Friends & Foes Intel Ops 94-97 FBI says friends, foes spy on U.S. business. spies from 23 countries are conducting economic espionage aimed at U.S. technology and trade secrets. CIA in a 96 report said france, china, russia, iran and cuba collected such intel. private sources identify japan, canada, germany, india, mexico, south korea, singapore, taiwan, pakistan and egypt. spies target biotechnology, aerospace, telecommo, stealth-technology, energy research, defense and weapons technology, and technology to build the national info infrastructure. methods include planting agents inside or foreign students. friendship societies used, exchange groups and import-export companies. FBI set up new center to combat computer crime called computer investigations and infrastructure assessment center. washington times 4/22/97 a6 95 allied governments are engaged in economic espionage in a concerted intel assault of the U.S. per a white house report. countries target U.S. economic and technological info despite friendly relations. they take advantage of their considerable legitimate access and collect sensitive info and utilize it in competition against U.S. firms. CIA put number of countries doing this at nearly twenty. nations with aggressive foreign economic spies are france, israel, and japan. other friendly countries' spies are england, germany, india, pakistan, south korea, taiwan, singapore, mexico, egypt, and hong kong. traditional adversaries that try to steal economic secrets are russia, china and some former soviet bloc countries. "foreign nations are attacking our intellectual property at will," per FBI national security division chief robert bryant. major economic espionage problem is still russians. areas targeted are biotechnology, aerospace, telecommunications, used in info highway, computer software and hardware, advanced transportation and engine technology, advanced materials, energy research, defense and armaments, and manufacturing processes. bid, contract, customer and strategy are aggressively targeted as well as gvt and corporate finanCIAl and trade data. methods used are recruiting company insiders, electronic computer intrusions and office or hotel break-ins. computer break-ins and phone intercepts account for largest portion of lost economic info from corporations. some governments engage in "economic disinformation." foreign students used to steal technical info, as are foreign employees of U.S. firms, recent emigres and members of some ethnic groups. report produced by national counterintel center includes info on defensive measures and states it against U.S. policy for government to spy on foreign corporations or countries for U.S. firms. report recommends improving efforts to thwart economic spying by increasing resources to counterintel and law enforcement agencies and prosecuting economic spies. washington times 8/9/95 a3 95 FBI has informed two silicon valley companies that they have been the targets of foreign intel. FBI agents also noted three individuals who have either been hired by silicon valley firms or are attempting to be hired and have connections with foreign intel agencies. john smith, a senior criminal investigator with the santa clara county district attorney's office said that russia, china, and taiwan have been involved in industrial espionage. san jose mercury news 7/28/95, and ap 7/28/95 95 the national security council's new national counterintel center (ncic) has produced its first public report which concerns foreign industrial espionage in the united states. 1995 "annual report to congress on foreign economic collection and industrial espionage" is the first comprehensive gvt evaluation of the question and clearly divides american opponents into three groups. non-adversary but "aggressive" foreign economic espionage is carried out by the intel services of france, israel and japan. non-adversary and less aggressive programs are carried out by great britain, germany, canada, india, pakistan, south korea, taiwan, singapore, mexico, egypt and hong kong. adversaries involved in economic espionage are russia, china and many nations of the former soviet union. the 20-page unclassified version of the report states that computer hacking and telephone tapping "account for the largest portion" of collected economic intel. china has a predilection for using students studying abroad to gather economic intel. some nations even engage in economic warfare by generating "economic disinfo" to scare local companies away from doing business with american companies. the report's recommendations are the usual litany of calls for "reinforcing" efforts with more money, manpower and coordination. although the FBI, with its development of counterintel awareness (deca) program, is the "lead agency" in fighting economic espionage, the state department overseas security advisory council (osac) helps with an electronic bulletin board (bbs) and publications, and, of course, the ncic itself has begun providing reports to U.S. companies. indeed, the drift of the ncic report is that economic security should be part of national security and therefore under the nsc and the ncic which could furnish the coordination necessary and get the FBI and the osac to work for it. economic counter-espionage "turf wars" are in the offing. intelligence - a computerized intelligence newsletter published in france 9/11/95 33 70-96 book, war by other means: economic espionage in america by john j. fialka w.w. norton & company. brief excerpt. economic espionage in the u. s. breaks down into three major styles. agents from china, taiwan, and south korea are aggressively targeting "present and former nationals working for U.S. companies and research institutions." second category is headed by france, said to prefer "classic cold war recruitment and technical ops," which generally include bribery, discreet thefts, combing through other people's garbage, and aggressive wiretapping. russia and israel carry out similar spying "with varying degrees of government sponsorship." germany is described as planning to increase the number of its federal intel service (bnd) agents in d.c. to improve its collection capabilities. japan, which does not have a formal intel agency but sometimes collectively resembles one, falls in the third category. it uses japanese industry and private organizations to gather "economic intel, occasionally including classified proprietary docs and data." result is an exceptionally efficient spy network described as "not fully understood" by the u. s. book gives info from and about jan herring former CIA officer. a copy of chapter one filed 6/19/97. new york times book review 97 taiwan, chile, iran, philippines, 75-79 senate foreign relations committee draft report zeroed in on spying by 4 friendly intel services. study entitled "activities of certain intel agencies in the U.S.," portrayed a systematic pattern of spying, harassement, and in some cases murder in the U.S. disturbing role played by FBI and CIA through their training and intel sharing made them seem to be aiding and abetting commission of criminal acts by foreign gvts in U.S. committee counsel michael glennon met CIA officer gary chase, a senior officer dealing with liaison. one CIA man told of a story where the CIA and FBI helped savak identify a shah critic in the U.S. in late 79, jack anderson's column broke news of the study. substantial portions leaked to the press - what not reported was the section on liaison, comprising more than 1/4 of the report. to this day study repressed. kaplan, d. (1992). fires of the dragon: politics, murder, and the kuomintang 283,284