Weapons of the FMLN-Part Two: The Logistics of an Insurgency By Lawrence J. Whelan

[KLa...@msn.com]

This is an article that I found over at a group which was called "The
Institute for Research on Small Arms in International Security" or
IRSAIS for short. They used to have a Web Site:
http://www.smallarmsresearch.org/

Apparently that site no longer exists. Does anyone know what happened
to IRSAIS? Does it still exist? If it does, could it be contacted? Does
it have a new Web Site?

Weapons of the FMLN-Part Two: The
Logistics of an Insurgency
By
Lawrence J. Whelan

Decades of unrest provided the fuel for an insurgency that engulfed El
Salvador in the early 1980s and appears capable of lasting well into
the 1990s. Much has been written discussing the different social,
political and economic factors that contribute to this ongoing struggle
but little study has been given to understanding the logistical support
required to keep guerilla forces like the FMLN (Farabundo Marti
National Liberation Front) in the field. Beans, bullets and the ability
to deliver these to the troops in the field is critical for any
fighting force. This can be a special challenge for insurgent forces
constantly on the move, who may be required to hide among a sometimes
hostile population and for whom indigenous munitions sources are often
inadequate to support their operations in a prolonged war of attrition.
A seemingly simple solution is an infusion of military assistance from
a government sympathetic to the cause. But supplying an insurgency is
not a simple, short term project. Requirements for establishing
multiple sources, deliver them to the target country, and distribute
them to the forces in the field. Further complicating the logistical
system is the need to protect the source and identity of the
assistance. In 11 years the FMLN and its supporters have developed a
sophisticated logistical support network that has provided weapons from
all corners of the world. In July, 1990 (See Vol. 1, No. 4), IRSAIS
began a study to document the evolution and extent of logistical
support for the FMLN. In the mid-1970s five separate terrorist
organizations were operating in El Salvador. This fact alone made it
nearly impossible to effectively supply all factions. The success of
the Nicaraguan revolution in 1979 highlighted the need for a
coordinated effort by all five anti-government groups operating in El
Salvador. After months of negotiations in Havana, Cuba, the major
guerilla groups emerged consolidated under the Unified Revolutionary
Directorate (DRU). In part this unity is believed to have been due to
the pressure of Fidel Castro who sought to consolidate training and
logistical support. Shortly after the announcement of the creation of
the DRU, in May, 1980, there were indications that approximately 600
tons of weapons had arrived in El Salvador. Prior to 1980 crudely
sanitized ex-Cuban 7.62x51mm NATO caliber FN FAL assault rifles,
Czechoslovakian 9x19mm vz. 23 and vz. 25 submachine guns captured by
Salvadorian government forces both showed limited FMLN logistical
resources and pointed to Cuba as the primary supplier. Despite the
removal of the national crest, markings remained that allowed the
captured FN FALs to be traced to lots delivered to Cuba in the late
1950s. In addition to the FALs, Cuba had purchased large quantities of
Czechoslovakian vz. 23s and vz. 25s in the 1960s, but no conclusive
evidence is available to link them with those weapons captures in El
Salvador. When the FMLN announced it's first "final offensive" in
1981, the initial indicators of an expansion of the logistical support
network and new sources of small arms became evident. During this time
the 7.62 mm FALs were being replaced by increasing numbers of 5.56 x
45mm M16/AR15 rifles as evidenced by the numbers of those weapons
captures by Salvadorian forces. It is important to note that in 1981
the M16 had not yet been issued to the Salvadorian military in
significant numbers; during this period the 7.62 x 51mm NATO Gewehr 3
(G3) was still the standard service rifle. The largest percentage of
5.56mm M16/AR15 rifles captured have been traced to weapons either
provided to the Republic of South Vietnam or issued to US units sent to
Vietnam. Both US Defense Intelligence Agency serial number trace data
and the Institute's samples examined in El Salvador show the single
largest source of M16/AR15 rifles provided to the FMLN has been
Vietnam. By late 1984 the FMLN decided to change its tactics and
announced a "war of attrition" designed to topple the government by
destroying the economy. Over the next five years the FMLN employed a
combination of small scale unit actions and terrorism; launching few
large-scale military operations. During this period the FMLN command
worked to establish new logistical sources to consolidate ammunition
requirements, and to standardize and replenish small arms stocks lost
in the "final offensive." Gradually the FMLN initiated replacement
of aging 5.56 x 45mm M16 and 7.62 x 51mm FAL rifles with a standard
service rifle, the 7.62 x 39 mm AKM (North Korean, Hungarian, East
German, Yugoslav). Between 1984 and 1989, Eastern Europe emerged as an
important new source for FMLN small arms. Salvadoran government
documents show that prior to 1987 so-called "Communist Bloc"
weapons represented less than one percent of all captured weapons. By
1990 the total of such weapons had grown to over 30 percent and
continues to grow. Intelligence reports indicate the first significant
shipments of eastern European weapons arrived in El Salvador in 1985.
Hungarian manufactured AKMs were that first East European small arms to
be supplied to the FMLN in significant quantities. Early serial number
data from Salvadorian government documents (when local record keeping
was very rudimentary) and the Institute's own field samples were too
small to accurately estimate the total number of Hungarian AKMs in the
