1945
cr...@earthlink.net
than just beating the Germans in 1945, ie: the dissection of Berlin,
Russia becoming a force of its own in Europe, the beginning of the Cold
War, etc.
Did we have any idea knowledge of all the political issues that evolved
from the end of the war in Europe? Did we know that Russia was the
more dangerous aggressor back in 1939-41?
Craig
Stephen Graham
> How soon did the Allies know that there were going to be more problems
> than just beating the Germans in 1945,
Sometime in 1938. Or pick your date in 1939 when it became convincing
that war was going to break out. A Second World War, in whatever form it
took, was going to rewrite the political landscape of Europe again. What
that landscape would look like was going to depend on who won, how they
won, and why they won. The political problems of the 1920s and 1930s
would have to be resolved. And if Germany lost, what to do with it and
the Nazi regime was a clear issue at the time.
> ie: the dissection of Berlin,
The occupation zones were established during the war. The division of
Germany into separate states based on the zonal boundaries came from
disagreements as to the future of Germany. The Soviets normally favored
a unified and neutralized Germany; the Western Allies through the
establishment of Bizonia and Trizonia indicated a different path.
A history such as Naimark's The Russians in Germany, or any work
covering the birth of the two Germanies will go into detail.
> Russia becoming a force of its own in Europe,
The Soviets had always been a force in Europe. The realities of the war
and who occupied which areas simply increased its sway.
> the beginning of the Cold
> War, etc.
Britian, France and the US and the Soviet Union had always had strained
relations dating from the Russian Civil War. These strained relations
continued.
> Did we know that Russia was the
> more dangerous aggressor back in 1939-41?
It's not clear to me that the Soviets were ever the more dangerous
aggressor - I think this attitude is an artifact of the Cold War.
David Thornley
<cr...@earthlink.net> wrote:
>How soon did the Allies know that there were going to be more problems
>than just beating the Germans in 1945, ie: the dissection of Berlin,
>Russia becoming a force of its own in Europe, the beginning of the Cold
>War, etc.
>
from person to person. The Warsaw Uprising started a lot of anti-
Soviet feeling, with Stalin deliberately fostering an unfavorable
image of the USSR.
>Did we have any idea knowledge of all the political issues that evolved
>from the end of the war in Europe? Did we know that Russia was the
>more dangerous aggressor back in 1939-41?
>
The Soviet Union was not the more dangerous aggressor. Historically,
it has only been aggressive when it is safe. Aside from WWII, which
was pretty well forced on Stalin, Soviet aggression has always been
by proxy and with deniable forces.
In other words, not only Stalin but all following Communist leaders
could be deterred from aggression, while Hitler could not be.
I'm not going to argue which was the more evil, but Hitler was
very definitely more dangerous. I think that perceptions to the
contrary are based on the fact that we beat Nazi Germany in 1945,
since it was the most dangerous, and did not fight the Soviets,
because they were not nearly as dangerous.
--
David H. Thornley | If you want my opinion, ask.
da...@thornley.net | If you don't, flee.
http://www.thornley.net/~thornley/david/ | O-
Tero P. Mustalahti
> The Soviet Union was not the more dangerous aggressor. Historically,
> it has only been aggressive when it is safe. Aside from WWII, which
> was pretty well forced on Stalin, Soviet aggression has always been
> by proxy and with deniable forces.
Well, it is debatable how much the pre-Barbarossa Soviet aggressions in
WW2 were forced on Stalin. The attack on Poland and the annexation of
the Baltic countries can be viewed as creating a buffer zone, albeit a
blatant and unprovoked violation on the sovereignty of those countries,
but the attempt to conquer Finland can not be included in that attempt
-- after all, the Germans were in no position to attack Finland or
Soviet Union through Finland in 1939.
Perhaps Stalin suspected that Germany might try to invade Norway and
Sweden, but in 1939 he had no intelligence data of such German
intentions. The occupation of the Scandinavian countries was never an
integral part of the Nazi ideology or doctrine either -- quite the
contrary in fact -- so Stalin had no real reason to suspect a German
attack through the Scandinavian countries and Finland. It was almost
pure paranoia, typical to his character. So perhaps Stalin was not as
aggressive as Hitler, but he was willing to make unprovoked attacks if
it somehow enhanced the security of the Soviet Union in his paranoid mind.
> In other words, not only Stalin but all following Communist leaders
> could be deterred from aggression, while Hitler could not be.
Stalin could be deterred by sufficient force, that is true. He agreed to
the negotiated peace with Finland in 1940, since he was afraid of a
Western intervention.
Tero P. Mustalahti
Dave Smith
>From what I had gathered, the Allies were suspicious of Stalin prior to the
war, though more concerned with Hitler. During the war he showed his true
colours. Then it was a matter of an alliance of necessity. Patton got into
trouble for saying aloud about the Soviets what many were thinking
privately.
Roman Werpachowski
a war with the West on his own. When he grabbed his spoil in 1945, he
was exploiting an opportunity -- his armies stood where they stood and
nobody was going to throw them out. If Hitler didn't attack Poland in
1939, USSR wouldn't touch an inch of Polish pre-1939 border.
Michele Armellini
news:1137433274....@o13g2000cwo.googlegroups.com...
"we" weren't alive at the time.
"Russia" was a federate republic of the Soviet Union.
And the Soviet Union was not the more dangerous aggressor. Certainly not in
1941 (the year in which Germany took over Yugoslavia and Greece and invaded
the Soviet Union), but not even before. Without German help, or connivance,
or consent, the Soviet Union did not attack anyone and it could be safely
assumed it would not have had. On the contrary, without Soviet help, Germany
attacked here and there and over there too, anschlussed this and dismembered
that, and so on.
To reply to your first question, the British began to worry immediately
about the post-war East-European situation, as soon as the Soviet Union
stated the intention of not letting the Baltic states to be independent
again, and its interests on the Eastern bits of Poland it had taken over in
1939. These statements took place in mid-1942. Confirmation came in 1943
when the SU broke its always strained relations with the Polish government
in exile, over Katyn.
Since I mentioned the Poles, your question can also be answered with: as
soon as Sep 17, 1939, if knowledge by one of the Allies is considered as
knowledge by all the Allies.
Cub Driver
>Did we have any idea knowledge of all the political issues that evolved
>from the end of the war in Europe? Did we know that Russia was the
>more dangerous aggressor back in 1939-41?
Well, I'm not sure that Russia *was* the more dangerous aggressor,
except perhaps to Finland and the good people of Lvov. Oh, and Latvia,
Lithuiana, and Estonia (small countries of whom we know nothing). But
to the U.S., Britain, and France? I don't think so.
Certainly there were large segments of the population, including my
old Dad, who believed that having liberated western Europe and beaten
Germany, we should join forces with the German army and continue on to
the eastward. (How far, I'm not sure. As the cowboy found when he
tried to take a sip from a spitoon, the great problem with Russia is
how to stop.) But that mattered little as long as Roosevelt lived,
with his infatuation with Stalin. For all his faults, Truman seems to
have taken Stalin's measure very early on. The Berlin Airlift probably
had its origins at Potsdam.
Stalin's appetite for eastern Europe was pretty obvious in 1945, but
there was still Japan to defeat, and an army to demobilize. We were in
much the same position as Britain had been with respect to Germany in
1938. Crikey, let the man have some of those small nations, if he
wanted them so badly. Perhaps he would let them go in time! (He did
let go of eastern Austria in 1955 or thereabouts. I hitchhiked through
Italy that spring, and the country was full of American cars with "US
Forces in Austria" license plates, taking up new domiciles.)
I suppose the question is dangerous *to whom*. Hitler was dangerous to
western Europe; Stalin, to eastern Europe. The former has always
seemed more import to "us," meaning Britain and the U.S.
-- all the best, Dan Ford
email: usenet AT danford DOT net
Warbird's Forum: www.warbirdforum.com
Piper Cub Forum: www.pipercubforum.com
In Search of Lost Time: www.readingproust.com
Cub Driver
wrote:
> Aside from WWII, which
>was pretty well forced on Stalin, Soviet aggression has always been
>by proxy and with deniable forces.
Hardly. It was a Russian army that invaded Finland. Arguably the
Russian invasion of Poland also took place before WWII, which didn't
exist until Britain and France made it so. Perhaps not aggression, but
a coup de main, was the Russian occupation of Latvia, Lithuania, and
Estonia.
And "Russia" is the more useful word. Europe's experience with Russia
did not begin with the November Revolution. Even the Allied
intervention in Russia in 1918-1921 had as much to do with Russia as
with the Soviet Union.
Cub Driver
<miarmeldon'ts...@tin.it> wrote:
>"we" weren't alive at the time.
I was.
>"Russia" was a federate republic of the Soviet Union.
A distinction without a difference, like saying that Prussia was
merely one German state. Germany *was* Prussia. The USSR *was* Russia.
That they drew sustenance (and rulers) from associated states is
incidental. There is not a whole lot of difference between Stalin's
USSR in 1938 and Putin's Russia in 2006.
>And the Soviet Union was not the more dangerous aggressor.
True.
Roman Werpachowski
> The Soviet Union was not the more dangerous aggressor. Historically,
> it has only been aggressive when it is safe. Aside from WWII, which
> was pretty well forced on Stalin, Soviet aggression has always been
> by proxy and with deniable forces.
Except for the Afghanistan, too. I'd say -- it is off-topic for WW II,
of course -- that the USSR was most dangerous when it started crumbling
in the 80's but didn't yet acknowledge defeat in the Cold War.
> I'm not going to argue which was the more evil, but Hitler was
> very definitely more dangerous.
.. to the outsiders, yes.
Michele Armellini
messaggio news:v3kps15d177mmi37l...@4ax.com...
> On Mon, 16 Jan 2006 16:49:34 -0500, thor...@visi.com (David Thornley)
> wrote:
>
> > Aside from WWII, which
> >was pretty well forced on Stalin, Soviet aggression has always been
> >by proxy and with deniable forces.
>
> Hardly. It was a Russian army that invaded Finland.
Sure, on November 30, 1939. Now, if you wish, you can formally classify that
war as separated from WWII.
Arguably the
> Russian invasion of Poland also took place before WWII, which didn't
> exist until Britain and France made it so.
Arguably the Soviet invasion of Poland took place on September 17, 1939,
while Britain and France made the war a world war on September 2-3.
Perhaps not aggression, but
> a coup de main, was the Russian occupation of Latvia, Lithuania, and
> Estonia.
It was aggression, only it was not resisted. And it took place in the frame
of WWII; it would have not happened without Hitler's go-ahead, that came
hand in hand with the partition of Poland.
David Thornley
Cub Driver <usenet.AT.da...@giganews.com> wrote:
>On Mon, 16 Jan 2006 16:49:34 -0500, thor...@visi.com (David Thornley)
>wrote:
>
>> Aside from WWII, which
>>was pretty well forced on Stalin, Soviet aggression has always been
>>by proxy and with deniable forces.
>
>Hardly. It was a Russian army that invaded Finland. Arguably the
>Russian invasion of Poland also took place before WWII, which didn't
>exist until Britain and France made it so. Perhaps not aggression, but
>a coup de main, was the Russian occupation of Latvia, Lithuania, and
>Estonia.
>
not happen for a couple of weeks, by which time Britain and France
had declared war.
The aggression in Finland, Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and
Romania was during WWII and made possible, and, in most cases,
useful and important, by WWII. While the invasion of Finland
looks to have been a bad idea, the other aggression provided
buffers between German armies and the Russian heartland.
Before WWII, there was no armed Soviet aggression after the
Russo-Polish War, at least not in Europe. After WWII, there
was none, and the Soviets withdrew from Austria and Iran.
While Stalin obviously wasn't averse to grabbing what he could,
he clearly did so only when it was safe. This made him much
less dangerous than Hitler.
>And "Russia" is the more useful word. Europe's experience with Russia
>did not begin with the November Revolution. Even the Allied
>intervention in Russia in 1918-1921 had as much to do with Russia as
>with the Soviet Union.
>
While the Soviet Union was certainly Russian-dominated (if run by
a Georgian during our period of interest), it was not just Russia,
nor were Soviet policies just continuations of Russian policies.
