R. (2011), Insecurity in Nigeria: What Hope for the Common Man? Leadership, Tuesday, October, p. 31.
- Adegbamigbe, A. (2001) "Robbers in Police Uniform" *The News*, 16 April, Vol. 16, No. 15, pp. 14-23.
- Adegbamigbe, A. *et al.* (2008) "Houses Fit for Pigs", *The News*, February 4, p. 34.
- Adejuwon, L. (2009) "Daming Report", *The Week*. Vol. 29, April 6, pp. 20-21.
- Adeyemi K. (2012a) "Boko Haram: Police arrest 180 Chadian Mercenaries", *The Nation*, Friday 27, pp 1, 4.
- Adeyemi, A. (2012), "Terrorism: Lessons from other lands", *TELL*, February 6 p 44.
- Adeyemi, K. (2012b), "Guns Boom in Kano", *The Nation*, Wednesday, January 25, pp 1, 4.
- Adeyemi, K. (2012c), "Police 10 bomb laden vehicles found in Kano," *The Nation*, Tuesday, January 24, p 1, 4.
- Agbaegbu, T. (2006) "Killing for Money", *NewsWatch*, October 2, Vol. 44, No. 14, pp. 18-34.
- Agbro, J. (2012), "Looking beyond the Military", *The Nation* on Sunday, January 29, Pp 24-25
- Ajetunmobi, W. (2012), "NLC to Federal Government: Stop these Killings", *The Nation*, Tuesday, January 24, p. 2.
- Akintunde, K. (2007) "Robbers Everywhere", *NewsWatch*, December 24, Vol. 46, No. 25, pp. 16 – 23.
- Al Bishak, M. (2011), "Global and Historical Purview of Terrorism", *The National Scholar*, Vol 8; No. 2 (November) Pp 6 6-8
- Brock, J. (2012), "Untold Story of how Boko Haram bombed UN House," *The Nation* Wednesday, February 1, pp 2-3.
- Dambazau, A. B. (2007) *Criminology and Criminal Justice*. Ibadan: Spectrum Books Ltd.
- Egburonu, S, et al (2012), "Tension as groups flee over Boko Haram Threats", *The Nation* on Sunday, January 29, pp 20-22.
- Egburonu, S. et al (2012), "The Nation on Sunday, January 29, Pp 20-21.
- Eme, O. I. (2004) "Insecurity Question in Nigeria: A Thematic Exposition," *The Academy*, Vol. 4, No. 4, (July) pp. 8-9.
- Eme, O. I. (2009) "Ethno-Religious Identities in Nigeria: Implications for Good Governance in Nigeria." A Paper submitted to the Editor-in-Chief of a Book Project on Islam and Governance in Nigeria.
- Ezea, S. (2010), "Security Challenges: from Ringim to Abubakar, Will History Repeat itself?, *The Gurdian* Saturday, January 28, p. 49
- Ezeoha, S.L. (2011), "Causes and Effects of Insecurity in Nigeria", *The National Scholar*, Vol 8; No. 2 (November) pp 28-28.
- Fajnzylber, P. *et al.* (2001) "Crime and Victimization: An Economic Perspective," *Economia*, 1(1), pp. 219 – 78.
- Fasan, R (2011), "Will There be Peace in our Time? *The Vanguard*, Wednesday, September 28, p. 36
- Field, S. (1990) *Trends in Crime and their Interpretations: A Study of Recorded Crime in Post-War England and Wales*, London: Home Office Research.
- Ibrahim, J. and Igbuzor, O. (2002) "Memorandum submitted to the Presidential Committee on National Security in Nigeria."
- Jegedi, S.B. (2011), "Back to State of Nature? *The National Scholar*, Vol 8; No. 2 (November) p. 30.
- Johnson, B. (2012), "A Nation on the Brink", *The News*, February 6, pp 14-17.
- Maduabuchi, E. (2012), "Siege of a nation". *Sunday Independent*, January 29, 1 p 15-18.
- Mba-Afolabi, J. (1999) "Criminals on the Prowl", *NewsWatch*, August 16, Vol. 30, No. 6, pp. 8 – 16.
- Moore, M. H., Trojan Wicz, R. C. and Kelling, G. L. (1998), *Crime and Policy: Perspectives on Policing*, Washington. National Institute of Justice.
- Nmeribeh, M. (2012), "Horror Tales", *The News*, February 6 pp 18-20.
- Nzomiwu, E. et al, 2012), "Sokoto for attack soon, if . . . – Boko Haram", *Sunday Independent*; January 29, pp 1, 2.
- Ogunwale, G. (2012), "Army Chief to Federal Government: Do not negotiate with Boko Haram", *The Nation*, Wednesday, January 25, p 5
- Ogunyemi, B. (2011), "Our sense of Security", *ThisDay*, Friday, September 30, p. 35
- Ogunyemi, B. and Align, M.K. (2011), "Is Nigeria under siege", *The National scholar*, Vol. 8 No. 2 pp 4-5 and 26.

- Okorie, I. (2011), "Insecurity" Consequences for Investment and Employment, "The Punch, Thursday, September 9, pp37-38.
- Oladipo, D. (1999) "Why they Fail", *Newswatch*, August 16, Vol. 30, No. 6, pp. 10 – 15.
- Oladipupo, S. (2005) "Police as Public Enemy", *Nigerian Newsworld*, July 18, Vol. 11, No. 25, pp. 12-16.
- Ololade, O. (2012), "The ugly manifestations of tribal politics in Nigeria", *The Nation*, Saturday, January 28, pp 19-22.
- Olonsisakin, F. (2008) "In the Line of Fire," *BBC Focus on Africa*, (April – June) pp. 19 – 23.
- Olorode, O. (2011), "Security Crisis: Implications of National Integration", *The National Scholar*, Vol 8; No. 2 (November) pp 9-15.
- Onyemaizu, C. (2006) "In the Maze of Violence," *The Source*, September 4, Vol. 19, No. 22, pp. 10 – 21.
- Oshodi, J. (2011), "Orientation on Terrorism: The Psychological approach; *The National Scholar*, Vol 8; No. 2 (November) p 29.
- Oyebode, A. (2011), "The Imperative of Security", *The National Scholar*, Vol 8; No. 2 (November) pp 27-29.
- Phillips, A. (2012), "AU Igbo Go Home," *Newswatch*, February 6, pp 16-17
- Shejaym (2012), "Shekau's Threat", *The News*, February 6, p.17.
- Small Arms Survey* (2007) "Small Arms, Armed Violence and Insecurity in Nigeria: The Niger Delta in Perspective," December 5.
- Stewart, S.C. (2012), " Nigeria's Boko Haram Militants remains a regional threat", *Stratfor Global Intelligence*.
- Suleiman, T. (2012), "Boko Haram Siege Deepens," *TELL*, February 6, pp 42-50.
- The Nation* Editional (2012), "Funding Terror", *The Nation*, Thursday, 26, pp 19.
- Thomas, O and Kujenya, J.C. (2012) "Guns, Guns every where", *The Nation*, Monday, January, 30, pp 2-3.
- Yusuf, I.A. (2012), "Rising Security Votes," *The Nation* on Sunday, January 29, p 25.