Suvorov's Myth
Glenn A. Steinberg
Today article, entitled "Barbarossa, June 1941: Who
Attacked Whom?" In the article, he puts the myths
perpetrated by Suvorov to rest.
I've read excerpts from the article that were posted in
another World War II forum. According to the article,
"Recent releases from the archives and declassification of
key documents have made it possible to trace exactly what
'strategic design' did materialise in Russia, as opposed to
an idea based on conjecture or invention. Between 1928 and
1941, seven major operational war plans were drafted,
complete with fifteen reviews and revisions."
None of these war plans was offensive in nature. They
envisioned counterblows against a German invasion -- not a
preemptive invasion of Germany. Even Zhukov's plan of March
11, 1941, was *defensive.*
Suvorov made much of Stalin's May 5 speech to military
academy graduates as evidence of Stalin's offensive
intentions, but Suvorov misrepresented that speech (now
available in its entirety): "On May 5th, 1941, Stalin made
his famous speech to military academy graduates. The text,
now available for all to see, does not support previous
contentions that this was a summons to aggressive war
against Germany. Stalin intended to counter impressions of
Red Army weakness, counter German over-confidence in the
Wehrmacht and bolster army morale should war materialise.
The subsequent shift in propaganda did not reflect advocacy
of 'revolutionary war', rather the discharge of the Red
Army's 'international tasks' in the context of defence of
the Soviet Union. It also replaced a suspect 'pacifist'
orientation with 'offensive spirit', revitalised patriotism
and promoted 'vigilance.'"
As the German offensive neared, the Soviets became more and
more aware of the Germans' plans and changed their own plans
accordingly: "On May 5th Soviet military intelligence
reported on the German order of battle: 103-107 German
divisions (with more to come) concentrated in the east,
facing the Soviet Union. This did grave damage to Stalin's
strategy of presently deterring, and hopefully deferring,
war.... The problem now was how to disrupt an inevitable and
well-nigh imminent German attack. To deny the Germans the
initiative, it was vital to 'pre-empt' (upredit) German
deployment and attack to deny the enemy the possibility of
forming a coherent front, of co-ordinating separate arms.
This was the basis of a highly controversial document dated
May 15th, 'Considerations on plans for the strategic
deployment of Soviet armed forces in the event of war with
Germany and its allies'. It was marked 'Absolutely secret',
one copy only, signed by Timoshenko and Zhukov. The aim of
the plan was a pre-emptive offensive operation by 152 Soviet
divisions to destroy 100 German divisions. The first
strategic objective was the destruction of German forces
south of Brest, the second objective an attack in the centre
and north-west to capture Poland and East Prussia....
Mindful of the precedent of 1914, when mobilisation
triggered war, Stalin ruled out mobilisation and refused to
authorise increased readiness. The plan of May 15th was
possibly designed to impress him with the urgency of the
situation, a plea for increased readiness. But it was
essentially what the Red Army went haltingly to war with in
June, based on a maldeployment dating back to October 1940
and the strategic design founded in the January 1941 war
games. Three initial directives dated June 22nd-23rd
prescribed 'counterblow' objectives culled from the war
games. Stalin had neither the intention nor the capability
to embark on 'preventive war'. His 'war avoidance strategy'
ruled out a pre-emptive strike, and even militated against
timely defensive moves lest they be construed as
'provocations'.... The 'Suvorov' fantasies, fictions and
inventions do not bear comparison with a horrendous reality
[of unreadiness for either defensive or offensive war]."
Erickson cites a new book by Godoretsky, entitled The
Icebreaker Myth (published in Moscow in 1995), based on "a
'thorough scrutiny' of Soviet archives, the Foreign
Ministry, the General Staff and intelligence materials."
According to Erickson, "The fresh evidence is impressive,
the conclusions arresting. No longer was Stalin the devious
plotter or the 'outwitted bungler'. This is a rational
Stalin, a geopolitical operator, interested in negotiating
for European peace, but his presumption of being a possible
arbiter seduced him from awareness of the German threat. A
misreading of the political scene, coupled with his near
paranoid suspicion of the British, led him to discount his
own intelligence reports; but, worse, military errors
impelled him to adopt a policy of outright appeasement
towards Germany, which led inevitably towards disaster."
Maybe now we can put Suvorov and his unsubstantiated myths
behind us.
--
Jerzy Pankiewicz
: None of these war plans was offensive in nature. They
: envisioned counterblows against a German invasion -- not a
: preemptive invasion of Germany. Even Zhukov's plan of March
Stalin was able to decide any day and any time of the day
that Germany had attacked. It's the problem of the language -
Freedom, Democracy, Defensive, Final Solution, Peace -
that words had specific meaning in Nazi Germany and Soviet Union.