E.F.Schelby
>I think that perceptions to the >contrary are based on the fact that
>we beat Nazi Germany in 1945,since it was the most dangerous, and did
>not fight the Soviets,because they were not nearly as dangerous.
Or was it perhaps because Germany was smaller, densely populated,
faced by multiple enemies, and sooner depleted of resources and
manpower, while Soviet Russia was terribly big, wide, cold, and
tough?
ES
Roman Werpachowski
"Faced by multiple enemies" -- of its own choosing.
Roman Werpachowski
> While the Soviet Union was certainly Russian-dominated (if run by
> a Georgian during our period of interest), it was not just Russia,
> nor were Soviet policies just continuations of Russian policies.
They were to some extent. With all this talk about internationalism
etc., Soviets were Russian imperialists at heart.
Rich Rostrom
>How soon did the Allies know that there were going to be more
>problems than just beating the Germans in 1945...
Which Allies?
The Poles were an Ally, yes?
One can be pretty sure that the Poles realized that
just beating Germany was not going to solve all
their problems the day after the USSR invaded Poland
in 1939.
The USSR was an Ally, yes?
The USSR of course was looking past the end of the
war from before the war - its long-term political
ambitions were intrinsically hostile to all
non-Communist countries.
But I guess you are speaking of the United States
and Great Britain.
>ie: the dissection of Berlin, Russia becoming a
>force of its own in Europe, the beginning of the Cold
>War, etc.
One comment:
Russia had been a major force in Europe for about 200
years at that time - since the Russian Empire intervened
in the War of the Austrian Succession. Before WW I,
Russia owned Poland, and the Russian imperial frontier
was only 300 km from Berlin. The exclusion of Russia
(as the USSR) from European affairs in 1921-1939 was
peculiar and unstable circumstance, which collapsed
in the general shake-up of the war.
But you seem to be asking when the US and Britain
first began to worry about the USSR in post-war
Europe.
The US (or at least its leader, Roosevelt) was
extremely naive about the post-war world. Several
of FDR's advisors from the period have said that
he had no plan for dealing with the USSR after
the war except to "win the trust" of Stalin, and
no idea what Stalin (or Communism) was really like
or what Stalin really wanted.
Britain was more wary. Unlike FDR, Churchill was
a conservative, who disliked Communists on instinct.
But even Churchill did not really understand what
the USSR really was; and a large part of the British
political establishment were Socialists who admired
or sympathized with the Soviet regime.
Churchill clearly recognized there would be problems
as early as the Tehran conference in December 1943.
At that time, Churchill confronted Stalin and
negotiated a 'deal' allocating post-war control
over several nations in the Balkans, with the USSR
and the US/UK getting "percentage" shares of
influence that varied from country to country.
In practice the 'minority' shares meant nothing.
This deal gave the USSR de facto control over all
Balkan states except Greece, which fell to the
US/UK.
The Germans evacuated Greece in October-November
1944. Greek resistance forces seized Athens on
October 12; British troops arrived the same day.
The Greek royalist government-in-exile arrived
on October 18th. The Greek resistance forces were
dominated by the Communist Party, and refused to
recognize the royal government. (In fact, during
the occupation, Communist-controlled resistance
forces had attacked and killed non-Communist
partisans.) The British forces moved to enforce
the authority of the royal government, and by
December there was open fighting between the
Communists and the British. Churchill himself
went to Greece to try to resolve the dispute.
So certainly by that time, the British knew there
were problems beyond defeating Germany, and I
suppose the US at least noticed the Greek troubles.
>Did we have any idea knowledge of all the political
>issues that evolved from the end of the war in Europe?
_All_ the issues? Hardly. I don't think anyone did.
>Did we know that Russia was the
>more dangerous aggressor back in 1939-41?
No, at that time it was not clear. While the USSR
was a much larger nation with much greater natural
resources, Germany still had the greater industrial
plant. Also, Germany was still viewed as the world
leader in technology, and thus thought to have
great potential to invent devastating or even world-
beating weapons. Communism had its partisans around
the world, but there were fascist groups in many
countries then, and it seemed as though pro-Axis
infiltrators were all over. And Hitler was far more
reckless and aggressive than Stalin.
BTW, for this period, at least, "USSR" is more
appropriate than "Russia". Half the population
of the USSR was non-Russians, including the head
of state.
--
| The shocking lack of a fleet of modern luxury |
| dirigibles is only one of a great many things that |
| are seriously wrong with this here world. |
| -- blogger "Coop" at Positive Ape Index |
jussi....@faf.mil.fi
> Hardly. It was a Russian army that invaded Finland.
Dan, you've already been reminded of the proper terminology a couple of
times. Let me repeat it to you once again: it was a _Soviet_ army.
And don't start claiming that this is a "distinction without
difference". Labeling all of the Red Army forces that invaded Finland
in November 1939 as "Russian" is a straight and direct insult at the
non-Russian soldiers who fought and died in the campaign that they had
not asked for.
For the most obvious example, a majority of the Red Army soldiers who
perished in the Road of Raate were Ukrainian, in the ethnic sense of
the word; and today, the location has two separate memorial monuments,
one for the perished Russian soldiers and another one for the perished
Ukrainian soldiers.
Claiming that all of the Red Army soldiers who fought on the campaign
were "Russian", and that all the casualties suffered by the USSR during
the war were "Russian" is equal to denying the casualties of the
non-Russian nationalities, and supports the present-day
politically-motivated Russian attempts to monopolize the victory over
the Third Reich. Do I need to explain to you how offensive that is?
> And "Russia" is the more useful word.
Well, no, it isn't. Ask our British contributors how would they like if
all of the casualties suffered by the United Kingdom during the war
were categorized as "English" war dead. It's pretty much the same
thing.
Cheers,
Jalonen
Michele Armellini
messaggio news:lekps1dk29mffhvfj...@4ax.com...
> On Tue, 17 Jan 2006 04:27:38 -0500, "Michele Armellini"
> <miarmeldon'ts...@tin.it> wrote:
>
> >"we" weren't alive at the time.
>
> I was.
>
If by "we" we mean the participants in this newsgroup, I think it is
accurate to state that "we" weren't alive. Besides, the point is that the
participants in this newsgroup, me, or you, cannot be identified with the
decision-makers of the time, regardless of whether we, I, or you were alive
at the time. It's misleading.
> >"Russia" was a federate republic of the Soviet Union.
>
> A distinction without a difference, like saying that Prussia was
> merely one German state. Germany *was* Prussia.
Go tell that to a Bavarian. I can't find a kind way of telling you this,
but... I would like to suggest that you need to learn more about Germany.
BTW, I have not noticed you referring to the Prussian invasion or Poland, or
the Prussian ruler, Hitler, or to the Prussian Wehrmacht. So there must be
some other distinction at work, there.
> The USSR *was* Russia.
Sure, and the United Kingdom was England and the USA was Texas; or maybe you
prefer California? Come on.
> That they drew sustenance (and rulers) from associated states is
> incidental.
Try to imagine WWII with, East of Poland, the whole constellation of
independent states there are now. Each acting on its own, allying with
neighbors or with Germany against neighbors, stockpiling its own resources
separately from each other. You sure it only makes an "incidental"
difference?
There is not a whole lot of difference between Stalin's
> USSR in 1938 and Putin's Russia in 2006.
>
In Putin's intentions and desires, maybe.
> >And the Soviet Union was not the more dangerous aggressor.
>
> True.
>
Well, at least there is something we agree upon.
jussi....@faf.mil.fi
> Half the population of the USSR was non-Russians, including the head of state.
Basically correct, except that the Soviet _head of state_ actually was
Russian. Mikhail Ivanovich Kalinin was born in Tver.
(Of course, his birthplace would indicate that he may have had Karelian
roots; but if this was the case, those were in the distant past.)
Stalin was not the head of state, he was the head of the party - and
also, after he had appointed himself as the Chairman of the Council of
People's Commissars in 1946, also the head of the government.
Cheers,
Jalonen
jer...@autograf.pl
> was only 300 km from Berlin. The exclusion of Russia
> (as the USSR) from European affairs in 1921-1939 was
> peculiar and unstable circumstance, which collapsed
> in the general shake-up of the war.
I would like to precize who excluded the USSR till 1934,
when it joined the League of Nations.
It was mostly the Soviet leadership.
The exclusion wasn't however complete.
Germany cooperated with the SU politically and
technologically ( also in the area of military
technology and training).
Cub Driver
<rrostrom.2...@rcn.com> wrote:
>But I guess you are speaking of the United States
>and Great Britain.
Yes, of course he was. The usual term is "western allies". But
"Allies" is a great deal more than "allies". The term refers to
Britain, France, and the U.S. in WWI, and was extended to the U.S. and
Britain in WWII. Of course Russia was "an ally", but it was never one
of "the Allies" as the term was understood in Britain and the U.S.
After all, Germany, Italy, and Japan were allied with one another.
That didn't make them Allies.
Cub Driver
>Dan, you've already been reminded of the proper terminology a couple of
>times. Let me repeat it to you once again: it was a _Soviet_ army.
Had there been no Russians, there would have been no Soviet army. So
yes, I regard it as a distinction without a difference.
Similarly, the army that invaded Russia in 1940 was the German army,
not an Axis army. That Germany was headed by an Austrian, and that
other nationalities were included in his army, is equally a
distinction without a difference.
"Proper terminology" is in the mind of the poster. I don't need your
instruction, thank you.
Robert Willett
news:6obss1538qjs7hagj...@4ax.com...
> On Wed, 18 Jan 2006 02:56:27 -0500, jussi....@faf.mil.fi wrote:
>
> >Dan, you've already been reminded of the proper terminology a couple of
> >times. Let me repeat it to you once again: it was a _Soviet_ army.
>
I'm with Cub on this. In the US during WWII it was common to use Russia
when referring to the Soviet Union (USSR). Also Britain and England were
used quite often when referring to the United Kingdom. Charles MacDonald in
The Mighty Endeavor uses Russia almost exclusively. Although written after
the war McDonald was a well qualified historian and a veteran of WWII.
E.F.Schelby
>E.F.Schelby napisal(a):
>> Or was it perhaps because Germany was smaller, densely populated,
>> faced by multiple enemies, and sooner depleted of resources and
>> manpower, while Soviet Russia was terribly big, wide, cold, and
>> tough?
>"Faced by multiple enemies" -- of its own choosing.
Not entirely, but you know that. We just heard from another poster
that Britain and France made the war into a world war. Furthermore,
it takes a special foolhardiness to take on Russia. As an enemy,
Germany was a much handier morsel.
Regards,
ES
Michele Armellini
> On Wed, 18 Jan 2006 02:56:27 -0500, jussi....@faf.mil.fi wrote:
>
> >Dan, you've already been reminded of the proper terminology a couple of
> >times. Let me repeat it to you once again: it was a _Soviet_ army.
>
> Had there been no Russians, there would have been no Soviet army. So
> yes, I regard it as a distinction without a difference.
Sure, and had there been no Ukrainans, there would have been no Soviet Army.
Nor without Kazakh oil, etc.
>
> Similarly, the army that invaded Russia in 1940
You mean 1941.
was the German army,
> not an Axis army. That Germany was headed by an Austrian, and that
> other nationalities were included in his army, is equally a
> distinction without a difference.
>
> "Proper terminology" is in the mind of the poster.
And of the reader. Somebody who's not informed enough on his own, might be
misled by your confused over-generalizations.
I remember an anecdote. During the war, the BBC used to refer to "British
troops" when at least some of the troops involved were British, and to
"Allied troops" when they were entirely American. Somehow this grated on the
Americans. But of course it's a distinction without a difference.
After all, it was a British army that landed in France in 1944 to free
Europe. The overall commander was some foreigner and there were some other
nationalities along, but that's... you know.
Michele Armellini
news:8juss1ptg321qb68c...@4ax.com...
> "Roman Werpachowski" <roman.wer...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> >E.F.Schelby napisal(a):
>
> >> Or was it perhaps because Germany was smaller, densely populated,
> >> faced by multiple enemies, and sooner depleted of resources and
> >> manpower, while Soviet Russia was terribly big, wide, cold, and
> >> tough?