Caribbean region but it did provide an excellent foundation for our
data base. One possible scenario suggests the reasonableness of an
estimate of 11,000 Hungarian AKMs received in the region over a five
year period. Evident among the captured Hungarian-made rifles are
several different serial number progressions, often with consecutively
numbered guns having been captured in different regions of the country.
While large numbers of the Hungarian AKMs appear to have entered the
region in late 1984, East German manufactured MPiKMS-72s do not appear
to have reached El Salvador in significant quantities until mid-1986.
Intelligence reports from January 1987 revealed several MPiKMS-72s, all
manufactured in late 1984 and relatively closely associated in lot
designations. But again a reliable estimate was hindered by the small
sample. By June 1989, capture of MPiKMS-72s by Government forces
increased dramatically, furnishing the data required to make a more
accurate estimate of the number of weapons that had entered the
country. Four separate lots have since been identified in El Salvador:
They have serial number prefixes .'MK," .'MQ," .'MY," and
.'MX." Of these, only the .'MY" and .'MX" lots were
confiscated in any significant numbers. Based on serial numbers
obtained from Salvadorian Army reports and from on-site inspections
there were approximately 4,000 of the 1984 "MY" lot and 1,100 of
the 1984 "MX" lot smuggled into the region. As with the Hungarian
AKMs, there was a definite progression of serial numbers, accompanied
by consecutive numbers captured in different located in both the
"MY" and "MX" lots. Samples of captured weapons from the two
lots, "MK' and "MQ" were too small for a reasonable update.
With the transition to the 7.62 x 39mm AKM as the standard service
rifle, the next step for the FMLN was to adopt a common caliber squad
automatic weapon. Previously, a limited number of captured US 7.62 x
51mm NATO caliber M60 machine guns provided FMLN squads with fire
support, further complicating logistic support by adding belted 7.62 x
51mm ammunition to an already lengthy ammunition list. In addition, the
M60 machine guns and its ammunition were very heavy for troops moving
about rough country on foot. Lighter and easier to handle
Yugoslavian-made 7.62 x 39mm RPKs arrived soon after the 7.62 x 39mm
AKMs to replace the 7.62 x 51mm M60s at the squad level, Manufactured
in 1985, the serial numbers of those RPKs captured by government forces
showed a marked progression. Best estimates based on available date
indicated 750 Yugoslavian RPKs were shipped to the region beginning in
early 1986. Another important factor influencing the choice of the AKM
and RPK as standard weapons was the relative availability of 7.62 x
39mm ammunition. Cuba lacks the facilities necessary to manufacture
5.56mm and 7.62 mm NATO standard ammunition making acquisition of
either of these types of ammunition in sufficient quantities difficult.
Production facilities for 7.62 x 39mm have been operating in Cuba since
1987. A sample of captured ammunition showed that the largest
percentage of the AKM ammunition had Cuban head stamps and that most of
it had been made since 1988. Other samples showed that 5.56mm NATO
ammunition was manufactured in 1973 and 1974. The largest portion of
5.56, ammunition provided to the FMLN was from the stockpiles of
American equipment left behind in Vietnam. Intercepted shipments of
5.56mm M16/AR15 rifles with serial numbers traced to the Vietnam era
were accompanied by large shipments of ammunition manufactured in the
early 1970s. This transition to the Hungarian AKM, the Yugoslavian RPK,
and the East German MPiKMS-72 standardized the small arms in the
FMLN's inventory with the small arms inventories of its two closet
allies, Cuba and Nicaragua. Eastern Europe has not been the only recent
supplier of weapons to the FMLN. Increasing numbers of North Korean
manufactured 7.62 x 39mm Type 68 (AKM) rifles have been captured by
government forces. Serial number samples for these weapons were
insufficient to make an accurate estimate of the number of these rifles
in the country. The Type 68s in the sample showed a similar pattern to
the East European AKMs and RPKs in that they were all in excellent
condition and appeared to have been of recent manufacture. Logistical
support for the FMLN has not been dependent upon a single source, nor a
single region. Over the past ten years, the FMLN has received assault
rifles from Vietnam, Cuba, East Germany and Hungary. This diversity
minimizes the impact of any precipitous policy shifts or radical
political changes in the source countries. An example of this
protection has been the absence of large scale shortages of ammunition
or small arms in spite of the recent upheavals in Eastern Europe. Early
indications show that the FMLN logistics system has simply shifted to
make North Korea its main supplier. As recently as six months ago
captured weapons from the FMLN showed that the guerillas have continued
to modernize their small arms inventories with more sophisticated
infantry weapons including the SA-14 man-portable surface-to-air
missiles. Despite the recent peace talks in Mexico and gestures of good
will from the FMLN, the guerilla group still undoubtedly holds large
stockpiles of weapons as did the Contras in Nicaragua at the end of
that group's conflict with the Sandinistas. Whatever the outcome of
the peace talks involving the parties to the fighting in El Salvador,
the presence of thousands of small caliber weapons (and of the
ammunition needed to shoot them) in Central America will continue to be
a destabilizing factor for the life of the region.

Supposedly the author of this article, Mr. Whelan, has written at least
two additional articles about the weapons the FMLN used, and the
foreign governments which supplied them. DOes anyone know anything
about them? Could they be posted? If not, is there any place where they
could be obtained?