The Soviet Union was a revolutionary state. It had millions
of supporters in Western Europe. The SU didn't construct
Maginot-type lines but rather tanks and planes. You cannot
invide Germany using Maginot line but you can if you have
thousands tanks.
Jerzy Pankiewicz
George Hardy
> Maybe now we can put Suvorov and his unsubstantiated myths
> behind us.
So, your position is that we can "put behind us" German historians
Max Klülver and Joachim Hoffmann, Austrian historian Ernst Topitsch,
American historian R.H.S. Stolfi also?
No, the Ambrose and Eisenhoer "heroic" version of WWII is not the
truth, but a comforting story for old veterans who want to feel
good about what they did.
GFH
--
Stuart Wilkes
news:<3c892cae...@news.pacific.net.au>...
> Glenn A. Steinberg <gste...@tcnj.edu> wrote:
> : None of these war plans was offensive in nature. They
> : envisioned counterblows against a German invasion -- not a
> : preemptive invasion of Germany. Even Zhukov's plan of March
After Mr. Steinburg's well-considered and very complete post
detailing Soviet policy on the eve of Operation Barbarossa, concluding
with an apparently optimistic
"Maybe now we can put Suvorov and his unsubstantiated myths behind
us."
Mr. Pankiewicz adds:
> Stalin was able to decide any day and any time of the day
> that Germany had attacked. It's the problem of the language -
> Freedom, Democracy, Defensive, Final Solution, Peace -
> that words had specific meaning in Nazi Germany and Soviet Union.
>
> The Soviet Union was a revolutionary state. It had millions
> of supporters in Western Europe. The SU didn't construct
> Maginot-type lines but rather tanks and planes. You cannot
> invide Germany using Maginot line but you can if you have
> thousands tanks.
Exactly how Mr. Pankiewicz's points disputes <anything> in Mr.
Steinburg's post is not exactly clear, but apparently Mr. Pankiewicz
is unaware that the Soviet Union had <two> sets of Fortified Areas in
existence in June of 1941:
The Stalin Line along the 1938 Soviet border, partially disarmed but
definitely not destroyed as per the claims of "Suvorov".
And
The Molotov Line under construction along the 1941 Soviet border,
several Fortified Regions of which, such as Brest, Peremyshl, and Rava
Russa, were sufficiently complete to offer effective resistance to
German attacks in their sectors.
So, contrary to the understanding of Mr. Pankiewicz, the Soviet Union
did construct fortifications, as well as those nefarious tanks and
planes that Mr. Pankiewicz apparently considers irrefutable evidence
of a Soviet intention to attack Nazi Germany, since he offers no other
evidence of it.
Stuart Wilkes
Stuart Wilkes
news:<a56k62$2kqi$1...@nntp6.u.washington.edu>...
> "Glenn A. Steinberg" <gste...@tcnj.edu> wrote in message news:<a4uog4$18lk$1...@nntp6.u.washington.edu>...
<snip>
> So, your position is that we can "put behind us" German historians
> Max Klulver and Joachim Hoffmann, Austrian historian Ernst Topitsch,
> American historian R.H.S. Stolfi also?
Most emphatically, at least the work of Mr Stolfi and Mr. Topitsch,
whose books I have read. And you can include Mr. Raack.
None of their unwarranted suppositions and groundless conjectures
finds support in the Soviet archival materials that Mr. Erickson, Mr.
Gorodetsky, and Mr. Glantz work with.
Stuart Wilkes
Treris
however had no intentions as far as I know to really attack Germany
anywhere before 1944. If Hitler hadn't attacked by then Stalin might
and I say might have attacked Germany, but NOT in 1941.
By 1941 the Red Army was still reorganising and putting into full
effect the lessons learned in the war against Finland. Also they were
about to introduce in grand scale the two new tanks, the KV-1 and the
T-34. 1941 was not a good time for the Red Army to attack anything.
The defense of the Soviet Union however had one advantage, the Soviet
Union was a vast country with plenty of opportunity to lure an enemy
into traps and exhaust him and his logistical system, ask Napoleon.
The Red Army always had in mind to use this big advantage.
To be able to use the vast countrysides of the SU effectively however
it is very important to have a mobile army that can manoeuver its way
around and away from any invaders.
It is no use making grand lines of defense such as the maginot line,
allthough they indeed did build two of them, because it is impossible
to defend a line of over a thousand kilometers. Eventually the enemy
will get through somewhere along the line and than you have nothing
left. Ask the French about the benefits of their maginot line during
May of 1940.