>
> >"Faced by multiple enemies" -- of its own choosing.
>
> Not entirely, but you know that. We just heard from another poster
> that Britain and France made the war into a world war.
Oh yes, entirely. The Germans knew the Britain and France would declare war
if they assaulted Poland. Not only that. They were told that if they
immediately withdrew their troops on September 2, 1939, France and Britain
would _not_ go to war. And what did they do? You know.
Then let's see, who chose to be enemy with whom, when it came to Holland,
Belgium, Luxembourg, Denmark, Norway, Yugoslavia, Greece, the Soviet Union,
the USA? You know. Actually it's surprising you need to be reminded.
Furthermore,
> it takes a special foolhardiness to take on Russia.
Yes, the kind of foolhardiness Hitler had. It's strange that you point this
out in the same message in which you donwplay German aggressiveness against
all comers. That's a prime example.
As an enemy,
> Germany was a much handier morsel.
Well, that depends on when, doesn't it? After the Allies had done their job
of munching it, which had been caused by that German aggressiveness, yes, it
was.
BTW, the nation that made the Soviet Union a great military powerhouse by
1945 is, once again, Germany. Without Germany, the USSR had a large army,
but wasn't the heavyweight it was to become thanks to Germany.
David Thornley
>troops" when at least some of the troops involved were British, and to
>"Allied troops" when they were entirely American. Somehow this grated on the
>Americans. But of course it's a distinction without a difference.
>
forces was an American victory, and a victory that was soley Australian
was an Allied victory.
>After all, it was a British army that landed in France in 1944 to free
>Europe. The overall commander was some foreigner and there were some other
>nationalities along, but that's... you know.
>
Who cares about the overall commander here? The command that mattered
at the time was the ground force command, and that was a Brit. No
need to worry about the nationalities attacking the other three of the
five invasion beaches, after all.
Roman Werpachowski
It is rare and lucky occasion when a country has only friends. However,
there is a different between having enemies in foreign relations,
diplomacy and economical competition and having enemies on the
battlefield. It was Germany's choice to change the form of the conflict
from the first to the second, and to invite other participants. Poland,
for one, was not acting aggresively towards Germany.
jussi....@faf.mil.fi
> Had there been no Russians, there would have been no Soviet army.
... and had there been no Ukrainians, there would have been no Soviet
army, either. And had there been no English people, there would have
been no British army in existence. So, would you consider it accurate
to refer to all of the British armed forces as "English"?
I understand that you have a bit of a one-track mind, but perhaps you
should still consider pausing for a while and think about this a little
bit longer. Do you absolutely wish to hold on to this fallacious
reasoning?
[The flawed comparison to the Barbarossa snipped. The Third Reich was
not a multi-national federal state, for starters.]
> "Proper terminology" is in the mind of the poster. I don't need your instruction, thank you.
Well, there's a proud announcement, something to expected from a man
who has already made up his mind and is immune to all arguments to the
contrary. Dan, it's obvious that you _do_ need instruction, but you
simply don't care. There's a considerable difference.
I already noted to you that labeling all of the Red Army forces that
participated in the invasion of Finland in 1940 - or in the Second
World War in general - as "Russians" is anachronistic, incorrect and
even insulting at the non-Russian soldiers who fought and died in the
campaign. Furthermore, it also perpetuates the present-day
politically-motivated Russian attempts to monopolize the entire Soviet
participation in the Second World War as a "Russian" experience, while
removing, for example, the Ukrainians from the equation completely. Not
only is this dead wrong, from a historical point of view, it's also
offensive in so many levels.
If you choose to ignore these facts and sling out anachronistic terms
in a historical discourse... it's obviously your own choice. But don't
be expected to be taken seriously afterwards.
I've said my piece; the last word is yours.
Cheers,
Jalonen
jussi....@faf.mil.fi
> In the US during WWII it was common to use Russia when referring to the
> Soviet Union (USSR).
And in Finland at the same time, it was equally common to speak of
"Russia". Why, it was still perfectly common to speak of "St.
Petersburg" instead of "Leningrad".
That doesn't mean that these were accurate or preferable terms, or that
the commentators who used them were right.
Besides, with his "distinction without a difference"-argument, Dan is
going further than that. I've already given the reasoning, so I won't
repeat it there any more.
Cheers,
Jalonen
jer...@autograf.pl
> if they assaulted Poland. Not only that. They were told that if they
They were told in Munich:
"His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the French
Government have entered into the above agreement on the basis that they
stand by the offer, contained in paragraph 6 of the Anglo-French
proposals of September 19th, relating to an international guarantee of
the new boundaries of the Czechoslovak State against unprovoked
aggression."
and learned that the HMG and FG weren't serious.
Cub Driver
Russia flows along with using "Nazi" instead of German with respect to
aggression in WWII. It is politically correct to refer to the "Nazi
army" that invaded France, Russia, whatever, with the clear
implication that Germans had nothing to do with it. This is the
near-universal policy in the American press. (I'd be curious to know
if the European press honors it also.)
Similarly, I sense an exculpation when I see "Soviet" used to mean
Russian imperialism.
As for Petersburg, I note that it is St. Pete's again. The Soviets
came and went; Russia endures.
David Thornley
discontinuity to consider the two entities separately.
Before and after the Soviet Union, Russia has been a large country,
somewhat backward, not very democratic, but a country among others.
There was a lot of Russian expansionism before the Soviet Union.
The Soviets were at least a lot more cautious, and since then I
haven't noticed the Russians rattling too many sabers.
During the Soviet Union, the USSR was explicitly and intentionally
different from Western countries, having a different philosophy
of government (certainly not Marx's, for what that's worth), and
driven partly by ideology.
It's hard to imagine Russia, before or after the Soviet Union,
doing what the Soviet Union did in 1941-42.
Roman Werpachowski
> I suppose my objection to "Soviet" as a synonym (or euphemism) for
> Russia flows along with using "Nazi" instead of German with respect to
> aggression in WWII. It is politically correct to refer to the "Nazi
> army" that invaded France, Russia, whatever, with the clear
> implication that Germans had nothing to do with it. This is the
> near-universal policy in the American press. (I'd be curious to know
> if the European press honors it also.)
Not the Polish one, I warrant you! However, I fail to see the analogy.
There was a country called "Germany" at the time, inhabited and
governed (mostly) by the people who called themselves "Germans". Why,
they considered non-German people to be worse then themselves. This is
why there is solid ground to call German troops, err... German. BUT if
I were to refer, precisely, to *all* troops occupying Poland during WW
II, I'd say "Nazis", because they were not only German, but also
Estonian and Ukrainian. Sure, mostly German. What's more, Nazi troops
were separated by ethnicity, but the Soviet troops were a mixture of
different nationalities.
To the contrary, USSR was *not* meant to be a purely-German state, as
Nazi Germany was. It was supposed to be, in the official ideology, a
multi-national state (run by the Russian elite, of course -- Stalin's
ethnicity was an exception). That's why calling it "Russia" is
erroneous. It's not as wrong as calling it "China" or "Argentina", but
still a bit wrong.
>
> Similarly, I sense an exculpation when I see "Soviet" used to mean
> Russian imperialism.
Why? Soviets undoubtedly inherited Russian imperialism, but they added
their own flavour to it. It was something directly connected to Tzarist
times, but different.
What's more, Germans are not proud of their Nazi past, so changing
"German" to "Nazi" when referring to WW II is something which they may
see as kindness. But the Russians -- most of them -- are proud of the
USSR heritage! It simply wouldn't make sense to replace Russian with
Soviet as an exculpation.
>
> As for Petersburg, I note that it is St. Pete's again. The Soviets
> came and went; Russia endures.
The myth of Russia endures (nowadays, not only Russians live in Russia
-- what about Chechens, Ingushes, Chukchas and other Caucasian and
Siberian peoples?), but the country changes.
Roman Werpachowski
> In article <1137537488....@g49g2000cwa.googlegroups.com>,
> Roman Werpachowski <roman.wer...@gmail.com> wrote:
> >David Thornley napisal(a):
> >> While the Soviet Union was certainly Russian-dominated (if run by
> >> a Georgian during our period of interest), it was not just Russia,
> >> nor were Soviet policies just continuations of Russian policies.
> >
> >They were to some extent. With all this talk about internationalism
> >etc., Soviets were Russian imperialists at heart.
> >
> I didn't say there was no continuity, I said that there was enough
> discontinuity to consider the two entities separately.
>
> Before and after the Soviet Union, Russia has been a large country,
> somewhat backward, not very democratic, but a country among others.
> There was a lot of Russian expansionism before the Soviet Union.
In Asia. Much less in Europe.
> The Soviets were at least a lot more cautious, and since then I
> haven't noticed the Russians rattling too many sabers.
Because they had the Far East all for themselves already, which was
their natural area of expansion. Note they started competing with the
Chinese as soon as they've grown more powerful.
>
> During the Soviet Union, the USSR was explicitly and intentionally
> different from Western countries, having a different philosophy
> of government (certainly not Marx's, for what that's worth), and
> driven partly by ideology.
Tzarist Russia was also driven by ideology, only a different one.
Religion was very important. THey had this notion of the
exceptionality, you can smell it through Dostoyevsky's novels.
>
> It's hard to imagine Russia, before or after the Soviet Union,
> doing what the Soviet Union did in 1941-42.
They did it in 1812.
Tero P. Mustalahti
> David Thornley napisal(a):
>>Before and after the Soviet Union, Russia has been a large country,
>>somewhat backward, not very democratic, but a country among others.
>>There was a lot of Russian expansionism before the Soviet Union.
>
>
> In Asia. Much less in Europe.
Of course, but the circumstances have to be noted. In Europe Russian
expansionism started in earnest during and after Peter the Great's
reign. The first target was Sweden, which at the time was a bit
overgrown for a country with a relatively small population and low
agricultural production. Russia managed to chip away eastern parts of
Sweden during the 18th century -- most of those areas are nowadays part
of either modern day Russia or Finland. She even tried to do the same to
Prussia and almost succeeded before Catherine the Great's death ended
the Seven Years War. Then came Napoleon and put the Russian expansion on
hold in Central Europe. However, Russia gained from Sweden the area that
is now the independent country called Finland.
After the Napoleonic Wars Prussia started to gain strength again and
expansion in Central Europe became very difficult. In the North Russian
czars still dreamed of a proper Atlantic port, but the new border with
Sweden was much shorter and presented a lot more difficult terrain. So
expansion in that direction was put on hold as well. Russia then tried
to conquer land from Turkey, but England and France much to the surprise
of the Russians did not agree, which led to the well-known Crimean war
and its less well-known side conflict around the archipelago of Aland in
Northern Baltic Sea.
Against this background it is hardly surprising that some Finnish
historians also see the Winter War and the attempted conquest of Finland
as part of s historical Russian expansionistic continuum.
> Tzarist Russia was also driven by ideology, only a different one.
> Religion was very important. THey had this notion of the
> exceptionality, you can smell it through Dostoyevsky's novels.
Very much so. It all goes back to the Grand Duchy of Moscow, the
revolution against the Golden Horde and of course the nearly magical
concept of 'Third Rome'. These guys really believed that they were the
spiritual successors of the Roman emperors and of course they
identified themselves especially with the late Christian and Byzantine
emperors. It is difficult to understand Russia unless you know something
about the Byzantine as well.
Tero P. Mustalahti
jussi....@faf.mil.fi
> BUT if I were to refer, precisely, to *all* troops occupying Poland during WW
> II, I'd say "Nazis", because they were not only German, but also Estonian and
> Ukrainian.
Estonian police units didn't figure particularly prominently among the
Axis occupation forces stationed in Poland. Some units _were_ there, of
course. According to the Estonian International Commission for
Investigation of Crimes against Humanity, there were Estonian guard
units in three Polish towns; Lódz, Przemysl and Rzeszów.
Similarly, there were also Estonian guard units in Tarnopol, which had
been a part of Poland prior to the war and become annexed by the USSR
in 1939. The most prominent recorded atrocity where Estonian police
units participated took place in the ghetto of Novogrudok/Nowogródek
in Byelorussia, which had also been former Polish territory prior to
October 1939.
> It (USSR) was supposed to be, in the official ideology, a multi-national state (run by
> the Russian elite, of course -- Stalin's ethnicity was an exception).
Um. Really? Stalin was the sole exception?
Of the people who held official posts during the Second World War,
Anastas Mikoyan was an Armenian. Lavrenti Beria was a Mengrel. Lazar
Kaganovich was Jewish, which hardly made him a member of the "Russian
elite". Khrushchev and Brezhnev were both Ukrainians, and so were many
others. Otto Wille Kuusinen was Finnish. And I suppose that I don't
have to remind you of the ethnic origins of people such as Konstantin
Rokossovski and (to get back to a bit older period) Felix Dzherzhinski.
The Soviet elite was multi-national enough [1]. On balance, Russians no
doubt made up the largest group within the top hierarchy of the Soviet
state; but given the fact that they also made up the majority of the
population in the USSR, this was perfectly natural.
Cheers,
Jalonen
[1] Of course, the same could be said of the old Tsarist Russian elite,
which also included more than a few people of foreign extraction.
Louis Capdeboscq
> How soon did the Allies know that there were going to be more problems
> than just beating the Germans in 1945
They knew that even before WWII started. Fear of paving the way for
communism was a big motivator behind the appeasement policy.
It's not as if the world in general, and Europe in particular,
discovered communism with the Cold War you know...
> ie: the dissection of Berlin,
...was agreed upon prior to 1945 and by 1943 the British and some
Americans (not Roosevelt) knew that settling the postwar with the
Soviets was going to be a problem.
> Russia becoming a force of its own in Europe,
Russia had been a major European power for centuries. Nothing new here.
> the beginning of the Cold War, etc.
Well, you could argue that the Cold War began in 1947 because that's
when the Americans decided to get involved so from their perspective
that's when it started. But the opposition between the "communist" and
"capitalist" political systems had started well before WWII. See for
example the various Western forces sent to try and undo the Soviet
revolution in 1919-1922, as well as Western attitudes to communism in
general and the USSR in particular during the 1920's and 1930's.
> Did we have any idea knowledge of all the political issues that evolved
> from the end of the war in Europe?
We knew that there would be some, communism and the nationalities
problem were hardly new in 1945. The exact details weren't known obviously.
> Did we know that Russia was the
> more dangerous aggressor back in 1939-41?
No, which is just as well since it wasn't.
LC
--
Remove "e" from address to reply
jussi....@faf.mil.fi
> She even tried to do the same to Prussia and almost succeeded before Catherine the
> Great's death ended the Seven Years War.
Elizaveta's. But let's try to get this back on topic.
> Against this background it is hardly surprising that some Finnish historians also see
> the Winter War and the attempted conquest of Finland as part of some historical Russian
> expansionistic continuum.
Some Finnish historians _have, in the past, seen_ the conflicts of
1939-1940 and 1941-1944 as parts of that kind of a historical
continuum, yes, and even gilded them with the necessary aura of the
grand conflict between "western" and "eastern" civilizations.
I wouldn't say that this is the case with the current cohort of
academic historians in this country right now. The two wars against the
USSR are studied and treated pretty much normally in an ordinary 20th
century context. At least I haven't seen any serious historian trying
to equate the Winter War with the Great Wrath lately. Mythical,
all-encompassing interpretations are a thing of the past.
Politicians are a breed apart, of course, with their own "historical"
rhetoric. Why, to give an example from the times of the Second World
War, there's the draft radio speech prepared by Juho Kusti Paasikivi,
which was supposed to be delivered after the Germans had managed to
capture Leningrad: "Conquest, expansion and acquisition of new
territories have made up the dominating thread in the history of
Russia. Of the thirty-three wars waged by Russia before the First World
War, twenty-two were wars of aggression. Of the two hundred years, 128
were years of war and only 72 were years of peace..."
Cheers,
Jalonen
Michele Armellini
news:1137658514.6...@g14g2000cwa.googlegroups.com...
They learned? They mistakenly believed, you mean, as we all know. Beisdes,
this "they" can be restricted to Ribbentrop, Hitler and his dog. Everybody
else believed the Anglo-French would fight this time.
Ever heard of the straw that broke the camel's back?
Other points of note:
- An "international guarantee" was what the Poles had before August 25,
1939. After that date they also had a defensive alliance with the UK, which
is a tad more.
- The Czechs did not oppose the annexation of the Sudeten. Every German
serviceman from corporals up knew the Poles were going to fight.
- Between the Sudeten and Poland, there is also the small affair of the rest
of Czechoslovakia. With the Sudeten, Chamberlain and his French colleagues
could be fooled into thinking that Hitler was only out to retrieve German
minorities. After the rest of Czechoslovakia was dismembered, it was clear
that Hitler was out for territorial aggrandizement by conquest and
minorities were at worst an excuse and at best just a minor part of the
plan. Guess what, that's how it went with Poland too; Germany did not just
take Danzig or any territory where a German minority was present.
Things had changed between Munich and Wielun, and only a man who had no
international experience and only saw his destiny-mandated plans wouldn't
understand that.
Roman Werpachowski
> Roman Werpachowski wrote:
>
> > BUT if I were to refer, precisely, to *all* troops occupying Poland during WW
> > II, I'd say "Nazis", because they were not only German, but also Estonian and
> > Ukrainian.
>
> Estonian police units didn't figure particularly prominently among the
> Axis occupation forces stationed in Poland. Some units _were_ there, of
> course. According to the Estonian International Commission for
> Investigation of Crimes against Humanity, there were Estonian guard
> units in three Polish towns; Lódz, Przemysl and Rzeszów.
>
> Similarly, there were also Estonian guard units in Tarnopol, which had
> been a part of Poland prior to the war and become annexed by the USSR
> in 1939. The most prominent recorded atrocity where Estonian police
> units participated took place in the ghetto of Novogrudok/Nowogródek
> in Byelorussia, which had also been former Polish territory prior to
> October 1939.
I forgot to include Latvian units which took part in the elimination of
the Warsaw Ghetto.
> > It (USSR) was supposed to be, in the official ideology, a multi-national state (run by
> > the Russian elite, of course -- Stalin's ethnicity was an exception).
>
> Um. Really? Stalin was the sole exception?
>
> Of the people who held official posts during the Second World War,
> Anastas Mikoyan was an Armenian. Lavrenti Beria was a Mengrel. Lazar
> Kaganovich was Jewish, which hardly made him a member of the "Russian
> elite". Khrushchev and Brezhnev were both Ukrainians, and so were many
> others. Otto Wille Kuusinen was Finnish. And I suppose that I don't
> have to remind you of the ethnic origins of people such as Konstantin
> Rokossovski and (to get back to a bit older period) Felix Dzherzhinski.
>
> The Soviet elite was multi-national enough [1]. On balance, Russians no
> doubt made up the largest group within the top hierarchy of the Soviet
> state; but given the fact that they also made up the majority of the
> population in the USSR, this was perfectly natural.
However, on the lower level of Party ranks, it was much harder for an
Ukrainian than for a Russian to advance. Russians still despise
Ukrainians often and call them "chachly".
Cub Driver
<miarmeldon'ts...@tin.it> wrote:
>Everybody
>else believed the Anglo-French would fight this time.
Then he was wrong, because they didn't fight. They went to war, but
they didn't fight, but instead waited to see if Germany would. There
*is* a difference.
Drazen Kramaric
>Khrushchev and Brezhnev were both Ukrainians,
Were they ethnic Ukrainians or Russians born in Ukraine? Their family
names ending with typically Russian endings such as "-ev" do not look
as Ukrainian as endings that are more typical for Ukraine like "-uk"
or "-ko".
For example, Eremenko, Rybalko, Lyelyushenko, Timoshenko were generals
I'd expect to be of Ukrainian ethnicity.
Drax
Drazen Kramaric
<miarmeldon'ts...@tin.it> wrote:
>BTW, the nation that made the Soviet Union a great military powerhouse by
>1945 is, once again, Germany. Without Germany, the USSR had a large army,
>but wasn't the heavyweight it was to become thanks to Germany.
As we all know, Red Army was in the midst of reform when attacked by
Germany. A power with sound industrial and resources base, huge
manpower pool, substantial number of scientists as well as long and
successful military tradition was bound to be a heavyweight with or
without Hitler.
The temporary weakness USSR has been caught in was more an aberation
than a rule as far as Russian (Soviet) military might was concerned.
One underestimates Russians at his own peril.
Drax
phog...@abo.fi
>
> Politicians are a breed apart, of course, with their own "historical"
> rhetoric. Why, to give an example from the times of the Second World
> War, there's the draft radio speech prepared by Juho Kusti Paasikivi,
> which was supposed to be delivered after the Germans had managed to
> capture Leningrad: "Conquest, expansion and acquisition of new
> territories have made up the dominating thread in the history of
> Russia. Of the thirty-three wars waged by Russia before the First World
> War, twenty-two were wars of aggression. Of the two hundred years, 128
> were years of war and only 72 were years of peace..."
I have always been curious about that one. Has the draft been published
somewhere?
Michele Armellini
messaggio news:2ug1t1lcriaegaokj...@4ax.com...
> On Fri, 20 Jan 2006 04:32:18 -0500, "Michele Armellini"
> <miarmeldon'ts...@tin.it> wrote:
>
> >Everybody
> >else believed the Anglo-French would fight this time.
>
> Then he was wrong, because they didn't fight. They went to war, but
> they didn't fight, but instead waited to see if Germany would. There
> *is* a difference.
I'm sure the wives and children of the British bomber crewmen who died over
Wilhelmshaven on September 3 would have appreciated it.
Michele Armellini
news:pvo1t11jjse2o6r6m...@4ax.com...
All true. But there are factors you aren't considering. Just to mention a
few:
Without a war even the most belligerent nation isn't under the stimulation
that only a war brings. For instance, it's pretty a safe bet that the ageing
rust heaps like the BT tanks would have been replaced at a slower pace, had
they been subject to normal peacetime wear and tear, instead of to wartime
attrition.
Without the peculiar situation that developed in late 1939, how would the
Soviets have understood how many problems their army had? It was also thanks
to the problems in Eastern Poland and to the debacle in Finland that the
Soviets understood a lot of things much faster than in peacetime.
Without Hitler, the Soviet Union would not have gotten additional manpower
and trained personnel it got from Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania and Bessarabia.
Without the war, would the West have supplied all those tens of thousands of
trucks to the Red Army?
Michael Emrys
usenet.AT.da...@giganews.com wrote on 1/20/06 8:50 AM:
> On Fri, 20 Jan 2006 04:32:18 -0500, "Michele Armellini"
> <miarmeldon'ts...@tin.it> wrote:
>
>> Everybody else believed the Anglo-French would fight this time.
>>
> Then he was wrong, because they didn't fight. They went to war, but they
> didn't fight...
Again, you are neglecting the vigorous campaign that the RN waged on the
seas. That was the only area at the time where the Allies could bring a
preponderance of force to bear. Everywhere else, they were relatively weak
for the time being. To force a fight with an enemy who is stronger and
better prepared than yourself is to put your head in a noose.
Michael
jussi....@faf.mil.fi
[Paasikivi's draft radio speech, intended to be read after the German
conquest of Leningrad in 1941, and for obvious reasons never
delivered:]
> I have always been curious about that one. Has the draft been published
> somewhere?
The original Finnish version of Paasikivi's speech was included, for
example, in Max Engman's "Pietarinsuomalaiset" ("The Finns of St.
Petersburg", a general history of the Finnish interaction with the
metropolis of the Neva), published by WSOY just two years ago.
An extremely unprofessional and unofficial English translation of the
text, made by the undersigned, can be found from the usenet archives,
behind the following abridged link:
Cheers,
Jalonen
jussi....@faf.mil.fi
> Were they [Khrushchev and Brezhnev] ethnic Ukrainians or Russians born in Ukraine?
Khrushchev is a bit of a borderline case, admitted. His home village
was right on the Russian border, and his family origins were those of a
typical, illiterate peasant. Most likely he had no ethnic identity
whatsoever, and was thus a "Ukrainian" mostly in the regional sense of
the word only.