Therefore a army that si very mobile could look offensive but might
actually be defensive.
Treris
--
Yama
"George Hardy" <geo...@mail.rlc.net> wrote in message
news:a56k62$2kqi$1...@nntp6.u.washington.edu...
> "Glenn A. Steinberg" <gste...@tcnj.edu> wrote in message
news:<a4uog4$18lk$1...@nntp6.u.washington.edu>...
> > Maybe now we can put Suvorov and his unsubstantiated myths
> > behind us.
>
> So, your position is that we can "put behind us" German historians
> Max Klülver and Joachim Hoffmann, Austrian historian Ernst Topitsch,
> American historian R.H.S. Stolfi also?
Glantz, Ericsson, Overy et cetera have all totally refuted the idea that
USSR was about to attack at 1941. I think I will rather believe them.
Especially as anyone can see that Red Army was not in shape to fight an
offensive war against Finland, let alone Germany.
Just small example - at June 1941 almost 20% of Soviet tanks were totally
inoperable. Further two-thirds had various mechanical shortcomings. Only a
fraction were 100% serviceable.
--
Glenn A. Steinberg
> So, your position is that we can "put behind us" German historians
> Max Klülver and Joachim Hoffmann, Austrian historian Ernst Topitsch,
> American historian R.H.S. Stolfi also?
>
Did those historians have available to them the sources that
Erickson and Godoretsky now have?
I'm familiar with Stolfi's work. I'll be frank: I would
trust Erickson's credentials and expertise long before I'd
trust Stolfi's. Stolfi has some interesting theories from
time to time, but they're rarely more than theories.
--
Jussi Jalonen
> By 1941 the Red Army was still reorganising and putting into full
> effect the lessons learned in the war against Finland.
Another myth. Most, if not all, operational and organizational
improvements and changes made in the Red Army were decided and done
_before_ November 1939. The war against Finland didn't result in any
kind of doctrinal or other reassesment in the Soviet armed forces.
As far as I can remember, the only major effect of the Winter War was
the Soviet decision to manufacture submachineguns on a far larger
scale than previously planned.
Cheers,
Jalonen
--
DLS
[ Especially as anyone can see that Red Army was not in shape to fight
an
offensive war against Finland, let alone Germany. Just small example
- at
June 1941 almost 20% of Soviet tanks were totally inoperable. Further
were
100% serviceable.]
In rebuttal -
- That small fraction was still considerably more than what Germany
launched
against them in June 1941.
- The most common tank model in Red Army service in 1941, the BT-7,
was,
like its predecessors, equipped to operate not only on tracks but on
wheels.
This feature would be useless if the tank were intended to operate in
the
USSR, which at the time had very few paved roads. In Poland and
Germany,
which had many more roads, this was much more useful.
- A far greater portion of the Red Army's equipment was deployed in
forward
areas than was warranted if the plans were to remain on the defensive
in
anticipation of a German attack.
- There was no effort made to dig antitank ditches, prepare fields of
fire,
or even lay mines.
- Red Army forces had detailed maps of Poland and Germany with them
when
captured, but none of the western Soviet Union itself (interesting to
note
that until Gorbachev and his "Perestroika" in the 1980's, detailed
maps were
not generally distributed to the Soviet public).
- A Soviet marshall made an interesting comment in 1974, that Hitler
had
"forestalled" Stalin's plans BY TWO WEEKS (July 6, 1941, the date
given by
Suvorov as M-Day, the Soviet attack, is exactly two weeks after
Barbarossa
started) . This fifteen years before Suvorov's work, and four years
before
his defection to the West.
- The Germans themselves were not well prepared for a sustained
offensive.
Their tank and aircraft production lagged badly. Guderian wanted to
expand
the Panzers to 36 divisions of almost 8,000 tanks (almost all of them
Panzer
III and IV models). Instead, Barbarossa was launched with 3,200
tanks, half
of them being inferior Panzer I, II, and Czech 38(t) models. Well,
the
38(t) wasn't all that bad, especially when they took the turrets off
and put
captured Soviet 76.2 mm guns on them! Almost half of the German
infantry
regiments were reservists that had only recently been activated,
without a
period of training that typical Army practice would've considered
vital.
This is indicative that the Germans were hurriedly throwing this
offensive
together. If it hadn't been for the capture of enormous stocks of
Soviet
equipment and ordnance, the Wehrmacht would've stalled much sooner
than it
did.