Brezhnev, who was born in the heartland of Ukraine, is somewhat more
complicated. He was, ethnically, of a Russian extraction, but he spoke
in a clear Ukrainian accent all his life, and retained
characteristically Ukrainian mannerisms. This was actually something
that intensified as he got older. During his last years in office, he
often slipped to speaking in Ukrainian linguistic variants when holding
his speeches. It was one of the first signs that he was losing his
edge.
There's plenty of overlap between Ukraine and Russia, of course. In a
purely cultural and linguistic sense, it's difficult to tell where
exactly the one ends and the another one begins. Just like it used to
be in certain regions of former Yugoslavia, I suppose.
> For example, Eremenko, Rybalko, Lyelyushenko, Timoshenko were generals I'd expect
> to be of Ukrainian ethnicity.
... and Klimenko, Fedorenko, Rudenko, Grechko, Cherevichenko and
Apanesenko, of course, just to extend the list. Marshal Konev, of
course, also had Ukrainian origins, and even Zhukov's family had
emigrated to Kaluga from Poltava.
Cheers,
Jalonen
Louis Capdeboscq
> "Michele Armellini" wrote:
>
>>Everybody
>>else believed the Anglo-French would fight this time.
>
> Then he was wrong, because they didn't fight. They went to war, but
> they didn't fight, but instead waited to see if Germany would. There
> *is* a difference.
Repeating nonsense will not make it true.
The Royal Navy and Marine Nationale fought, capturing or sinking German
ships and losing military personnel. The RAF and armee de l'Air fought,
downing German airplanes, dropping a few bombs (rather ineffectively) on
German installations and losing aircrews. The French army made an attack
which it quickly aborted when it appeared that Poland was going down
even faster than anticipated.
Essentially, if you're arguing that he British and the French weren't
really at war with Germany in 1939-40, then with the same argument the
US "didn't fight, but instead waited to see if Germany would" in the
early months of 1942 because appart from losing tons of merchant
shipping direct US military action against Germany was pretty much minimal.
The 1939 Allies, like the 1942 Americans, were temporarily in a position
of inferiority and needed time to mobilize, so they started small and
waited for their buildup to be completed before attacking. Contrary to
the 1942 US, Germany was in a position to launch a major offensive which
removed France from the war. This doesn't mean that Britain and France
were only pretending to be at war.
Rich Rostrom
>- Between the Sudeten and Poland, there is also the small affair of the rest
>of Czechoslovakia. With the Sudeten, Chamberlain and his French colleagues
>could be fooled ... After the rest of Czechoslovakia was dismembered, it was clear
>that Hitler was out for territorial aggrandizement by conquest...
Yes, but France and Britain didn't fight then, despite
having "entered into... an international guarantee". That
is what Jerzy7 was referring to.
France and Britain
> entered into... an international guarantee of
> the new boundaries of the Czechoslovak State against unprovoked
> aggression.
and did nothing whatever when those boundaries
were violated. Except to issue more diplomatic
words.
In retrospect, one can see there was a change -
France and Britain now meant what they were
saying - but it was not absurd of Hitler to
imagine they were bluffing again.
--
| The shocking lack of a fleet of modern luxury |
| dirigibles is only one of a great many things that |
| are seriously wrong with this here world. |
| -- blogger "Coop" at Positive Ape Index |
Rich Rostrom
>It is politically correct to refer to the "Nazi
>army" that invaded France, Russia, whatever, with the clear
>implication that Germans had nothing to do with it. This is the
>near-universal policy in the American press.
I've never noticed it, myself.
At the time it was not at all unusual to refer to all
Germans under arms as "Nazis".
For instance, in his World War II memoirs, RAdm Dan
Gallery writes that after his task group forced U.515
to the surface
Hatches popped open and Nazis dove over the side...
We fished 44 Nazis out of the water.
The task group picked up another sound contact at the
same time:
Our submerged Nazi must have heard the ominous
rumblings from depth charges... he didn't stick
his head up until after midnight...
and hunted down U.68, catching her on the surface a
little before dawn.
When the sun came up, it found three dazed Nazis
paddling around...
On their next cruise, Gallery and his group captured
U.505. Gallery and his 'brain trust' had decided that
if a U-boat surfaced, they would cease trying to sink
it,
because the Nazis would pull the plug on it themselves.
After capturing U.505, they interrogated the crew, of
course.
We found out later from the Nazis that their first
warning of danger came when ... [depth charges] ...
exploded around all them ... The panic-stricken
Nazis ... yelling that the after torpedo room was
blown wide open...
Then Gallery's men boarded U.505.
Lieutenant David ... leaped aboard ... just after
the last Nazi took his departure... the Nazi had
done a hurried job of scuttling... The... boarding
party now were busy closing the valves which the
Nazis had opened...
They captured
... the Nazi code books...
which were useful to monitors who
... put a regular watch on the Nazi U-boat frequencies ...
the Nazis changed their codes periodically...
To be fair, he also uses "German" several times, too.
Also, these quotes are from his first book, _Clear The
Deck_ (1951). In his later book _Twenty Millions Under
The Sea_ (1956), Gallery obviously uses a lot of material
from German sources, including anecdotes from U.505's
crew - and the word Nazi almost never appears.
Cub Driver
<miarmeldon'ts...@tin.it> wrote:
>I'm sure the wives and children of the British bomber crewmen who died over
>Wilhelmshaven on September 3 would have appreciated it.
One raid with a few hapless Blenheims? Germany could have taken a
Wilhemshaven raid every Friday night for ten years without blinking.
It's like Crocodile Dundee when threatened with a stickknife in New
York. "THAT ain't a knife! THIS is a knife!"
Wilhelmshaven wasn't a raid. DRESDEN was a raid!
jussi....@faf.mil.fi
> Without Hitler, the Soviet Union would not have gotten additional manpower
> and trained personnel it got from Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania and Bessarabia.
Um. You can find examples to support your argument, but this definitely
isn't one of them. In fact, your suggestion is ridiculous. Because in
terms of manpower and trained personnel, the contribution of the
annexed Baltic republics to the Red Army was pretty much zero.
Yes, the armed forces of all three states were incorporated into the
Soviet military, in toto, and the local people became subjects to draft
within the USSR. But as soon as the fighting against the Third Reich
broke out, most of those Estonian, Latvian or Lithuanian soldiers who
had been conscripted to the Red Army voted with their feet, and either
defected or deserted.
As for the "trained personnel", most of the local professional military
men who had managed to avoid Stalin's terror in 1940-1941 eventually
ended up fighting on the German side. In this respect, the Baltic
states posed a liability to the USSR, not an asset.
Bessarabia hardly warrants a mention.
Cheers,
Jalonen
Michele Armellini
news:1138001697.2...@g43g2000cwa.googlegroups.com...
> Michele Armellini kirjoitti:
>
> > Without Hitler, the Soviet Union would not have gotten additional
manpower
> > and trained personnel it got from Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania and
Bessarabia.
>
> Soviet military, in toto, and the local people became subjects to draft
> within the USSR. But as soon as the fighting against the Third Reich
> broke out, most of those Estonian, Latvian or Lithuanian soldiers who
> had been conscripted to the Red Army voted with their feet, and either
> defected or deserted.
Still, in the summer of 1941 the Red Army had several divisions with
predominantly Baltic personnel. I know that what you wrote is a common
post-war and more importantly post-Communism political line, but I'd like to
see some contemporary evidence.
>
> As for the "trained personnel", most of the local professional military
I wasn't thinking about top brass, and indeed I did not mention
"professional" personnel. Generals are seldom in shortage. But a 30-year-old
reservist who has had serious military training, although in peacetime, and
has served for a year in any army, even the Estonian one, is still largely a
superior human-resource asset than a farmboy who's enlisted, gets two weeks
of hasty training and is sent to the front.
> Bessarabia hardly warrants a mention.
>
I don't know if it doesn't deserve a mention from the Red Army point of
view, I'll admit that, in the sense that I don't know if it levied there (I
strongly suspect it did). What I do know for sure, however, is that the
_Romanian_ Army got shortchanged and it went to war after having to disband
several infantry divisions, because it no longer had the military-district
basis for levying them. Some of those were Transylvanian or Dobrudjan
districts, OK - but some were Bessarabian.
Michele Armellini
> On Fri, 20 Jan 2006 13:09:27 -0500, "Michele Armellini"
> <miarmeldon'ts...@tin.it> wrote:
>
> >I'm sure the wives and children of the British bomber crewmen who died
over
> >Wilhelmshaven on September 3 would have appreciated it.
>
> One raid with a few hapless Blenheims? Germany could have taken a
> Wilhemshaven raid every Friday night for ten years without blinking.
You being an aviator and a veteran and all, I didn't expect such callousness
in repyling to a remark about air combat losses on the second day of war.
The point isn't that the raid was weak and ineffective. The point is that
you claimed the British and French didn't fight. It's a falsity, and
repeating it won't make it true. Fighting ineffectively is still fighting,
and getting downed from the sky into cold water to drown is still a way to
die.
If only fighting effectively is fighting, then the US servicemen who
"haplessly" died at Pearl Harbor did not fight. If only fighting in an
offensive fight is fighting, then the US 28th Division during operation
Wacht am Rhein did not fight.
Since you like literary quotes, I'll quote the soon-to-die sergeant who
tells Tom Clancy's Ryan: "Combat is when you get shot at" (or words to that
effect). If you feel that being shot at is not combat, or that it isn't if
the occurrence takes place between September 1939 and May 1940, you should
phrase the concept in such a way that those widows and orphans would
understand.
Roman Werpachowski
> On Fri, 20 Jan 2006 13:09:27 -0500, "Michele Armellini"
> <miarmeldon'ts...@tin.it> wrote:
>
> >I'm sure the wives and children of the British bomber crewmen who died over
> >Wilhelmshaven on September 3 would have appreciated it.
>
> One raid with a few hapless Blenheims? Germany could have taken a
> Wilhemshaven raid every Friday night for ten years without blinking.
>
> It's like Crocodile Dundee when threatened with a stickknife in New
> York. "THAT ain't a knife! THIS is a knife!"
>
> Wilhelmshaven wasn't a raid. DRESDEN was a raid!
Compare the capabilities of RAF in 1939 and 1945.
Roman Werpachowski
> The point isn't that the raid was weak and ineffective. The point is that
> you claimed the British and French didn't fight. It's a falsity, and
> repeating it won't make it true. Fighting ineffectively is still fighting,
> and getting downed from the sky into cold water to drown is still a way to
> die.
The people who flew there DID fight. The question is: do a few soldiers
fighting mean the whole country is fighting? It is often stressed that
Poland in 1939 did not oppose the Red Army. However, some Polish
soldiers were shot at and shot at the Russians. According to your POV,
it means that Poland was fighting the USSR as much as it was fighting
Germany.
jer...@autograf.pl
> The 1939 Allies, like the 1942 Americans, were temporarily in a position
> of inferiority and needed time to mobilize, so they started small and
1. Who other than the Allies themselves put them into the position of
inferiority?
2. The best moment to fight the Germans was till September the 14teen,
eventually the end of 1939. Not when and where the Germans wanted. To
mobilise and wait isn't any good method to win.
3. France was too weak to warranty Poland's independence. France was
too weak even to survive.
Michele Armellini
news:1138019799.7...@o13g2000cwo.googlegroups.com...
No, sorry. The comparison doesn't hold water.
The Polish soldiers (and for that matter, they weren't just individuals
acting on their own but fair-sized units, IIRC) who fought against the
Soviets for a few days at the end of September 1939 did so without orders
from their government - actually _against_ the orders of their government,
that had explicitly ordered no resistance against the Soviets. Now, anybody
who's got a gun can decide for his own self that he wants or has to fight,
but that is not the same as having his own government behind him.
The British and French who fought in small numbers from September 3 on for
many months always were acting on orders from their governments.
The British and French governments, that can be considered much better
representatives of the respective nation's will than the German government
or the Polish one, decided to put their own soldiers' lives on the line, and
indeed did lose them. So the conclusion is that those countries were
fighting.
They did not lose large numbers, true, but then again, in order to demand
those, one should be able to prove that large numbers of British and French
KIAs would have served some practical purpose. That has been attempted time
and again on this very newsgroup, and nobody could ever match Louis's
inconvenient and uncomfortable data.
To demand the British and French to lose large numbers of KIAs after
September 1939, just in order to prove they were "really" fighting, with no
prospect of achieving any meaningful practical purpose, is something one
would expect on a political newsgroup, not on a military history newsgroup.
Michele Armellini
> Louis Capdeboscq schrieb:
>
> > The 1939 Allies, like the 1942 Americans, were temporarily in a position
> > of inferiority and needed time to mobilize, so they started small and
>
> 1. Who other than the Allies themselves put them into the position of
> inferiority?
> 2. The best moment to fight the Germans was till September the 14teen,
You mean _before_ September 14? I.e. before the Allies had mobilized? Not
really the best moment, you know, before actually having an army.
> eventually the end of 1939. Not when and where the Germans wanted. To
> mobilise and wait isn't any good method to win.
So you say. It was said in the past, on this very newsgroup, without anybody
ever having been able to convincingly show that an Allied offensive in the
winter of 1939 would have had any serious chance of accomplishing anything
significant.
> 3. France was too weak to warranty Poland's independence. France was
> too weak even to survive.
>
So? What's your suggestion? Stay out of the war? Roll over and die? One
supposes that since Poland was also too weak, the same suggestions would
hold true for them, too? The USA were also too weak to guarantee anybody. So
your suggestion to them would be...? Do as if Pearl Harbor has not happened,
stay out of the war?
David Thornley
<jer...@autograf.pl> wrote:
>Louis Capdeboscq schrieb:
>
>> The 1939 Allies, like the 1942 Americans, were temporarily in a position
>> of inferiority and needed time to mobilize, so they started small and
>
>1. Who other than the Allies themselves put them into the position of
>inferiority?
Nobody. In September 1939, the Allies were stuck with the results of
a long string of bad decisions. That didn't mean they weren't
in a position of inferiority.
>2. The best moment to fight the Germans was till September the 14teen,
>eventually the end of 1939. Not when and where the Germans wanted. To
>mobilise and wait isn't any good method to win.
Mobilizing and waiting for a time can be a good method to win. The
US used it quite effectively in Europe. The US Army was not simply
thrown into Europe as is in January 1942, but rather built up, along
with other forces, until it was time to enter France.
>3. France was too weak to warranty Poland's independence. France was
>too weak even to survive.
>
As it turns out yes, but what else was France to do? Dig into a deeper
hole? Historically, it's uncertain what would have happened if the French
Army had been deployed differently, and France might well have survived
as in WWI until strong enough to counterattack. The overall plan was
not bad, but the execution was.
--
David H. Thornley | If you want my opinion, ask.
da...@thornley.net | If you don't, flee.
http://www.thornley.net/~thornley/david/ | O-
Michael Emrys
Werpachowski at roman.wer...@gmail.com wrote on 1/23/06 9:03 AM:
> The question is: do a few soldiers fighting mean the whole country is
> fighting?
I'd say that that mainly depended on whether they were fighting as a result
of orders from a duly authorized chain of command. In other words, if the
president or chief of staff of the army gave the order to fight, then yes
you may say that the country is officially fighting. If on the other hand, a
few soldiers take it upon themselves to fight, then they are on their own.
Michael
Michael Emrys
thor...@visi.com wrote on 1/23/06 12:56 PM:
> <jer...@autograf.pl> wrote:
>>
>> 1. Who other than the Allies themselves put them into the position of
>> inferiority?
>
> Nobody. In September 1939, the Allies were stuck with the results of
> a long string of bad decisions. That didn't mean they weren't
> in a position of inferiority.
They also suffered the extreme misfortune of coming up against a man with an
insane vision who followed it fanatically. In the midst of a great
depression, it would have been fiscally irresponsible to spend a country's
meager resources on a lavish military establishment, and it took a few years
to see that not only was Hitler doing that, but giving indications that he
meant to use it once he'd gotten it. That put them about three years behind
the curve right there.
Michael
jussi....@faf.mil.fi
> Still, in the summer of 1941 the Red Army had several divisions with
> predominantly Baltic personnel.
I'd like to see a cite for that. Preferably with exact numbers.
Also, remember that there's a difference between the political cadres
of Baltic extraction who had spent the inter-war era as exiles in the
USSR and who had thus been employed by the Red Army already _before_
the war. In their case, the annexation wasn't any kind of a factor when
it comes to their contribution to the Red Army.
(And in any case, even those people were considered unreliable by the
Soviet leadership. The purges had taken a heavy toll on them back in
the '30s.)
> I know that what you wrote is a common post-war and more importantly post-
> Communism political line, but I'd like to see some contemporary evidence.
"Political line", eh? Cute.
Anyway. Let's use Estonia as a showcase, because those numbers are easy
to find.
The regular armed forces of the Republic of Estonia were absorbed to
the Soviet military as the 22nd Army Corps of the Red Army. Their
strength was ca. 12'500 men, of whom a five thousand or so were either
imprisoned or released from service altogether due to their
unreliability. Of the rest, an exact 6'248 people either deserted or
defected to the German side. Some two hundred were killed in action,
leaving only five hundred men in the ranks.
Six thousand people of Estonian origin were recruited by the Red Army
to the destruction battalions, labour regiments and militia
detachments. The purpose of these units was the supervision and
execution of the Soviet-ordered scorched-earth tactics in Estonia. Of
the people recruited to these units, a thousand or so made it to Russia
in the general chaos that followed the summer campaign of 1941.
Additionally, 45'000 - 50'000 Estonians were forcibly drafted to the
Red Army, usually by using extortion methods, such as the imprisonment
of family members. Since the Soviet military considered these
conscripts unreliable, they were transported beyond the front-lines to
Central Russia. During the deportation, three thousand conscripts died
and several thousand escaped to the forests, joining the various
partisan formations fighting against the Soviet occupiers. All in all,
only 33'304 reached their intended destination. These people were
assigned to labour battalions, and an estimated ten thousand of them
died from the hardships and cold during the winter of 1941-1942.
On May 1942, the ethnic element in the "Estonian divisions" established
by the Red Army included only 22'125 men, and as far as I know, none of
them made an appearance in the main front until 1944.
For comparison, at the same time, there were 62'000 Estonians serving
in various military, police, civil guard and Waffen-SS units under the
German occupation authority.
To put these figures in perspective: before the Soviet annexation, the
military plans of the independent Estonian armed forces had called for
the mobilization of 105'749 men in the case of war. Given the numbers
above, which one of the occupying powers do you think managed to make
the most out of this manpower resource during the actual war? The Third
Reich or the Soviet Union?
(... meanwhile, let's also bear in mind that the Soviet terror in
1940-1941 had resulted in a population loss of approximately 60'000
people.)
> But a 30-year-old reservist who has had serious military training, although in peacetime,
> and has served for a year in any army, even the Estonian one, is still largely a superior
> human-resource asset than a farmboy who's enlisted, gets two weeks of hasty training
> and is sent to the front.
See above. The reservists who had received "serious military" training
in the Estonian army and who ended up being drafted to the Red Army
were initially used mostly in the labour battalions, where one out of
three people were worked to the death. Consequently, the main purpose
of their menial tasks seems to have been to release the local, rather
more reliable Soviet farm-boys for that one fortnight of training
before the front-line service.
So much for the Soviet use of these "superior human resources" of the
annexed Baltic republic in the Barbarossa. You may wish to argue that
even as a forced labour pool, these men still made a substantial
contribution to the Soviet manpower - and why not, workers are
important, especially in wartime - but given that your original
argument was focused on the issue of how the Soviet Union became a
"great military powerhouse", I think you would be venturing to a
somewhat more untenable side.
(Why the choice of words, "_even_ the Estonian army", by the way?
Between-the-lines suggestion of qualitative inferiority, or what?)
Cheers,
Jalonen
Louis Capdeboscq
> Louis Capdeboscq schrieb:
>
>
>>The 1939 Allies, like the 1942 Americans, were temporarily in a position
>>of inferiority and needed time to mobilize, so they started small and
>
> 1. Who other than the Allies themselves put them into the position of
> inferiority?
Sure, but the same applies to the 1942 Americans so I gather you like my
comparison.
> 2. The best moment to fight the Germans was till September the 14teen,
> eventually the end of 1939. Not when and where the Germans wanted. To
> mobilise and wait isn't any good method to win.
To mobilize and wait until the force is assembled is a very good method
to win, that was the method used by the biggest winner of WWII, i.e. the
USA.
Regarding the "best moment to fight the Germans", you have been given
the facts before and have always failed to answer any of them. Until you
bother to provide facts for a serious discussion, your opinion will
remain only that.
> 3. France was too weak to warranty Poland's independence. France was
> too weak even to survive.
So why blame it for not fighting harder in September, then ?
Michele Armellini
> Michele Armellini wrote:
>
> > Still, in the summer of 1941 the Red Army had several divisions with
> > predominantly Baltic personnel.
>
> I'd like to see a cite for that. Preferably with exact numbers.
Well, you do provide exact (?) numbers, but a "cite" would be a mention of
the source. You don't provide that, but you ask that from me.
>
> > I know that what you wrote is a common post-war and more importantly
post-
> > Communism political line, but I'd like to see some contemporary
evidence.
>
> "Political line", eh? Cute.
>
> Anyway. Let's use Estonia as a showcase, because those numbers are easy
> to find.
Where? You don't say. Which means you don't say if this is from contemporary
sources or post-1990 ones. We can even suppose that recent sources used
contemporary data - but I wouldn't rule out their editorializing the
original data along the lines "we were never on the side of the evil
Communist regime".
>
> Additionally, 45'000 - 50'000 Estonians were forcibly drafted to the
> Red Army,
>
> For comparison, at the same time, there were 62'000 Estonians serving
> in various military, police, civil guard and Waffen-SS units under the
> German occupation authority.
Since you find my remark "cute", I'll tell you that I find it cute that
those serving with the USSR were "forcibly drafted", while those who were
under _German occupation authority_ just happen to be "serving". I suppose
that if the alternative was to starve as unemployed civilians or to go into
some "security" unit, the Estonians under German occupation can be
considered as enthusiastic volunteers.
>
> To put these figures in perspective: before the Soviet annexation, the
> military plans of the independent Estonian armed forces had called for
> the mobilization of 105'749 men in the case of war. Given the numbers
> above, which one of the occupying powers do you think managed to make
> the most out of this manpower resource during the actual war? The Third
> Reich or the Soviet Union?
To put things in perspective, one should also be aware of who was in control
of the territory involved for much of the fighting, wouldn't one? The moment
that you define as "at the same time" above, largely means "while the
Germans had their boots over Estonian territory and the Soviets had not".
Somehow, the Italian co-belligerent government wasn't very effective in
drafting Italian privates from Northern Italy in 1944. Might be because
Northern Italy was occupied by the Germans.
>
> (... meanwhile, let's also bear in mind that the Soviet terror in
> 1940-1941 had resulted in a population loss of approximately 60'000
> people.)
>
> > But a 30-year-old reservist who has had serious military training,
although in peacetime,
> > and has served for a year in any army, even the Estonian one, is still
largely a superior
> > human-resource asset than a farmboy who's enlisted, gets two weeks of
hasty training
> > and is sent to the front.
>
> See above. The reservists who had received "serious military" training
> in the Estonian army and who ended up being drafted to the Red Army
> were initially used mostly in the labour battalions,
Well, no, that's wrong. _Initially_ those Estonians were used for frontline
duties, in the 180th and 182th Rifle Divisions for instance.
And while plenty of Estonians served in labor battalions for a while, new
frontline divisions were raised from them and used again in combat. The
first Soviet troops entering Tallinn, IIRC, were of Estonian ethnicity. This
late in the war, the Red Army still had at least a couple of Estonian
divisions.