Of course, this is all hindsight. German intelligence on Soviet
strength
and dispositions was, to say the least, sadly lacking. Hitler was
ALMOST
RIGHT in declaring that "We only have to knock on the door, and the
whole
rotten edifice will come crashing down!". He fatally underestimated
Soviet
resiliency and their resources. In spite of all the men in the Red
Army,
and all their equipment, they still were ineptly led for the most
part, and
poorly supported, even after reforms were supposedly made after their
experience in Finland. The Red Army was negligent in how blind it was
to
its deficiencies, and Stalin was blind to the ineffectiveness of an
Army
founded on political reliability.
It is my opinion that what led to Barbarossa was more a series of
blunders
and miscalculations on both sides. Sure, both Hitler and Stalin
probably
understood from the beginning that the non-aggression pact of 1939
wouldn't
last. Stalin was likely gambling that Germany would get bogged down
in the
west versus the UK and France. When France fell in only 43 days, it
likely
"spooked" him into moving quickly into the Baltic countries and then
grabbing a piece of Romania. The latter, since it brought the Red
Army to
with a few hours drive for an enterprising Soviet Tank Army commander
of
Polesti, likely in turn "spooked" Hitler into believing that he could
not
afford to dither in terms of dealing with Britain, especially when
peace
entreaties failed and so did the Luftwaffe to get the Brits out of the
war.
This heightening of tension was not eased by a disastrous visit by
Molotov
to Berlin in late 1940. Molotov all but bullied Hitler in their
sessions,
and Hitler was then absolutely convinced that there would soon be war
with
the Soviets one way or the other.
While I'm not entirely convinced by Suvorov that Stalin would've
definitely
attacked in July 1941, I am quite convinced that his posturing and
preparation were for the offensive. It's just a question of when. My
belief is late 1941 or early 1942, when the T-34 tanks and Mig-3
fighters
would've been ready, and Soviet manpower wasn't needed for the
harvests. I
do differ with Suvorov that such an attack would've succeeded. Had
common
sense prevailed (in short supply with Hitler and the Nazi heirarchy),
the
Wehrmacht would've dealt with it, probably in a second battle of
Tannenberg
or another Brussilov offensive. In fact, I venture that had Hitler
deployed
his armies in the defensive mode against the Soviets, there would've
been
enough for Rommel to push the British across the Suez and even out of
Palestine. Such a move had a good chance of bringing down the
Churchill
government, and moving the Brits to sue for peace. Then he would've
followed his own advice from Mein Kampf.
DLS
Jerzy Pankiewicz
: The Red Army always had in mind to use this big advantage.
Maybe deep in minds. Preparing the defence was dangerous
under Stalin.
The ideology of the SU was the world revolution.
There were several options - Iran, Far East, Europe.
Finland 'attacked' the SU, the same Poland or Mandzhukuo
or Iran would attack the SU. Eventually a workers' government
would ask for help.
The low quality of Soviet products was obvious.
Would the quality grow till e.g. 1944 or not -
I'm not sure. The Czech technology would have
helped the Soviets. They would have probably
deported thousands of workers and several
plants to Russia. I'm not sure how many
Czech workers would have survived the deportation.
The same the Nazis deported or killed Jewish scientists.
Jerzy Pankiewicz
W. Lydecker
Rumania; the Baltic Republics, and a BIG peace of Poland, etc.
David Thornley
DLS <sels...@attbi.com> wrote:
>
>- The most common tank model in Red Army service in 1941, the BT-7,
>was,
>like its predecessors, equipped to operate not only on tracks but on
>wheels.
>This feature would be useless if the tank were intended to operate in
>the
>USSR,
They weren't intended to operate in the USSR, they were intended to
operate in the USA. The BT tanks were evolved from Christie designs, and
the idea of taking off the tracks came from Christie. However, the
T-26 tanks, also very common in Soviet service, had no such facility.
>- A far greater portion of the Red Army's equipment was deployed in
>forward
>areas than was warranted if the plans were to remain on the defensive
>in
>anticipation of a German attack.
The plan was to counterattack any German attack with powerful
armored forces and throw it back out of Soviet territory. In
order to do this, it was necessary to have armored forces
considered powerful fairly close to the front. Stalin intended
to be strategically defensive, not tactically.
>- There was no effort made to dig antitank ditches, prepare fields of
>fire,
>or even lay mines.
Really? I've read of the construction of border defenses.
>- Red Army forces had detailed maps of Poland and Germany with them
>when
>captured, but none of the western Soviet Union itself
What would be your source from this?
>- A Soviet marshall made an interesting comment in 1974, that Hitler
>had
>"forestalled" Stalin's plans BY TWO WEEKS (July 6, 1941, the date
>given by
>Suvorov as M-Day, the Soviet attack, is exactly two weeks after
Which Soviet marshall would this be? Can we have a cite to show
that one did say something like that? Such comments are subject
to misinterpretation and often mistranslation.
>- The Germans themselves were not well prepared for a sustained
>offensive.
They were as prepared as they could get in that time, given that the
situation had changed rapidly and in unforeseeable ways.
>and dispositions was, to say the least, sadly lacking. Hitler was
>ALMOST
>RIGHT in declaring that "We only have to knock on the door, and the
>whole
>rotten edifice will come crashing down!".
I see no indications that the whole rotten edifice was close to
crashing down, except due to German victories over quickly
renewed Soviet armies. Given that the Soviet Union kept raising
armies, and managed to keep as much war production going as it
did, it would seem that Hitler was definitely wrong.
The Red Army was negligent in how blind it was
>to
>its deficiencies, and Stalin was blind to the ineffectiveness of an
>Army
>founded on political reliability.
Really? The army was in the middle of the Timoshenko reforms,
showing that it did have some idea of its problems. Why do you
think Stalin was blind to the problems of the army? He
overestimated the Red Army's abilities, but that's not surprising.
That doesn't mean he felt ready for war.
>While I'm not entirely convinced by Suvorov that Stalin would've
>definitely
>attacked in July 1941, I am quite convinced that his posturing and
>preparation were for the offensive. It's just a question of when. My
>belief is late 1941 or early 1942,
I would think 1942, myself. The Soviets had scheduled formation-
level training for their tank divisions for late summer and early
fall of 1941, and I don't think they would deliberately have
started a war in the winter.
>harvests. I
>do differ with Suvorov that such an attack would've succeeded.
It probably would have caused most of the fighting to be on the
new Soviet-German border, saving the prewar Soviet Union from a
good deal of devastation.
>Wehrmacht would've dealt with it, probably in a second battle of
>Tannenberg
>or another Brussilov offensive.
Um, the Brusilov offensive was pretty much the most effective
offensive action the Allies took until 1918. Another Brusilov
offensive would seem to me very bad for Germany.
In fact, I venture that had Hitler
>deployed
>his armies in the defensive mode against the Soviets, there would've
>been
>enough for Rommel to push the British across the Suez and even out of
>Palestine.
That would run into serious logistical difficulties. It was
pretty much impossible to supply more formations in North Africa.
Since the supply had to go on Italian ships, it was pretty much
politically impossible to remove most of the Italian infantry
and substitute German troops.
--
David H. Thornley | If you want my opinion, ask.
da...@thornley.net | If you don't, flee.
http://www.thornley.net/~thornley/david/ | O-
--
Stuart Wilkes
<snip>
> Preparing the defence was dangerous under Stalin.
No, defenses were authorized by resolutions of the Central Committee,
and Stalin put former (and future) Chief of the General Staff General
Shaposhnikov in charge of the Main Engineering Directorate to
supervise their construction. In case you didn't notice, Shaposhnikov
survived his "dangerous" assignment supervising constructing defenses
very nicely, and resumed being Chief of the General Staff when Zhukov
took up the burden of STAVKA troubleshooter.
> The ideology of the SU was the world revolution. There were several options -
> Iran, Far East, Europe. Finland 'attacked' the SU, the same Poland or
> Mandzhukuo or Iran would attack the SU.
> Eventually a workers' government would ask for help.
> The low quality of Soviet products was obvious.
Like T-34s and KVs, MiGs and Yaks, Il-2s, Tu-2s, and Pe-2s?
It's interesting that the range and payload characteristics of the
Pe-8 compare very favorably to those of other 4-engined bombers in
service in 1939.
> Would the quality grow till e.g. 1944 or not - I'm not sure.
Sure it would.
> The Czech technology would have helped the Soviets.
Hence the pre-Munich orders placed with the Skoda Works.
> They would have probably deported thousands of workers and several plants to
> Russia. I'm not sure how many Czech workers would have survived the
> deportation.
And <how> does this get to happening?
I'm afraid accepting the basing of Soviet aircraft on Czechoslovak
airfields during a hypothetical German-Czechoslovak war in 1938 just
won't have the consequences you seem to enjoy claiming that it would.
> The same the Nazis deported or killed Jewish scientists.
I know you enjoy saying so. Dosen't make it true.
Stuart Wilkes
--
David Thornley
>was,
>like its predecessors, equipped to operate not only on tracks but on
>wheels.