You may wish to argue that
> even as a forced labour pool, these men still made a substantial
> contribution to the Soviet manpower - and why not, workers are
> important, especially in wartime - but given that your original
> argument was focused on the issue of how the Soviet Union became a
> "great military powerhouse", I think you would be venturing to a
> somewhat more untenable side.
The how and why the Soviet Union became a great military powerhouse include
many many factors. One of them was the help, willing or unwitting, of Nazi
Germany. One of the minor aspects of this help, which in turn is only one
factor of the above, is that Nazi Germany agreed to the Soviet Union's
occupation of buffer areas and states. One of the aspects of these
acquisitions is manpower (though the buffer territory is certainly more
important).
So please don't make me say that it was the supersoldiers form the great
powerful Estonian army that made the Soviet Union the military powerhouse it
became. That's not what I said.
Within the limitations of Baltic manpower being a minor facet of the
territorial acqusitions that were a subset of German-fostered contributions
that were one of the factors that hepled the Soviet Union in becoming what
it became, then yes, of course, labor units also turned out to be useful.
Better to have them than the contrary.
>
> (Why the choice of words, "_even_ the Estonian army", by the way?
> Between-the-lines suggestion of qualitative inferiority, or what?)
>
You're too sensitive. What I meant is actually that having been trained in
another, foreign army was a disadvantage to a reservist being called to
service in the Red Army. The language, the doctrines, the traditions, the
equipment etc. were different. I could have said the same of just any army
that wasn't the Red Army itself.
Roman Werpachowski
> Where? You don't say. Which means you don't say if this is from contemporary
> sources or post-1990 ones. We can even suppose that recent sources used
> contemporary data - but I wouldn't rule out their editorializing the
> original data along the lines "we were never on the side of the evil
> Communist regime".
Why do you suppose Estonians are falsifying their history? Do you also
suspect modern American historians of doing such things, or is it just
your bias showing?
jussi....@faf.mil.fi
> Where? You don't say.
Michele, some of us do this sort of stuff as a career. As it happens,
in the last December, I participated in the seminary of Baltic history
at the University of Oulu. Several Finnish and Estonian historians were
present, and the division of Estonians to the Soviet and German armed
forces during 1941-1942 was precisely one of the issues that was
discussed at the meeting. The papers are published in the web, and
assuming that you can read Finnish, you can find the relevant abstract
right behind the following link, which is where I re-checked the
numbers again. Of course, you'll need Adobe to read this:
http://www.oulu.fi/historia/Baltia/Vepsalainen_151105.doc
The University will publish a collection of more detailed articles of
the seminary in the coming spring. Most of the texts will be written in
Finnish, but assuming that you want a copy, I'll gladly send you one.
Just e-mail me your post adress to jussi.jalonen at uta.fi.
(Incidentally, my own presentation was a bit off-topic for this
particular usenet forum. I delivered a lecture of the participation of
the Imperial Life-Guard's Finnish Sharp-Shooting Battalion in the
Polish campaign of 1831. But I digress.)
> Which means you don't say if this is from contemporary sources or post-1990 ones.
I'm expecting you to specify what you mean by this statement. The
studies that have been made of this subject after the '90s rely on
contemporary sources, of course, and are based on relevant German,
Soviet and Estonian primary material from the '40s.
So, where do you assume that there would be a contradiction?
> We can even suppose that recent sources used contemporary data - but I wouldn't rule
> out their editorializing the original data along the lines "we were never on the side of the
> evil Communist regime".
Oh, for crying out loud. As if claiming that "we gladly and voluntarily
fought on the side of _the even more evil_ Nazi regime" would be a more
beneficial argument? Please, don't be ludicrous.
Assumption of revisionist falsification without even looking at the
relevant local research isn't a particularly fruitful approach, by the
way.
> Since you find my remark "cute", I'll tell you that I find it cute that those serving
> with the USSR were "forcibly drafted", while those who were under _German
> occupation authority_ just happen to be "serving".
[Shrugs] Once again, Michele, I don't understand what your problem is.
The absolute majority of the Estonians who served in the
German-organized police, military or civil guard forces did so on
voluntary basis. Like it or not, these people collaborated with the
Third Reich because they wanted to. A majority of them preferred the
German occupation authority over the Soviet one.
Why is this fact so difficult for you to accept? _Where_ do you suspect
the political agenda is, exactly? What advantages do you think the
present-day Estonian historians would gain by emphasizing the fact that
a good part of their local population collaborated with the regime that
is generally considered as the ultimate manifestation of evil by most
West Europeans, Americans and Russians still today?
And most of the people who were drafted by the Soviets in 1941 _were_
forcibly drafted, in every sense of the word, as shown by their
propensity to escape during the transportation, as well as their
inclination to desert on the front. The fact that the Soviets used
extortion methods in their conscription is a recorded fact.
> To put things in perspective, one should also be aware of who was in control
> of the territory involved for much of the fighting, wouldn't one?
... so why, then, did you even mention the role of the occupied Baltic
republics as a source for the Soviet manpower in the first place? Do
you admit that this part of your original argument was untenable, or do
you not?
> The moment that you define as "at the same time" above, largely means "while the
> Germans had their boots over Estonian territory and the Soviets had not".
The Soviets weren't particularly effective in raising local troops even
when they were in control of the said territory in 1940-1941, nor were
they particularly effective when dealing with those conscripts whom
they had evacuated in the summer of 1941.
> Well, no, that's wrong. _Initially_ those Estonians were used for frontline
> duties, in the 180th and 182th Rifle Divisions for instance.
Yes, the ones who had served in the regular forces that were absorbed
to the Red Army. Didn't I specifically point out this in my post? And
once again, a majority of them voted with their feet and either
deserted or defected to the German side as soon as the opportunity
presented itself.
> And while plenty of Estonians served in labor battalions for a while, new frontline
> divisions were raised from them and used again in combat. The first Soviet troops
> entering Tallinn, IIRC, were of Estonian ethnicity. This late in the war, the Red Army
> still had at least a couple of Estonian divisions.
Again, as I mentioned in the post that I made, you have to separate
those Estonian cadres who had lived in the USSR already prior to the
war from this equation. And as it happens, the 7th and the 249th
divisions of the 8th Estonian Rifle Corps of the Red Army, set up in
1942, consisted largely of these people. Still, when it comes to their
service in the Red Army, the annexation of Estonia was not a factor.
Since they had already lived in the Soviet Union, they were already an
accessible resource to the Soviet military, even without the Soviet
occupation of the Republic of Estonia.
Yes, the survivors of those men who had been drafted in Estonia back in
1941 were also included in the corps. They were decimated at Velikie
Luki both by attrition as well as (oh my, what a surprise) defection
and desertion. And yes, they did see limited action on the Narva front
in 1944, and entered Tallinn the same year. I'm not sure if they were
the _first_ Red Army troops entering the Estonian capital, although
given their ceremonial value to the Soviet military, it wouldn't
surprise me one bit.
[slash]
> So please don't make me say that it was the supersoldiers form the great powerful
> Estonian army that made the Soviet Union the military powerhouse it became. That's
> not what I said.
No, but you did raise the "additional manpower and trained personnel"
that the USSR received from the occupied Baltic republic as one factor
that actually contributed to the development of the Soviet Union into a
military power during the Second World War.
Again, when it comes to assessing factors, I don't think that this
warrants a mention. And I don't even think that it's correct, for
reasons that I already stated. Therefore, I decided to point that out.
> > (Why the choice of words, "_even_ the Estonian army", by the way?
> > Between-the-lines suggestion of qualitative inferiority, or what?)
>
> You're too sensitive.
Nope, merely curious. I asked for the clarification, and you gave me
one. This is how the rules of the discourse work for me.
Cheers,
Jalonen
Michele Armellini
news:1138128777.0...@f14g2000cwb.googlegroups.com...
> Michele Armellini napisal(a):
> > Where? You don't say. Which means you don't say if this is from
contemporary
> > sources or post-1990 ones. We can even suppose that recent sources used
> > contemporary data - but I wouldn't rule out their editorializing the
> > original data along the lines "we were never on the side of the evil
> > Communist regime".
>
> Why do you suppose Estonians are falsifying their history?
I'm not supposing anything, I'm just asking a question. "I wouldn't rule out
that" doesn't mean "I suppose that".
Do you also
> suspect modern American historians of doing such things, or is it just
> your bias showing?
>
There's plenty of authors (I wouldn't use the word "historians") that are
selling books that falsify history, and just visiting this newsgroup from
time to time should have exposed you to this sad truth. And they may be of
whatever nationality, Italian, Canadian, American, what have you.
Michele Armellini
> Michele Armellini wrote:
>
> > Where? You don't say.
>
> Michele, some of us do this sort of stuff as a career.
I wouldn't dare challenge you on your academic qualifications. It is all the
more surprising that you, as a historian, did not find anything strange in
asking me a source while at the same time failing to provide one yourself.
Most of the texts will be written in
> Finnish, but assuming that you want a copy, I'll gladly send you one.
Since I don't understand Finnish, I'll take your word for it. Actually I did
not really need a source, I was just surprised of your attitude on the issue
of asking sources without providing your ones.
> > Which means you don't say if this is from contemporary sources or
post-1990 ones.
>
> I'm expecting you to specify what you mean by this statement.
I mean that I'm asking you if your figures come directly from primary
material or were filtered from studies, and if so where and when the studies
come from.
The
> studies that have been made of this subject after the '90s rely on
> contemporary sources, of course, and are based on relevant German,
> Soviet and Estonian primary material from the '40s.
>
> So, where do you assume that there would be a contradiction?
I don't assume there would be a contradiction. I just acknowledge where the
figures come from.
> > We can even suppose that recent sources used contemporary data - but I
wouldn't rule
> > out their editorializing the original data along the lines "we were
never on the side of the
> > evil Communist regime".
>
> Oh, for crying out loud. As if claiming that "we gladly and voluntarily
> fought on the side of _the even more evil_ Nazi regime" would be a more
> beneficial argument? Please, don't be ludicrous.
>
Not so ludicrous, I'm afraid, because yes, that line appears to be more
popular nowadays in certain environments.
> Assumption of revisionist falsification without even looking at the
> relevant local research isn't a particularly fruitful approach, by the
> way.
Definitely. But I'm assuming nothing. I just asked a question.
_Where_ do you suspect
> the political agenda is, exactly?
See above.
What advantages do you think the
> present-day Estonian historians would gain by emphasizing the fact that
> a good part of their local population collaborated with the regime that
> is generally considered as the ultimate manifestation of evil by most
> West Europeans, Americans and Russians still today?
>
There isn't only the Western public opinion, there is also an internal
public opinion, in all countries. As to rubbing the Russians the wrong way,
I wonder if that isn't an incentive.
> > To put things in perspective, one should also be aware of who was in
control
> > of the territory involved for much of the fighting, wouldn't one?
>
> ... so why, then, did you even mention the role of the occupied Baltic
> republics as a source for the Soviet manpower in the first place?
Because they did recruit there for as long as they could. Criticizing them
for not recruiting once they were no longer in control of the country seems
a moot point to me.
Do
> you admit that this part of your original argument was untenable, or do
> you not?
No. Considering it untenable because the Soviets, having been evicted from
actual territorial control, couldn't recruit more, is like complaining that
the Greek government was ineffective in raising its own troops after Greece
had been occupied.
>
> > The moment that you define as "at the same time" above, largely means
"while the
> > Germans had their boots over Estonian territory and the Soviets had
not".
>
> The Soviets weren't particularly effective in raising local troops even
> when they were in control of the said territory in 1940-1941,
Well, 30,000 men conscripted and evacuated from the country at the drop of a
hat, while the country itself was under attack, and not counting other
troops already in the field... that sounds not bad.
nor were
> they particularly effective when dealing with those conscripts whom
> they had evacuated in the summer of 1941.
>
That's undoubtedly true. Since they were rather ineffective with all their
resource management throughout 1941 at least, that's not a big issue,
however.
> > Well, no, that's wrong. _Initially_ those Estonians were used for
frontline
> > duties, in the 180th and 182th Rifle Divisions for instance.