>This feature would be useless if the tank were intended to operate in
>the
>USSR,
They weren't intended to operate in the USSR, they were intended to
operate in the USA. The BT tanks were evolved from Christie designs, and
the idea of taking off the tracks came from Christie. However, the
T-26 tanks, also very common in Soviet service, had no such facility.
>- A far greater portion of the Red Army's equipment was deployed in
>forward
>areas than was warranted if the plans were to remain on the defensive
>in
>anticipation of a German attack.
The plan was to counterattack any German attack with powerful
armored forces and throw it back out of Soviet territory. In
order to do this, it was necessary to have armored forces
considered powerful fairly close to the front. Stalin intended
to be strategically defensive, not tactically.
>- There was no effort made to dig antitank ditches, prepare fields of
>fire,
>or even lay mines.
Really? I've read of the construction of border defenses.
>- Red Army forces had detailed maps of Poland and Germany with them
>when
>captured, but none of the western Soviet Union itself
What would be your source from this?
>- A Soviet marshall made an interesting comment in 1974, that Hitler
>had
>"forestalled" Stalin's plans BY TWO WEEKS (July 6, 1941, the date
>given by
>Suvorov as M-Day, the Soviet attack, is exactly two weeks after
Which Soviet marshall would this be? Can we have a cite to show
that one did say something like that? Such comments are subject
to misinterpretation and often mistranslation.
>- The Germans themselves were not well prepared for a sustained
>offensive.
They were as prepared as they could get in that time, given that the
situation had changed rapidly and in unforeseeable ways.
>and dispositions was, to say the least, sadly lacking. Hitler was
>ALMOST
>RIGHT in declaring that "We only have to knock on the door, and the
>whole
>rotten edifice will come crashing down!".
I see no indications that the whole rotten edifice was close to
crashing down, except due to German victories over quickly
renewed Soviet armies. Given that the Soviet Union kept raising
armies, and managed to keep as much war production going as it
did, it would seem that Hitler was definitely wrong.
The Red Army was negligent in how blind it was
>to
>its deficiencies, and Stalin was blind to the ineffectiveness of an
>Army
>founded on political reliability.
Really? The army was in the middle of the Timoshenko reforms,
showing that it did have some idea of its problems. Why do you
think Stalin was blind to the problems of the army? He
overestimated the Red Army's abilities, but that's not surprising.
That doesn't mean he felt ready for war.
>While I'm not entirely convinced by Suvorov that Stalin would've
>definitely
>attacked in July 1941, I am quite convinced that his posturing and
>preparation were for the offensive. It's just a question of when. My
>belief is late 1941 or early 1942,
I would think 1942, myself. The Soviets had scheduled formation-
level training for their tank divisions for late summer and early
fall of 1941, and I don't think they would deliberately have
started a war in the winter.
>harvests. I
>do differ with Suvorov that such an attack would've succeeded.
It probably would have caused most of the fighting to be on the
new Soviet-German border, saving the prewar Soviet Union from a
good deal of devastation.
>Wehrmacht would've dealt with it, probably in a second battle of
>Tannenberg
>or another Brussilov offensive.
Um, the Brusilov offensive was pretty much the most effective
offensive action the Allies took until 1918. Another Brusilov
offensive would seem to me very bad for Germany.
In fact, I venture that had Hitler
>deployed
>his armies in the defensive mode against the Soviets, there would've
>been
>enough for Rommel to push the British across the Suez and even out of
>Palestine.
That would run into serious logistical difficulties. It was
David Thornley
Jussi Jalonen <jussi_...@aktivist.fi> wrote:
>tre...@hotmail.com (Treris) wrote in message news:<a5eijh$7e2$1...@nntp6.u.washington.edu>...
>
>> By 1941 the Red Army was still reorganising and putting into full
>> effect the lessons learned in the war against Finland.
>
>Another myth. Most, if not all, operational and organizational
>improvements and changes made in the Red Army were decided and done
>_before_ November 1939. The war against Finland didn't result in any
>kind of doctrinal or other reassesment in the Soviet armed forces.
>
replaced by Timoshenko. Voroshilov's "socialist self-criticism"
was rather biting. Timoshenko then pushed through a good many
reforms, although they may not have been organizational or
doctrinal.
The major doctrinal and organizational change was caused by the
fall of France. Before the war, the "deep battle" doctrine
developed in the 1930s had been deemed politically incorrect,
and so the armor had been parcelled out as infantry support.
After the German blitzkrieg proved itself, the Soviets
frantically reorganized and tried to change their doctrine.
By June 22, 1941, they had 29 mechanized corps, each with two
tank and one mechanized division. They didn't have adequate
equipment, NCOs, or trained men for these forces, and many of
them were handily defeated early in the campaign.
Stuart Wilkes
news:<3c8af8b...@news.pacific.net.au>...
<snip>
> In rebuttal - That small fraction was still considerably more than what
> Germany launched against them in June 1941.
Is there some law that says that it is an indication of aggressive
intentions for those marked for racial extermination by Hitler to have
lots of tanks?
> - The most common tank model in Red Army service in 1941, the BT-7,
> was, like its predecessors, equipped to operate not only on tracks but on
> wheels. This feature would be useless if the tank were intended to operate in
> the USSR, which at the time had very few paved roads.
But the track-wheel combination saves track wear and increases speed
during long-distance moves between sectors of the front. Useful for
defensive, counteroffensive, and offensive operations.
> In Poland and Germany, which had many more roads, this was much more useful.
You don't show that it was useless for defensive fighting, or for
off-road movement during the summer.
For instance, this feature was very useful when Zhukov had to get
BT-7s to the battlefield to fight the Japanese at Halkhin-Gol. And
guess what. Once Zhukov had trounced the Japanese, he did not attack
into Manchukuo. The usefullness of BT-7s for defensive and
counteroffensive operations is thus illustrated.
> - A far greater portion of the Red Army's equipment was deployed in
> forward areas than was warranted if the plans were to remain on the defensive
> in anticipation of a German attack.
Why?
The Anglo-French Armies deployed the vast majority of their best
troops and equipment very far forward in 1940, and no one with any
credibility claims that the British and French were intending to
attack Germany in 1940 but Hitler beat them to the punch.
In fact, the Soviet Army in 1941 was deployed in considerable depth.
The Mechanized Corps of the Kiev Special Military District were spread
out <in depth> between Lvov and Kiev, and beyond. Several armies were
deploying behind the Dneipr. If that ain't depth, I don't know what
is.
But indeed, strong Soviet forces were deployed forward. The idea was
to promptly counterattack in the event of a German attack. You can
augue the wisdom of that counteroffensive strategy, but it in no way
shows that the Soviets were planning to attack Germany in 1941.
> - There was no effort made to dig antitank ditches, prepare fields of
> fire, or even lay mines.
Comprehensively false.
> - Red Army forces had detailed maps of Poland and Germany with them
> when captured, but none of the western Soviet Union itself
Source for this ludicrous claim?
> - A Soviet marshall made an interesting comment in 1974, that Hitler
> had "forestalled" Stalin's plans BY TWO WEEKS (July 6, 1941, the date
> given by Suvorov as M-Day, the Soviet attack, is exactly two weeks after
> Barbarossa started) . This fifteen years before Suvorov's work, and four
> years before his defection to the West.
And which Soviet Marshal is that?
And how do you know that he meant "forestalled the beginning of Soviet
offensive operations against Germany"?
Indeed the Soviet Union was preparing for the possibility of war in
1941. Stalin had reports of the signing by Hitler of the Directive
for Barbarossa within a week of Hitler signing it. With this knowlege
the Soviets were preparing for a possible German attack. Another two
weeks would have been nice to have, but the beginning of Barbarossa
forestalled further defensive preparations.
> - The Germans themselves were not well prepared for a sustained offensive.
Their incompetence in Intel and planning is too bad for them. They
had been explicitly planning that attack for about a year.
That's what you get when you assume the war will be short.
That's what you get when you assume that "One good kick and the whole
rotten structure will collapse."
That's what you get when you assume that the
JewBolshevikRiddenSubhumanSlavs are incapable of effectively waging
war.
That's what you get when you assume that the
JewBolshevikRiddenSubhumanSlavs will let you get to Moscow in 6 weeks
and to the line Archangel-Volodoga-Astrakhan in 16 weeks, with a bit
of messy business destroying all battle-worthy elements of the Soviet
Army before the Dneipr.
The laughable German assumptions that went into the planning of
Operation Barbarossa are the fault of Hitler and the Intel officers
and planners on the German General Staff.
They are not indications of otherwise peaceful German intentions
concerning the Soviet Union, or of warlike Soviet intentions
concerning Germany.
<snip>
> Of course, this is all hindsight. German intelligence on Soviet strength
> and dispositions was, to say the least, sadly lacking.
True.
And this is not an indication of otherwise peaceful German intentions
concerning the Soviet Union, or of warlike Soviet intentions
concerning Germany.
> Hitler was ALMOST RIGHT in declaring that "We only have to knock on the door,
> and the whole rotten edifice will come crashing down!".
No, he wasn't.