>
> Yes, the ones who had served in the regular forces that were absorbed
> to the Red Army. Didn't I specifically point out this in my post? And
> once again, a majority of them voted with their feet and either
> deserted or defected to the German side as soon as the opportunity
> presented itself.
>
I don't doubt that many defected. I do wonder whether all those who ended up
on the German side of the front were defectors. A prisoner is a prisoner.
But once you are prisoner, it might boost your status with the captor if you
claim that when you were captured, you were trying to defect to his side.
> > And while plenty of Estonians served in labor battalions for a while,
new frontline
> > divisions were raised from them and used again in combat. The first
Soviet troops
> > entering Tallinn, IIRC, were of Estonian ethnicity. This late in the
war, the Red Army
> > still had at least a couple of Estonian divisions.
>
> Again, as I mentioned in the post that I made, you have to separate
> those Estonian cadres who had lived in the USSR already prior to the
> war from this equation. And as it happens, the 7th and the 249th
> divisions of the 8th Estonian Rifle Corps of the Red Army, set up in
> 1942, consisted largely of these people. Still, when it comes to their
> service in the Red Army, the annexation of Estonia was not a factor.
> Since they had already lived in the Soviet Union, they were already an
> accessible resource to the Soviet military, even without the Soviet
> occupation of the Republic of Estonia.
>
Undoubtedly and I don't challenge that. However...
> Yes, the survivors of those men who had been drafted in Estonia back in
> 1941 were also included in the corps.
...that would be some 20,000 men, according to your calculations, right? The
better part of 2 Soviet divisions. Not bad for this mid-war time frame, from
a country that was under enemy occupation. You say that the 8th Corps was
"largely" composed of Estonians not coming from the labor battalions, but
according to your own calculations, some 20,000 men went into that Corps,
coming from the labor battalions.
So how large was the Corps, in order to include a "largely" proportion of
non-ex-labor-battalion men? 60,000? Do you realize that this sounds rather
big? How many divisions did this Corps vaunt?
Less than a 2-to-1 proportion between the two components would mean your
"largely" is unwarranted, IMHO.
>
> > So please don't make me say that it was the supersoldiers form the great
powerful
> > Estonian army that made the Soviet Union the military powerhouse it
became. That's
> > not what I said.
>
> No, but you did raise the "additional manpower and trained personnel"
> that the USSR received from the occupied Baltic republic as one factor
> that actually contributed to the development of the Soviet Union into a
> military power during the Second World War.
>
> Again, when it comes to assessing factors, I don't think that this
> warrants a mention. And I don't even think that it's correct, for
> reasons that I already stated. Therefore, I decided to point that out.
Then we'll disagree on this. I don't claim it's a big plus, but it's there
nevertheless.
sidam00
> 1941 were also included in the corps. They were decimated at Velikie
> Luki both by attrition as well as (oh my, what a surprise) defection
> and desertion.
Shows the level of trust Estonians had toward Soviet Union - they were
deserting _into_ a _besieged_ city!
> And yes, they did see limited action on the Narva front
> in 1944,
Corps Artillery was used against Narva during Summer '44 offensive,
infantry elements were not employed on front line.
> and entered Tallinn the same year. I'm not sure if they were
> the _first_ Red Army troops entering the Estonian capital, although
> given their ceremonial value to the Soviet military, it wouldn't
> surprise me one bit.
>
Apparently, it was largely a private initiative of Lembit Pärn,
Caucasian-born commander of Estonian Rifle Corps (it was still named so
even after Velikie Luki, where the Corps lost 50% of its strength and
as the consequence, Estonians became a minority). A mobile detatchment
was formed from tanks and motorized infantry. It made a breakthrough
from Central Estonia on Sept 21th when Germans were evacuating Estonia,
and covered 150 km during one night to take Tallinn - to the surprise
of other Soviet forces, entering from the east during next day. It was
speculated that one of the causes for such swift operation was an
attempt to save the capital from atrocities - not an unfounded fear,
considering what happened later in Poland and, of course, on Prussia
and Germany proper - and, given that in the first few days, Corps'
patrols were busy arresting later-arriving Soviets for drunkenness and
maraudering.
> Cheers,
> Jalonen
jussi....@faf.mil.fi
> I wouldn't dare challenge you on your academic qualifications.
Hey, you can challenge them any day you like. It's not as if I'm any
kind of a long-time professional, merely a somewhat overaged doctoral
student whose rather short list of post-graduate publications includes
only two articles and a few web biographies written for the Air Force.
But well, after a long break from the practice, I'd still like to
consider that a decent beginning.
> It is all the more surprising that you, as a historian, did not find anything strange in
> asking me a source while at the same time failing to provide one yourself.
As you noted, when discussing of regional subjects such as this, I
often have to rely on material that isn't written in languages that
might be known to people from West Europe. Therefore, I don't _always_
bother to include the reference, since in the end, the reader would,
due to the linguistic barrier, still just have to take my word for it.
Moreover, in this particular case, the reference was oral, based on a
guest lecture. Admitted, I tend to be a bit lazy sometimes. Rest
assured, I'll always cough up my sources when asked.
As a side note, I must confess that participation in this forum may
have also turned me a bit cynical. Having noted the tendency of one
particular British poster to dismiss most historical studies written in
countries outside the United Kingdom as presumably biased and
unreliable"national histories", while at the same time quoting from
rather unspecified sources such as "the official British history", and
occasionally failing to come up with a cite when asked... well, I get a
bit tired sometimes, and I don't see the reason to bother all the time
myself, either. My apologies.
> I mean that I'm asking you if your figures come directly from primary material or were
> filtered from studies, and if so where and when the studies come from.
Rather recent academic studies, based on primary material straight up
from the relevant archives. No particular need to doubt them, although
it's obvious that there will still be a lot of work for the future
scholars.
The report of the Estonian International Commission for Investigation
of Crimes against Humanity also touches on this subject, but their
website seems to be temporarily down.
> There isn't only the Western public opinion, there is also an internal public opinion,
> in all countries.
Well, minimizing the limited collaboration of a certain segment of the
native Estonian population with the Soviet regime wouldn't particularly
fit with this context, either. Even if there was a political agenda, a
newly-independent post-communist nation would hardly want to whitewash
its Soviet "quislings".
Of course there are always people willing to collaborate with _any_
occupation power. For example, as I think I already mentioned in my
post, those Estonians who served in the Soviet-organized destruction
battalions in the summer of 1941 were volunteers. But the fact still is
that in all Baltic states, there was, both quantitatively and
qualitatively, a good deal more collaboration with the German occupiers
in 1941-1944, rather than with the Soviet occupiers in 1940-1941 or
even after 1944-1945. And honestly, I don't see that there's anything
"political" in admitting this.
> Well, 30,000 men conscripted and evacuated from the country at the drop of a
> hat, while the country itself was under attack, and not counting other troops already
> in the field... that sounds not bad.
Relatively speaking, I'm not terribly impressed. By 1944, Estonia
itself was placed in a more or less similar - or worse - situation, and
managed to raise over three times the same number for a battle against
the Soviets. Based on pre-existing cadres and on the advantage of
working at home rather than in an occupied country, true, but even
taking those advantages in account, still better.
> ...that would be some 20,000 men, according to your calculations, right?
By May 1942, the ethnic element in the Estonian units of the Red Army
included 22'125 men, as I already mentioned. Some of them were
survivors of those men who had been conscripted, evacuated and assigned
to the labour battalions in 1941, yes.
> You say that the 8th Corps was "largely" composed of Estonians not coming from the
> labor battalions, but according to your own calculations, some 20,000 men went into
> that Corps, coming from the labor battalions.
All of the men who had served in the labour battalions were not
re-assigned to these new units. Some of them still remained in
captivity and in labour service. As I recall it, most of the people who
ended up serving in this now corps were still "Yestonians", i.e.
Estonians who had already lived in the Soviet Union, either as exiles
or as locals in the Soviet-controlled, ethnically Estonian territories
southeast of the Lake Peipus.
As for exact references for the numbers and the internal cleavages
within the ethnic element of these two divisions, I don't really have
the time nor the energy to do the calculations, especially since it's
ten to eight on the Friday morning. I've mentioned the proportional
majority of Soviet-born Estonians as a recollection from what I've read
and what I remember from my discussions. I'll yield that part of the
argument for now, and spare the rest of it for some other time. Others
are free to fill in the blanks that I've left.
At any event, for now, I'll still maintain my original position, as I
stated it: in terms of actual battlefield value, whatever manpower and
trained personnel that the USSR managed to extract from the annexed
Estonia and other Baltic states in 1940-1941 and afterwards hardly
warrants a mention in the context of the development of the USSR into a
military power.
> Then we'll disagree on this.
I'm always glad to settle for a disagreement.
Cheers,
Jalonen
Michele Armellini
> Michele Armellini wrote:
>
> > I wouldn't dare challenge you on your academic qualifications.
>
> Hey, you can challenge them any day you like.
Thanks, but there's no reason to.
>
> > It is all the more surprising that you, as a historian, did not find
anything strange in
> > asking me a source while at the same time failing to provide one
yourself.
>
> As you noted, when discussing of regional subjects such as this, I
> often have to rely on material that isn't written in languages that
> might be known to people from West Europe.
Indeed. I understand.
>
> At any event, for now, I'll still maintain my original position, as I
> stated it: in terms of actual battlefield value, whatever manpower and
> trained personnel that the USSR managed to extract from the annexed
> Estonia and other Baltic states in 1940-1941 and afterwards hardly
> warrants a mention in the context of the development of the USSR into a
> military power.
>
> > Then we'll disagree on this.
>
> I'm always glad to settle for a disagreement.
Fine. But regardless of any assessment, the USSR got a few divisions,
although of questionable value, out of those occupations. In 1941 the USSR
had some ten (unfortunately I can't find the exact number right now)
nationally-defined divisions (Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Moldavian).
Even taking into account that roughly half of the men in the
nationally-defined Soviet divisions actually were Russians or anyway
individuals who had been living within the 1938 Soviet borders, the other
half wouldn't be there without the occupations, that is some 4-5 divisions.
Add to that the labor units and the independent militia/destroyer units.
I acknowledge your opinion on the fact, but the fact is this.
Jim Lillie
>
> Of course there are always people willing to collaborate with _any_
> occupation power. For example, as I think I already mentioned in my
> post, those Estonians who served in the Soviet-organized destruction
> battalions in the summer of 1941 were volunteers.
> Jalonen
>
Please explain what a 'de'struction battalion is.
How would this differ from a construction/labor/labour battalion?
Jim Lillie
jussi....@faf.mil.fi
> Please explain what a 'de'struction battalion is.
Destruction battalions were Soviet-organized units in the Baltic SSRs
at the outbreak of the Barbarossa in the summer of 1941. As the name
indicates, their task was destruction, i.e. to carry out the Kremlin's
orders of scorched-earth tactics and wreck the local infrastructure in
anticipation of the advancing Germans.
Organized terror against the local population was also part of it.
Cheers,
Jalonen
walt...@mindspring.com
contributions. I must say that quite a few contributors seem to be
looking at the situation through the wrong end of the telescope, ie,
you're concentrating on on facet to the exclusion of the other factors.
1) Hitler's annexation of Czecho-slovakia was aan alrm beel to Britain.
2) I have read that upon Germany's invasion of Poland, Britain issued
an ulitmatum to germany; when Hitler was informed his reply was 'Was
Nun?' (What now?) because he had not expected such a reaction. 3) The
Soviet support for Allied actions such as the convoys to Murmansk, the
attempted 'shuttle bombing missions' out of Fifteenth Air Force, the
refusal to transfer any intelligence on the German forces, and similar
instances of sheer bloody mindedness alerted the Allies to the fact
their 'friend' was strictly looking out for himself. Katyn was a
warning that the Soviets had an eye on Poland, psot-war. The refusal to
support the Warsaw uprising and the refusal to support Allied air drops
was only an underline of the problem. Of course the suspected Soviet
post-war aims were the spark to Churchill's desire to invade the 'soft
underbelly' (Hah!) of Europe through Llubjana. Nor did Truman have any
illusions left concerning 'Good Old Joe' by 1945. Sorry, Jalonen - I
can't read Finnish; wish I could.
Walt BJ