And this is evidence that he was gleefully looking forward to
attacking the Soviet Union, not acting under the pressure of the
prospect of a Soviet attack on Germany.
> He fatally underestimated Soviet resiliency and their resources.
Yes he did, and so did the German General Staff planners.
And this is not an indication of otherwise peaceful German intentions
concerning the Soviet Union, or of warlike Soviet intentions
concerning Germany.
> Sure, both Hitler and Stalin probably understood from the beginning that the
> non-aggression pact of 1939 wouldn't last.
By 19 August 1939, Stalin had agent reports from Berlin that the
Germans intended their return to the "Rapallo policy" to be temporary,
limited to about two years.
These agent reports were confirmed by decrypts of cables from the
German Foreign Ministry to Ambassador Schulenberg in Moscow.
> Stalin was likely gambling that Germany would get bogged down in the
> west versus the UK and France.
That was indeed had a part in his thinking.
> When France fell in only 43 days,
Oh yes. Stalin's reaction to the rapid collapse of France was shock
and alarm verging on panic. He understood very well that the Drang
noch Osten was on its way.
> it likely "spooked" him into moving quickly
> into the Baltic countries and then grabbing a piece of Romania.
Most of which were already agreed to in that little deal between von
Ribbentrop and herr Molotov.
> The latter, since it brought the Red Army to with a few hours drive for an
> enterprising Soviet Tank Army commander of Polesti, likely in turn "spooked"
> Hitler
The planning documents for Operation Barbarossa have been available
for some time. Can you show in them what role this consideration
played in initiating the planning of Operation Barbarossa?
<snip>
> In fact, I venture that had Hitler deployed his armies in the defensive mode
> against the Soviets, there would've been enough for Rommel to push the British
> across the Suez and even out of Palestine.
Guess what.
Rommel already had <everything> that the Germans and Italians could
possibly have kept supplied in North Africa.
The distance from El Aghelia to Cairo and Alexandria is quite large.
The Italian tanker fleet is quite small and vulnerable. Fuel, oil,
tires, and water are heavy and bulky, and the further you advance the
more of your fuel, oil, tires, and water your supply trucks use
themselves. Leaving precious little for PanzerArmee Africa as it
approaches the Suez Canal.
How does delaying Barbarossa build more Itailian oil tankers?
Even without Barbarossa, the Germans have little prospect of keeping
supplied any greater force in North Africa than they had there
historically. Which means that not doing Barbarossa gives them little
prospect of getting any further than El Alamain.
> Such a move had a good chance of bringing down the Churchill
> government, and moving the Brits to sue for peace.
Dream on.
> Then he would've followed his own advice from Mein Kampf.
You have finally hit upon the true motivation for Operation
Barbarossa. Not some mythical planned Soviet attack on Germany
Stuart Wilkes
George Hardy
news:<a4uog4$18lk$1...@nntp6.u.washington.edu>...
> Maybe now we can put Suvorov and his unsubstantiated myths
> behind us.
Russian voices are rare on this board. I suggest that you read
Amzin (am...@umail.ru), who posted to the thread:
Re: What if Barabarossa didn't happen?
The post could well go in this thread.
GFH
Frank Plamboeck
"George Hardy" <geo...@mail.rlc.net> schrieb im Newsbeitrag
news:a56k62$2kqi$1...@nntp6.u.washington.edu...
> So, your position is that we can "put behind us" German historians
> Max Klülver and Joachim Hoffmann, Austrian historian Ernst Topitsch,
> American historian R.H.S. Stolfi also?
I read Max Klüvers (Klüver, not "Klüvler") book "Präventivschlag 1941",
Leoni am Starnberger See 1989, a couple of weeks before: He has no real
arguments and he does not really work with historical sources. His book is
like a book of Däniken, but Klüver hates Andreas Hillgruber et.al., nearly
every third phrase of him proves this. His book is for sure one of the worst
books that do exist to subject. And I am sorry to correct you: Ernst
Topitsch IS NOT a historian.
Frank Plamboeck
--
Stuart Wilkes
<snip>
> Russian voices are rare on this board. I suggest that you read
> Amzin (am...@umail.ru), who posted to the thread:
> Re: What if Barabarossa didn't happen?
I did.
> The post could well go in this thread.
I found nothing in it that disputes Mr. Steinberg's post, or factually
supports any claim by Mr. Suvorov.
Or by Mr. Topitsch.
Or by Mr. Stolfi.
Or by Mr. Hardy.
Stuart Wilkes
tank Fixer
would have been the quickest way for the Germans to have reached
Moscow by fall
--